Flux RSS Army - Conflicts in the world

Army - Conflicts in the world

Russia deploys new TOS-3 Drakon thermobaric rocket system in Ukraine against fortified positions
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On February 4, 2026, the Russian Ministry of Defense released a second official footage showing the TOS-3 Drakon heavy flamethrower system conducting combat operations in Ukraine.

On February 4, 2026, the Russian Ministry of Defense released official footage showing the TOS-3 Drakon heavy flamethrower system conducting combat operations in Ukraine. The ministry identified the crew as belonging to the 29th Separate Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense Brigade of the Center Group of Forces and stated that the system destroyed a Ukrainian stronghold in the Krasnoarmeysk direction.
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The TOS-3 launcher pod is fitted with protective mesh screening, like the TOS-2, Volnorez electronic warfare systems, and possibly a digital fire control and communications equipment to support extended engagement distances. (Picture source: Russian MoD)

The TOS (Russian acronym for “Tyazhyolaya Ognemyotnaya Sistema,” meaning “Heavy Flamethrower System”) designates a family of 220 mm thermobaric rocket launchers used by Russia, which began with the Soviet-era TOS-1 Buratino, developed between 1971 and 1979 to attack fortified positions and light armour. The TOS-1 was introduced in 1988 and was mounted on a tracked T-72 tank chassis, with 30 launch tubes in its original configuration and a crew of three; it carried thermobaric warheads for area blast effects. The launcher’s rockets had a 0.5 km to 3 km range in early models, and the vehicle weighed about 45.3 tonnes, had an 840 hp diesel engine, a maximum road speed of 60 km/h, and a range of 550 km without auxiliary tanks. The TOS-1 was deployed by the Russian NBC Protection Troops rather than conventional artillery units, and initial combat tests took place in 1988-1989 in the Panjshir Valley during the Soviet-Afghan war.

The TOS-1A Solntsepyok, developed as the modernized variant of the original system, entered Russian service in 2001 with a reduced 24-tube launcher arranged in three rows of eight, mounted on a T-72, T-80, or T-90 tank chassis with characteristics similar to those of the TOS-1. The TOS-1A’s 220 mm rockets had a firing range of up to 6 000 m using the MO.1.01.04M rocket and up to 10 000 m with the MO.1.01.04M2 upgrade, and the launcher could fire multiple rockets in rapid succession. The vehicle’s design included a reinforced hull for crew protection, a fire-control system with a ballistic computer, observation equipment and a laser rangefinder, and smoke-grenade launchers for obscuration; it operated alongside main battle tanks and infantry. The TOS-1A has been used in multiple conflicts, including the Russo-Ukrainian war, and variants have been produced for export to other countries.

Return of combat experience later resulted in the development of the TOS-2 Tosochka in 2018, which shifted from a tank base to a wheeled 6x6 UralAZ-63704-0010 truck chassis, with production starting in 2021. The TOS-2 carries 18 220 mm rockets and is equipped with an integrated loading crane, updated fire-control systems, satellite navigation and communication equipment, and the TBS-M3 rocket with a stated range of at least 10 km and, in some references, reaching 20 km; it also retains thermobaric warhead employment. The wheeled chassis provided higher road speed and longer operational range compared with tracked predecessors, and the system was first publicly displayed in 2020 and entered service in early 2021; it has been observed deployed in Ukraine.

The TOS-3, often referred to as “Dragon” or Drakon, represents a further evolutionary step, combining features from earlier variants with enhanced missile range ambitions and additional defensive systems. The first public indication of the TOS-3's existence emerged in mid-January 2024 when Omsktransmash applied to register the “TOS-3 Drakon” trademark and logo (a tracked chassis with a 15-tube launcher arranged in three rows of five), securing rights in early February 2024 across categories including military vehicles and artillery systems. On April 8, 2024, Bekhan Ozdoev of Rostec confirmed that the project had progressed beyond development and that a prototype had been constructed, specifying the use of a tracked chassis and a new launcher for increased-range ammunition. Then, in June 2024, the TOS-3 ‘Dragon’ was publicly unveiled during an official event in Russia’s southwest Saratov region. In November 22, 2025, the first combat footage of the TOS-3 in Ukraine appeared, already linked to the 29th Separate NBC Protection Brigade.

Available information indicates that the TOS-3 uses a tracked armored chassis similar to the TOS-1A (speculation focuses on possible use of T-72 or T-80 chassis) but with a lighter launcher unit carrying 15 220 mm rockets, which allows each rocket to carry increased propellant for enhanced range. A fully loaded TOS-1A weighs 46 tonnes with 24 rockets, and there are indications that designers may target 40 to 42 tonnes for the TOS-3 in combat configuration to improve mobility and survivability. The launcher pod on TOS-3 is fitted with protective mesh screening, like the TOS-2, Volnorez electronic warfare systems, and possibly a digital fire control and communications equipment to support extended engagement distances. These measures were likely adopted after FPV drone-related losses of TOS systems in Ukraine.

Range progression across the TOS family shows incremental increases. The original TOS-1 rocket had a minimum effective range of about 0.5 km and a maximum of about 3 km, later extended by MO.1.01.04M rockets to about 6 km and by MO.1.01.04M2 to around 10 km for TOS-1A. The TBS-M3 rocket, introduced with the TOS-2, has a stated range of at least 10 to 12 km, while some references cite engagement distances up to 20 km depending on configuration; these rockets are longer and heavier to achieve greater range. Early reports on TOS-3 estimate its new or improved 220 mm rockets can engage targets at 15 km or beyond (some higher estimates reaching 18 km or 24 km), although formal official figures remain unpublished; the smaller number of tubes on TOS-3 suggests a larger rocket size with increased propellant capacity to achieve such extended flight.

Thermobaric munitions used by the TOS systems function by dispersing an aerosol cloud of fine fuel particles in the target area and then igniting it, producing a high-temperature, high-pressure blast wave and a sustained overpressure effect that relies on atmospheric oxygen to amplify blast duration and effect. Thermobaric warheads are also designed to generate sustained pressure and heat over wider areas than conventional condensed explosives of similar mass, to increase the damage done to fortifications, enclosed structures, light armored vehicles, and personnel through shockwave and oxygen depletion. Earlier operational procedures required crews to approach within line of sight, determine range using a laser rangefinder, calculate elevation through a ballistic computer, and fire salvos from short distances, while later variants incorporated digital fire control upgrades and integration with reconnaissance drones to reduce reaction time.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
Ukraine starts testing new Mac Owl 4x4 armored personnel carrier under combat conditions
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The new Mac Owl armored personnel carrier had entered testing with units of the Ukrainian Army, shortly after its public unveiling on January 16, 2026.

On February 1, 2026, Dimko Zhluktenko reported that the Mac Owl armored personnel carrier had entered testing with units of the Ukrainian Army following its public presentation on January 16, 2026. The vehicle, developed by the Ukrainian company Mac Hub, is being evaluated under operational conditions characterized by mine threats, improvised explosive devices, artillery fragments, and direct fire.
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The Mac Owl can ford water obstacles up to 1,200 mm deep without preparation, cross ditches up to 800 mm wide, climb gradients of 60 percent, and operate on lateral slopes of up to 21 percent. (Picture source: X/Dimko Zhluktenko)

The APC, produced by the Ukrainian company Mac Hub, will be tested under conditions relevant to ongoing high-intensity operations, where armored personnel carriers face frequent exposure to mines, improvised explosive devices, artillery fragments, and direct fire, often with limited freedom of maneuver. According to the manufacturer, development of the vehicle lasted more than one year and included consultations with representatives from Ukraine’s defense intelligence to align design choices with observed battlefield requirements. Mac Hub also stated that Mac Owl is Ukraine’s first armored vehicle certified to STANAG 4569 Levels 4a and 4b for ballistic and mine protection.

The Mac Owl is built around a monocoque capsule hull intended to maximize protection against mines and explosive threats while preserving internal volume and ground clearance. Mine resistance is rated at STANAG 4a and 4b, corresponding to resistance against the detonation of 10 kg of TNT under any wheel and 10 kg beneath the hull, exceeding the level offered by many armored vehicles typically rated at STANAG 3a and 3b. The lower hull incorporates a V-shaped structure, while the hull's thickness is specified as 16 mm for the side and rear walls, 15 mm for the bottom, and 8 mm for the roof. Armored glass thickness is specified at 90 mm by 120 mm. The armor layout uses a two-layer structure consisting of an external armored steel layer intended to stop direct fire and an internal polymer layer designed to absorb fragments and resist prolonged thermal exposure.

Ballistic protection for both the crew and engine compartments is rated at STANAG 4569 Level 4a, and the vehicle is also rated to withstand a side explosion equivalent to 50 kg of TNT. Protection can be increased through the addition of external ceramic armor elements, which the manufacturer states can raise resistance to 14.5 mm caliber threats when required. Survivability measures extend beyond passive armor, as the Mac Owl integrates a 360-degree situational awareness system offering the automatic detection of obstacles and potential targets around the vehicle. An onboard electronic warfare suite is included to counter electronically triggered or guided threats.

Fire safety is addressed through an automatic fire detection and suppression system covering both the crew compartment and the engine bay. The vehicle also incorporates an independent liquid cooling system intended to maintain operational capability in high ambient temperatures. Crew seating uses lightweight military seats equipped with integrated four-point seat belts compliant with EEC UN standards, aimed at reducing injury from blast effects and sudden deceleration. Propulsion is provided by a 450 hp diesel engine coupled to a six-speed automatic transmission driving a 4x4 layout. Curb mass is specified at 15 tons, with a payload capacity of 2 tons. The manufacturer has not disclosed the external length, width, or height dimensions of the Mac Owl, but the wheelbase measures 3,300 mm, for a turning radius of less than 18 m.

Tires are specified as 16.00R20 all-terrain types, and differential locks are fitted at the front, rear, and central positions. Maximum speed is stated as up to 100 km/h, depending on terrain and armor configuration, for an operational range of 700 km in mixed conditions, or 700 km when cruising at 60 km/h. The Mac Owl can ford water obstacles up to 1,200 mm deep without preparation, cross ditches up to 800 mm wide, climb gradients of 60 percent, and operate on lateral slopes of up to 21 percent. Acceleration from 0 to 60 km/h is specified as under 15 seconds, and acceleration from 0 to 80 km/h as under 30 seconds. Braking performance from 60 to 0 km/h is specified as 3 seconds within a distance of less than 30 m, with compliance to ECE-R13 requirements.

Suspension is hydropneumatic and independent, offering 300 mm of wheel travel through compact A-shaped control arms and reinforced components. Steering uses hydraulic power assistance, and constant-speed external front drive shafts on the steering axis are intended to maintain smooth wheel movement without feedback, even at full steering lock. The braking system is supplied by Knorr-Bremse and consists of pneumatic disc brakes with an integrated anti-lock braking system, with a rear parking brake, and pneumatic couplings for towing. Maintenance considerations are central to the Mac Owl’s design, with the monocoque hull acting as a single integrated capsule to which major systems are directly mounted. The engine and gearbox form one replaceable module, while the running gear and other subsystems are organized as separate modules.

In case of failure or damage, individual modules can be removed and replaced in field conditions rather than repaired in place, reducing downtime and limiting the need for specialized tools or advanced technical training. Crew configuration is specified as two crew members plus six or eight passengers, depending on internal arrangement. The Mac Owl supports both left-hand and right-hand drive layouts, with adjustable driver and co-driver seats. Rear seating can be arranged facing inward or outward. Access points include a hydraulically operated rear door with an exit hatch and explosive locks, two roof hatches, and two side doors for the driver and co-driver. Internal systems are configured to support sustained operations. The electrical system operates at 24 V and includes a 260 A alternator, main and auxiliary batteries, and internal power outlets providing 24 V, 12 V, and 5 V, including multiple cigarette lighter and USB sockets.

External power outlets and NATO-standard 24 V sockets are fitted at the front and rear. Lighting equipment includes high beams, low beams, daytime running lights, side marker lights, fog lights, and rear LED white lights for crew use. A roof-mounted rear-view camera provides low-light rear visibility to the driver via the instrument panel. Climate control includes heating and air conditioning rated at 12 kV cooling and heating capacity, alongside insulation and noise suppression. The current armored fighting configuration supports a user-defined turret option, with the baseline configuration designed for a Browning machine gun. Operational flexibility includes the ability to convert the Mac Owl into a medical evacuation configuration within a few hours.

This involves removing the turret, installing a roof cover, replacing troop seats with stretchers, and adding a central medic seat. Gas-filled shock absorbers are intended to improve ride smoothness during casualty evacuation. Standard equipment includes a NATO-standard towing device, two external 20-liter water containers, onboard tools, firing ports, run-flat inserts, centralized tire inflation, anti-lock braking, HVAC, and fire suppression systems. Optional equipment includes window heating with anti-icing elements, infrared lighting, additional liquid storage via two 20-liter canisters, and an 8-ton winch mountable on either bumper, as well as additional surveillance and notification systems. Mac Hub stated that the Mac Owl program was implemented in cooperation with Paramount Group Europe, which can explain its resemblance to the Mbombe 4, without being able to confirm whether it is a licensed production or a revised and improved version to better meet Ukraine's needs.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
Ukraine downs first Iranian Shahed-107 drone with high-speed Sting interceptor
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On January 24, 2026, Ukraine confirmed the first recorded interception of an Iranian-made Shahed-107 loitering munition by a Ukrainian Sting interceptor drone during an extended air defense operation.

On January 24, 2026, Wild Hornets confirmed the first recorded interception of an Iranian-made Shahed-107 loitering munition by a Ukrainian Sting interceptor drone during a six-hour air defense operation conducted by the Sky Wars unit of the 47th Mechanized Brigade Magura. The interception provides additional confirmation of the Sting’s operational success against long-range attack UAVs of Iranian origin employed by Russian forces in Ukraine.
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Russia uses the Shahed-107 primarily to strike targets 100 to 300 kilometers behind the Ukrainian front line, making it suitable for attacks on logistics hubs, fuel depots, command posts, air defense systems, and infrastructure nodes that are costly to defend continuously. (Picture source: Wild Hornets and Iranian MoD)

The Sting is a Ukrainian quadcopter drone designed specifically to intercept and destroy incoming Shahed drones and similar UAVs, through physical impact or proximity detonation. It entered operational use in 2024 and has been employed continuously through 2025 and early 2026 by dedicated drone-hunting teams, using FPV control with thermal imaging for night and low-visibility operations. Multiple tests and demonstrations have shown sustained flight speeds around 300 to 315 km/h, with some claims placing the upper limit closer to 350 km/h in short bursts, allowing it to pursue and engage propeller-driven attack drones and even faster jet-powered variants within altitudes of up to about 3,000 meters. Designed for rapid deployment from mobile positions, the Sting can be recovered if no engagement occurs and redeployed quickly, for an estimated cost of about $2,000 to $2,500 per interceptor.

First employed against Ukraine in 2025, the Shahed-107 is a high-wing unmanned aerial vehicle with an X-shaped tail assembly intended to stabilize flight over extended distances, and its wingspan is estimated as approximately three meters. Examination of recovered components revealed a fuselage constructed from carbon fiber combined with aluminum structural elements, a configuration aimed at reducing weight while maintaining sufficient structural strength. In the examined sample, a cumulative high-explosive fragmentation warhead weighing 15 kg was identified, a payload assessed as suitable for engaging fortified positions and critical infrastructure rather than exclusively soft targets.

Propulsion is provided by a Chinese-made DLE 111 two-stroke gasoline engine paired with a fuel tank holding 28 liters, resulting in an operational range stated as about 300 kilometers for the configuration assessed by Ukrainian specialists. Comparable small gasoline engines have been identified across several other unmanned systems used by Russian forces, including the Gerbera, BM-35, Parodiya, and Delta drones, indicating a shared component supply pattern. The navigation chain combines inertial navigation with satellite guidance, supported by a four-element antenna intended to reduce the effectiveness of some electronic countermeasures rather than fully negate them.

Chronologically, the Shahed-107 was first publicly revealed by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in June 2025 during a period of heightened confrontation between Iran and Israel. Following this unveiling, the drone soon appeared in Russian service and was subsequently employed against Ukrainian territory, situating it within the broader framework of Iran-Russia cooperation in unmanned strike capabilities. Additional available information links earlier mentions of the Shahed-107 to January 2024, including references to potential transfers valued at over $2 million and adaptations intended to seek out high-value targets such as Western-origin multiple launch rocket systems used by Ukrainian forces.

Alongside the three-meter wingspan and 300-kilometer range configuration, other pieces of information about the Shahed-107 include claims of ranges reaching up to 1,500 kilometers, fuselage lengths of about 2.5 meters, and visual features such as rectangular wings with control surfaces and a pitot-tube-like airspeed sensor. Separate characterizations reference a smaller fixed-wing loitering munition measuring about 1.6 meters in length with a 2.5-meter wingspan, an 8 to 9 kg warhead, a cruise speed of about 120 km/h, operational altitude up to 3,000 meters, and launch methods ranging from catapult systems to rail or assisted runway takeoff using detachable gear.

Operationally, the interception of the Shahed-107 is part of an increasing combat record for the Sting interceptor. By late 2025, Wild Hornets and Ukrainian military units reported that Sting interceptors had destroyed well over 1,000 hostile UAVs, including Shahed/Geran variants and decoy drones. In December 2025, the Sting was also credited with intercepting a jet-powered Geran-3, which is based on the Iranian Shahed-238, demonstrating that the interceptor can engage faster, more challenging targets than earlier propeller-driven drones. Within Ukraine’s broader interceptor drone program, this interceptor now represents one of the most mature and widely fielded drones, forming a practical template for how low-cost aerial interceptors are being integrated into modern air defense architectures.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
Russia Deploys the New Geran-5 Jet Strike Drone in Ukraine in Its First Combat Use
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Ukrainian military intelligence says Russia has conducted the first combat use of a new jet-powered long-range strike drone known as Geran-5 during air attacks in January 2026. The system signals a shift toward faster, heavier UAVs derived from Iranian design concepts, complicating Ukraine’s air defense and electronic warfare response.

Ukrainian intelligence officials say Russian forces have begun combat operations with a previously unseen long-range strike drone, marking a notable evolution in Moscow’s unmanned attack arsenal. According to the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine, the jet-powered UAV designated Geran-5 was employed during combined air attacks in mid-January, with early analysis suggesting foreign design influence and expanded strike capabilities compared to earlier Geran variants.
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Russia's Geran-5 is a jet-powered long-range strike drone assessed by Ukrainian intelligence as a derivative of Iran's Karrar UAV, featuring a conventionnal fixed-wing layout, an estimated 1,000 km range, a 90 kg warhead, jam-resistant satellite navigation, and potential options for air launch from Su-25 aircraft and experimental carriage of short-range air-to-air missiles (Picture source: Open source).

HUR describes Geran-5 as a relatively large, fixed-wing vehicle about 6 meters long with a wingspan up to 5.5 meters, carrying a warhead of roughly 90 kg and advertised for a strike range of around 1,000 km. Unlike the earlier Geran-2 family associated with Iranian Shahed-style flying-wing layouts, the new drone uses a conventional aerodynamic configuration, a change that typically supports higher dash speed, better high-altitude handling, and a more forgiving integration path for external stores or sensors. HUR also stresses that many subsystems remain unified with other Geran models, indicating an evolutionary design built for scalable production rather than a one-off prototype.

At the heart of that evolution is propulsion: the agency identifies a Telefly turbojet similar to the powerplant used on Geran-3, but with greater thrust, aligning with the airframe’s larger dimensions and heavier payload class. Telefly engines are Chinese-manufactured and have appeared on other Russian jet UAVs, reportedly obtainable on the civilian market, which helps explain how Russia continues to field “new” drones despite sanctions pressure. In parallel, the electronic architecture described by HUR is familiar: a 12-channel Kometa satellite navigation unit, a tracker built around a Raspberry Pi-type microcomputer, and 3G and 4G modems. Kometa is assessed as a specialised navigation module designed to resist jamming, a critical attribute given Ukraine’s heavy reliance on electronic warfare against long-range drones.

Geran-5 appears tailored for the same combined-strike playbook Russia has refined since 2022, but with a sharper edge. A jet-powered drone compresses the defender’s timeline, forcing faster detection, classification, and engagement. Gun-based mobile fire groups, a backbone of Ukraine’s air defense, have fewer seconds to react. HUR’s note that Russia is exploring airborne launch from Su-25 attack aircraft hints at a tactical concept aimed at pushing release points closer to the front line, extending effective reach while reducing fuel demands, and complicating Ukrainian early-warning geometry.

The most controversial element in the Ukrainian assessment is the claim that Russia is considering fitting Geran-5 with R-73 short-range air-to-air missiles. If pursued, this would represent an attempt to transform a one-way strike drone into a limited counter-air platform capable of threatening Ukrainian helicopters or low-flying aircraft. While such a role raises technical challenges in seeker cueing and launch dynamics on an expendable platform, it would nevertheless force Ukrainian planners to treat some drones not only as strike threats but as potential airborne ambush systems along predictable aviation routes.

Ukrainian intelligence argues that Geran-5 cannot be considered a purely indigenous Russian development. Investigators report significant structural and technological similarities with Iran’s Karrar jet-powered UAV, a system Tehran has long marketed as a high-speed strike and interceptor-capable platform. Iran has previously demonstrated Karrar in missile-armed configurations, making Russia’s exploration of an air-to-air role appear less speculative and more a case of adapting an existing foreign design concept to local production and operational needs.

On the defensive side, Ukraine continues to rely on a layered counter-drone system that has evolved under combat pressure. Air defense fighters, surface-to-air missile units, electronic warfare assets, UAV units, and mobile fire groups are integrated into a single engagement framework. Jet-powered drones like Geran-5 stress this system, but jamming, small-arms fire from mobile teams, and selective missile use remain effective when coordinated. Ukraine is also accelerating the fielding of interceptor drones and expanding the number of trained crews and sensors, aiming to impose asymmetric costs on Russia’s expanding UAV arsenal.

HUR confirms that recovered Geran-5 wreckage is now undergoing detailed forensic analysis and that a comprehensive breakdown of its design, components, and supply chains will be published through War&Sanctions. For Army Recognition readers, the significance of Geran-5 lies less in its name than in what it represents: a clear Russian shift toward faster, longer-range, jet-powered unmanned strike systems derived from Iranian design logic, adapted for mass use, and increasingly integrated into complex, multi-domain attack packages.
UK Sends Raven and Gravehawk Air Defenses to Ukraine to Counter Russian Drones and Missiles
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The UK government says it has delivered 13 Raven short-range air defense systems and two prototype Gravehawk launchers to Ukraine, with more Gravehawk units arriving soon. The deployments highlight how low-cost, mobile interceptors are becoming central to Ukraine’s defense against Russian drones and deep-strike attacks, a lesson closely watched by the United States and NATO allies.

According to disclosures published by UK Parliament on 6 January 2026, the Ministry of Defence has now supplied Ukraine with 13 Raven air-defense systems and two prototype Gravehawk launchers, with the first units from an additional 15-system Gravehawk contract expected shortly. British officials describe Raven as a frontline shield for maneuvering troops, while Gravehawk is designed to protect critical infrastructure from Russia’s sustained drone and missile campaign.

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UK-supplied Raven and Gravehawk air-defense systems deployed in Ukraine combine high-mobility launch platforms with infrared-guided air-to-air missiles adapted for ground use, enabling rapid engagement of drones, helicopters, and low-flying aircraft while strengthening short-range and point air defense against Russian aerial threats (Picture source: UK MoD).

Ravenis a mobile SHORAD solution built around the AIM-132 ASRAAM, a high-agility imaging infrared missile normally carried by fast jets. On the Ukrainian configuration, two ASRAAM rounds are mounted on aircraft-derived launch rails fitted to a Supacat HMT 600 6x6 truck, paired with a mast-mounted electro-optical sensor package offering all-round search and track, and a simple operator interface designed for fast engagements under pressure. In its ground-launched role, Raven is typically described with an engagement reach up to about 15 km, trading the longer kinematic range of an air launch for a compact system that can reposition quickly and fight on short notice.

Raven’s value is less about building another strategic air-defense belt and more about patching the holes that appear at brigade and battalion levels when Russian drones, helicopters, and low-flying aircraft probe for artillery targets and logistics nodes. An electro-optical, infrared-guided kill chain also matters in Ukraine’s dense electronic warfare environment: Raven can hunt without emitting a radar signature that invites anti-radiation missiles or loitering munitions. IR-based engagements depend on weather, background clutter, and the target’s heat profile, and they can be stressed by saturation attacks that force crews into repeated reload cycles. Open reporting has nevertheless credited Raven with hundreds of combat engagements and success rates above 70%, suggesting Ukraine has found practical tactics for shoot-and-scoot survivability and disciplined target selection.

If Raven is the frontline quick draw, Gravehawk is the UK’s attempt to industrialize a Ukrainian wartime habit: turning available air-to-air missiles into surface-launched interceptors. In UK-released imagery and broadcast reporting, Gravehawk is built into a standard ISO shipping container with a roll-back roof that exposes a twin-rail launcher, using rails adapted from Soviet-era fighters so it can fire Ukraine’s existing stocks of Vympel R-73 air-to-air missiles. The system relies on a passive infrared camera and a compact remote command module for acquisition and lock-on, reducing electromagnetic signature at the cost of radar-style wide-area cueing. The R-73’s performance in this context is typically described as Mach 2.5 with an air-to-air range of around 20 miles, though real engagement envelopes against drones or cruise missiles are shaped by launch geometry, seeker limits, and line-of-sight.

Gravehawk’s most important feature may be economic and logistical rather than purely kinematic. By consuming missiles, Ukraine already knows how to store, handle, and maintain; it preserves scarce Western interceptors for the hardest targets and raises the number of firing units Ukraine can disperse around power generation, air bases, and command nodes. That logic fits the broader UK air-defence package announced in December 2025, which tied Raven and Gravehawk deliveries to a winter defensive push and the sustained flow of UK-built missiles, alongside plans to supply remotely guided counter-drone turrets acquired from Estonia in 2026. In a war increasingly defined by massed drones and layered strike packages, Ukraine’s success often hinges on density and responsiveness as much as headline ranges.

Neither Raven nor Gravehawk is presented as a standard British Army in-service system; they are bespoke, wartime builds aimed at speed of fielding. The missiles behind them, however, are well known. ASRAAM is in service with the UK and several partner nations, and has already been used in real combat, including an RAF Typhoon shootdown of a hostile drone over Syria in 2021. The R-73, in service since the 1980s and widely exported across MiG and Sukhoi fleets, has likewise seen extensive operational use and has been repeatedly adapted by Ukraine in improvised roles. Together, Raven and Gravehawk reflect a pragmatic UK-Ukrainian approach to air defense: prioritizing speed, adaptability, and battlefield relevance over peacetime perfection.
Russian Tanks Change Battlefield Tactics as Drone Attacks Dominate Fighting in Ukraine
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Russian tank crews from the Vostok grouping have outlined a paired maneuver tactic near Sladkoye, combining overwatch fire, short forward dashes, and continuous drone correction, according to Russia’s Ministry of Defense. The approach highlights how armored units are adapting to survive in a battlefield dominated by UAV reconnaissance and FPV strike drones.

The Russian Ministry of Defense said on 21 December 2025 that tank crews operating near Sladkoye have begun using a paired maneuver technique intended to reduce vulnerability to drone-directed fires. Outlined on the ministry’s official Telegram channel, the method divides roles between two tanks, one providing overwatch fire from depth while the second advances in short, aggressive bursts to deliver direct fire before quickly disengaging and repositioning. The tactic reflects mounting concern within Russian armored units over prolonged exposure in areas saturated with UAV reconnaissance, FPV strike drones, and rapidly cued indirect fires. The same concept was later reinforced by state defense conglomerate Rostec, which presented it as evidence of how Russian armor is adapting to preserve assault and breakthrough relevance under constant aerial surveillance. Rostec argued that pairing tanks with dedicated drone support helps compress engagement timelines, reduce predictable movement patterns, and improve responsiveness to emerging threats, signaling a shift toward armor operating as tightly managed elements within a continuous drone-enabled warning and surveillance framework.
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Russian tanks operate in coordinated pairs supported by real-time drone reconnaissance, using short forward dashes and overwatch fire to reduce exposure to FPV drones and modern anti-tank threats while maintaining direct-fire pressure on the battlefield (Picture source: Rostec).

The core of the method is simple, but it is designed around one brutal reality of the Ukraine battlefield: a tank that lingers is a tank that gets mapped, bracketed, and hunted. In the MoD description, one vehicle covers the sector with fire from the depths, acting as an overwatch shooter, while the second tank moves forward in sharp bursts to deliver direct fire, then immediately withdraws to reload and change direction. Operators are tasked to adjust impacts, cue fresh targets as defenses shift, and provide early warning when FPV teams, anti-tank guided missiles, or artillery observers begin to set up.

This tactic leans on the fact that Russia’s current transition tank fleet still offers heavy, flexible direct-fire power even when the battlefield is saturated with sensors. Rostec explicitly pointed to the T-90M Proryv, the upgraded T-80BVM, and the T-72B3M as the modernized platforms receiving rapid protection and onboard-system changes based on combat feedback. These tanks retain the familiar 125 mm smoothbore main gun architecture and coaxial machine gun suite, with the T-90M also featuring a 12.7 mm heavy machine gun on a remotely operated mount. In practical terms, this keeps the ammunition mix that matters for assault support: high-explosive fragmentation rounds for fieldworks and infantry positions, anti-armor rounds for enemy vehicles, and in some configurations, the option to launch gun-fired guided missiles from the 125 mm system family.

What changes with drone-enabled pairing is not the gun, but the tempo and the geometry of exposure. The rear tank can fire from partial defilade or from positions selected for survivability, while the forward tank performs a brief fire raid at close range where optics, stabilization, and point-target engagement are strongest. The drone feed reduces the time spent searching through periscopes and thermal sights, and shortens the kill chain from detection to first round on target. That matters against modern threats that punish hesitation: FPV drones attacking from above or from oblique angles, top-attack anti-tank weapons, loitering munitions, and artillery directed by quadcopters.

Russian industry statements suggest protection upgrades are being treated as inseparable from the new drill. In recent Rostec channel reporting about T-90M deliveries, Uralvagonzavod described tanks being fitted with anti-FPV nets and additional rubber-reinforced protection around vulnerable rear areas, alongside broader improvements to fire control and electronic warfare equipment. These add-ons aim to complicate the most common defeat mechanisms seen in drone footage: roof and engine-deck hits, and close-in attacks that exploit thin rear arcs during maneuver.

Rostec’s longer-term argument is that the decisive improvement is integration, not a single armor kit. The corporation framed future armored fists as nodes inside a combined system linking automated command-and-control, multiple UAV classes, artillery, electronic warfare, air defense, engineers, and anti-tank elements, to neutralize a portion of anti-tank threats before the assault phase begins. In that logic, the tank pair is a visible frontline expression of a wider trend: armor operating under a drone umbrella rather than charging ahead as the primary scout.

Independent verification of battlefield effect remains difficult, but the tactical intent is clear. By splitting roles, compressing exposure time, and using drones as both spotters and threat sentries, Russian units are attempting to restore some shock value to armored direct fire while reducing vulnerability to FPV ambushes and rapidly cued anti-tank fires. The tradeoff is dependence on drones and the communications links that enable them, which are themselves targets for electronic warfare and counter-UAV fires. Still, as both Moscow’s official messaging and industrial commentary now emphasize, the tank’s survival on today’s front appears less about thicker armor alone, and more about learning to fight as a fast-moving, drone-coached element inside a wider sensor-and-shooter network.
Upgraded Australian M1A1 Abrams Tanks Enter Ukraine Combat Service Against Drone Threats
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Ukrainian forces have begun combat operations with 49 Australian-supplied M1A1 Abrams tanks, using them primarily as protected direct-fire platforms rather than breakthrough vehicles. The shift highlights how Ukraine is reshaping Western armor tactics to survive a battlefield dominated by drones, precision artillery, and constant surveillance.

Ukrainian armored units are now employing M1A1 Abramsmain battle tanks supplied by Australia in active combat roles, using the heavy vehicles as protected direct-fire assets rather than traditional breakthrough platforms. The tanks, delivered in two tranches and fully handed over by mid-December 2025, have moved rapidly from a closely managed logistics effort into frontline service as Ukraine adapts Western armor to a battlefield dominated by drones, precision artillery, and constant reconnaissance. Australia’s Department of Defence confirmed the transfer of all 49 retired M1A1 Abrams, a package valued at roughly A$245 million and included within more than A$1.7 billion in Australian military support since Russia’s full-scale invasion. Ukrainian crews are integrating the tanks into combined-arms operations that emphasize night fighting, short-duration assaults, and rapid displacement, leveraging the Abrams’ protection and fire-control advantages while minimizing exposure to Russian loitering munitions and long-range fires.
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M1A1 Abrams firepower centers on a 120 mm smoothbore cannon with stabilized sights and digital fire control for accurate long-range day-night shots, backed by 7,62 mm and 12,7 mm machine guns for close defense (Picture source: 425th Separate Assault Regiment, Ukrainian Armed Forces).

Australia’s Abrams are heavy, protection-first vehicles built for combined-arms warfare, and their baseline specifications translate well to Ukraine’s grinding positional battles when used intelligently. The M1A1 fields the 120 mm M256 smoothbore cannon with a digital fire-control computer designed for rapid point-and-shoot engagements, backed by an advanced sensor suite that enables long-range target acquisition day or night and in poor weather. With a four-person crew, ammunition and fuel stored in separate compartments, and a tank urban survivability kit intended to boost resilience in complex terrain, the platform’s design prioritizes crew survival and sustained combat tempo rather than minimalist weight. Mobility remains a core asset: at roughly 62 tonnes combat weight, the gas-turbine-powered tank can exceed 60 km/h on roads and shift armored mass rapidly between threatened sectors.

On today’s drone-saturated battlefield, Ukraine is unlikely to treat the M1A1as a Cold War-era breakthrough battering ram in dense minefields. Instead, the Abrams is best employed as a protected direct-fire system that supports assault infantry, suppresses Russian strongpoints, and defeats counterattacking armor from standoff positions, particularly at night when Western optics and fire control widen the engagement advantage. The tank’s protection and internal layout also make it suitable for short, violent pushes behind engineer-led breaching efforts, followed by rapid displacement before Russian loitering munitions and artillery can respond. This approach reflects lessons already absorbed by Ukrainian crews operating U.S.-supplied Abrams, which have at times been pulled back from the front line as Russian drone reconnaissance and strike capabilities intensified.

Australian officials have described the donated vehicles as modified M1A1s, a term that aligns with the broader adaptation of Western tanks for Ukraine’s battlefield reality. In practice, this includes add-on protection and field modifications to counter top-down threats, such as reactive armor elements, additional frontal protection, and rooftop cage structures designed to disrupt drone-dropped munitions and diving FPV attacks. These measures mirror the rapid evolution seen across Ukrainian and Russian armored fleets as both sides respond to the dominance of unmanned aerial systems and precision-guided fires.

Ukraine will integrate the Abrams into a diverse armored ecosystem that already includes refurbished Soviet-origin T-64 and T-72 variants, captured Russian tanks, and Western donations such as Challenger 2 and Leopard families. In direct comparison with Russia’s most common battlefield tanks, the M1A1’s strengths lie in crew survivability, reliable long-range gunnery, and robust protection concepts that separate ammunition from personnel. Russian T-72B3 units rely on upgraded sights, improved fire control, and explosive reactive armor, while newer T-90 variants add further protection and countermeasures, yet remain constrained by legacy ergonomics and ammunition placement that can lead to catastrophic losses when penetrated.

None of this makes the Abrams invulnerable. Its survivability depends on disciplined tactics, camouflage, air defense cover, electronic warfare support, and careful exposure management. Still, with 49 vehicles, Ukraine can field a full tank battalion with reserves for maintenance and attrition, allowing concentrated armored action rather than dispersing tanks as static pillboxes. In that role, Australia’s M1A1 Abrams are set to become a meaningful, if carefully managed, addition to Ukraine’s armored punch against Russian forces.
Russia arms Shahed drone with Igla-S air defense missile to shoot down Ukrainian helicopters
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On January 4, 2026, Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces said fighters from the Darknode Battalion of the 412th Nemesis Brigade intercepted for the first time a Shahed drone fitted with an Igla-S MANPADS missile, indicating an attempt by Russia to use these drones to threaten Ukrainian helicopters and low-flying aircraft involved in counter-drone interception.

On January 4, 2026, the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces stated that fighters from the Darknode Battalion of the 412th Nemesis Brigade intercepted a Russian Shahed-type kamikaze drone fitted with an Igla-S man-portable air defense system. This variant, observed for the first time during the war, carried a camera and a radio modem, allowing the missile to be launched remotely by an operator located on Russian territory to threaten Ukrainian helicopters and low-flying aircraft involved in counter-drone interception.
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Ukraine may now have to allocate more air defense assets and counter-UAS resources to deal with such a threat, as MANPADS-armed drones could potentially serve as a decentralized air defense layer for Russia's advancing forces. (Picture source: Ukrainian MoD)

According to Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov, a Ukrainian military and technical expert, the missile launch was not automatically but manually triggered by the Shahed operator using the onboard camera feed and radio link. This new variant was assessed as being intended to engage Ukrainian helicopters and other low-flying aircraft that had previously intercepted Russian drones at close range using machine guns or cannons. Army aviation crews were warned to avoid approaching Shahed drones on a head-on course and to be particularly cautious when encountering drones flying in circular or loitering patterns, which were interpreted as potential attempts to draw aircraft into missile engagement zones. Ukrainian units also indicated that examination of the tactics associated with this configuration was ongoing in order to adapt interception procedures.

From a tactical perspective, mounting an Igla-S on a Shahed offers several potential advantages. Even a limited air-to-air capability forces Ukrainian pilots to assume that some drones within a swarm may be able to fire back, increasing uncertainty during interceptions. This can push helicopters and aircraft to operate at greater distances, reducing the effectiveness of close-range engagements that had previously been relatively efficient against unarmed Shaheds. The presence of a missile also alters the risk balance, as the potential loss of a manned aircraft and crew carries far greater consequences than the loss of a single drone, even if actual firing opportunities remain limited.

At the same time, the disadvantages of this approach directly affect the core strengths of the Shahed drone. Adding a MANPADS launcher and missile to a prop-driven loitering munition imposes significant weight and aerodynamic drag, which can reduce the drone’s relatively low endurance, range, and speed. Slower speed or reduced endurance makes the drone easier to detect and intercept, particularly by dedicated counter-UAS systems, and less maneuverable. The need for a continuous radio link and live video feed exposes this new Shahed variant to electronic warfare and jamming, especially in an environment where such measures are actively used.

The added cost of an Igla-S also undermines the economic logic of Shahed operations, which rely on mass production and saturation attacks: deploying more complex air defense-armed variants means fewer drones available for primary strikes per sortie, potentially reducing the saturation effect Ukraine has struggled against. Finally, unlike purpose-built air defense systems, the Shahed lacks radar, advanced target tracking, or integrated fire control, meaning successful engagements depend heavily on operator skill, communication stability, and favorable geometry against low-flying targets.

The Igla-S configuration follows earlier attempts to give Shahed drones limited air-to-air capability. In December 2025, Ukrainian soldiers from the same Darknode battalion intercepted a Shahed fitted with a Soviet-era R-60 air-to-air missile, marking an earlier effort to threaten aircraft intercepting drone swarms. That configuration reportedly included multiple cameras, a mesh radio modem, and a pylon mounting system, but it required the entire drone to be aimed toward the target to support infrared seeker lock. Compared with the heavier R-60, a MANPADS such as Igla-S is lighter and simpler to integrate, although both approaches reflect a broader pattern of iterative modifications capable of limited self-defense or ambush rather than a one-off field experiment. The appearance of these two variants suggests a deliberate effort by Russia to target Ukrainian pilots who have previously been effective in intercepting Shahed swarms at close range.

These developments are occurring alongside sustained large-scale drone and missile attacks by Russia. Ukrainian air defenses have continued to face waves of Shahed, Geran, and decoy-type drones launched from multiple directions, often in combination with ballistic missiles such as Iskander-M or surface-to-air missiles used in a surface-to-surface role. Recent nights have seen dozens to more than a hundred drones launched in single attacks, with Ukrainian forces employing a mix of aviation, surface-to-air missiles, electronic warfare units, unmanned interceptors, and mobile fire groups to counter them. For instance, one recap stated that on the night of January 3, 2026, Russia attacked Ukraine with 95 strike drones from multiple directions, with Ukrainian defenders said to have destroyed 80 of them through combined air defense and aviation actions.

The Shahed-136 itself, also known in Russian service as Geran-2, remains a relatively simple Iranian loitering munition optimized for low-cost production and extended reach. However, the addition of the Igla-S missile, which weighs around 10 to 11 kilograms, directly reduces fuel fraction, endurance, and range on a 200-kilogram drone that already flies at relatively low speeds of roughly 150 to 185 kilometers per hour. In a standard attack configuration, the Shahed typically carries a high-explosive warhead estimated between 40 and 50 kilograms, although heavier payloads have been observed at the cost of reduced range, which is often cited at up to 2,500 kilometers under optimal conditions. Over time, it has been modified with additional antennas, cameras, and other components to improve navigation, resilience, and survivability against interception, reflecting iterative adaptation driven by battlefield conditions.

The Igla-S, for its part, is a shoulder-fired infrared-guided man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) designed to engage low-flying aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles. The missile itself weighs approximately 10.8 kilograms, with the complete launch system weighing close to 18 kilograms, and it is typically credited with a maximum engagement range of around 6 kilometers and an effective altitude envelope up to roughly 3.5 kilometers. The Igla-S uses an improved infrared seeker compared with earlier Igla variants, incorporating enhanced sensitivity and greater resistance to countermeasures such as flares, while retaining a fire-and-forget guidance principle once launched. In Russian service, the Igla-S has been widely deployed alongside older Igla models and more recent systems such as Verba, making it available in sufficient numbers for such experimental integration.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
INTEL: Russia May Deploy North Korean Hwasal-1 RA-3 Cruise Missile in Ukraine War
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Russia may soon employ a variant of North Korea’s Hwasal-1 Ra-3 strategic cruise missile in strikes against Ukraine, according to OSINTWarfare reporting on December 25, 2025. If confirmed, the move would underscore a deepening Russia–North Korea defense partnership and introduce a serious new proliferation risk into the conflict.

Russia is reportedly preparing to deploy a variant of North Korea’s Hwasal-1 Ra-3 strategic cruise missile in combat operations against Ukraine, according to information shared by the OSINTWarfare account on X on December 25, 2025. The claims, attributed to multiple Russian sources, suggest the missile variant could be equipped with a one-ton high-explosive warhead and have an estimated operational range of 130 to 250 km, marking a potentially significant shift in Moscow’s strike capabilities.
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The Hwasal-1 Ra-3 (also referenced as Hwasal-1D-3) is seen during a test launch from what appears to be a paved runway, likely at Onchon Airbase on North Korea’s western coast. The missile, equipped with a modified large-diameter warhead, was unveiled during a strategic cruise missile test on April 20, 2024. (Picture source: North Korea Press Agency)

The Hwasal‑1 Ra‑3 variant first appeared publicly in April 2024, when North Korean state media showcased the missile on a TEL (transporter erector launcher) during a test conducted by the DPRK Missile Administration. The system, visibly enlarged to accommodate a “super-large” warhead, was presented as an evolution of the standard Hwasal‑1, a subsonic land-attack cruise missile with terrain-following capability. The shift to a larger warhead configuration, analysts assess, sacrifices fuel capacity for payload, reducing its range but significantly increasing strike lethality against fortified targets or logistics hubs.

More critically, this development does not occur in isolation. Since the early stages of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Moscow and Pyongyang have deepened their military cooperation, quietly forging one of the most consequential arms corridors in the post-Cold War era. By late 2023, U.S. intelligence began tracking high-volume transfers of North Korean munitions to Russia, with estimates suggesting that millions of 122mm and 152mm artillery shells, as well as 122mm Grad rockets, had already entered Russian stockpiles. These shipments were likely intended to offset critical shortages faced by Russian frontline units across Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhzhia.

The collaboration escalated further in early 2024 when U.S. and South Korean intelligence officials publicly accused North Korea of supplying short-range ballistic missiles to Russia. Satellite imagery and intercepted launch telemetry linked multiple Russian missile strikes in eastern Ukraine to North Korean-produced KN-23 and KN-25 systems, tactical ballistic platforms modeled on the Russian Iskander-M but adapted for the DPRK’s own industrial base. The KN-23, in particular, is capable of evading missile defenses with a quasi-ballistic flight path and terminal maneuverability, making it especially threatening in the Ukrainian context.

Now, with reports of the Hwasal‑1 Ra‑3 variant entering the Russian arsenal, military analysts warn that Ukraine could face a new threat vector: low-flying, GPS-guided cruise missiles capable of bypassing radar and air defense systems primarily calibrated for high-altitude or ballistic threats. Unlike ballistic missiles, cruise missiles can approach targets from unexpected directions, skimming the terrain and exploiting gaps in sensor coverage, particularly in areas where Western-supplied air defense systems like NASAMS or IRIS-T are not densely deployed.

Equally significant is the strategic message this sends. Moscow’s willingness to integrate foreign-designed missile systems, especially from a country like North Korea, itself under a strict international arms embargo, illustrates both Russia’s increasing reliance on pariah states and Pyongyang’s growing assertiveness in projecting its weapons technology into active combat theaters. In essence, North Korea is now field-testing its weapons in a live European war zone through a proxy partner, a development that should deeply concern not only Ukraine and NATO, but also the broader Indo-Pacific security community.

While no official statement has confirmed the operational deployment of the Hwasal-1 Ra-3 by Russian forces, the continued accumulation of evidence from satellite imagery, social media posts, and strike pattern analysis could soon provide conclusive indicators. If confirmed, this would be the first known use of a North Korean cruise missile in a major conventional war, effectively internationalizing the Korean Peninsula’s weapons ecosystem and offering Moscow a new class of standoff precision weapon at a time when its indigenous cruise missile stockpiles, particularly Kalibr and Kh-101 types, have been heavily depleted.

This development underscores the urgent need for NATO and Ukraine’s partners to reassess the threat spectrum and consider how unconventional actors are enabling Russia’s continued military campaign. Beyond battlefield implications, the growing Moscow–Pyongyang defense axis signals a troubling erosion of international nonproliferation norms.

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
Ukraine Destroys Russia’s Only Black Sea Ilyushin Il-38 Anti-Submarine Aircraft
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Ukrainian special forces carried out a coordinated strike in southern Russia in December 2025, destroying a Russian Il-38N maritime patrol aircraft and later targeting a submarine in Novorossiysk, according to Ukraine’s Security Service. The operation underscores Ukraine’s expanding reach in the Black Sea and its growing ability to disrupt Russian naval surveillance and undersea operations.

According to information released by the Security Service of Ukraine and supported by videos circulating on social media, Ukrainian special operations units executed a carefully sequenced strike against Russian naval assets in the Black Sea region in December 2025. The operation reportedly began with the destruction of a Russian Ilyushin Il-38N maritime patrol and anti-submarine warfare aircraft, followed by a separate strike against a submarine at or near the naval base in Novorossiysk, delivering a rare blow to Russia’s airborne maritime surveillance network far from the front lines.
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Satellite imagery showing the parking position of the Russian Ilyushin Il-38N maritime patrol aircraft at Yeysk airbase prior to its destruction during a Ukrainian drone strike. (Picture source: Ukraine MoD)

Ukraine’s Security Service later revealed that the mission was planned as a multi-stage operation designed to remove Russia’s most capable detection asset before a follow-on naval attack. The initial target was an Il-38N aircraft stationed at Yeysk airbase, identified by Ukrainian authorities as the only operational Black Sea-based anti-submarine patrol aircraft available to the Russian Navy at the time. Known in NATO terminology as the Sea Dragon, the aircraft was heavily tasked with detecting Ukrainian naval drones and monitoring approaches to Novorossiysk, a key port and submarine base for Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.

The Russian Ilyushin Il-38N occupies a unique position within naval aviation. Derived from the Soviet-era Il-18 airframe, the aircraft serves as Russia’s primary long-range maritime patrol and anti-submarine warfare platform. Its missions include the detection and tracking of submarines, surveillance of surface vessel movements, maritime reconnaissance, and the transmission of targeting data to surface combatants, submarines, and coastal defense units. With long endurance and wide sensor coverage, the Il-38N serves as an airborne surveillance node, an essential component of Russia’s layered maritime defense concept.

The Il-38N variant is distinguished by the integration of the Novella-P-38N mission system, a comprehensive modernization that significantly enhanced the aircraft’s combat relevance. This system combines a multi-mode surface-search radar, electro-optical and infrared sensors, electronic intelligence equipment, sonobuoy processing capability, and magnetic anomaly detection to locate submerged submarines. These sensors allow the aircraft to detect low-signature underwater threats, including unmanned platforms, and to coordinate responses by naval forces operating across wide maritime areas.

In the context of the Russia-Ukraine war, the Il-38N has become increasingly important as Ukraine expanded its use of unmanned surface and underwater drones to challenge Russian naval superiority. The aircraft has been employed to protect ports, secure naval bases, and counter Ukrainian maritime drones threatening high-value assets. Ukrainian security statements indicate that the Il-38N was the only Russian airborne platform in the Black Sea capable of reliably detecting the Sub Sea Baby underwater drone, making it a direct obstacle to Ukraine’s evolving maritime strike strategy.

Video footage reviewed by Army Recognition shows a Ukrainian combat drone striking the aircraft while it was parked on the apron at Yeysk airbase. The drone detonated above the radar and mission equipment compartment, where the core components of the Novella-P-38N sensor suite and mission computers are installed. Ukrainian statements indicate that the explosion caused catastrophic damage to mission systems and at least one engine, rendering the aircraft non-mission capable and effectively destroying it as an operational asset.

The destruction of the Il-38N is of exceptional significance given the aircraft’s rarity in Russian service. Fewer than a dozen Il-38N aircraft are believed to remain in active use across the entire Russian Navy, with only a small number assigned to the southern regions. Unlike tactical combat aircraft, the Il-38N cannot be rapidly replaced. Production ended decades ago, modernization pipelines are slow, and Western sanctions continue to restrict access to advanced avionics and components. As a result, the loss represents a long-term degradation of Russia’s maritime patrol and anti-submarine warfare capability.

With the Il-38N removed from service, Russian naval forces temporarily lost their most capable airborne anti-submarine sensor platform in the eastern Black Sea. This sudden reduction in surveillance coverage directly shaped the conditions for the subsequent Ukrainian strike targeting a Russian submarine in Novorossiysk. While Kyiv has not disclosed the extent of the damage to the submarine, the sequence of events indicates a mature Ukrainian operational approach focused on neutralizing surveillance and early-warning assets before engaging high-value naval platforms.

For Russia, the incident highlights the growing vulnerability of scarce and irreplaceable aviation assets to Ukrainian long-range drones, even far from the front line. For Kyiv, it demonstrates a sophisticated application of asymmetric warfare, targeting critical enablers rather than confronting Russian naval power directly. The destruction of the Il-38N represents one of the most consequential single losses suffered by Russian naval aviation in the Black Sea and signals a continuing shift in maritime power dynamics in favor of Ukraine.

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
Ukraine Says Sabotage and Drone Strikes Disabled 4 Russian Fighter Jets at Two Air Bases
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Ukrainian intelligence says covert operatives and long-range drones disabled four Russian fighter aircraft during separate attacks at a base near Lipetsk and at Belbek airfield in occupied Crimea. If confirmed, the operations highlight a widening Ukrainian effort to reduce Russia’s airpower by striking aircraft on the ground, where losses are hardest to replace.

According to information published by the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the Security Service of Ukraine, on December 20 and 22, 2025, Ukrainian special services claim they disabled four Russian fighter aircraft in two separate operations, one a clandestine sabotage raid at an air base near Lipetsk and the other a long-range drone strike on Belbek airfield in occupied Crimea. If confirmed, the twin actions underscore a widening Ukrainian campaign to hit Russian tactical aviation on the ground, where even a single successful breach can erase aircraft, crews, and sortie capacity faster than Russia can replace them.
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Ukrainian intelligence and security services claim to have disabled four Russian fighter jets in two coordinated operations, using sabotage at a guarded air base near Lipetsk and long-range drones against Belbek airfield in occupied Crimea, underscoring Ukraine's expanding ability to strike Russian tactical aviation deep behind the front lines (Picture source: Security Service of Ukraine).

Ukrainian intelligence said the Lipetsk attack occurred overnight on December 20 to 21, when two high-value fighters burned inside a protective hangar. Ukrainian and international reporting around the incident has carried some ambiguity about the exact aircraft types involved, with early descriptions listing a Su-30 and a Su-27and later Ukrainian outlet updates emphasizing Su-30s, a reminder that independent verification is limited when attacks happen deep inside Russia, and identification often relies on post-incident imagery and insider reporting.

What is clearer is the method. Ukrainian reporting cited by military intelligence indicated that operatives studied patrol routes and guard shift schedules for roughly two weeks, infiltrated the base, ignited the aircraft, and withdrew undetected. Additional reporting noted tail numbers “12” and “82” and that the aircraft were allegedly destroyed by fire inside the shelter, a detail that matters because it implies a penetration of base security and protected infrastructure rather than damage from an external blast wave.

If one of the targets was a Su-30SM, the technical impact is nontrivial. The Su-30 family is a two-seat multirole Flanker derivative designed to swing between air defense and strike escort, typically carrying a large external load across 12 hardpoints, withwidely cited payload capacia ty up to 8,000 kg. In Russian service, Su-30-class fighters have been used to cover standoff strikes, police maritime approaches, and provide the kind of flexible airborne presence that lets Russia mass glide-bomb and missile launches while keeping Ukrainian aircraft at distance.

The second operation was openly claimed by the Security Service of Ukraine on December 20, saying its Special Operations Center A, known as Alpha, used long-range drones to hit two Su-27 fighters at Belbek airfield in Crimea and to strike the control tower. Ukrainian outlets highlighted one aircraft on the taxiway with a full combat load, ready for a sortie, a scenario that directly targets Russia’s ability to generate rapid-response launches over southern Ukraine and the Black Sea littoral.

The Su-27 remains a valuable air-defense and interception platform even in older configurations, built around the N001 pulse-Doppler radar and supported by the OLS-27 infrared search-and-track system for passive engagements, a combination that helps defend airspace against drones and cruise-missile vectors while reducing reliance on emitting radar. Damaging the tower compounds the effect by disrupting flight control and sortie sequencing, forcing a base to slow its rhythm even if additional aircraft survive.

For Russia, the disadvantage is immediate and cumulative. Lipetsk is widely described in open sources as a core combat training and evaluation hub for Russian tactical aviation, so a successful sabotage action there pressures rear-area security procedures and can divert manpower to hardening, patrols, and internal counterintelligence. The broader arithmetic is also moving against Moscow. Open-source tracking indicates hundreds of Russian aerial losses since February 2022, including more than a hundred combat jets assessed destroyed. Russia can field new aircraft, but at a pace measured in dozens per year, not hundreds, making each additional loss on the ground harder to absorb over time.

For Ukraine, the significance goes beyond the four airframes. The paired operations illustrate a maturing airbase-interdiction playbook that mixes human networks, reconnaissance, and long-range unmanned strike to reach targets Russia expects to be safest, tightening the air war by reducing Russian sortie generation while signaling to partners that Ukrainian strike capacity is evolving despite resource constraints.
Ukraine’s Fire Point Produces 200 Strike Drones Daily and Supplies 60% of Defense Forces
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Ukraine is rapidly expanding domestic drone and missile production, with manufacturers like Fire Point now central to daily strike operations against Russian logistics and infrastructure. The shift highlights how industrial scale, not single breakthrough weapons, is shaping Ukraine’s ability to sustain pressure deep behind Russian lines.

According to reporting by the BBC on December 18, 2025, Ukrainian journalists were taken under blindfold to a heavily secured production site linked to Fire Point, one of the country’s fastest growing drone and missile manufacturers. The rare access underscored how defense factories have become frontline assets themselves, guarded as tightly as military bases, as Ukraine doubles down on domestically built long-range strike systems to offset Russia’s numerical advantages and maintain pressure on rear area logistics.
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Ukraine's drone industry is surging, with Fire Point claiming up to 200 strike drones a day to sustain the high attrition, high-tempo unmanned campaign against Russian forces and rear area targets (Picture source: Mezha Media).

In parallel with the BBC’s look inside the program, Ukraine’s defense media outlet Militarnyi reported that Fire Point claims a production rate of up to 200 strike drones per day, and that the drones it supplies enable roughly 60% of the Defense Forces’ drone strikes. If accurate, that figure places one company’s output near the center of Ukraine’s daily strike architecture and explains why Russia repeatedly tries to hit production nodes.

Fire Point’s portfolio spans at least two “strike drone” families that fit different operational problems. The FP-1 is positioned as a deep strike, one-way attack system with a reported range up to 1,600 km and a warhead up to 120 kg, intended to hit strategic depth targets rather than tactical frontline positions. For nearer ranges, Fire Point unveiled the FP-2 “middle strike” drone for targets closer to the front, with a stated range of 200 km and a heavier 105 kg warhead. The FP 2 concept is built around flexibility: autonomous guidance against stationary targets, operator control via radio for moving targets, and day or night employment. Developers have also described launcher concepts, including a fixed launcher and a mobile solution disguised as a truck, a practical answer to Russia’s counterbattery and counterstrike cycle that punishes predictable launch patterns.

The BBC report also ties Fire Point’s drone ramp-up to a broader shift toward cruise missile-class weapons, notably the FP-5 “Flamingo.” Open source reporting describes Flamingo as a ground-launched system with a range of around 3,000 km, putting it in the category of systems Western partners have largely declined to provide in comparable reach and payload. The Defense Post, citing imagery and Ukrainian reporting, lists a 14 m length, 6 m wingspan, an Ivchenko AI 25TL turbofan, an inertial navigation system paired with GPS and satellite navigation, and a 1,150 kg warhead, with top speed around 950 km/h and a ceiling around 5,000 m. Those numbers, if confirmed by further evidence, suggest a weapon closer to a small aircraft than a typical loitering munition, built for deep strikes against high-value infrastructure and industrial targets.

Ukraine’s drone industry did not start at this level. In 2022 and 2023, many units relied on adapted commercial quadcopters, volunteer procurement, and fast learning cycles that blurred the line between hobby electronics and combat systems. By 2024 and 2025, that improvisation hardened into an ecosystem: standardized FPV strike drones in huge numbers, dedicated reconnaissance platforms, maritime drones, and increasingly, factory built long range one way attack systems supported by state contracts and battlefield feedback loops. Ukraine’s monthly drone output surged strongly, with figures circulating that point to a jump from tens of thousands per month to more than 200,000, reflecting industrial scaling rather than artisan production. At the high end, Fire Point has been described as producing thousands of FP-1 class drones monthly, emphasizing rapid assembly, cost discipline, and adaptations for contested navigation and survivability against jamming.

Sustainment is the keyword because drones in this war are consumables. First, attrition is structural: electronic warfare, air defense, small arms fire, and simple mechanical failure delete platforms at a pace that would be unacceptable for crewed aircraft but is baked into the economics of unmanned warfare. Second, drones have become the connective tissue of Ukraine’s army, feeding targeting to artillery, delivering precision at the squad level through FPV attacks, and extending the strike campaign into Russia’s logistics depth. Ukraine’s commander in chief has publicly framed drones as the dominant strike instrument, with reporting that drones account for more than 60% of Ukrainian strikes on enemy targets.

Third, Russia’s own mass matters. Reporting referenced a Russian launch tempo averaging around 200 Shahed-type drones per day, with Ukraine responding at roughly half that number, a dynamic that forces Ukraine to keep replenishing both offensive stocks and defensive intercept solutions. This is why production rates, not just prototype performance, are now strategic. A drone that is excellent but scarce loses relevance in a battlespace where hundreds of targets must be serviced nightly, and where the enemy can absorb losses by sheer volume.
ALERT: Russia Deploys Chinese Silent Hunter Laser in Ukraine to Counter Drones
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Russian forces have reportedly deployed the Chinese-made Silent Hunter high-energy laser system in Ukraine, marking its first known combat use. The move, alongside Ukraine’s own apparent laser deployments in Odessa, signals a new phase in the escalating drone-countermeasure race.

Russian military units operating in Ukraine have begun using the Chinese-developed Silent Hunter laser air defense system, according to information published on multiple social media platforms and reviewed by Army Recognition’s open-source monitoring team. While neither Moscow nor Beijing has officially confirmed the deployment, the reported combat use would represent the first battlefield employment of China’s export-oriented directed-energy weapon, as both sides search for cost-effective ways to counter the relentless expansion of drone warfare.
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The Chinese Silent Hunter is a high-energy fiber-optic laser weapon system designed to disable drones and low-flying threats with pinpoint precision. It can be mounted on various combat platforms, including 6x6 tactical trucks and fixed installations, offering mobile or static deployment options for rapid counter-UAV defense. (Picture source: China Poly Technology)

The Silent Hunter system, developed by the Chinese state-owned conglomerate Poly Technologies, has been visually confirmed through footage shared by Russian military-affiliated social media accounts. Mounted on a modified 6x6 tactical truck, the platform features a roof-mounted laser turret, optical tracking system, and ruggedized generator module. Though neither Moscow nor Beijing has issued any official statement confirming its presence, the vehicle’s configuration, sensor suite, and beam optics match those seen at Chinese defense exhibitions and promotional materials, leaving little doubt about its identity.

Designed to neutralize low-altitude aerial threats, the Silent Hunter uses a high-energy fiber-optic laser capable of burning through drone structures, sensors, or propulsion systems. With a reported output of 30 to 100 kilowatts, depending on the variant, it is believed to engage small UAVs effectively at ranges up to 1.5 kilometers. It can receive targeting data from radar or optical sensors, track moving threats in real time, and silently disable incoming drones without radar exposure or ammunition expenditure. The system’s primary tactical advantage lies in its low per-engagement cost and the ability to respond quickly to drone swarms, a capability Russia has lacked in many frontline zones saturated by Ukrainian unmanned systems.

The presence of Silent Hunter on the battlefield underscores how deeply China has become a silent partner in sustaining Russian military capabilities. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Beijing has avoided formal alliance status but has provided critical indirect support. This has included dual-use technologies such as semiconductors, thermal imaging modules, UAV components, and now, according to these latest field observations, operational energy weapons. While officially maintaining a neutral diplomatic posture, China has leveraged state-owned enterprises like Poly Technologies to deepen Russia’s access to advanced military hardware below the threshold that would trigger Western sanctions. For China, Ukraine provides a live testing ground to evaluate its next-generation systems under real combat conditions without direct confrontation with the West.

Echipajul unei nave amfibii turce a filmat sisteme ucrainene de apărare antiaeriană în portul Odesa și a publicat imaginile online fără cenzură. Pe lângă tunurile antiaeriene, sunt vizibile două lasere active. Scopul lor este neclar: fie orbesc dronele, fie servesc la ghidarea… pic.twitter.com/bUmf9bWggT
— BobbyD (@bobbydtiktok) December 20, 2025

Meanwhile, evidence has emerged that Ukraine is deploying its own laser systems in defensive positions around key infrastructure. A video published on December 20, 2025, by crew members of a Turkish amphibious ship docked in Odessa shows Ukrainian air defense positions in full operation. The footage, shared on multiple social platforms without censorship, shows two laser beams emitted from ground-based platforms near anti-aircraft artillery emplacements. Open-source analysts and former NATO targeting officers reviewing the footage confirm the beams are active and focused, indicating either a targeting, guidance, or counter-optics function.

While no official details have been released by Ukrainian authorities, defense specialists suggest several possible operational roles. The lasers may be used to blind or disrupt drone electro-optical sensors, assist in guiding semi-active laser munitions such as APKWS-type rockets (Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System, a laser-guided upgrade kit for 70mm rockets), or serve as part of an integrated target acquisition suite tied into broader air defense systems. The specific platforms involved remain unidentified, and it is unclear whether these are domestically developed, imported under classified arrangements, or field-modified versions of commercial-grade laser systems adapted for military use.

The simultaneous appearance of directed-energy systems on both sides of the conflict confirms that laser weapons have moved beyond theoretical testing and into practical combat application. What began as science fiction and later evolved into static base-defense roles has now fully entered the mobile battlefield. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces are integrating laser technology not as futuristic experiments, but as immediate solutions to counter an evolving threat that traditional systems alone cannot manage. With UAV saturation defining modern combat, ranging from low-cost commercial quadcopters to long-range loitering munitions, lasers offer the rare combination of speed, precision, and sustainability.

These developments carry profound implications for NATO and Western defense communities. While the United States and its allies have made considerable progress in developing high-energy laser systems, such as the U.S. Army’s DE M-SHORAD, the U.S. Navy’s HELIOS, and the UK’s DragonFire, none have yet been deployed in combat. The real-world use of Silent Hunter and Ukraine’s own tactical laser systems provides an unprecedented case study in the effectiveness, limitations, and tactical value of directed-energy weapons under wartime conditions. It also highlights a new front in great power competition, as Chinese systems gain battlefield validation in a conflict that pits Western-backed Ukrainian forces against a Russian military increasingly sustained by foreign technology.

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
Breaking news: Ukraine claims first Sub Sea Baby underwater drone strike on Russian Kilo-class submarine
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Ukraine’s Security Service says it disabled a Russian Project 636.3 Improved Kilo-class submarine at Novorossiysk using an underwater drone called Sub Sea Baby. If confirmed, the strike would mark a major shift in naval warfare by showing that even protected submarine bases are vulnerable to low-cost unmanned attacks.

Ukraine’s Security Service, known as the SBU, claimed on December 15, 2025, that it successfully struck a Russian Improved Kilo-class submarineinside the port of Novorossiysk using an underwater unmanned system, a platform the agency refers to as Sub Sea Baby. According to the SBU, the operation was conducted jointly with the Naval Forces of Ukraine through military counterintelligence channels and caused critical damage that rendered the submarine non-operational, a claim that cannot yet be independently verified through imagery or official Russian statements.
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Ukraine’s Security Service video showing a Russian Project 636.3 Varshavyanka Kilo class submarine, which the SBU claims was critically damaged in Novorossiysk by an underwater Sub Sea Baby drone during a joint operation with the Ukrainian Navy (Picture source: Ukraine's Security Service).

If the claim is confirmed, the tactical meaning is hard to overstate because submarines are among the most difficult naval assets to target, especially inside a defended harbor. A diesel electric boat can disappear at sea for weeks, and even in port, it is typically sheltered by layered security that may include controlled access zones, patrol craft, surveillance, and physical barriers intended to stop unmanned surface craft and divers before they reach the hull. Past satellite-based reporting has shown Russia experimenting with barrier-based defenses at Novorossiysk as Ukraine’s maritime drone campaign intensified, an acknowledgement that the base is not a sanctuary even on Russian soil.

The SBU statement adds a detail that deserves careful attention: it differentiates between the surface “Sea Baby” unmanned surface vessels that have become familiar since 2023 and an underwater “Sub Sea Baby” used for this strike. The SBU has publicly demonstrated that the Sea Baby family has evolved from a way explosive craft into a modular system with longer range and heavier payload. Upgraded Sea Baby variants are reported to have a range exceeding 1,500 kilometers and payload capacity up to 2,000 kilograms, and some versions are designed to carry remotely controlled weapons rather than acting solely as kamikaze craft. Other reported improvements include AI-assisted targeting, stabilized weapon stations, rocket launchers, and layered self-destruct measures intended to prevent capture and exploitation.

What the SBU has not published, at least in its initial announcement, is a detailed technical profile of the “Sub Sea Baby.” That absence matters because the distinction between a surface drone and an underwater system is decisive in determining whether harbor barriers and surface patrols remain effective. An underwater approach can exploit blind zones in port security, reduce exposure to defensive fire, and reach a submarine at its most vulnerable area below the waterline. In operational terms, a successful underwater strike implies reliable navigation and control in a cluttered harbor environment, as well as a warhead and fuzing concept capable of damaging propulsion, pressure hull adjacent systems, or other mission-critical components while the boat is alongside.

The target described by the SBU, Project 636.3, is Russia’s Improved Kilo class, designed for quiet operations in contested littoral waters. Open technical data places the 636.3 at approximately 74 meters in length with submerged displacement close to 4,000 tons, diesel electric propulsion, and a crew of around 50 personnel. Its primary armament consists of six 533 millimeter torpedo tubes capable of firing heavyweight torpedoes, laying naval mines, and launching Kalibr cruise missiles from submerged positions. In missile-capable configurations, the class can deliver short interval salvos, giving it a credible land attack and anti-ship strike role in addition to traditional sea denial missions.

The SBU claims the submarine in Novorossiysk carried four Kalibr launchers, directly linking the strike to Russia’s long-range missile campaign against Ukrainian territory. Kalibr missiles are assessed to have a range of roughly 1,500 to 2,500 kilometers, depending on variant, which is why each missile-capable submarine is treated as a strategic asset rather than a purely tactical platform. Even without sinking the boat, damage severe enough to require major repairs can remove it from the operational cycle for months or longer. International sanctions further complicate access to spare parts, shipyard capacity, and specialized components, strengthening the operational impact.

For Ukraine, the achievement, if verified, would underline a harsh reality for the Russian Navy: acoustic stealth does not guarantee safety when an adversary can deliver precision explosives using low-cost unmanned systems. Russian naval units have already been compelled to disperse from Sevastopol under pressure from Ukrainian maritime strikes, with Novorossiysk emerging as a key alternative hub. An underwater strike at that port would indicate that Russia’s defensive challenge is expanding from sea control to base security, forcing costly investments in sensors, patrols, barriers, and counter-sabotage measures that demand constant manpower and vigilance.

For Russia, a disabled Improved Kilo represents both an immediate reduction in Kalibr launch capacity and a psychological blow to confidence in port safety. If Ukraine has indeed fielded an operational underwater derivative of the Sea Baby family, the Black Sea conflict is entering a new phase in which even heavily protected infrastructure and concealed assets can be threatened at their moorings, further shifting the balance between expensive legacy platforms and rapidly evolving unmanned strike systems.
Canada's Roshel confirms Ukraine received over 2,000 Senator armored vehicles since war started
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Roshel CEO Roman Shimonov announced on December 5, 2025, that Ukraine has received more than 2,000 Senator armored vehicles since Russia’s full-scale invasion began.

On December 5, 2025, Roshel CEO Roman Shimonov announced that more than 2,000 Senator armored vehicles have now been delivered to Ukraine since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. He released new footage from Ukraine showing a Senator being struck by a Russian drone and continuing to move before the crew dismounted safely, illustrating how the Senator could really save the lives of its occupants. Used by numerous Ukrainian units, including National Guards and Special Forces, the Senator became one of the most widely fielded armored vehicles used by Ukraine in areas frequently exposed to Russian artillery and FPV drones.
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Approximately 90 percent of Ukrainian orders concerning the Roshel Senator were financed by foreign governments, including Ukraine itself, and around 10 percent of the fleet was donated directly by Canada (Picture source: Ukrainian MoD)

The path to this total combines a gradual production ramp-up with repeated aid decisions. Production of the Senator began in 2018, with the vehicle entering service that year and being used in 2020 to transport astronauts Bob Behnken and Doug Hurley during the Crew Dragon Demo-2 mission. The first eight newly-built Senators were shipped to Ukraine in 2022, followed in January 2023 by a Canadian package that included 200 vehicles valued at about 92 million Canadian dollars. By July 10, 2023, around 550 Senators were already in Ukrainian service, rising to 1,000 with the delivery of the thousandth vehicle on December 21, 2023, and to approximately 1,400 by mid-September 2024. The 1,700th vehicle was delivered by March 2025, and Shimonov’s latest statement shows how Roshel's production has kept pace with Ukraine's needs. Throughout this period, Roshel has cited a production rate of roughly 120 to 140 vehicles per month, supported by about 500 full-time employees. The Senator’s approximate unit price is reported to be around $600,000, which is less than other MRAPs such as the Cougar, the Nyala, or the M1117 Guardian.

Used in Ukraine for troop transport, logistics, medical evacuation, and other field missions, the Senator family is built on commercial truck platforms such as the Ford F-550 Super Duty or the Ram 5500, depending on variant and customer requirements. Most versions weigh close to 8 tonnes and measure roughly 5.6 meters in length, 2.4 meters in width, and up to 2.75 meters in height. They typically use a 6.7-liter turbocharged diesel V8 engine producing between 330 and 400 horsepower, with a high torque output (comprised between 1,050 to 1,250 Nm) transmitted through an automatic transmission and full-time four-wheel drive. The Senator's road speed of 100 to 120 km/h and ground clearance of about 319 mm help Ukrainian soldiers to move easily over damaged roads and soft terrain common along the front lines. Tires are often 335/85 R20 or 12.5 R20 with runflat inserts, approach and departure angles near 19 degrees, while National Research Council Canada testing reported side-slope tolerance close to 39 degrees, which further reduces mobility loss in uneven or cratered environments. Crew layouts generally include two front occupants and space for up to ten additional passengers, depending on configuration.

As shown in Ukraine, the protection of its passengers is the heart of the Senator's design. The armored steel hull and ballistic glass are compliant with NATO STANAG 4569 AEP 55 levels, depending on the version. Senator APC variants provide ballistic protection at Level 2, while MRAP variants incorporate enhanced blast protection reaching Level 2a and 2b thresholds. Tests cited for the Senator include a resistance to 7.62×39 mm armor-piercing rounds at short distances, blast effects equivalent to 6 kg TNT under the wheel or center, and fragmentation effects from 155 mm artillery shells at around 80 meters, which are the most common battlefield risks. Blast-mitigating seating and energy-dissipating floors reduce injury likelihood, and CBRN filtration systems are designed to isolate the passengers from external contamination. For offensive operations, roof mounts can accept remote weapon stations or manually operated systems accommodating 7.62 mm or 12.7 mm machine guns or 40 mm automatic grenade launchers. Digital situational awareness additions, such as night-vision equipment, cameras, and mapping interfaces, further help Ukrainian soldiers operate under limited visibility or electronic warfare conditions.

Variant diversification expanded how Ukrainian units could employ the Senator. The Senator APC supports standard troop movement, while the MRAP variant offers increased blast resistance for routes where mines and improvised devices are frequent. The Pickup variant provides a payload near 3.5 tonnes, enabling soldiers to transport supplies or equipment without shifting to unprotected platforms. Medical evacuation configurations allow movement of wounded personnel in armored capsules, which addresses recurring challenges in artillery-dominated sectors. Explosive ordnance disposal and emergency response variants support technical teams requiring protected workspaces. Roshel’s lighter Captain APC and Light Utility Vehicle concepts also reflect adaptations informed by Ukrainian operational feedback, including ergonomics, maintenance access, and driveline tolerance to variable fuel quality.

Exports broadened the user base beyond Ukraine. Police forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Moldova, and South Korea acquired Senators for internal security and high-risk patrols. In Brazil, vehicles were assigned to the Riot Police Battalion in Brasília and to the Special Police Operations Battalion. Haiti ordered seventeen Senator MRAPs on Ram 5500 chassis, with seven delivered for operations in urban zones affected by armed groups. In November 2025, Roshel delivered its first Senator Emergency Response Vehicle to a U.S. law enforcement agency in Guam, adding to earlier acquisitions by the United States federal organizations (such as the ICE) and NASA. Chile evaluated the Senator as a potential replacement for its legacy armored vehicles, and Roshel continued to seek industrial partnerships to support regional assembly and maintenance.

Roshel’s industrial expansion paralleled this increased demand. The company, founded in 2016 and based in Brampton, Ontario, operates manufacturing sites in Canada and maintains facilities in the United States, with plans for localized production in Ukraine. In August 2025, Roshel and Sweden’s Swebor announced a partnership to establish Canada’s first ballistic steel facility to produce hardened armor plate using Canadian iron ore and Swebor’s manufacturing processes. The agreement included shared intellectual property and was intended to support national supply for armored vehicle production and related programs. Roshel also agreed with ST Engineering to develop production of the Captain vehicle in Singapore, and at IDET 2025 in Brno, it outlined intentions for Czech-based assembly of Senator MRAP, APC, and ambulance variants.

Finally, the new counter-drone variant of the Senator addressed one of Ukraine’s most serious operational challenges. At CANSEC 2025, Roshel presented a Senator Pickup with Leonardo’s Falcon Shield suite, combining radar, electro-optical, and infrared sensors, electronic surveillance, and electronic attack components for detecting, tracking, identifying, locating, and disrupting hostile drones. The system can integrate kinetic or non-kinetic effectors and interface with NATO command networks. At DSEI 2025, Roshel emphasized modularity and the capacity to integrate varied communications and sensor packages. With deliveries to Ukraine exceeding 2,000 by December 2025, these features reflect ongoing adjustments that align the vehicle with the operational environment Ukrainian soldiers face daily.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
Ukraine Reports High Interception Rate Against Russian Iskander And Kinzhal Missiles
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Ukraine says Russia launched a record mixed strike on November 25 with 22 missiles and 464 attack drones aimed at critical infrastructure. The scale of the attack highlights Moscow’s winter campaign to drain Ukraine’s air defenses and pressure its power grid.

The Ukrainian Air Force announced on November 25, 2025, that Russia conducted a record combined strike against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure, firing 22 missiles of several types and 464 attack drones in a single night engagement. Ukrainian air defenders reported destroying 438 drones and 14 missiles, including one of four Kh-47M2 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles, all three Iskander-M ballistic missiles, and the majority of Kalibr and Iskander-K cruise missiles. Despite the high interception rate, impacts were recorded on energy and residential sites, particularly around Kyiv.
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Ukrainian air defense crews engage a massive Russian missile and drone barrage on November 25, 2025, a night that saw more than 450 drones and 22 missiles launched. Despite heavy impacts on energy sites, Ukraine's layered Patriot, IRIS-T, NASAMS, and electronic-warfare network achieved one of its highest interception rates of the war. Picture of a Kh-47M2 Kinzhalmissile (Picture source: U.S. DoW).

This raid sits within a renewed Russian winter campaign aimed at exhausting Ukraine’s grid and air defense magazines. Earlier in November, Russian forces launched another large-scale attack involving roughly 45 missiles and 450 drones, already described by Ukrainian officials as one of the most intense barrages since 2022. The November 25 strike surpassed that in drone numbers and matched it in missiles. Some drones reportedly crossed into Moldovan and Romanian airspace, forcing NATO fighters to scramble and underlining the regional risk created by saturation tactics.

At the low end of Russia’s strike complex were hundreds of Shahed-class loitering munitions, produced in Russia as the Geran 2. The Shahed 136 is a simple delta-wing drone roughly 3.5 meters long with a small piston engine that drives it at around 140 to 185 kilometers per hour, carrying a 30 to 50 kilogram warhead over more than 1,000 kilometers. Western and Ukrainian intelligence now assess that Russia’s Yelabuga facility can produce on the order of 3,000 Geran or Shahed family drones per month, allowing Moscow to sustain weekly launch rates that at times exceed 1,100 drones. These slow but plentiful munitions are used to overwhelm radar, force Ukrainian batteries to reveal themselves, and distract operators from higher-value ballistic and cruise threats.

The most dangerous of those threats remains the Iskander and Kinzhal ballistic systems. The 9K720 Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile has a maximum range of about 500 kilometers, carries up to 700 kilograms of explosives, and maneuvers along a quasi-ballistic path with a maneuvering reentry vehicle and decoys designed to complicate interception by systems such as Patriot. The Kh 47M2 Kinzhal, an air-launched derivative carried by MiG-31 K aircraft, extends that radius to roughly 1,500 to 2,000 kilometers while carrying a 480-kilogram warhead and reportedly reaching speeds up to Mach 10 on its terminal dive. Western reporting over the past months indicates Russia has modified some ballistic missiles, adjusting trajectories and decoy packages in ways that have sharply reduced Ukrainian interception rates on many nights.

Cruise missiles added a further layer to the November 25 package. The 3M14 Kalibr land attack cruise missile, the main Russian naval strike weapon, flies at low altitude using terrain following guidance with a range between 1,500 and 2,500 kilometers and a warhead of up to 500 kilograms. The Iskander-Kvariant employs a similar cruise missile from a road mobile launcher. These cruise systems are designed to slip underneath radar coverage and arrive nearly simultaneously with ballistic and drone threats, creating the kind of mixed profile salvo that challenges even well-trained NATO air defense units.

Against this mix, Ukraine fields an improvised but increasingly dense defensive network. Soviet era S-300P and Buk-M1 systems still provide much of the long-range backbone, while Western-supplied batteries fill critical gaps. Patriot fire units around Kyiv and other hubs use PAC-3 hit-to-kill interceptors that can engage ballistic missiles in their terminal phase. Medium-range IRIS-T SLM systems delivered by Germany offer vertical launch, imaging infrared guided intercepts out to around 40 kilometers and altitudes up to 20 kilometers, proving particularly effective against cruise missiles and drones in cluttered urban environments. NASAMS launchers and their AMRAAM missiles cover low and medium altitudes, while Gepard self-propelled guns, French Mistral teams, and MANPADS rings defend key infrastructure against Shaheds.

Electronic warfare now forms a third pillar of this defense. Ukrainian forces deploy mobile systems such as Bukovel AD, which can detect drones at up to 100 kilometers and jam their control and navigation links within 20 kilometers by blocking GPS, GLONASS, Galileo, and BeiDou signals. These jammers, combined with an expanding fleet of domestically produced interceptor drones and civilian spotter networks, increasingly disrupt Shahed swarms before they reach defended zones.

The performance of this layered system on November 25 appears especially strong when judged against long-term data. A recent Royal United Services Institute analysis of missile strike records compiled by Ukrainian researcher Petro Ivaniuk and cross-checked by CSIS shows that between September 2022 and 24 October 2025, Russia fired 939 Iskanderand Kinzhal ballistic or aero ballistic missiles at Ukraine. Only 227 were intercepted, an average success rate of about 24%, and in 273 of 345 recorded attacks that included these missiles, none were intercepted at all. Financial Times and other outlets have reported months when Ukrainian ballistic missile interception rates dipped into single digits as Russian upgrades took effect.

Set against that baseline, the Ukrainian Air Force's claim that all three Iskander-M missiles and one Kinzhal were downed on November 25, along with five of seven Iskander-K and five of eight Kalibr cruise missiles, stands out as a statistical outlier. Overall, Ukraine reports neutralizing 14 of 22 missiles and 438 of 464 drones, roughly two-thirds of the missile salvo and more than 90 percent of the drone swarm. Independent Russian commentary has tried to cast doubt on those figures, but in doing so has often contradicted both the Russian Ministry of Defense and itself about the use of Iskander missiles and the scale of damage, underscoring how politicized strike narratives have become.

The intercept statistics highlight how quickly Ukrainian crews have mastered complex Western systems and integrated them with Soviet hardware and homegrown EW tools. That skill is precisely why President Volodymyr Zelensky is pressing Washington for up to 25 Patriot systems under a proposed loan and replacement scheme, arguing that only a much larger inventory can give Ukraine nationwide ballistic coverage.

For NATO planners, the November 25 barrage is more than a Ukrainian success. It validates European investments such as the German-led European Sky Shield Initiative and Germany’s own plans to procure additional IRIS-T SLM batteries and other ground-based air defense systems, while offering a live fire laboratory on how to counter massed drones and mixed missile salvos. As Russia scales production of Shahed-type drones and continues to refine its ballistic arsenal, the battle over Ukraine’s skies is shaping the next generation of integrated air and missile defense concepts from Warsaw to Washington.