Ukraine’s Fire Point Produces 200 Strike Drones Daily and Supplies 60% of Defense Forces.

Ukraine is rapidly expanding domestic drone and missile production, with manufacturers like Fire Point now central to daily strike operations against Russian logistics and infrastructure. The shift highlights how industrial scale, not single breakthrough weapons, is shaping Ukraine’s ability to sustain pressure deep behind Russian lines.

According to reporting by the BBC on December 18, 2025, Ukrainian journalists were taken under blindfold to a heavily secured production site linked to Fire Point, one of the country’s fastest growing drone and missile manufacturers. The rare access underscored how defense factories have become frontline assets themselves, guarded as tightly as military bases, as Ukraine doubles down on domestically built long-range strike systems to offset Russia’s numerical advantages and maintain pressure on rear area logistics.
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Ukraine's drone industry is surging, with Fire Point claiming up to 200 strike drones a day to sustain the high attrition, high-tempo unmanned campaign against Russian forces and rear area targets (Picture source: Mezha Media).

In parallel with the BBC’s look inside the program, Ukraine’s defense media outlet Militarnyi reported that Fire Point claims a production rate of up to 200 strike drones per day, and that the drones it supplies enable roughly 60% of the Defense Forces’ drone strikes. If accurate, that figure places one company’s output near the center of Ukraine’s daily strike architecture and explains why Russia repeatedly tries to hit production nodes.

Fire Point’s portfolio spans at least two “strike drone” families that fit different operational problems. The FP-1 is positioned as a deep strike, one-way attack system with a reported range up to 1,600 km and a warhead up to 120 kg, intended to hit strategic depth targets rather than tactical frontline positions. For nearer ranges, Fire Point unveiled the FP-2 “middle strike” drone for targets closer to the front, with a stated range of 200 km and a heavier 105 kg warhead. The FP 2 concept is built around flexibility: autonomous guidance against stationary targets, operator control via radio for moving targets, and day or night employment. Developers have also described launcher concepts, including a fixed launcher and a mobile solution disguised as a truck, a practical answer to Russia’s counterbattery and counterstrike cycle that punishes predictable launch patterns.

The BBC report also ties Fire Point’s drone ramp-up to a broader shift toward cruise missile-class weapons, notably the FP-5 “Flamingo.” Open source reporting describes Flamingo as a ground-launched system with a range of around 3,000 km, putting it in the category of systems Western partners have largely declined to provide in comparable reach and payload. The Defense Post, citing imagery and Ukrainian reporting, lists a 14 m length, 6 m wingspan, an Ivchenko AI 25TL turbofan, an inertial navigation system paired with GPS and satellite navigation, and a 1,150 kg warhead, with top speed around 950 km/h and a ceiling around 5,000 m. Those numbers, if confirmed by further evidence, suggest a weapon closer to a small aircraft than a typical loitering munition, built for deep strikes against high-value infrastructure and industrial targets.

Ukraine’s drone industry did not start at this level. In 2022 and 2023, many units relied on adapted commercial quadcopters, volunteer procurement, and fast learning cycles that blurred the line between hobby electronics and combat systems. By 2024 and 2025, that improvisation hardened into an ecosystem: standardized FPV strike drones in huge numbers, dedicated reconnaissance platforms, maritime drones, and increasingly, factory built long range one way attack systems supported by state contracts and battlefield feedback loops. Ukraine’s monthly drone output surged strongly, with figures circulating that point to a jump from tens of thousands per month to more than 200,000, reflecting industrial scaling rather than artisan production. At the high end, Fire Point has been described as producing thousands of FP-1 class drones monthly, emphasizing rapid assembly, cost discipline, and adaptations for contested navigation and survivability against jamming.

Sustainment is the keyword because drones in this war are consumables. First, attrition is structural: electronic warfare, air defense, small arms fire, and simple mechanical failure delete platforms at a pace that would be unacceptable for crewed aircraft but is baked into the economics of unmanned warfare. Second, drones have become the connective tissue of Ukraine’s army, feeding targeting to artillery, delivering precision at the squad level through FPV attacks, and extending the strike campaign into Russia’s logistics depth. Ukraine’s commander in chief has publicly framed drones as the dominant strike instrument, with reporting that drones account for more than 60% of Ukrainian strikes on enemy targets.

Third, Russia’s own mass matters. Reporting referenced a Russian launch tempo averaging around 200 Shahed-type drones per day, with Ukraine responding at roughly half that number, a dynamic that forces Ukraine to keep replenishing both offensive stocks and defensive intercept solutions. This is why production rates, not just prototype performance, are now strategic. A drone that is excellent but scarce loses relevance in a battlespace where hundreds of targets must be serviced nightly, and where the enemy can absorb losses by sheer volume.