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Cambodia uses Chinese Type-90B and PHL-03 rocket launchers in strikes on Thailand
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Thailand announced on December 8, 2025, that Cambodian forces may use Chinese-made Type-90B 122 mm and PHL-03 300 mm multiple launch rocket systems into Thai border areas, according to Reuters. Videos posted by residents and open-source investigators independently verified the rocket launches and impacts.

According to information published by Reuters on December 8, 2025, the Thai government confirmed that Cambodian forces employed Chinese-made multiple launch rocket systems, specifically the Type-90B 122 mm MLRS and the PHL-03 300 mm MLRS, to fire artillery rockets into several border areas within Thailand amid escalating tensions along the disputed frontier. Thai officials said independent verification came from multiple videos posted on social media by local residents and open-source investigators, showing rocket trails, impacts in border villages, and the movement of Cambodian military MLRS units toward forward firing positions.
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The Cambodian Army's Chinese-made Type-90B 122mm multiple rocket launchers on display during a military parade in Phnom Penh, highlighting its 40-tube configuration and high-mobility chassis. This system has been integrated into frontline artillery brigades since its delivery from China in 2022. (Picture source: YouTube video footage)

According to Reuters on December 8, 2025, the Thai government confirmed that Cambodian forces employed Chinese-made multiple launch rocket systems, specifically the Type-90B 122 mm MLRS and the PHL-03 300 mm MLRS, to fire artillery rockets into several border areas within Thailand amid escalating tensions along the disputed frontier. Thai officials said independent verification came from multiple videos posted on social media by local residents and open-source investigators, showing rocket trails, impacts in border villages, and the movement of Cambodian military MLRS units toward forward firing positions.

The Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) is a class of mobile artillery designed to deliver rapid, high-volume firepower over a wide area. Unlike traditional howitzers or mortars, which typically fire one round at a time, an MLRS vehicle is equipped with a series of rocket tubes—often 12, 24, or even 40 in number—capable of launching a coordinated salvo within seconds. This capability enables units to suppress, neutralize, or destroy enemy concentrations, air defense sites, or logistical hubs with devastating speed. MLRS systems are particularly valuable in shaping the battlefield during offensive operations, softening enemy positions ahead of a mechanized assault, or in a defensive role to saturate advancing formations. Their high mobility and quick shoot-and-scoot tactics make them difficult to counter, enabling rapid repositioning to avoid counterbattery fire.

Cambodia currently operates 74 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, while Thailand fields 69. This gives the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces a marginal numerical advantage but, more significantly, reflects a deliberate modernization strategy. Since 2022, Cambodia has integrated advanced Chinese-origin rocket systems into its artillery command, notably 8 Type-90B 122 mm truck-mounted launchers and 6 PHL-03 300 mm heavy MLRS. Both systems are produced by NORINCO and provide long-range strike capability, rapid mobility, and digital fire control systems. These launchers were introduced during military parades but have since been absorbed into active artillery brigades positioned near the border.

The Type-90B is a truck-mounted 122 mm system configured with 40 launch tubes and a computerized fire control suite. It provides rapid area suppression at ranges up to 40 km. In combat conditions, a battery of Type-90Bs can fire a saturation barrage and reposition within minutes, minimizing exposure to counter-battery radar. The heavier PHL-03 system, modeled on Russia’s BM-30 Smerch, delivers strategic-level firepower with 12 launch tubes for 300 mm rockets. Depending on the warhead, the system can achieve ranges beyond 70 km and is capable of deploying cluster munitions, thermobaric payloads, or anti-runway submunitions. Cambodian artillery personnel trained with Chinese advisors in 2022 to support integration of these systems, including logistics, maintenance, and mission planning.

Footage posted to social media shows Cambodian units firing multiple salvos consistent with the Type-90B’s exhaust signature and pattern, with impact analysis showing strike dispersion typical of 122 mm high-explosive fragmentation rounds. Crater assessment in the Thai border district of Sisaket indicates accurate grid targeting, though with limited warhead effect beyond the immediate impact radius. The tactical employment suggests a demonstration of offensive capability within engagement range, rather than strategic disruption.

In addition to its modern systems, Cambodia maintains a complex MLRS inventory of legacy platforms. These include 107 mm Type-63 systems, 122 mm BM-21 Grad variants, 132 mm BM-13 and 140 mm BM-14 launchers, as well as RM-70 Czech-made platforms. These assets vary significantly in terms of range, reload speed, and accuracy, but provide depth for massed fires. The newer Chinese systems now serve as the high-precision layer, while older platforms serve in area-denial or mass-saturation roles. This layered approach aligns with contemporary artillery doctrine among PLA-affiliated forces and enables tactical flexibility.

Thailand’s inventory of 69 MLRS systems is structured around mixed-caliber firepower with an emphasis on modernization and precision. The Royal Thai Army operates 4 SR-4 122 mm systems, 60 Type-85 130 mm launchers, and long-range heavy assets, including 1 DTI-1 (302 mm), 3 DTI-1G (306 mm), and 1 Israeli PULS system. The DTI-1 family, developed domestically in cooperation with Chinese firms, provides theater-range strike capabilities similar to the PHL-03, while the PULS introduces multi-caliber flexibility and precision guidance. Thai artillery units are increasingly integrated with advanced ISR and radar support, enabling faster response times and greater targeting accuracy.

The operational implications of the Cambodian rocket launches have triggered a shift in Thai artillery posture along the frontier. Counter-battery radars, likely including Israeli-made EL/M-2084 systems, have been deployed alongside forward fire control teams to monitor and respond to future salvos. Thai doctrine emphasizes responsive fires and joint force integration, and artillery brigades near Sisaket have begun repositioning to exploit terrain and limit exposure.

Both countries now possess comparable quantities of MLRS systems, but their strategic approaches differ. Cambodia favors volume-based saturation and mobility, leveraging Chinese MLRS designs for theater firepower. Thailand, meanwhile, is advancing toward modular, precision-guided systems with enhanced C4ISR support. The recent incident marks the first known combat deployment of Cambodia’s PHL-03 or Type-90B, offering new data points on operational readiness and system integration.

From a purely military perspective, the Cambodian launch demonstrates that its newer MLRS platforms are fielded, crewed, and ready for operational use. The use of mobile rocket artillery from prepared forward positions indicates growing proficiency in tactical coordination and in executing fire missions. In the event of future conflict escalation, the presence of theater-range rocket systems on both sides introduces a new level of intensity, where rapid deep-strike engagements could occur within minutes.

For analysts monitoring Southeast Asian artillery modernization, the December 2025 border engagement represents a milestone in the region’s shift toward high-mobility, long-range precision fires. Both Cambodia and Thailand now operate MLRS systems capable of shaping outcomes at the brigade level and above, with implications for regional deterrence postures and combined-arms force structure.

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
U.S. Army confirms first delivery of M1E3 Abrams tank prototype by General Dynamics
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The U.S. Army confirmed that it has taken delivery of its first M1E3 Abrams tank prototype from General Dynamics Land Systems, according to Defense Daily.

As reported by Defense Daily on December 12, 2025, the U.S. Army confirmed it has received the first prototype of the M1E3 Abrams main battle tank, marking the transition of the program from design into testing. U.S. Army leadership states that the early delivery supports a revised acquisition approach focused on shortened development timelines and early soldier evaluation.
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With the M1E3, the U.S. Army is deliberately breaking from earlier Abrams tanks, which evolved through adding new capabilities onto an existing platform, by restarting the design baseline and integrating key capabilities directly into the vehicle architecture from the outset. (Picture source: U.S. Army)

U.S. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Randy A. George also stated that three additional prototypes are expected in 2026, reflecting a deliberate effort to compress what had previously been described as a six to seven-year development timeline. The M1E3 is framed by Army leadership as a core element of a broader push to shorten acquisition cycles and place new vehicles into soldiers’ hands earlier for evaluation. This approach emphasizes early feedback, iterative changes, and acceptance of managed risk rather than waiting for a finalized configuration. The prototype delivery is therefore treated less as an end state and more as a starting point for rapid refinement. The U.S. Army has also indicated that early vehicles will be used to assess practical aspects of crew operation, protection concepts, and integration within armored units.

The M1E3 program is embedded within the Army Transformation Initiative, which senior leaders link to a Department of Defense directive dated April 30, 2025, aimed at restructuring how the U.S. Army fields capabilities. This initiative is described as a response to battlefields increasingly shaped by drones, persistent sensors, decoys, electronic warfare, and rapidly evolving dual-use technologies. Within this framework, the U.S. Army seeks to deliver critical warfighting capabilities faster, optimize force structure, and eliminate programs or processes considered obsolete or inefficient. Leadership has tied the M1E3 Abrams tank directly to these goals, alongside efforts involving long-range fires, modernized unmanned systems, and faster integration of artificial intelligence into command and control. Funding and prioritization are intended to shift toward capability-based portfolios rather than platform-specific silos, allowing resources to be redirected more quickly as requirements change.

The decision to pursue the development of the M1E3 followed a significant reset of the Abrams tank modernization path announced on September 6, 2023, when the U.S. Army chose to close out development of the M1A2 SEPv4 and focus instead on a new variant. At the same time, production of the M1A2 SEPv3 continued at a reduced rate to sustain the fleet during the transition, supported by a $4.6 billion upgrade contract scheduled through June 2028. Army leaders cited weight growth, logistical burden, and the increasing difficulty of adding protection and power-generating systems as bolt-on solutions as key drivers behind the shift. Combat observations from recent conflicts, notably in Ukraine, reinforced the need for protection systems and signatures to be integrated into the base design rather than added externally.

The U.S. Army leadership has emphasized speed as a defining feature of the M1E3 program, with Gen. George stating that an initial production schedule of roughly 65 months was deemed too slow and directed to be cut by at least two-thirds. Earlier projections that placed the Initial Operational Capability (IOC) around 2030 were subsequently replaced by a stated ambition to field usable capability within approximately 24 to 30 months. This acceleration relies heavily on digital engineering, modular design, and open architecture standards intended to simplify future upgrades. The Army has described plans to place early vehicles into small, unidentified units for direct soldier interaction, including assessments of crew layout, gunnery workflow, and sustainment demands. Prototypes are expected to be operating inside U.S. Army formations during 2026, even as many design elements remain adjustable. This approach accepts that not all subsystems will be mature at first fielding, prioritizing learning and adaptation over completeness.

In terms of design direction, it is known that the M1E3 is associated with several efforts to reduce weight, improve energy management, and simplify long-term modernization. Concepts linked to the program include a hybrid electric drive, an autoloader, potential changes to the main gun, integrated armor protection, improved networking and command connectivity, and applications of artificial intelligence to assist crew decision-making. The Army has highlighted the importance of integrating an active protection system (APS) directly into the tank architecture, rather than relying on external kits as was done with earlier Abrams variants. Signature management is also emphasized, including reducing thermal and electromagnetic visibility in sensor-dense environments. While the 120mm smoothbore gun is expected to remain central, officials have acknowledged that elements such as the autoloader present technical challenges that could influence timing and configuration.

The current focus is apparently on designing a tank that can evolve without repeating the cumulative weight and complexity increases seen in past Abrams upgrades. Industrial and program execution aspects are also integral to the M1E3 program, with multiple contract actions and market engagement activities supporting the accelerated schedule. Beyond the SEPv3 upgrade contract, the U.S. Army awarded an Abrams Engineering Program contract valued at about $150 million in May 2024, running through June 2027, to support development activities relevant to the M1E3. Follow-on actions discussed by the U.S. Army include rapid selection of new capabilities such as powertrain improvements, integrated protection, artificial intelligence-assisted targeting, and reconfigurable software and hardware frameworks. In 2025, the Army conducted market surveys addressing tracked vehicle production, digital engineering, predictive logistics, quality systems, and secure handling of classified work, followed by additional engagement focused on component kit production and installation.

A recurring theme has been the use of commercially supportable components where feasible, to reduce sustainment costs, ease access to spare parts, and improve availability compared to legacy approaches reliant on limited supplier bases. The AbramsX technology demonstrator, unveiled in 2022 by General Dynamics Land Systems, is also cited as an illustration of feasible directions for the M1E3, including significant weight reduction, a hybrid electric diesel powertrain, an unmanned turret with a three-person crew, and enhanced defenses against drone-based threats, while acknowledging that not all features would transition directly into service. More broadly, U.S. Army leaders reference parallel developments abroad, such as new tank concepts in Europe and Asia, to underline the competitive and evolving nature of armored warfare. At the same time, oversight questions persist regarding whether the M1E3 will replace existing Abrams on a one-for-one basis or result in a mixed fleet, how quickly it could be fielded across all brigades, whether National Guard units would receive it, and whether the design would be authorized for Foreign Military Sales.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
BREAKING NEWS: Türkiye successfully conducts new live-fire test of Tayfun hypersonic ballistic missile
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Türkiye has completed another successful live-fire test of its indigenously developed Tayfun hypersonic ballistic missile, Anadolu Ajansı reported on December 12, 2025. The precision strike underscores the system’s operational readiness and signals a shift from development into mass production and active delivery.

Türkiye has carried out a new live-fire test of its Tayfun hypersonic ballistic missile, marking a significant milestone in the country’s long-range strike ambitions. Anadolu Ajansı reported on December 12, 2025, that the missile struck its designated target with high accuracy, reinforcing confidence among Turkish defense officials that the program is moving beyond testing and toward sustained production and operational deployment.
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Turkish defense industry footage shows the test fire of the Roketsan-developed Tayfun hypersonic ballistic missile, launched from a dual-container TEL (Transporter Erector Launcher) 8x8 truck. The missile achieved a high-precision strike, marking a milestone in Türkiye’s transition to operational hypersonic capabilities. (Picture source: Roketsan Video footage)

Türkiye officially presented its first hypersonic ballistic missile, the Tayfun Block-4, at the opening of the 17th International Defense Industry Fair (IDEF) 2025, held in Istanbul from July 22 to 27. The missile was developed by Roketsan and introduced alongside five additional systems, marking a major milestone in Türkiye's ongoing expansion of its long-range strike capabilities. The unveiling signaled Ankara’s strategic ambition to field next-generation deterrent systems tailored to regional security realities and operational independence from foreign suppliers.

This latest launch, confirmed by Turkish defense sources and accompanied by video footage circulating on official and open-source platforms, suggests that the Tayfun is no longer a proof-of-concept weapon but a deployable hypersonic system. In contrast to earlier prototypes, which had fewer visual identifiers, the recent test showcased a fully integrated launch unit mounted on a purpose-built 8×8 military truck acting as a Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL). Army Recognition’s initial analysis of the visual material reveals a dual-container configuration mounted at the rear of the truck chassis, each container housing a ready-to-launch missile, a notable shift from previous single-missile tests and a clear indication of readiness for field deployment.

Developed by Roketsan, the Tayfun (meaning "typhoon" in Turkish) represents Türkiye’s boldest foray yet into the realm of hypersonic weapons, placing it among a select group of nations including the United States, Russia, China, North Korea, and India that are actively developing or fielding hypersonic-capable platforms. While most of these countries are focused on advanced hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) or scramjet-powered cruise missiles, Türkiye’s achievement stands out due to its accelerated timeline, operational fielding, and indigenous industrial base. With the Tayfun, Türkiye becomes the first NATO country outside the United States to operationalize a hypersonic ballistic missile, marking a critical shift in the alliance’s technological landscape.

Hypersonic weapons, defined by their ability to travel at speeds exceeding Mach 5, or more than 6,100 km/h, while maintaining maneuverability through the atmosphere, are reshaping strategic doctrines worldwide. Unlike traditional ballistic missiles that follow a predictable arc, hypersonic systems are designed to evade missile defenses by altering trajectory mid-flight, reducing response time for interception, and increasing the survivability of the payload. These characteristics make them ideal for time-critical, high-value target strikes, and their proliferation is triggering a new global arms race in advanced strike systems.

The Tayfun’s design reflects several key features consistent with hypersonic-capable medium-range ballistic systems. According to publicly available footage and expert assessments, the Tayfun Block-4 incorporates a solid-propellant two-stage booster, enabling rapid acceleration and sustained high-speed flight. Estimates based on the flight profile suggest it reaches speeds of at least Mach 6, approximately 7,350 km/h, and potentially higher depending on atmospheric conditions and altitude. The missile is launched vertically and follows a depressed trajectory, minimizing radar detection and interception windows. Its terminal phase is believed to involve a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV), allowing mid-course corrections and evasive maneuvers, a hallmark of modern hypersonic designs.

In terms of dimensions, the Tayfun is approximately 7-8 m long, with a launch weight likely exceeding 5 t. Its reported operational range exceeds 1,000 km, placing it firmly in the category of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs). The missile is compatible with mobile TEL platforms, enabling rapid deployment and enhanced tactical flexibility across Türkiye’s diverse terrain. The twin-container TEL configuration enables back-to-back launches or immediate re-strikes, a significant force multiplier in active combat scenarios.

Video analysis by Army Recognition also shows refinements in missile ejection and plume behavior, suggesting that the Tayfun uses a cold-launch method where the missile is expelled from the container before the main engine ignites. This technology reduces thermal signature and minimizes wear on the launch platform, further aligning the system with modern ballistic launch techniques observed in Chinese and Russian equivalents. The TEL appears to be based on a domestically manufactured 8×8 heavy-duty tactical truck.

Sources within the Turkish defense industry have hinted that Tayfun is part of a broader strategic push by Ankara to establish long-range, sovereign precision-strike capabilities. The integration of mobile TELs dramatically enhances the missile’s survivability and deployability across varying terrains, particularly in Türkiye’s complex regional security environment. This configuration enables rapid repositioning, shoot-and-scoot tactics, and reduced vulnerability to preemptive strikes.

Strategically, the deployment of Tayfun is likely to reshape power dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Aegean, and potentially beyond. Türkiye’s decision to publicize this successful test, accompanied by footage and state media amplification, sends a clear signal to regional competitors and NATO partners that it is accelerating its indigenous deterrent capabilities amid ongoing regional tensions. While Türkiye remains a NATO member, it has increasingly asserted a more independent defense posture, exemplified by its pursuit of strategic autonomy in missile technology, aerospace, and unmanned systems.

Turkish defense officials have remained tight-lipped about potential export plans for the Tayfun missile, but industry watchers speculate that it could eventually be offered to select allies in Asia, the Gulf, or North Africa under strict end-use conditions. However, its hypersonic classification and potential WMD-delivery capacity may place it under the scrutiny of international arms control regimes, particularly the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), to which Türkiye is not a signatory.

As of now, the Tayfun hypersonic ballistic missile stands as a potent symbol of Türkiye’s expanding military-industrial complex, joining other indigenous programs such as the Altay main battle tank, the TCG Anadolu LHD, and the Kaan fifth-generation fighter jet. The transition from test phase to production and delivery suggests that Türkiye is actively building an operational hypersonic strike force, further narrowing the technological gap with top-tier military powers.

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
Denmark selects U.S. Lockheed Martin air warning radars for Arctic and North Atlantic defense
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Denmark has selected Lockheed Martin to supply advanced air-warning radars for deployment at Skagen, Bornholm, and the Faroe Islands, according to the Ministry of Defense. The move sharpens Danish and allied situational awareness in the Arctic and North Atlantic amid heightened Russian military activity.

Denmark will proceed with Lockheed Martin as its supplier of next-generation air-warning radars, following a unanimous decision by the parliamentary conciliation group and the Danish Chief of Defense's endorsement, the Ministry of Defense said on December 11, 2025. The radars are slated for key geographic choke points across the Kingdom, including Skagen at the entrance to the Baltic Sea, Bornholm in the central Baltic, and the Faroe Islands overlooking North Atlantic air and maritime approaches, significantly expanding Denmark’s long-range surveillance coverage.
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On December 11, 2025, Denmark announced the deployment of new air-warning radars in Skagen, Bornholm, and the Faroe Islands to strengthen surveillance across Danish and North Atlantic airspace. (Picture source: Danish MoD)

These advanced radar systems are designed to provide persistent air surveillance, enabling Danish forces to detect, track, and identify airborne threats across a broad operational envelope. While the specific model has not been publicly confirmed, industry and defense sources familiar with similar procurements suggest that Lockheed Martin may deliver variants of its AN/TPS-77 or newer AESA-based systems, known for high mobility, long-range tracking, and advanced clutter-rejection capabilities. These systems are widely used by NATO allies and represent a significant leap forward from the legacy Danish air surveillance architecture.

Defense Minister Troels Lund Poulsen described the acquisition as a critical step in reinforcing Denmark’s sovereignty and readiness. “The radars constitute an important capacity for surveillance in Denmark and the North Atlantic. The Kingdom’s ambition for low tension is under pressure, and the current security policy situation requires that our presence and cooperation in the Arctic and the North Atlantic be significantly strengthened. With this acquisition, we are well on our way,” Poulsen said in an official statement.

The radar sites—Skagen in northern Jutland, Bornholm in the Baltic Sea, and the Faroe Islands in the North Atlantic—form a triangular surveillance network that offers Denmark unprecedented situational awareness across multiple theaters. Skagen and Bornholm provide critical coverage against Russian air activity in the Baltic Sea, while the Faroe Islands site enhances Denmark’s ability to monitor the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) gap, a traditional flashpoint for NATO-Russia tensions and a crucial vector for transatlantic air and naval movements.

Chief of Defense General Michael W. Hyldgaard emphasized the operational value of the systems: “Modern air warning radars are essential for us to detect, understand, and respond quickly to deviations from the normal picture and specific threats. With the new systems, we will have a significantly improved situational picture, which strengthens security throughout the Kingdom and our ability to contribute to NATO’s overall air defense.”

The timing of this acquisition reflects Denmark’s recalibrated strategic priorities. Since 2022, Russia has increased military flights in the North Atlantic, including long-range bomber patrols, ISR missions, and simulated strike drills near allied airspace. NATO has responded with stepped-up aerial policing and sensor deployments, but Denmark’s move to invest in sovereign, high-end radar coverage marks a proactive effort to close remaining gaps in northern surveillance infrastructure.

A fourth radar installation is also being considered for East Greenland, according to Denmark’s broader Arctic and North Atlantic strategy, outlined in the second phase of the government’s regional defense plan. This prospective expansion reflects the growing recognition in Copenhagen of Greenland’s strategic importance as both a surveillance outpost and an early warning hub. East Greenland lies directly beneath high-latitude polar flight paths, which are increasingly used by foreign military aircraft, including long-range bombers and surveillance platforms. Establishing a forward-operating air surveillance node in this remote region would significantly enhance Denmark’s capacity to detect incursions and monitor strategic movements across the GIUK gap and into North American airspace—a mission aligned with both national defense objectives and NATO's integrated air and missile defense framework.

The radar program will be financed through Denmark’s Arctic Capacity Package and the Acceleration Fund, two government-backed initiatives aimed at fast-tracking military modernization in response to new security challenges. Initial deliveries are expected within the next 2 years, with full operational capability projected for 2027-2028.

For Lockheed Martin, this contract reaffirms the company’s role as a critical supplier of air domain awareness solutions to NATO and its northern allies. The U.S. defense firm has expanded its radar offerings in Europe in recent years, including contracts with Norway and the Baltic states. Denmark’s selection strengthens Lockheed’s presence in the high north and may open the door to future cooperative surveillance efforts across the Arctic region.

This radar deployment represents not just a hardware acquisition, but a strategic signal. Denmark is preparing for a future in which the Arctic and North Atlantic will no longer be buffer zones, but contested domains requiring constant vigilance, rapid detection, and close alignment with NATO's collective defense architecture.

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
Hungary's Leopard 2A7HU tank fleet reaches full strength after final delivery from Germany
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The Hungarian Defence Forces received the final Leopard 2A7HU main battle tank on December 12, 2025, completing a fleet of 44 vehicles assigned to the Klapka György 1st Armored Brigade.

On December 12, 2025, the Hungarian Defence Forces took delivery of the final Leopard 2A7HU main battle tank from KNDS Deutschland, with the handover of the 44th unit to the Klapka György 1st Armored Brigade in Tata. Defence Minister Kristóf Szalay-Bobrovniczky and Chief of Defence General Gábor Böröndi were present, as this marked the full operational strength of Hungary’s Leopard new armored battalion.
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The event was also the conclusion of a multi-year delivery phase that brought together tanks, supporting vehicles, training infrastructure, and sustainment arrangements in a single formation. (Picture source: Hungarian MoD)

The origins of Hungary’s Leopard program are tied to a broader reassessment of land forces conducted in the mid-2010s, when the government concluded that existing armored capabilities based on Soviet-era tanks no longer met national defense requirements, and the country’s economic situation by 2015 made it possible to sign contracts. This process, which rebuilt the heavy armored forces from the ground up, was not limited to replacing tanks but focused on restoring a full-spectrum armored capability, including mobility support, recovery assets, training systems, and logistics. The Leopard acquisition, therefore, emerged as part of a deliberate long-term plan rather than a rapid procurement to reestablish a modern armored battalion compatible with NATO standards and operational concepts.

This modernization path was formalized in December 2018 through a comprehensive agreement with KNDS Deutschland, which covered 44 Leopard 2A7HU main battle tanks, 24 PzH 2000 self-propelled howitzers, three Leguan bridge-laying systems, five WiSENT recovery vehicles, and a dedicated simulation center, along with a full training and logistics framework. Deliveries were phased between 2023 and 2025 to allow gradual force buildup and crew preparation. To bridge the transition, 12 Leopard 2A4HU tanks were introduced for training purposes in December 2020, enabling crews to shift from the ageing T-72M1, which Hungary acquired during the Cold War when it was part of the Warsaw Pact, to more modern Western tanks before the first delivery of Leopard 2A7HUs in August 2023.

The Leopard 2A7HU, which now represents the most modern tank variant in Hungarian service, possesses several specifics, such as an FN Herstal Remote Weapon Station (RWS), an improved roof protection, an upgraded fire control system (FCS) with automatic target tracking, and a new PERI RTWL stabilized commander's sight. Based on the Leopard 2A7+, the 2A7HU retains a four-person crew consisting of a commander, a gunner, a loader, and a driver, with the driver positioned on the right side of the hull. The hull measures 7.7 meters in length, while overall length reaches 10.97 meters with the main gun forward, and the tank has a width of 3.76 meters without additional armor modules and a height of 3.03 meters. Its main armament is a Rheinmetall 120 mm L55A1 gun, which allows the use of modern high-pressure ammunition and extended-range kinetic energy rounds at ranges of up to 5,000 meters, supported by a 7.62 mm coaxial machine gun and a 12.7 mm remote weapon station for close-in defense. Two banks of eight 76 mm grenade launchers provide smoke screening and high-explosive grenade capability, supporting both defensive maneuvers and obscuration during movement.

The Leopard 2A7HU also retains the MTU MB 873 Ka-501 V12 diesel engine producing 1,500 horsepower, coupled with the Renk HSWL 354 transmission, allowing for speeds of up to 68–72 km/h despite an approximate combat weight of 67.5 tonnes. The tank is capable of crossing wet gaps up to 1.2 meters, fording deliberately to 2.25 meters, and conducting deep wading operations to depths of 4 meters with appropriate preparation, enabling operation across rivers and complex terrain when supported by engineering assets such as the Leguan bridge-layer. Its protection architecture combines composite armor with a wedged add-on self-limiting explosive reactive armor module designed to improve survivability against modern threats. An optional 360-degree Urban kit can be fitted to enhance protection in built-up environments and removed when not required, as well as additional rubber sheets. Hungarian military leadership has emphasized that these features must be paired with adapted tactics and training to address emerging challenges such as unmanned aerial threats.

Beyond the vehicle itself, Hungary has built a support structure intended to sustain Leopard 2A7HU operations over the long term. Maintenance and availability responsibilities are anchored domestically through KNDS Hungary Kft., ensuring that technical support and servicing are conducted inside the country. Ammunition procurement includes several types of armor-piercing rounds and two types of short-range training shells, with large quantities ordered under contracts involving Rheinmetall and with production linked to the Várpalota artillery shell plant in cooperation with Rheinmetall Waffe Munition GmbH. Training is centered in Tata, where a renovated training and simulation facility was inaugurated in October, which includes a turret simulator and supports continuous crew qualification, complemented by live-fire and system adjustment activities at the Szomód range. Together, these elements frame the Leopard 2A7HU fleet as a permanently integrated component of Hungary’s modernized armored forces.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
Thailand deploys U.S.-made Stryker 8x8 armored vehicles as war with Cambodia intensifies
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The Royal Thai Army has begun using U.S.-manufactured Stryker armored vehicles in frontline operations during ongoing fighting with Cambodia along disputed border areas.

As reported by OSINTdefender on December 10, 2025, Thailand’s Royal Thai Army has deployed U.S.-made Stryker 8x8 armored vehicles in frontline operations along the Thai-Cambodian disputed border. Despite public statements from U.S. President Donald Trump that both sides had agreed in principle to halt fighting, clashes with Cambodia continue to intensify, especially near the Bueng Takwan checkpoint in Sa Kaeo province.
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Thailand's Stryker orders were placed in fiscal years 2019, 2020, and 2021 for 70, 50, and 10 vehicles, respectively, bringing the reported total to 130 Strykers at an overall program cost of about 9.1 billion baht, or roughly $282,830,000. (Picture source: X/OSINTdefender)

Thailand’s Royal Thai Army has begun deploying U.S.-made Stryker 8x8 armored vehicles in active combat as fighting with Cambodia escalates along disputed border areas, marking one of the most intense phases of the confrontation to date. Thai forces used Strykers around the Bueng Takwan checkpoint in Ta Phraya district, Sa Kaeo province, opposite the Ban Ta Phraya border trade crossing, to transport infantry, secure positions, and establish defensive control measures. By December 13, 2025, the war remained active and fluid, with continued exchanges reported along several sectors of the roughly 817 km border and with both governments issuing conflicting statements on de-escalation. Thai troops were seen raising the national flag, laying concertina wire, and holding ground with Stryker-supported infantry, underscoring that the vehicles are now employed in frontline operations. At the same time, political messaging and battlefield realities have diverged, complicating assessments of whether any reduction in hostilities is actually taking hold.

The current phase of the Thai-Cambodian war has been characterized by repeated exchanges of rockets, artillery, and mortars across multiple border points, exceeding the intensity of earlier clashes seen in July 2025. Statements by U.S. President Donald Trump suggested that Thailand and Cambodia had agreed in principle to stop shooting after high-level calls involving Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul and Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet, with an effective time referenced for Friday evening. However, subsequent official communications from Bangkok and Phnom Penh did not confirm a clearly implemented ceasefire, and Thai military messaging indicated that fighting was still ongoing.

Cambodia’s leadership emphasized a desire for a peaceful resolution while calling for third-party verification of which side initiated fire, whereas Thai authorities accused Cambodia of attacks affecting civilian areas and of laying landmines along the frontier. These competing narratives unfolded alongside continued tactical engagements, and, as a result, military units on both sides have continued to posture for further contact rather than standing down. Elsewhere along the border, Thai media referred to Cambodian BM-21 rocket impacts in Sisaket province, while Cambodia, in parallel, alleged that Thai fighter jets struck targets inside Cambodian territory during the same period.

Diplomatic mechanisms intended to stabilize the border had already been weakened before the latest escalation, shaping the current trajectory of the war. A Kuala Lumpur Peace Accord signed on October 26, 2025, outlined steps such as withdrawals, monitoring arrangements, and de-mining measures aimed at reducing risks after earlier clashes. Thailand later suspended its participation following a November landmine incident that injured Thai soldiers, a decision that became a reference point in subsequent accusations and counter-accusations. As hostilities resumed, both sides framed their actions as defensive while blaming the other for violating understandings or initiating attacks. The continued deployment of armored vehicles, including Strykers, signals that Thailand is preparing for prolonged operations rather than a short-lived confrontation. Thailand’s Stryker fleet is the result of a multi-year procurement and fielding process that combined refurbished transfers, follow-on orders, and sustained training and maintenance support.

Thailand's procurement remains a little unclear, but available information details orders placed in fiscal years 2019, 2020, and 2021 for 70, 50, and 10 vehicles, respectively, bringing the reported total to 130 Strykers at an overall program cost of about 9.1 billion baht (roughly $282,830,000). Earlier program elements were linked to approval for 60 Stryker infantry carrier vehicles and associated support equipment, including M2 .50-caliber machine guns, vehicle vision and communications systems, smoke grenade launchers, spares, training, and field service support. Thai media also described an initial tranche of 37 refurbished vehicles, with additional vehicles provided to reach a 60-vehicle batch for early operational use. Deliveries were associated with Laem Chabang port and inspection processes at Saraburi prior to handover to operational units, including formations within the 11th Infantry Division based in Chachoengsao province. Training efforts included sending an initial group of around 30 Thai soldiers to the United States to qualify as drivers, mechanics, and technicians, while sustainment support involved U.S. mechanics assisting with maintenance as the fleet entered service.

The Stryker is an 8x8 wheeled armored vehicle family derived from the Canadian LAV-III, itself based on the Mowag Piranha, and produced for the U.S. Army by General Dynamics Land Systems-Canada. In the M1126 infantry carrier configuration, the same used by Thailand, the vehicle is operated by a two-person crew and can transport up to nine infantry soldiers, providing protected mobility for mechanized infantry operations. The M1126 has a length of 6.95 m, a width of 2.72 m, and a height of 2.64 m, with a combat mass in the mid-16 t range. Mobility is assured by a wheeled drivetrain capable of operating as 8x4 and shifting to full 8x8, enabling road speeds of up to about 97 km/h and an operational range of roughly 500 km. These attributes support rapid movement along extended borders and between threatened sectors, which is particularly relevant in a conflict spread across multiple flashpoints, such as the Thai-Cambodian war.

In terms of armament, Thai Strykers have been observed operating with heavy machine guns, consistent with the platform’s typical use of remote weapon stations that can mount a 12.7 mm M2 machine gun or a 40 mm Mk19 automatic grenade launcher, and in some configurations a 7.62 mm M240 machine gun. The Strykers are also equipped with smoke grenade launchers to provide rapid obscuration during contact or withdrawal. A remote weapon configuration allows the gunner to remain under armor while engaging targets, an important factor in environments where mortar and artillery fire pose constant threats. Thailand’s Strykers will be equipped with a new Battle Management System and wider C4I components, including mounted computer systems from Leonardo DRS and Systematic’s Sitaware, after a $7 million contract announced in February 2025 and an MoU signed on November 11, 2025, involving Leonardo DRS and Thai firm Chaiseri has been cited in connection with these efforts, alongside references to integrating the M153 CROWS II remote weapon station.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
U.S. Army Battle Command System Intercepts Cruise Missiles in Milestone Joint Air Defense Test
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The U.S. Army’s Integrated Battle Command System, or IBCS, successfully intercepted two surrogate cruise missile targets during a flight test at White Sands Missile Range. The event signals a shift toward fully networked, joint air and missile defense as cruise missile threats grow worldwide.

On December 11, 2025, Northrop Grumman announced that the U.S. Army’s Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) had successfully intercepted two surrogate cruise missile targets during a pivotal flight test at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, as reported by Northrop Grumman. Conducted in October under the Follow-on Operational Test and Evaluation (FOT&E) campaign, the trial placed soldiers in a complex tactical environment designed to reproduce real-world conditions and electronic congestion. Beyond validating a single engagement, the event is presented as a demonstration of how a networked command-and-control architecture can knit together sensors and effectors from several services into one integrated air and missile defense picture. At a time when cruise missiles and low-flying threats are proliferating in Europe, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific, this test positions IBCS at the center of future joint and allied air defense concepts.

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The Integrated Battle Command System is the U.S. Army’s networked command and control platform that links radars, sensors, and missile interceptors into a single, shared air and missile defense picture across services (Picture Source: Northrop Grumman)

The flight test took place on October 2, 2025 and brought together Program Executive Office Missiles and Space, Integrated Fires Mission Command, and soldiers of the 3rd Battalion, 43rd Air Defense Artillery Regiment at White Sands Missile Range. Using IBCS as the fire-control backbone, the unit detected, tracked and classified two maneuvering cruise missile surrogates in a contested environment before engaging them with two interceptors, achieving two first-shot kills. The scenario combined multiple sensors and launchers and incorporated U.S. Navy participation, underlining the system’s ambition to operate across services rather than within a single Army formation. For Northrop Grumman and the Army, this soldier-run FOT&E event is a key data point on whether IBCS can maintain performance when exposure to jamming, clutter and complex trajectories begins to mirror operational reality rather than controlled test conditions.

IBCS itself is designed less as a single weapon system than as a software-driven command-and-control layer that links disparate radars, launchers and effectors into one fire-control network. The system relies on Engagement Operations Centers, communications relays and an integrated fire control network to fuse data from legacy and next-generation sensors, generating a single, fire-control-quality air picture instead of separate, stove-piped radar views. In previous trials, it has already demonstrated the ability to connect Patriot and Sentinel radars and PAC-3 interceptors and is being prepared to integrate assets such as the Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS) and Indirect Fire Protection Capability launchers. Its open, modular architecture is intended to allow the rapid onboarding of new sensors or weapons and to support the principle of pairing any available sensor with the most appropriate interceptor, regardless of which unit or service owns them.

Industrial implementation is following suit. Northrop Grumman is now producing IBCS under a full-rate production contract in a new manufacturing center in Madison, Alabama, a facility sized to roughly double the company’s capacity in the Huntsville area and scale deliveries for both U.S. and international customers. The company secured a five-year production contract valued at more than $1 billion in December 2021, and the transition to full-rate production comes as Army units are beginning to field the system as part of the service’s integrated air and missile defense modernization program. The recent test therefore serves a dual purpose: it provides operational evidence to inform fielding decisions under FOT&E, and it underpins the business case for scaling up an industrial infrastructure sized for export as well as U.S. demand.

The strategic implications go well beyond a single U.S. battalion-level engagement. Poland has already committed approximately USD 2.53 billion to acquire IBCS for integration with its Wisła and Narew air and missile defense programs between 2024 and 2031, with the system intended to connect diverse Polish and U.S.-origin sensors and launchers into a “plug-and-fight” network. More recently, the U.S. State Department cleared a potential sale of IBCS-enabled Patriot and related systems to Denmark valued at up to USD 3.2 billion, and a broader package including IBCS, Indirect Fire Protection Capability and AMRAAM missiles estimated at USD 3–3.7 billion, making Copenhagen the first potential export customer for the system after Poland. In this context, a successful cruise missile intercept under FOT&E conditions reinforces the credibility of NATO allies’ investment in a common command-and-control layer for ground-based air defense. It also strengthens the argument for a de facto standard that could allow European IBCS users to share a consistent air picture and coordinate engagements more effectively during a crisis.

The test reflects a wider shift in air defense doctrine driven by the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, where cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and long-range drones are frequently used in saturation attacks. The U.S. Department of War has publicly acknowledged a sharp increase in European demand for American air and missile defense capabilities since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with countries such as Poland, Sweden and the Netherlands emerging as major customers. Systems like IBCS are central to that transformation because they promise to turn national inventories of radars and missiles, often acquired over decades and from multiple suppliers, into shared, networked resources instead of isolated batteries. For adversaries, the message is equally clear: penetrating allied airspace increasingly means confronting not just individual missile systems, but an integrated defensive architecture able to reassign sensors and shooters dynamically in response to evolving threats.

The October 2025 cruise missile intercept at White Sands Missile Range is more than another successful weapons trial; it is a visible step in the transition from platform-centric to network-centric air and missile defense. By demonstrating that IBCS can manage a full kill chain against maneuvering cruise missiles in a contested, joint environment, the U.S. Army and Northrop Grumman have signaled that this architecture is moving from development into operational reality. As production accelerates in Alabama and export projects advance in Poland and Denmark, the system is poised to shape how the United States and its allies protect critical infrastructure, forces and populations against increasingly complex aerial threats. The strong performance in this key test therefore resonates far beyond the desert of New Mexico, indicating that future crises are likely to be met by an integrated, multinational air defense network in which IBCS plays a central role.
Lithuania to assemble 41 Leopard 2A8 tanks following new agreement with Germany
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On December 11, 2025, Lithuania finalized a combined procurement and industrial cooperation agreement with KNDS Deutschland and Rheinmetall Landsysteme to assemble up to 41 Leopard 2A8 tanks locally in Kaunas.

On December 11, 2025, Lithuania finalized a combined procurement and industrial cooperation agreement with KNDS Deutschland to assemble up to 41 Leopard 2A8 tanks locally in Kaunas. The framework integrates vehicle delivery, industrial assembly, workforce training, and long-term maintenance, with all tanks scheduled for delivery by the end of 2030.
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The Leopard 2A8 possesses an improved 120 mm/L55 A1 smoothbore gun able to fire programmable munitions, such as the DM11, against targets including lightly armored vehicles, infantry, and fortifications. (Picture source: KNDS Deutschland)

Lithuania's decision brings together tank procurement, industrial cooperation, workforce training, and maintenance planning within a single framework designed to shorten delivery timelines and anchor armored vehicle support capabilities inside the country. Agreements were concluded with KNDS Deutschland and Rheinmetall Landsysteme, alongside the state-owned energy group EPSO-G, positioning Lithuania Defense Services (LDS) as the core entity responsible for implementing the project. The initiative is presented as both a military capability step and an industrial development measure, with local assembly, repair, and technical readiness treated as integral components rather than follow-on activities.

The industrial component centers on the construction of a Leopard 2A8 assembly plant in the Kaunas Free Economic Zone, where Lithuania Defense Services will act as the subcontracted operator under contract with KNDS Deutschland. The facility is planned to assemble up to 41 Leopard 2A8 tanks locally, a measure intended to accelerate deliveries while creating a permanent production and sustainment footprint. Alongside assembly, a separate availability-related agreement covers the training of skilled personnel for manufacturing and maintenance tasks, as well as the provision of logistical support for a five-year period starting after delivery of the first system. Lithuania Defense Services is tasked not only with assembling tanks, but also with long-term maintenance, repair, and technical readiness of the Leopard 2A8 fleet and other Lithuanian Armed Forces equipment. The same industrial base is expected, over time, to be capable of supporting the German brigade stationed in Lithuania and potentially additional armored vehicle fleets.

Ownership and financing arrangements are structured to integrate state participation with industrial partners. It is planned that 25.1 percent of Lithuania Defense Services (LDS) will be transferred to EPSO-G Invest, a subsidiary of the state-owned energy group EPSO-G, with detailed cooperation terms scheduled to be finalized during 2026. Lithuania Defense Services has indicated planned investment of about €50 million in the Kaunas project, with employment projections ranging from roughly 80 to around 100 jobs as operations ramp up toward 2028. The Ministry of the Economy and Innovation granted the initiative major investment project status, a designation intended to streamline administrative procedures and accelerate implementation. Lithuanian officials also linked EPSO-G’s involvement to broader resilience planning, noting that the group is already engaged in a separate 155 mm artillery ammunition production effort alongside other strategic companies.

This industrial step is directly tied to Lithuania’s Leopard 2A8 acquisition path, which has been pursued through a German-led cooperative procurement framework. In May 2024, Lithuania joined the Leopard 2 Cooperative Procurement Arrangement together with Germany, the Czech Republic, and the Netherlands, expressing the intent to acquire the latest Leopard 2A8 tanks along with driver training tanks, combat support vehicles, and crew training simulators. The framework allows participating countries to align with Germany’s preliminary contracts and procure standardized equipment under the same conditions. A follow-on contract for the main battle tanks was signed in December 2024, initially associated with a delivery window spanning 2029 to 2034. The updated agreement, which incorporates industrial cooperation and local assembly, revises this schedule so that all tanks for the Lithuanian Armed Forces are to be delivered by the end of 2030.

The revised timeline places local industrial activity at the center of Lithuania’s force development. According to the agreed planning, the first Leopard 2A8 assembled in Lithuania is expected to roll out in early 2028, with the remaining tanks completed by 2030. Lithuania is described as the first country to formally join the Common Procurement Agreement for Leopard 2A8 tanks, while the broader cooperative framework has expanded to include additional European participants, with combined orders reaching several hundred vehicles. For Lithuania, the program represents the introduction of main battle tanks into its inventory for the first time, marking a structural shift in force composition that is closely connected to NATO standardization and to the permanent deployment of allied forces on Lithuanian territory.

The Leopard 2A8 itself is the latest production variant of the long-running Leopard 2 tank (in production since 1978), and reflects cumulative updates in protection, sensors, and vehicle systems. The tank retains a four-person crew and combines enhanced passive armor with an active protection system commonly referred to as Trophy or EuroTrophy, providing all-around coverage against threats such as anti-tank guided missiles and rocket-propelled grenades, with some configurations also addressing drone-related risks. Structural protection has been reinforced in areas such as the turret roof and underbelly, and mine protection is integrated into the design. The primary armament is an improved 120 mm L55A1 smoothbore gun capable of firing a wide range of modern ammunition, including programmable rounds intended for use against infantry, field fortifications, and lightly armored targets. Secondary armament includes a coaxial 7.62 mm machine gun, with optional equipment such as remotely controlled weapon stations and laser warning systems referenced as part of the configuration set.

The Leopard 2A8 is powered by an MTU MB 873 Ka-501 12-cylinder turbocharged diesel engine, rated at around 1,500 horsepower, paired with a Renk HSWL 354 automatic transmission with four forward and two reverse gears, enabling road speeds typically cited between 65 and 70 km/h and an operational range of roughly 400 to 450 km depending on configuration and equipment. The Leopard 2A8’s hull has a length of about 8,050 mm, and with the main gun forward, it measures approximately 11,170 mm. The tank’s width is about 3,600 mm, and its height is around 3,130 mm to the top of the turret, while the 2A8's combat weight is cited at around 69,500 kg. The tank integrates third-generation thermal sights for commander and gunner, a digital fire control system with laser rangefinder and ballistic computer, and crew-support systems including cooling, heating, NBC overpressure protection, and comprehensive fire suppression. Finally, an auxiliary power unit, cited at around 20 kW, allows onboard systems to operate with the main engine shut down.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
U.S. Marines Compete During a Drone Exercise to Destroy an Armored Vehicle in Japan
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U.S. Marines with III Marine Expeditionary Force conducted an intensive attack drone competition and live demonstration at Camp Schwab, Okinawa. The event underscores how small, low-cost unmanned attack systems are becoming standard tools for Marine Corps operations in the Indo-Pacific.

U.S. Marines assigned to III Marine Expeditionary Force conducted an intensive attack drone competition and live demonstration at Camp Schwab, Okinawa, Japan, marking a significant step in the institutionalization of small unmanned aircraft systems configured for strike missions within the Marine Corps. The event brought together operators from across the 3rd Marine Division with the objective of certifying a new generation of drone pilots, instructors, and payload specialists capable of employing unmanned systems in high-intensity combat scenarios.
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U.S. Marines with III Marine Expeditionary Force conduct a live attack drone demonstration at Camp Schwab, Okinawa, as part of a competition designed to certify operators and instructors in small unmanned strike systems, strengthening III MEF lethality and readiness for future Indo-Pacific combat operations (Picture source: U.S. DoW).

Over two weeks, Marines were challenged through a series of progressively complex scenarios that mirrored real-world battlefield conditions. Using first-person view attack drones, participants executed simulated strike missions against designated targets, emphasizing precision navigation, rapid target acquisition, and effective payload delivery. The competition format introduced time pressure, electronic interference simulations, and dynamic mission changes to replicate the uncertainty expected in future conflicts across the Indo-Pacific theater.

The drones employed during the demonstrations reflected the Marine Corps’ growing focus on low-cost, modular platforms that can be rapidly adapted for multiple roles. Configured primarily for strike missions, the systems demonstrated the ability to transition between reconnaissance, target designation, and attack profiles with minimal reconfiguration. Marines trained extensively on payload integration, arming procedures, and safe employment techniques, reinforcing the balance between lethality and operational control.

A central outcome of the event was the certification of Marines as attack drone operators and instructors. By expanding its internal pool of qualified trainers, III MEF is laying the groundwork for rapid dissemination of unmanned strike expertise across subordinate units. This approach reduces reliance on external training pipelines and ensures that operational knowledge evolves alongside emerging tactics and technologies.

The event stressed that attack drones are no longer viewed as niche capabilities but as integral components of infantry and expeditionary operations. Certified instructors are expected to return to their parent units and immediately begin training additional Marines, accelerating the adoption of unmanned strike concepts at the platoon and company levels.

The live demonstration also highlighted how attack drones fit within the broader framework of Marine Corps Force Design 2030. As the service shifts toward distributed operations and stand-in forces, small unmanned systems provide a means to extend sensing and striking power without exposing Marines to unnecessary risk. In a contested maritime environment, these capabilities offer commanders flexible options to disrupt adversary formations, conduct precision strikes, and support maneuver elements operating across wide areas.

From a strategic perspective, III MEF’s emphasis on attack drone proficiency reflects the operational realities of the Indo-Pacific region, where long distances, complex terrain, and advanced adversary defenses demand innovative solutions. The competition at Camp Schwab demonstrated not only technical proficiency but also a cultural shift within the force toward embracing unmanned systems as standard tools of combat.

As the Marine Corps continues to refine doctrine and training for unmanned strike operations, the III MEF attack drone competition stands as a clear signal of intent. By investing in people, platforms, and instruction, the Marines are ensuring they remain adaptable, lethal, and ready to operate in the most demanding environments anticipated in future conflicts.
Netherlands orders Skyranger 30 air defense systems from Rheinmetall
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On December 11, 2025, the Netherlands signed a contract with Rheinmetall for the procurement of Skyranger 30 very-short-range air defense systems in mobile and static configurations, including training simulators and support elements.

On December 11, 2025, the Netherlands signed a contract with Rheinmetall for the acquisition of Skyranger 30 very-short-range air defense systems, covering mobile platforms, static systems, and simulators. The agreement implements a January 2025 policy decision to procure 22 Skyranger 30s mounted on ACSV Gen 5 tracked armored vehicles to address short-range aerial threats, including unmanned aerial systems. Deliveries are scheduled between 2028 and 2029.
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The Netherlands participates in initiatives such as the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI), where short-range solutions like the Skyranger 30 are envisioned to complement missile systems such as the NASAMS, the Patriot, and the SAMP/T. (Picture source: Dutch MoD)

The contract with Rheinmetall to acquire Skyranger 30 air defense systems covers mobile weapon platforms, static configurations, and training simulators, as part of a broader effort to strengthen protection against short-range aerial threats, particularly drones. The acquisition is positioned as a reinforcement of the Dutch ground-based air defense structure, complementing existing short, medium, and long-range systems, while addressing the growing need to protect both deployed forces and key national infrastructure. The contract signature follows a policy decision taken in January 2025, when the Netherlands committedto introducing a new very-short-range air defense capability to close gaps identified in recent operational assessments.

The January decision set the framework for procuring 22 Skyranger 30 systems mounted on ACSV Gen 5 tracked armored vehicles, with an explicit focus on countering unmanned aerial systems and other low-flying threats in the very-short-range domain. Within this concept, the systems are intended to protect maneuver units in the field while also contributing to homeland defense missions, including the protection of military bases and critical civilian infrastructure such as the Port of Rotterdam. The Skyranger 30 is planned to be integrated into the Dutch Joint Ground-based Air Defence Command (DGLC) centered at Lieutenant-General Best Barracks in Vredepeel, with an increase of approximately 125 personnel foreseen to support operation, maintenance, and command functions.

The Skyranger 30 is optimized for the engagement of drones with a mass of up to 600 kg, reflecting a focus on threats ranging from small reconnaissance systems to larger loitering or strike-capable drones. The engagement range for this variant of the Skyranger system extends to approximately 5 km, emphasizing rapid reaction and close-in defense rather than area coverage. Interestingly, the Netherlands is procuring both mobile configurations mounted on ASCV armored vehicles and ground-based, static configurations, allowing the same core system to be used flexibly for maneuver support or point defense. Additional elements included in the package comprise tactical-level control nodes and hooklift transport platforms, enabling rapid relocation and deployment of the stationary systems.

The Skyranger 30 turret, which has recently drawn interest from Saudi Arabia and Belgium, centers on a 30 mm x 173 KCE revolver cannon, combined with an integrated sensor suite that includes a tracking radar to detect, track, and engage aerial targets. The Skyranger 30 is also designed to employ programmable airburst ammunition, with detonation points set to increase effectiveness against small, fast, and low-signature targets such as drones. Like many of Rheinmetall's products, the turret architecture is modular, with provisions for future growth, including the potential integration of surface-to-air guided missiles, which would extend engagement options beyond gun range depending on the selected effector. The overall order value for the Netherlands is described as being in the high triple-digit million € range, with first deliveries planned before the end of 2028 and final delivery and project completion targeted by the end of 2029.

For the mobile variant, the Skyranger 30 will be mounted on the tracked Armoured Combat Support Vehicle (ACSV), specifically the ACSV Gen 5 variant. The ACSV is a modular tracked vehicle developed by the German company Flensburger Fahrzeugbau Gesellschaft (FFG) as a replacement option for aging M113-based support vehicles, with development starting in 2012 as a private initiative. It was first publicly presented in 2014 and entered serial production in 2021, with Norway identified as the first confirmed operator. The vehicle, which offers a payload capacity of up to 9,000 kg, could be used in multiple configurations, including command and control, medical evacuation, logistics, recovery, and air defense roles, optimizing logistics and maintenance efficiency.

Industrial execution of the Skyranger 30 program is split between Rheinmetall Switzerland and Rheinmetall Nederland, reflecting an approach that combines initial system development with domestic industrial participation. The first three prototypes are to be produced in Switzerland, while Rheinmetall Nederland’s facility in Ede is assigned a significant role in the production and assembly of the remaining systems. The scope of the contract also includes classroom simulators, system integration, and a comprehensive integrated logistics support package, indicating an emphasis on sustainment and training alongside hardware delivery. This structure aligns with the Netherlands’ broader approach of tying capability upgrades to long-term support and industrial involvement.

Within the wider Dutch air defense context, the Skyranger-30 procurement is part of a layered approach managed under the Joint Ground-based Air Defence Command, which operates a mix of very short, short, medium, and long-range systems. These include FIM-92 Stinger MANPADS, NASAMS for medium-range air defense, and Patriot systems for long-range and ballistic missile defense, with units such as 800 Support Squadron and 802 Patriot Squadron playing key roles. The Netherlands is also pursuing modernization through systems like the NOMADS, planned on the same ACSV platform as the Skyranger 30, and armed with AIM-9X II Sidewinder missiles. In addition to ground-based systems, the Royal Netherlands Air Force continues to contribute to air defence through the operation of F-35 Lightning II fighters, which provide airspace control, surveillance, and interception capabilities that complement ground-based radars and missile systems.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
Croatia confirms transfer of M-84 tanks to Germany for delivery to Ukraine
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Croatia has already transferred M-84 main battle tanks and M-80 infantry fighting vehicles to Germany for direct delivery to Ukraine, Prime Minister Andrej Plenković confirmed on December 10, 2025.

During a press conference on December 10, 2025, Prime Minister Andrej Plenković confirmed that Croatia has already transferred its M-84 main battle tanks and M-80 infantry fighting vehicles to Germany for direct delivery to Ukraine. The statement was made during a press conference formalizing Croatia’s Leopard 2A8 procurement agreement with Germany. Officials said the vehicles are no longer subject to administrative procedures in Croatia.
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The Croatian M-84A4 Snajper tank possesses an improved fire control and observation system, with the DBR-84 ballistic computer working in conjunction with the SCS-84 all-weather day-night infrared gunner sight. (Picture source: Croatian MoD)

Croatia’s Prime Minister Andrej Plenković stated that Croatia has already transferred its M-84 main battle tanks and M-80 infantry fighting vehicles to Germany so they can be forwarded directly to Ukraine. He explained that the vehicles are no longer awaiting administrative steps in Croatia and are physically in Germany, allowing a direct and faster handover to Ukrainian forces. In the same remarks, the Croatian leadership contrasted the outgoing M-84 fleet with the Leopard 2A8 that Croatia is set to receive in the coming years, describing the Leopard as a fundamentally different tank in terms of protection philosophy, digital integration, and NATO-standard systems rather than an incremental evolution of the Yugoslav-era tank. The remarks were made during a press conference held to formalize Croatia’s Leopard 2 agreement with Germany, which includes 50 Leopard 2A8 main battle tanks for an estimated total value of about €1.5 billion.

This statement reflects a process that has been developing over several years, shaped by Croatia’s dual objectives of supporting Ukraine militarily and replacing its own legacy heavy equipment. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Croatia began assessing which parts of its inventory could be transferred without undermining national defense, while at the same time accelerating plans to exit dependence on vehicles derived from former Yugoslav and Soviet lineages. By late 2024, Zagreb and Berlin aligned these objectives through an arrangement under which Croatia would release M-84 tanks and M-80 IFVs for Ukraine, while Germany would provide financial and industrial support linked to Croatia’s entry into the Leopard 2 user group, which also included the delivery of Leopard 2A4HRVs. This approach allowed Croatia to convert aging armored assets into both immediate military assistance and longer-term modernization capital.

The M-84 main battle tank occupies a central place in this exchange because it has long been the backbone of Croatia’s armored forces. Croatia inherited the M-84 fleet after the breakup of Yugoslavia, with the original Yugoslav production itself being a licensed development of the Soviet T-72M1 adapted to local industry. Over time, Croatia maintained and upgraded these tanks rather than replacing them, largely due to budgetary constraints and the availability of domestic overhaul capacity. Previous figures concerning the transfer to Ukraine indicated that 30 M-84 tanks are included in the package sent to Germany, as part of a combined batch of 30 tanks and 30 M-80 IFVs with spare parts and ammunition valued at €144,800,000.

The Croatian M-84 fleet underwent a defined modernization path that culminated in the M-84A4 Snajper standard. By 2008, this upgrade had been applied across the fleet, and by 2023, most vehicles had received additional repairs and communications updates to keep them operational. The M-84A4 configuration emphasizes fire control accuracy and mobility, integrating the DBR-84 ballistic computer with the SCS-84 day-night infrared gunner sight, and improving turret rotation and gun elevation mechanisms. Propulsion is provided by the V46-TK diesel engine rated at 1,000 hp, supporting mobility comparable to other T-72 family derivatives. However, the modernization did not fundamentally alter the protection scheme, as it did not include the addition of reactive armor or new modular protection packages, leaving armor protection broadly aligned with T-72M1 and T-72A standards.

The M-80 infantry fighting vehicle forms the second major component of the transfer and serves a different operational role. Often confused with Soviet BMPs, the M-80 is an original Yugoslav design developed in the 1970s and entered service in 1979, with approximately 1,000 units produced before Yugoslavia’s dissolution. The vehicle is amphibious and powered by a German-licensed Daimler-Benz diesel engine rated at about 320 hp, providing modest mobility for a tracked IFV of its era. Its primary armament is the HS.804, also known as the M-55, a 20 mm automatic cannon with a cited rate of fire of up to 1,000 rounds per minute, supplemented by secondary weapons depending on configuration. For Ukraine, the relevance of the M-80 lies in the fact that similar vehicles from other donors are already in service, easing training and logistics despite the platform’s relatively light protection.

The transfer of M-84 tanks and M-80 IFVs fits into a broader pattern of Croatian military assistance to Ukraine that has expanded steadily since 2022. By November 2025, Croatia had announced 15 aid packages, with 14 described as fully delivered and valued at more than $212 million. This assistance has included 14 Mi-8 helicopters delivered in 2023, 2 An-32B transport aircraft, artillery systems such as M-46 field guns and D-30 howitzers, RAK-SA-12 128 mm multiple rocket launchers, anti-tank weapons, MANPADS including Strela-2 and Igla systems, tens of thousands of small arms, large quantities of ammunition, and protective equipment. Croatia has also signaled longer-term cooperation through a letter of intent signed on October 27, 2025, aimed at expanding joint arms production with Ukraine. Within this broader framework, the armored vehicle transfer represents one of Croatia’s most substantial contributions of heavy equipment, while also marking a decisive step away from its Yugoslav-era armored inventory.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
U.S. Marines Boost Indo-Pacific Agility with Japan-Based Island-Hopping Tests of HIMARS Launchers
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U.S. Marines at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan, loaded a HIMARS launcher onto a KC-130J as part of a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System Rapid Infiltration (HIRAIN) drill during exercise Typhoon Crossbow 26.1 on December 3, 2025. The event underscores how U.S. forces in Japan are refining agile, long-range precision strike options across the first island chain in a more contested Indo-Pacific theater.

On December 3, 2025, at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni in Japan, U.S. Marines executed a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System Rapid Infiltration (HIRAIN) as part of exercise Typhoon Crossbow 26.1, as reportedby the U.S. Defense Visual Information Distribution Service (DVIDS). The drill saw a HIMARSlauncher loaded onto a KC-130J Super Hercules from Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron (VMGR) 152 to rehearse rapid deployment of long-range precision fires. Beyond the image of a launcher rolling into a transport aircraft, the event illustrates how the U.S. Marine Corps intends to project strike capabilities across the first island chain under tight timelines. It signals that U.S. forces in Japan are adapting their posture to operate dispersed, mobile and hard to target.

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U.S. Marines used a HIMARS Rapid Infiltration drill at MCAS Iwakuni, loading the launcher onto a KC-130J during Typhoon Crossbow 26.1, to rehearse fast, island-hopping long-range strikes that keep forces dispersed, mobile and harder for adversaries in the Indo-Pacific to target (Picture Source: DVIDS)

During Typhoon Crossbow 26.1, Marines from VMGR-152 and artillery units from 3rd Battalion, 12th Marines rehearsed the full HIRAIN sequence at Iwakuni: ground guiding the M142 HIMARS into the KC-130J, securing the load, and preparing for a rapid deployment toward forward operating locations. VMGR-152, permanently based at Iwakuni under 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, operates the KC-130J in both airlift and aerial refueling roles across the region. The scenario exercised aircraft crews, loadmasters and artillerymen in a single, tightly choreographed chain of actions designed to minimize time on the ground. The objective is to ensure that both aircraft and launcher can arrive, deploy, fire and depart before an adversary can detect, target and engage the system.

The HIRAIN concept rests on the combination of HIMARS mobility and tactical airlift, allowing long-range rocket artillery to be projected well beyond permanent bases. In recent years, the U.S. Marines have multiplied drills in which HIMARS is loaded onto KC-130J or C-17 aircraft, flown to austere or allied airstrips, offloaded to conduct a limited series of precision strikes, then re-embarked to return to rear areas. This approach is fully aligned with Force Design 2030 and emerging concepts such as Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, which rely on small, dispersed “stand-in” forces operating inside contested zones. Within this framework, HIMARS becomes a key asset for generating long-range, precision fires in support of joint and coalition forces while remaining difficult to locate and track.

In the Indo-Pacific, such HIRAIN drills from Japanese bases carry clear strategic implications. They demonstrate that U.S. long-range fires are not fixed to a narrow set of known sites but can be repositioned along the first island chain using a network of runways and airfields, including those of allies and partners. For Japan, which is itself investing in extended-range strike and strengthening the defense of its southwestern islands, these rehearsals show how U.S. Marine units could operate from Japanese territory in a crisis, integrating into national infrastructure while remaining under U.S. command. For regional militaries watching closely, the message is that potential targets may be engaged by U.S. precision fires from multiple, shifting locations, complicating any attempt to saturate or neutralize a single base.

More broadly, the HIRAIN executed at Iwakuni fits into a pattern of exercises designed to signal readiness and adaptability to China, North Korea and other regional actors. By practicing the full cycle of deployment with HIMARS and KC-130J, from alert and loading to arrival at forward locations, simulated fires and rapid withdrawal, the Marine Corps refines a concept of operations built for contested littoral environments. This posture supports U.S. commitments under its alliances with Japan and other partners, while reinforcing the credibility of conventional deterrence in the Western Pacific. In practical terms, it suggests that any future contingency in the region could see small, mobile Marine detachments operating from Japanese and partner airfields, bringing long-range fires closer to potential flashpoints on short notice.

The Typhoon Crossbow 26.1 HIRAIN drill at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni is more than a routine training snapshot; it encapsulates the evolution of U.S. expeditionary fires in the Indo-Pacific. By combining the mobility of the KC-130J with the range and precision of HIMARS, the U.S. Marine Corps is demonstrating a capacity to deploy, strike and withdraw quickly from dispersed locations along the first island chain. For Japan and regional partners, this underscores the growing role of their territory and infrastructure in enabling such operations. For potential adversaries, it is a reminder that fixed-base targeting will not be sufficient to neutralize U.S. long-range fires, which are increasingly designed to be agile, unpredictable and deeply integrated into a wider network of allied capabilities.

Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
U.S. selects SOLGW MK1 as next-generation 5.56mm assault rifle for Special Forces units
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U.S. Special Operations Command has chosen the Sons of Liberty Gun Works SOLGW MK1 as its next-generation 5.56mm assault rifle, confirming the award under the Combat Assault Rifle program. The selection signals a major shift in SOCOM's small-arms planning, aligning operators with a modernized platform that promises greater reliability and modularity.

U.S. Special Operations Command officials confirmed on November 20, 2025, that the Sons of Liberty Gun Works SOLGW MK1 assault rifle will become the command’s next standard 5.56mm combat weapon, a decision reached after a competitive evaluation that involved multiple industry submissions. According to program officials familiar with the announcement, the MK1 was selected for its consistent performance in reliability testing, its adaptable operating system, and its compatibility with SOCOM’s growing suite of optics and enablers. The rifle is scheduled to begin fielding in late 2026, providing units across Army Special Forces, Naval Special Warfare, Air Force Special Tactics, and Marine Raiders with a unified light-assault rifle.
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U.S. Special Operations Forces will begin fielding the new SOLGW MK1 rifle in 2026, shown here equipped with a suppressor, advanced optics, and modular accessories tailored for high-risk operations. (Picture source: Gunmen video Youtube channel)

Currently, the Colt M4A1 carbine serves as the standard-issue assault rifle across most U.S. SOCOM (Special Operations Command) Special Forces units. In service since the late 1990s, the M4A1 has undergone various enhancements but remains largely unchanged in architecture. The introduction of the SOLGW MK1 is not intended to replace all M4A1 rifles across the command immediately. Instead, it will be fielded incrementally, beginning with specific Special Operations elements that require a more rugged, precision-tuned, and suppressor-optimized platform for expeditionary and clandestine missions.

The decision to adopt the MK1 follows an intensive multi-year selection process, during which SOCOM subjected candidate rifles to extreme testing conditions. The trials included salt fog corrosion, full submersion in mud and brackish water, suppressed and unsuppressed high-volume fire, and exposure to temperature extremes ranging from Arctic cold to desert heat. The MK1 proved capable of maintaining accuracy and full reliability throughout these trials, a critical factor in its final selection.

The rifle itself is a select-fire AR-15–based platform engineered for durability and mission modularity. It features a forged 7075-T6 aluminum receiver set, a 41V50 chrome-moly-vanadium barrel with a mid-length gas system, and a corrosion-resistant bolt carrier group. Ambidextrous controls, an M-LOK free-floating handguard, and a finely tuned two-stage trigger enable the weapon to perform across a range of tactical roles, from close-quarters combat to precision engagements.

One of the decisive factors in selecting the MK1 was its superior performance under suppression. SOCOM operators frequently run suppressed in both urban and austere environments, and the MK1’s minimal zero shift, low gas blowback, and recoil stability under suppression set it apart during evaluation. The platform was also praised for its maintainability and long-term durability of its parts, particularly in high-round-count use.

While the M4A1 will continue to serve in many SOCOM and conventional units, the MK1 will fill a critical role in scenarios where reliability under extreme conditions and tight integration with suppressors are paramount. This includes maritime boarding operations, special reconnaissance, direct action raids, and high-risk advisory missions with partner forces. Sources familiar with the rollout plan suggest that Naval Special Warfare and select Army Special Forces battalions will be among the first to receive the new platform.

The selection of a rifle from Sons of Liberty Gun Works, an independent manufacturer better known in law enforcement and high-end civilian markets, also reflects SOCOM’s shift toward sourcing from smaller, quality-driven companies capable of rapid innovation. The award places SOLGW among a select tier of American firms entrusted with supplying weapons to the most elite U.S. combat forces.

Although the total contract value and quantity remain classified, procurement is expected to span several thousand units over multiple years. Additional orders are likely based on operational feedback. The MK1's success could also influence future Army and Marine Corps small-arms modernization efforts, especially as larger-scale rifle-replacement programs evolve.

For SOCOM, the move signals more than just a hardware upgrade. It reflects a broader recalibration of how the U.S. military equips its most capable fighters. By prioritizing reliability, modularity, and user-driven design, this decision reaffirms a commitment to battlefield dominance. By replacing the M4A1 in key operational pockets, the SOLGW MK1 not only modernizes the platform; it redefines what special operations rifles must deliver in the era of near-peer threats and global irregular warfare.

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
MKE’s ALPAY Rocket Mine-Clearer Propels Türkiye Alongside U.S. and Russian Breaching Platforms
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Türkiye’s MKE has showcased the ALPAY rocket-propelled mine-clearing system, a line charge platform designed to carve safe lanes through dense minefields. The system positions Ankara as a growing competitor in an area long dominated by U.S. and Russian breaching vehicles, a shift with real implications for modern land warfare.

On 9 December 2025, Türkiye’s state-owned defence manufacturer Makine ve Kimya Endüstrisi (MKE) highlightedits ALPAY Mine-Clearing System, a rocket-propelled line charge designed to open safe corridors through dense minefields. In a context where the wars in Ukraine, the Middle East and the Sahel have brought back large-scale mine warfare, the emergence of a new domestic breaching system is strategically significant for Ankara and its partners. According to recent information and visuals shared by Makine ve Kimya Endüstrisi on X, ALPAY employs a 400 kg C4 explosive line charge to clear 10×100 m lanes with a claimed 99% reliability rate, fired up to around 200 m in front of the launcher. This makes ALPAY a direct competitor to long-established U.S. and Russian mine-clearing vehicles such as the M1150 Assault Breacher Vehicle and the UR-77Meteorit.

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Türkiye’s MKE is promoting its ALPAY rocket-propelled mine-clearing system, a 400-kilogram C4 line charge that opens 10-by-100-meter lanes and rivals U.S. M1150 ABV and Russian UR 77 Meteorit systems (Picture Source: U.S. DoD / MKE / Russian MoD)

Developed entirely with national engineering and domestic technologies, ALPAY has been conceived as a high-capacity line-charge module rather than a dedicated armoured vehicle. Trailer-mounted, it can be towed by armoured personnel carriers, tanks or military trucks, allowing combat engineers to tailor the platform to the mission profile and terrain. The system fires a rocket-propelled line charge containing 400 kg of C4, which can be projected up to 200 m ahead, creating a cleared corridor about 10 m wide and 100 m long while neutralising mines buried down to roughly one metre. MKE states that two operators can ready ALPAY for firing in around 15 minutes and that the equipment is designed for all-weather use, expanding its usefulness from high-intensity manoeuvre warfare to more static border security missions.

Operationally, ALPAY embodies Türkiye’s desire to combine industrial autonomy with tactical flexibility. The system is reported to be effective against both anti-tank and anti-personnel mines and is already in service with Turkish forces in operational zones and border areas, where mine threats remain persistent. Because the launcher is not tied to a single expensive chassis, the same line-charge technology can theoretically be integrated on a variety of platforms, from heavy armoured vehicles leading a deliberate breach to lighter trucks supporting infantry or gendarmerie units. In a NATO framework, this modularity could allow Türkiye to deploy ALPAY on coalition operations or to offer tailored configurations to partner nations facing extensive mine contamination, including Ukraine or countries engaged in UN peacekeeping demining tasks. At the same time, the fully domestic design reduces dependence on foreign components at a moment when export controls and sanctions can rapidly degrade breaching capabilities.

Compared with its U.S. counterpart, the M1150 Assault Breacher Vehicle, ALPAY represents a different doctrinal choice. The M1150 is a heavily armoured engineering vehicle based on the M1 Abrams tankchassis, weighing over 70 tonnes and combining a powerful front mine plow with dual M58 MICLIC rocket-propelled line charges. Each MICLIC line is roughly 107 m long and carries about 790 kg of C4, enabling the ABV to clear a lane around 8–14 m wide and about 100 m long per charge, depending on soil and mine density. The ABV, used extensively by U.S. Marines and Army units in Afghanistan and now by Ukrainian forces, is designed to advance under direct fire with the armour protection of a main battle tank. It can plow and blast its way through complex obstacle belts but comes with high acquisition and operating costs, considerable logistical demands and a reliance on the Abrams supply chain. In that sense, the ABV is a specialised niche asset for top-tier armoured formations rather than a widely exportable solution.

The Russian UR-77 Meteorit, by contrast, is an older but still widely used system that illustrates another model in minefield breaching. Based on the 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled howitzer chassis, the UR-77 carries two rocket-propelled line charges (MDK-3) that, once launched, create a corridor around 6 m wide and up to roughly 90 m long. The system has been in service since the late 1970s and has seen combat in the Chechen wars, the Syrian conflict and, more recently, in the war in Ukraine, where both Russian and Ukrainian forces have employed it. Reports from Syria and Ukraine indicate that the UR-77 has sometimes been used in an offensive urban role, detonating its line charges to demolish buildings or fortified positions over an entire street front, underlining the destructive potential of such systems beyond pure mine clearance. While effective, the Meteorit reflects Soviet-era design priorities: it offers limited crew protection by contemporary standards, lacks integrated lane-marking systems and is optimised for relatively narrow corridors tailored to older mechanised formations.

Placed beside the ABV and UR-77, ALPAY occupies a middle ground that is significant from both an operational and geopolitical perspective. Its 10 m × 100 m corridor is comparable to the lanes produced by Western line-charge systems, while the claimed 99% clearance reliability and 200 m stand-off provide tactical reassurance to advancing units without exposing an expensive heavy chassis to the initial blast. For militaries that cannot afford to field specialised breacher tanks or that operate a heterogeneous fleet of armoured vehicles, a trailer-mounted, high-capacity line charge offers a more affordable way to modernise breaching capabilities. At the same time, Türkiye positions itself as a supplier of a contemporary alternative to Russian equipment in markets where UR-77-type systems have long been dominant, from the Middle East to parts of Africa and Asia.

Beyond the technical comparison, ALPAY’s emergence speaks to broader strategic trends. Minefields and improvised explosive devices have re-emerged as key instruments in positional warfare, as seen along the front lines in Ukraine, where dense belts of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines have slowed mechanised manoeuvre and raised casualty rates. The ability to open a reliable corridor quickly, under fire and with limited manpower, is now a central requirement not only for NATO’s eastern flank but also for states facing insurgent threats or protecting contested borders. By fielding a domestically designed line-charge system and putting it into operational service, Türkiye signals that it intends to be self-sufficient in this critical capability and to offer an export product that competes directly with established U.S. and Russian solutions. This adds another layer to Ankara’s broader strategy of leveraging its defence industry to gain influence in regions exposed to the long-term consequences of mine warfare.

As minefields continue to shape modern battlefields and post-conflict environments, systems like ALPAY will increasingly determine whether mechanised forces can manoeuvre and whether civilian populations can safely return to contaminated areas. MKE’s trailer-mounted line-charge solution, with its 400 kg C4 payload, 10×100 m corridors and claimed 99% reliability, offers Türkiye a flexible breaching tool that can be deployed with various platforms and exported to partners seeking alternatives to U.S. and Russian equipment. In a world where access to high-end armoured breachers is limited and legacy Soviet systems raise questions about survivability and collateral damage, ALPAY gives Ankara a credible, domestically controlled option that could influence both the tactical conduct of future operations and the strategic balance in the global market for combat engineering systems.
How South Korean Hanwha aims to build a full spectrum land combat industry in Romania
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Hanwha Aerospace has outlined a proposal for Romania’s new infantry fighting vehicle program that would localize up to 80 percent of Redback IFV production and leverage the country’s emerging K9 artillery industrial base. The offer, which Hanwha says could deliver the entire IFV fleet by 2030, ties Bucharest’s land forces modernization to long-term domestic manufacturing capacity on NATO’s eastern flank.

Hanwha Aerospace is positioning itself as a long-term industrial partner for Romania’s land forces, stating in a new policy style communication that it can shift up to 80 percent of Redback infantry fighting vehicle production into Romanian facilities while meeting Bucharest’s ambitious fielding timeline through 2030. The proposal, framed explicitly against the European Union’s SAFE mechanism and its 65 percent local content threshold, links the ongoing K9 Thunder artillery program and a new production site in Dâmbovița to a broader tracked combat vehicle ecosystem designed to serve both national needs and export markets. For a country sitting close to the Black Sea security environment, the choice of industrial partner now becomes as important as the technical characteristics of the IFV itself.
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Hanwha’s stated approach focuses on production in Romania, technology transfer, and the participation of Romanian small and medium enterprises. (Picture source: Hanwha)

This position builds on an industrial base already under development through the K9 artillery program and the establishment of a production site in Dâmbovița intended for machining, integration, and testing of land systems. The K9 Thunder, which Romania is beginning to acquire, features a 155 mm/52-calibre gun with a range of roughly 40 km using conventional rounds and over 50 km when firing rocket-assisted munitions. The system carries nearly fifty rounds, employs a semi-automatic loading process, and can deliver three shots in fifteen seconds before maintaining a sustained rate of six to eight rounds per minute. These characteristics give Romanian artillery units modern NATO-standard fire support while creating an industrial foothold that facilitates the integration of tracked combat vehicles.

Within this framework, the Redback is presented as the mechanized element of Hanwha’s offer. The IFV uses a 1,000 hp MTU engine paired with an Allison transmission, producing speeds above 65 km/h and a range of roughly 520 km. Its chassis employs composite rubber tracks that limit noise and enhance movement over soft ground. The protection suite combines modular armour with the Iron Fist active protection system, designed to defeat incoming anti-tank rockets and missiles, while panoramic electro-optical sensors provide continuous awareness for the vehicle commander. The integration of the Elbit MT-30 turret, an evolution of the UT-30 already fielded on Romania’s Piranha 5 fleet, reduces training divergence by retaining a stabilized 30 mm cannon, airburst-compatible ammunition, and a digital fire-control system aligned with existing procedures.

The tactical and operational logic rests on coherence and logistical simplification. The shared powerpack between the K9 and Redback reduces the need for separate maintenance pipelines, enables common stocks of critical parts, and narrows the training burden for technical personnel. Vehicle crews operate within similar layouts, lowering adaptation time. The digital architecture, built for interoperability with NATO-standard command-and-control networks, allows the Redback to connect with artillery, reconnaissance drones and mechanized units, producing a more responsive decision cycle. In areas such as the approaches to Galați, where reaction time can determine the outcome of defensive actions, this networked structure offers practical advantages.

Hanwha’s stated approach focuses on production in Romania, technology transfer, and the participation of Romanian small and medium enterprises. Achieving up to 80 percent localization implies bringing hull welding, machining of key components, electronic subsystem integration, and functional testing into Romania. For Bucharest, building a domestic supply chain able to contribute to national programs and export markets aligns with its objectives for industrial autonomy and its role within the SAFE framework, where the EU prioritizes resilient and geographically diversified supply lines.

Should Romania adopt a model close to the one outlined by Hanwha, the European Union would see the emergence of a land-systems production center on its eastern flank, combining Asian-developed technologies with a European industrial environment. This development would alter the balance between established Western European suppliers and newer entrants while giving NATO a more widely distributed industrial base. In a strategic environment marked by uncertainty, Romania’s ability to structure a complete tracked-vehicle and artillery production ecosystem would contribute to regional defence stability and strengthen collective resilience around the Black Sea.
U.S. Special Forces seizes sanctioned tanker in Helicopter raid from USS Ford off Venezuela
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U.S. forces have seized the sanctioned oil tanker Skipper in international waters off Venezuela, using MH-60S Seahawk helicopters from the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford to fast-rope boarding teams onto the VLCC. The high-profile operation, which Washington links to Iranian-backed oil smuggling and terrorist financing, signals a more aggressive U.S. posture against adversaries' energy flows in the Caribbean region.

The United States has carried out a rare, highly choreographed seizure of a very large crude carrier off Venezuela, boarding the sanctioned tanker Skipper from MH-60S Seahawk helicopters launched by the USS Gerald R. Ford after the vessel sailed from the port of Jose with more than a million barrels of crude oil on board. Announced publicly by President Donald Trump and later detailed in Justice Department and Coast Guard statements, the operation is framed by Washington as a lawful high-seas interdiction targeting an Iranian-linked smuggling network that funnels oil revenues to terrorist organizations and criminal structures, and by Caracas as an act of “international piracy” and theft of Venezuelan resources.
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Visible features in the videos point to a helicopter from the U.S. Navy MH-60 Seahawk family, most likely an MH-60S from a Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron embarked on the Gerald R. Ford (Picture source: US DoJ)

Footage released by Attorney General Pam Bondi shows a particularly forceful boarding sequence, unusually demonstrative for a sanctions-enforcement operation. A helicopter hovers at very low altitude above the main deck of the very large crude carrier, fast ropes are immediately deployed, and several operators slide down within seconds. Troops in camouflage spread out across the width of the ship with weapons at the ready, move toward the superstructure, secure the access points, and push on to the bridge. A second aerial platform films the scene, suggesting careful planning of the insertion and an intention to produce a highly visible sequence for both the U.S. public and foreign governments.

The operation begins that same morning, shortly after Skipper leaves the Venezuelan terminal. The raid is launched from the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford, deployed for several weeks in the Caribbean, giving U.S. forces a continuous ability to intercept targets far from shore. Two helicopters carry a boarding force made up of ten members of the U.S. Coast Guard Maritime Security Response Team, ten Marines, and a core of special operations personnel. Legally, the Coast Guard retains control of the mission, since the authorities used fall under its remit, while the U.S. Navy provides the sea-based platform, the aircrews, and the protective bubble around the tanker.

Visible features in the videos point to a helicopter from the U.S. Navy MH-60 Seahawk family, most likely an MH-60S from a Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron embarked on the Gerald R. Ford. This twin-engine aircraft is designed for surface missions, support to boarding operations, and short-range anti-surface warfare, with the ability to fly for several hours at economical speed and to maintain precise hover over a ship. Its configuration with an open side door, a door gunner, and a fast-rope bar makes it well suited to inserting a heavily equipped boarding team onto a tanker’s deck while retaining immediate fire capability to deter any armed resistance to the seizure.

The choice of this helicopter type increases the tactical flexibility of the system. An MH-60S can be refuelled and rearmed quickly on an aircraft carrier, which allows frequent cycles of insertion, overwatch, and extraction around the targeted vessel. Its onboard sensors, particularly the infrared and TV electro-optical turrets mounted under the nose or on the side, provide strong situational awareness to track movements on deck, detect approaching small craft and guide operators during the clearing phase. The same platform can, if the situation deteriorates, switch to a close air support role by using its door-mounted weapons against a localized threat.

The tanker’s profile also shapes the way the boarding is conducted. Skipper, built in 2005 under the name The Toyo, is a VLCC about 333 meters long, capable of carrying up to two million barrels of crude. Its high freeboard, long side walkways, and dense superstructure make a classic ladder boarding from a patrol vessel impractical. Rappelling allows the boarding party to secure the main deck immediately, then lock down the stairways leading to the bridge. They then clear the ship level by level, paying particular attention to sensitive spaces such as the chart room, the radio control room, and the technical access points to propulsion systems.

Inside, the teams have to manage a highly compartmentalized environment. The internal volumes of a VLCC consist of narrow passageways, technical rooms, and blind corners, which impose a slow and methodical clearing rhythm. Operators from the Maritime Security Response Team are trained for this kind of close-quarters combat in metal structures, where acoustics and dead angles complicate threat detection. Radio support from the helicopter and the aircraft carrier maintains an overall picture of the situation, helps control the crew, allows rapid identity checks, and ensures that there is no attempt to sabotage critical systems, especially in the engine room.

Caracas reacts sharply, describing the seizure as international piracy and a “shameless theft” of Venezuelan resources, and announces its intention to take the case to several international organizations. Washington maintains that Skipper is part of a sanctioned oil transport network at the intersection of Iranian, Russian, and Venezuelan interests, and that the operation forms part of a broader campaign to cut off financial flows used to support terrorist groups and narcotics structures. The official U.S. narrative stresses the legality of the seizure warrant and the controlled conduct of the action, presented as a law enforcement operation on the high seas rather than an act of war.

The episode highlights a tactical shift in the U.S. posture in the Caribbean. By combining a latest-generation aircraft carrier, MH-60 Seahawk assault helicopters, and units specialized in high-risk boardings, Washington shows its readiness to employ strategic-level assets to strike directly at the energy flows of its opponents. This long-range interdiction capability tightens U.S. control over regional oil routes, but it also increases the risk of incidents or naval counter-measures from actors who may choose to escort their own ships. The crisis around Skipper thus forms part of a broader confrontation in which sea lines of communication, tankers, and boarding capabilities become central instruments of geopolitical competition in the Western Hemisphere.

Written By Erwan Halna du Fretay -DefenseAnalyst,Army Recognition Group

Erwan Halna du Fretayis agraduate of aMaster’sdegree in International Relations and hasexperience in thestudy ofconflicts and globalarmstransfers.Hisresearchinterests lie insecurity andstrategicstudies,particularly thedynamics of thedefenseindustry, theevolution ofmilitary technologies, and thestrategic transformation ofarmed forces.