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Cyprus National Guard eyes French Jaguar armored reconnaissance vehicles to replace Russian BMP-3s
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Cyprus is considering the acquisition of French EBRC Jaguar 6×6 armored reconnaissance vehicles alongside Israeli Merkava Mk3 or Mk4 main battle tanks to restructure the Cypriot National Guard’s armored fleet. This procurement strategy aims to transition the military away from aging Russian-built T-80 tanks and BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, which face severe sustainment and spare parts bottlenecks due to international sanctions. The planned restructuring leverages European SAFE financing for French acquisitions, including potential complementary orders for Griffon and Serval armored vehicles, while using domestic defense budgets to establish a modern, multi-tiered armored combat force starting around 2028.

Cyprus is evaluating the 25-ton EBRC Jaguar 6×6, equipped with a 40mm Cased Telescoped Cannon and Akeron MP missiles, to serve as a high-technology direct-fire and reconnaissance platform for its ground forces. The procurement plan encompasses a broader fleet modernization potentially featuring 80 Griffon and 100 Serval armored vehicles under EU financing mechanisms, complemented by ongoing negotiations with Israel for heavy tracked Merkava main battle tanks.

Related topic:Cyprus eyes 180 Griffon and Serval armored vehicles from France under European SAFE funding

Cyprus is considering the EBRC Jaguar to replace its difficult-to-sustain Russian BMP-3s with a modern 6×6 vehicle while integrating its potential future armored force with the Griffon and Serval under the French SCORPION architecture. (Picture source: French Army)

According to Phileleftheros on August 10, 2026, Cyprus was considering the French Jaguar 6×6 armored reconnaissance vehicle as one component of a broader restructuring of the National Guard's armored fleet, alongside negotiations involving roughly 80 Griffon 6×6 and 100 Serval 4×4 vehicles and renewed efforts to acquire Israeli Merkava Mk3 or Mk4 main battle tanks. These large armored acquisitions are expected to begin materializing from 2028 onward, unlike smaller programs such as drone purchases that have shorter procurement and production cycles. The National Guard would retain a heavy tracked component, potentially based on Merkava tanks, the Jaguar would occupy the reconnaissance and medium direct-fire tier, and both the Griffon and the Serval would cover troop transport, command, reconnaissance, and other functions.

This restructuring is increasingly driven by sustainment: Russian-made T-80 tanks and BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles remain important elements of the Cypriot inventory, but sanctions and restricted access to Russian industrial support have complicated the procurement of components, maintenance, and long-term fleet management. Cyprus, therefore, considered between 75 and 90 Leopard 1A5 tanks from Greece, but concluded by June 2026 that the available tanks did not satisfy the National Guard's operational requirements even as an interim solution. The potential procurement model also represents a change in fleet architecture, with SAFE financing supporting European acquisitions while a Merkava purchase would be funded separately through the Cypriot Ministry of Defense armaments budget. As a reminder, Cyprus has access to €1.8 billion in preferential financing under SAFE for the broader European modernization effort.

At 25 tons, the Jaguar is lighter than the main battle tanks it would accompany, but considerably more heavily armed and instrumented than a conventional armored personnel carrier. KNDS France, Arquus and Thales developed the vehicle under France's SCORPION program after the French Army established its requirement for a new medium cavalry vehicle in 2009, with the final configuration combining a manned turret, cannon, anti-tank missiles and a remote weapon station. The Jaguar entered French service in 2022 as the replacement for three vehicles with overlapping missions: the AMX-10RC, the ERC-90 Sagaie and the VAB HOT. It measures 7.8 m long with the cannon, 2.99 m wide, and 2.8 m high, and uses a three-person crew of driver, commander, and gunner instead of the four-person crew of the AMX-10RC.

A militarized Volvo D11 six-cylinder turbodiesel produces 500 hp through a ZF seven-speed automatic transmission, giving the Jaguar a top speed of 90 km/h, an off-road speed of 70 km/h, and an operational range of up to 800 km. All six wheels are driven and the rear axle steers, while an adjustable suspension can increase ground clearance to 47 cm for cross-country movement; the vehicle can therefore ford 1.2 m of water and negotiate obstacles roughly 0.5 m high. Standard armor corresponds to STANAG 4569 Level 4, protecting against 14.5 mm armor-piercing ammunition and associated artillery fragment, mine and IED threats, with modular armor available when greater protection is required. France plans 300 Jaguars, with 238 scheduled by 2030 and the complete fleet by 2035, while Belgium ordered 60 as part of its own modernization.

The Jaguar's armament is built around the stabilized 40 mm Cased Telescoped Cannon rather than the 105 mm gun of the AMX-10RC, allowing it to fire at roughly 200 rounds per minute, while its -10° to +45° elevation permits engagement of targets on upper floors, reverse slopes, and other positions difficult to cover with the smaller elevation arcs of conventional tank guns. The Jaguar carries 180 40 mm rounds, 65 of them ready to fire. APFSDS-T ammunition provides an effective range of roughly 3 km against armored targets, general-purpose ammunition reaches roughly 2.5 km, and programmable airburst ammunition can detonate above trenches, behind cover, or near elevated infantry positions. Furthermore, two Akeron MP anti-tank missiles are ready to be launched on the right side of the turret, and two more are stored as reloads.

The Akeron MP can attack tanks and protected structures at up to 5 km and supports fire-and-forget, lock-on-before-launch, and lock-on-after-launch engagements, including beyond-line-of-sight attacks when the target is masked by terrain or another obstacle. Consequently, a Jaguar encountering a main battle tank does not have to close the 40CTC engagement distance to respond. The third weapon is an Arquus T3 Hornet S remotely operated station with an FN MAG58 7.62 mm machine gun, with 550 ready rounds, roughly 800 m of effective range, for a 360° traverse and an elevation from -20° to +60°. A Jaguar consequently has distinct weapons for three target classes: the machine gun for close infantry threats, the 40CTC for infantry positions and light or medium armored vehicles, and the Akeron MP for tanks and hardened targets.

For Cyprus, a tank would remain necessary when the mission requires repeated engagements, heavier protection, and direct armored combat rather than reconnaissance followed by selective engagement. The strongest differentiation from Cyprus's existing reconnaissance vehicles would come from sensors and digital target sharing. The Jaguar integrates roughly 20 sensors, and the commander and the gunner each receive an independent Safran Paseo stabilized electro-optical sight rather than sharing a single primary observation channel. The arrangement supports hunter-killer operation: the gunner can track or engage one target while the commander searches independently for the next. The Paseo can detect a target at 15.4 km, recognize it at 7.6 km, and identify it at roughly 4 km, while its laser rangefinder reaches beyond 7 km and an automatic tracking can maintain contact with ground or aerial targets.

Two Thales Antares units mounted on opposite parts of the turret provide continuous 360° azimuth coverage and observation from -15° to +75° in elevation. Each uses a 5-megapixel imaging system and combines local observation with laser warning; in daylight it can detect an armored vehicle at 500 m, a small UAV at 250 m, and a person at 150 m, while locating a laser source to within 1.5°. Five peripheral cameras cover the immediate surroundings, and conventional backup optics remain available to the commander and gunner if primary electro-optical equipment fails. Moreover, the Pilar V adds a different sensor channel by acoustically detecting small arms fire, medium-caliber weapons, mortar rounds, rockets, and RPGs at 360°. Its directional accuracy reaches 2° in azimuth and 3° in elevation, with a 10% margin in estimated distance.

When several SCORPION vehicles detect the same firing event, their measurements can be exchanged and triangulated to locate the shooter, after which the Jaguar's turret can be directed toward the calculated position. In Cypriot service, that could make the Jaguar a forward acquisition node: one Jaguar could detect a target and pass coordinates to another Jaguar, an Akeron MP team, infantry, or a Merkava without itself becoming the firing vehicle. The Jaguar cannot logically possess the same protection level as a tank, so its survivability model combines ballistic protection with detection, electronic countermeasures, obscuration, and mobility. The Antares warns the crew when the vehicle is illuminated by a laser rangefinder, while a missile-launch detector and the Pilar V warn against missiles and direct fire. An infrared jammer provides another countermeasure channel, and the Thales Eclipse jammer detects and suppresses radio signals used to trigger remotely controlled IEDs, without blocking friendly communications.

The Galix, for its part, provides the physical countermeasure layer through fourteen 80 mm grenade launchers. After detection and localization of a threat, the system can deploy multispectral countermeasures in less than one second. The resulting non-toxic cloud masks the vehicle in visible wavelengths against laser rangefinders and designators, and across infrared wavelengths from 0.8 to 14 microns; it can extend 20 to 60 m from the vehicle, rise to 7 m, and persist for up to 90 seconds. This is intended to interrupt acquisition or guidance long enough for the Jaguar to reposition rather than rely on armor to defeat every incoming weapon. Sustainment is unusually relevant to the Cypriot requirement because monitoring sensors check suspension, brake pads, and gearboxes.

Instead of waiting for failure or replacing components solely based on calendar intervals, maintenance personnel can subsequently use accumulated operating data to estimate remaining component life and plan interventions. Cyprus's experience with T-80s and BMP-3s shows that a fleet with high nominal strength but inadequate access to spares, diagnostic equipment, or depot repair can rapidly lose its relevance. The prospective parallel purchase of roughly 80 Griffons and 100 Servals gives the Jaguar proposal a wider significance, as Cyprus could introduce at least 180 French armored vehicles before the Jaguar quantity is even determined. The important procurement metric is commonality.

Both the Jaguar and the Griffon were designed around a target of roughly 70% shared components, including suspension, communications, acoustic detection and vehicle electronics, specifically to reduce development, production, maintenance and logistics costs. France's own SCORPION program illustrates the scale at which this architecture was conceived: current objectives include 1,872 Griffons, 978 Servals, 300 Jaguars and 200 modernized Leclerc tanks, with the broader program estimated at €11 billion and roughly €2 billion allocated to the 300 Jaguars. Cyprus would operate the concept on a much smaller scale but could use the same functional division. It is also considering the refurbishment of roughly 80 VABs from approximately 150 delivered between 1985 and 1988, meaning the transition would not occur in a single procurement cycle.

The National Guard already has around 50 French AMX-30B2 tanks, approximately 150 VABs, AMX-13 vehicles, including roughly a dozen Mk F3 155 mm self-propelled guns, VLRA vehicles, 12 newer Arquus Sherpa Wagons, and Akeron MP missiles. The issue is therefore not simply whether Cyprus buys French vehicles, since French equipment has been present for decades, but whether it moves from several generations of largely separate French vehicles toward a common digital and logistical architecture. The Merkava would address the part of the force that neither Jaguar nor Griffon can replace.

Cyprus still requires a main battle tank because its armored force must retain a vehicle capable of absorbing substantially greater direct-fire punishment, carrying a tank-caliber gun and fighting enemy armor at the front of a combined-arms formation. The proposed Greek alternative involved 75 to 90 Leopard 1A5s, but Cyprus inspected the available tanks and concluded that those specific vehicles failed to meet its operational requirements, preventing an agreement. A Merkava purchase would simultaneously move the National Guard from the 125 mm to the 120 mm caliber, which means replacing not only vehicles but ammunition reserves, storage procedures, loader and gunner training, maintenance tooling, and parts inventories. Israel's own requirements complicate the transaction.

Israel examined foreign sales of older Merkavas in 2023, but the expansion of combat after October 7, 2023 returned potentially exportable tanks to relevance for IDF reserve formations, force regeneration, and wartime readiness. Cyprus is now pressing for a significant number of Mk3 or Mk4 tanks, requiring Israel to decide how many vehicles can be released without affecting domestic requirements. If Cyprus proceeds with all three French vehicles and the Merkava, the procurement would represent a complete restructuring of how the National Guard organizes armored reconnaissance, infantry mobility, and tank combat, not merely the replacement of several aging vehicle fleets.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.

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Castelion Raises $1 Billion to Scale Hypersonic Weapons Production and Broaden U.S. Strike Options
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Castelion raised $1 billion to expand hypersonic missile production and fund longer-range strike and defensive systems, valuing the company at $13 billion. The financing could give U.S. forces larger inventories of lower-cost hypersonic weapons as China and Russia continue to field comparable strike capabilities.

Announced by Castelion on August 19, 2026, the Series C combines $800 million in equity with a $250 million committed revolving credit facility and follows more than $500 million in U.S. military contracts secured over the previous 18 months. The company is expanding its 1,000-acre Project Ranger complex in Sandoval County, New Mexico, where it plans to manufacture solid rocket motors, conduct static testing and assemble missiles at rates ultimately measured in the thousands per year. Castelion is also preparing Blackbeard for planned U.S. military fielding in 2027 while developing a longer-range precision-strike weapon and lower-cost air and missile defense systems based on common propulsion, guidance and manufacturing technologies. The new capital is intended to move those programs into higher-rate production and broaden the number of hypersonic weapons available for sustained operations in the Indo-Pacific and Europe.

Related News: Blackbeard Hypersonic Missile Launch from Marauder USV Could Expand U.S. Distributed Maritime Strike Architecture

Castelion’s Blackbeard hypersonic strike missile during a flight test as the company prepares to expand production for U.S. military requirements. (Picture source: Castelion)

The Series C round combines $800 million in equity financing with a $250 million committed revolving credit facility and values Castelion at $13 billion. It is co-led by JPMorganChase’s Strategic Investment Group, Andreessen Horowitz, and funds managed by Carlyle, with participation from several existing investors. The objective therefore extends beyond continued work on Blackbeard. Castelion is now seeking to finance production, testing, integration on operational platforms, and the development of additional weapon families at the same time.

According to Castelion in a statement published on August 19, 2026, the company has secured more than $500 million in U.S. military contracts over the past 18 months and moved its first hypersonic missile from a clean-sheet design to a program intended for production in less than four years. This progression relies on a level of vertical integration that is unusual for a company founded only recently. Castelion develops propulsion and guidance subsystems, produces solid rocket motors, and conducts regular flight-test campaigns. By December 2025, its investors said the company had already completed more than 25 flight tests since its creation.

This industrial capability is taking shape at Project Ranger in Sandoval County, New Mexico. The 1,000-acre campus is planned to bring together solid rocket motor manufacturing, static testing, and final assembly within the same industrial complex. Twenty-one buildings are planned, with a stated capacity of several thousand missiles per year once the site reaches full operation. Castelion also has an agreement providing for a minimum of 500 Blackbeard missiles annually once the system is validated, with an option for the U.S. government to acquire several thousand more. In June 2026, the U.S. Navy ordered 50 pre-production missiles for $23.4 million, following a $105 million contract that includes integration of the weapon on the F/A-18 Super Hornet ahead of an initial operational capability planned for 2027.

This is where the new financing is expected to have its main effect. The funds will support the production ramp-up at Project Ranger, but also the development of a much longer-range strike weapon already under development and a new family of defensive systems. Castelion intends to reuse common propulsion, guidance, manufacturing, and testing technologies across these programs to reduce costs and shorten development cycles. The company is also working on alternative deployment concepts. One project with Saronic is intended to demonstrate the launch of Blackbeard from the Marauder autonomous surface vessel in 2027. Such an architecture could distribute hypersonic strike assets across unmanned naval platforms rather than concentrating them exclusively on land-based launchers, major surface combatants, or crewed aircraft.

For U.S. forces, the operational value lies as much in available quantity as in missile speed. Annual production in the hundreds and potentially the thousands would make it possible to allocate hypersonic weapons against a broader range of high-value targets, including command posts, air-defense systems, missile batteries, logistics infrastructure, and naval assets protected by anti-access and area-denial networks. Integration on the F/A-18 would also provide carrier air wings with a hypersonic strike option, while the Marauder concept could support more distributed launch architectures. This approach would complement heavier U.S. programs such as the Long Range Hypersonic Weapon Dark Eagle, whose common hypersonic glide body is designed to travel above Mach 5 and engage targets at ranges extending from several hundred to several thousand kilometers.

The acceleration of these programs is directly linked to changes in the strategic environment. The Pentagon considers China and Russia to be powers that already field conventional hypersonic capabilities able to threaten U.S. and allied forces. China operates the DF-17, an intermediate-range ballistic missile equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle and commonly assessed to have a range of roughly 1,500 to 2,000 km for land-attack or anti-ship missions. The U.S. Department of Defense’s 2025 report on Chinese military developments describes China as possessing the world’s largest hypersonic arsenal. Russia, for its part, has used the Kinzhal in Ukraine and also fields the Zircon missile. Against this background, Washington is not only seeking to possess hypersonic weapons, but to field them in quantities compatible with a prolonged conflict in the Indo-Pacific or Europe. Castelion’s financing therefore has a wider strategic dimension, since it could contribute to larger U.S. inventories, more diverse launch options, and lower unit costs for a class of weapon that remains scarce while Beijing and Moscow continue to integrate hypersonic systems into their strike architectures.

Written By Erwan Halna du Fretay - Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Erwan Halna du Fretay holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and has experience studying conflicts and global arms transfers. His research interests lie in Security and strategic studies, particularly the dynamics of the defense industry, the evolution of military technologies, and the strategic transformation of armed forces.
U.S. Funds X-Bow Low Cost Interceptor to Expand Defenses Against Ballistic and Hypersonic Threats
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The U.S. Missile Defense Agency awarded X-Bow Systems a $10.98 million contract to develop and flight-test a low-cost interceptor designed for ballistic and hypersonic threats. The program could expand U.S. interceptor inventories and diversify suppliers as recent operations in Ukraine and the Middle East place growing pressure on missile-defense stocks.

X-Bow Systems will develop its Low-Cost Interceptor under a Phase II Small Business Innovation Research contract tied to the Missile Defense Agency’s Rapid Response Small Launcher Technology effort, the company announced on August 18, 2026. The MDA is targeting an interceptor cost below $750,000 per round, while X-Bow plans to integrate an internally produced solid rocket motor and has already conducted a static test of a sub-scale motor design for the program. The effort comes as the Pentagon seeks additional interceptor types, higher production capacity and a broader supplier base to reduce dependence on costly missile-defense inventories and constrained solid rocket motor production.

Related News: U.S. Introduces Buckler Interceptor to Counter Mass Drone Attacks at Lower Cost

Static test of a subscale solid-rocket motor developed by X-Bow Systems for the U.S. Missile Defense Agency's Low-Cost Interceptor program. (Picture source: X-Bow Systems)

The contract does not yet cover production of an operational missile. Instead, it is intended to validate a different approach to interceptor economics. The MDA Low-Cost Interceptor initiative seeks modular missiles costing less than $750,000 per round, relying on available technologies where they meet requirements and following a deliberately compressed development schedule. Program documentation describes an architecture covering the main functions of a modern interceptor, including propulsion, flight control, communications, fire-control interfaces, terminal sensing, and the kill mechanism. Integration with existing missile defense systems is also among the core requirements.

According to an announcement published by X-Bow Systems on August 18, 2026, the Missile Defense Agency awarded the contract as a Phase II effort under the Small Business Innovation Research program and the Rapid Response Small Launcher Technology initiative. X-Bow’s proposal is notable because the company is developing both the interceptor and its solid rocket motor, reducing reliance on external propulsion suppliers. The LCI is expected to use an internally developed motor, while X-Bow has already completed a static test of a sub-scale motor demonstrator associated with the MDA program. This industrial model brings propulsion design, propellant production and missile integration within the same organization.

That approach also addresses a constraint that has become increasingly important for the U.S. defense industrial base: limited solid rocket motor production capacity. X-Bow’s manufacturing model relies in part on its Advanced Manufacturing of Solid Propellant process and its Rocket Factory in a Box concept, designed to provide fixed or deployable solid rocket motor production capacity. The company states that its AMSP process is certified by the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory. Related technologies are already used across several propulsion programs for missiles, interceptors, and suborbital vehicles. Vertical integration alone does not ensure that the MDA cost target will be met, but it gives X-Bow direct control over a missile component associated with both high costs and recurring production bottlenecks.

The program should nevertheless be distinguished from the Buckler interceptor introduced by X-Bow in July 2026. Buckler is a separate surface-to-air weapon developed primarily to counter Group 3 unmanned aerial systems. According to the company, the interceptor has completed flight testing, reaches supersonic speed, and is intended to cost less than $100,000 per round. The MDA LCI is aimed at a more demanding threat set involving ballistic and hypersonic weapons, which impose more stringent requirements in terms of speed, guidance, discrimination and interception geometry. The two programs nevertheless reflect the same industrial logic: air and missile defense can no longer depend solely on small inventories of sophisticated and costly interceptors.

At the tactical and operational levels, the issue therefore extends beyond unit price. A less expensive interceptor could give commanders greater flexibility when assigning weapons against raids involving multiple trajectories, decoys or simultaneous attacks. Within a layered defense architecture, an LCI-class missile could complement higher-performance interceptors rather than replace them, allowing those weapons to be reserved for targets requiring greater range, velocity or discrimination capability. The operational effect would be measured primarily in magazine depth. Larger inventories create more engagement opportunities, support salvo firing where doctrine requires it, and reduce the risk of a defense network becoming ineffective while its radars and launchers remain operational but its interceptor stocks are nearly depleted.

Pentagon interest in this type of system reflects a broader problem that has become increasingly clear in Washington. Large-scale military support to Ukraine since 2022, followed by sustained U.S. operations and missile interceptions in the Middle East, has placed pressure on several American munitions inventories, particularly in air and missile defense. These commitments have shown how quickly stocks can decline during prolonged interception campaigns or when opposing forces rely on large numbers of missiles and drones. The United States is therefore seeking not only to expand production capacity, but also to diversify its interceptor families in order to reduce dependence on a limited number of expensive systems and concentrated supply chains. This helps explain the growing attention given to manufacturers such as X-Bow, which can introduce alternative architectures, manufacturing methods and internally produced solid rocket motors. The objective is both operational and industrial: increase the number of available missiles, broaden the supplier base, reduce production bottlenecks and align interception costs more closely with the threats being engaged. In this context, the LCI forms part of a wider effort to rebuild depth in U.S. inventories and prepare forces for prolonged air and missile defense campaigns against adversaries able to combine ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, hypersonic weapons and unmanned systems.

Written By Erwan Halna du Fretay - Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Erwan Halna du Fretay holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and has experience studying conflicts and global arms transfers. His research interests lie in Security and strategic studies, particularly the dynamics of the defense industry, the evolution of military technologies, and the strategic transformation of armed forces.
U.S. Army Lays Groundwork for 133,014 GMLRS Rockets to Expand HIMARS Firepower Through 2034
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The U.S. Army is laying the industrial groundwork to produce as many as 133,014 GMLRS rockets from FY2028 through FY2034, according to a market-research notice published on August 17, 2026. Sustaining output of up to 19,002 rockets per year would sharply expand the ammunition depth available for HIMARS and M270 launchers, strengthening U.S. capacity for prolonged high-intensity operations.

The proposed production level would exceed the previously targeted 14,000-round annual capacity and create greater resilience for replacing combat expenditure while supplying deployed forces and allies. Although the notice is not yet a procurement commitment, it signals an effort to build the industrial capacity needed to sustain long-range precision firepower at a scale increasingly relevant to future peer warfare.

Related Topic: Canadian CC-177 Globemaster III Unlocks New Strategic Mobility for U.S. HIMARS Across North America’s Arctic

The U.S. Army is preparing industry to produce up to 19,002 GMLRS rockets annually, expanding the precision-fire capacity available to HIMARS and M270 units (Picture Source: USMC)

On August 17, 2026, the U.S. Army published a new market-research notice pointing toward a potentially historic expansion of America’s Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System production base. Army Contracting Command–Redstone Arsenal is asking industry to demonstrate the capacity to support 19,002 GMLRS rockets annually from FY2028 through FY2034, a maximum planning quantity of 133,014 rockets, with initial deliveries beginning in February 2030. The notice is not yet a solicitation or procurement commitment, but its scale offers an unusually clear indication of the industrial capacity the Army wants available for one of its most important precision-fire weapons.

GMLRS: The Precision-Fires Backbone of HIMARS and M270

GMLRS is the precision-fire workhorse behind both the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) and the tracked M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System family. The Army’s requirement encompasses the principal GMLRS configurations: the Unitary rocket for precision engagement of point targets, the Alternative Warhead variant for area effects, and Extended Range GMLRS. The Unitary configuration carries a 200-pound-class payload designed for precision effects with limited collateral damage, while the Alternative Warhead disperses pre-formed penetrators to generate area effects while complying with current U.S. cluster-munition policy. ER-GMLRS extends the family substantially farther while retaining either the Unitary or Alternative Warhead payload. The Army’s FY2027 budget confirms that standard Unitary and Alternative Warhead rockets remain in full-rate production, ER-GMLRS Unitary is in production, and initial ER-GMLRS Alternative Warhead production is planned for FY2027.

The importance of GMLRS rests on nearly two decades of combat-driven evolution. The system entered operational use during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, where precision-guided rockets offered commanders a combination of artillery responsiveness and accuracy that had previously been difficult to achieve from ground-based rocket systems. Rather than replacing the architecture after its early success, the United States progressively expanded it: precision Unitary effects were followed by the Alternative Warhead and then the Extended Range family. That evolutionary approach has allowed the Army to increase lethality and reach while retaining a mature launcher, logistics, training and command-and-control ecosystem. The result is not simply an individual munition but a scalable precision-fires architecture that can be modernized without rebuilding the entire force around a new launcher.

Layered Fires: Why GMLRS and PrSM Serve Different Targets

The operational value of GMLRS becomes even clearer when it is considered alongside the Army’s Precision Strike Missile (PrSM). The two weapons are complementary rather than competitors. PrSM provides the deeper layer of the fires architecture, with operational ranges exceeding 400 kilometers and two missiles carried in a compatible launch pod, while GMLRS provides commanders with a much larger volume of comparatively economical precision fire for targets inside its engagement envelope. On the Army’s FY2027 gross weapon-system unit-cost basis, GMLRS averages about $219,339 per rocket, compared with approximately $1.804 million per PrSM across the FY2027 PrSM procurement line, more than eight times the GMLRS figure. These are budget-level averages rather than like-for-like contract prices, but they illustrate the logic of the force structure: GMLRS and ER-GMLRS can deliver precision effects in volume, while the more expensive PrSM inventory can be reserved for deeper, higher-priority and time-sensitive targets. That layered magazine gives U.S. commanders considerably more flexibility than relying on a single class of long-range weapon.

From 14,004 to 19,002: Building a Wartime Production Base

The most consequential element of the Army notice may therefore be industrial rather than tactical. The FY2027 Army budget identifies 14,004 rockets per year as the current total GMLRS production capacity across all variants; the new market-research requirement examines 19,002 annually, an increase of approximately 36 percent. The 19,002 figure itself is not appearing for the first time: an April 2025 Sources Sought notice already referenced that annual rate, and a March 2026 production notice described capacity of up to 19,002 tactical rockets, or 3,167 six-round pods, per year. The August 2026 notice is important because it again places that rate within an explicit maximum production schedule extending through FY2034. That continuity suggests the 19,002-round objective is becoming a sustained Army industrial-planning benchmark rather than a short-lived surge assumption. Across seven years, the maximum 133,014-round schedule would represent 22,169 six-round pod equivalents, illustrating the magnitude of the capacity being examined.

The notice also reaches well beyond final assembly. Prospective respondents are being asked to identify facilities and supply-chain partners, demonstrate experience managing subcontractors, present qualification schedules, explain technical capabilities and safeguarding arrangements, and show how they could develop or obtain subsystem-level technical data where the government provides integrator-level specifications and drawings. The Army’s FY2027 procurement documentation currently identifies Lockheed Martin as the industrial source that is both facilitized and qualified to produce GMLRS, making this market research especially significant. While the notice does not announce a second-source strategy, its requirements indicate that the Army is examining how additional qualified capacity, alternative industrial pathways or a broader supplier structure could be created. For the United States, that could reduce dependence on single production nodes, improve surge capacity and make the GMLRS enterprise more resilient to disruption in motors, energetics, guidance components, warheads and other critical supply-chain elements.

Strategic Depth, Allied Production and the Cost of Scale

Strategically, the production ambition indicates that Washington is increasingly treating munition depth as seriously as launcher numbers. The FY2027 Army budget requests 96 additional M142 HIMARS launchers and lists an Army Acquisition Objective of 617 HIMARS, while the same budget gives GMLRS an Army Acquisition Objective of 140,004 rockets. A larger launcher fleet without an equally deep ammunition inventory would provide limited endurance in prolonged high-intensity warfare; a larger GMLRS industrial base, by contrast, gives the United States the ability to replenish stocks, sustain dispersed precision fires and meet allied requirements without forcing every new demand through a production line optimized for lower peacetime volumes. The implications extend from Europe to the Indo-Pacific. Australia successfully test-fired its first domestically manufactured GMLRS rockets in April 2026, built by Lockheed Martin Australia to U.S. standards, and Canberra plans to begin producing GMLRS solid rocket motors domestically by 2030. Together, expanding U.S. capacity and emerging allied production point toward the beginnings of a distributed precision-munitions ecosystem that can strengthen interoperability, supply resilience and coalition staying power across multiple theaters.

The financial scale reinforces the distinction between industrial capacity and funded procurement. The Army’s FY2027 budget request identifies approximately $1.058 billion in gross weapon-system cost for 4,824 GMLRS rockets, comprising 2,928 Standard Unitary, 1,596 Standard Alternative Warhead and 300 ER-GMLRS Alternative Warhead rockets. Projected quantities for FY2028 through FY2031 are 5,244, 4,878, 4,740 and 5,292 rockets, respectively, meaning the 19,002-round annual production capacity identified in the Army’s Sources Sought notice would be roughly 3.6 to four times those currently projected annual procurement quantities.

The Army also states that GMLRS procurement is being executed under a four-year multiyear arrangement covering FY2024-FY2027 and that advance procurement is being used to reduce production lead times and mitigate supply-chain volatility. Lockheed Martin remains the currently identified qualified producer, while the Army’s FY2027 procurement-history table lists a March 2025 sole-source, firm-fixed-price entry for 5,076 rockets at an indicated unit cost of $190,508, with first delivery shown for February 2027. Separately, the Army announced in October 2024 an undefinitized GMLRS and ER-GMLRS contract action with Lockheed Martin worth up to $4.1 billion, intended to be definitized as part of a three-year multiyear contract. The August 2026 Sources Sought notice itself does not constitute a solicitation, contract award or commitment to procure 133,014 rockets.

The 133,014 figure should be understood not as 133,014 rockets already ordered, but as a statement about the arsenal the United States wants industry capable of producing. The U.S. Army is preparing for a security environment in which precision fires cannot remain a boutique capability available only in limited wartime quantities; they must be supported by an industrial system able to sustain extended operations, rebuild inventories and meet growing U.S. and allied demand simultaneously. The persistence of the 19,002-round annual target, the expansion of HIMARS, the fielding of ER-GMLRS and PrSM, advance procurement for long-lead components, and the development of allied manufacturing capacity all point in the same direction. If industry can deliver the production depth the Army is testing, the United States will have strengthened one of its most important advantages in modern land warfare: not merely the ability to strike accurately and at range, but the industrial endurance to keep precision fires flowing through a long fight.

Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.

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US Northern Command Warns Drone Defense Gaps Leave Military Bases Exposed to Domestic Swarm Attacks
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U.S. Northern Command says American forces lack sufficient sensors and effectors to reliably detect and defeat drone swarms launched from within the United States. The gap leaves military bases and critical infrastructure exposed to low-cost attacks that can bypass air defenses designed primarily for threats approaching from outside the country.

Lieutenant General Joseph Jarrard, deputy commander of U.S. Northern Command and vice commander of the U.S. element of NORAD, said at the Space and Missile Defense Symposium in Alabama on August 13, 2026, that some locations may have neither the sensors to detect an incoming drone swarm nor the effectors to stop it. NORTHCOM is integrating counter-UAS operations into Operation Noble Eagle while seeking greater interoperability between military sensors, law enforcement networks, and systems protecting civilian infrastructure. The Pentagon has requested about $21 billion for drones, counter-drone systems, munitions, and related capabilities as the services pursue electronic warfare, kinetic interceptors, high-energy lasers, and high-power microwave weapons to address the threat.

Related News: Lockheed Martin Builds a Layered Counter-Drone Architecture for the Age of Autonomous Swarms

U.S. Army Staff Sgt. Kristopher Runyon operates a Dronebuster Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft System during a patrol near Eagle Pass, Texas, on June 14, 2025. U.S. Northern Command has warned that current sensor and effector coverage remains insufficient to counter drone swarm attacks across the homeland. (Picture source: US DoD)

The challenge concerns both sensors and effectors. Some U.S. military installations may not have sufficient coverage to detect an approaching swarm of small drones, while systems capable of engaging them remain unevenly deployed. Detection therefore represents one of the main weaknesses in the current homeland defense posture. On August 13, 2026, during the Space and Missile Defense Symposium in Alabama, U.S. Army Lieutenant General Joseph Jarrard, deputy commander of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and vice commander of the U.S. element of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), said U.S. forces remained “ill-equipped” to address this type of threat. According to Jarrard, some areas may have neither the sensors required to identify an incoming swarm nor the effectors needed to neutralize it.

His comments point to a challenge that differs from the aerial threats traditionally addressed by NORAD. North America’s air defense architecture has historically been structured to detect aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles approaching from outside the continent. A small commercial drone or loitering munition launched only a few kilometers from a military base creates a different operational problem, combining a limited radar signature, very low-altitude flight, short reaction times, and the potential simultaneous use of dozens of aircraft. The problem becomes more complex when drones are covertly introduced into the country before being launched. U.S. officials have increasingly referred to Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb as an example of such a scenario. During the 2025 operation in Russia, Ukraine concealed drones near several air bases before launching them against Russian strategic bombers. An attack based on a similar approach could bypass much of the early-warning architecture intended to detect threats approaching from outside national territory.

Former NORTHCOM and NORAD commander General Glen VanHerck also stated in August 2026 that the United States was not prepared to stop a comparable attack. Repeated drone incursions over Langley Air Force Base in Virginia in 2023 had already exposed difficulties faced by U.S. authorities in identifying, tracking, and rapidly attributing the activity of small aircraft operating near a sensitive military installation. The spread of civilian drones creates an additional challenge. Unlike a missile or military aircraft, a small unmanned aerial system can be purchased commercially, transported in a vehicle, and launched from almost any location near a target. An attack could therefore reduce the interval between detection and impact to only a few minutes, or less, while making it more difficult to distinguish a hostile aircraft from civilian drone activity.

NORTHCOM is now seeking to integrate counter-drone operations more closely into Operation Noble Eagle, the U.S.-Canadian air defense framework established after the September 11, 2001 attacks. NORAD currently relies on existing radar systems while working to connect its networks with detection capabilities operated by other federal agencies, local law enforcement organizations, and authorities responsible for protecting critical infrastructure. For Jarrard, this level of interconnection is a central element of a future U.S. counter-UAS architecture. Military systems will need to exchange information with sensors and networks deployed outside military bases, including those protecting cities, airports, and strategic infrastructure. The issue therefore extends beyond acquiring additional effectors and includes the ability to establish a coherent chain linking detection, classification, command and control, and engagement.

U.S. and German forces test counter-UAS systems against simulated drone threats during Project Flytrap 4.5 at the Putlos Training Area in Germany in November 2025. The U.S.-led initiative evaluated sensors, effectors and their integration with existing radar and command-and-control systems. (Picture source: US DoD)

The U.S. Department of Defense is also increasing investment in this area. The Pentagon has requested approximately $21 billion for drones, counter-drone systems, munitions, and related capabilities, while the individual services continue to assess a growing range of options intended to reduce the cost of each interception. Current responses are based on several complementary layers. Electronic warfare systems can disrupt the command links or navigation systems of certain drones, while kinetic weapons can engage aircraft able to continue operating despite jamming. The United States is also developing directed-energy weapons, including high-energy lasers and high-power microwave systems intended to engage multiple drones at a lower cost per engagement.

The U.S. Army is pursuing the Enduring High Energy Laser, or E-HEL, program, which is intended to transition work conducted over several years on laser weapons into a sustained operational capability. These technologies could provide a more economically viable option than routinely using missile interceptors against drones costing thousands or tens of thousands of dollars. However, they remain dependent on a detection and command architecture capable of identifying targets early enough and transmitting targeting data to the appropriate effectors. This requirement helps explain why NORTHCOM’s concerns focus as much on sensors and interoperability as on the weapons themselves. Deploying multiple independent counter-drone systems around sensitive installations does not necessarily provide an effective response to a saturation attack if radars, radio-frequency sensors, electro-optical systems, command centers, and effectors cannot exchange data in real time.

The vulnerability also contrasts with the objectives of the Golden Dome program, through which Washington plans to establish a homeland defense architecture against a range of ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missile threats. While the United States is preparing major investments against strategic threats originating at long range, successive warnings from NORTHCOM indicate that a smaller, less expensive threat potentially launched from within the country remains difficult to counter. Operational experience from Ukraine and the Middle East has reinforced these concerns. The large-scale use of small drones shows that an adversary does not necessarily need to penetrate U.S. airspace with combat aircraft or long-range missiles to threaten an air base, logistics facility, or critical infrastructure site. A combination of modified commercial drones, autonomous systems, and saturation attacks could generate more targets than available detection and interception systems can handle.

Jarrard’s comments therefore indicate that the U.S. challenge extends beyond acquiring another counter-drone weapon. NORTHCOM is seeking an integrated architecture capable of detecting threats emerging at very short range, immediately sharing that information between military and civilian authorities, and assigning the most appropriate effector. Until such a detection and engagement chain is deployed on a broader scale, the proliferation of small drones will continue to expose a gap in a U.S. air defense structure historically organized against larger threats approaching from much greater distances.

Written By Erwan Halna du Fretay - Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Erwan Halna du Fretay holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and has experience studying conflicts and global arms transfers. His research interests lie in Security and strategic studies, particularly the dynamics of the defense industry, the evolution of military technologies, and the strategic transformation of armed forces.
U.S. Marines Train FPV Attack Drone Teams for Synchronized Strikes Against Multiple Ground Targets
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The U.S. Marine Corps trained FPV attack-drone teams to coordinate strikes against separate targets with near-simultaneous times-on-target during its first attack-drone competition at Quantico. The exercise shows a shift from individual drone employment to coordinated small-unit fires while exposing operators to ISR detection and signature management challenges.

Marines from the 3rd Littoral Combat Team and 4th Marine Division conducted strike planning, ISR integration, urban and night operations, long-range attacks and moving-target engagements during the Marine Corps Attack Drone Competition held from August 10 to 14, 2026, at Marine Corps Base Quantico in Virginia. Teams also operated against an opposing force using ISR to locate and track launch elements, forcing them to manage antennas, radio-frequency emissions and concealed positions while completing missions. The Marine Corps is separately fielding the Neros Archer FPV system, which has demonstrated speeds above 90 mph, ranges beyond 20 kilometers and payload capacity of about 2.3 kilograms. The FY2027 competition is expected to add a dedicated opposing force, electronic-warfare effects and engagement distances of up to 20 kilometers.

Related News: U.S. Marines Bring FPV Precision Strike to the Tactical Edge in South Korea With Neros Archer Attack Drones

Neros Archer first-person-view drones staged during the Marine Corps Attack Drone Competition at Camp Schwab in Okinawa, Japan, on December 7, 2025. During the two-week event, the Marine Corps Attack Drone Team trained and certified 3rd Marine Division personnel as attack drone operators, attack drone instructors, and payload specialist instructors. (Picture source: US DoD)

Weapons Training Battalion, which hosted the competition under Training Command, is using the event to develop tactics and training standards for a capability that is now part of Marine Corps modernization efforts. The FY2026 Competition-in-Arms program already identifies armed FPV drones as a relatively low-cost means of increasing Marine lethality, while the Marine Corps Attack Drone Team is responsible for disseminating intermediate and advanced employment techniques and evaluating operators through competitions.

According to results published on August 18, 2026, by the Marine Corps Training and Education Command, the first Marine Corps Attack Drone Competition took place from August 10 to 14 at Marine Corps Base Quantico in Virginia. The exercise went beyond navigation and the terminal approach to a target. An opposing force used ISR assets to detect and track drone teams, requiring operators to reduce their signatures while maintaining communications with their aircraft. Marines had to manage concealed positions and antennas, react to detection, and continue their missions under pressure. This reversed the usual tactical problem. Crews had to locate and engage their targets while also accounting for the risk that launch sites, radio-frequency emissions or repeated operating patterns could allow an adversary to detect them.

The Marine Corps has not disclosed the exact drone models used during the competition and has not confirmed whether explosive payloads were employed at Quantico. The service, however, fields the Neros Archer as one of its main FPV attack-drone systems. Guidance published by the Marine Corps in September 2025 describes the Archer as a low-cost expendable platform intended to support the development of standardized tactics and the training of a growing number of operators. The system is also included in the U.S. Department of Defense Blue UAS framework and can carry different payloads depending on the mission.

Testing conducted at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms provides a clearer indication of the performance envelope being pursued. During a demonstration in March 2025, an Archer exceeded 90 mph, or about 145 km/h, while reaching a distance of more than 20 kilometers with a payload of approximately five pounds, or 2.3 kilograms. The aircraft also completed a ground-strike profile beyond 20 kilometers and an aerial interception at around 10 kilometers while transmitting real-time video and position data. These figures show how military FPV systems are moving beyond the short-range quadcopter model. In operational conditions, however, effective range still depends on antenna positioning, terrain, data-link quality and the level of electromagnetic interference.

U.S. Marines operate Neros Archer first-person-view drones during the Attack Drone Operator Course at Camp Pendleton, California, on June 17 and 18, 2026. The training focused on preparing Marines to employ attack drones and develop certified operators for operational units. (Picture source: US DoD)

The main tactical value of the competition lies in coordinating several drones against separate targets with nearly simultaneous arrival times. Combined with ISR support, this approach enables a small unit to identify several objectives, prepare different avenues of approach, and concentrate strikes within a very short time window. The exercise also highlights a central constraint for FPV teams: after launch, antenna management, radio emissions and rapid displacement become critical to reducing the risk of detection or enemy response.

Weapons Training Battalion has already identified several areas for further development, including long-range aerial navigation, time-on-target calculations, emergency protective measures, escape and evasion procedures and signature reduction. These lessons also feed into the Marine Corps train-the-trainer model. Personnel who develop higher levels of proficiency during these competitions can return to their units and disseminate standardized procedures across the Fleet Marine Force. The service has also established dedicated training for attack-drone operators, including courses involving the Neros Archer at Camp Pendleton in June 2026.

The competition planned for fiscal year 2027 is expected to introduce a dedicated opposing force, electronic-warfare effects and engagement distances of up to 20 kilometers. This development reflects several lessons observed in Ukraine and other recent conflicts, where low-cost unmanned systems have changed the conditions under which reconnaissance, fires and force protection are conducted at the tactical level. For the United States and its allies, the spread of coordinated FPV strikes could give dispersed infantry and littoral units access to precision effects that previously depended more heavily on larger weapon systems. At the same time, it increases pressure on armed forces to develop counter-UAS capabilities, electronic protection, camouflage, and rapid displacement procedures.

Written By Erwan Halna du Fretay - Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Erwan Halna du Fretay holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and has experience studying conflicts and global arms transfers. His research interests lie in Security and strategic studies, particularly the dynamics of the defense industry, the evolution of military technologies, and the strategic transformation of armed forces.
South Korea’s K9MH Wheeled Howitzer Makes US Army Debut in Bid for Major Artillery Modernization Program
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On August 18, 2026, the U.S. Army awarded Hanwha Defense USA a $100.3 million contract to deliver prototype K9 Mobile Howitzers for testing under the Mobile Tactical Cannon program. The prototype agreement allows for up to 18 K9MH 8x8 wheeled artillery systems to undergo four years of operational evaluations to determine if the platform can potentially replace M777 towed howitzers in select formations. This award initiates a competitive experimentation phase with prototype hardware rather than a final selection or serial production contract for the U.S. Army's entire artillery fleet.

The prototype agreement carries a $262.9 million ceiling to support rapid prototyping, soldier experimentation, and technical evaluations of six initial K9MH vehicles with an option for 12 additional units. Army leadership will use the four-year testing period to assess firing performance, automated loading, and operational supportability before making any downselect decision for future serial production.

Related topic:US Army fires hypersonic warhead from repurposed supergun in first Yuma Proving Ground live test

The K9MH is an 8x8 155 mm self-propelled howitzer that combines a Tatra chassis with a K9A2-derived automated turret, a 40-round magazine, and a 52-caliber CN98 cannon capable of firing nine rounds in 59 seconds. (Picture source: Hanwha Defense USA)

On August 18, 2026, the U.S. Army awarded Hanwha Defense USA, the U.S. subsidiary of South Korea's Hanwha Aerospace, a $100,302,961 contract to develop and deliver prototypes of the K9 Mobile Howitzer, or K9MH, for the Mobile Tactical Cannon (mTC) program. Under this firm-fixed-price Other Transaction Authority agreement, which has a total cumulative value of $262,903,274, Hanwha will initially provide six K9MH artillery systems, while the Army holds options for 12 additional systems, creating a potential prototype fleet of 18 wheeled 155 mm self-propelled howitzers. The US Army identifies an estimated four-year period of performance for rapid prototyping, testing, and Soldier experimentation, during which operational units will evaluate performance, reliability, and supportability in realistic conditions.

This is also the first time a South Korean defense company has secured a U.S. military program involving a complete Korean weapons system, even if this award does not mean that the K9MH will become the U.S. Army's future self-propelled howitzer. If approved, MTC is intended primarily to replace roughly 498 to 500 M777 155 mm towed howitzers in selected formations. The K9MH is still facing Elbit America's Sigma, BAE Systems' Archer, American Rheinmetall/KNDS' RCH 155, and a Leonardo DRS/KNDS Caesar proposal. The K9MH itself is substantially different from the tracked K9A1 that established the K9 Thunder family. Here, the South Korean company Hanwha combines a K9A2-derived automated turret with an 8x8 wheeled chassis from the Czech manufacturer Tatra and reduces the operating crew from five positions on the earlier K9 configuration to three personnel. The earlier crew arrangement included a commander, a gunner, an assistant gunner, a No. 1 gunner or loader, and a driver; the K9MH eliminates several manual ammunition-handling functions by using an automated loading sequence.

Its baseline weapon is the CN98 155 mm/52-caliber cannon, whose barrel length is roughly 8.06 m and which complies with the Joint Ballistics Memorandum of Understanding (JBMOU) standard for 155 mm artillery. With standard propellant charges, the stated firing range is 40 km, while rocket-assisted or comparable extended-range ammunition increases reach beyond 60 km. The automated turret uses separate projectile and charge conveyors, which removes the repeated manual handling cycle that normally slows a howitzer crew after the first few shots. During an April 2026 live-fire sequence, the K9MH fired nine rounds in 59 seconds, placing the demonstrated burst rate close to nine rounds per minute. Hanwha also places the firing-position preparation below 30 seconds. The U.S. Army's decision to begin with the 52-caliber CN98 also reflects the problem that stopped the earlier U.S. programs from reaching production.

The U.S. Army’s Mobile Tactical Cannon (MTC) program emerged from more than three decades of unsuccessful efforts to replace or substantially improve upon the M109 155 mm self-propelled howitzer, beginning with the XM2001 Crusader launched in 1994 and cancelled in 2002, followed by the XM1203 Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon under Future Combat Systems, cancelled with that program in 2009, and then Extended Range Cannon Artillery (ERCA), initiated in 2018 but terminated in April 2024. At that time, the US Army had already begun reassessing its artillery force through a conventional fires study initiated in 2023 and completed in March 2024, which concluded that future cannon artillery required greater mobility, range, and automation rather than simply extending the M109 service life.

On August 28, 2024, the Army therefore issued an industry request for mature 155 mm self-propelled systems already in service or capable of entering service by 2026 with minimal U.S.-funded development, marking a deliberate shift from designing another bespoke American howitzer toward evaluating existing systems. On October 14, 2024, it awarded five Other Transaction Agreement contracts worth roughly $4 million combined to American Rheinmetall Vehicles, BAE Bofors, Hanwha Defense USA, General Dynamics Land Systems and Elbit Systems USA for the Self-Propelled Howitzer Modernization (SPH-M) performance demonstration, with demonstrations scheduled for completion by mid-December 2024. During 2025, however, the Army Transformation Initiative changed the operational focus of the requirement: instead of concentrating first on a successor or complement to the tracked M109A7 in Armored Brigade Combat Teams, the service prioritized replacing M777A2 155 mm towed howitzers in Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, followed by Mobile and Infantry Brigade Combat Teams.

Elbit America’s SIGMA remains the closest competitor to the K9MH in automation and ammunition capacity, combining a 155 mm/52-caliber gun with a fully automated 40-round magazine on an Oshkosh-derived 10×10 wheeled chassis. It requires three soldiers, fires more than eight rounds per minute, provides 360° traverse, enters action within 45 seconds, and can use U.S./NATO ammunition including XM1113 and XM1115 for ranges exceeding 70 km. Compared with the K9MH, the SIGMA offered greater road-oriented strategic mobility and a more explicitly automated firing architecture, while the K9MH offered tracked cross-country mobility and technology derived from the K9 family already operated by multiple armies.

The Archer represents a lighter wheeled alternative built around a 155 mm/52-caliber automated gun mounted on an 8×8 tactical truck, with a crew operating the weapon entirely from an armored cab. It can enter action and fire in less than 30 seconds, leave the firing position in less than 30 seconds, fire six rounds and move 500 m within two minutes, reach 90 km/h and travel up to 650 km on internal fuel. Relative to the K9MH, the Archer emphasized rapid road movement, lower logistical burden, and very short shoot-and-scoot cycles, whereas heavier tracked self-propelled howitzers sacrifice road speed and strategic mobility for better mobility across soft ground and terrain alongside tracked maneuver formations.

For its part, the RCH 155 combined the KNDS Artillery Gun Module with the 8×8 Boxer, carrying 30 projectiles and 144 modular charges and using a 155 mm/L52 cannon capable of more than eight rounds per minute, 40 km with base-bleed ammunition and 54 km with V-LAP. At less than 40 t, it reaches more than 100 km/h and 700 km road range, needs only two crew members and, unlike the K9MH and the other MTC contenders, can fire while moving through its fully automated unmanned turret. Compared with the K9MH, its principal advantages are substantially greater automation, a two-person crew, and wheeled operational mobility, while the K9MH provides a 40-round ammunition load and a less radical artillery architecture with a larger existing K9 logistics and operator base.

Leonardo DRS and KNDS also offered the Caesar 6×6, with Leonardo DRS acting as U.S. prime contractor, making it the lightest and mechanically simplest of the principal MTC proposals rather than competing with the K9MH through extensive turret automation. The 155 mm/52-caliber Caesar family can engage targets beyond 40 km with extended-range ammunition, while the newer Caesar Mk2 weighs less than 26.7 t, fires six rounds per minute, and retains a five-person nominal crew that can be reduced to three. Compared with the K9MH, CAESAR offered much lower weight, easier C-17/C-5 air transport, and a smaller logistical footprint, but less onboard ammunition and crew protection than a turreted howitzer, making the competition a trade-off between the Caesar's deployability and the K9MH's protected capacity and sustained fire.

The K9MH (K9 Mobile Howitzer) is Hanwha Aerospace’s new wheeled 155mm/52-caliber self-propelled howitzer, combining K9-series firepower and automated ammunition handling with an 8×8 configuration designed for greater road mobility, rapid deployment, and shoot-and-scoot artillery operations.

Hanwha has nevertheless retained a growth path. In December 2025, Hanwha Defense USA entered a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement with the U.S. Army DEVCOM Armaments Center to evaluate integration of a government-designed 155 mm/58-caliber cannon into the K9 family. Hanwha's U.S. localization concept also includes 58-caliber tube upgrades and autonomous software insertion among possible later modifications. The distinction is critical for judging the 2026 system accurately: the K9MH entering US Army testing is an L52 howitzer with a 40 km standard-range figure and more than 60 km with rocket-assisted ammunition, while 70 km belongs to a possible future L58 configuration. MTC therefore lets the US Army test mobility, automation, crew reduction and resupply with a mature cannon before deciding whether the operational benefit of another 18% increase in barrel length justifies added recoil, barrel life and maintenance penalties.

Hanwha Defense USA signed a three-year lease on an idle facility in Opelika, Alabama, and began investing about $2 million to establish K9MH integration and testing capacity. Opelika is Phase I, not a complete serial-production complex, and later manufacturing phases, production rates, and site locations remain undisclosed. Hanwha Aerospace's localization model draws on K9 programs in Australia, Poland, Egypt and Romania, where workshare expanded from imported systems toward domestic assembly, sustainment and production. In parallel, Hanwha committed roughly $1.3 billion to a U.S. munitions facility in Arkansas, an investment about 650 times larger than the initial $2 million Opelika setup and aimed at the ammunition side of the artillery system.

Hanwha's Yeosu modular-charge facility currently produces about 1.2 million modules per year and is planned to reach 1.6 million in 2028, while a second facility at Boeun is intended to reach a similar annual level in 2027. Those module figures are not equal to complete artillery rounds because each shot can use multiple charge modules depending on range, projectile, and firing table, but they indicate the production scale required to support sustained 155 mm operations. A 500-gun MTC fleet firing only 20 rounds per gun during one high-intensity day would consume 10,000 projectiles; at 50 rounds per gun, daily expenditure would reach 25,000. That demand would sit alongside barrel replacement, maintenance, engine and transmission spares, autoloader parts, fire control electronics and depot repair.

Hanwha can therefore move from six prototype vehicles assembled and tested through Opelika to a production network capable of delivering hundreds of guns and their ammunition architecture without leaving barrels, propellant components or critical turret subsystems dependent on single foreign sources. The August 2026 award consequently settles only the prototype downselect and leaves the force-structure and procurement questions open. The funded quantity is six K9MHs, the agreement permits 12 more, and the maximum experimental fleet of 18 remains small compared with the earlier requirement of roughly 498 to 500 systems, as a 500-gun acquisition would be 27.8 times larger than the maximum prototype fleet.

The K9MH prototype award does not therefore constitute the U.S. Army’s final MTC acquisition decision, as 2030 is currently the planned First Unit Equipped date rather than the scheduled final selection date. The US Army’s published acquisition schedule calls for MTC competitive evaluation through FY2026, Soldier experimentation and integration testing throughout FY2027, followed by an Army Senior Leaders downselect of the final MTC solution in Q4 FY2027; the selected system would then proceed through additional engineering, ammunition integration, qualification, and production preparation before First Unit Equipped in Q4 FY2030.

The production requirement is already unusually explicit: the five MTC competitors have to demonstrate a credible plan to establish U.S. production within two years of award and reach 24 to 48 systems per year, while production unit cost, domestic supply chain capacity, ammunition compatibility, and data rights were formal evaluation criteria. Consequently, if the K9MH passes experimentation and remains the US Army’s preferred solution at the FY2027 downselect, the 2028-2030 period would principally cover maturation, U.S. industrialization, qualification, and preparation for operational fielding, culminating in the first MTC-equipped Army unit in late FY2030 rather than a new competition in 2030.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.

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U.S. Army Awards Elroy Air $46M for Autonomous Hybrid-Electric Cargo Aircraft
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The U.S. Army awarded Elroy Air a $46 million multiyear contract to develop the Chaparral autonomous hybrid-electric VTOL cargo aircraft into a more capable system for resupplying forces in contested, infrastructure-limited environments, the company announced on August 18, 2026. The effort aims to reduce reliance on runways, pilots, and vulnerable logistics networks when conventional supply routes are disrupted or exposed to attack.

Chaparral will gain GPS-denied navigation, cyber-protected communications, greater autonomy, expeditionary mission planning, and modular payload-delivery capabilities designed to improve reliability in austere conditions. These upgrades could expand the Army’s ability to sustain dispersed forces with autonomous air logistics while reducing risk to crews and improving operational flexibility.

Related Topic: U.S. Army Demonstrates UH-60 Helicopter Air-Launched Effects System to Control Multiple Combat Drones

Elroy Air’s Chaparral is an autonomous hybrid-electric VTOL cargo aircraft being developed under a $46 million U.S. Army program to provide GPS-denied navigation, protected communications, modular payload delivery and runway-independent resupply for contested logistics. (Picture source: Elroy Air)

The new U.S. Army effort marks a major technological step beyond the earlier $1.9 million Phase II Small Business Innovation Research work focused on autonomous cargo-pod handling and airdrop functions. The latest contract shifts the focus toward integrating the navigation, communications, mission-management, and reliability technologies required to transform Chaparral from an experimental cargo drone into a more capable autonomous logistics aircraft.

Chaparral is designed to carry more than 227 kg (500 lb) of cargo without requiring a runway or prepared airstrip, placing it between small delivery drones and much larger crewed helicopters. Its hybrid-electric VTOL configuration combines vertical launch and recovery with longer-distance flight, allowing the aircraft to operate from austere or temporary sites while transporting operationally meaningful quantities of ammunition, batteries, medical supplies, spare parts, water, and other high-priority materiel.

This combination of payload capacity, autonomy, and runway independence is what makes the aircraft technologically distinctive. Smaller logistics drones can move lightweight supplies but lack the payload capacity to perform a substantial share of tactical resupply missions, while conventional helicopters offer much greater lift but require crews, larger support footprints, and more demanding operating infrastructure. Chaparral is intended to occupy the middle ground by moving several hundred kilograms of cargo autonomously without requiring a pilot onboard or a conventional airfield.

The U.S. Army’s focus on GPS-denied navigation matters because it addresses one of the central weaknesses of current autonomous aircraft. Satellite-navigation signals can be jammed, spoofed, or degraded, meaning that an unmanned aircraft that depends entirely on GPS could suffer degraded navigation accuracy or reduced mission effectiveness in a contested electromagnetic environment. Chaparral is being developed to continue operating when conventional positioning signals are unreliable, which is essential if autonomous logistics is expected to function beyond permissive training conditions.

Cyber-protected communications are equally important to the aircraft’s operational credibility. Chaparral will need to receive mission data, route updates, and payload instructions while resisting attempts to interfere with command links, manipulate routing, or compromise onboard systems. Combined with GPS-denied navigation, protected communications would let the aircraft operate with greater independence while reducing its dependence on uninterrupted remote control.

Adding an expeditionary mobile mission planner further reinforces the shift toward decentralized autonomous logistics. Instead of relying on fixed command infrastructure, deployed U.S. Army units could potentially assign destinations, payloads, and routes from temporary or mobile positions, allowing Chaparral missions to be planned closer to the tactical edge. This would make the aircraft more adaptable to rapidly changing logistics demands and reduce the need for centralized aviation-control facilities.

Elroy Air has also developed multiple unattended delivery methods for Chaparral, including cargo release while hovering, forward-flight airdrop, and autonomous ground delivery. These delivery modes extend the aircraft’s utility beyond simple point-to-point transport by allowing it to adapt to different terrain, threat conditions, and receiving locations. A hover release could support confined areas where landing is impractical, while forward-flight delivery could reduce the time spent directly over a destination, and autonomous ground delivery could be used where landing is possible.

The modular payload concept is another important part of the system’s potential military value. Rather than configuring the aircraft for only one logistics task, interchangeable cargo modules could allow the same aircraft to move different types of supplies depending on mission requirements. This would give the U.S. Army greater flexibility to use a common autonomous aircraft for ammunition, medical supplies, repair parts, batteries, or other urgent loads without major structural modification.

The hybrid-electric propulsion architecture also separates Chaparral from many smaller battery-powered unmanned aerial vehicles. Purely electric aircraft can offer low acoustic signatures and simplified propulsion systems but are often constrained by endurance and payload limitations, while conventional fuel-powered aircraft provide greater range at the cost of larger mechanical and logistical requirements. Chaparral’s hybrid-electric approach is intended to combine vertical lift with longer-range cruise performance and practical refueling, supporting missions that would be difficult for smaller electric drones.

For the U.S. Army, the technological advantage does not lie simply in replacing a helicopter with an unmanned aircraft. Chaparral could enable some logistics missions with fewer personnel, less infrastructure, and lower risk exposure, while freeing larger crewed helicopters for missions that require heavier payloads, personnel transport, or greater tactical flexibility. The value therefore lies in adding another layer to the logistics architecture rather than replacing existing aviation assets.

This distinction is important because Chaparral would not compete directly with aircraft such as the CH-47 Chinook or UH-60 Black Hawk in payload capacity or mission breadth. Instead, it could handle repetitive, lower-volume, and potentially higher-risk resupply tasks for which assigning a crewed helicopter would be inefficient. By automating those missions, the U.S. Army could potentially increase logistics tempo without proportionally increasing aircrew requirements.

The aircraft could also offer advantages over smaller unmanned delivery systems through its payload capacity and operational radius. A system able to move more than 227 kg (500 lb) in a single mission can transport useful quantities of ammunition, batteries, or maintenance parts rather than only lightweight emergency supplies. That makes Chaparral more relevant to sustained tactical logistics, particularly where multiple autonomous sorties can be generated over time.

Field reliability will be one of the most important factors in determining whether this technology can move beyond development into operational use. Autonomous flight alone is not enough if the aircraft requires extensive contractor support, lengthy maintenance, or specialized infrastructure between missions. The U.S. Army will need to determine whether Chaparral can be refueled, inspected, loaded, launched, and retasked by deployed personnel under austere conditions with acceptable turnaround times.

Greater autonomy could also reduce the manpower required to operate the aircraft at scale. If one operator or a small team can manage multiple Chaparral missions simultaneously, the U.S. Army could expand aerial resupply capacity without assigning a dedicated pilot to each aircraft. This would differ significantly from conventional rotary-wing aviation and could become increasingly important as autonomous systems are fielded in larger numbers.

The industrial dimension also supports the transition from experimental technology toward a more mature logistics aircraft. Elroy Air has established a manufacturing relationship with Kratos Defense & Security Solutions, which has been selected as the exclusive U.S. manufacturing partner for Chaparral. Access to an established aerospace production base could become important if the U.S. Army later decides to move from technology development toward larger-scale acquisition.

The $46 million award should not yet be interpreted as a U.S. Army decision to procure a large operational fleet. The current effort remains focused on maturing the technologies that will determine whether Chaparral can function as a dependable autonomous logistics aircraft, including navigation resilience, protected communications, mission planning, payload flexibility, and field reliability.

The progression from a $1.9 million development effort to a $46 million multiyear program is therefore significant because it indicates that the U.S. Army is moving beyond relatively limited demonstrations of autonomous cargo delivery. The emphasis is now on integrating the technologies required for a more capable logistics aircraft that can navigate without reliable GPS, communicate securely, carry modular payloads, operate without a runway, and reduce dependence on onboard pilots.

If these capabilities are successfully validated together, Chaparral could represent a meaningful technological advance in military logistics by combining the payload capacity of a larger unmanned aircraft with the flexibility of VTOL operations and the manpower advantages of autonomy. Its importance lies less in replacing existing helicopters than in creating a new category of autonomous aerial resupply capable of performing missions that are too heavy for small drones but too routine or exposed to justify the continuous use of crewed aircraft.

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Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
Australia Tests Boobook High-Energy Laser Developed with Japan for Threat Detection
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Australia and Japan successfully tested the jointly developed Boobook high-energy laser in South Australia, advancing the first defence-industry co-development programme between the two countries toward further development and production. The trials deepen bilateral defence cooperation as Canberra and Tokyo also expand missile testing, naval programmes and operational integration.

Boobook combines more than 20 years of laser research by Australia’s Defence Science and Technology Group with electronic and optical technologies from Mitsubishi Electric Australia and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation. Tested at the Cultana Training Area and DSTG Edinburgh, the system is designed for land and maritime platforms and uses laser technology to optically detect incoming threats, supporting platform protection and situational awareness. Australia has not disclosed its power, wavelength, range or beam architecture, while Mitsubishi Electric Australia is investing A$70 million in a new Defence Division and manufacturing facilities at Rydalmere near Sydney. The programme is progressing alongside talks to give Japan greater access to Australian ranges for stand-off and hypersonic missile testing and Australia’s acquisition of 11 upgraded Mogami-class frigates.

Related News: Australia Orders 3 Upgraded Mogami Frigates in Japan’s Largest Defense Export Deal

During Trial Salus, DSTG combined data from radar, EO/IR and directed-energy systems into a fused situational awareness display. The trial included the Athel directed-energy laser, illustrating the broader Australian sensor and laser research base that also underpins the separate Boobook programme (Picture source: DSTG)

The project draws on more than 20 years of DSTG research into laser technologies and combines this work with Mitsubishi Electric’s expertise in electronic and optical systems. Unlike several high-energy laser programmes developed around the destruction of unmanned aerial systems, Boobook is primarily described as a surveillance and platform-protection capability. Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles said the system can be used from land and sea-based platforms and is intended to improve protection and situational awareness by using a laser to optically detect incoming threats. Its beam power, wavelength, range and optical architecture have not been publicly disclosed.

On 18 August 2026, the Australian Government announced the successful completion of trials conducted at the Cultana Training Area and the DSTG site at Edinburgh. The testing generated data intended to refine Boobook’s design and technical requirements ahead of further development and commercialisation. Japanese Defence Minister Shinjiro Koizumi also noted that the programme represents the first case in which technologies from Japan’s defence industry have attracted the interest of a foreign government and progressed to international co-development.

These details help define Boobook’s likely role. Its stated function of optically detecting incoming threats points to a system focused on warning, surveillance and platform protection rather than a laser designed solely to produce a destructive effect. Installation aboard surface vessels or land-based systems could provide an additional means of detecting and characterising threats without relying exclusively on radar sensors. Public information does not, however, identify the precise target sets involved, detection ranges or whether the system can operate against missiles or drones across a full range of operational conditions. Nor does it confirm a hard-kill function. At this stage, Boobook is therefore best understood as an active optical capability intended to improve warning and survivability, with an architecture suitable for both land and maritime applications.

Industrialisation is already accompanying the programme’s development. Mitsubishi Electric Australia is investing A$70 million in new facilities at Rydalmere in the Sydney area, which are expected to host its new Defence Division and support larger-scale production in Australia. The site provides Canberra with a pathway to convert domestically developed technology into industrial capability, while giving Mitsubishi Electric a permanent manufacturing and defence-industry presence in Australia.

The 18 August meeting also showed that bilateral technology cooperation now extends beyond Boobook. Canberra and Tokyo are working on arrangements that would give the Japan Self-Defense Forces greater access to Australia’s large missile testing ranges for long-range weapons. Koizumi specifically raised the possibility of testing stand-off and hypersonic missiles in Australia, while Marles indicated that the proposed arrangement could cover a period of around a decade and multiple missile categories. Japan has already fired an anti-ship missile in Australia in 2023 and conducted a more complex launch scenario during Talisman Sabre 2025.

This convergence is also developing in the naval domain. After Australia selected the upgraded Japanese Mogami-class frigatedesign in 2025, Tokyo signed an agreement in April 2026 covering the first three ships of a planned 11-vessel Australian fleet. The programme has become Japan’s largest defence export contract of the post-war period. Both ministers said the project remains on schedule for the first vessel to enter service with the Royal Australian Navy before the end of the decade.

Boobook therefore sits within a broader relationship that now combines defence industry cooperation, advanced technologies, access to testing ranges, long-range strike, naval programmes and joint training. The Reciprocal Access Agreement that entered into force in 2023 already facilitates Japanese military activities in Australia and Australian deployments in Japan, while both countries are increasing exercises with the United States and expanding cooperation in air and missile defence, autonomous systems and undersea technologies. Against a backdrop of expanding Chinese military capabilities, North Korea’s continuing missile modernisation and concerns over the ability of the United States to sustain attention across several theatres at once, Canberra and Tokyo are seeking a defence relationship that is more operationally integrated and supported by deeper industrial links. Boobook is only one element of that process, but as the first bilateral co-development programme, it illustrates the growing scope of Australia-Japan defence cooperation.

Written By Erwan Halna du Fretay - Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Erwan Halna du Fretay holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and has experience studying conflicts and global arms transfers. His research interests lie in Security and strategic studies, particularly the dynamics of the defense industry, the evolution of military technologies, and the strategic transformation of armed forces.
UK's Cambridge Aerospace to showcase Skyhammer and Starhammer interceptors at Future Forces Prague
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British defense manufacturer Cambridge Aerospace will present its tube-launched Skyhammer and Starhammer interceptors at the Future Forces Exhibition & Forum in Prague from October 21 to 23, 2026. The exhibition deployment follows the company achieving a $3.4 billion valuation through a $300 million Series C funding round and securing a rapid procurement contract from the UK Ministry of Defence. This dual-interceptor portfolio establishes a threat-specific engagement architecture, utilizing the 700 km/h turbojet Skyhammer to neutralize low-speed unmanned aerial vehicles while reserving the Mach 2 Starhammer missile for cruise missiles and high-velocity targets.

Less than 26 months after its establishment, Cambridge Aerospace has reached 250 employees and raised over $630 million to finance the mass production of its autonomous defense systems. The manufacturer plans to produce 2,500 Skyhammer interceptors per month by March 2027, operating alongside the higher-altitude Starhammer system to provide a mathematically sustainable defense against varying threat velocities.

Related topic:Cambridge Aerospace to develop low-cost interceptor systems to close gaps in UK air and missile defence

Cambridge Aerospace's emerging portfolio is based on two different expenditure categories: a light drone interceptor, the Skyhammer, for sustained counter-UAS consumption and a higher-energy missile, the Starhammer, reserved for faster threats. (Picture source: Army Recognition)

On August 17, 2026, Cambridge Aerospace announced that it will present its Skyhammer and Starhammer at the Future Forces Exhibition & Forum in Prague from October 21 to 23, 2026, less than 26 months after the British company was founded. The company will exhibit in Hall 4 at Stand 424 during an event expected to host more than 400 exhibitors from over 35 countries, more than 9,000 professional participants from more than 70 countries, and over 40 conferences, panels and specialist events across more than 20,000 m² of indoor exhibition space. Cambridge Aerospace was founded on September 4, 2024, reached roughly 250 employees by August 2026, and had raised more than $630 million, including a $300 million Series C round led by DFJ Growth that valued the company at $3.4 billion.

Its April 2026 valuation had been $1.3 billion after a $200 million financing round, meaning the valuation increased by $2.1 billion, or 162%, in roughly four months. Its Skyhammer moved from development start in January 2025 to initial flight testing within about six weeks, followed by weekly testing; a UK procurement was announced on April 10, 2026, with initial deliveries scheduled from May and testing of the interceptor and launcher in Jordan. Cambridge Aerospace intends to raise its Skyhammer production to 2,500 interceptors per month by March 2027, equivalent to 30,000 per year. The second interceptor, named Starhammer, is a rocket-powered missile with Mach 2+ speed and a 10 km altitude envelope, to cover targets whose velocity and engagement geometry exceed what the Skyhammer can reliably address.

The company's emerging structure is therefore based on two different expenditure categories: a lighter interceptor for sustained counter-UAS consumption and a higher-energy missile reserved for faster threats. The Skyhammer interceptor weighs 17 kg, is powered by a kerosene-fuelled turbojet, reaches 700 km/h, exceeds 30 km in range and can operate above 4 km altitude. It measures 1,800 mm in length, 1,500 mm across its deployed wings and 180 mm in depth, while the launch container measures 2,000 mm long and 350 mm in diameter. Deployment takes less than one minute. Its warhead weighs 2 kg, equal to 11.8% of total launch mass, and is configured to limit collateral damage around the intercept point. The mass efficiency is relevant to deployment density.

A battery holding 48 rounds would contain 816 kg of interceptor mass, 96 rounds would amount to 1.63 tonnes, and 240 rounds would amount to 4.08 tonnes, excluding canisters and launcher structure. A reserve of 1,000 interceptors would amount to 17 tonnes of missile mass. At the maximum speed of 700 km/h, a Skyhammer travels 11.7 km per minute. A 30 km transit at constant maximum speed would therefore take 2 minutes 34 seconds, before acceleration, turns, and terminal maneuvering are included. Against a one-way attack UAV travelling at 180 km/h, the Skyhammer has a maximum speed advantage of 520 km/h in a tail chase and a speed ratio of 3.9:1. That is sufficient for the slower UAV target class but far below the multi-Mach performance required for many conventional missile engagements, which is why the Skyhammer's design does not spend mass and propulsion on speed that is unnecessary against Shahed drones.

That performance envelope only becomes operationally useful if the Skyhammer receives target information early enough. Therefore, the British interceptor drone uses dual-band active radar and resilient communications and is intended to operate when GNSS is denied. External sensors can provide the target track before launch, so each Skyhammer does not need to search autonomously across the entire 30+ km range from a cold start. The practical engagement sequence is therefore surveillance detection, target classification, track formation, C2 transfer, launcher assignment, interceptor launch, midcourse guidance, and autonomous terminal engagement. Every stage consumes time and therefore distance. An adversary UAV flying at 180 km/h covers 3 km per minute; a 30-second delay between detection and launch allows it to move 1.5 km closer to the defended asset, while a 60-second delay costs 3 km of engagement depth.

The effect becomes more severe against faster threats. A 900 km/h cruise missile travels 15 km in one minute and 7.5 km in 30 seconds, leaving little tolerance for track latency or launcher reaction. That is why Cambridge Aerospace's integration work with multiple sensor systems since 2025 is not a peripheral feature but part of the interceptor's usable range. GNSS-denied operation further places greater emphasis on inertial navigation, radar updates, communications continuity, and onboard terminal sensing, as satellite navigation cannot be assumed during electronic warfare. The development record is unusually compressed for a European defence program: the Skyhammer development began in January 2025, and the first flight test followed approximately six weeks later, placing initial airborne activity in February or March 2025.

Cambridge Aerospace then maintained weekly testing, which over a full year would theoretically permit more than 50 test cycles rather than a handful of major campaigns, although the exact number of firings has not been released. On April 10, 2026, only 15 months after development began, the UK Ministry of Defence announced a multi-million-pound procurement covering Skyhammer interceptors, launchers, integration, support and end-user training for British forces and Gulf partners. Initial deliveries were scheduled for May 2026, while the interceptor and launcher were also tested in Jordan. At Eurosatory 2026, Cambridge Aerospace reported 70% effectiveness across all Skyhammer testing conducted to that point. The mathematics nevertheless illustrates the ammunition consequence.

If 70% were treated only as an independent single-shot success probability, one interceptor would provide 70%, two would provide 91%, three 97.3%, and four 99.19% probability of at least one success. Reliability is consequently not only a performance variable but a production variable: as seen with the Patriot, every additional interceptor required per engagement directly reduces the number of targets that a fixed annual production volume can cover. Cambridge Aerospace's March 2027 target of 2,500 Skyhammers per month is therefore the most important industrial figure attached to the drone. At steady production, that equals 30,000 interceptors per year, 7,500 per quarter, roughly 577 per week and 82 per calendar day. The consumption implications are equally concrete. A force expending 50 Skyhammers per day would consume 18,250 per year and remain below the planned annual production by 11,750 rounds.

At 82 per day, consumption and production would be essentially balanced. A 30,000-round annual production rate would sustain 100 shots per day for 300 days, 250 per day for 120 days or 500 per day for only 60 days. If two rounds were routinely fired per target, annual production would cover approximately 15,000 engagements; with three rounds per target, 10,000. Training firings, qualification launches, reserve policy, damaged rounds and unsuccessful launches would, logically, reduce those figures. Magazine depth therefore depends as much on daily production and single-shot effectiveness as on how many tubes are fitted to one launcher. Consequently, the Starhammer missile exists because those same Skyhammer characteristics become inadequate once target speed approaches or exceeds interceptor speed.

The missile measures 2.8 m in length and 0.41 m in wingspan, exceeds 20 km in range, reaches an altitude of 10 km, and exceeds Mach 2. Guidance combines INS and datalink functions with an active radar seeker. Using 686 m/s as a representative Mach 2 velocity, a Starhammer can move about 41 km per minute once at maximum speed, compared with the Skyhammer's 11.7 km per minute. A 20 km transit at constant Mach 2 would take roughly 29 seconds, compared with about 103 seconds for the Skyhammer to cover the same distance at 700 km/h. The actual Starhammer flight would take longer because the weapon must accelerate, but the order of magnitude illustrates the difference in reaction time. The 10 km altitude figure is also more than 2.5 times Skyhammer's 4 km ceiling.

The Starhammer's shorter 20+ km nominal range does not mean it has less energetic performance, as its rocket motor converts propellant rapidly into acceleration and velocity, whereas the Skyhammer's turbojet exchanges very high initial thrust for sustained lower-speed flight. Against a cruise missile travelling at 900 km/h, or 250 m/s, the Skyhammer's 194 m/s maximum speed leaves it 56 m/s slower in a tail chase, making many rear-aspect interceptions impossible. In contrast, the Starhammer at Mach 2 has a nominal speed ratio of 2.7:1 against the same target and a tail-chase speed advantage exceeding 430 m/s. The division between the Skyhammer drone and the Starhammer missile can therefore be expressed in terms of target speed, reaction time, and expenditure rather than generic references to layered air defense. A Shahed-class UAV in the 150 to 200 km/h speed band covers only 2.5 to 3.3 km per minute.

A 700 km/h interceptor therefore retains a large overtaking margin and does not need the propulsion energy of a Mach 2 missile. A cruise missile at 900 km/h covers 15 km per minute and reduces a 30 km warning distance to only two minutes before reaching the defended point. If detection, classification, and engagement authorization consume 30 seconds, one quarter of that warning period is already lost. Against that target, the Skyhammer's lower speed severely restricts interception geometry, whereas the Starhammer's higher acceleration and velocity provide more opportunities to reach the projected intercept point before the target crosses it. The warhead and airframe dimensions reflect the same division.

The Skyhammer's 2 kg warhead represents only 11.8% of a 17 kg interceptor because its principal targets are relatively fragile UAV structures whose propulsion, fuel system, control surfaces, or electronics can be disabled without the larger energetic package carried by a conventional SAM. The Starhammer's larger 2.8 m body is required to accommodate the propulsion, guidance, and control authority associated with a Mach 2-class flight regime. Using Starhammers against a target that Skyhammers can defeat would therefore consume a higher-energy round without changing the basic target requirement. Using the Skyhammer against a target flying faster than the interceptor can instead create an engagement geometry in which no amount of lower unit cost compensates for insufficient closing velocity.

The two systems are complementary because each avoids forcing the other to operate outside the part of the threat spectrum for which its propulsion and guidance architecture are optimized. At Future Forces 2026, the company will reach Prague with roughly 250 employees, more than $630 million raised and a $3.4 billion valuation, equivalent mathematically to more than $2.5 million raised per employee and $13.6 million in valuation per employee. More relevant is the relationship between production and expenditure. At the planned Skyhammer rate, Cambridge Aerospace would manufacture one interceptor every 17.5 minutes, averaged continuously across a 30-day month.

A battery firing 12 rounds during one attack would consume roughly 3.5 hours of average production; 100 rounds would represent more than a full day of output; 500 rounds would equal six days of output; 1,000 rounds would represent only approximately 12 days of production. In a mixed attack, assigning slower UAVs to Skyhammers preserves Starhammers for cruise missiles and other threats whose speed or altitude requires it. Cambridge Aerospace identifies the Skyhammer as the first element of a broader family that will include higher-speed interceptors and systems supporting detection, communications and integration across air defense networks.

The relevant economic measure is therefore not simply the price of one interceptor compared with the price of one drone. It is the cost and number of rounds required to achieve one successful engagement, multiplied by the number of targets faced per day and compared with the rate at which complete interceptors can be manufactured. The Skyhammer's role is to move large numbers of slower targets away from scarce high-speed missile inventories. The Starhammer's role is to prevent that economy from creating a gap against threats travelling too fast or too high for Skyhammers. Cambridge Aerospace can sustain that division based on three numbers that determine wartime endurance: successful intercepts per shot, shots expended per target, and complete missiles produced per day.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.

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NATO and U.S. Forces Showcase Eastern Flank Strength at Poland Armed Forces Day Parade
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NATO’s Forward Land Forces Battle Group-Poland fielded U.S. M1A2 Abrams tanks with British Jackal 2 reconnaissance vehicles and Romanian Gepard air-defense systems during Poland’s August 15 Armed Forces Day parade in Warsaw. The multinational formation reflects NATO’s effort to combine armored, reconnaissance and short-range air-defense capabilities on its eastern flank while deepening operational integration with Polish forces.

The U.S. contingent included the 2nd Battalion, 37th Armored Regiment, whose M1A2 Abrams tanks operate with a 120 mm M256 smoothbore gun and 1,500-horsepower AGT1500 turbine, alongside Jackal 2 reconnaissance vehicles from the British Light Dragoons and twin 35 mm Gepard systems from Romania’s 348th Air Defense Artillery Battalion. The units train with Polish forces at Bemowo Piskie and Drawsko Pomorskie, where recent exercises have combined Abrams tanks, HIMARS, AH-64D Apache helicopters and counter-UAS systems. Poland’s growing use of M1A2 SEPv3 tanks and regular combined training with U.S. forces are also tightening operational and logistical links intended to speed allied reinforcement and sustainment during a crisis on NATO’s eastern flank.

Related News: Europe’s Largest Apache Hub Creates a New Strategic Center of Attack Aviation on NATO’s Eastern Flank

U.S. Army M1A2 Abrams tanks from the 2nd Battalion, 37th Armored Regiment, parade through Warsaw during Poland’s Armed Forces Day on August 15, 2026, as part of the NATO Forward Land Forces Battle Group-Poland. (Picture source: Poland MoD)

The U.S. contingent includes the 2nd Battalion, 37th Armored Regiment, assigned to the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team of the 1st Armored Division. It parades with M1A2 Abrams tanks alongside Jackal vehicles operated by the British Army’s Light Dragoons and Flakpanzer Gepard systems from Romania’s 348th Air Defense Artillery Battalion. The 17th Croatian contingent completes the multinational formation. Their presence comes as allied forces stationed in Poland continue combined training with the Polish Armed Forces, including at the Bemowo Piskie and Drawsko Pomorskie training areas.

According to U.S. Army V Corps, whose Maj. Gen. Christopher R. Norrie attends the parade, the 2-37 AR currently operates M1A2 Abrams tanks in Poland. On July 23, 2026, the battalion conducted a live-fire training event with its M1A2s near Bolesławiec, engaging stationary and moving targets to train crew coordination and firing under combat conditions. The M1A2 is equipped with the 120 mm M256 smoothbore gun and an AGT1500 gas turbine producing 1,500 horsepower. Its weight creates substantial requirements in fuel supply, maintenance and mobility support, but the platform combines heavy protection, direct-fire capability and tactical mobility within an armored brigade.

The other vehicles on display complement the heavy armored component with different operational functions. The British Jackal 2 is a high-mobility reconnaissance and support vehicle capable of reaching around 80 km/h. Its ring mount can carry a 12.7 mm heavy machine gun or an automatic grenade launcher, while its open configuration favors observation, rapid movement, and immediate reaction. The Romanian Gepard is built around two 35 mm Oerlikon automatic cannons linked to a search radar and fire-control system. Its engagement range of several kilometers against nearby aerial targets enables it to provide mobile protection for mechanized formations against helicopters, low-flying aircraft and certain categories of drones.

The tactical relevance of this force becomes clearer when these systems are considered within the framework of exercises conducted in Poland. During Operation Winter Falcon 26 in January 2026, U.S. M1A2 tanks fired alongside Polish M1A2 SEPv3s at the Drawsko Combat Training Center, while both armies also trained with HIMARS systems, AH-64D Apache helicopters and counter-unmanned aircraft systems. Such exercises go beyond placing different platforms on the same training area. A reconnaissance element can detect or confirm an avenue of approach, pass that information to armored units and allow Abrams crews to concentrate direct fire on the threatened sector. Air-defense assets can protect columns against low-altitude aircraft, while C-UAS systems address the persistent threat posed by reconnaissance and attack drones. The January exercise combined armored forces with UAS and C-UAS technologies to train threat detection and reduce the exposure of heavy vehicles.

British light cavalry employs the Jackal 2 for forward reconnaissance, identifying routes of advance and monitoring approaches before armored units are committed. Its mobility allows crews to disperse, reposition quickly and relay information to higher command levels. The Romanian Gepardcomplements this role by providing short-range air defense for columns, command posts and logistics areas with its twin 35 mm cannons. Together, these capabilities improve the battle group’s ability to identify ground threats ahead of the main force while protecting heavier elements against helicopters, low-flying aircraft and certain types of drones, a requirement that has become increasingly relevant since the war in Ukraine.

This cooperation forms part of a broader U.S.-Polish military relationship that extends well beyond the battle group. Poland now operates its own M1A2 SEPv3 tanks, creating common ground with the U.S. Army in training, maintenance, technical support and logistics. The two countries conduct regular combined exercises, while the U.S. military presence in Poland has gradually developed around armored forces, command elements and infrastructure intended to facilitate the arrival of reinforcements. The objective is therefore not limited to maintaining a visible presence, but also to reducing the time required to deploy, sustain and commit U.S. and allied units during a crisis.

The Warsaw parade should therefore be viewed within the broader transformation of NATO’s eastern flank since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Poland occupies a central position between Germany, the Baltic states, Belarus and Ukraine, making it both an important corridor for allied reinforcements and an area directly exposed to Russian and Belarusian military capabilities. The presence of U.S., British, Romanian and Croatian forces is intended to ensure that any confrontation in this theater would immediately involve several alliance members and trigger a multinational response. Reinforcing the eastern flank addresses a renewed conventional threat from Russia as well as an operating environment shaped by precision strikes, drones, electronic warfare and attacks against logistics infrastructure. In this context, the U.S.-Polish defense relationship has become one of the main elements of NATO’s regional posture, with a focus on forces that already train together, can receive reinforcements rapidly and can operate under a common command structure from the early stages of a crisis.

Written By Erwan Halna du Fretay - Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Erwan Halna du Fretay holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and has experience studying conflicts and global arms transfers. His research interests lie in Security and strategic studies, particularly the dynamics of the defense industry, the evolution of military technologies, and the strategic transformation of armed forces.
Taiwan Refines FPV Drone Anti-Armor Tactics Against Vehicles Protected by Anti-Drone Cages
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Taiwan is using retired tanks and tracked armored vehicles as live-fire targets to sharpen FPV drone attacks against armor, according to Taiwanese reporting published on August 18, 2026. The training reflects lessons from Ukraine, where low-cost attack drones have become a persistent threat to armored forces and a key tool for striking vehicles at tactical depth.

The drills are moving Taiwan beyond basic FPV experimentation toward repeatable anti-armor tactics under realistic conditions. They also give Taiwanese forces direct experience with the threat their own armored units could face, strengthening both offensive drone capability and battlefield survivability.

Related Topic: Taiwan’s New U.S.-Made M1A2T Abrams Tanks Get Camouflaged Canopies to Counter Drone Threats

Taiwan is testing FPV attack drones armed with anti-armor warheads against retired tanks and armored vehicles as it applies battlefield lessons from the war in Ukraine to strengthen its island défenses (Picture Source: Taiwanese Army / Edited By Army Recognition Group)

On August 18, 2026, new reporting from Taiwan revealed another step in the Republic of China Armed Forces’ effort to operationalize first-person-view attack drones under increasingly realistic combat conditions. Retired CM12 tanks and CM24 tracked armored vehicles are now being used as live-fire targets as Taiwanese troops refine drone-delivered anti-armor strikes and absorb battlefield lessons emerging from the war in Ukraine. Liberty Times Defense, Taiwan’s Youth Daily and Military News Agency, together with imagery circulated by the Taiwan-focused New 27 Brigade account, show an armed force moving beyond basic drone experimentation toward standardized tactical employment. The significance extends beyond acquiring another unmanned strike capability: Taiwan is simultaneously learning how to employ FPV drones offensively and how to protect its own armored formations from the same threat.

FPV Drones Move From Experimentation to an Operational Strike Capability

Under training organized by the Army’s Unmanned Systems Training Command, Taiwanese personnel have progressed through standardized FPV instruction covering pre-flight checks, communications links, munition integration, target engagement and multi-aircraft coordination. Liberty Times reported that personnel from the 21st, 43rd and 58th Artillery Commands recently conducted FPV live-fire activity against CM12 tanks and CM24 armored vehicles, while Youth Daily described broader joint training involving multiple formations. Operators flew FPV drones carrying 3.5-inch high-explosive armor-piercing warheads, assessing the appropriate distance and attack angle before conducting single-drone and coordinated two-drone diving attacks. Taiwan’s Military News Agency has separately confirmed frontal and lateral FPV attack profiles and said operators were trained to execute strikes using an optimum attack geometry. This emphasis is operationally important: the effectiveness of an FPV attack is determined not only by the munition carried but also by the pilot’s ability to control the terminal approach against a protected and potentially moving military target.

The selection of genuine armored vehicles gives the exercise considerably greater training value than conventional target boards or lightly constructed mock-ups. The CM12, developed from the M48A3 and equipped with a 105 mm M68A1 cannon and fire-control equipment related to the CM11, served the ROC Army for more than three decades. Taiwan converted 100 vehicles to the CM12 configuration, and the fleet has now been withdrawn as newer M1A2T Abrams tanks enter service. The CM24, developed from the CM21 tracked chassis, served as an armored ammunition carrier transporting 155 mm and 203 mm artillery rounds to firing positions and is also being progressively retired. Using actual vehicles exposes FPV operators to realistic dimensions, armor structures, visual signatures and terminal engagement conditions while giving obsolete platforms one final role in strengthening Taiwan’s combat readiness. Liberty Times did not disclose the level of damage inflicted during the latest attacks, an important limitation when assessing the actual lethality achieved during the exercise.

Cage-Protected CM12 Raises the Difficulty of Taiwan’s FPV Training

The most revealing detail visible in imagery circulated by New 27 Brigade is the extensive cage and standoff protection fitted to the CM12 target. The additional structures appear to cover the side skirts, surround the turret, extend above the turret and protect the engine compartment, creating a vehicle configured to present a substantially more difficult anti-armor target. Taiwan’s Military News Agency had previously confirmed that a CM12 fitted with protective grating over its upper surface was used during attack-drone testing. The imagery suggests that Taiwanese troops are no longer simply training against an exposed legacy tank, but against a target intended to reproduce the enhanced passive protection increasingly encountered on drone-intensive battlefields. Similar arrangements have become particularly visible during the Russia-Ukraine war, where armored forces have adopted cage structures and other improvised defenses to complicate attacks by FPV drones and top-attack munitions.

For Taiwanese operators, this configuration creates a more demanding target-recognition and terminal-control problem. Rather than assuming that a strike anywhere on the vehicle will produce the intended effect, pilots must assess the protective layout, identify vulnerable or less-protected areas and refine their attack profile accordingly. With cage protection extending across the vehicle’s upper and lateral surfaces, troops appear to be practicing how to exploit exposed sections of an already well-protected target, adjust terminal dive angles and improve the probability of achieving a successful penetration. The exercise goes beyond basic drone marksmanship: it trains operators to defeat a target that has itself been adapted to counter anti-armor weapons and drone-delivered munitions, bringing the engagement problem closer to the conditions they could face in actual combat.

Ukraine’s Reconnaissance-Strike Lessons Are Entering Taiwan’s Doctrine

Taiwan’s approach is explicitly informed by the Russia-Ukraine war. The ROC Military News Agency stated that the Unmanned Systems Training Command was drawing on recent international combat experience, including Ukraine, and developing attack drones around low-cost, high-efficiency and modular principles. Training has included single-drone and coordinated two-drone strikes while requiring personnel to practice the complete sequence of reconnaissance, designation, tracking, acquisition, engagement and battle-damage assessment. This is strategically more important than simply producing proficient pilots. It points toward an effort to compress the tactical sensor-to-shooter cycle, allowing distributed units to identify targets and generate precision effects without automatically relying on expensive missiles or conventional artillery missions.

FPV drones also introduce an attrition-economic advantage: a comparatively inexpensive and replaceable unmanned aircraft can threaten vehicles, artillery pieces, logistics assets and other systems worth many times its own acquisition cost. For Taiwan, which could face sustained pressure on resupply routes during a high-intensity conflict, domestic production capacity, standardized components, batteries, communications equipment and expendable airframes could become critical elements of sustained drone operations. At the same time, the next level of operational maturity will depend on how effectively Taiwan’s drone formations can function inside a contested electromagnetic environment. Ukraine has demonstrated the disruptive potential of inexpensive FPV systems, but it has also highlighted the continuous competition between drone operators and electronic-warfare forces over command links, video feeds, navigation and spectrum access. In a confrontation with the People’s Liberation Army, Taiwanese unmanned systems would have to operate amid electronic attack, counter-UAS systems, persistent surveillance and attempts to locate operators through their electromagnetic signatures.

Taiwan’s M1A2T Abrams Shows the Other Side of the Drone Warfare Equation

Taiwan is simultaneously applying the Ukrainian experience defensively to its newest armored capability. During Han Kuang 42, M1A2T Abrams tanks belonging to the Army’s 584th Armored Brigade were observed operating with elevated rigid structures covered by camouflage material above the turret, following earlier use of irregular camouflage netting intended to disrupt recognition from overhead surveillance. Army Recognition assessed the configuration as combining signature reduction with an additional passive barrier against overhead threats, while stressing that such canopies should not be characterized as proven stand-alone counter-UAS systems. The same exercises included rapid field refueling and dispersion drills designed to reduce the period during which tanks, fuelers and supporting vehicles remain concentrated and observable.

The development illustrates one of Ukraine’s central armored-warfare lessons: protection now begins well before physical armor is struck. Avoiding detection, classification, geolocation and continuous tracking has become an integral component of vehicle survivability. Taiwan is consequently addressing both sides of the FPV equation, training its artillery formations to conduct drone-enabled strikes while teaching its most advanced tank units to survive inside the same reconnaissance-strike environment. Resilient communications, spectrum management, rapid tactical displacement, decentralized control, camouflage, deception and the ability to replace expendable platforms at scale will shape whether FPV units can sustain combat effectiveness. Taiwan is not simply copying Ukrainian tactics; it is institutionalizing lessons observed in Ukraine and adapting them to an island-defense environment characterized by dense urban terrain, restricted maneuver corridors, critical ports and airfields, coastal approaches and the possibility of intensive PLA air, missile and electronic-warfare operations. In this context, the transfer of Ukrainian battlefield experience is best understood as adaptation for the Taiwan Strait and the northern approaches to the South China Sea, rather than a direct reproduction of Ukrainian land warfare.

Taiwan’s decision to place real armored vehicles beneath armed FPV drones sends a broader signal about the direction of its military transformation. The CM12’s final contribution to Taiwan’s defense may no longer come from its 105 mm cannon, but from teaching a new generation of operators how to engage protected armored targets under conditions increasingly representative of contemporary warfare. At the same time, Taiwan’s newest M1A2T Abrams tanks are being prepared to operate under persistent aerial observation through camouflage, passive overhead protection, rapid refueling and tactical dispersion. Fielding the drone while learning to defeat the drone captures the deeper transformation underway inside the ROC Armed Forces. By turning lessons from Ukraine into training standards, reconnaissance-strike procedures, expendable precision-attack capabilities and new armored-survivability practices, Taiwan is building a more distributed, adaptive and difficult-to-target force designed to impose severe operational costs on any adversary attempting to establish and sustain a foothold on the island.

Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.

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Taiwan Raises 2027 Defense Budget to Record $31.4 Billion as Chinese Pressure Grows
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Taiwan will raise proposed defense spending to a record NT$1.1225 trillion, about $31.4 billion, in 2027, a 16 percent increase as Taipei accelerates military modernization under sustained pressure from China. The package will push annual defense expenditure above NT$1 trillion for the first time and beyond 3 percent of GDP, reinforcing Taiwan's drive to field forces capable of surviving initial strikes and sustaining combat operations during a prolonged conflict.

President Lai Ching-te confirmed the NT$1.1225 trillion figure on August 17, describing stronger defense funding as an investment in peace and saying the buildup would strengthen Taiwan's ability to preserve stability across the Taiwan Strait. The proposed 2027 expenditure represents an increase of about 16 percent from 2026, while the Cabinet is expected to formally present the budget and its detailed allocations on August 20. The increase comes as Taiwan shifts resources toward air and missile defense, long-range precision fires, unmanned systems, resilient command networks and larger munitions stocks, capabilities designed to keep military units operational after missile strikes, cyberattacks or attacks on command infrastructure. Those priorities form part of a wider strategy centered on asymmetric warfare and distributed combat power.

Related News: Taiwan’s New U.S.-Made M1A2T Abrams Tanks Get Camouflaged Canopies to Counter Drone Threats

Taiwan Navy Coastal Operations Command deploys a mobile coastal missile launcher during the Han Kuang 42 exercise in August 2026. Units equipped with Hsiung Feng II and Hsiung Feng III anti-ship missiles conducted simulated joint strikes against enemy vessels in Taiwan's First Operational Zone. (Picture source: Taiwan Military News Agency)

The increase forms part of a broader modernization trajectory. Taipei is not seeking to match the People's Liberation Army in quantitative terms, but to make any Chinese military operation slower, more costly, and harder to execute. The threat is no longer limited to a conventional amphibious assault. China now has the means to combine joint air and naval patrols, gray-zone pressure, maritime blockade operations, missile strikes, cyber operations and amphibious action. Repeated exercises around Taiwan also allow Beijing to reduce the time separating routine military activity from a potential combat operation.

This approach is clearly reflected in official Taiwanese documents. The Presidential Office has indicated that defense spending should exceed 3 percent of GDP in 2027 and reach 5 percent by 2030, while the Ministry of National Defense is structuring its effort around layered defense, a digitized kill chain and the development of domestic capabilities. Taiwan's 2025 National Defense Report explicitly identifies possible Chinese scenarios involving joint blockades, large-scale strikes and amphibious operations, while the Executive Yuan has outlined the planned integration of the Taiwan Tactical Network, the Team Awareness Kit, decision-support systems and new unmanned sensors.

Current programs illustrate this approach. HIMARS provides Taiwan with a mobile long-range strike capability, but it represents only one part of a much broader force structure. The army is also fielding M1A2T main battle tanks and plans to acquire M109A7 155 mm self-propelled howitzers, while Javelin and TOW 2B anti-tank missiles and anti-armor loitering munitions are intended to strengthen defense in depth against forces that manage to establish a foothold. New force structures also include drone battalions in several operational areas, reflecting the direct integration of unmanned systems into combat units.

The naval component is following the same direction. Taiwan combines shore-based anti-ship missiles, surface vessels, surveillance drones and new unmanned surface vehicles to monitor and contest the maritime approaches to the island. The Ministry of National Defense has cited systems including the Albatross II maritime surveillance drone, vertical takeoff and landing unmanned aircraft and coastal reconnaissance platforms designed to locate hostile naval movements and feed targeting data to strike systems. Coastal attack drones and small expendable unmanned surface vessels are also planned to complicate amphibious operations or a maritime blockade.

Air and missile defense represents another central element. Taipei intends to integrate Patriot and domestically developed Sky Bow systems into the T-Dome architecture, creating several layers of interception. The locally developed Strong Bow system, designed for medium-range ballistic missile defense, is expected to contribute alongside new air-defense missiles and counter-unmanned aircraft systems. This development responds directly to the threat identified by Taiwan's defense authorities, which assess that Chinese ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and air-launched weapons can cover the entire island.

The operational value lies in connecting these different systems rather than treating them as separate capabilities. Taiwan is seeking to shorten its sensor-to-shooter cycle through the Taiwan Tactical Network and Team Awareness Kit, allowing information to circulate between sensors, drones and firing units. A coastal unmanned aircraft detecting a naval group or troop concentration could therefore pass targeting data to missile batteries, artillery units or attack drones. The same distributed architecture is intended to preserve combat effectiveness when fixed air bases, radar sites and command centers come under attack. The objective is to prevent China from disabling the broader defense network through a limited number of early strikes.

The Chinese threat therefore shapes both the scale and the composition of Taiwan's defense investments. Beijing can exert military pressure below the threshold of open conflict, then shift from recurring air and naval deployments toward blockade or strike operations with limited warning. Taipei's response increasingly relies on layered air defense, coastal missiles, mobile artillery, drones, unmanned systems, tactical networks and sufficient ammunition stocks to sustain a prolonged campaign rather than a short initial exchange.

The 2027 defense budget increase fits into this broader evolution of Taiwan's deterrence model, now centered on resilience, force dispersion and the ability to deny Beijing a rapid military victory. Washington has for several years encouraged its partners to assume a larger share of their own defense, while Taipei is seeking to reduce its exposure to China's initial strikes and retain combat capability over time. Beijing is likely to interpret this effort as a further deepening of Taiwan's military preparedness, particularly where U.S. arms acquisitions are combined with systems developed domestically. In this context, the detailed allocation of the 2027 budget may matter as much as the headline figure, because it will show whether Taiwan can convert higher spending into survivable, distributed, and sufficiently numerous capabilities able to complicate China's military planning over the longer term.

Written By Erwan Halna du Fretay - Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Erwan Halna du Fretay holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and has experience studying conflicts and global arms transfers. His research interests lie in Security and strategic studies, particularly the dynamics of the defense industry, the evolution of military technologies, and the strategic transformation of armed forces.
U.S. Army Expands $750 Million Drone Marketplace With Group 3 UAS and Mission Payloads
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The U.S. Army is expanding its UAS Marketplace so operational units can select drones, payloads and software around specific battlefield requirements rather than wait for a single centrally selected solution. The expansion pushes procurement authority closer to soldiers and could sharply compress the path between identifying a tactical need, evaluating available equipment and putting that capability into the field.

The U.S. Army is expanding its UAS Marketplace so operational units can select drones, payloads, software and mission equipment around specific battlefield requirements rather than wait for a single centrally selected solution. The move pushes procurement authority closer to soldiers and could shorten the time between identifying a tactical need and fielding a usable capability. Launched five months ago and developed in close coordination with Amazon Web Services, the Marketplace is now moving beyond small drones to include Group 3 unmanned aircraft, payloads, software, components and accessories. A new capability selection tool is also intended to help units assemble mission-specific packages, reinforcing the Army's shift toward a user-driven acquisition model built around speed, modularity and operational demand.

Related News: U.S. Army readies drone marketplace to streamline selection and accelerate battlefield deployment

U.S. Army soldiers prepare an RQ-28 unmanned aircraft system during Combined Resolve 26-07 at Hohenfels Training Area in Germany on April 15, 2026. (Picture source: U.S. Army)

The financial figure stands out because of how quickly it has been reached. More than $750 million in transactions within a few months indicates that the Marketplace is moving beyond an experimental procurement channel. The U.S. Armyadds new systems every week and allows users to filter available solutions according to several criteria, including category, price, range, endurance and ratings. Units can therefore compare competing products before ordering equipment that has already been assessed for military use, bringing part of the capability selection process closer to the formations that will operate the systems.

According to an announcement published on August 14, 2026, by the U.S. Army’s Capability Program Executive Aviation, the addition of Group 3 UAS broadens the range of missions that can be addressed through the platform. Under the U.S. military classification, these aircraft generally weigh between 55 and 1,320 pounds, or roughly 25 to 599 kilograms, operate below 18,000 feet and fly at speeds below 250 knots. They therefore sit above the Group 1 and Group 2 systems already listed and provide access to platforms offering longer endurance, greater payload capacity and operation at increased distance from their operators. The Army has opened a dedicated Call for Solutions on SAM.gov to identify additional Group 3 systems.

A second Call for Solutions covers payloads, software, components and associated equipment. The objective is no longer limited to purchasing a drone in a fixed configuration but extends to building a system around the mission. The new selection tool begins with a base platform before adding payloads, accessories and training. Categories identified by the Army include intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance equipment, communications systems and non-kinetic electromagnetic warfare capabilities. The aircraft is therefore treated less as a standalone platform and more as one element within a configurable unmanned architecture.

U.S. Army soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division prepare and operate Ghost-X and PDW C100 unmanned aircraft systems during training at the Joint Readiness Training Center in April 2026. (Video source: U.S. Army)

This flexibility also introduces technical and regulatory constraints. Equipment entering the Marketplace must comply with National Defense Authorization Act requirements, while U.S. Armyassessors conduct physical teardowns and cyber inspections during vendor onboarding. Systems that pass the process receive cleared status, allowing unrestricted direct purchase through the platform. According to the Army, the resulting inspection reports can also support manufacturers seeking Defense Contract Management Agency Blue List certification. Faster procurement is therefore being combined with measures intended to manage supply chain and cybersecurity risks, two areas that have become particularly sensitive in the small UAS sector.

The main value of the Marketplace lies in allowing a unit to select a system for a defined mission profile and then add the required payloads and accessories directly. With Group 3 drones entering the platform, the U.S. Army can address requirements beyond the short-range missions typically associated with Groups 1 and 2, including persistent surveillance, longer-distance links, communications relay and electronic warfare payload employment. Adding ISR sensors, communications modules and non-kinetic systems also allows a single air vehicle to be configured for different roles without requiring the development of a new platform. For units, the practical benefit lies in shortening the interval between defining a requirement and purchasing an already assessed package, while comparing range, endurance, cost and configuration within the same procurement environment.

The concept is also extending beyond U.S. forces. During summer 2026, 23 allied and partner countries signed statements of intent under the Secretary of the Army’s Foreign Military Sales Fast Lane initiative. Products intended for export can be evaluated and pre-cleared before partner acquisition, reducing part of the administrative delay traditionally associated with Foreign Military Sales.

For Washington, the mechanism provides a way to accelerate the distribution of U.S.-approved drones and payloads among partner forces while retaining control over compliance requirements. For suppliers, entry into the Marketplace can potentially provide access not only to U.S. Army customers but also to foreign buyers using the FMS channel. For allied armed forces, the system may shorten procurement timelines and facilitate access to platforms, software, and payloads already assessed by the U.S. Army. In practice, this could also favor suppliers able to meet U.S. regulatory and technical standards, while gradually encouraging wider use of American-certified unmanned systems across partner forces.

Written By Erwan Halna du Fretay - Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Erwan Halna du Fretay holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and has experience studying conflicts and global arms transfers. His research interests lie in Security and strategic studies, particularly the dynamics of the defense industry, the evolution of military technologies, and the strategic transformation of armed forces.
Australian Army Deploys First AS9 Huntsman Howitzers for Protected Mobile 155mm Firepower
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The Australian Army has fielded its first operational battery of AS9 Huntsman 155mm self-propelled howitzers with 106 Battery in Townsville, giving the 3rd Brigade a protected artillery force able to fire and rapidly relocate. The deployment marks a major shift from M777A2 towed guns toward heavier, mobile firepower designed to survive counter-battery threats and operate alongside Australia’s expanding armored forces.

106 Battery, 4th Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery, is receiving six AS9 Huntsman howitzers supported by three AS10 armored ammunition resupply vehicles, establishing the first complete Huntsman battery within the 3rd Brigade. The regiment’s remaining two batteries are expected to adopt the same structure by the end of 2027 as Army transitions its Townsville artillery force from four M777A2 guns per battery to six AS9s. The next phase will move crews beyond individual qualification toward unit and brigade-level employment, including tactical movement, ammunition resupply, maintenance and recovery of the roughly 48-ton tracked howitzers. Australian crews completed their first AS9 operator training and live-fire activity at Puckapunyal in May 2026 before returning to their regiment to develop procedures and collective proficiency.

Related News: Australia Tests First Locally Produced AS9 Huntsman 155mm Howitzer to Advance Mobile Artillery

Australian Army soldiers conduct the first live firing of the new AS9 Huntsman 155mm self-propelled howitzer at Puckapunyal in Victoria. (Picture source: Australian MoD)

The arrival changes the artillery model previously used by the 4th Regiment, which has been mainly structured around the M777A2 155 mm towed howitzer. The M777A2 remains lighter and can be deployed by air in situations where strategic mobility is a priority, but bringing it into action relies more heavily on manual procedures and exposes crews to a greater degree during deployment, ammunition resupply and displacement. With the AS9, the regiment is moving to a protected, mobile and digitised platform able to operate directly alongside the mechanised elements of the 3rd Brigade.

The Australian Army first communicated on the introduction of the Huntsman into the 4th Regiment and the training of its initial crews, before the information was reported by several specialised media outlets. The Australian Department of Defence had already confirmed on June 4, 2026, that thirty gunners from the regiment had completed a six-week AS9 training course at Puckapunyal, including the first live-fire activity conducted with vehicles built in Geelong. At the time, the Army described the system as intended to provide mobile and protected indirect fire while reducing exposure to counter-battery fire.

The programme dates back to LAND 8116 Phase 1 Protected Mobile Fires. The Australian government announced its intention to reintroduce a self-propelled artillery capability in May 2019 before awarding the contract to Hanwha Defense Australia on December 13, 2021. The acquisition covers 30 AS9 Huntsman self-propelled howitzers and 15 AS10 Armoured Ammunition Resupply Vehicles. The initial contract value was approximately AUD 1.017 billion, while Defence budget documents now place approved expenditure for LAND 8116 at around AUD 1.326 billion. Two AS9s and one AS10 from the initial batch were built in South Korea, with the remaining vehicles assembled at the Hanwha Armoured Vehicle Centre of Excellence near Geelong.

The AS9 is derived from the South Korean K9 Thunder but incorporates several modifications for Australian requirements. It is equipped with a 155 mm 52-calibre gun and carries 48 projectiles. The platform can fire three rounds in approximately fifteen seconds and sustain a rate of six to eight rounds per minute during intensive firing sequences. The K9 baseline has a reference effective range of around 40 km with conventional extended-range ammunition, although the actual engagement envelope depends on the projectile and propellant charge used. Its semi-automatic loading system also reduces crew workload and allows fire missions to be conducted in faster succession.

The AS10 completes the system by providing ammunition resupply without requiring crews to remain exposed for extended periods. Derived from the South Korean K10, it can carry up to 104 projectiles and uses a conveyor system linking the two vehicles directly. According to the Australian Army, an AS9 can therefore be fully resupplied in around twenty minutes. The Australian variant also incorporates increased internal height, updated fire-control systems, additional storage space and air conditioning adapted to local operating conditions. Trials have also covered the integration of Australian 155 mm ammunition and its compatibility with the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System used to calculate and coordinate fire missions.

The operational contribution goes beyond range or rate of fire. An AS9 on the move can halt and be ready to fire in under a minute, or in around thirty seconds when already stationary. After firing its final round, it can leave the position immediately. Against an opponent equipped with artillery-locating radars, reconnaissance drones and loitering munitions, shortening the detection, firing and displacement cycle directly affects survivability. Armour also protects the five-person crew from fragmentation and some ballistic threats, while the AS10 allows ammunition supply to continue under protection. Compared with the M777A2, Australia therefore gains greater tactical mobility, improved crew protection, a higher volume of fire and the ability to keep pace with mechanised formations rather than operating from more static firing positions.

The change comes as Canberra concentrates more heavy capabilities in northern Australia and adapts the Army for high-intensity operations in the Indo-Pacific. The AS9 does not turn Australian artillery into a strategic strike capability, a role increasingly associated with longer-range systems such as HIMARS, but it strengthens artillery at brigade and divisional level by providing more mobile and better-protected 155 mm fires. It also places Australia within a broader international community of K9 users that includes several European and Asian partners, while developing a domestic industrial base around Geelong. For Canberra, the effect is twofold: a field artillery capability better suited to surviving in a contested environment and a national industrial capacity able to produce, sustain and potentially upgrade an important component of land combat power.

Written By Erwan Halna du Fretay - Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Erwan Halna du Fretay holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and has experience studying conflicts and global arms transfers. His research interests lie in Security and strategic studies, particularly the dynamics of the defense industry, the evolution of military technologies, and the strategic transformation of armed forces.
Czech ADMASYS CZ Positions 3D Printing and Scanning for Defence Equipment Sustainment
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ADMASYS CZ will showcase industrial 3D printing, 3D scanning and digital manufacturing technologies at Future Forces Exhibition & Forum 2026 in Prague. The capabilities could help defence manufacturers accelerate development, produce limited batches and sustain equipment with locally manufactured parts.

The Czech company will target manufacturers, engineering teams and defence and security organizations seeking faster routes from digital design to physical components. Its presentation will focus on additive manufacturing and 3D scanning workflows that can shorten prototyping cycles, support small-series production and help reproduce or replace components needed to maintain equipment. The Future Forces Exhibition & Forum takes place October 21 to 23 at PVA EXPO PRAGUE. The event combines a defence technology exhibition with expert panels and NATO working-group activities, with organizers listing more than 400 exhibitors from over 35 countries and more than 9,000 participants from over 70 countries.

Related News: UK Cambridge Aerospace Positions Skyhammer Low-Cost Interceptor for European Air Defence Market

ADMASYS CZ will present industrial 3D printing and digital manufacturing technologies at Future Forces 2026, with potential applications including prototyping, small-series production and the manufacture of specialised components. (Picture source: ADMASYS CZ)

The company draws on experience gained in several technically demanding industrial sectors, including mechanical engineering, automotive, aerospace and research. According to ADMASYS CZ, this expertise can also support defence applications where production speed, component availability, reliability and adaptation to changing operational requirements are important factors.

Additive manufacturing will be one of the main areas presented at Future Forces 2026. It can be used to produce functional prototypes, assembly fixtures, covers, brackets, protective elements and specialised components in small series. Manufacturing without costly moulds can simplify design changes and reduce the time required to move from a digital model to a physical part.

In a defence context, this flexibility can be relevant for programmes involving frequent modifications or limited production volumes. ADMASYS CZ identifies possible applications including electronic enclosures, sensor mounts, assembly components, transport aids, maintenance fixtures and parts adapted to specific operating conditions. Additive manufacturing can also be used to reduce weight, optimise geometry or consolidate several separate components into a single part, potentially simplifying assembly, maintenance and inventory management.

“At the Future Forces Exhibition & Forum, we want to present 3D printing as a practical tool for faster development, manufacturing and maintenance. A successful application requires the right combination of technology, material, part design and post-processing,” said Martin Kalous of ADMASYS CZ.

The company will also present professional 3D scanning applications. A physical component can be converted into a digital model and then used for dimensional inspection, reverse engineering, archiving or the preparation of a new design. This approach can be used when certain parts are no longer available or have been discontinued. Combining 3D scanning, design modification and additive manufacturing can therefore support the maintenance of older equipment. An existing part can be scanned, adapted to current requirements, reinforced in selected areas and reproduced according to operational needs. Examples cited by the company include covers, control elements, cable brackets, air ducts and maintenance fixtures.

ADMASYS CZ also highlights the concept of digital inventory. Approved manufacturing files can be stored in a digital library and used to produce selected parts when required. This approach can shorten delivery times, reduce physical stock levels and limit dependence on remote suppliers, particularly for components used in low quantities or subject to irregular availability. In defence and security applications, this digital manufacturing model also introduces requirements related to data management. ADMASYS CZ points to the need for model approval procedures, full traceability of file versions and control over access rights and manufacturing authorisations. Protection of technical documentation is therefore part of the production process.

Material selection and post-processing are also important elements of additive manufacturing. Relevant characteristics may include mechanical strength, temperature resistance, chemical resistance, toughness, dimensional stability, surface quality and weight. Finishing steps such as support removal, cleaning, curing and surface treatment can also affect the final performance of the part. ADMASYS CZ also notes that 3D printing is not intended to replace conventional manufacturing methods in all cases. The use of functional components requires assessment of mechanical loads, operating conditions, production repeatability and quality-control procedures. Some applications may also require dimensional inspection, material testing or documentation of manufacturing parameters.

“Industrial 3D printing does not replace every manufacturing method. It delivers the greatest value in applications where speed, flexibility, part availability or low-volume production without high initial costs are the deciding factors,” Kalous added. ADMASYS CZ supplies industrial 3D printers, professional scanners, materials, software and post-processing equipment. The company also supports customers with application analysis, sample production, material testing, equipment installation, operator training and technical support.

At Future Forces 2026, visitors will be able to discuss rapid prototyping, the production of maintenance and assembly fixtures, component digitisation, small-series manufacturing, replacement parts and the establishment of in-house additive manufacturing capabilities with ADMASYS CZ specialists. The company will exhibit in Hall 2 at the event in Prague.

Written By Erwan Halna du Fretay - Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Erwan Halna du Fretay holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and has experience studying conflicts and global arms transfers. His research interests lie in Security and strategic studies, particularly the dynamics of the defense industry, the evolution of military technologies, and the strategic transformation of armed forces.
Lockheed Martin Builds a Layered Counter-Drone Architecture for the Age of Autonomous Swarms
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Lockheed Martin has unveiled a layered counter-drone architecture designed to detect, prioritize and defeat multiple autonomous threats arriving simultaneously from land, air or sea, the company detailed on August 11, 2026. The approach addresses the growing battlefield risk posed by low-cost drones and coordinated swarms that can overwhelm defenses built to engage threats individually.

The architecture links sensors, AI-enabled mission software, command-and-control systems, autonomous platforms and both kinetic and non-kinetic effectors into a scalable defensive network. By combining detection, decision-making and multiple defeat options, it is intended to improve survivability against mass drone attacks and strengthen defenses as autonomy becomes a larger part of modern warfare.

Related Topic: Lockheed Martin’s 500 kW Containerized Laser Weapon System Anchors Next-Generation U.S. Air Defense Architecture

Lockheed Martin has unveiled a layered counter-drone architecture that integrates AI-enabled command and control, advanced sensors, kinetic interceptors and non-kinetic weapons to counter increasingly autonomous and coordinated drone threats (Picture Source: Lockheed Martin / Edited By Army Recognition Group)

On August 11, 2026, Lockheed Martin unveiled a layered counter-drone architecture designed for a battlespace increasingly shaped by inexpensive, autonomous and potentially coordinated unmanned aircraft. The challenge is no longer simply detecting and destroying an individual drone, but identifying, prioritizing and defeating multiple threats arriving simultaneously from land, air or sea. Lockheed Martin's approach is particularly significant because it connects sensors, AI-enabled mission software, command and control, autonomous platforms and complementary kinetic and non-kinetic effectors into a scalable defensive ecosystem. The development was detailed by Lockheed Martin in its latest feature, “The New Drone Threat Demands a New Defense.”

From Counter-Drone Weapons to a Layered Kill Web

Today's drone threat is fundamentally changing the mathematics of air defense. Unmanned systems are becoming smaller, cheaper and more autonomous, while coordinated swarms can attempt to overwhelm defenses not only through numbers but by creating an enormous sensor-processing and decision-making burden. Lockheed Martin's answer is therefore broader than any single radar or interceptor. Its Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System approach combines radar, electro-optical/infrared and radio-frequency sensing, correlating tracks to reduce clutter and help distinguish genuine threats before connecting that information with command-and-control systems and layered effects. For swarm defense, this integration is crucial: the objective is to shorten the chain from detect, identify and decide to defeat, even when many targets are competing simultaneously for attention.

Viewed operationally, the architecture resembles a multi-layer counter-UAS kill web. Sensor fusion provides the detection and discrimination layer; Sanctum™ contributes AI-enabled mission management and threat prioritization; CommandIQ™ and SkyKeeper support the command-and-control layer; JAGM provides a precision kinetic response; MORFIUS™ adds a reusable high-power microwave capability intended for mass defeat; while GRIZZLY™ and autonomous maritime platforms provide flexible deployment options. The strategic advantage is that these technologies do not have to solve the same problem in the same way. Instead, commanders can potentially select effects according to threat type, direction, density and mission importance. This is an important shift: Lockheed Martin is building the connective architecture around the interceptor rather than asking one interceptor to become the entire architecture.

Saildrone and JAGM Push Counter-UAS Defense Out to Sea

The maritime dimension is among the most significant elements of the concept. Lockheed Martin states that its JAGM Dual Launcher (JDL) has been demonstrated aboard an autonomous Saildrone Surveyor, extending counter-UAS capability onto an uncrewed surface platform. At the center is the Joint-Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM), a precision weapon that is already in production and operational and which Lockheed Martin says has demonstrated performance against multiple UAS threats, including Group 3 systems. JAGM employs a dual-mode seeker and provides fire-and-forget capability, while Lockheed Martin separately demonstrated a 90-degree vertical JAGM launch from its larger JAGM Quad Launcher in January 2026, validating a configuration capable of creating a 360-degree defensive envelope around maritime or other defended positions.

The deeper significance of placing such capability on Saildrone is geographical as much as technological. Instead of concentrating every sensor and interceptor on a high-value warship or immediately around a port, autonomous vessels could become forward-positioned nodes of a distributed defensive perimeter, extending engagement opportunities farther from the asset being protected while reducing personnel exposure. Lockheed Martin's work with Saildrone therefore points beyond remotely operated surveillance: autonomous surface vessels could increasingly become active participants within naval defensive networks. The company's launcher strategy also provides a path toward scale, with larger autonomous vessels potentially carrying the four-round JAGM Quad Launcher as requirements grow. Lockheed Martin's wider Saildrone partnership is already aimed at integrating additional defense payloads into commercially derived autonomous vessels, reinforcing the potential for modular, distributed maritime operations.

GRIZZLY, Sanctum and SkyKeeper Compress the Ground-Defense Kill Chain

On land, the combination of GRIZZLY™, JAGM and Sanctum™ demonstrates how the same philosophy can protect maneuver formations, expeditionary forces and critical infrastructure. In a June 2026 demonstration, Lockheed Martin integrated Sanctum C-UAS, the GRIZZLY containerized launcher and JAGM in less than 45 days and used the combination to defeat a Group 3 one-way attack drone. The significance extends beyond the successful interception. GRIZZLY provides a rapidly deployable launcher, JAGM supplies the precision kinetic effect and Sanctum manages the engagement, illustrating how separate components can be connected into an end-to-end defensive chain. For forces that may need to reposition air defenses quickly or reinforce vulnerable installations, containerized launch capacity also introduces a degree of deployment flexibility that conventional fixed infrastructure cannot always provide.

Sanctum may ultimately be one of the most consequential elements of the architecture because modern swarm defense is as much an information-management problem as a weapons problem. Lockheed Martin says Sanctum uses AI-enabled software to rapidly identify and prioritize threats, coordinate responses and reduce operator workload while keeping humans firmly responsible for mission decisions. CommandIQ integrated with SkyKeeper further strengthens the ground-based air-defense picture by helping operators identify, classify and track unmanned aircraft. Importantly, SkyKeeper itself brings established operational heritage: Lockheed Martin says the system has served as the battle-management component of the UK Ministry of Defence's Land Environment Air Picture Provision capability since December 2014. The architecture consequently combines newly accelerated C-UAS technology with command-and-control experience accumulated over years of operational service. Lockheed Martin has also invested $25 million in Fortem Technologies to expand capabilities within the Sanctum ecosystem, further illustrating the company's emphasis on open architecture and rapid integration of complementary technologies.

MORFIUS Changes the Economics of Fighting a Swarm

The architecture becomes particularly compelling when MORFIUS™ X-Rotor is considered alongside JAGM. Unveiled by Lockheed Martin in July 2026, MORFIUS uses airborne high-power microwave technology and, according to the company, can neutralize more than 50 enemy drones during a single flight before being recovered and reused in the field. It is also designed to remain sensor- and command-and-control-agnostic, allowing integration into different defensive networks. That introduces a critical second dimension to counter-swarm warfare: engagement economics and magazine depth. Precision missiles remain invaluable where commanders require a highly reliable kinetic effect against a priority threat, but exchanging a separate missile for every inexpensive drone can become increasingly difficult as attack numbers rise. MORFIUS offers a one-to-many option, while JAGM provides precision lethality against selected threats. Rather than competing solutions, the two technologies illustrate the logic of Lockheed Martin's layered architecture, different effectors assigned to different portions of the threat set.

Lockheed Martin's counter-drone strategy represents more than the introduction of another interceptor or standalone C-UAS system. It is an architecture built around the recognition that the future drone battle will be won through integration: seeing threats sooner, processing more tracks simultaneously, assigning the right effector and completing engagements before a swarm can overwhelm the defender's decision cycle. JAGM brings proven precision; GRIZZLY adds deployable launch capacity; Sanctum and SkyKeeper provide the intelligence and command layer; Saildrone demonstrates how that defensive network can move into the autonomous maritime domain; and MORFIUS introduces the potential to defeat mass at a fundamentally different cost and scale.

Perhaps the most important characteristic of Lockheed Martin's approach is that the architecture does not depend on every technology having the same level of maturity or remaining static. It brings together fielded capabilities such as JAGM and operationally established SkyKeeper with rapidly advancing systems such as Sanctum, GRIZZLY and MORFIUS, all under an open integration philosophy designed to accept new sensors and effectors as the threat evolves. That adaptability could prove decisive because tomorrow's drone swarm will not necessarily resemble today's. By building an ecosystem capable of evolving with the threat, Lockheed Martin is positioning layered C-UAS defense not as a single response to today's drone problem, but as a foundation for defeating the increasingly autonomous, distributed and massed aerial threats of the future.

Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.

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U.S. Air Force Buys Chinese DJI Drones for Counter-Drone Training at Nuclear Missile Base
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The U.S. Air Force plans to acquire Chinese-made DJI commercial drones to give security forces at F.E. Warren Air Force Base realistic airborne targets for counter-drone training around the Minuteman III nuclear missile complex. The purchase would let defenders train against widely available commercial drones while sharpening detection, electronic warfare and defeat procedures used to protect one of America's three operational ICBM wings.

The DJI aircraft are intended for the 90th Missile Security Operations Squadron, which provides counter-small unmanned aircraft system support and helps secure F.E. Warren's sprawling missile field. The 90th Missile Wing oversees 150 Minuteman IIIlaunch facilities and 15 missile alert facilities spread across roughly 9,600 square miles in Wyoming, Nebraska, and Colorado. Using DJI drones as threat representatives is notable because Chinese-made unmanned aircraft face significant restrictions inside the U.S. military. The Pentagon has previously authorized Chinese drones under controlled conditions specifically as targets for counter-UAS testing, rather than for operational missions. For F.E. Warren, the requirement fits into a broader effort to strengthen defenses against small drones near strategic nuclear infrastructure. Air Force data published through the SBIR program described unauthorized UAS activity at ballistic missile bases as a growing concern and specifically identified the 90th Missile Security Operations Squadron's counter-UAS requirement.

Related News: U.S. Deploys Anduril Counter-Drone System to Strengthen Homeland Defense Against Drone Threats

U.S. Soldiers assigned to the 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry Regiment, operate a DJI Mavic 3 during a live-fire exercise in Selija, Latvia, April 29, 2026. During the exercise, squads used drones for reconnaissance as teams bounded forward to attack simulated objectives. (Picture source: US DoD)

The requirement includes two refurbished DJI Mavic 2 Pro drones with Fly More kits, two DJI Mini 3 Pro aircraft with remote controllers, two DJI Avata 2 Fly More Combos, and six payload release devices. The contract is expected to be awarded on a firm-fixed-price basis to the lowest-priced technically acceptable offer. The procurement is reserved for small businesses, with several US-based resellers able to supply the requested aircraft despite the brand-specific DJI requirement.

The procurement, first highlighted by Defense Blog, appears in a solicitation published on August 14, 2026, on SAM.gov by F.E. Warren’s 90th Contracting Squadron. A brand-name justification signed on July 29 by contracting officer Chad A. Evans explains why the 90th Missile Security Operations Squadron requires DJI platforms rather than US-made drones with comparable performance. According to the document, DJI’s proprietary electronic protocols, radio-frequency signatures, and certain flight characteristics cannot be faithfully reproduced by aircraft from other manufacturers. The justification also estimates that DJI accounts for roughly 80 to 85 percent of the global commercial drone market.

This choice is directly linked to the threat profile the exercises are intended to reproduce. US officials consider that relying only on simulated data or domestically produced platforms would leave operators insufficiently prepared for the types of aircraft they are most likely to encounter around a military installation. The justification warns of a critical gap in site defense if crews are unable to test their systems against actual DJI emissions and communication protocols. It therefore links realistic threat replication to the nuclear security mission carried out by units at F.E. Warren.

The three selected models also provide different operational profiles. The Mavic 2 Pro is a folding quadcopter fitted with a three-axis stabilized camera and a one-inch CMOS sensor. The Mini 3 Pro belongs to the sub-250-gram category, with a compact configuration that facilitates transport and deployment from concealed positions. The DJI Avata 2 is more closely associated with first-person-view operations. Weighing about 377 grams, it can reach 27 m/s in manual mode and uses the DJI O4 transmission architecture across the 2.4 and 5 GHz bands. Its data-link range can reach 13 km under certain FCC conditions, although terrain, obstacles, and the electromagnetic environment can reduce that envelope in operational use.

These differences are directly relevant in a tactical scenario. An Avata 2 flying at low altitude can conduct a rapid approach with limited reaction time, while a Mavic or Mini can hold position, observe an installation, or conduct reconnaissance before withdrawing. Security teams can therefore expose their radars and RF detectors to several flight profiles, measure identification times, and determine at what distance jamming becomes effective. At F.E. Warren, where Minuteman IIIfacilities are dispersed across a wide area, a commercial drone could also be used to observe security procedures, probe US responses, or carry a small payload. The payload release devices included in the procurement allow this last scenario to be incorporated into training.

The use of DJI equipment nevertheless raises a cybersecurity issue that the US Air Force is seeking to isolate from the rest of its architecture. Before operational use, the aircraft are expected to receive modified software called RIZER. The justification states that this configuration is intended to prevent telemetry or imagery from being transferred to foreign entities or to US military networks while preserving the electronic characteristics required for training. The document also indicates that Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana is pursuing a similar approach, which could lead to a more standardized method of threat replication across Air Force Global Strike Command.

This precaution is particularly relevant in light of recent difficulties encountered in the United Kingdom with the K3 Scout systems used by the Royal Navy. A cybersecurity assessment in August 2026 found that cameras integrated into these unmanned surface vessels were sending automated heartbeat communications to an internet address located in China. The UK Ministry of Defence stated that no sensitive data had been compromised and that internet connectivity for the affected cameras had been removed. The case nevertheless shows how a secondary component can introduce an external connection or dependency that may not be immediately apparent. In this context, the US interest in accessing genuine DJI RF signatures and protocols is operationally understandable, but it also raises a broader question about introducing Chinese-made equipment into the environment of a nuclear missile base. F.E. Warren’s approach therefore rests on a deliberate trade-off between realistic threat replication and technical risk control, with RIZER and system isolation intended to prevent the training platform itself from becoming a vulnerability.

Written By Erwan Halna du Fretay - Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Erwan Halna du Fretay holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and has experience studying conflicts and global arms transfers. His research interests lie in Security and strategic studies, particularly the dynamics of the defense industry, the evolution of military technologies, and the strategic transformation of armed forces.
Trump orders reduction of US-South Korea military exercises citing Kim Jong Un ties and Seoul refusal on Iran War
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On August 16, 2026, U.S. President Donald Trump ordered Secretary of War Pete Hegseth to substantially reduce American participation in the joint Ulchi Freedom Shield 2026 military exercises with South Korea, less than 24 hours before the 11-day maneuvers were scheduled to begin. Trump cited high financial costs, signal management toward North Korea, and South Korean President Lee Jae Myung's refusal to assist with U.S. actions regarding Iran as the primary drivers behind the directive. The decision forces an operational scale-back across field-training events and air-ground targeting sequences without altering the permanent baseline posture of 28,500 U.S. personnel stationed on the Korean Peninsula.

The August 17–27 Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise was designed to involve 18,000 South Korean personnel alongside U.S. forces practicing joint precision targeting, wet-gap crossings, and countermeasures against drones, electronic warfare, and cyberattacks. Trump's mandate requires internal exercise reductions (such as lowered sortie rates, curtailed live-fire serials, and smaller headquarters staffs) at a time when North Korean forces are actively accumulating modern warfare experience in Ukraine and expanding their ballistic missile capabilities.

Related topic: North Korea deploys ballistic missile unit to help Russia exploit Patriot interceptor shortages in Ukraine

Donald Trump ordered a substantial reduction in U.S.-South Korean military exercises, including the Ulchi Freedom Shield 2026, citing their cost, his relationship with Kim Jong Un, and Seoul's refusal to support U.S. action against Iran. (Picture source: US DoD)

On August 16, 2026, U.S. President Donald Trump ordered Secretary of War Pete Hegseth to "substantially reduce" joint military exercises with South Korea, less than 24 hours before Ulchi Freedom Shield 2026 was scheduled to start on August 17 and continue through August 27. The order did not reduce the presence of 28,500 U.S. military personnel in South Korea and therefore changed the alliance's training activity before changing its force posture. UFS 2026 had already entered execution with an 11-day schedule and 18,000 South Korean personnel, a scale comparable with recent iterations, leaving little practical opportunity to redesign the exercise before it began.

Trump identified cost and signaling toward Pyongyang as reasons for his decision, arguing that the exercises sent a "totally inappropriate and hostile" message to a North Korea he called "unthreatening and respectful," while linking his position to his relationship with Kim Jong Un. He simultaneously cited South Korean President Lee Jae Myung's refusal to participate in U.S. action against Iran. The timing is difficult to separate from the security environment: North Korea had conducted two ballistic missile tests within days, UFS itself had been redesigned to address drones, electronic warfare and cyberattacks, and North Korean troops and missiles are continuing to gain combat experience through Russia's war against Ukraine.

Ulchi Freedom Shield gives a measurable starting point for judging what "substantially reduce" could mean. The August 17-27 exercise was to last 11 consecutive days and involve 18,000 South Korean troops, while the U.S. military presence in South Korea remains 28,500 personnel, equivalent to 1.58 permanently stationed U.S. personnel for every South Korean service member scheduled to participate in this UFS iteration. U.S. and South Korean forces were scheduled to practice joint precision targeting and maneuver, wet-gap crossing, movement and distribution of prepositioned equipment, and responses to drones, GPS disruption, electronic warfare, and cyberattacks. U.S. military spokesperson Ryan Donald explicitly tied the exercise to the changing battlefield created by North Korean involvement in Russia, including lessons connected with unmanned systems and electronic warfare.

Trump also acknowledged that UFS had progressed too far to cancel, so a presidential order issued on August 16 could not realistically remove months of planning, deployment and headquarters preparation. The reduction must therefore occur within the exercise itself through fewer participating U.S. units, fewer field-training events, shorter tactical phases, lower sortie generation, fewer live-fire serials, smaller staffs, or the cancellation of specific combined activities. Those differences matter because eliminating a headquarters seminar does not have the same readiness effect as eliminating a battalion live-fire event, an air-ground targeting sequence, or a brigade maneuver. The decision is also difficult to reconcile, operationally, with the burden-sharing model that Hegseth endorsed only 98 days earlier.

On May 11, 2026, Hegseth met Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back at the Pentagon and praised South Korea's commitment to higher defense spending and its leadership in "assuming primary responsibility for the security of the Korean Peninsula." Hegseth specifically presented the South Korean approach as an example of how Washington wanted alliance burden-sharing to work, while Ahn stated that Seoul was pursuing a Korean-led defense of the peninsula by acquiring critical national defense capabilities and increasing military expenditure. The distinction between greater South Korean responsibility and lower U.S. participation is operationally important. Seoul can assume additional missions, field more combat formations, and provide a larger percentage of conventional firepower without eliminating the need to train with U.S. intelligence networks, air operations, long-range strike assets, logistics, reinforcement flows, and combined command structures.

Transferring responsibility without rehearsing those interfaces creates a different outcome from transferring responsibility while preserving high-frequency combined exercises. If U.S. participation declines while Korean-only training rises and combined command activity remains stable, the change would indicate burden redistribution. If total exercise activity and combined integration both decline, it would instead represent a reduction in alliance rehearsal capacity. The threat being exercised against has simultaneously become more operationally mature because North Korea has deployed a sizeable number of personnel into an actual high-intensity war. The first North Korean contingent sent to Russia in late 2024 was estimated at 14,000 to 15,000 personnel, while a subsequent estimate placed the number involved in Russian operations at 16,000 to 22,000.

Pyongyang is now assessed to be preparing another 30,000 to 50,000 personnel. At the 50,000 upper estimate, the prospective reinforcement would be 3.33 times the size of the initial contingent, while cumulative participation across successive rotations could produce a combat-exposed population equivalent to several North Korean divisions. North Korean troops have fought in Russia's Kursk region and subsequently participated in mine-clearing operations, rather than being confined to ceremonial, logistics or advisory functions. British estimates placed North Korean casualties above 6,000 killed and wounded, a casualty burden equal to more than 40% of a 15,000-man initial force if measured against that baseline, though the casualty total and deployed population cover different time periods.

The combat environment also exposes North Korean personnel to FPV drones, reconnaissance UAVs, electronic warfare, persistent aerial surveillance, mines, precision artillery, counter-battery fire, dispersed infantry tactics and Russian command procedures. Pyongyang has also agreed to send 5,000 construction personnel and 1,000 combat engineers to Kursk, extending battlefield learning into engineering, fortification, obstacle clearance and rear-area infrastructure. Trump is therefore reducing part of a training cycle specifically adapted to Russian-Ukrainian battlefield lessons at the same time North Korea is accumulating those lessons through thousands of troops experiencing them directly. The weapons side of the Russia-North Korea relationship is even easier to quantify.

Ukraine assesses that North Korea supplied 50% of the ammunition consumed by Russian forces during 2024-2025, in addition to self-propelled howitzers, multiple rocket launchers, and ballistic missiles. Ukraine's Main Directorate of Intelligence records 148 KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic missiles delivered since 2025. A new North Korean missile detachment associated with Russia is expected to comprise 90 personnel, six transporter-erector-launchers and up to 120 missiles, with an initial batch of 40 missiles. The operational significance is not simply inventory size. Russia has used North Korean ballistic missiles against Ukrainian targets, giving Pyongyang combat data on missile reliability, accuracy, launcher procedures, maintenance, terminal maneuver, interceptor engagement, and actual warhead effects.

The KN-23 and KN-24 occupy a battlefield role similar to the Russian 9M723 Iskander, while Ukrainian military assessments credit North Korean missiles with greater payload or range in some configurations but poorer accuracy. Repeated combat use provides North Korean engineers with feedback unavailable from instrumented launches into the sea, including how weapons behave under wartime storage conditions, how quickly crews can regenerate launchers, which flight profiles complicate interception by American Patriot missiles, and how accuracy degrades across operational batches. North Korea is therefore not only transferring weapons to Russia, but effectively placing part of its ballistic missile inventory through a sustained foreign combat evaluation cycle. Russia also gives Pyongyang the financial and industrial inputs needed to turn that experience into further capability development.

The South Korean Institute for National Security Strategy estimates North Korean revenue from ammunition sales and troop deployments at $7.7 to $14.4 billion, while Bloomberg Economics estimates that military support to Russia generated more than $14 billion between 2022 and 2025. North Korean GDP is cited at $27 billion, so $14 billion equals 51.9% of one year's GDP, although the military revenue was accumulated across several years. Personnel payments offer another scale measure: Russia is estimated to provide $2,800 per enlisted soldier per month and $3,000 per officer per month, while payments associated with a North Korean soldier killed are placed at $6,000 to $10,000. If 15,000 deployed personnel were all paid at the enlisted rate, the gross monthly transfer would reach $42 million before officer premiums, death payments, and other arrangements. The exchange is not exclusively monetary.

Russia supplies crude oil, petroleum products, grain, and military assistance extending into air defense, drones, missiles, and submarine technology. Pyongyang consequently receives five distinct outputs from one military relationship: foreign revenue, energy and food, experience for personnel, combat evaluation of weapons, and access to Russian military knowledge or technology. The relationship has coincided with expansion into capabilities that require substantial industrial investment, including two new destroyers in the 5,000-ton class, larger UAVs, loitering munitions, new missile families and submarine development work. Russia therefore reduces several of the financial, technological and operational constraints that limited North Korean modernization during Trump's first term.

South Korea has the industrial capacity to assume more of the conventional burden, but that capacity is concentrated in specific categories and should not be confused with an ability to replace every U.S. contribution. South Korean arms exports reached $15.4 billion in 2025, compared with $17.3 billion in 2022 and $7 billion in 2021. Poland alone has ordered approximately 1,000 K2 main battle tanks, over 600 K9 155 mm self-propelled howitzers, and around 288 K239 Chunmoo multiple rocket launchers, alongside 48 FA-50 light combat aircraft and more than 1,400 Legwan 4x4 vehicles, making it the largest single export customer for South Korean ground combat systems and associated platforms. Finland, Estonia, Norway and Romania have also bought K9s, showing that the production base can support domestic forces and multiple export customers simultaneously.

South Korea's Cheongung-II medium-range air defense system intercepts aircraft and ballistic missiles at distances up to 40 km, with each interceptor estimated at $1.1 million. Ten batteries were sold to the UAE; Saudi Arabia has also purchased the system, and a complete Cheongung-II system can be delivered in one year compared with a minimum four-year delivery time cited for a Patriot battery. The KF-21 program adds domestic fighter production, while F-35 procurement retains access to U.S. low-observable combat aviation. These capabilities mean Seoul can generate more of its own tanks, artillery, rocket launchers, missiles, and combat aircraft. They do not duplicate U.S. satellite and airborne intelligence, extended nuclear deterrence, long-range reinforcement, high-end command networks, or the operational familiarity created when U.S. and South Korean formations repeatedly train together.

Whether Trump's order represents an exercise adjustment or the beginning of an alliance redesign will therefore be measurable only over several training cycles. There are historical precedents for temporary reductions: major exercises were suspended in 2018 during Trump's diplomacy with Kim Jong Un, and training was reduced again in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic. The force facing the alliance in August 2026 is nevertheless substantially different from the one that existed when Trump was first elected on November 8, 2016. North Korea had conducted five nuclear tests by that date but had zero successfully flight-tested ICBMs, zero demonstrated solid-fuel ICBMs, and no mature hypersonic missile family.

By August 2026, it had progressed through the Hwasong-14, Hwasong-15, Hwasong-17, solid-fuel Hwasong-18, and Hwasong-19, while the Hwasong-20 was emerging as another strategic system. The October 10, 2025 parade displayed a Hwasong-20 associated with a new solid-fuel engine credited with 1,971 kN maximum thrust, alongside hypersonic missiles, Cheonma tanks, 155 mm artillery, 600 mm rocket launchers, cruise missiles, and dedicated drone-launch vehicles. North Korea now fields or develops overlapping KN-23/KN-24 short-range ballistic missiles, KN-25 600 mm systems, nuclear-capable cruise missiles, solid-fuel ICBMs, hypersonic weapons, submarine-launched systems, and tactical nuclear weapons.

Its force remains numerically large at 1.28 million active personnel, including 1.1 million ground troops, with more than 3,500 tanks and two-thirds of the ground force concentrated near the DMZ. Pyongyang has also written continued nuclear development into its constitution, abandoned the previous objective of peaceful reunification, and identified South Korea as a hostile state and "principal enemy." The change since 2016 is therefore not best measured by counting border attacks, since North Korea has not repeated an incident equivalent to the March 2010 sinking of ROKS Cheonan, which killed 46 South Korean sailors, or the November 2010 shelling of Yeonpyeong, which killed four South Koreans.

It is measurable instead in force structure: zero tested ICBMs in November 2016 versus multiple ICBM generations in 2026, no solid-fuel ICBM versus the Hwasong-18 and Hwasong-19, an embryonic tactical nuclear force versus KN-23/24, KN-25 and cruise-missile options, no comparable large modern UAV family versus Saetbyol systems, and virtually no recent combat experience versus thousands of personnel and hundreds of missiles exposed to the Russia-Ukraine war. A single curtailed UFS does not erase alliance readiness. A sustained reduction in exercise days, field events, sorties, live-fire activity, and headquarters integration would be more significant because it would reduce combined rehearsal precisely while the North Korean force is becoming more diverse, more difficult to detect before launch, and more experienced in modern combat.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.

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Ukraine’s U.S.-Made Patriot Missile Shortage Strains Air Defenses as Russia Intensifies Ballistic Strikes
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Ukraine’s U.S.-made Patriot air-defense systems are facing a growing shortage of interceptor missiles as Russia intensifies ballistic missile strikes against Kyiv, according to reports following major attacks on August 5 and August 8, 2026. Ukrainian crews reportedly recorded no successful ballistic-missile interceptions during those strikes, highlighting how dwindling interceptor stocks could weaken one of the country’s most important defenses against high-speed threats.

The reported failures underscore that Patriot effectiveness increasingly depends not only on the system’s technical performance but also on sustained access to costly interceptor missiles. If shortages persist, Russia could gain greater freedom to employ ballistic missiles against critical infrastructure and military targets, placing additional pressure on Ukraine’s air-defense network and Western resupply efforts.

Related Topic: Ukraine and U.S. Raytheon agree on joint Patriot missile production to counter Russian ballistic strikes

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and German Federal Defense Minister Boris Pistorius stand in front of Patriot air-defense launchers during a visit to the 21 Surface-to-Air Missile Group in Sanitz, Germany. Germany has been a major supplier of Patriot systems and interceptors to Ukraine. (Picture source: Defense of Ukraine X account)

The Financial Times reported on August 15 that some Ukrainian Patriot crews had exhausted limited interceptor stocks during recent Russian attacks. The development is operationally significant because U.S.-made Patriot air defense missiles remain Ukraine’s most capable defense against ballistic missiles such as the Russian Iskander-M, while most other Ukrainian surface-to-air missile systems are better suited to engaging aircraft, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles.

The shortage highlights a growing distinction between the number of Patriot launchers Ukraine possesses and the number of engagements those systems can actually conduct. A firing unit may retain functional radar, command equipment, and launchers, but its ability to protect defended airspace falls sharply once stocks of PAC-3 family interceptors are depleted.

This is particularly serious during large Russian strike packages combining ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and Shahed-type attack drones. Such attacks force Ukrainian commanders to manage multiple threat categories simultaneously while preserving the most advanced interceptors for weapons that lower-tier air-defense systems may struggle to defeat.

Ballistic missiles impose especially demanding engagement conditions because of their high terminal speed and short warning time. Patriot batteries equipped with PAC-3 interceptors use hit-to-kill technology intended to destroy ballistic threats through direct impact, giving Ukraine a capability central to the defense of Kyiv since the system entered Ukrainian service.

Army Recognition coverage of Ukraine’s Patriot air-defense systemshas previously highlighted their importance against Russian ballistic missiles. Earlier combat demonstrated that Patriot could successfully engage some of Russia’s most difficult missile threats, meaning the latest interception failures are more likely to reflect ammunition availability than a fundamental loss of system capability.

That distinction matters because Russia does not necessarily need to destroy Patriot launchers to weaken Ukraine’s air defense. Repeated missile attacks can gradually deplete interceptor inventories, leaving otherwise operational batteries unable to engage every ballistic target their radars detect.

This creates an attritional problem for Ukraine. Each Russian ballistic launch can force commanders to decide whether the incoming missile threatens a target important enough to justify expenditure of a scarce interceptor.

As stocks decline, Ukrainian crews may increasingly be required to prioritize government facilities, command centers, air bases, defense-industrial sites, energy infrastructure, and densely populated areas. Other targets could remain exposed even when Patriot batteries are deployed within engagement range.

Russia can exploit this pressure by increasing the frequency and complexity of its long-range strikes. Large numbers of relatively inexpensive drones can complicate defensive planning and consume other surface-to-air missiles, while ballistic weapons can then be directed against the most heavily defended strategic targets.

The Russian Iskander-M ballistic missile is particularly relevant to this challenge. The Russian short-range ballistic missile is designed for rapid launch and high-speed terminal attack, reducing the time available for detection, classification, engagement planning, and interception.

Army Recognition analysis of Russia’s Iskander missile capability has detailed how these missiles are used against command facilities, logistics infrastructure, air bases, and other high-value targets. Their operational value increases when Ukrainian stocks of specialized ballistic-missile interceptors become limited.

The current shortage also demonstrates why additional Patriot launchers alone cannot solve Ukraine’s air-defense problem. More firing units can expand defended geography and increase simultaneous engagement capacity, but every launcher requires a sustained missile supply to remain combat-effective during prolonged operations.

Interceptor availability has therefore become at least as important as the number of Patriot batteries Western partners deliver. Ukraine depends heavily on external production because it cannot manufacture Patriot PAC-3 interceptors domestically at the scale required for sustained combat.

The industrial challenge is substantial. PAC-3 missiles are sophisticated guided weapons that require specialized seekers, propulsion systems, guidance electronics, warhead components, and precision manufacturing, making rapid output increases difficult even with additional government funding.

Western producers are working to expand capacity, but missile manufacturing cannot immediately match sudden increases in battlefield consumption. Ukraine consequently remains dependent on both new production and transfers from existing allied inventories.

That creates a broader allocation problem for Washington and other Patriot operators. The same interceptors Ukraine needs are also required to maintain U.S. and allied air-defense readiness in Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific.

For Kyiv, the operational consequence is increasingly clear. Patriot systems may still be deployed around critical areas, but their deterrent and defensive value depends on whether crews have enough ready-to-fire missiles to respond to repeated Russian attacks.

A shortage also risks changing Russian targeting calculations. If Moscow assesses that Ukrainian Patriot units are rationing missiles, it may become more willing to employ ballistic weapons against targets previously considered too well protected.

This could increase pressure on Kyiv, major military facilities, defense factories, logistics hubs, and energy infrastructure. Ballistic missiles are particularly dangerous against these targets because their speed gives defenders less time to respond and reduces opportunities for civilians and military personnel to take protective action.

Ukraine may therefore have to adopt an increasingly selective air-defense strategy, concentrating Patriot interceptors around the most strategically important areas while relying on NASAMS, IRIS-T, Soviet-designed surface-to-air missile systems, mobile firing groups, and electronic warfare against less demanding threats.

Such a layered approach can preserve scarce PAC-3 rounds, but it cannot fully replace Patriot in the anti-ballistic role. This makes interceptor stock depth one of the most important variables in Ukraine’s ability to sustain air defense during a prolonged Russian missile campaign.

Army Recognition reporting on Western air-defense support for Ukraine has repeatedly shown that delivery numbers alone do not determine battlefield effectiveness. Radar coverage, launcher availability, trained crews, maintenance support, and above all missile inventories must remain synchronized for an air-defense network to function under sustained pressure.

The August 2026 attacks therefore illustrate a significant shift in the air-defense contest. The central issue is no longer simply whether Ukraine possesses Patriot systems, but whether it can maintain enough interceptors to keep those systems operational through repeated waves of Russian ballistic attacks.

If additional Patriot PAC-3 air defense missiles do not arrive in sufficient numbers, Ukrainian commanders may be forced to defend a progressively smaller number of priority targets. That would give Russia greater freedom to use ballistic missiles against strategic infrastructure and could turn interceptor supply into the decisive factor determining how effectively Patriot batteries can protect Ukraine during the next phase of the war.

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Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
Cyprus Could Become First Foreign Operator of Israel’s Merkava Tanks After Rejecting Leopard 1A5s
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Cyprus could become the first foreign operator of Israel’s Merkava main battle tank as it renews efforts to acquire Mk3 or Mk4 vehicles for the Cypriot National Guard. The move follows Cyprus’s rejection of Greek Leopard 1A5 tanks that reportedly failed to meet its operational requirements, and a Merkava acquisition could significantly increase armored protection, firepower, and battlefield survivability.

A Merkava acquisition would give Cyprus a heavier and more modern platform for high-intensity ground combat while potentially opening the first export pathway for Israel’s domestically developed tank family. Beyond the procurement itself, such a deal could strengthen Cypriot deterrence and mark a significant shift in the armored balance of the Eastern Mediterranean.

Related Topic: Israel Launches $1.5 Billion Program To Accelerate Merkava Tank and APC Production

Israeli Army Merkava 4 main battle tank during operations, highlighting the heavily protected combat vehicle that Cyprus could become the first foreign country to operate if export negotiations with Israel result in a contract. (Picture source: Wikimedia)

According to the Cypriot daily newspaper Phileleftheros, which reported on the issue on August 10, 2026, Cyprus is pressing Israel to release a significant number of Israeli Merkava tanks as it searches for a successor to its Russian-origin T-80U tank fleet. A potential acquisition would strengthen the National Guard’s heavy armored capability while accelerating Cyprus’s shift away from Russian equipment and toward Israeli and Western defense supply chains.

The prospect of a first export gives the negotiations significance beyond the size of the Cypriot Army. The Merkava was developed specifically for Israel’s national defense requirements and has remained closely associated with the Israel Defense Forces rather than the international arms market.

Israel explored the possibility of selling older Merkava tanks abroad in 2023, including through negotiations with two unidentified countries, one of them reportedly in Europe. Army Recognition reported at the time that Cyprus was in talks over the Merkava Mk3 and that completion of such an agreement would represent a major precedent, as Israel had not previously exported complete Merkava main battle tanks to a foreign military.

Those discussions were later complicated by Israel’s own demand for armored vehicles following the expansion of combat operations after October 7, 2023. Tanks that had previously been considered potentially available for export gained renewed importance for reserve formations, force regeneration, and Israeli wartime readiness.

The issue has now resurfaced as Cyprus continues to restructure its land forces. Phileleftheros reports that Cyprus requires a new main battle tank to replace its Russian T-80s because maintaining them has become increasingly costly and inefficient, with the Merkava Mk3 or Mk4 emerging as the preferred solution.

That requirement reflects a broader challenge facing European operators of Russian-origin military equipment. The war in Ukraine and the deterioration of defense relations with Moscow have made access to Russian spare parts, ammunition, and long-term technical support increasingly problematic, encouraging European states to migrate toward Western and allied defense industries.

Cyprus illustrates this transition particularly clearly because Russian equipment has historically formed an important part of its ground forces. Moving from the T-80 to the Merkava would shift one of the National Guard’s most important combat capabilities from a Russian sustainment system toward Israeli logistics, ammunition, training, and technical support.

The rejection of Greece’s Leopard 1A5 proposal adds another dimension to the decision. Greece and Cyprus had been discussing the possible transfer of between 75 and 90 Leopard 1A5 main battle tanks from Greek Army stocks, with a Cypriot military delegation expected to inspect the vehicles before any final commitment.

That inspection ultimately appears to have changed the outcome. A Cypriot National Guard delegation traveled to Greece and examined the tanks available for transfer. Phileleftheros subsequently reported on June 7, 2026, that those specific vehicles could not satisfy Cypriot operational requirements, even as an interim solution. Consequently, no transfer agreement was concluded.

This distinction is important because Cyprus did not reject the Leopard 1A5 without conducting an evaluation. It considered a concrete Greek offer and inspected the vehicles before concluding that the tanks available from Greek stocks were unsuitable for its requirements.

Greek Army Leopard 1A5 main battle tanks, similar to the vehicles Cyprus inspected but ultimately declined after determining that those offered from Greek military stocks did not meet National Guard operational requirements, even as an interim solution. (Picture source: Wikimedia)

Earlier reporting indicated that the proposed Greek transfer was intended partly to support replacing Cyprus’s aging fleet of 126 EE-9 Cascavel wheeled armored vehicles. The Leopard 1A5 proposal therefore formed part of a broader armored-force modernization effort rather than a direct, one-for-one replacement for the Russian-made T-80U tank.

Cyprus’s continued focus on the Merkava nevertheless indicates that maintaining a credible heavy armored capability remains a priority. The Merkava Mk3 is armed with a 120 mm smoothbore gun and powered by an approximately 1,200-horsepower diesel engine, providing the firepower and mobility required for armored maneuver and direct engagement of enemy tanks and fortified positions.

A transition to the Israeli Merkava tank would also move Cyprus toward a Western-standard 120 mm tank-ammunition architecture, rather than maintaining dependence on the Russian 125 mm ammunition family used by the T-80. This could simplify future sourcing and align a major Cypriot combat capability more closely with European and Israeli suppliers.

The Merkava Mk4 would represent a more ambitious option. In Israeli service, the newer tank incorporates enhanced protection, digital systems, and advanced survivability technologies. However, it remains unclear which systems Israel would authorize for export if it offered Cyprus the Mk4 rather than refurbished Mk3 tanks.

The export question is particularly sensitive because Israel must balance the diplomatic and industrial benefits of a Cypriot contract against the IDF’s own force requirements. Phileleftheros reported that opinion within Israel is divided, with some officials supporting a transfer to Cyprus and others favoring the retention of the tanks for Israeli reserve use.

That debate could make older Merkava Mk3 tanks a more realistic option. Israel could potentially refurbish and modernize vehicles removed from frontline service while retaining its newest Merkava Mk4 and Mk4 Barak tanks for Israeli formations.

For Cyprus, its proximity to Israel could provide an important operational and logistical advantage. Phileleftheros identified the broadly similar operating environment and the short distance between the two countries as factors supporting the Merkava option, particularly because nearby Israeli industry could simplify spare parts, maintenance, and technical assistance.

This matters because armored capability depends on far more than the number of tanks delivered. Engines, transmissions, tracks, optics, ammunition, recovery vehicles, logistics infrastructure, and trained maintenance personnel all determine whether a tank force can remain operational during sustained combat.

A potential deal would also carry wider implications for Eastern Mediterranean security. Cyprus is not a NATO member, but it operates in an increasingly NATO-adjacent regional environment shaped by close defense relations with Greece, expanding cooperation with Israel, and growing procurement from Western defense industries.

The Cypriot National Guard T-80U main battle tank, part of the Russian-origin fleet, is increasingly difficult to sustain with spare parts and long-term support. (Picture source: Wikimedia)

An Israeli Merkava tank acquisition would deepen that orientation. It would tie Cyprus’s heavy armored forces more closely to an Israeli defense relationship that already spans other military domains, while further reducing the country’s reliance on Russian-origin systems.

Army Recognition previously reported on Cyprus’s negotiations with Israel for Merkava Mk3 main battle tanks and Israel’s negotiations to export used Merkava tanks to foreign customers. Those earlier discussions established Cyprus as one of the most credible candidates to become the first foreign operator of the Merkava.

For Israel, completing such a contract would be strategically different from exporting missiles, air-defense systems, or unmanned aircraft. The Merkava is closely tied to Israel’s national military identity and was developed to provide the country with sovereign control over a critical ground-combat capability.

Placing complete Merkava tanks in foreign service would therefore establish a significant precedent. Israel would need to create or expand an export-support structure covering training, maintenance, spare parts, ammunition, and potentially future modernization packages for a foreign armored force.

For Cyprus, the choice would send an equally important signal. After inspecting and rejecting the Leopard 1A5 tanks available from Greek stocks, the country appears unwilling to address its armored requirement simply by accepting older vehicles because they are readily available.

Instead, Cyprus’s continued pursuit of the Merkava suggests that it is prioritizing survivability, heavy firepower, sustainable logistics, and long-term combat relevance. It also illustrates how the declining practicality of maintaining Russian military equipment in Europe is reshaping procurement decisions, including among countries that have historically operated substantial Russian-origin inventories.

If Israel ultimately approves a transfer, Cyprus could become the first foreign military to field the Merkava, giving Israel’s best-known main battle tank its first international operator decades after it entered IDF service. Such an agreement could simultaneously strengthen Cyprus’s armored forces, deepen Israeli-Cypriot defense ties, and provide another prominent example of Russian-origin military equipment being replaced by Israeli and Western systems in Europe.

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Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
U.S. Special Operations Forces Deploy Near Russia in Western Alaska for Polar Dagger 2026
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U.S. Special Operations Forces have deployed across western Alaska just a few kilometers (a few miles) from Russian territory for Operation POLAR DAGGER 2026, with personnel operating from Little Diomede Island, St. Lawrence Island, Wales, Tin City, Nome, and Point Hope between August 15 and 31. The deployment places U.S. teams along the Bering Strait and western Arctic approaches, testing how quickly they can establish and sustain a forward presence in terrain critical to defending the North American homeland.

The operation tests whether small U.S. forces can deploy, operate, and remain supported from austere Arctic locations near key maritime and air approaches. That capability is becoming increasingly important as the Arctic gains strategic importance for surveillance, deterrence, rapid reinforcement, and protecting U.S. territory.

Related topic: U.S. Considered Special Forces Operation with Army Rangers and Navy SEALs to Secure Iran's Uranium

U.S. Army Green Berets from the 10th Special Forces Group load all-terrain vehicles onto a U.S. Air Force MC-130J Commando II during Operation POLAR DAGGER in Wales, Alaska, on August 17, 2024, demonstrating rapid Arctic infiltration and mobility near the Bering Strait. (Picture source: U.S. Department of War/Defense)

U.S. Special Operations Command North announced POLAR DAGGER 2026 on August 11, describing it as an annual Arctic deployment exercise conducted across air, land, and maritime domains. The event complements Exercise TUNDRA MERLIN and gives U.S. Northern Command a broader framework for testing how special operations forces integrate with conventional aviation, maritime surveillance, air defense, and long-range fires across Alaska.

The most strategically sensitive location is Little Diomede Island. The U.S. island sits directly opposite Russia’s Big Diomede Island in the Bering Strait, placing American personnel operating there only a few kilometers (a few miles) from Russian territory and beside one of the principal maritime gateways connecting the Pacific and Arctic regions.

For U.S. Special Operations Forces, Little Diomede provides an austere environment for testing missions that depend on small teams operating with limited infrastructure. Any sustained presence there requires reliable communications, resupply, mobility, and extraction, making the island a demanding test of whether specialized forces can remain effective close to Alaska’s most exposed western approaches.

Wales and Tin City reinforce the same geographic position from the eastern side of the Bering Strait. Located on the Seward Peninsula, they provide access to terrain overlooking maritime and air approaches entering western Alaska while placing personnel close to elements of the region’s wider surveillance and early-warning network.

St. Lawrence Island extends the operation farther into the Bering Sea. Located between mainland Alaska and the Russian Far East, it provides another forward position from which activity approaching the Bering Strait can be observed, while also imposing significant requirements for air or maritime resupply and resilient communications.

Nome provides the logistical depth behind these forward positions. Its airfield and transportation infrastructure make it one of the most important staging points in western Alaska, allowing U.S. forces to move personnel, equipment, and supplies toward the Bering Strait region.

That role was already demonstrated during Exercise TUNDRA MERLIN. In late July and early August, U.S. Northern Command used Nome as a staging area for the deployment of U.S. Army personnel, an M142 HIMARS launcher, and an AN/TPQ-53 radar, supported by Royal Canadian Air Force C-17 strategic airlift.

The activity demonstrated that Nome can serve as a gateway for rapidly moving significant military capability into western Alaska. POLAR DAGGER applies the same logic to Special Operations Forces, but with smaller and more dispersed teams operating farther forward.

Point Hope extends the exercise north of the Bering Strait along the Chukchi Sea coast. Its inclusion shows that the operation is not limited to the Bering Strait itself but also addresses access toward the broader Arctic approaches leading north from western Alaska.

Taken together, the six locations form a dispersed chain stretching from the Bering Sea into the Chukchi Sea. That distribution is operationally significant because U.S. Arctic defense cannot depend entirely on large permanent installations across a region defined by enormous distances, sparse infrastructure, and limited road networks.

Special Operations Forces are particularly suited to this type of environment because they can deploy in small teams, operate from austere locations, and support missions involving reconnaissance, surveillance, communications, infrastructure security, and coordination with larger joint-force elements.

SOCNORTH has not publicly identified the specific special operations units participating in POLAR DAGGER 2026. The command has also not released a detailed list of aircraft, maritime craft, unmanned systems, ISR sensors, or satellite communications equipment involved in the operation.

Those details will be important as the exercise develops because the effectiveness of isolated teams depends heavily on their ability to remain connected to the wider Arctic command-and-control network. A team operating on a remote island or coastal site has limited operational value unless it can securely transmit information to aircraft, ships, intelligence centers, or other joint-force elements capable of acting on it.

This makes communications one of the most important capabilities being tested, even if SOCNORTH has not yet disclosed the technical systems involved. Forces operating across western Alaska must remain connected despite extreme distance, limited infrastructure, and difficult environmental conditions.

Operation POLAR DAGGER strengthens U.S. Arctic homeland defense by testing how rapidly Special Operations Forces can deploy, sustain and operate from remote locations along Alaska’s Bering Strait approaches, where surveillance, communications and access are critical to detecting and responding to threats near the Russian Far East. (Picture source: U.S. Department of War/Defense)

The connection with TUNDRA MERLIN gives POLAR DAGGER additional operational depth. In early August, U.S. Northern Command demonstrated an integrated Arctic homeland-defense scenario combining F-35A Lightning II fighters, F-16 Fighting Falcons, a KC-135 Stratotanker, HIMARS, and an AN/TPQ-53 radar around Nome and St. Lawrence Island.

That exercise focused on detecting and defeating a simulated threat approaching the U.S. homeland. POLAR DAGGER adds Special Operations Forces to the same broader defensive geography, suggesting a layered concept in which small forward teams may contribute observation, local awareness, and reconnaissance while larger joint-force assets provide radar coverage, airpower, maritime surveillance, and long-range fires.

The operational logic is clear even without detailed disclosure of the 2026 scenario. Small SOF teams positioned near the Bering Strait can potentially extend situational awareness into areas where larger formations cannot remain continuously deployed.

Such teams could also contribute to the protection of key infrastructure or support the monitoring of maritime and air activity. If effectively linked to joint sensors and command networks, a small forward presence can generate operational value far beyond the size of the deployed force.

Previous POLAR DAGGER exercises indicate that SOCNORTH has used the series to test challenges including infiltration and extraction, long-range movement, resupply, domain awareness, critical infrastructure protection, and medical evacuation in remote Arctic conditions.

Those earlier activities do not confirm the exact missions being conducted in 2026, but they show that the exercise is designed around more than cold-weather survival. Its broader purpose is to determine whether U.S. Special Operations Forces can deploy rapidly, remain connected, and support wider homeland-defense operations in areas where reinforcement may take time.

The Alaska National Guard has also supported previous POLAR DAGGER events, particularly through aviation suited to moving personnel and equipment across remote terrain. SOCNORTH has not yet confirmed the National Guard's full role in the 2026 exercise, but locally based aviation and support units remain important because of their familiarity with Alaska’s weather, geography, and logistics.

Maritime access is another central consideration. The Bering Strait is not only the geographic boundary between the United States and Russia but also a maritime passage connecting the North Pacific with the Arctic Ocean.

U.S. Northern Command has already increased joint and allied activity in this area during TUNDRA MERLIN, including U.S. Coast Guard and Royal Canadian Navy operations through the Bering Sea and Bering Strait. These activities reinforce the maritime layer of the same broader defensive architecture in which POLAR DAGGER is placing Special Operations Forces ashore.

The combination of SOF deployments, fighter aircraft, radar, long-range fires, maritime patrols, and strategic airlift reflects a broader U.S. effort to make Arctic defense more distributed. Rather than relying only on large installations, the Joint Force is increasingly testing how rapidly it can move surveillance and combat capability into remote areas.

That approach is particularly relevant as Russia maintains a significant military presence across its northern territories and continues to regard the Arctic as an important region for air, maritime, and missile operations.

China’s growing interest in Arctic access, scientific activity, and northern shipping routes adds a longer-term strategic consideration for U.S. planners. For Washington, improved surveillance and rapid deployment across Alaska are increasingly tied to both immediate homeland defense and broader competition over access and awareness in the Arctic.

POLAR DAGGER 2026 is significant because it tests that challenge at the tactical edge. Little Diomede, Wales, Tin City, and St. Lawrence Island are not major military hubs, yet their geography gives them considerable value for monitoring movement through the Bering Strait and reinforcing Alaska's western edge.

Nome provides the logistical base needed to support those forward positions, while Point Hope extends the operating area toward the northern Arctic coastline. Together, they create a coherent network of locations rather than a collection of unrelated training sites.

The central question for SOCNORTH is whether Special Operations Forces can move through that environment quickly enough, remain sufficiently connected, and contribute meaningfully to a larger defensive response. Success depends as much on logistics, communications, and access as on tactical skill.

As Operation POLAR DAGGER continues through August 31, further SOCNORTH releases may provide more detail on participating units, aircraft, unmanned systems, maritime assets, and ISR equipment. Those disclosures will help clarify how far the 2026 exercise moves beyond rapid deployment into integrated reconnaissance and support for wider joint operations.

POLAR DAGGER 2026 therefore tests more than Arctic mobility. By deploying U.S. Special Operations Forces near Russia along the Bering Strait and across Alaska’s western approaches, SOCNORTH is examining whether small, dispersed teams can establish a forward presence in some of the most strategically exposed locations in the United States, remain connected in austere conditions, and contribute to a broader homeland-defense network built around surveillance, airpower, maritime forces, and long-range fires.

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Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
U.S. Marines Open First Counter-Drone Training Lanes to Shoot Down Drones With Rifles and Shotguns
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U.S. Marines are now training to shoot down small drones traveling at speeds exceeding 90 mph using M27 rifles, M1014 shotguns, and grenade launchers as part of the Marine Corps’ first dedicated counter-drone training lanes at Twentynine Palms, California. Marines engaged simulated hostile unmanned aerial systems at distances as short as 20 meters while also employing electronic warfare, creating a layered defense against the type of fast-moving first-person-view (FPV) drone threat reshaping modern ground combat.

The U.S. Marine Corps introduced the counter-small unmanned aerial system (C-sUAS) lanes during Service Level Training Exercise 4-26 on July 15, 2026, involving units from the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions. Announced by the service on August 11, the initiative integrates counter-drone warfare directly into routine maneuver training rather than leaving the mission solely to dedicated air-defense and electronic-warfare specialists.

Related Topic: U.S. Marines Order 10 Tempest Counter-UAS Vehicles to Boost Mobile Drone Defense

U.S. Marine Corps Lance Cpl. Jeremiah Smith fires an M27 Infantry Automatic Rifle during counter-drone training at Twentynine Palms, California, on July 17, 2026, as Marines practice engaging fast-moving small unmanned aerial systems at close range. (Picture source: U.S. Marine Corps)

The 20-meter engagement distance illustrates the severity of the threat. At more than 90 mph, a drone flying directly toward a Marine position can cover 20 meters in roughly half a second, leaving almost no margin for hesitation once it enters close-range weapon engagement distance.

That makes early detection and layered defense critical. The U.S. Marines participating in the exercise trained to identify and respond to unmanned aerial threats before employing kinetic or electronic countermeasures. Hostile drones were subsequently introduced throughout other exercise events, requiring units to maintain air awareness while continuing to perform their primary missions.

The kinetic weapons used during the new Marine Corps counter-drone training included the 5.56 mm M27 Infantry Automatic Rifle and the 12-gauge M1014 combat shotgun. Marines also fired M32A1 and M320 grenade launchers using low-velocity 40 mm ammunition against simulated small-UAS targets.

The choice of weapons is operationally significant because none is a conventional air-defense system. Instead, they are infantry weapons already available within Marine formations, allowing rifle squads to establish an emergency final layer of protection if an FPV drone penetrates electronic-warfare and dedicated counter-UAS defenses.

The M27 gives Marines an immediate response option using their standard 5.56 mm infantry weapon. Its effectiveness against drones, however, depends heavily on early detection, tracking, and marksmanship because a rifle projectile offers little margin for error against a small, rapidly maneuvering aerial target.

The M1014 addresses the same threat differently. Its 12-gauge ammunition disperses multiple projectiles in a widening shot pattern, potentially increasing the probability of striking vulnerable components of a small drone at short range compared with attempting to hit the target with a single rifle projectile.

This approach has direct parallels with battlefield adaptations observed during the war in Ukraine. Ukrainian personnel have developed close-range counter-FPV tactics using 12-gauge shotguns, including rapid target reacquisition, firing from trenches and other covered positions, and maintaining constant awareness of low-flying drones approaching infantry positions. Army Recognition has previously examined Ukrainian shotgun tactics used against Russian FPV drones.

Russian forces have also incorporated shotguns into infantry counter-drone defenses, reflecting similar tactical pressure from inexpensive FPV attack drones. The convergence is significant: battlefield experience has shown that sophisticated electronic warfare does not eliminate the need for soldiers to possess a physical means of destroying a drone once it reaches close range. Army Recognition has also reported on Russian infantry units receiving shotguns as an emergency response to drone attacks.

The emergence of fiber-optic FPV drones makes that requirement even more relevant. Unlike conventional radio-controlled drones, fiber-optic systems maintain their command link through a physical cable and therefore cannot be disrupted through conventional radio-frequency jamming in the same manner. This limitation can force defenders to rely more heavily on kinetic interception, concealment, and other physical countermeasures.

U.S. Marines from 2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment neutralize a simulated enemy drone during counter-UAS training at Twentynine Palms, California, on July 17, 2026. (Picture source: U.S. Marine Corps)

The U.S. Marine Corps training at Twentynine Palms appears intended to build similar reflexes before U.S. forces encounter comparable conditions in combat. Counter-drone defense is being incorporated into other battlefield tasks, so Marines must keep maneuvering, communicating, and fighting while assuming hostile unmanned aircraft may be observing or attacking them.

Electronic warfare remains a central component of that defensive structure. According to the Marine Corps, trainees employed both physical methods of eliminating drones and non-kinetic electronic-warfare techniques, enabling units to target an unmanned aircraft through its communications or control links before resorting to direct fire.

This approach creates a layered engagement sequence. Electronic warfare may disrupt a conventional radio-controlled FPV drone at greater distances, while M27 rifles, M1014 shotguns, and grenade launchers provide progressively more immediate kinetic options if the aircraft continues toward the formation.

The method also acknowledges the limitations of electronic attack. Adversaries can change operating frequencies, strengthen communications links, increase autonomy, or use fiber-optic control. As a result, a counter-drone architecture based entirely on jamming risks becoming ineffective against portions of the threat.

At the infantry level, these defensive measures complement more capable systems such as the Marine Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS). MADIS combines detection sensors, electronic warfare, and kinetic effectors to protect Marine maneuver units against unmanned aircraft and other low-altitude threats, providing a broader defensive envelope than rifles or shotguns can offer.

The distinction between MADIS and the new training lanes is important. MADIS is designed to detect and defeat aerial threats as part of a dedicated short-range air-defense architecture, whereas Marines armed with M27 rifles or M1014 shotguns represent a final protective layer when an enemy drone survives those outer defenses or appears in an area where specialized systems are unavailable.

Army Recognition has previously detailed MADIS's operational role in strengthening U.S. Marine Corps mobile counter-drone and short-range air-defense capabilities.

This capability becomes particularly important under the Marine Corps’ emphasis on dispersed operations. Small Marine units operating from temporary positions, coastal sites, or widely separated maneuver areas may not always have immediate access to a dedicated counter-UAS system, but they are likely to retain their rifles, shotguns, and other organic weapons.

The new training also reflects the economics of drone warfare. Small FPV drones can be fielded in large numbers and used against individual soldiers, vehicles, weapon crews, or command positions. Using expensive missile interceptors against every such threat would create an unfavorable cost exchange, reinforcing the need for lower-cost defensive options at the unit level.

Experience from Ukraine helps explain why the U.S. Marines are focusing on a combination of electronic warfare and comparatively inexpensive infantry weapons rather than relying on a single universal counter-drone solution. A layered defense gives a unit several opportunities to disrupt or destroy an incoming aircraft while reserving more sophisticated interceptors for threats that genuinely require them.

The U.S. Marine Corps also increased the realism of SLTE 4-26 by preparing Marines to operate drones as an opposing force. These operators created a more representative threat for units moving through the counter-UAS lanes and subsequent exercise events, requiring Marines to respond to maneuvering aerial targets rather than predictable range profiles.

That distinction matters most at speeds exceeding 90 mph. Hitting a drone flying along a known path on an isolated range is fundamentally different from detecting and engaging an FPV aircraft that appears while Marines are moving, communicating, treating casualties, or engaging ground targets.

The first counter-drone lanes therefore assess more than shooting ability. They train observation, identification, warning procedures, electronic-warfare employment, weapon selection, and immediate-reaction drills, while requiring Marines to preserve the squad's combat effectiveness.

The U.S. Marine Corps intends to continue incorporating small-UAS and counter-UAS scenarios into future Service Level Training Exercises at Twentynine Palms. Marines who complete the training are also expected to bring the resulting tactics, techniques, and procedures back to their home units, helping spread counter-drone proficiency across the force.

The broader operational change is that drone defense is becoming an increasingly important infantry responsibility. Battlefield experience has shown that FPV drones can force soldiers to monitor the air continuously, alter movement patterns, and use weapons suited to close-range aerial defense.

By training U.S. Marines to engage drones traveling at more than 90 mph at distances as short as 20 meters with M27 rifles and M1014 shotguns, while integrating electronic warfare and dedicated systems such as MADIS into the broader defensive structure, the U.S. Marine Corps is adapting its training to a battlefield where small unmanned aircraft can reach infantry formations with very little warning. The result is a layered counter-drone approach, from sensors and jammers to the individual Marine, who may have only seconds to respond before impact.

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Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
U.S. Creates Task Force Falcon Strike to Coordinate Multinational Attack Drones Across Middle East
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U.S. Central Command is creating Task Force Falcon Strike, its first multinational force designed to coordinate one-way attack drones across the air, sea-surface and underwater domains. The initiative is intended to give U.S. and regional forces a broader ability to mass expendable unmanned weapons, complicate enemy defenses and strike dispersed targets across the Middle East.

The task force moves CENTCOM beyond separate drone deployments by combining multiple types of attack systems within a coalition strike structure. This distributed approach could increase strike capacity, improve operational flexibility and strengthen deterrence by forcing adversaries to defend against simultaneous threats across several domains.

Related Topic: U.S. Deploys Combat Proven LUCAS FLM 136 Loitering Munition for Low-Cost Strike Saturation

A LUCAS one-way attack drone launches from USS Santa Barbara during U.S. Central Command operations in the Arabian Gulf in December 2025. Falcon Strike will expand this concept into a multinational force combining aerial, surface, and underwater attack systems. (Picture source: U.S. Department of War/Defense)

The U.S. CENTCOM (Central Command) announced Falcon Strike on August 13, 2026, with U.S. Special Operations Command Central personnel leading a staff of U.S. and regional representatives as it extends invitations to partner countries. The initiative is significant because it seeks to transform separate national unmanned capabilities into a coordinated strike force capable of imposing simultaneous threats from above, across, and below the maritime battlespace.

The concept represents a significant development. CENTCOM describes Falcon Strike as its first multidomain, multinational attack-drone task force and says it will employ one-way attack unmanned systems operating in the air, on the sea surface and underwater. That structure effectively creates a framework for combined attack packages in which aerial one-way attack drones, unmanned surface vessels and underwater systems could be synchronized against a common set of targets.

The Pentagon is therefore moving beyond experimentation with individual low-cost unmanned weapons toward an operational architecture capable of generating mass across several attack vectors. For forces defending ports, naval bases, coastal radar sites or logistics hubs, the challenge would no longer be limited to intercepting drones approaching through the air. It could also extend to detecting small unmanned vessels at sea and hostile systems operating beneath the surface.

Falcon Strike builds directly on Task Force Scorpion Strike, which CENTCOM established nine months earlier as the U.S. military’s first dedicated one-way attack-drone squadron in the Middle East. According to CENTCOM, Scorpion Strike achieved several operational milestones, including launching an aerial attack drone from a U.S. Navy warship in December 2025 and employing one-way aerial systems during Operation Epic Fury.

The maritime component has already moved beyond experimentation. CENTCOM stated that Scorpion Strike used unmanned attack vessels during strikes against Iranian port facilities in July 2026, demonstrating that inexpensive unmanned weapons were being integrated into offensive operations before Falcon Strike was formally announced.

On July 12, U.S. forces struck dozens of Iranian targets using fighter aircraft, naval vessels, one-way attack aerial drones and, according to the U.S. military, one-way attack sea drones for the first time. The targets included Iranian air-defense systems, coastal radars, missile and drone capabilities, and small boats. The operation illustrated how unmanned weapons can be incorporated into a broader joint strike sequence rather than employed as isolated systems.

Army Recognition coverage of CENTCOM’s Task Force Scorpion Strikeprovides the immediate operational background to Falcon Strike. The principal change is that CENTCOM is now attempting to institutionalize these capabilities within a multinational organization rather than keeping them primarily within a U.S.-controlled experimental or operational unit.

In practical terms, a Falcon Strike attack package could begin with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets locating a target and distributing its coordinates through a common command network. Airborne one-way attack drones could then approach from several directions while unmanned surface vessels advance toward coastal or harbor targets and underwater systems create an additional axis of attack beneath the surface.

Such an attack would complicate defensive planning because each unmanned weapon type requires different sensors and engagement methods. An air-defense radar designed to detect low-flying aerial drones does not necessarily provide the surveillance needed to identify small unmanned boats amid sea clutter, while protecting a harbor from underwater attack requires sonar, barriers, patrol craft and specialized counter-underwater systems.

The attack sequence could also be staggered rather than simultaneous. Aerial drones could force air-defense radars to activate and expend interceptors, allowing other strike assets to identify emitters or exploit coverage gaps. At the same time, surface systems could approach through coastal waters while underwater systems threaten naval infrastructure or vessels from another direction.

This possibility could make Falcon Strike more important than the destructive power of any individual weapon. The operational objective is to create several inexpensive, geographically distributed attack problems at the same time, forcing an adversary to divide surveillance, electronic-warfare, interceptor and close-defense resources across multiple domains.

A subsequent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance cycle could assess damage and identify surviving targets for additional attacks. If Falcon Strike eventually connects reconnaissance, target assignment, weapons release and battle-damage assessment within a common multinational command structure, CENTCOM could use relatively inexpensive unmanned weapons to sustain pressure across several strike cycles rather than relying exclusively on costly cruise missiles or crewed aircraft.

The most difficult element of the concept is therefore likely to be command and control rather than the drones themselves. CENTCOM has not publicly identified Falcon Strike’s communications architecture, mission-planning software, autonomy levels, target-data standards or procedures governing weapons release by participating countries.

Those details will determine whether Falcon Strike becomes a genuinely integrated combat force or remains a collection of national unmanned detachments operating alongside one another. Different countries may field drones with incompatible data links, encryption standards, navigation systems and mission software, while national restrictions may limit which intelligence can be shared and which targets their forces are authorized to engage.

A genuinely multinational strike architecture would therefore require a way to distribute a common operational picture and targeting information without forcing every participant to expose sensitive national intelligence networks. It would also require procedures that allow commanders to assign targets rapidly while preserving each country’s authority over the release and employment of its weapons.

U.S. Corsair one-way attack sea drones demonstrate the surface-strike component of CENTCOM’s expanding unmanned warfare concept. Their reported combat use against Iranian port facilities in July 2026 provides a direct operational precursor to Task Force Falcon Strike, which is intended to integrate aerial, surface and underwater attack drones within a multinational force.

SOCCENT’s leadership of the task-force staff is important here. The command plans and conducts special operations throughout CENTCOM’s 21-country area of responsibility and works extensively with regional military forces, giving Falcon Strike an existing framework for multinational command, liaison, and operational coordination.

Army Recognition analysis of U.S. low-cost one-way attack-drone development has examined how the Pentagon is increasingly treating expendable unmanned weapons as a means of generating combat mass. Falcon Strike extends that approach into coalition warfare, in which several countries could potentially contribute their own aerial drones, unmanned attack vessels or underwater systems while sharing elements of the command-and-control and targeting architecture.

CENTCOM has not yet disclosed which regional governments will join Falcon Strike, and that question will strongly influence the unit’s eventual combat power. The command said consultations are underway and formal invitations are being issued, with the force expected to expand as regional partners formally join.

It also remains unclear whether participating countries will contribute domestically developed unmanned weapons, U.S.-supplied systems, operational personnel or liaison officers. A force composed largely of liaison personnel would improve coordination, but a coalition in which regional states contribute their own attack drones could create a much larger and more geographically distributed arsenal.

That distinction has immediate operational implications in the Gulf. Regional countries could provide access to coastlines, airfields, and launch locations beyond established U.S. bases, increasing the number of directions from which unmanned attacks could originate and making it harder for an opponent to suppress the force by striking a small number of known installations.

Distributed launch points could also improve survivability. One-way attack drones are particularly useful when they can be launched from mobile vehicles, ships or dispersed shore positions because commanders do not need to concentrate large numbers of expensive aircraft at vulnerable air bases before generating a strike.

CENTCOM Commander Adm. Brad Cooper said Falcon Strike would build on the success of Scorpion Strike and take advantage of innovation among U.S. regional allies and partners. He said that integrating and deploying new capabilities together would allow the command to expand its attack-drone capabilities across the Middle East into what CENTCOM describes as a unified multidomain, multinational deterrent.

The deterrence argument rests partly on uncertainty. An adversary facing Falcon Strike could potentially have to account for aerial drones launched from land or warships, attack vessels approaching through coastal waters and unmanned systems operating underwater, while also determining which country controls each weapon and where follow-on attacks might originate.

Army Recognition coverage of U.S. and Gulf military drone cooperation will become increasingly relevant once CENTCOM identifies participating countries and their equipment. Key indicators will be whether partners contribute operational weapons, whether Falcon Strike conducts combined live-fire exercises, and whether systems from different countries can receive target information through a shared command network.

The initiative also represents an escalation in how CENTCOM intends to employ low-cost unmanned weapons following their combat use against Iranian targets in 2026. Rather than treating one-way attack drones primarily as supplementary weapons, Falcon Strike establishes an organization specifically intended to scale their use across multiple domains and among several countries.

Its strategic value will ultimately depend less on any single drone than on whether CENTCOM can synchronize large numbers of heterogeneous weapons faster than an opponent can detect and defeat them. If Falcon Strike succeeds in integrating targeting, communications, and multinational weapons-release procedures, it could give U.S. and partner forces a new way to overwhelm defensive networks while conserving more expensive missiles and crewed combat aircraft.

Falcon Strike therefore marks a potentially important evolution in U.S. military operations in the Middle East. The Pentagon is building a coalition strike force around expendable unmanned weapons capable of attacking through the air, across the sea surface, and below it. The next decisive step will be demonstrating that these different weapons and national forces can operate within a single command architecture rapidly enough to transform multidomain drone warfare from a collection of individual capabilities into a coordinated combat system.

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Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
U.S. Army to Test Rival XM30 IFV Prototypes Ahead of 2027 Bradley Replacement Decision
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The U.S. Army is moving toward a decisive 2027 choice between General Dynamics Land Systems and American Rheinmetall for the XM30 Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle, which is intended to replace the M2 Bradley across armored brigade combat teams. Testing by the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, could lead to a winner in late spring 2027 and determine how U.S. mechanized infantry fights alongside tanks in future high-intensity warfare.

The competition will assess which XM30 design best balances firepower, protection, mobility, and battlefield integration under demanding operational conditions. The selected vehicle could shape U.S. armored warfare for decades by improving infantry survivability and lethality while supporting a broader shift toward more networked and adaptable combat formations.

Related Topic: U.S. Army Funds $547M for First 19 XM30 Infantry Fighting Vehicles to Begin Bradley Replacement

XM30 program timeline showing the U.S. Army’s planned competition between General Dynamics Land Systems and American Rheinmetall, from prototype deliveries in late 2026 through Iron Horse Brigade testing at the National Training Center and a potential winner selection in spring 2027 for the future replacement of the M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle. (Picture source: Editing Army Recognition Group)

Colonel Todd Hertling, commander of the U.S. Army Iron Horse Brigade, discussed the planned evaluation in an August 13, 2026 interview with Breaking Defense during the 18th Annual Ground Vehicle Systems Engineering & Technology Symposium, held from August 11 to 13. Both GDLS and American Rheinmetall are scheduled to deliver their XM30 prototypes to the Army by the end of 2026, setting up direct operational competition ahead of a possible Army procurement down-select in spring 2027.

The XM30 is the U.S. Army’s next-generation tracked infantry fighting vehicle designed to replace the M2 Bradley and fight alongside M1 Abrams main battle tanks in future armored formations. Formerly known as the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle, the XM30 is being developed to provide mechanized infantry with greater lethality, protection, sensor coverage, digital connectivity and growth capacity than the Bradley can support after decades of modernization.

The Army has centered XM30 requirements on a remotely operated turret armed with a 50mm automatic cannon, anti-tank guided missiles, advanced electro-optical sensors, active protection and a modular electronic architecture. Compared with the Bradley’s 25mm M242 cannon, the larger-caliber weapon is intended to improve effectiveness against enemy infantry fighting vehicles, fortified positions and troops protected by cover.

The competition now comes down to two major U.S. defense industry teams. General Dynamics Land Systems is developing the Wolf XM30, while American Rheinmetall is offering an XM30 design derived from the Lynx KF41 family and extensively adapted for U.S. Army requirements.

That two-way contest matters because the Army is not simply buying another armored vehicle. The XM30 winner could establish the technical baseline for the service’s future Bradley replacement fleet and influence how U.S. armored brigade combat teams integrate infantry, Abrams tanks, unmanned systems, sensors and networked fires in high-intensity warfare.

Both manufacturers are expected to provide prototype vehicles before the end of 2026. The Army previously planned for each competitor to deliver multiple prototypes for developmental testing and soldier evaluation, allowing engineers and operational units to compare performance before the service commits to a production design.

The Iron Horse Brigade’s National Training Center rotation will be one of the most consequential phases of the competition because it will place the GDLS and Rheinmetall vehicles in sustained combined-arms operations rather than controlled engineering trials. Soldiers will be able to compare how each XM30 performs during force-on-force maneuver, live-fire events, long-distance movement, maintenance cycles and continuous tactical operations.

Those conditions could expose performance differences that are difficult to identify through technical specifications alone. Crew workload, infantry dismount procedures, sensor effectiveness, ammunition handling, mechanical reliability, fuel demand and maintenance accessibility could all influence which company wins the Army procurement decision.

Reliability may matter most in the Bradley replacement selection. An infantry fighting vehicle can offer superior firepower, protection and digital capability, but its battlefield value drops quickly if maintenance demands reduce availability during prolonged armored warfare.

The NTC evaluation will also allow soldiers to determine whether the remotely operated turret and expanded sensor suite provide a meaningful combat advantage. The U.S. Army expects XM30 crews to achieve stronger 360-degree situational awareness than Bradley crews, an increasingly important requirement against unmanned aerial vehicles, anti-tank teams and loitering munitions attacking from multiple directions.

The 50mm cannon will be another major discriminator. Its greater range and destructive effect are intended to give U.S. mechanized infantry substantially more direct-fire power than the Bradley’s 25mm weapon, potentially allowing the XM30 to defeat enemy armored vehicles and fortified positions without immediately depending on an Abrams main battle tank.

The Army will also assess how effectively each XM30 design integrates with the broader armored formation. The next-generation combat vehicle is intended to operate alongside Abrams tanks, unmanned systems, reconnaissance assets and networked fires, making digital interoperability and data sharing nearly as important as mobility, firepower and armor protection.

This Abrams-XM30 relationship is particularly significant for the future of U.S. armored warfare. Main battle tanks provide heavy direct fire and protection against enemy armor, while infantry fighting vehicles move mechanized soldiers, suppress anti-tank threats and secure terrain where tanks operating alone are vulnerable.

A more heavily armed and digitally connected Bradley replacement could allow U.S. armored brigades to distribute combat power more effectively across the formation. If the XM30 delivers the expected gains in sensors, 50mm firepower and networking, mechanized infantry could play a larger role in detecting and destroying threats before they can engage Abrams tanks.

Soldier feedback could therefore become decisive in the GDLS-Rheinmetall contest. The U.S. Army has already used crew and infantry input during earlier XM30 design phases to refine interior layout, ramp configuration, visibility and maintenance access, and the NTC rotation will provide a far more demanding test of those decisions.

The selection timetable remains flexible. The U.S. Army acquisition officials have indicated that the service could choose a winner after the spring 2027 evaluation, but it may retain both competitors longer if operational results do not establish a clear advantage.

Keeping GDLS and Rheinmetall in the competition would preserve technical and commercial pressure while giving the Army additional evidence before making a long-term procurement commitment. However, a clear performance advantage at the National Training Center could accelerate the transition toward a single XM30 production design.

The stakes are unusually high because XM30 is intended to become the Army’s primary infantry fighting vehicle for future armored formations. Previous U.S. Army programs to replace the Bradley did not reach full production, making the current next-generation combat vehicle competition an important test of the service’s revised acquisition strategy.

The Iron Horse Brigade evaluation will ultimately test whether the GDLS Wolf or American Rheinmetall XM30 offers a measurable operational advantage under realistic combat pressure. Rather than selecting the Bradley replacement solely on technical specifications, the U.S. Army is positioning soldiers to determine which design can remain lethal, mobile, connected, and maintainable during the demanding tempo of large-scale combat operations.

If the spring 2027 NTC rotation produces a clear result, the U.S. Army could move quickly to pick a winner between GDLS and Rheinmetall and advance the XM30 toward production. That decision would do more than determine the future Bradley replacement: it could shape the structure, lethality, and digital architecture of U.S. armored warfare for the next generation, defining how mechanized infantry and Abrams tanks fight together in future conflicts.

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Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
U.S. Army to Test Four New M1E3 Abrams Tanks with 1st Cavalry Division in 2026
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The U.S. Army’s 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, nicknamed the Iron Horse Brigade, will receive four new M1E3 Abrams main battle tank prototypes by the end of 2026 for operational evaluation. The trials will place the next-generation Abrams in soldiers’ hands to determine whether it can deliver greater mobility, survivability, and battlefield effectiveness while reducing the logistical burden associated with heavy armor.

The brigade will assess mobility, protection, sustainment, and crew workload under realistic operating conditions. Army officials detailed the plan at GVSETS 2026 (Ground Vehicle Systems Engineering & Technology Symposium), according to Breaking Defense on August 13, 2026. The results could directly influence the M1E3’s final design and shape how the U.S. Army adapts its armored forces for more mobile, dispersed, and contested future combat environments.

Related Topic: U.S. Army Accelerates M1E3 Abrams Tank with $474M Funding Ahead of 2028 Production

M1E3 Abrams prototype unveiled by the U.S. Army in Detroit in January 2026, showcasing the future direction of the next-generation U.S. Army main battle tank. (Picture source: U.S. Army)

The delivery will provide the U.S. Army with a platoon-sized group of M1E3 Abrams tank prototypes for testing by an active armored formation. Unlike developmental trials conducted primarily by engineers, operational evaluation with the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team will show how the new tank performs during maneuver, maintenance, refueling, ammunition resupply, tactical networking, and combined-arms operations.

For readers examining the differences between the M1E3 Abrams and the M1A2 Abrams, the central distinction is that the M1E3 is being developed as a fundamentally redesigned main battle tank rather than as another incremental upgrade of the existing Abrams. The new Abrams is intended to reduce weight and fuel demand, introduce a more open digital architecture, increase automation, and integrate future protection technologies from the outset. By contrast, current M1A2 SEP variants remain based on an architecture that has accumulated successive upgrades in armor, electronics, and survivability over several decades.

The M1E3 should therefore not be understood simply as an Abrams replacement in the conventional sense of abandoning the Abrams family. Instead, it represents the U.S. Army’s effort to preserve the Abrams’ core combat role while creating a lighter, more adaptable, and easier-to-sustain next-generation tank capable of remaining relevant against drones, precision fires, electronic warfare, and increasingly sophisticated battlefield surveillance.

The M1E3 represents a major departure from the current M1A2 SEP Abrams family rather than another incremental upgrade. The U.S. Army decided to pursue the M1E3 after concluding that continued additions of armor, electronics, and protection equipment were increasing the weight and logistical burden of the existing Abrams design.

Current M1A2 SEP variants retain the traditional four-person crew of commander, gunner, loader, and driver, while the M1E3 is being developed around greater automation and the possibility of a reduced crew. Early M1E3 configurations have also demonstrated an automatic-loading concept, which could allow the U.S. Army to reduce the vehicle’s protected internal volume while maintaining the 120 mm-class firepower expected from an Abrams main battle tank.

Weight reduction is one of the most important objectives of the M1E3 program. The current M1A2 SEP configuration can exceed 70 tons, depending on armor and mission equipment, creating constraints related to bridges, transporters, recovery vehicles, and tactical mobility. The U.S. Army wants the M1E3 to reduce that burden significantly, improving the ability of armored formations to maneuver across infrastructure that may not support the heaviest existing Abrams configurations.

This is also where the M1E3-versus-M1A2 comparison becomes operationally significant. A lighter M1E3 could improve route flexibility, bridge access, strategic transport, recovery operations, and maneuverability in terrain where the weight of current Abrams tanks can constrain commanders, while still preserving the protection and direct-fire capability expected from a U.S. Army main battle tank.

The M1E3 is also expected to introduce a new propulsion approach compared with the AGT1500 gas turbine used by current Abrams tanks. The U.S. Army has been evaluating hybrid-electric technologies intended to reduce fuel consumption and increase the electrical power available for sensors, protection systems, communications equipment, and future electronic systems.

Lower fuel consumption would directly improve combat endurance. M1A2 SEP units depend on a substantial fuel and transportation network during high-tempo operations, while a more efficient M1E3 could reduce the number of refueling movements required to sustain an armored brigade and decrease the exposure of logistical convoys to artillery, drones, mines, and long-range precision fires.

Survivability is another area in which the M1E3 is intended to differ from the current Abrams. Rather than relying primarily on additional passive armor, the U.S. Army is developing the new tank around an integrated combination of armor, sensors, active protection systems, electronic countermeasures, and reduced vehicle signatures.

This approach reflects lessons from recent conflicts, in which tanks face threats not only from enemy armored vehicles and anti-tank guided missiles but also from first-person-view drones, loitering munitions, top-attack weapons, and persistent aerial surveillance. Integrating these defensive systems from the outset should give the M1E3 greater growth potential than adding further equipment to the already heavily modified M1A2 SEP design.

The M1E3 will also place greater emphasis on software and open-systems architecture. The U.S. Army wants to introduce new sensors, electronic warfare capabilities, battlefield applications, and defensive technologies without requiring lengthy redesigns of the entire vehicle.

This digital approach could become particularly important in the face of rapidly evolving drone and electronic warfare threats. A tank capable of receiving software and sensor upgrades more quickly would allow the U.S. Army to adapt its armored units faster than traditional modernization cycles would allow.

Testing with the Iron Horse Brigade will therefore focus on more than whether the M1E3 can maneuver and fire effectively. U.S. Army crews will be able to determine whether reduced weight, greater automation, new propulsion technologies, digital architecture, and redesigned protection systems actually improve combat effectiveness compared with the current M1A2 SEP Abrams.

Army Recognition previously reported on the first M1E3 Abrams prototype and its redesigned architecture, while earlier coverage examined the U.S. Army’s effort to reduce the Abrams’ weight and logistical requirements. Additional related coverage can examine future U.S. Army armored vehicle modernization and the role of the M1E3 in next-generation combat formations.

The four prototypes expected to be delivered to the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team by the end of 2026 will give the U.S. Army its first opportunity to test these concepts with soldiers in a realistic armored formation. The results will help determine whether the M1E3 Abrams tank can overcome the mobility and logistical limitations of the M1A2 SEP while retaining the heavy direct-fire capability required for high-intensity combat. The Iron Horse Brigade evaluation will therefore represent an important step in defining the future of the next-generation U.S. Army main battle tank.

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Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
U.S. Army Reveals First Production Maneuver Support Vessel Light for Abrams Tank Operations
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The U.S. Army has presented USAV Craney Island, its first production Maneuver Support Vessel Light, at Vigor Marine Fabrication in Vancouver, Washington. The new landing craft will move tanks, armored vehicles, and supplies through shallow coastal waters and unimproved beaches, expanding Army logistics options for distributed operations in the Indo-Pacific.

Craney Island is the second vessel completed under the MSV(L) program, following the SSG Elroy F. Wells prototype launched in 2022, and is expected to be delivered to the Army in fall 2026. The 117-foot landing craft is designed to replace the aging Landing Craft Mechanized 8 fleet while giving Army units the ability to move heavy combat equipment between established ports, austere shorelines, and inland waterways without depending on major port infrastructure. The Army has identified the MSV(L) as a key part of its watercraft modernization effort. A Government Accountability Office report said the first production vessel is planned for assignment to U.S. Army Pacific, underscoring the service's focus on improving logistics across the Indo-Pacific.

Related News: U.S. Army Tests New Maneuver Support Vessel Enabling Rapid Medical Evacuation

Vigor Marine Group unveiled USAV Craney Island, the second Maneuver Support Vessel (Light) built to support the modernization of the U.S. Army’s watercraft fleet. (Picture source: US DoD)

Measuring 35.6 meters in length and 8.6 meters in width, the MSV(L) has a maximum payload capacity of 82 tons and a cargo deck of nearly 158 square meters. It can reach 21 knots while loaded and more than 30 knots when empty, with an announced range of more than 360 nautical miles. Propulsion is provided by three 2,600-hp engines connected to three waterjets, while its draft at full load remains at around 1.2 meters. This configuration allows the vessel to approach beaches and coastal areas that are inaccessible to larger logistics ships. It is also fitted with a folding bow ramp and a drive-through arrangement that allows vehicles to move from the stern toward the bow.

In a statement published on August 11, 2026, Vigor Marine Group announced that its Vigor Marine Fabrication shipyard in Vancouver had presented USAV Craney Island, the first production MSV(L) intended for the U.S. Army. The company said the facility is now in full-rate production of MSV(L) hulls. The design, developed with BMT, is based on a so-called tribow monohull intended to improve seakeeping and stability in littoral environments and inland waterways. More than 300 Vigor employees contributed to the construction of the vessel, alongside more than 40 companies based in Washington State and other U.S. suppliers.

The initial contract dates to September 28, 2017. The U.S. Army awarded Vigor Works a firm-fixed-price IDIQ contract with a ceiling value of $979.79 million covering development and production of the MSV(L), with the contractual period running through September 28, 2027. This does not represent a firm order worth nearly $1 billion, but rather the maximum value that can be used through individual orders. The contract initially allowed for the production of up to 36 vessels. In 2022, however, the Army stated that its Army Acquisition Objective had been set at 13 MSV(L)s.

The payload allows the vessel to carry one M1A2 Abrams main battle tank, two BradleyFighting Vehicles, two Strykers or four Joint Light Tactical Vehicles, depending on configuration. For the U.S. Army, the main difference compared with the LCM-8 it is replacing lies in payload and speed. The older craft is limited to around 60 short tons and a speed of roughly 10 knots. The MSV(L) can therefore move heavier loads while operating at about twice the transit speed, reducing the time required to shift a unit between points in an archipelago or to recover a system after a mission.

U.S. Marines from the 3rd Littoral Logistics Battalion and U.S. Soldiers from the 7th Transportation Brigade loaded a JLTV and an MTVR onto an Army MSV(L) at Marine Corps Base Hawaii on August 26, 2025, during interoperability training focused on interservice littoral transport. (Picture source: US DoD)

This type of capability is not new across U.S. naval forces. The U.S. Navy already operates LCU 1610 Landing Craft Utility vessels capable of carrying around 140 short tons, including one M1A1 tank, with a range of about 1,200 nautical miles at 8 knots. Its future LCU 1700 is expected to increase payload to about 170 short tons and carry up to two M1A1 tanks. These vessels are, however, slower, at around 11 knots, and remain closely tied to Navy and Marine Corps amphibious operations. The MSV(L) therefore gives the Army an organic option that is faster, lighter, and more suited to frequent movements between beaches, secondary ports, and dispersed littoral positions.

The distinction was demonstrated in Hawaii on February 24 and 25, 2026, when SSG Elroy F. Wells transported a HIMARS launcher to an unimproved beach during a littoral rapid infiltration operation. The concept involves landing the launcher, conducting or simulating a fire mission, then re-embarking the system so it can be moved to another island or coastal sector before it can be located and engaged. The same vessel later hosted a surgical unit installed in a CONEX container in March, showing that the platform can also support medical evacuation and treatment between different points in an island chain.

The MSV(L) can therefore be used to move HIMARS launchers, armored vehicles, ammunition, fuel, or medical modules without relying exclusively on deep-water ports. In a scenario where fixed facilities such as Guam, Okinawa, or other forward bases are under surveillance or threatened by ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and reconnaissance drones, the vessel can redirect logistics flows toward secondary landing sites. A HIMARS detachment, for example, could be transported to an austere beach, move to a firing position, engage a maritime or land target, then re-embark before an adversary completes its targeting cycle. Ammunition and fuel stocks could likewise be distributed across several islands instead of being concentrated at a single port, reducing the exposure of logistics networks supporting U.S. land operations in the Pacific.

For Washington, the MSV(L) mainly gives the U.S. Army more options for moving heavy units rapidly between dispersed coastal positions without relying on major ports. In the Pacific, it can support the repositioning of HIMARS launchers, air defense systems, and logistics stocks between islands or secondary beaches. Against China, this increases the number of locations from which U.S. forces can operate and redeploy, complicating efforts to identify and target fixed patterns of movement.

Written By Erwan Halna du Fretay - Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Erwan Halna du Fretay holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and has experience studying conflicts and global arms transfers. His research interests lie in Security and strategic studies, particularly the dynamics of the defense industry, the evolution of military technologies, and the strategic transformation of armed forces.
U.S. Forms First Multinational Attack Drone Force to Expand Middle East Operations
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The United States is establishing a new structure in the Middle East intended to integrate aerial, surface, and underwater attack drones with regional partner forces. Known as Task Force Falcon Strike, the formation will bring together U.S. and allied personnel around uncrewed systems able to operate across several domains.

The initiative comes as recent operations against Iran have confirmed the growing role of one-way attack drones in strike campaigns, while security in the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea remains under sustained military pressure.

Related News: U.S. Central Command Deploys First Attack Drone Task Force to the Middle East

A Low-Cost Unmanned Combat Attack System (LUCAS) launches from the flight deck of the Independence-class littoral combat ship USS Santa Barbara (LCS 32) in the Arabian Gulf on December 16, 2025. (Picture source: US DoD)

Falcon Strike builds on an effort launched in late 2025 with Task Force Scorpion Strike, the first U.S. unit specifically dedicated to one-way attack drones within CENTCOM’s area of responsibility. Scorpion Strike was created to accelerate the deployment of systems that are less expensive and potentially easier to produce than some traditional precision-guided munitions. The unit has since provided an operational framework for several types of uncrewed platforms and has allowed U.S. forcesto test new employment concepts from both land and maritime platforms.

In a statement issued on August 13, 2026, U.S. Central Command officially confirmed the creation of Task Force Falcon Strike and described it as the first multinational and multi-domain force dedicated to this type of mission. According to the command, it will operate one-way attack drones in the air, on the surface and below the sea, with U.S. and regional military personnel. CENTCOM said it has begun consulting and formally inviting partners, although it has not yet identified which countries will join. U.S. Special Operations Command Central, or SOCCENT, will lead the multinational staff.

The Low-Cost Unmanned Combat Attack System, or LUCAS, is one of the systems already associated with this broader U.S. operational shift. Developed and manufactured by Arizona-based SpektreWorks, LUCAS is a long-range loitering munition also designated FLM-136 within the company’s Flexible Loitering Munition family. It is intended as an attritable precision-strike system designed for comparatively low-cost production and scalable deployment. The platform can be launched by catapult, with rocket-assisted takeoff, or from mobile ground and vehicle-mounted systems. On December 16, 2025, Task Force 59 also launched a LUCAS from the USS Santa Barbara, an Independence-class Littoral Combat Ship operating in the Persian Gulf, demonstrating that the capability can be distributed between land positions and naval platforms.

This flexibility matters because it increases the number of locations from which a strike can be prepared without relying solely on air bases or fixed launch sites. LUCAS, however, remains available in relatively limited numbers. In March 2026, Pentagon technology official Emil Michael said U.S. inventories at the time amounted to only dozens of systems and that full-rate production had not yet begun. This constraint indicates that Falcon Strike is not only about adopting lower-cost platforms, but also about expanding production and building inventories large enough to support prolonged operations.

The most distinctive aspect of Falcon Strike is the planned integration of aerial, surface, and underwater systems within a single organization. CENTCOM has not specified which maritime or submersible platforms will be assigned to the force, nor whether future partners will contribute their own equipment. That uncertainty matters because an aerial one-way attack drone, an autonomous surface vessel, and an underwater vehicle have different communication requirements, approach speeds, navigation methods, and targeting processes. Bringing them into a common operational structure therefore involves more than simply fielding a larger number of uncrewed systems.

In the Middle Eastern context, Falcon Strike could broaden CENTCOM’s options for sustaining military pressure without consistently relying on its most expensive platforms and munitions. In the Persian Gulf and around the Strait of Hormuz, drones launched from partner territory or U.S. naval vessels could complement maritime forces monitoring Iranian activity and supporting the U.S. posture around Iranian ports. Surface and underwater systems could add additional approach vectors against naval facilities, port infrastructure, and coastal targets. This is particularly relevant after recent U.S. operations against Iran, during which CENTCOM has already employed one-way attack drones and uncrewed maritime systems. Falcon Strike could turn these separate operational experiences into a more structured capability with additional launch points and regional contributions. For U.S. forces, there is also a logistical dimension: assigning part of the surveillance or strike burden to attritable systems could help preserve combat aircraft, surface ships, and precision-guided missile stocks for missions where their specific performance remains necessary.

This approach is part of a U.S. regional posture that appears intended to remain in place over time. On August 13, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said the United States had enough assets to maintain the naval blockade of Iran indefinitely, with ships able to rotate into and out of the region as required. Falcon Strike adds another element to that endurance-based approach. Rotating naval forces can sustain the conventional presence, while a multinational drone force could increase the number of systems available around key sea lanes and the Iranian coastline without raising the exposure of U.S. crews to the same extent. For CENTCOM, the issue therefore goes beyond introducing another category of weapon. The task force is intended to build, with regional partners, a distributed strike capability able to support prolonged U.S. operations, maritime control, and pressure on Iran while reducing reliance on a limited number of crewed platforms and high-value munitions.

Written By Erwan Halna du Fretay - Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Erwan Halna du Fretay holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and has experience studying conflicts and global arms transfers. His research interests lie in Security and strategic studies, particularly the dynamics of the defense industry, the evolution of military technologies, and the strategic transformation of armed forces.
U.S. to Upgrade UAE THAAD Interception System With New Launchers for More Resilient Missile Defense
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The United Arab Emirates is moving to strengthen its ballistic missile defenses with new Configuration 3 THAAD launchers from Lockheed Martin. The upgrade would reinforce one of the Gulf's most capable defenses against ballistic missile attacks.

Abu Dhabi already operates two Terminal High Altitude Area Defense systems as the upper tier of a layered air and missile defense network that also includes Patriot interceptors. The additional launchers will expand and modernize the ground equipment supporting a THAAD force built around long-range AN/TPY-2 radars and hit-to-kill interceptors designed to destroy ballistic missile threats during the terminal phase of flight.

Related News: Lockheed Martin secures $142.6m contract to sustain UAE's THAAD missile defense system

A Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) launcher is deployed and ready to fire interceptors against ballistic missile threats. (Picture source: US DoD)

Since that initial acquisition, THAAD has taken on a larger role in the protection of Emirati strategic infrastructure. Each launcher can carry eight interceptors designed to destroy ballistic missiles through direct kinetic impact using the hit-to-kill principle. Combined with the X-band AN/TPY-2 radar and Fire Control and Communications elements, THAAD covers the upper part of the missile defense architecture, while Patriot systems provide engagement options at lower altitudes. This layered structure gives defenders more than one opportunity to intercept the same threat before it reaches its target.

According to a U.S. contract notice published on August 13, 2026, Lockheed Martin Space received a $211.435 million modification to contract HQ0147-19-C-5001 under the Foreign Military Sales program for the United Arab Emirates. Designated P00082, the modification raises the cumulative value of the contract to $1.054 billion and covers the manufacture of new THAAD launchers in Configuration 3 between August 2026 and January 2031. The Missile Defense Agency is the contracting authority. The main point of the award is the introduction of the C3 standard, which is directly associated with the new hardware baseline incorporated into THAAD System Build 5.0.

Missile Defense Agency budget documents describe Configuration 3 as part of a modernization effort intended to replace obsolete equipment, address cybersecurity vulnerabilities, and improve system supportability. This work is being conducted alongside software and hardware architecture changes aimed at increasing modularity and interoperability across THAAD. Build 5.0 also includes Link 16 interface updates and integration of Common X-Band 6.0 software for the AN/TPY-2 radar, to maintain tracking and discrimination performance against evolving ballistic threats. The MDA planned to introduce Build 5.0 and its Configuration 3 hardware into the Operational Capability Baseline during 2026.

This modernization also forms part of a broader shift toward a more distributed THAAD architecture. The MDA is developing the Radio Frequency Remote THAAD Launcher concept, which allows Fire Control and Communications elements to maintain radio-frequency links with launchers deployed away from the main battery position. The purpose is to expand the area that can be defended without concentrating all launchers around the radar and command post. For the UAE, this approach corresponds to the geographic distribution of the assets requiring protection, including air bases, urban areas, ports, energy infrastructure and logistics facilities located across several parts of the country.

The transition toward C3 should also be considered alongside the Emirati Long-Range Discrimination Radar project presented in the United States in 2026. The proposed architecture includes two THAAD C3 Fire Control and Communications Tactical Operations Stations, two C3 TFCC Launch and Control Stations, and twelve Sentinel A4 uplinkers. These uplinkers are intended to provide X-band communications that can transmit updated target data to THAAD interceptors during flight. The combination of long-range sensors, modernized C3 elements, and distributed launch sites points toward a more integrated missile defense network in which the quality and circulation of targeting data are as important as interceptor performance.

From a tactical perspective, Configuration 3 is therefore best understood as part of an evolution affecting the full engagement chain. Greater launcher dispersion can expand firing geometries, allow interceptors to be distributed according to threat direction and make it more difficult for an adversary to disable an entire battery with a concentrated strike. This type of arrangement is particularly relevant during attacks involving several ballistic missiles approaching from different directions. It can also help maintain coverage over multiple critical areas while keeping those launch sites connected to a common command architecture.

The UAE’s operational experience gives this modernization additional context. On January 17, 2022, an Emirati THAAD system conducted the first known operational interception by the system against a ballistic missile launched by the Houthis during an attack on Abu Dhabi. Since then, the regional threat environment has become more demanding. During the 2026 confrontation with Iran, the UAE faced high volumes of ballistic missiles and drones directed against military, energy, and civilian infrastructure. These attacks showed that missile defense depends not only on radar and interceptor performance, but also on the ability to sustain repeated engagements over several days or weeks.

This places THAAD interceptor inventories at the center of the operational equation. A launcher provides eight ready-to-fire cells, but the actual endurance of a battery depends on the number of interceptors available for reload after repeated engagements. The use of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and drones in combined or successive salvos creates an attritional dynamic in which ammunition availability becomes almost as important as the number of launchers in service. This pressure affects both the UAE and U.S. forces deployed in the region, as several operators may depend on the same industrial base to replenish missile stocks.

In this context, demand for THAAD systems and interceptors now extends beyond the Emirati case. The Middle East contains a high concentration of infrastructure vulnerable to ballistic missile attack, including air bases, oil and gas facilities, ports, command centers and densely populated urban areas. Iran retains the largest and most diverse ballistic missile arsenal in the region, while recent events have demonstrated its ability to employ these weapons in volume and across several axes at the same time. For Gulf states, the requirement is therefore twofold: to operate missile defense networks capable of detecting and engaging threats at long range, and to maintain enough interceptors to sustain a prolonged campaign. The acquisition of new THAADC3 launchers by the UAE fits directly into this broader shift. It expands the options for dispersion and resilience across the network while underlining a central operational reality in the Middle East: missile defense depends as much on interceptor stock depth as on the systems used to launch them.

Written By Erwan Halna du Fretay - Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Erwan Halna du Fretay holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and has experience studying conflicts and global arms transfers. His research interests lie in Security and strategic studies, particularly the dynamics of the defense industry, the evolution of military technologies, and the strategic transformation of armed forces.