Russia arms Shahed drone with Igla-S air defense missile to shoot down Ukrainian helicopters.

On January 4, 2026, Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces said fighters from the Darknode Battalion of the 412th Nemesis Brigade intercepted for the first time a Shahed drone fitted with an Igla-S MANPADS missile, indicating an attempt by Russia to use these drones to threaten Ukrainian helicopters and low-flying aircraft involved in counter-drone interception.

On January 4, 2026, the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces stated that fighters from the Darknode Battalion of the 412th Nemesis Brigade intercepted a Russian Shahed-type kamikaze drone fitted with an Igla-S man-portable air defense system. This variant, observed for the first time during the war, carried a camera and a radio modem, allowing the missile to be launched remotely by an operator located on Russian territory to threaten Ukrainian helicopters and low-flying aircraft involved in counter-drone interception.
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Ukraine may now have to allocate more air defense assets and counter-UAS resources to deal with such a threat, as MANPADS-armed drones could potentially serve as a decentralized air defense layer for Russia's advancing forces. (Picture source: Ukrainian MoD)

According to Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov, a Ukrainian military and technical expert, the missile launch was not automatically but manually triggered by the Shahed operator using the onboard camera feed and radio link. This new variant was assessed as being intended to engage Ukrainian helicopters and other low-flying aircraft that had previously intercepted Russian drones at close range using machine guns or cannons. Army aviation crews were warned to avoid approaching Shahed drones on a head-on course and to be particularly cautious when encountering drones flying in circular or loitering patterns, which were interpreted as potential attempts to draw aircraft into missile engagement zones. Ukrainian units also indicated that examination of the tactics associated with this configuration was ongoing in order to adapt interception procedures.

From a tactical perspective, mounting an Igla-S on a Shahed offers several potential advantages. Even a limited air-to-air capability forces Ukrainian pilots to assume that some drones within a swarm may be able to fire back, increasing uncertainty during interceptions. This can push helicopters and aircraft to operate at greater distances, reducing the effectiveness of close-range engagements that had previously been relatively efficient against unarmed Shaheds. The presence of a missile also alters the risk balance, as the potential loss of a manned aircraft and crew carries far greater consequences than the loss of a single drone, even if actual firing opportunities remain limited.

At the same time, the disadvantages of this approach directly affect the core strengths of the Shahed drone. Adding a MANPADS launcher and missile to a prop-driven loitering munition imposes significant weight and aerodynamic drag, which can reduce the drone’s relatively low endurance, range, and speed. Slower speed or reduced endurance makes the drone easier to detect and intercept, particularly by dedicated counter-UAS systems, and less maneuverable. The need for a continuous radio link and live video feed exposes this new Shahed variant to electronic warfare and jamming, especially in an environment where such measures are actively used.

The added cost of an Igla-S also undermines the economic logic of Shahed operations, which rely on mass production and saturation attacks: deploying more complex air defense-armed variants means fewer drones available for primary strikes per sortie, potentially reducing the saturation effect Ukraine has struggled against. Finally, unlike purpose-built air defense systems, the Shahed lacks radar, advanced target tracking, or integrated fire control, meaning successful engagements depend heavily on operator skill, communication stability, and favorable geometry against low-flying targets.

The Igla-S configuration follows earlier attempts to give Shahed drones limited air-to-air capability. In December 2025, Ukrainian soldiers from the same Darknode battalion intercepted a Shahed fitted with a Soviet-era R-60 air-to-air missile, marking an earlier effort to threaten aircraft intercepting drone swarms. That configuration reportedly included multiple cameras, a mesh radio modem, and a pylon mounting system, but it required the entire drone to be aimed toward the target to support infrared seeker lock. Compared with the heavier R-60, a MANPADS such as Igla-S is lighter and simpler to integrate, although both approaches reflect a broader pattern of iterative modifications capable of limited self-defense or ambush rather than a one-off field experiment. The appearance of these two variants suggests a deliberate effort by Russia to target Ukrainian pilots who have previously been effective in intercepting Shahed swarms at close range.

These developments are occurring alongside sustained large-scale drone and missile attacks by Russia. Ukrainian air defenses have continued to face waves of Shahed, Geran, and decoy-type drones launched from multiple directions, often in combination with ballistic missiles such as Iskander-M or surface-to-air missiles used in a surface-to-surface role. Recent nights have seen dozens to more than a hundred drones launched in single attacks, with Ukrainian forces employing a mix of aviation, surface-to-air missiles, electronic warfare units, unmanned interceptors, and mobile fire groups to counter them. For instance, one recap stated that on the night of January 3, 2026, Russia attacked Ukraine with 95 strike drones from multiple directions, with Ukrainian defenders said to have destroyed 80 of them through combined air defense and aviation actions.

The Shahed-136 itself, also known in Russian service as Geran-2, remains a relatively simple Iranian loitering munition optimized for low-cost production and extended reach. However, the addition of the Igla-S missile, which weighs around 10 to 11 kilograms, directly reduces fuel fraction, endurance, and range on a 200-kilogram drone that already flies at relatively low speeds of roughly 150 to 185 kilometers per hour. In a standard attack configuration, the Shahed typically carries a high-explosive warhead estimated between 40 and 50 kilograms, although heavier payloads have been observed at the cost of reduced range, which is often cited at up to 2,500 kilometers under optimal conditions. Over time, it has been modified with additional antennas, cameras, and other components to improve navigation, resilience, and survivability against interception, reflecting iterative adaptation driven by battlefield conditions.

The Igla-S, for its part, is a shoulder-fired infrared-guided man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) designed to engage low-flying aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles. The missile itself weighs approximately 10.8 kilograms, with the complete launch system weighing close to 18 kilograms, and it is typically credited with a maximum engagement range of around 6 kilometers and an effective altitude envelope up to roughly 3.5 kilometers. The Igla-S uses an improved infrared seeker compared with earlier Igla variants, incorporating enhanced sensitivity and greater resistance to countermeasures such as flares, while retaining a fire-and-forget guidance principle once launched. In Russian service, the Igla-S has been widely deployed alongside older Igla models and more recent systems such as Verba, making it available in sufficient numbers for such experimental integration.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.