U.S. Pentagon Deploys Laser and Microwave Counter-Drone Systems Across 5 U.S. Military Bases.

The U.S. Department of War has selected five military bases across the United States to field high-energy laser and high-power microwave systems in an operational counter-drone defense pilot program, marking a significant step toward replacing costly missile interceptors and conventional ammunition for short-range air defense. The initiative, announced on May 6, 2026, will test how directed-energy weapons can protect critical infrastructure and airbases against the growing threat posed by small unmanned aerial systems operating near sensitive military and civilian airspace.

Fort Huachuca, Fort Bliss, Naval Base Kitsap, Grand Forks Air Force Base, and Whiteman Air Force Base will serve as operational test locations for the new systems, allowing the military to evaluate real-world deployment, targeting, and safety procedures under active base-defense conditions. The program reflects a broader shift toward scalable and lower-cost air defense technologies designed to counter mass drone attacks, improve force protection, and sustain defensive operations without rapidly depleting traditional interceptor stockpiles.

Related topic: U.S. Army Demonstrates Counter Drone Capabilities During Balikatan 2026 in the Philippines.

U.S. military installations will test high-energy laser and high-power microwave weapons under a new counter-drone pilot program aimed at protecting critical bases, airfields, and strategic infrastructure from small unmanned aerial threats (Picture source: U.S. DoW).

The Department has not publicly identified the exact weapons, vendors, emitter power levels, sensor packages, or number of firing units assigned to each location. That omission is significant because directed-energy performance depends on more than the weapon category: beam power, beam quality, thermal management, electrical generation, target tracking accuracy, atmospheric conditions, airspace safety logic, and command authority all affect whether a small drone can be defeated before reaching a protected area. The public data nevertheless indicate the intended operational mix. High-energy lasers will provide precision hard-kill engagements against individual unmanned aerial vehicles, while high-power microwave weapons will address electronics-dependent threats, including multiple drones arriving inside a short engagement window.

A high-energy laser counter-drone weapon normally combines a power source, thermal-control equipment, beam director, electro-optical or infrared tracking sensors, fire-control software, and a safety system that prevents hazardous beam propagation outside the approved engagement geometry. The defeat mechanism is thermal. The laser must hold energy on a vulnerable section of the drone long enough to burn or weaken a propeller arm, motor housing, battery compartment, airframe skin, sensor aperture, or flight-control component. Against a small quadcopter, the engagement may be measured in seconds, but the requirement for stable tracking is strict: wind, evasive movement, smoke, dust, rain, fog, beam jitter, and range all influence dwell time and lethality. This makes the laser useful for point defense around hangars, ammunition storage areas, command facilities, radar sites, fuel farms, and aircraft parking zones, but less suitable as a stand-alone answer to all low-altitude threats.

Publicly available industry data show the kind of laser technology likely to shape the pilot program, even if the Department has not named the selected systems. AeroVironment delivered the first two Army Multi-Purpose High Energy Laser prototypes to the U.S. Army Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office in September 2025, using a 20-kW-class LOCUST laser weapon mounted on the General Motors Defense Infantry Squad Vehicle. The company said a second increment would add two Joint Light Tactical Vehicles with a 20-kW-class laser, radar, and command-and-control equipment. AeroVironment’s newer LOCUST X3 is advertised as a 20–35+ kW laser designed for Group 1 to Group 3 unmanned aircraft, with precision tracking software, modular architecture, and fixed-site or vehicle-mounted configurations.

High-power microwave weapons use a different physics chain and solve a different tactical problem. Instead of burning one aimpoint, they transmit radio-frequency energy intended to disrupt or damage electronics inside the target: flight controllers, datalinks, electronic speed controllers, GPS receivers, cameras, and payload-control circuits. Epirus describes its Leonidas family, one of the better-known U.S. high-power microwave counter-drone weapons, as a software-defined, solid-state, long-pulse system using gallium nitride semiconductors for counter-electronics effects. The operational relevance is that a microwave weapon can affect several drones within a sector, which matters when an attacker uses multiple low-cost aircraft to overwhelm one-target-at-a-time defenses. The limitation is deconfliction: commanders must manage electromagnetic effects near friendly radios, base networks, aircraft avionics, navigation aids, medical equipment, and civilian infrastructure.

The site selection appears designed to test different mission sets rather than simply spread equipment across the country. Fort Huachuca offers an intelligence, surveillance, communications, and border-security environment where identification and electronic characterization of drones are central to the mission. Fort Bliss brings the Army air defense community, large maneuver areas, and proximity to the southern border, where drone activity has already forced closer FAA–military coordination. Naval Base Kitsap introduces a maritime and strategic naval infrastructure problem. Grand Forks Air Force Base adds a northern-tier air base with long-range surveillance relevance, while Whiteman Air Force Base brings protection of strategic bomber infrastructure. This mix should generate data on fixed-site defense, border employment, airfield safety, electromagnetic compatibility, and protection of high-value assets.

The military value is not that lasers and microwave weapons replace existing counter-drone systems: it is that they reduce the cost and magazine-depth problem created by cheap unmanned aircraft. A Stinger missile, Coyote interceptor, 30 mm airburst round, or guided rocket remains necessary for some targets, but each shot consumes a munition that must be bought, stored, transported, maintained, and replaced. Directed energy changes that calculation when power and cooling are available. A laser engagement is limited primarily by electricity, thermal capacity, target tracking, and weather; a high-power microwave engagement is limited by emitter power, pulse management, safety constraints, and electromagnetic-control measures. This is why the correct tactical architecture is layered: radar, passive radio-frequency detection, electro-optical identification, electronic attack, kinetic interceptors, high-energy lasers, high-power microwave weapons, passive protection, and clear command authority.

The program also reflects a policy correction. The Department’s December 2024 counter-unmanned systems strategy identified unmanned systems as a threat to U.S. forces, assets, and installations at home and abroad, and called for improved detection, active and passive defenses, rapid acquisition, open modular solutions, realistic testing, and measures to reduce the cost imbalance between drones and countermeasures. The Army’s earlier role as executive agent for Group 1 to Group 3 counter-small UAS gave it responsibility for doctrine, requirements, materiel, training standards, research, development, acquisition, and transition into sustainment. JIATF-401 now gives the effort a more operational interagency structure, with U.S. Northern Command and the FAA involved because domestic counter-drone defense is inseparable from civil airspace safety.

For U.S. posture, the decision is important because drone defense is moving from expeditionary force protection into homeland installation defense. The White House’s June 2025 airspace sovereignty order cited cartel drone use for smuggling, prison contraband delivery, and law-enforcement surveillance, and identified military bases and critical infrastructure as frequent targets of unidentified drone incursions. Directed energy gives commanders a non-missile defeat option for recurring, low-cost aerial threats, but the pilot’s real measure of effectiveness will be procedural as much as technical: whether operators can detect, classify, authorize, engage, and assess a drone without closing civilian airspace unnecessarily or interfering with friendly systems. If the five-site test produces reliable data, it could become the template for protecting U.S. bases, ports, bomber facilities, border missions, and overseas installations before drone incursions impose operational disruption rather than after.

Written by Evan Lerouvillois, Defense Analyst.

Evan studied International Relations, and quickly specialized in defense and security. He is particularly interested in the influence of the defense sector on global geopolitics, and analyzes how technological innovations in defense, arms export contracts, and military strategies influence the international geopolitical scene.