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Army - Conflicts in the world

Ukraine Reports High Interception Rate Against Russian Iskander And Kinzhal Missiles
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Ukraine says Russia launched a record mixed strike on November 25 with 22 missiles and 464 attack drones aimed at critical infrastructure. The scale of the attack highlights Moscow’s winter campaign to drain Ukraine’s air defenses and pressure its power grid.

The Ukrainian Air Force announced on November 25, 2025, that Russia conducted a record combined strike against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure, firing 22 missiles of several types and 464 attack drones in a single night engagement. Ukrainian air defenders reported destroying 438 drones and 14 missiles, including one of four Kh-47M2 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles, all three Iskander-M ballistic missiles, and the majority of Kalibr and Iskander-K cruise missiles. Despite the high interception rate, impacts were recorded on energy and residential sites, particularly around Kyiv.
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Ukrainian air defense crews engage a massive Russian missile and drone barrage on November 25, 2025, a night that saw more than 450 drones and 22 missiles launched. Despite heavy impacts on energy sites, Ukraine's layered Patriot, IRIS-T, NASAMS, and electronic-warfare network achieved one of its highest interception rates of the war. Picture of a Kh-47M2 Kinzhalmissile (Picture source: U.S. DoW).

This raid sits within a renewed Russian winter campaign aimed at exhausting Ukraine’s grid and air defense magazines. Earlier in November, Russian forces launched another large-scale attack involving roughly 45 missiles and 450 drones, already described by Ukrainian officials as one of the most intense barrages since 2022. The November 25 strike surpassed that in drone numbers and matched it in missiles. Some drones reportedly crossed into Moldovan and Romanian airspace, forcing NATO fighters to scramble and underlining the regional risk created by saturation tactics.

At the low end of Russia’s strike complex were hundreds of Shahed-class loitering munitions, produced in Russia as the Geran 2. The Shahed 136 is a simple delta-wing drone roughly 3.5 meters long with a small piston engine that drives it at around 140 to 185 kilometers per hour, carrying a 30 to 50 kilogram warhead over more than 1,000 kilometers. Western and Ukrainian intelligence now assess that Russia’s Yelabuga facility can produce on the order of 3,000 Geran or Shahed family drones per month, allowing Moscow to sustain weekly launch rates that at times exceed 1,100 drones. These slow but plentiful munitions are used to overwhelm radar, force Ukrainian batteries to reveal themselves, and distract operators from higher-value ballistic and cruise threats.

The most dangerous of those threats remains the Iskander and Kinzhal ballistic systems. The 9K720 Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile has a maximum range of about 500 kilometers, carries up to 700 kilograms of explosives, and maneuvers along a quasi-ballistic path with a maneuvering reentry vehicle and decoys designed to complicate interception by systems such as Patriot. The Kh 47M2 Kinzhal, an air-launched derivative carried by MiG-31 K aircraft, extends that radius to roughly 1,500 to 2,000 kilometers while carrying a 480-kilogram warhead and reportedly reaching speeds up to Mach 10 on its terminal dive. Western reporting over the past months indicates Russia has modified some ballistic missiles, adjusting trajectories and decoy packages in ways that have sharply reduced Ukrainian interception rates on many nights.

Cruise missiles added a further layer to the November 25 package. The 3M14 Kalibr land attack cruise missile, the main Russian naval strike weapon, flies at low altitude using terrain following guidance with a range between 1,500 and 2,500 kilometers and a warhead of up to 500 kilograms. The Iskander-Kvariant employs a similar cruise missile from a road mobile launcher. These cruise systems are designed to slip underneath radar coverage and arrive nearly simultaneously with ballistic and drone threats, creating the kind of mixed profile salvo that challenges even well-trained NATO air defense units.

Against this mix, Ukraine fields an improvised but increasingly dense defensive network. Soviet era S-300P and Buk-M1 systems still provide much of the long-range backbone, while Western-supplied batteries fill critical gaps. Patriot fire units around Kyiv and other hubs use PAC-3 hit-to-kill interceptors that can engage ballistic missiles in their terminal phase. Medium-range IRIS-T SLM systems delivered by Germany offer vertical launch, imaging infrared guided intercepts out to around 40 kilometers and altitudes up to 20 kilometers, proving particularly effective against cruise missiles and drones in cluttered urban environments. NASAMS launchers and their AMRAAM missiles cover low and medium altitudes, while Gepard self-propelled guns, French Mistral teams, and MANPADS rings defend key infrastructure against Shaheds.

Electronic warfare now forms a third pillar of this defense. Ukrainian forces deploy mobile systems such as Bukovel AD, which can detect drones at up to 100 kilometers and jam their control and navigation links within 20 kilometers by blocking GPS, GLONASS, Galileo, and BeiDou signals. These jammers, combined with an expanding fleet of domestically produced interceptor drones and civilian spotter networks, increasingly disrupt Shahed swarms before they reach defended zones.

The performance of this layered system on November 25 appears especially strong when judged against long-term data. A recent Royal United Services Institute analysis of missile strike records compiled by Ukrainian researcher Petro Ivaniuk and cross-checked by CSIS shows that between September 2022 and 24 October 2025, Russia fired 939 Iskanderand Kinzhal ballistic or aero ballistic missiles at Ukraine. Only 227 were intercepted, an average success rate of about 24%, and in 273 of 345 recorded attacks that included these missiles, none were intercepted at all. Financial Times and other outlets have reported months when Ukrainian ballistic missile interception rates dipped into single digits as Russian upgrades took effect.

Set against that baseline, the Ukrainian Air Force's claim that all three Iskander-M missiles and one Kinzhal were downed on November 25, along with five of seven Iskander-K and five of eight Kalibr cruise missiles, stands out as a statistical outlier. Overall, Ukraine reports neutralizing 14 of 22 missiles and 438 of 464 drones, roughly two-thirds of the missile salvo and more than 90 percent of the drone swarm. Independent Russian commentary has tried to cast doubt on those figures, but in doing so has often contradicted both the Russian Ministry of Defense and itself about the use of Iskander missiles and the scale of damage, underscoring how politicized strike narratives have become.

The intercept statistics highlight how quickly Ukrainian crews have mastered complex Western systems and integrated them with Soviet hardware and homegrown EW tools. That skill is precisely why President Volodymyr Zelensky is pressing Washington for up to 25 Patriot systems under a proposed loan and replacement scheme, arguing that only a much larger inventory can give Ukraine nationwide ballistic coverage.

For NATO planners, the November 25 barrage is more than a Ukrainian success. It validates European investments such as the German-led European Sky Shield Initiative and Germany’s own plans to procure additional IRIS-T SLM batteries and other ground-based air defense systems, while offering a live fire laboratory on how to counter massed drones and mixed missile salvos. As Russia scales production of Shahed-type drones and continues to refine its ballistic arsenal, the battle over Ukraine’s skies is shaping the next generation of integrated air and missile defense concepts from Warsaw to Washington.
Ukraine Reveals Improvised Tochka-U Strike Missile Fitted With FAB-250 Fragmentation Bomb
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Newly released photos from Russian sources show a Ukrainian Tochka-U missile fitted with a Soviet-FAB 250 bomb wrapped in a resin-based fragmentation jacket. The improvised warhead highlights how Ukraine keeps legacy missiles operational for deep strike missions despite limited stocks.

Russian sources published on social media, on November 25, 2025, new photographs showing an unexploded Ukrainian Tochka-Utactical ballistic missile whose standard 9N123F warhead was replaced by a Soviet FAB-250 aerial bomb wrapped in a resin-based fragmentation jacket. The wreckage, reportedly recovered on Russian-controlled territory, confirms in remarkable detail how Ukrainian engineers kept aging Tochka launchers in the fight once factory warheads became scarce in 2022.
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Ukrainian Tochka-Uhybrid missile fitted with an improvised FAB-250 warhead, offering mobile, short-range strike capability out to roughly 120 kilometers with a dense fragmentation effect optimized against personnel, soft vehicles, and exposed logistics positions (Picture source: CSIS/ open source pictures).

The images reveal that the bomb, likely an FAB-250 M62 or similar OFAB-250T, was inserted into the original Tochka-U warhead space with its tail unit removed, then surrounded by a cylindrical shell packed with pre-formed steel fragments set in resin. In its standard form, the FAB-250 weighs about 250 kilograms with roughly 100 kilograms of high explosive, compared with the 9N123F warhead’s 482-kilogram body and approximately 160 kilograms of explosive filler. The Ukrainian modification trades some raw blast power for a very dense fragmentation effect tailored to infantry, soft vehicles, and exposed logistics nodes.

The FAB-250 M62 is a thin-walled, general-purpose bomb designed to combine blast overpressure with a wide fragment footprint, with open sources citing an explosive mass close to 100 kilograms and a typical lethal radius approaching 100 to 120 meters against exposed personnel. In its original air dropped role, a single nose fuze produces impact detonation and irregular high velocity fragments. Ukraine’s resin jacket effectively transforms it into a quasi pre-formed fragmentation warhead, likely generating more fragments than the 9N123F but with slightly lower explosive energy, a tradeoff that favors anti-personnel and anti-soft target missions over hardened infrastructure.

The host missile remains the 9K79 1 Tochka-U, NATO Scarab B, a single-stage solid-fuel tactical ballistic system developed by KBM Kolomna as a successor to the Luna M artillery rocket. With a launch weight of about 2,010 kilograms, maximum range near 120 kilometers, and a circular error probable of roughly 95 meters, Tochka-U was designed around a modular warhead family that included high-explosive fragmentation, cluster, nuclear, and specialized anti-radar options. Shifting from a 482-kilogram factory warhead to a lighter bomb plus jacket inevitably changes the missile’s mass and center of gravity, which can alter both range and accuracy, something Ukrainian technicians reportedly tried to compensate for by adjusting the thickness of the fragmentation sleeve.

The fuze arrangement underlines the improvisation: Tochka-U normally employs an electronic fuze to achieve airburst around 20 meters above ground, maximizing fragment dispersion. In the hybrid missile, investigators found an AVU ET mechanical impact fuze, standard for FAB series bombs and widely documented in Ukrainian ordnance guides. When the missile struck at a shallow angle, the nose fuze never sensed the proper deceleration vector, leaving the bomb undetonated and exposing the entire engineering solution to EOD teams and open source analysts.

Behind this field modification is a system with a long combat record. The original Tochka entered Soviet service in 1975 as a brigade-level asset replacing FROG 7 rockets, with Tochka-U introduced in 1989 after state trials and given improved range and accuracy. Tochka batteries have since seen action from Chechnya and Yemen to Syria and the wider Russo-Ukrainian conflict, where both Russia and Ukraine have used them against airfields, depots, and command posts.

Ukraine’s 19th Missile Brigade inherited Tochka-Uafter independence and began regenerating additional battalions after 2014, a process documented by Ukrainian officers and Western researchers. In the opening phase of the full-scale invasion, Tochka-U became one of Kyiv’s few tools for striking deep targets, including the March 2022 Berdiansk port attack that destroyed the Russian landing ship Saratov and forced the Black Sea Fleet to pull valuable amphibious assets out of range.

By early 2022, however, daily firing cycles were exhausting Ukraine’s limited stock of complete missiles. Ukrainian accounts indicate that technical personnel began examining surplus missile bodies stored without warheads since the nuclear drawdown of the 1990s and proved they could be safely mated with conventional aerial bombs. The result was a small-scale wartime production line of hybrid Tochka rounds that some observers have labeled Franken missiles, combining Soviet era rocket motors with whatever FAB or OFAB bodies could be pulled from depots.

The newly documented FAB 250-based configuration appears optimized for area suppression, with a lighter payload compensated by massive fragmentation and a possible marginal increase in range due to reduced overall weight. A previously reported variant used an FAB-500T, roughly doubling explosive mass and prioritizing blast overpressure against hardened positions, aircraft on aprons, or critical fuel and ammunition storage. Together, these two fields designed warheads to recreate the original Soviet concept of a family of tailored Tochka payloads, now driven by battlefield necessity rather than formal design bureaus.

The hybrid Tochka-Usits at the intersection of artillery and airpower. It gives Ukrainian commanders a way to deliver a single, large high-explosive effect out to 100 kilometers and beyond from road mobile, NBC-protected launchers, without exposing scarce combat aircraft to Russian long-range air defenses. In that sense, it mirrors Russia’s own practice of equipping FAB series bombs with UMPK glide kits, but from the opposite direction. Instead of giving bombs wings, Ukraine is giving them rockets.

The adaptation is not without risk because of improvised aerodynamics, non-optimal fuzing, and the absence of modern terminal guidance, all work against precision and reliability. Yet set against a backdrop of ammunition shortages, intense Russian use of glide bombs against Ukrainian cities, and Ukraine’s broader push toward new indigenous strike systems, the hybrid Tochka-U illustrates a defining dynamic of the war. Ukraine is buying time and range by squeezing new life out of old hardware, turning museum-age missiles and Cold War gravity bombs into a still-relevant deep strike capability.
Ukraine destroys Russia’s unique Beriev A-60 airborne laser aircraft in Taganrog drone strike
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On November 25, 2025, Ukrainian strikes against the Taganrog Yuzhny Air Base triggered fires in the area where the sole remaining Beriev A-60 airborne laser aircraft had been stored. Imagery circulating after the attack shows a burning airframe with features consistent with the A-60, suggesting the unique platform may have been destroyed.

During the night of November 25, 2025, Ukrainian forces carried out coordinated strikes against Russian targets, including the Taganrog Yuzhny Air Base in Rostov Oblast, which experienced large fires following impacts in areas associated with aircraft repair and testing activities. Preliminary information circulating after the attack indicated that one of the rare Beriev A-60 airborne laser laboratory aircraft may have been struck on the ground, with early claims presenting this as the possible destruction of one of only two such prototypes ever produced.
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The laser system mounted on the A-60 destroyed at Taganrog could have been part of the 1LK222 Sokol-Eshelon program, which focused on defeating or impairing the optical sensors of reconnaissance satellites rather than destroying them physically. (Picture source: X/Anton Gerashchenko and RussianPlanes/Alexander Nikolaev)

Footage released following the attack displayed multiple explosions across Taganrog, with observers noting flames erupting near industrial zones and apron areas connected to the Taganrog complex, where A-50 airborne early warning aircraft are normally serviced, and where the unique A-60 experimental aircraft have been parked for years. In one short clip, the sound of a jet engine could be faintly heard moments before impact, suggesting that cruise missiles (maybe the Neptune or the Long Neptune) may have been used during the strike in addition to drones, although this remains unconfirmed and cannot be established beyond the presence of that audio signature. Some images showed a burning aircraft silhouette with a distinct dorsal hump, interpreted by several observers as resembling the top structure of an A-60 laser turret housing, as this aircraft was positioned close to facilities where the Beriev design bureau conducts ongoing work. During the same period, Taganrog authorities announced damage to two industrial enterprises, two multi-story buildings, a private house, and a mechanical college, indicating a wide pattern of impacts throughout the city.

Geolocation efforts identified the primary impact area at approximately 47.198203 north and 38.863344 east, corresponding to an area inside the Taganrog Yuzhny Air Base used to gather, maintain, and overhaul A-50 airborne early warning aircraft. This airfield serves as the main testing and operational center for Beriev aviation projects, making it a location where long-term storage and work on several high-value aircraft, such as the A-50 and A-60, have traditionally taken place. The base has already been a target in previous attacks, including an event on March 1, 2022, when a Tochka-U missile launched by Ukrainian forces was intercepted by a Pantsir-S1 system while aimed at the same airfield, with debris falling in a nearby park. The long-term concentration of rare aircraft, research platforms, and special-mission prototypes explains why this site has remained a recurring strategic target for Ukraine since then.

The Beriev company, officially named Taganrog Aviation Scientific and Technical Complex named after G. M. Beriev, was founded in 1934 and has grown into a major aviation facility responsible for producing, upgrading, and repairing amphibious and special-purpose aircraft. Its activities include the modernization of A-50 airborne early warning aircraft and the maintenance of Tu-95MS strategic bombers, making it a unique, strategically important site without any direct equivalent or alternative elsewhere in Russia. The complex operates both the Taganrog Yuzhny airfield and an additional hydroplane testing site located in Gelendzhik Bay, supporting a wide range of research and flight development tasks. After the beginning of the current conflict, the enterprise came under sanctions from the European Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, and other jurisdictions, affecting its broader industrial environment. Local incidents have also occurred over the years, including a fatal case of suspected thallium poisoning involving a worker in 2017.

An airborne laser, such as the Beriev A-60 stationed at Taganrog, is an aviation platform equipped with a high-energy laser weapon system designed to investigate or apply intense directed beams within the atmosphere or toward airborne and orbital targets. Such systems require substantial electrical power, thermal management solutions, and stabilized optical assemblies to deliver a concentrated beam capable of illuminating or disabling sensors, depending on power output. To maintain a precise beam control across long distances, an airborne laser system typically includes large turbogenerators, retractable optical heads, and systems to counteract atmospheric turbulence and keep beam coherence. Among these very unique aircraft, the A-60 is one of the earliest attempts to integrate a megawatt-class laser into an aircraft for the purpose of studying beam propagation in the upper atmosphere and exploring methods to impair reconnaissance satellites. In total, only three airborne laser systems were created, including the A-60 and two similar programs in the U.S., including the Boeing YAL-1, a modified Boeing 747-400F scrapped in 2014, and a modified NKC-135A currently kept in storage, but such platforms remain extraordinarily rare, costly, and technically complex due to the energy demands and sensitivity of their specialized optics.

Satellite imagery later shared by the Telegram channel Dnipro Official shows the aftermath of the strike against the Beriev Aviation and Scientific Complex Facility, confirming the destruction of the Beriev A-60 and one Il-76 heavy transport aircraft, while the factory’s final assembly shop sustained significant structural damage. (Picture source: Dnipro Official)

The A-60 program originated in the 1970s when Soviet authorities instructed the Beriev design bureau and the Georgiy Dimitrov machine-building plant to create a special airborne laser system capable of addressing several key defense-related technological challenges. Work began on a flying laboratory designated 1A in 1977, incorporating cooperation with the Almaz design center, which traditionally handled air and missile defense systems. The first A-60 aircraft made its maiden flight on August 19, 1981, followed by the second prototype, designated 1A2, on August 29, 1991, which integrated improvements based on earlier trials. Only two prototypes were constructed, with one believed to have been destroyed in a fire at Chkalovskaya Air Base in 1989, leaving the second aircraft as the basis for later modifications and storage at Taganrog. Over time, this platform became associated with research into atmospheric laser propagation and potential anti-satellite applications, connecting it to long-term development lines within Soviet and Russian experimental aviation.

To accommodate the laser system, an Ilyushin Il-76MD airframe underwent extensive changes that significantly altered both its appearance and internal layout. The standard nose radome, which included a weather radar, was replaced by a bulbous fairing containing targeting and beam-directing equipment, while the upper fuselage section between the wings and vertical tail was cut open and replaced with large multi-segment doors concealing a retractable turret that housed the main laser optics. Along the sides of the fuselage, external pods were added to contain turbogenerators that provided the electrical supply required by the laser and its associated systems. The cargo doors were removed, and the opening was sealed, although the ramp remained as a structural element of the airframe. Additional power systems similar to those on the now-scrapped Il-76PP electronic warfare aircraft were installed in the forward section, and aerodynamic considerations guided the decision to make the laser turret retractable so it would not impede flight performance when not needed for experiments.

As expected, the Beriev A-60 maintained the main characteristics of the Il-76MD transport aircraft, featuring a wingspan of 50.50 meters, a length of 46.86 meters, a height of 14.76 meters, and a wing area of 300 square meters. According to available information, the empty weight of the A-60 is around 92,000 kilograms, and its maximum takeoff weight is approximately 179,000 kilograms. Propulsion is provided by four D-30KP series 2 turbofan engines, each producing about 12,000 kilogram-force of thrust, enabling the aircraft to reach a maximum speed of about 850 km/h, cruise near 700 km/h, and operate across a practical range of roughly 8,200 km with a ceiling close to 13,800 meters. The aircraft typically carried a crew of four flight members and up to ten operators who managed the laser, measurement devices, stabilization systems, and associated equipment throughout the flight and testing cycles.

The high-energy laser assembly of the A-60 is apparently linked to gas-dynamic CO₂-based systems with designed outputs approaching the megawatt scale, though this part of the program is evidently surrounded by secrecy. However, it is known that the testing of this laser included experiments involving ground targets, tests against airborne platforms such as La-17 drones, and attempts to assess laser behavior through atmospheric layers under varying conditions. One of the most notable achievements was the illumination of a satellite at an altitude of about 1,000 km, confirming that this weapon could reach orbital trajectories and interact with spaceborne sensors. Development stages also focused on laser stabilization, optical correction methods, and energy management techniques designed to ensure consistent beam quality during extended operations. Reports indicate that work on the second prototype continued across the 1990s and 2000s, including periods of modernization aimed at improving vibration control, precision tracking, and optical system reliability. The aircraft spent many years positioned at Taganrog Yuzhny, reflecting the extreme scarcity of specialized facilities capable of handling such a unique platform.

Notably, the laser system associated with the A-60 that seems to have been destroyed at Taganrog apparently evolved into the 1LK222, a configuration linked to the Sokol-Eshelon program, which focused on defeating or impairing the optical sensors of reconnaissance satellites rather than destroying them physically. Earlier Soviet concepts related to megawatt-class gas-dynamic lasers were integrated into this secret experiment, contributing to extended research on directed energy effects against orbital assets. The A-60 continued serving as the airborne test platform for these experiments, supporting attempts to characterize how atmospheric turbulence and beam dispersion could be compensated at long distances. The program, reported to be active to this day, included activities intended to evaluate illumination of orbital targets and the potential operational utility of airborne laser systems for strategic counter-reconnaissance roles. Therefore, the weapon developed for the Sokol-Eshelon program might also be lost, as it used this modified Il-76MD as its primary carrier.

Moreover, estimating the financial cost of the strike on the A-60 is difficult, but we could estimate it by combining known values for Il-76 airframes with the known financial information related to these airborne laser programs. A 2017 figure placed the price of a new Il-76MD-90A at about 5 billion rubles, which corresponds to more than $63 million using 2025 conversion values, while large-scale conversion projects producing AWACS-type aircraft reached roughly $120 million per unit. When adjustments are made for turbogenerators, atmospheric correction optics, retractable laser turrets, and decades of engineering and testing, the estimated value of an A-60 falls within a wide band between $150 million and $480 million. If the aircraft involved in the Taganrog strike is confirmed to be the one integrated into Sokol-Eshelon testing, the total valuation could lean toward the upper part of this range due to unique system components and the role of the aircraft for such secret, long-term military programs, as the A-60 cannot be replaced quickly.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
Russia Fields Latest Su-30SM2 Fighters To Naval Aviation As Strikes Increase Over Ukraine
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Russia has delivered a fresh batch of Su-30SM2 multirole fighters to its Naval Aviation forces, marking the first fleet delivery publicly reported in 2025. The move adds more long-range strike capacity at a time when Moscow leans on heavy fighters to pressure Ukrainian air defenses and coastal infrastructure.

The United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), a Russian state-owned aircraft conglomerate, announced on November 21, 2025, that Rostec’s United Aircraft Corporation delivered a new batch of Su-30SM2multirole fighters to the Russian Ministry of Defense under the state defense order. Official imagery from the handover shows aircraft in standard blue-gray naval camouflage with the St Andrew flag on the fuselage, confirming their assignment to Russian Naval Aviation rather than the Aerospace Forces. This is the first publicly reported Su-30SM2 delivery to the fleet in 2025 and follows earlier batches that went to Baltic Fleet units before the program briefly disappeared from the spotlight. The timing is highly significant, coming as Russia leans heavily on long-range aviation to sustain pressure on Ukraine’s air defenses and critical infrastructure.
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The Su-30SM2 is Russia's latest naval multirole fighter, combining AL-41F-1S engines, Irbis-E long-range radar, and upgraded electronic warfare with an 8-ton weapons load for extended patrol, interception, and stand-off strike missions (Picture source: Soldar).

The Su-30SM2 is a deep modernization of the familiar Su-30SM, preserving the two-seat airframe and canard layout while integrating key systems from the Su-35. The aircraft uses AL 41F 1S turbofan engines with increased thrust and improved reliability, which give the naval Su-30 greater endurance on maritime patrols and more energy in high altitude missile launches. A typical maximum takeoff weight of around 34.5 tons, internal fuel of roughly 9.6 tons, and a combat payload near 8 tons put it at the heavy end of the fighter spectrum. Top speed remains about Mach 2 at altitude, with a service ceiling above 17 kilometers, but the main advances are in sensors and weapons management rather than raw performance.

At the center of the upgrade is the Irbis-E passive electronically scanned radar, inherited from the Su-35 and adapted for the Su-30SM2’s mission profile. Russian sources claim detection ranges on the order of several hundred kilometers against fighter-sized targets, with the ability to track dozens of contacts and engage several simultaneously. A modernized electro-optical sight, updated cockpit with large color displays, and improved data links allow the two-person crew to split workload between long-range air combat management and navigation or strike planning. The electronic warfare suite has also been refreshed, with an evolved Khibiny family system and digital jammers designed to complicate Western radar missiles and ground-based air defenses, including systems of the Patriot class that Russia claims to have engaged in Ukraine.

Weapon integration reflects the aircraft’s role as a multirole missile carrier for shore-based Naval Aviation. In the air-to-air role, the Su-30SM2 can carry short and medium-range missiles such as R-73 and R-77 1, and is reported to be compatible with the very long-range R-37 M intended to threaten tankers and airborne early warning platforms far from Russian airspace. For strike missions, it can employ Kh 31 anti-ship and anti-radar missiles, Kh 29 and Kh 59 series tactical missiles, and guided bombs, including the KAB 250 family, alongside classic unguided bombs and rockets for lower cost sorties. In practice, this lets Russian planners use the Su-30SM2 as a flexible platform that can move from hunting Ukrainian drones and unmanned surface craft over the Black Sea to launching stand-off strikes against infrastructure deep inside Ukraine while remaining under the cover of Russian air defense.

The arrival of new Su-30SM2s strengthens Russian Naval Aviation at a moment when the maritime flanks of the war are becoming more contested. Units in Kaliningrad and around the Black Sea already rely on the Su-30 family to patrol approaches, escort maritime patrol aircraft, and deliver guided munitions from medium altitude outside the effective envelope of many Ukrainian systems. Western defense analysts generally assess that Russia has shifted toward a pattern in which heavy fighters act as missile trucks firing precision weapons from within Russian or Crimean airspace, trading risk in the terminal phase of the weapon for greater survivability of the aircraft. Additional Su-30SM2 airframes mean more radar coverage along the coasts, more launch platforms for long-range missiles, and more pressure on any future Ukrainian F-16 deployment that must operate under the dome of Russian long-range sensors.

The contract story behind these aircraft shows how Moscow is trying to rationalize its fighter fleet under sanctions. After the first Su-30SMs entered service around 2013, the Ministry of Defense decided in the late 2010s to converge systems with the Su-35 to simplify logistics and production. A major contract signed around 2020 reportedly funded 21 Su-30SM2s alongside Yak 130 trainers, and parallel programs aim to retrofit roughly 110 earlier Su-30SM airframes to the new standard by the middle of the decade. Irkutsk Aviation Plant is under pressure to maintain this tempo while coping with restricted access to imported components, which makes the continuation of deliveries in 2025 a sign that Russia has at least partially stabilized its supply chain for engines, avionics, and onboard computers.

In comparative naval terms, the Su-30SM2 occupies a different niche than Western carrier-capable fighters such as the F/A-18E Super Hornet or Rafale M. Those aircraft are lighter and optimized for catapult and arrested recovery on carriers, and they field active electronically scanned radars and highly integrated sensor fusion. The Russian jet, which operates from shore rather than from carriers in routine missions, trades that tight carrier integration for greater fuel capacity and payload, making it well-suited as a long-range maritime strike and air defense platform over enclosed seas. The Irbis radar’s PESA architecture is less advanced than Western AESA sets in some respects, but the combination of a large antenna, high power output, and a two-person crew still makes the Su-30SM2 a formidable player in beyond visual range engagements over water.

Beyond Russia, Belarus has emerged as the first confirmed foreign operator of the Su-30SM2standard, receiving upgraded aircraft that build on an earlier order for Su-30SMs. Other users of the Su-30 family, including India with the Su-30MKI, Algeria with the Su-30MKA, Malaysia with the Su-30MKM, and China with the Su-30MKK and MK2, field variants that differ in radar and avionics but share the same basic airframe. In theory, these fleets could adopt elements of the SM2 package over time, yet in practice, geopolitical tensions, local industrial upgrades, and divergent mission requirements make a one-to-one alignment unlikely. For now, the Su-30SM2 remains a primarily Russian solution to Russian operational problems, centered on sustaining a high tempo of long-range missions around NATO borders and over Ukraine. As more of these aircraft reach Naval Aviation units through 2025 and 2026, Ukrainian planners and NATO maritime commanders will have to account for a denser belt of Russian sensors and missiles along the Baltic and Black Sea arcs.
Ukrainian Drones Weaken Russia by Destroying Ka-27 Helicopter and Four Radars in Crimea
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Ukrainian Defence Intelligence reported that special units used kamikaze drones on 21 November to destroy a Russian Ka-27 naval helicopter and four major radar systems in occupied Crimea. The coordinated strike further erodes Russia's air surveillance network and supports a broader Ukrainian campaign to weaken the peninsula’s air defenses.

According to the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine(GUR), on 21 November 2025, the Prymary or Ghosts special unit used kamikaze drones against Russian positions in occupied Crimea, destroying a Ka 27 naval helicopter and four air defense radar systems, including a Lira A10 airfield radar, 55Zh6U Nebo U, dome-housed Nebo SV, and a P 18 Terek. GUR released edited onboard footage that shows a Ukrainian drone evading a missile from a Pantsir S1 system before diving into a radar site, and Ukrinform confirmed the strike based on the same official material.
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Ukrainian Ghosts unit strikes a Ka-27 naval helicopter and multiple Russian radar systems in Crimea using low-flying kamikaze drones, dealing a significant blow to the peninsula's air surveillance network and exposing persistent vulnerabilities in Russia's air defenses (Picture source: U.S. Navy).

The Ka-27 Helix is the standard shipborne helicopter of the Russian Navy, designed primarily for anti-submarine warfare with a typical range of about 800 kilometers, a three-person crew, and the ability to deploy dipping sonar, sonobuoys, and lightweight torpedoes or depth charges against submarines and surface targets. In the Black Sea Fleet, it operates from frigates, coastal bases like Kacha airfield near Sevastopol, and patrol vessels to search for Ukrainian submarines, uncrewed surface vessels, and low-flying missile threats. Removing even a single fully equipped Ka 27 reduces Russia’s ability to screen convoys, cover the approaches to Sevastopol, and protect surviving combatants already pushed eastward by Ukrainian missile and drone attacks.

The radar targets tell an even more important story. The Lira A10 is a modern S-band terminal area radar used for airfield surveillance, providing 360-degree coverage out to roughly 160 to 200 kilometers and feeding both air traffic control and local air defense. The Nebo U and Nebo SV family are mobile VHF band surveillance radars, designed to detect low observable aircraft, cruise missiles, and high altitude targets at ranges above 300 kilometers, and to supply three-dimensional coordinates to higher-level command posts. The P-18 Terek, a widely exported 2D VHF early warning radar with a range of around 250 kilometers, is valued for its ability to see small or stealth optimised targets at long range and to cue more precise engagement radars. Together, these systems form the outer surveillance ring that feeds Russia’s S-300 and S-400 batteries in western Crimea, so destroying all four in a single night punches a measurable hole in the regional air picture.

GUR and multiple Ukrainian outlets stress that the operation was carried out entirely with strike drones. The video shows a first-person view style munition flying at treetop height, provoking a launch from a Pantsir S1 before jinking violently as the missile bursts behind it and then continuing into the radar dome. That sequence matches a pattern documented in other Ghosts and Primary raids in Crimea and Donbas, where long-range FPV or one-way fixed-wing drones are flown in low, using terrain masking and clutter to compress the reaction time of Russian crews. Analysts who study FPV combat footage note that systems such as Pantsir S1, optimised for fast-moving aircraft and cruise missiles, struggle against small, slow, low-flying drones that can hide in ground returns or approach from blind sectors close to the launcher.

Since mid-2024, Ukrainian forces have repeatedly hit S-300 and S-400 components, 92N6E engagement radars, and coastal surveillance sites in Crimea to degrade Russia’s integrated air defense and open corridors for deeper missile and drone attacks. The Ka-27 and radar losses of 21 November follow earlier Ghosts operations against aircraft, radars, and landing craft on the peninsula and reinforce a methodical pattern described by Western analysts as a process where Ukrainian forces blind Russian radar networks before striking high-value assets.

The operation also illustrates how the war in 2025 has tilted decisively toward massed unmanned systems. Ukrainian officials report that domestic firms produced more than 2 million drones of all types in 2024, with output forecast to exceed 4.5 million in 2025, over 2 million of them FPV strike platforms. Analysts estimate that drones now account for roughly two-thirds of Russian equipment losses, while Ukraine’s new Unmanned Systems Forces represent a rapidly expanding arm of the military responsible for a growing share of frontline strikes. Senior Ukrainian officers have warned NATO that its armies are not prepared for the scale and tempo of drone warfare now seen daily across the front.

For Russia, losing scarce high-end radars in Crimea is harder to absorb than replacing individual launchers or missiles. Sanctions and wartime demand have already forced Moscow to rely more heavily on legacy Soviet era systems and modest upgrades rather than genuinely new designs, with increasing pressure on the microelectronics supply chain. Reconstituting a Nebo or modernised P-18 battery demands trained crews, specialized vehicles, and complex electronics that cannot be surged to the front as quickly as cheap FPV drones can be assembled in Ukrainian workshops. In the near term, Russian commanders will likely disperse and move remaining radars more frequently, accept gaps in coverage, or strip other sectors to reinforce Crimea; each option erodes the coherence of their wider air defense network.

On the battlefield, the November raid is unlikely to decide the war, which remains a grinding contest along the eastern and southern fronts. But it is a clear case study of how a mid-tier power, faced with a larger opponent, is using an industrial-scale drone ecosystem to peel away critical enablers like surveillance radars and naval helicopters. For every radar dome destroyed on the Crimean coast, it becomes slightly easier for Ukrainian long-range drones, cruise missiles, and eventually modern combat aircraft to reach deeper into occupied territory while forcing Russia to adapt tactically and spend more of its limited high-end assets on static defense.
First German Skyranger 35 mm anti-aircraft gun on Leopard 1 Tank chassis to arrive in Ukraine
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Rheinmetall CEO Armin Papperger has confirmed that the first Leopard 1-based Skyranger 35 self-propelled anti-aircraft gun is in the logistics pipeline and is expected to reach Ukraine within days. The delivery opens a new chapter in Kyiv’s short-range air defense, pairing surplus Leopard 1 hulls with a modern 35 mm gun and AESA radar to counter drones and cruise missiles around critical infrastructure.

Speaking at Rheinmetall’s Capital Markets Day 2025 on 18 November, CEO Armin Papperger told investors that the first Skyranger 35 turret mounted on a Leopard 1 tank chassis has already left the factory and is moving through the logistics chain toward Ukraine, with arrival expected next week. He framed the shipment as the opening move in a larger European-funded program to strengthen Ukraine’s short-range air defense network ahead of a renewed Russian campaign against the power grid and transport nodes, confirming both the Leopard 1 as the chosen carrier and the Skyranger 35 as a central element in Kyiv’s response to mass drone and cruise missile attacks.
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The Leopard 1 Skyranger 35 fits into the framework Ukraine has already built around Gepard and Skynex batteries, which use the same Rheinmetall 35 mm ammunition family, share similar training pathways, and rely on related supply chains. (Picture source: Rheinmetall)

The Skyranger 35 self-propelled anti-aircraft gun (SPAAG) for Ukraine is covered by a contract announced in early October 2025, valued at several hundred million euros and financed by an unidentified European Union (EU) member state using windfall profits from frozen Russian assets. Production and system integration are carried out by Rheinmetall Italia SpA in Rome, embedding the project in an Italian industrial base closely tied to the company’s ground-based air defence activities.

The exact number of vehicles and their final configuration have not been disclosed, but Rheinmetall's statements since September point to an initial batch of Leopard 1-based systems large enough to form at least a mobile air defence battalion tasked with protecting critical infrastructure, forward command posts, and exposed logistics routes. The first unit is delivered as Ukrainian authorities warn of another winter campaign of strikes against the energy grid and transport nodes.

At the core of each Leopard fitted with the Skyranger 35 mm turret is the GDM-008 35 mm automatic cannon, firing 35×228 mm ammunition at up to 1,000 rounds per minute with an effective range of about 4,000 metres against airborne targets. The remote-controlled turret carries 252 ready-to-fire rounds, including programmable fragmentation shells and proximity-fuzed ammunition designed to engage small drones, cruise missiles, and lightly armoured ground targets. In the field of short-range air defence (SHORAD), the Skyranger 35 is designed as a compact solution that delivers a high volume of fire for forces operating in line with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) standards.

A short controlled burst sends a dense pattern of tungsten sub-projectiles in front of an incoming quadcopter or loitering munition, providing a lower-cost response than employing a medium-range surface-to-air missile. The turret was conceived from the outset as a modular combat module able to accept short-range missiles in a later phase, opening the way to a dual-effector architecture combining gun and missile on a single platform.

The sensors and fire-control suite turn the gun system into a short-range air defence node. The Skyranger 35 employs an AMMR (Multi-Mission Radar) active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar operating in the S-band, with five fixed antenna panels providing continuous 360-degree coverage optimised for small unmanned aircraft, low-flying air platforms, and rocket artillery projectiles. Rheinmetall’s Fast InfraRed Search and Track (FIRST) passive detection system, combined with an electro-optical package, allows crews to detect and track targets without emitting radar energy and to switch the radar on only when required.

This configuration supports strict emission control (EMCON) and enables the vehicle to feed data into a wider Recognised Military Picture (RMP) and Common Operational Picture (COP). The system can operate autonomously around a site to be defended or be integrated into a larger command-and-control network, acting as a gap-filler between medium-range ground-based air defence systems and man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), and contributing to a layered defence against the widespread use of low-cost drones on the battlefield.

From a tactical perspective, the choice of the Leopard 1 chassis is as important as the armament and sensors. A legacy tracked main battle tank hull offers mobility and protection that truck-based air defence vehicles cannot match when operating alongside armoured brigades on muddy, snowy, or heavily shelled terrain. Ukrainian commanders can deploy Leopard 1 Skyranger 35 vehicles close to manoeuvre formations, logistics hubs or river crossings to shield them from very low-level threats that have become routine along the front line.

Using a proven but older chassis reflects a pragmatic approach to mobility: the Leopard 1 does not offer the protection of a latest-generation main battle tank, but its availability, ease of maintenance, and existing support infrastructure make it a suitable carrier for air defence missions. Each system can cover an area of roughly 4×4 kilometres, allowing overlapping “drone-free” zones to be established around sensitive sites or high-value assets such as SAMP/T batteries within a layered defence construct.

The Leopard 1 Skyranger 35 fits into the framework Ukraine has already built around Gepard and Skynex batteries, which use the same Rheinmetall 35 mm ammunition family, share similar training pathways, and rely on related supply chains. This logistical and doctrinal continuity eases operational integration and gives Kyiv a coherent basis for developing its mobile ground-based air defence units. The turret is also engineered to accept missiles in a follow-on configuration, supporting a gradual increase in capability as deliveries proceed. Financing a multi-year production run through profits generated by frozen Russian assets functions as an indirect support mechanism for the European defence industrial base, keeping Italian and German production lines active and converting stored Leopard 1 hulls into relevant ground-based air defence assets for Ukraine and for potential future European customers.

The arrival of the first Skyranger 35 on a Leopard 1 chassis heading east illustrates how the war is reshaping ground-based air defence. Low-cost reconnaissance and strike drones, from small quadcopters to medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) unmanned systems, are bringing gun systems with programmable ammunition back into planning discussions after decades dominated by missiles and combat aircraft.

For Russia, the presence of tracked short-range air defence vehicles, networked and deployed around Ukrainian manoeuvre formations, complicates the use of drones and low-altitude strike profiles. For Ukraine’s partners, the Leopard 1 Skyranger 35 sent to Ukraine is both another delivery and a live test of how legacy tank hulls, modern sensor suites, and networked gun systems can be combined to strengthen air defence posture and influence capability choices and planning well beyond the current conflict.
Ukraine deploys first British MSI-DS Terrahawk Paladin air defense system against Russian drones
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The 156th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment published a video showing the first deployment in Ukraine of the British-supplied Terrahawk Paladin air defense system, mounted on a MAN HX 8x8 truck.

On November 18, 2025, Ukraine's 156th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment published a video showing the first deployment of the British MSI-DS Terrahawk Paladin very short-range air defence (VSHORAD) system with the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Installed on a NATO-standard flatrack carried by a German MAN HX 8x8 tactical truck chassis, the Terrahawk Paladin is shown equipped with the optional protective screens around the radar mast and sensor assemblies. The video follows earlier announcements in 2023 that Ukraine would receive Terrahawk Paladin systems from the United Kingdom to counter Russia's drone and missile attacks.
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The British MSI-DS Terrahawk Paladin very short-range air defence (VSHORAD) system will help Ukraine to counter Russia's low-flying drones and helicopters. (Picture source: 156th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment)

The 156th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment, named after Maksym Kryvonis, is a Ukrainian Air Force unit subordinated to the Air Command Center and based in Zolotonosha, Cherkasy Oblast, where it is responsible for the aerial defence of key administrative and industrial areas. It traces its origin to the 156th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade of the 14th Guards Combined Arms Army, which took an oath of loyalty to Ukraine on January 12, 1992, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and was subsequently reorganised as a regiment. In 2007, the unit relocated from Oleksiivka in Odesa Oblast to eastern Ukraine, with divisions deployed at Avdiivka, Luhansk, and Mariupol, and its Avdiivka “Zenit” position became a focal point during the early phases of the conflict in Donbas.

The regiment provided fire support around Donetsk Airport with ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns, suffered casualties from sniper and artillery fire in 2014–2016, and was eventually evacuated to Zolotonosha. Since 2014, it has been credited with destroying at least 32 Russian drones in Donetsk and Luhansk, then during the period from 25 February to 21 May 2022, it provided missile coverage of Kyiv and forces in Kyiv Oblast (with Soviet Buk-M1s) and destroyed 59 targets, including 6 aircraft, 13 helicopters, 36 drones, and 4 cruise missiles. From the start of the full-scale invasion through November 2025, the regiment reports operations across Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Poltava, Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts, for a total of 619 destroyed targets, including 542 Russian drones, 29 helicopters, 13 aircraft, and 35 cruise missiles.

Ukraine’s acquisition of the Terrahawk Paladin is linked to a British announcement on October 11, 2023, in which the country published a new package of military support to Ukraine valued at more than 100 million pounds, financed through the International Fund for Ukraine established by the United Kingdom and Denmark in 2022 and joined by Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, Iceland and Lithuania. Within this package, over 70 million pounds of capabilities were earmarked for air defence, including the MSI-DS Terrahawk Paladin system, described as part of an effort to provide close-range protection of high-value sites and critical infrastructure from missile and drone attacks. The same package included engineering and mobility assets such as mine-clearing equipment, bridging for river and trench crossings, heavy plant vehicles to remove obstacles, and additional equipment to support the Ukrainian counteroffensive and defensive operations. The video from the 156th Regiment indicates that at least one of the Terrahawk Paladins, equipped with the 30 mm Mk44 Bushmaster II gun, has now been integrated on MAN HX carriers in Ukraine, in line with the system’s use of modules

The Terrahawk Paladin itself originates from MSI Defence Systems’ long experience with naval close-range weapon stations, particularly the Seahawk Lightweight mounts, and reflects growing demand over the last decade for land-based very short-range air defence and counter-unmanned aerial systems. The baseline Terrahawk concept was unveiled in 2022 as a palletised VSHORAD system combining a remotely operated 30 mm Seahawk-derived gun mount, the company’s Surveillance Acquisition Targeting Optical System, and mast-mounted FIELDctrl radar panels on a NATO-standard Demountable Rack Offload and Pickup System (D.R.O.P.S.) flatrack, designed for trucks such as Leyland, DAF, Rheinmetall MAN, and Foden load carriers. In 2023, MSI-DS introduced the mobile Terrahawk Paladin variant at events such as DSEI in London and Eurosatory in Paris to provide a fully integrated mobile and deployable short-range air defence system. The company also situates Terrahawk Paladin within a wider Terrahawk VSHORAD family that includes static flatrack and trailer-based deployable options and lighter Terrahawk remote weapon stations, sharing common effectors, sensors, and fire control to simplify integration on land and maritime platforms. International interest has emerged beyond Ukraine, with the Royal Jordanian Air Force confirming acquisition and displaying Terrahawk Paladin during Exercise “Sky Shield” in 2025, where two systems with mast-mounted radar were used.

The Terrahawk Paladin is centered on the 30×173 mm Mk44 Bushmaster II chain gun in its standard configuration, with an option in some variants to install a 40 mm calibre weapon. The stabilized mount typically carries around 200 to 240 ready-to-fire rounds in a dual-feed system, allowing the crew to switch rapidly between ammunition types without manual reloading, for example, between programmable air burst or proximity fuzed high explosive rounds for small unmanned aircraft and armour-piercing or high explosive rounds for surface targets. The Terrahawk Paladin has an engagement range for drone-sized aerial targets of roughly 2 km when using programmable air burst ammunition, with longer slant ranges possible against larger or less manoeuvrable targets, and it is described as effector agnostic in principle, with the ability to host other direct fire weapons up to 40 mm and even missile or laser-guided rocket pods such as the APKWS. The gun mount is paired with the SATOS electro-optic director, which combines a daylight camera, thermal imager, and a laser rangefinder with a quoted range of around 10 km, enabling detection, identification, and precise range measurement at day and night.

The radar component is based on four active electronically scanned array (AESA) panels on a mast that provide 360-degree surveillance and track multiple objects in azimuth and elevation, feeding data into a fire control system with artificial intelligence-assisted video tracking, ballistic computation, semi-autonomous cue and slew functions, and options for enhanced target recognition algorithms developed with Advanced Protection Systems. This fire control architecture can support up to 16 weapon mounts in a network, and MSI-DS associates it with mesh C3/C4 systems that integrate sensors, fire control, and weapon stations into a flexible wide area defence network where platforms can operate individually or as coordinated nodes at the battery or company level. The complete Terrahawk Paladin module, including weapon, sensors, power generation and control electronics, has a typical mass of less than 10 tons and is designed for mounting on trailers, NATO standard flat racks or vehicle platforms, with offset remote control via hard wired or line of sight links that allow the crew to operate from protected shelters at a distance from the weapon station.

The Terrahawk Paladin protects high-value targets, critical infrastructure, troop concentrations, and vulnerable points against low-altitude threats such as nano and micro multirotor and fixed wing drones, larger vertical and short take off tactical unmanned aircraft, and loitering munitions and cruise type weapons in their terminal phase of approach. Beyond unmanned aircraft, the Terrahawk Paladin could be used against low-flying rotary and fixed-wing aircraft attempting terrain masking profiles, as well as ground and maritime targets such as lightly protected vehicles and fast inshore attack craft, reflecting its naval origin and cross-domain applications. In Ukraine, the Terrahawk Paladin will likely be deployed as a singleton point defence unit or as part of a layered air defence network to create overlapping coverage around cities, power plants, and military facilities already protected by missile batteries, to defeat dense waves of low-cost drones such as the Shahed while reserving missile interceptors for higher value or higher altitude targets such as cruise missiles.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
Ukraine confirms strikes in Russia with U.S. ATACMS missiles after months of Pentagon limits
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Ukraine has confirmed using U.S.-supplied ATACMS ballistic missiles against targets in Russia, with a salvo of four missiles fired toward the Voronezh region and claimed intercepted by Russian S-400 and Pantsir air defence systems. Kyiv frames the move as a necessary response to intensified Russian missile and drone attacks, while the strike signals a renewed phase of long-range pressure on Russian rear areas and a test of both Moscow’s air defence and Washington’s escalation management.

Ukraine’s General Staff has publicly confirmed that its forces used U.S. supplied Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missiles to hit targets inside Russia, ending months of operational constraints that had largely frozen such cross-border strikes. Officials in Kyiv linked the salvo, reportedly launched from the Kharkiv region toward the southern city of Voronezh, to a wave of Russian missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian cities, while Russia’s Defence Ministry said four ATACMS were aimed at civilian areas and were all shot down by S-400 and Pantsir systems, with debris damaging several buildings but causing no casualties.
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The ATACMS is a short-range tactical ballistic missile launched from the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) or the tracked M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) (Picture source: Ukrainian MoD)

According to the Russian Defence Ministry, Ukrainian forces fired four Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missiles towards the southern city of Voronezh, which Moscow described as an attempted strike on civilian targets. Russian authorities stated that S-400Triumph air defence batteries and Pantsir-S1 point-defence systems had intercepted all of the missiles, and that only debris had damaged the roof of a retirement home, an orphanage, and several houses, without causing casualties.

On the Ukrainian side, military sources suggested that the strikes were aimed at military infrastructure and installations in or around the city, in line with the General Staff’s statement stressing the need to defend Ukrainian territory and population against repeated attacks. In the absence of a precise public assessment of the damage, the information picture remained uncertain, but the political messaging of both sides quickly adjusted to their internal and external priorities.

The MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) remained at the core of this episode. It is a short-range tactical ballistic missile launched from the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) or the tracked M270Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS). The most recent unitary-warhead variants delivered to Ukraine can reach around 300 kilometres, with inertial guidance assisted by GPS, enabling accurate strikes against point targets and hardened infrastructure.

Initial deliveries to Kyiv in autumn 2023 involved shorter-range M39 cluster-warhead missiles, followed, in spring 2024, by unitary variants such as the M57 and M57E1, combining extended range, improved guidance, and a lower dud-rate compared to older submunition versions. For Ukrainian ground forces, this limited but valuable inventory opened the possibility of bringing within range ammunition depots, command posts, fire-control radars, and logistics nodes that had previously been beyond the reach of conventional artillery and Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) rockets.

In response to this threat, the defence of Voronezh relied on layered ground-based air defence built around long-range S-400 interceptors and Pantsir point-defence systems. The S-400 architecture employs 48N6 and 40N6 missiles, cued by 91N6E and 92N6E radars, with nominal engagement ranges of 250 to 380 kilometres against aerodynamic targets and shorter envelopes against ballistic trajectories.

The Pantsir-S1, combining 30 mm guns and short-range missiles on a single chassis, is designed to engage missiles that have evaded the upper layers or to neutralise unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) of the medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) category, including when they operate under strict emissions control (EMCON). Russian claims of complete interception rates could not be independently verified, but they reflected Moscow’s concern about the reappearance of U.S. tactical ballistic missiles in its airspace.

On the ground, the resumption of ATACMS launches allowed Kyiv to reopen a deep-strike corridor from launch positions in Kharkiv oblast and other border regions towards Russian rear-area nodes such as Voronezh, Kursk or Belgorod. A range of around 300 kilometres gives rocket artillery units the option to operate from relatively protected depth while still reaching air defence batteries, long-range rocket launchers, logistics hubs or forward-based aviation assets that support Russian offensives against Kharkiv and the eastern front.

Combined with long-range strike drones developed by the Ukrainian defence industry and other cruise-type systems, ATACMS contribute to a denser recognised maritime and air picture and common operational picture (RMP/COP) on the Russian side, by increasing requirements for dispersion, camouflage and mobility in the rear. For Ukraine, the key issue remains rationing a missile stock that is limited by definition, integrating it into a targeting chain that brings together Western intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), national sensors and tactical collection at the front line in order to prioritise the most critical targets.

The Voronezh episode took place in a context of increased pressure on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. In the preceding weeks, Russia had stepped up strikes on energy and gas installations, while multiplying drone and missile attacks that wounded dozens of civilians in Kharkiv and further weakened an electricity grid already under strain. Ukrainian leaders defended long-range strike capabilities as an essential tool to disrupt Russian staging areas, delay preparations for possible winter offensives and maintain a high operational cost for Russian forces around the eastern front. In response, Moscow announced short-range Iskander-M ballistic missile launches against Ukrainian multiple rocket launchers, seeking to deter further cross-border salvos while insisting that its “red lines” remained in place.

The decision taken by President Joe Biden in late 2024 to ease restrictions on the use of ATACMS against targets in Russia had opened a new phase, which his successor initially criticised, before the Pentagon put in place, according to U.S. media, a process for systematic review of long-range strikes launched from Ukrainian territory. The public confirmation by Ukraine’s General Staff in November 2025 suggested a partial relaxation of these constraints or a broader interpretation of which categories of targets were considered legitimate. Statements by Donald Trump, arguing that Ukraine had “no chance of winning” without the option to strike Russian territory, illustrated the persistent tension in the United States between the desire to limit escalation risks and the aim of preserving a credible military lever for Kyiv.

The reactivation of ATACMS strikes against Russia confirmed the central role of long-range conventional fires in deterrence, coercion and bargaining dynamics. Moscow had already linked Western support for deep-strike capabilities to its revised nuclear doctrine, indicating that sustained employment of U.S. and British missiles against Russian territory could, in an extreme scenario, be presented as grounds for nuclear retaliation, even though a large majority of analysts considered this outcome unlikely.

Capitals of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) now have to manage not only a higher level of escalation noise but also a more complex debate on interoperability, export controls and political conditions attached to long-range strike systems, from ATACMS to future European missiles. For Ukraine, each salvo that penetrates Russian air defence provides a degree of operational offset against Russian mass, but also reinforces Kyiv’s dependence on U.S. political cycles, with direct effects on the balance of power on the European theatre in the years ahead.
Russia turns to Iran’s Shahed 107 drone for its war of attrition against Ukraine
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A newly recovered wreckage on Ukraine’s eastern front in mid-November 2025 confirms that Russia is now using Iran’s Shahed 107 loitering munition for deep logistics strikes. With claimed ranges out to 1,500 kilometers and jam-resistant satellite guidance, the system tightens pressure on Ukrainian rear areas and highlights growing Iran-Russia defense cooperation.

Images posted on Telegram in mid-November by military blogger Sergey Flash show the black airframe of a downed loitering munition laid out on a blue tarp, its rear piston engine still attached and surrounded by a distinctive four-element antenna ring. Visual comparison with footage released in Tehran when the system was unveiled in June 2025 leaves little doubt that this is Iran’s Shahed 107, a medium-range attack drone that analysts and Ukrainian officials have long suspected was being transferred to Russia and folded into its growing inventory of Shahed-type weapons for deep strikes against Ukraine.
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On the battlefield, the Shahed 107 adds an extra layer of threat between small FPV kamikaze drones and heavier systems such as cruise missiles or Shahed 136s(Picture source: Telegram Channel @Sergey Flash)

The Shahed 107 is a strike unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) with a fixed wing, designed for medium-range penetration missions. Available data remain incomplete, but several parameters recur in Ukrainian and Western assessments: a high-explosive warhead of 8 to 9 kilograms, a cruising speed of around 120 kilometers per hour, a ceiling close to 3,000 meters, and, above all, a minimum range of several hundred kilometers, with some Iranian actors claiming up to 1,500 kilometers. In practice, even a more conservative envelope already gives Russian forces the ability to hit the full operational depth of Ukrainian territory from launch areas well behind the front line.

The guidance chain relies on a combination of inertial navigation and satellite positioning, with deliberate use of GPS and GLONASS signals. The term Controlled Reception Pattern Antenna (CRPA) refers here to the four-element antenna mounted at the base of the engine section. This device shapes the reception pattern and mitigates certain types of jamming, without providing complete protection against opposing electronic warfare assets. For Moscow, the main advantage lies in a guidance path that remains stable enough up to the target area, then in the drone’s relative autonomy in the terminal phase, even if data links are disrupted.

On the battlefield, the Shahed 107 adds an extra layer of threat between small FPV kamikaze drones and heavier systems such as cruise missiles or Shahed 136s. Its 8 to 9 kilogram warhead remains modest, but it is sufficient to destroy unarmoured vehicles, ammunition stocks, brigade-level command posts, or communications antennas. Its limited speed and medium altitude can reduce survivability against dense ground-based air defences, but these constraints are offset by a lower unit cost, the option of multiple launches, and the ability to operate from austere sites concealed in Russian rear areas or on occupied territory.

The tactical impact depends on how Moscow integrates this loitering munition with the rest of its strike toolkit. Single launches can target specific objectives identified by intelligence networks and reconnaissance drones, while salvos of Shahed 107s can be used to saturate early-warning radars, force surface-to-air systems to fire, and open corridors for heavier weapons. Ukrainian frontline units thus see their logistics hubs, assembly areas, and forward depots subjected to repeated attacks at distances of 100 to 300 kilometers from the line of contact. To limit losses, Kyiv’s command is forced to multiply movements, tighten emission discipline, emission control (EMCON), and disperse stocks more widely, at the cost of a more complex logistics effort.

In addition, the Shahed 107 drone found in Ukraine illustrates the support provided by Iran to Russia. The first examples used in Ukraine come from assemblies carried out in Iran, as indicated by markings observed by Ukrainian teams on some fragments. However, leaked documents and public statements regarding the Alabuga industrial zone suggest a gradual increase in local production, involving the transfer of designs, delivery of kits, and integration of Russian components into the chain. For Moscow, this approach reduces direct dependence on Iranian shipments while retaining a proven, low-cost loitering munition architecture.

By placing the Shahed 107 at the centre of its long-range strike strategy, Russia validates Iran’s approach of attrition and saturation using inexpensive delivery systems, which Tehran has been putting in place for many months, and offers Iran valuable feedback from a high-intensity conflict. Over time, this convergence is likely to encourage wider dissemination of similar loitering munitions to other partners of the Iran–Russia axis, whether armed groups or states. For NATO countries and their allies, the spread of such platforms requires adaptations in theatre air defence, improved interoperability of counter-drone systems, and a rethink of how to protect logistics depth, which has turned into a battlespace in its own right rather than a safe rear area.
Ukrainian drones neutralize four S-400 launchers and weaken Russian air defense power
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Ukraine’s security services say drones and missiles destroyed four S-400 launchers and two critical radars at Russia’s Novorossiysk air defense hub. The strike creates a notable gap in Russia’s Black Sea shield and disrupts protection over a vital oil export route.

According to information published by RBC-Ukraine, on November 15, 2025, sources in the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) reported that drones from the Alpha Special Operations Center destroyed four S-400 Triumf launchers and two key radars at the Kuban Red Banner regiment base near Novorossiysk on Russia’s Black Sea coast. Kyiv Post subsequently described the operation as blowing a “hole in Russian defenses,” noting that it was conducted in coordination with Ukraine’s military intelligence directorate (HUR) and Special Operations Forces. Satellite images reviewed by Ukrainian and independent analysts confirm the destruction of four launchers and the radar positions within the perimeter of military unit 1537.
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Ukrainian SBU long-range drones destroyed four S-400 launchers and two key radars during a precision strike on the Novorossiysk air defense site, crippling Russia's premier Black Sea air shield and exposing a major gap in the layered air defenses protecting its main oil export hub (Picture source: social media/ Vitaly Kuzmin).

Ukrainian intelligence displayed that around twelve S-400 launchers were deployed at the site, meaning at least a third of the fire units are confirmed destroyed and others likely damaged by blast and secondary detonations. The strike also removed two critical sensors from the battery: the 96N6 “Cheese Board” early warning radar and the 92N6 “Grave Stone” engagement radar, both visually confirmed in post-strike imagery. The 96N6 provides three-dimensional surveillance and is designed to pick up low-flying targets over sea and clutter, while the 92N6 tracks targets and guides S-400 missiles in flight. Ukrainian outlets underline that the 92N6 is regarded as the most valuable single component of the system, since without it, launchers on their own are essentially blind.

A typical S-400battalion combines a 55K6E command post, a 91N6E long-range acquisition radar, one or more 96L6/96N6 surveillance radars, several 92N6 engagement radars and between eight and twelve 5P85-series launchers. A full system is advertised to detect air targets at up to roughly 600 kilometers and engage aerodynamic threats at ranges approaching 400 kilometers, while tracking dozens of targets and guiding scores of missiles simultaneously. Each launcher usually carries four ready-to-fire canisters loaded with long-range 40N6 or 48N6DM missiles and medium-range 9M96 interceptors. By destroying four launchers, Ukraine has removed up to 16 ready missiles from the local air picture, but the more serious damage lies in the loss of the 96N6 and 92N6, which are far fewer in number than launch vehicles and take longer to rebuild or redeploy.

The location makes this loss far more than a tactical embarrassment. Novorossiysk is now the primary Black Sea hub for Russia’s crude exports and a fallback base for elements of the Black Sea Fleet relocated from Crimea earlier in the war. The same strike package forced a temporary halt to oil exports through Novorossiysk and the nearby Caspian Pipeline Consortium terminal, interrupting flows of roughly 2.2 million barrels per day, about 2 percent of global supply, before loadings resumed. For that reason, Moscow had built a layered air defense cocoon around the port, combining S-400 and S-300 systems with shorter-range Pantsir and Tor units. With one of the key S-400 nodes now neutralized, there is a measurable gap in the integrated air defense system over Russia’s main Black Sea export route.

Public details of the strike profile remain limited, but Ukrainian General Staff statements, independent analysis and Ukrainian reporting indicate that the attack combined domestically produced long-range one-way attack drones with R-360 Neptune cruise missiles, launched in waves from Ukrainian territory. Long-range drones flying at low altitude over the Black Sea can exploit the radar horizon and terrain masking, forcing S-400crews either to fire expensive long-range missiles at relatively cheap targets or to hold fire and rely on short-range systems. By approaching from multiple axes and mixing heavy warhead drones with decoy platforms, Ukrainian planners likely saturated both the surveillance picture and the local short-range defenses. Once the 96N6 and 92N6 lit up to search and engage, they became aim points for follow-on drones and Neptunes cued by pre-strike satellite and OSINT targeting, a playbook that Ukrainian officers and Western analysts say has been at the heart of their evolving suppression of enemy air defenses campaign.

The Novorossiysk operation sits within a broader pattern of hunting S-400s that began with earlier strikes on Crimea. Ukrainian media have previously documented successful Ukrainian attacks on S-400 sites near Yevpatoria and Cape Tarkhankut, where radars and launchers were destroyed in 2023 and 2024 using combinations of drones, cruise missiles and special operations forces. In response, Western intelligence assessments noted that Russia has been forced to pull S-400 batteries away from strategically sensitive regions like Kaliningrad to backfill losses in Ukraine, accepting thinner coverage along NATO’s northeastern flank to protect occupied territories and key logistics hubs. The degradation of a high-end battery at Novorossiysk deepens that structural dilemma, compelling Moscow to choose between shielding its remaining bomber and naval infrastructure or sustaining air defense density around other national centers.

For Kyiv, the operation also showcases how the SBU has transformed from a largely internal security and counterintelligence service into a strategic strike arm that complements HUR’s more traditional military intelligence and UAV operations. HUR has often been associated with attacks on airfields and logistical nodes, while the SBU’s Alpha units and dedicated drone directorates now specialize in complex long-range raids that rely on clandestine networks, high-quality targeting and bespoke unmanned systems. That evolution was already evident in Operation Spider’s Web on June 1, 2025, when the SBU concealed explosive-laden drones inside the roofs of wooden sheds transported by unsuspecting truck drivers to the perimeters of multiple Russian air bases.

Independent reporting and commercial satellite imagery showed that the Spider’s Web attack involved 117 drones and hit at least four strategic bomber bases, damaging or destroying 41 aircraft and temporarily removing roughly a third of Russia’s cruise missile carrier fleet at an estimated cost to Russia of around 7 billion dollars. The same SBU, using many of the same planners and methods, is now repeatedly striking Russia’s energy infrastructure, with reporting tracking drone and missile attacks on refineries, oil depots and pipelines across southern and central Russia, from Tuapse and Novorossiysk to Ryazan, Saratov and Volgograd. In that context, Novorossiysk looks less like a one-off spectacular and more like a mature doctrine: knock out the protecting S-400 radars, open a corridor for follow-on waves of unmanned systems, then hit the economic targets that finance Russia’s war.

For Russia, the loss of four launchers and, more importantly, two scarce S-400radars at a key export hub both expose finite high-end air defense stocks and underscore the vulnerability of fixed, heavily advertised systems to cheap, networked drones. For Ukraine, each destroyed 92N6 or 96N6 is not just a symbolic kill but a concrete reduction in Russia’s ability to contest the airspace over the Black Sea with modern sensors and interceptors. For NATO planners and defense industries, the lesson is blunt: future integrated air and missile defense architectures will have to be more mobile, more distributed and far more focused on counter unmanned systems if they are to survive against an adversary willing to trade low-cost drones for billion-dollar assets.
Ukraine’s Armed Forces released first visual confirmation of Italian Centauro B1 armored vehicles
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Ukraine’s 78th Air Assault Regiment released footage confirming Italian Centauro B1 wheeled gun systems now in service, with add-on protection visible on the vehicles. The debut gives maneuver units a mobile 105 mm direct-fire option that can integrate quickly with combined-arms teams.

Imageryposted by Ukraine’s 78th Air Assault Regiment shows Centauro B1s operating with the Air Assault Forces, offering the first clear look at Italy’s transfer after months of speculation. The clips and stills, released around Air Assault Forces Day, depict vehicles fitted with cage and grid sections against FPV drones and shaped-charge threats, suggesting crews are hardening the platform before wider fielding. Italy has not publicly disclosed quantities, consistent with Rome’s low-visibility approach to aid.
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Screenshot from the 78th Air Assault Regiment video released on Nov. 9, 2025, showing a Centauro B1 in frontline use in Ukraine fitted with improvised anti-drone screens (Picture source: Ukraine’s 78th Air Assault Regiment)

The images show spaced metal screens and a mesh “grille” surrounding the turret and hull. Set off from the armor, these structures shift the detonation point and lessen the impulse, while degrading the coherence of the shaped-charge jet when impact occurs at unfavorable angles. Cable-made “spikes” are also visible, intended to push an attacking drone’s fuze farther from the armor. The solution covers likely approach paths without blocking hatches or fields of fire. Such “mangal” kits spread on the theater from 2023 onward, and the adaptation to Centauro geometry looks thorough, especially around the turret ring, where the tensioned fabric mesh can, in some cases, prevent a fuze from functioning on impact.

Under these add-ons, the Centauro’s original armor provides all-round protection against 14.5 mm fire and resistance on the frontal arc to 25 mm armor-piercing rounds, a baseline relevant to common threats. The welded steel structure and internal compartmentalization support battlefield endurance, while an overpressure nuclear biological chemical (NBC) system and air conditioning allow prolonged operation in extreme temperatures. Ukrainian choices here emphasize drone defeat and spall reduction over heavy applique plates, preserving acceleration and mobility on soft ground. The mass-protection balance remains central for air assault units that rely on surprise, tempo, and controlled dispersion.

Firepower is centered on the 105 mm gun. The turret mounts an Oto Melara 105 mm/52 rifled cannon compatible with the L7/M68 family of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ammunition, opening access to a portfolio ranging from armor-piercing fin-stabilized discarding-sabot to blast-effect high explosive for neutralizing strongpoints. Forty rounds are carried in total, fourteen in the turret to speed engagement. A 7.62 mm coaxial machine gun complements the main armament, with an optional 7.62 mm or 12.7 mm roof mount, and 76 mm smoke dischargers on either side of the turret to screen a withdrawal. In a force structure mixing legacy calibers and Western standards, this compatibility eases logistics and interoperability, unlike the AMX-10 RC, which uses different cartridges.

For mobility, the B1 uses an Iveco VTCA V6 diesel of about 520 hp paired with a ZF automatic transmission, yielding a published road speed of 100 to 105 km/h and an approximate 800 km range in standard configuration. Hydropneumatic suspension, assisted steering on multiple axles at low speed, a central tire-inflation system, and run-flat tires enhance off-road traction and survivability. With a crew of four and a mass of roughly 24 to 25 tonnes before field kits, the vehicle remains within tactical airlift envelopes and can use infrastructure not available to tanks, which matters in Ukraine for quick moves between support points.

At the tactical level, Centauro combines cavalry and direct-support roles. In an air assault brigade, it can cover reconnaissance elements, secure a junction, strike a light column with accurate line-of-sight fire, then disengage under electromagnetic emission control (EMCON). Gun stabilization and a capable fire-control setup support a first-round hit, while the 8x8 chassis provides the acceleration needed to evade artillery and loitering munitions. It is not designed for urban breaching, and survivability depends on camouflage, deception, short-range air defense coverage, and electronic warfare support. With appropriate sensors and data links, Centauro platoons feed a common operational picture (COP), delegate observation to medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) drones, and retain the option to exploit short firing windows.

Italy’s choice, even without public numbers, strengthens European assistance and reflects confidence in Ukraine’s ability to absorb a Western 105 mm system within composite brigades. The November visual confirmation comes as European armies accelerate replenishment and upgrades, and it provides immediate feedback to the continent’s defense industrial and technological base (BITD) on survivability in a drone-saturated conflict. It highlights the value of interoperable ammunition families, opens channels for sustainment and offset, and encourages partners to industrialize anti-drone kits suited to current threats. For NATO, the task is to preserve deterrence stocks while supporting Ukraine, as Russia increases FPV saturation. In the near term, this widens Ukraine’s mobile direct-fire options; over time, it speeds the European learning cycle in a saturated environment, from the recognized maritime/air picture to the COP, from camouflage to EMCON, within an emerging war-economy context.
Russian troops in Ukraine upgrade T-80BV tank with U.S.-made BRAT reactive armor
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In Ukraine, a Russian T-80BV main battle tank was spotted with U.S.-made Bradley Reactive Armor Tiles (BRAT) recovered from a captured M2A2 ODS-SA Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle previously used by the Ukrainian Army.

On November 4, 2025, Andrei_bt reported that a Russian T-80BV main battle tank had been equipped with several Bradley Reactive Armor Tiles (BRAT) modules mounted on a welded frame covering the turret and glacis, likely taken from a captured or abandoned M2A2 ODS-SA Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle previously operated by the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The uncommon but technically achievable field modification, likely performed by unit-level mechanics, could suggest a shortage of standard Russian Kontakt-1 or Kontakt-5 explosive armor blocks, leading crews to repurpose captured NATO components to maintain protection against shaped-charge threats.
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The adaptation of BRAT modules onto the T-80BV required structural modification because the American armor tiles are designed for a completely different mounting pattern than that of the Russian tank’s Kontakt-1 system. (Picture source: US Army and Telegram/Andrei_bt)

A custom steel frame was welded to the turret and glacis to support the flat rectangular BRAT blocks, positioned mainly above the “mangal” grill-like protection and along the turret cheeks. The mounting procedure likely involved manual welding and mechanical reinforcement performed under field conditions with portable tools. The process would take several hours, including surface preparation, frame fitting, and securing of modules to ensure stability under recoil and motion. Because the BRAT kit was only partially applied on this T-80BV, the additional weight could be estimated below one tonne, limiting its effect on balance, suspension, or mobility. The hybrid structure nonetheless increases resistance to top-attack threats and shaped-charge impacts, providing limited but valuable additional protection.

The Bradley Reactive Armor Tiles (BRAT) kit, developed in the United States for the M2A2 ODS and M2A3 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles, is composed of 96 modular explosive reactive armor units designed to defeat anti-tank weapons such as RPGs and HEAT projectiles. Each tile consists of metal plates surrounding a small explosive layer that detonates outward when struck, disrupting the shaped-charge jet before it can penetrate the base armor. The BRAT was developed to provide affordable, easily replaceable protection to tracked vehicles engaged in urban or mechanized operations, using standardized blocks that can be removed or fitted in the field. The components of the BRAT kit include the M3 (~13.48 kg with ~1.18 kg explosive), the M5 (~33.46 kg with ~2.68 kg explosive), the M6 (~13.70 kg with ~1.32 kg explosive) and the M7 (~10.2 kg with ~0.95 kg explosive) for different mounting locations. The system is lighter than heavier Russian designs like Kontakt-5 or Relikt, making it suitable for medium-weight armored vehicles without major structural modifications. Although less effective against kinetic energy penetrators, it offers practical defense against older anti-tank grenades and missiles, which continue to pose a frequent threat in close engagements and ambush scenarios.

The system’s modular structure allows field engineers to remove, relocate, or reuse armor tiles as needed, a feature that explains its adoption for improvised defensive upgrades in Ukraine. Each BRAT module can be bolted or welded onto flat surfaces or auxiliary frames, allowing technicians to reconfigure protection zones around critical areas such as ammunition storage, crew compartments, or exposed hull sections. The system’s relative simplicity made it possible to salvage tiles from destroyed or abandoned vehicles and repurpose them on tanks or engineering vehicles. A complete BRAT package provides protection mainly against older RPG and ATGM warheads rather than modern tandem systems, but it can still significantly reduce the damage of direct hits from single-charge anti-tank weapons. Although less dense than Russian Kontakt-5 or Relikt tiles, BRAT remains effective against many common battlefield threats encountered in Ukraine, especially handheld anti-tank weapons and first-generation guided missiles.

Cost estimates for BRAT installations during official U.S. Army retrofit programs in the 1990s ranged between $50,000 and $70,000 per complete vehicle set, depending on procurement conditions and material prices. In the field, such as the example observed in Ukraine, the expense is limited to labor time, steel fabrication, and access to donor modules, making it an efficient way to reinforce older armor platforms. The added weight of one full BRAT array on a Bradley is approximately 1,000 to 1,200 kilograms, though improvised fits like that seen on the T-80BV use fewer modules and weigh less. The system provides enhanced survivability against explosive threats without major loss of mobility or strain on the suspension. In hybrid configurations, the effectiveness depends on alignment accuracy and structural rigidity of the mounting frame; if poorly aligned, the explosive layers may not react optimally, reducing efficiency. Nonetheless, partial integration remains a practical field solution where dedicated reactive armor kits are unavailable.

The T-80BV is a gas-turbine-powered main battle tank developed in the Soviet Union during the 1980s and built at the Omsktransmash plant. It entered service in 1985 as an improved version of the T-80B and introduced Kontakt-1 explosive reactive armor blocks on its hull and turret. The tank weighs approximately 43.7 tonnes and is armed with a 125 mm 2A46-2 smoothbore cannon, supported by a 7.62 mm coaxial PKT and a 12.7 mm NSVT anti-aircraft machine gun. It operates with a crew of three, consisting of a commander, gunner, and driver, using an autoloader that stores 38 rounds. The T-80BV is powered by a 1,100-horsepower GTE-1000TF gas-turbine engine, enabling a top speed of 70 km/h on road and about 50 km/h cross-country, with a maximum range of 500 km on internal fuel. It can cross a 1.2-meter water obstacle without preparation or up to 1.8 meters after fifteen minutes of setup, and 5 meters with full deep fording gear.

The tank’s armor configuration combines steel and composite layers with modular ERA coverage, giving protection equivalent to roughly 550 mm against APFSDS and 800 mm against HEAT rounds on the turret front. While the gas-turbine engine provides excellent acceleration and cold-start performance, it is noted for its high fuel consumption and maintenance complexity. The T-80BV’s transmission and suspension employ a torsion-bar system with hydraulic dampers, ensuring mobility across uneven terrain. The fire-control suite includes the 1A33 system with a 1G42 laser rangefinder sight, an analog ballistic computer, and night vision via the TPN-3-49 scope. The vehicle’s armament can fire conventional shells and 9M112 “Kobra” guided missiles. In operational service, the T-80BV demonstrated strong performance in speed and firing rate but has faced vulnerability to modern anti-tank weapons due to ammunition placement in the crew compartment, likely explaining the upfitting with these US-made BRAT modules.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
UK Deploys New Tranche of Storm Shadow Missiles to Ukraine Ahead of Winter Campaign
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The United Kingdom has delivered an additional, undisclosed tranche of MBDA Storm Shadow air-launched cruise missiles to Ukraine, Bloomberg reports, to maintain long-range strike capability through the winter.

According to information published by Bloomberg, on November 3, 2025, the United Kingdom delivered an additional, undisclosed tranche of MBDA Storm Shadow air-launched cruise missiles to Ukraine to sustain long-range strikes through winter, a move aligned with London’s pledge to keep pressure on Russian logistics and command infrastructure. The report notes recent massed salvos that penetrated Russian air defenses and confirms the UK’s practice of withholding quantities for operational security.
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Storm Shadow/SCALP is a low-observable air-launched cruise missile with 250+ km range, imaging-IR guidance, and a 450 kg BROACH penetrator for hardened targets (Picture source: UK MoD).

Storm Shadow, known in France as SCALP EG, is a low-observable, terrain-following cruise missile designed for pre-planned attacks on hardened, high-value targets. It couples INS and GPS with terrain-reference navigation and an imaging-infrared seeker for terminal aim-point matching. The 450-kilogram BROACH tandem penetrator bores through concrete and detonates inside the structure, while the range exceeds 250 kilometers, allowing low-altitude ingress from standoff distances. MBDA and Safran confirm the missile’s BROACH architecture and TR60-30 turbojet lineage that underpin its lethality and reach.

Politically, the handover tracks the UK’s consistent strategic messaging since it first confirmed transfers in May 2023, framing Storm Shadow as a proportionate response that upholds Ukraine’s right to self-defense. The current Defence Secretary John Healey has kept support high-tempo in 2025, while the foundational May 11, 2023, statement remains the baseline for London’s position.

On quantities, London has never published counts for any tranche, though reporting in late 2024 described “dozens” of additional missiles supplied. Paris has been more specific at times: President Emmanuel Macron pledged about 40 SCALP in January 2024 and said “several hundred bombs” would accompany the package; France had previously delivered roughly 50 SCALP by mid-2023. Kyiv’s Western deep-strike inventory thus rests on repeat British resupply and periodic French top-ups.

Ukraine employs Storm Shadowfrom Su-24M bombers using pre-planned, terrain-hugging routes and terminal image matching to defeat defenses. The system has been used to tell effect against Crimea-based infrastructure, including the September 2023 strike campaign that wrecked Sevastopol’s dry dock capacity and damaged the submarine Rostov-on-Don and the landing ship Minsk, followed days later by a direct hit on the Black Sea Fleet headquarters that forced Russia to disperse assets and relocate command functions. Imagery and open-source reporting confirm Su-24 carriage and repeated employment.

Storm Shadow complements ATACMS by offering a stealthy, low-altitude cruise profile optimized for fixed, hardened nodes rather than area targets. Ukrainian planners appear to reserve the missile for objectives whose loss creates operational friction beyond immediate blast effects: ship repair capacity, aviation command facilities, ammunition depots under earth cover, bridges, and integrated air-defense components. The BROACH mechanism and terminal seeker are the enablers that make these episodic strikes strategically resonant.

MBDA has restarted and upgraded Storm Shadow and SCALP lines while moving the Franco-British-Italian successor program into its development phase under the new STRATUS banner, the evolution of the FC/ASW project. In parallel, the UK government highlights more than 1,300 high-skill jobs linked to line upgrades and the deep-strike successor effort, anchoring a cross-Channel supply chain that includes Safran’s TR60 family of engines and seeker-electronics producers. The UK National Audit Office has flagged the bill to replenish donated munitions, underscoring the budget tradeoffs inherent in sustaining Ukraine while restoring domestic stockpiles.

Comparably, Germany’s Taurus KEPD 350 offers a slightly heavier penetrator (MEPHISTO around 480 kg) and an advertised range beyond 500 kilometers, trading size for deeper reach; Berlin has repeatedly declined a transfer to Ukraine despite debate through 2025 and instead funded upgrades to its own inventory. The U.S. AGM-158 family fields a 1,000-lb-class penetrator and stretches from 200+ miles (baseline) to 500+ miles (ER) and roughly 1,000 miles (XR). Washington has considered JASSM for Ukraine at various points but, as of today, has not publicly announced a transfer. In Ukrainian service now, Storm Shadow and SCALP remain the only European deep-strike cruise missiles integrated on available platforms and used at scale.

For Britain and France, each new delivery is more than a battlefield input. It signals durable demand for deep-strike munitions, validates MBDA’s production restart, and pushes suppliers of explosives, actuators, seekers, and turbojets to expand capacity. For Kyiv, it preserves a credible ability to impose costs deep in the Russian rear, shaping the campaign by forcing Russia to spend on dispersal, concealment, and reconstruction rather than offense. The latest Bloomberg report, paired with London’s broader 2025 posture, suggests Storm Shadow will continue to sit at the center of Ukraine’s deep strike capability alongside ATACMS and a fast-growing drone complex.

Written by Evan Lerouvillois, Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group.

Evan studied International Relations, and quickly specialized in defense and security. He is particularly interested in the influence of the defense sector on global geopolitics, and analyzes how technological innovations in defense, arms export contracts, and military strategies influence the international geopolitical scene.
Russia uses nuclear-capable 9M729 Novator missile against Ukraine for first time
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Ukraine has confirmed that Russia used the 9M729 Novator ground-launched cruise missile, a nuclear-capable weapon once central to the U.S. withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, marking the missile’s first verified use in combat.

On October 31, 2025, Reuters announced that Ukraine’s foreign minister Andrii Sybiha stated that Russia has fired the nuclear-capable 9M729 missile at least 23 times since August 2025 and twice in 2022, confirming its combat deployment. One missile reportedly traveled more than 1,200 kilometers before striking near Lviv, where debris labeled 9M729 was recovered. The missile, linked to the U.S. exit from the INF Treaty in 2019, had been viewed by Washington as a weapon capable of undermining global arms control stability.
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Publicly unveiled in 2019, the 9M729 Novator is a ground-launched cruise missile developed by NPO Novator, capable of carrying either a conventional or nuclear warhead and reaching targets at distances of up to 2,500 kilometers. (Picture source: RIA Novosti)

Ukrainian authorities state that Russia has launched the 9M729 Novator ground-launched cruise missile, known in NATO classification as SSC-8, twenty-three times since August 2025 and twice in 2022, marking its first verified use in warfare. One missile launched on October 5 reportedly traveled more than 1,200 kilometers before striking a residential area in Lapaiivka near Lviv, where debris bearing the 9M729 designation was recovered. The 9M729, capable of carrying either a nuclear or a conventional warhead, is linked to the 2019 withdrawal of the United States from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which had prohibited ground-launched missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. Russia has not commented on these specific Ukrainian claims, while Kyiv views this deployment as evidence of an expanding arsenal used against both Ukrainian and European targets.

The 9M729’s origins trace back to NPO Novator’s long experience with subsonic cruise missile development. It is believed to be a derivative of the sea-launched 3M14 Kalibr (SS-N-30A) missile, adapted for ground operations conducted with the Iskander-K system. According to available information, the 9M729’s airframe measures between 6 and 8 meters in length with a body diameter of approximately 0.514 meters and carries a single 450-kilogram warhead. It uses a solid-propellant booster for initial launch before transitioning to a small turbofan engine that maintains subsonic cruise speed, reportedly around 720 kilometers per hour. Its guidance system combines inertial navigation with satellite correction through GLONASS and GPS, with potential terrain contour matching in the final stage to enhance accuracy. The payload can be conventional or nuclear, giving Russian forces operational flexibility for both strategic and tactical missions. Each Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL) carries four sealed canisters, each containing one missile, allowing for salvo launches or staggered strikes.

At the heart of the 9M729’s controversy lies its range capability, which directly influenced the INF Treaty’s collapse. While Russia claims the missile’s maximum range is under 500 kilometers, U.S. and NATO estimates place it at up to 2,500 kilometers, encompassing nearly all of Europe within potential reach. Western analysts, citing testing data, assert that Russia tested one version from a fixed launcher beyond 500 kilometers and another from a mobile launcher under the threshold, combining results to obscure treaty compliance. The U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center recorded the missile’s maximum range as 2,500 kilometers in its 2017 report, confirming it as an intermediate-range system. The 9M729’s performance parameters, including fuel load, airframe length, and turbofan efficiency, align with such extended ranges. One 9M729 launched on October 5, 2025, reportedly flew 1,200 kilometers, a figure consistent with these Western assessments. Russia continues to maintain that the missile’s modifications increased accuracy and warhead power but decreased overall range by 10 kilometers compared to its predecessor, the 9M728.

The Russian Ministry of Defense publicly presented the 9M729 for the first time in January 2019 at the Patriot Expocentre near Moscow to foreign military attachés and international media representatives. Lieutenant General Mikhail Matveyevsky, commander of Russia’s missile and artillery forces, described the 9M729 as a modernized version of the 9M728 missile, featuring an upgraded warhead and guidance system while keeping the same propulsion and fuel capacity. According to Matveyevsky, these improvements made the missile’s transport and launch container 53 centimeters longer than the earlier model, necessitating the creation of a new, larger launcher capable of carrying four missiles instead of two. He claimed that the maximum range remained 480 kilometers, in compliance with the INF Treaty’s limits. Western officials, however, viewed the presentation as an attempt to demonstrate transparency without addressing the testing discrepancies that had already led Washington to declare the system a violation of the treaty.

The 9M729 uses a road-mobile launcher resembling the Iskander-M’s 9P78-1 TEL, making visual distinction difficult and complicating future verification or inspection measures. By February 2017, U.S. officials assessed that Russia had already deployed two battalions equipped with the SSC-8 missile, each containing four launchers with six missiles per launcher. Reports by early 2019 from European sources, including the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, indicated that four battalions were operational at Kapustin Yar, Yekaterinburg, Mozdok, and Shuya, giving Russia an estimated 64 missiles in total. The Russian government subsequently lifted geographic restrictions on intermediate-range systems on August 4, 2025, formally allowing deployment anywhere on its territory. Analysts from the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Pacific Forum noted that such systems could conduct strikes from deep within Russia while remaining beyond the reach of Ukrainian counterattacks.

Technical fragments collected after the October 5 strike offer strong indications of the missile’s type. Recovered debris reportedly included sections of a tubular cable housing, engine casing, and paneling consistent with Novator’s design layout. According to Reuters, Dr Jeffrey Lewis, from the Middlebury Institute, and other missile specialists who reviewed the imagery confirmed that the visible components matched the 9M729’s expected configuration, particularly the engine compartment and control surfaces. This evidence, combined with the measured flight distance, points to the 9M729’s use rather than other Russian long-range missiles like the Kh-101 or Kalibr. Its operational employment grants Russia an alternative attack axis independent of air or sea platforms, complicating Ukrainian air defense coverage. Analysts note that such use also allows Russia to test the missile’s reliability, precision, and survivability under wartime conditions, a step that could further inform its broader missile modernization strategy.

The missile’s reappearance on the battlefield revives unresolved questions about European security following the demise of the INF Treaty, also known as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Originally signed in 1987 by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, the treaty eliminated 2,692 ground-launched missiles from both sides by 1991 and remained a cornerstone of arms control for over three decades. After its collapse, Russia initially proposed a moratorium on intermediate-range missile deployments before later discarding it. The 9M729’s dual capability and long reach blur the line between conventional and nuclear deterrence, raising concerns among NATO members about response times and escalation risks. Its use in Ukraine indicates that Moscow not only retained the system but also integrated it into active military operations. The 9M729’s deployment alongside other strategic projects, such as the nuclear-powered Burevestnik cruise missile and the Poseidon underwater torpedo, highlights Russia’s continued pursuit of long-range precision weapons across multiple domains.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
Ukraine’s Inguar-3 Armored Vehicle Enters Frontline Service With Anti-Drone Armor Upgrades
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Ukraine’s domestically produced Inguar-3 MRAP entered service with National Guard units after state contracts and combat trials, with public footage showing the 3rd Operational Brigade operating the vehicle. The Inguar-3’s combination of STANAG Level 3 protection, modular armor, and integrated electronic warfare and anti-drone fittings addresses the immediate battlefield problem of FPV drones and artillery harassment.

In a social media postdated 26 October 2025, the 3rd Operational Brigade of the National Guard showcased one of the vehicles the unit is currently operating the Inguar-3 armored vehicle. On March 23, 2025, Ukraine’s defense forces began receiving the domestically built Inguar-3 armored vehicle, with National Guard formations confirmed among the first field users. Public footage and local reporting now show the Spartan 3rd Operational Brigade operating the type, while the 18th Slavic Brigade has been seen outfitting vehicles with anti-drone cages following state contracts placed at the end of 2024 for two unnamed structures.
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The Ukrainian Inguar-3 is a modular armored 4x4 with STANAG 3 protection, a 356 hp Deutz powertrain, and integrated counter-drone EW, boosting frontline mobility and survivability (Picture source: Screenshot from the 3rd Operational Brigade of the National Guard's video).

Built by Kyiv-based Inguar Defense, the program grew out of wartime lessons and a push to reduce reliance on adapted commercial trucks. Company records and contact listings confirm the manufacturer’s base in the capital, with the legal entity registered in 2020, a sign of the rapid maturation of Ukraine’s light armor sector since 2014. The firm styles Inguar-3 as a modular MRAP family available in 4x4 and 6x6, designed alongside special operations users and vetted in combat trials before orders.

Inguar-3 combines an armored steel and aluminum shell with a frame chassis, independent suspension and planetary gearboxes for rough terrain. Power comes from a Deutz diesel rated at 356 horsepower and 1,500 Nm, paired to an Allison automatic. Central tire inflation and RunFlat inserts preserve mobility after a puncture, while quick-change aluminum armor modules simplify repair. The manufacturer claims STANAG 4569 Level 3 ballistic and 3a/3b mine protection, targeting survivability against 7.62×51 AP rounds, 155 mm fragments at 60 meters and 8 kg mine blasts.

The vehicle is purpose-built for a drone-saturated battlespace. The Ukrainian Government order specified an integrated electronic warfare station, and units have been installing an armored anti-drone superstructure during acceptance, reflecting a doctrine that pairs passive protection with active jamming. Ukrainian outlets and official media further indicate a remote weapon station is in development, sized for 12.7 mm machine guns or a 40 mm grenade launcher, with ring-mount heavy machine guns used in the interim.

Inguar-3 gives National Guard and light infantry formations a protected mobility node for dispersed assault groups, convoy security and casualty evacuation under fire. In role and weight, it sits near Western protected mobility like JLTV or Poland’s Tur family, but its layout and fittings are tailored to Ukraine’s reality of dense mine belts, artillery harassment and FPV ambushes. Early battlefield narratives underscore that logic, with multiple reports of crews dismounting safely after FPV hits and, in one case, the vehicle remaining drivable through fire.

On procurement, quantities remain undisclosed. Kyiv media and industry sources describe a first state batch for two agencies late in 2024, summer 2025 deliveries beginning with National Guard units, and “serial deliveries in the pipeline” as brigades complete anti-drone fittings before formal acceptance. This wartime cadence compresses the traditional test-contract-fielding cycle and keeps configuration control close to the user, with brigade repair shops integrating EW blocks and cages as standard practice.

Ukraine faces massed tube and rocket artillery, layered obstacle belts and ubiquitous one-way-attack drones that punish soft-skinned transports and legacy APCs. A protected, modular workhorse with verified Level 3 protection and integrated counter-drone tools changes the risk calculus for moving squads, medics and fire support teams under observation. There are no confirmed foreign operators yet, but if domestic demand is met and performance trends hold, Inguar-3 is a credible export candidate for partners seeking a compact MRAP optimized for drone-heavy warfare.

Written by Evan Lerouvillois, Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group.

Evan studied International Relations, and quickly specialized in defense and security. He is particularly interested in the influence of the defense sector on global geopolitics, and analyzes how technological innovations in defense, arms export contracts, and military strategies influence the international geopolitical scene.
Ukraine selects Germany’s Rheinmetall Lynx KF41 as its main infantry fighting vehicle
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Ukraine has formally selected the German-made Rheinmetall Lynx KF41 as its future standard infantry fighting vehicle and will begin local production under a new bilateral agreement with Germany.

According to Defence Network on October 25, 2025, Ukraine has apparently officially selected the Rheinmetall Lynx KF41 as its future main infantry fighting vehicle following testing and evaluation of the vehicle delivered from Hungary in late 2024. According to insiders, during a meeting held last week, an agreement was signed between the defense ministers of Ukraine and Germany enabling joint production inside Ukraine through Rheinmetall and the state-owned defense group Ukroboronprom.
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This decision marks a turning point for Ukraine, which had previously accepted every infantry fighting vehicle offered through foreign donations, but had lacked a single IFV model suitable for mass production. (Picture source: Rheinmetall)

Insider reports indicate that Ukraine has now officially selected the German-made Rheinmetall Lynx KF41 as its standard infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) for domestic production, following a period in which it had accepted every infantry fighting vehicle offered through foreign donations but lacked its own production line. The decision was reached after extended evaluation and testing of the first Lynx, manufactured in Hungary, which arrived in Ukraine at the end of 2024 for trials. During a Ramstein-format meeting held last week, the defense ministers of Ukraine and Germany signed an agreement providing for the joint production of the Lynx in Ukraine. Rheinmetall plans to establish a new factory inside the country by the end of 2025, working in partnership with the Ukrainian state defense conglomerate Ukroboronprom. This marks a turning point for Ukraine, which until now relied on imported and donated armored vehicles from multiple sources without a unified production strategy, as its armed forces had not yet chosen a single model.

The agreement enables Ukraine to begin the serial production of a single standardized IFV, compatible with NATO maintenance and logistics systems, while localizing production, strengthening national industrial capabilities, and reducing dependence on external procurement amid continuing conflict. Positioning the Lynx KF41 as the foundation of Ukraine’s future armored fleet modernization, the bilateral agreement builds upon the joint venture Rheinmetall Ukrainian Defense Industry LLC, created in October 2023, which has so far focused on repair and maintenance of armored vehicles in western Ukraine. The new phase expands this cooperation to full-scale Lynx production. Rheinmetall CEO Armin Papperger previously mentioned a potential framework contract covering several hundred Lynx vehicles, though no specific quantities have been disclosed.

Testing and acceptance trials of the Lynx in Ukraine are taking place away from combat zones and will benefit from prior evaluation work conducted in Hungary. The German government has already approved export licenses allowing the transfer of components, tooling, and technical data necessary for local assembly. Rheinmetall’s plan is to deliver the first Ukrainian-assembled Lynx vehicles before 2027, depending on financing arrangements and industrial readiness. Negotiations are ongoing between Rheinmetall, the German government, and Kyiv regarding funding mechanisms for the project, as Berlin awaits a formal procurement request before committing to state-backed financial support. Once operational, the new facility would mark Ukraine’s first large-scale armored vehicle manufacturing line established during the ongoing war, completing the shift from repair-based cooperation to integrated production.

The KF41 Lynx employs a modular design architecture separating a base drive module from an interchangeable mission module, allowing rapid configuration changes for different operational roles. The vehicle can be adapted for infantry combat, reconnaissance, command and control, medical evacuation, mortar transport, or short-range air defense. This modularity is intended to streamline logistics and simplify training, since the same chassis and drivetrain can host multiple mission systems. Rheinmetall has demonstrated this adaptability through the Skyranger 35 air-defense variant, which mounts a 35 mm revolver cannon turret on the KF41 chassis to counter drones, helicopters, and cruise missiles. Other mission packages developed for international users include anti-tank, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare modules, which could also be produced in Ukraine in future stages of cooperation. The shared architecture between user nations such as Hungary, Italy, and Ukraine may eventually enable joint maintenance networks and common spare part inventories. This modularity, combined with digital integration capability, allows the KF41 to evolve over time with upgraded sensors, software, and weapon systems without requiring new platform development.

The KF41’s main configuration features the LANCE 2.0 turret equipped with a 35 mm Wotan automatic cannon and optional Spike LR2 anti-tank guided missiles for long-range precision engagement. The turret includes a stabilized electro-optical sight, laser warning receivers, and a fire-control computer to support automatic target tracking and engagement. Its modular armor protection provides resistance to 30 mm ammunition on the frontal arc and 14.5 mm rounds on the sides, while an armored double floor improves survivability against mines and improvised explosive devices equivalent to 10 kg of TNT. Crew safety systems include decoupled seating and spall liners throughout the fighting compartment. Additional survivability measures consist of Rheinmetall’s ROSY smoke protection system, the Acoustic Shooter Localization System (ASLS), and the optional StrikeShield active protection system for intercepting anti-tank weapons. The open-architecture electronics allow integration of new sensors or counter-drone tools, which is a growing requirement for frontline operations. The KF41 accommodates three crew members—driver, gunner, and commander—and carries up to eight or nine fully equipped soldiers in the rear compartment, providing combined transport and combat capability.

The vehicle is powered by an 850 kW (1,140 horsepower) Liebherr D9612 diesel engine coupled with a Renk automatic transmission, allowing a maximum road speed of 70 kilometers per hour and an operational range exceeding 500 kilometers on a 900-liter fuel capacity. Its combat weight ranges from approximately 44 to 50 tonnes, depending on configuration and armor kit. The suspension system, developed by Supashock, provides adjustable damping for stability over rough terrain and supports varied survivability packages. The powertrain uses components common to other European vehicles, such as the Puma and Ajax, reducing logistical complexity and ensuring spare part availability across allied fleets. The vehicle’s track system is compatible with lightweight steel or segmented rubber tracks, giving operators flexibility for different terrain types. The Lynx can negotiate 60 percent gradients, traverse 30 percent side slopes, and climb vertical obstacles up to one meter. It can cross trenches 2.5 meters wide and ford water obstacles up to 1.5 meters deep without preparation. These performance parameters place the KF41 among the most mobile vehicles in its weight class, suitable for both mechanized offensive and defensive operations across open and urban terrain.

The establishment of Lynx production in Ukraine represents a major element of Rheinmetall’s long-term industrial strategy to integrate Ukrainian manufacturing capacity into the European defense supply chain. The German company’s orders with Ukraine increased from around 900 million euros in 2022 to approximately 2.5 billion euros in 2023, covering armored vehicles, ammunition, and maintenance services. Rheinmetall plans to expand ammunition output across new facilities in Germany, Lithuania, and Ukraine to exceed 1.1 million shells annually, including about 700,000 artillery rounds and 10,000 tons of propellant. The transfer of technology for vehicle production is expected to create a qualified Ukrainian workforce trained in armored assembly, welding, machining, and quality control. In addition, the local facility will support the repair of Leopard tanks, Marder infantry vehicles, and Gepard anti-aircraft systems already in Ukrainian service. The long-term goal is to establish a fully autonomous industrial base capable of producing, maintaining, and upgrading armored vehicles without external dependency. Ukrainian officials have emphasized that this capacity will also support post-war reconstruction by developing dual-use engineering and manufacturing expertise.

For Ukraine, adopting the Lynx KF41 constitutes a modernization step from Soviet-era BMP-series IFVs toward a new generation of armored vehicles compatible with NATO standards. The KF41’s digital systems, modular structure, and scalable protection align with Ukraine’s need for survivable, adaptable, and networked vehicles in a high-intensity conflict environment. The program also strengthens the defense partnership with Germany, which has already provided Leopard 1 and Leopard 2 tanks, Marder IFVs, and air defense systems through bilateral and ring-exchange mechanisms. In operational terms, the Lynx is expected to enhance Ukraine’s ability to sustain combined-arms maneuvers under drone-saturated conditions and against modern anti-armor threats. The transition to domestic production will gradually reduce the logistical burden of maintaining diverse foreign fleets while ensuring faster repair cycles and spare parts availability. If production proceeds as planned, the first Ukrainian-built Lynx IFVs could enter service by 2027, representing both a technological upgrade for the armed forces and a step toward long-term industrial independence. Like Hungary, the partnership with Rheinmetall positions Ukraine as a future regional producer of modern armored systems within the European defense landscape.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.