Flux RSS Global Navy World Defense News

Global Navy World Defense News

Defense News security coverage report global international analysis technology Military equipment magazine industry armored missile weapons

US Navy eyes NextGen Submarine Rescue System for 72-hour global response to deep-sea emergencies
{loadposition bannertop}

{loadposition sidebarpub}
On September 2, 2026, the Naval Sea Systems Command's Undersea Special Mission Systems Program Office (PMS390) opened an Industry Day in Washington, D.C., to define requirements for the NextGen Submarine Rescue System (NGSRS). The effort aims to replace the legacy Submarine Rescue Diving and Recompression System (SRDRS) with a modular architecture capable of initiating global recovery operations within 72 hours. By reducing aircraft load counts and integrating onboard decompression, the U.S. Navy seeks to expand commercial vessel compatibility and shorten strategic deployment timelines.

The U.S. Navy initiated the NextGen Submarine Rescue System program on September 2, 2026, targeting a 72-hour worldwide Time to First Rescue (TTFR). The NGSRS architecture replaces the legacy SRDRS with modular rescue vehicles capable of handling internal submarine atmospheres up to 5 ATA while reducing total airlift requirements for commercial and military transport aircraft.

Related topic:USS North Dakota rejoins US Navy battle force as new GAO report highlights worsening US submarine crisis

At the heart of the Submarine Rescue Diving Recompression System (SRDRS) is the PRM-1 Falcon, a tethered, remotely operated rescue vehicle that can dive down to 2,000 feet (610 meters), mate with a submarine hatch at angles up to 45 degrees, and rescue up to 16 personnel per trip. (Picture source: US Navy)

On September 2, 2026, the U.S. Navy opened its NextGen Submarine Rescue System (NGSRS) Industry Day in Washington, D.C., to define a replacement for the current Submarine Rescue Diving and Recompression System (SRDRS) with a smaller, modular system able to begin recovering sailors from a disabled submarine anywhere in the world within 72 hours. The effort is led by Naval Sea Systems Command's Undersea Special Mission Systems Program Office (PMS390), with Time to First Rescue, or TTFR, as the central operational metric. The US Navy wants multiple small rescue vehicles, integrated decompression, fewer aircraft loads, compatibility with commercial cargo aircraft and C-17-class military transports, and a smaller footprint allowing more commercial ships to serve as vessels of opportunity.

The replacement is sought within five years of a design-development contract award, while broader submarine search, escape and rescue modernization places Initial Operational Capability no earlier than 2032 and Full Operational Capability in 2040. The September 2 event follows a Reverse Industry Day held on January 20-21, 2026. The January Reverse Industry Day included Rear Admiral Jonathan Rucker, then Program Executive Officer for Attack Submarines, Captain Michael McGlone of PMS390, NAVSEA contracting personnel, and officials responsible for submarine rescue and new technologies. The requirement already centered on a 72-hour worldwide TTFR, with attention focused on system weight, airlift sorties, movement between airport and seaport, availability of a suitable surface ship, installation time aboard that ship, and transit to the DISSUB position. The September effort expands this work into vehicle design, ownership, contracting, operation, maintenance, certification and sustainment arrangements.

PMS390 wants greater use of commercially available products, services and parts, combined with lower maintenance demand, higher reliability and redundancy, and lower life-cycle costs. This would change a support structure that has depended heavily on specialized equipment and contractor services. For instance, Oceaneering International received a contract valued at $156.7 million, covering submarine rescue readiness, engineering, logistics, maintenance, training, certification, and worldwide support from September 10, 2020, through June 30, 2026. The capability being replaced is not a single rescue submarine but a set of systems covering localization, underwater intervention, rescue, pressure management, and surface support. The inventory includes the Submarine Rescue System, Assessment/Underwater Work System (AUWS), Submarine Rescue System-Rescue Capable System, Submarine Rescue System-Transfer Under Pressure, Light Weight Mooring System, and Side-Looking Sonar. The AUWS provides remotely operated underwater intervention and sonar functions before rescue, including inspection of the disabled submarine and work around its rescue seat.

The current rescue capability covers 180 to 2,000 feet of seawater, or 54.9 to 609.6 m, broadly corresponding to the 610 m rescue depth used by several Western submarine rescue systems. It can mate with the common NATO submarine rescue seat with the DISSUB inclined by up to 45 degrees and operate when internal submarine pressure reaches 5 atmospheres absolute. Each sortie carries two tenders and 16 rescuees, meaning the evacuation of a 100-person crew would require at least seven sorties if all survivors were recovered by the vehicle at its maximum stated capacity. That capacity makes launch, recovery, underwater transit, mating, and transfer cycle times nearly as important as maximum diving depth. The existing architecture also provides recompression and decompression treatment at pressures reaching 6 ATA, with capacity for 62 people. This is required because flooding or other damage can leave a surviving submarine compartment pressurized, and personnel exposed to elevated pressure cannot necessarily be returned immediately to 1 ATA without risk of decompression sickness.

The NextGen requirement seeks to move more of that pressure-management function into the rescue vehicle itself. PMS390 wants the vehicle to recover personnel from a DISSUB atmosphere reaching 5 ATA, although 3 ATA may be considered if it produces a major reduction in vehicle dimensions and transport weight. Decompression using air or regulated oxygen must be possible inside the rescue vehicle while it is aboard the vessel of opportunity and after reaching pier side. Portable emergency hyperbaric chambers are also envisaged for critical casualties requiring onward medical evacuation. This creates a direct engineering tradeoff because pressure-resistant hull volume, oxygen equipment, environmental controls, and space for decompression add mass to a vehicle that simultaneously has to become smaller and easier to transport. The U.S. Navy is therefore balancing pressure capability and medical capacity against the weight and dimensions that directly determine strategic mobility.

The 72-hour requirement is primarily a logistics and system-integration problem rather than a question of submersible speed. The current U.S. mission framework maintains 24/7/365 submarine rescue readiness, but different contingencies have different timelines. U.S. submarine sea trials are supported against a 72-hour TTFR objective, while an unplanned worldwide response using the current Submarine Rescue Diving and Recompression System is associated with a 96-hour TTFR. A partnered international response is likewise expected within 96 hours when a U.S. or partner global rescue system is unavailable because of maintenance, exercises, or another commitment. Equipment must be prepared, transported to an airfield, loaded onto strategic transports, flown to a suitable airport, unloaded, moved to a seaport, installed aboard a vessel of opportunity, and carried to the casualty. Weather, sea state, water depth, and the submarine's angle on the seabed can then further delay mating and evacuation.

This sequence explains why reducing aircraft loads is operationally important. Removing several loads can eliminate complete cargo-loading, flight, unloading, and ground transport sequences rather than merely lowering transportation costs. It also reduces the probability that one delayed aircraft prevents the entire rescue system from becoming operational, particularly when specialized modules depend on each other before the first rescue sortie can begin. PMS390 consequently wants the complete system transportable aboard a reasonable number of widely available commercial cargo aircraft while retaining compatibility with the C-17 Globemaster III or comparable military transports. Commercial transport expands the potential airlift pool beyond U.S. Air Force strategic transports that could have competing missions during a crisis. The Navy also explicitly seeks a significant reduction in the number of aircraft required compared with the existing rescue enterprise.

The same approach applies at sea. PMS390 wants a sufficiently small footprint to increase the number of vessels of opportunity capable of embarking the rescue package and is considering arrangements allowing existing shipboard cranes to handle rescue equipment. This would reduce dependence on ships with specialized launch-and-recovery installations, while also cutting the amount of equipment that has to be transported through a port before the vessel can depart for the casualty location. Individual modules are intended to remain portable and configurable, with compatibility for saturation-diving operations. An open-system approach is intended to allow later modifications without major increases in weight, cost or integration time. Other requirements include a removable transfer skirt, configurable lock-in and lock-out capability and commercial certification by a member of the International Association of Classification Societies.

The wider modernization effort extends beyond the rescue vehicle because a DISSUB must first be found, contacted and stabilized. U.S. submarine casualty procedures progress through SUBLOOK, SUBMISS and SUBSUNK conditions as uncertainty over the submarine's status develops into evidence of a loss or confirmation of its position on the seabed. The operational sequence covers search and localization, communications and damage assessment, stabilization of the submarine and crew, and finally escape or rescue. Stabilization can require remotely operated systems to remove debris obstructing a rescue seat and delivery of carbon-dioxide-removal equipment, oxygen, drinking water, food and medical supplies. These actions can extend crew survival while rescue assets are still being transported and assembled. The rescue mission therefore begins well before a crewed rescue vehicle reaches the submarine.

Future requirements include automatic transmission of a submarine's position without requiring crew action and real-time underwater communications that remain available after loss of submarine electrical power. They also include trained pressurized and unpressurized escape options and wide-area seabed search, identification and inspection at maximum U.S. submarine operating depths and in high sea states. Search assets are additionally expected to support object recovery from the seabed. Robotic, uncrewed and autonomous underwater vehicles have a direct role in shortening the interval between SUBMISS and localization, particularly when the last known position leaves a large search area. The same architecture is intended to improve interoperability with AUKUS partners and other submarine-rescue organizations. This would allow U.S. rescue vehicles, sensors, communications equipment, aircraft and surface ships to operate with allied assets when geography makes a multinational response faster.

The geographic record helps explain the emphasis on worldwide deployment. Nine U.S. submarine collisions or groundings identified since 2000 occurred predominantly away from U.S. home waters, with eight of the nine taking place outside U.S. territorial waters. A rescue capability concentrated near a single American naval base therefore does not match the geographic distribution of submarine operations and past accidents. Future planning has considered dependence on international rescue partners, a single improved U.S. system and multiple U.S. systems. Sole reliance on International Submarine Escape and Rescue Liaison Office partners is the least preferred approach, while the longer-term objective favors at least two U.S. capabilities. East Coast and West Coast systems would provide redundancy while shortening deployment distances toward different operating theaters.

International systems demonstrate both the achievable rescue depth and the logistical burden involved. The NATO Submarine Rescue System jointly operated by France, Norway and the United Kingdom can evacuate personnel from a submarine at 610 m and uses transfer-under-pressure arrangements capable of handling up to 72 people. Deploying the complete system, however, involves about 350 tonnes of equipment, 27 trucks and several aircraft. During the September 1, 2026 Flying Fish exercise, the NATO system's Submarine Rescue Vehicle was checked against a loading simulator reproducing the internal dimensions and cargo arrangement of a C-17A Globemaster. Heavy support equipment was tested against an A400M Atlas configuration, including the first use of the A400M for NSRS transport planning. The U.S. NextGen SRS is consequently aimed less at extending rescue depth than at changing this logistics equation with integrated decompression, fewer aircraft loads, a smaller surface footprint, and compatibility with a larger population of vessels of opportunity.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, South Korea, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.

Explore More Defense News

• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News
United States Launches New Strikes on Iranian Military Targets After Attack on U.S. Base
{loadposition bannertop}

{loadposition sidebarpub}
U.S. Central Command has launched another wave of strikes against Iranian military targets around the Strait of Hormuz, hitting Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) air defenses, radar systems, maritime assets, mine-laying capabilities and communications sites. CENTCOM said the operation followed attempted attacks on commercial shipping and U.S. service members, as more than 50,000 American troops remain deployed across the Middle East and vulnerable to possible Iranian retaliation.

The strikes are designed to reduce the IRGC’s ability to detect, coordinate and support attacks across a critical maritime corridor while weakening capabilities used for sea denial and pressure on regional forces. Their effect could directly shape the security of U.S. deployments and commercial shipping as Washington seeks to limit Iran’s capacity to sustain further military action.

Related Topic: U.S. Central Command Iran Strike Wave Features F/A-18E Super Hornet Carrying Probable AGM-154 Joint Standoff Weapon

U.S. Navy fighter aircraft launch from an aircraft carrier during strike operations against Iranian military targets, highlighting the carrier air wing’s role in delivering long-range precision attacks while sustaining U.S. combat power across the Middle East. (Picture source: U.S. Department of War/Defense)

The September 1, 2026, strikes came as Iranian missile and drone activity continued to threaten U.S. forces and regional partners, raising the likelihood of additional American military action if Tehran sustains attacks. CENTCOM’s target selection shows that the United States is not only retaliating, but also trying to dismantle the network Iran uses to detect aircraft and ships, coordinate attacks, defend coastal military infrastructure and threaten maritime traffic through the Gulf.

The Strait of Hormuz gives the confrontation wider strategic and economic significance. The narrow waterway links Gulf energy producers with global markets and carries a substantial share of internationally traded oil and liquefied natural gas, making any sustained disruption a direct concern for Washington, U.S. allies and energy-importing economies. Even limited attacks on shipping, mining activity or the credible threat of closure can increase insurance costs, disrupt vessel movements and place upward pressure on global energy prices.

The U.S. target set is operationally important because it goes beyond destroying individual weapons or facilities. Radar and communications systems allow Iranian forces to build a tactical picture and pass targeting data to air-defense and maritime units, while surface-to-air missile systems protect missile, drone, naval and command infrastructure from U.S. aircraft. By attacking several of these elements together, CENTCOM can reduce the effectiveness of surviving Iranian forces even when those forces are not directly hit.

The renewed attacks on Iranian air defenses also suggest that surviving, repaired or reconstituted sites continue to pose enough of a threat to justify renewed targeting. Suppression of surface-to-air missile systems and supporting radars lowers the risk to U.S. combat aircraft and can create more favorable conditions for follow-on strikes if Tehran continues targeting American personnel or commercial shipping. Preventing Iran from rebuilding an integrated air-defense network would also make it harder for the IRGC to protect missile, drone, naval and command assets from additional attacks.

The maritime component is particularly important because Iran has long relied on asymmetric methods to challenge larger U.S. and allied naval forces in the confined waters of the Gulf. Coastal surveillance systems, fast attack craft, missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles and naval mines can be combined to create a layered threat that forces U.S. forces to devote additional resources to surveillance, escort, air defense and mine-countermeasure missions.

CENTCOM’s specific reference to mine-laying capabilities carries particular operational weight. Naval mines are relatively inexpensive but can impose disproportionate costs by restricting maneuver, slowing commercial traffic and forcing naval forces to clear routes before ships can transit safely. Iran does not need to close the Strait of Hormuz completely to produce strategic effects; even limited mining activity, or a credible threat that mines have been deployed, could delay shipping and require U.S. and allied naval forces to increase route-clearance and protection operations.

The fact that mine-laying capabilities were targeted again indicates that residual Iranian mine warfare capacity remains relevant despite earlier U.S. operations that heavily degraded Iran’s naval forces. Mine warfare does not require Iran to defeat U.S. warships directly. Its military value comes from creating uncertainty, slowing movement and forcing an opponent to spend time, ships and specialized equipment keeping sea lanes open.

The September strikes also continue the pattern established during previous U.S. operations against Iranian coastal surveillance, missile and drone infrastructure, maritime forces and air-defense systems. The latest target set follows the same operational logic by attacking the sensors, communications infrastructure, defensive systems and maritime capabilities that allow the IRGC to threaten movement through the Gulf. This suggests that U.S. operations are increasingly focused on preventing Iran from rebuilding a coherent coastal combat network rather than simply responding to individual attacks.

Force protection remains another central objective. With more than 50,000 U.S. service members operating across the Middle East, attempted attacks against American personnel create a direct requirement for CENTCOM to reduce the systems that could support future strikes. Targeting surveillance and communications infrastructure can make it harder for Iranian forces to coordinate operations, while attacks on air defenses can reduce the protection available to missile, drone and maritime units that could be used against U.S. bases and personnel.

Iran’s continued ability to launch missiles and drones nevertheless shows that earlier U.S. attacks have not eliminated Tehran’s capacity to retaliate. These threats place sustained pressure on U.S. and allied air and missile defenses and can force regional forces to maintain high readiness while potentially expending costly interceptors against comparatively cheaper incoming weapons.

This dynamic increases the likelihood of further U.S. strikes if Iranian attacks continue. Washington can use offensive strikes against sensors, command nodes, air defenses, launch infrastructure and maritime forces to reduce the scale and coordination of future Iranian operations, but the effectiveness of that approach will depend on whether U.S. forces can suppress those capabilities faster than Iran can disperse, repair or rebuild them.

The latest operation can therefore be understood as serving three connected objectives: retaliating for attempted IRGC attacks, protecting U.S. personnel and preventing further threats to commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. By attacking the systems that allow Iran to detect, coordinate, defend and conduct military operations, CENTCOM is seeking to reduce Tehran’s ability to repeat those attacks while preserving U.S. freedom of action across the Gulf.

The confrontation is increasingly becoming a contest over military regeneration as much as destruction. U.S. forces are trying to keep Iranian air-defense, surveillance, communications, maritime and mine-warfare capabilities below the level needed to seriously challenge American operations or disrupt Gulf shipping, while Iran retains enough missile, drone and maritime capacity to impose defensive costs. The outcome of that cycle will determine how much military leverage Tehran can preserve around the Strait of Hormuz and how much risk the United States must accept to keep one of the world’s most important energy corridors open.

Explore More Defense News

• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
U.S. Navy Awards GE $2.87B F414 Engine Deal to Keep F/A-18 and EA-18G Fighter Jets Combat-Ready
{loadposition bannertop}

{loadposition sidebarpub}
The U.S. Navy has awarded General Electric a logistics contract worth up to $2.87 billion to sustain F414-GE-400 engines powering F/A-18E/F Super Hornets and EA-18G Growlers, according to the service. The five-year deal protects the propulsion supply chain needed to keep both fleets combat-ready as they remain central to U.S. carrier air power beyond the end of new Super Hornet production.

Running through August 2031, the agreement will support engine components critical to sortie generation, aircraft availability, and sustained operations at sea. Reliable F414 support will be increasingly important as the Navy extends the operational life of its strike and electronic-warfare fleets while transitioning toward its next generation of carrier-based combat aircraft.

Related Topic: U.S. Navy Clears E-2D Advanced Hawkeye Early Warning Aircraft Upgrade for 2029 Flight Tests

U.S. Navy F/A-18E/F Super Hornet powered by twin F414-GE-400 engines, highlighting the fleet sustained under GE’s new $2.875 billion logistics contract through 2031. (Picture source: U.S. Department of War/Defense)

The Pentagon announced the award on September 1, 2026, covering logistics support for 17 F414 engine components, with an initial $198.22 million delivery order accompanying the contract. The commitment matters because engine availability directly determines how many Super Hornets and Growlers the U.S. Navy can generate for carrier operations while managing the transition toward its future carrier air wing.

Under contract N00383-26-D-UA01, General Electric will perform 90 percent of the work in Lynn, Massachusetts, and 10 percent in Jacksonville, Florida. Naval Supply Systems Command Weapon Systems Support in Philadelphia awarded the sole-source requirement, with subsequent orders expected to be financed through U.S. Navy working-capital funds as sustainment demand develops through 2031. The ceiling value does not mean the U.S. Navy immediately obligated the full $2.8747 billion: the initial delivery order, N00383-26-F-UA01, carries $198.22 million in fiscal 2026 funding, of which $148.67 million was obligated at award, while the broader agreement establishes the maximum potential value of component support over five years.

Performance-based logistics is particularly important for the F414 because propulsion readiness depends on far more than purchasing complete engines. GE is expected to maintain inventories, repair or replace covered components and deliver ready-for-issue parts within negotiated performance standards, shifting the emphasis from individual repair transactions toward assured component availability. A 2025 U.S. Navy procurement notice described the requirement as covering 17 head-of-family national stock numbers encompassing 44 F414-related items, including combustion liners, rotor components, case and vane assemblies, frames, bypass ducts and nozzle assemblies. These parts influence the engine’s hot section, airflow management and structural integrity, making their availability directly relevant to flight-line readiness and depot throughput.

Each F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and EA-18G Growler uses two F414-GE-400 afterburning turbofan engines, each producing roughly 22,000 pounds of thrust. That propulsion performance enables carrier launches, high-energy maneuvering and heavily loaded combat missions, but its operational importance extends beyond aircraft performance alone. U.S. Navy Super Hornets perform fleet air defense, strike, fighter escort, close air support and aerial-refueling missions, while U.S. Navy Growlers provide airborne electronic attack and support suppression of enemy air defenses. A shortage of serviceable F414 modules can therefore reduce the U.S. Navy’s ability to generate strike, electronic-warfare and tanker sorties simultaneously, creating pressure across the wider carrier air wing.

The U.S. Navy has already experienced the relationship between engine sustainment and aircraft availability. Fleet Readiness Center Southeast, which repairs F414 engine modules, has previously reported that efforts to increase mission-capable Super Hornet numbers drove demand across fan, high-pressure compressor, combustor, turbine and afterburner modules, contributing to parts shortages and reduced ready-for-issue engine inventories. The new agreement is consequently as much an availability contract as an engine-support contract. Ensuring predictable access to high-demand components reduces the risk that otherwise serviceable aircraft remain grounded while awaiting propulsion parts, an increasingly important consideration as the U.S. Navy depends on an aging but heavily tasked Super Hornet fleet.

That dependence will continue even as Boeing approaches the end of new-build F/A-18E/F manufacturing. The U.S. Navy ordered its final 17 Block III Super Hornets in March 2024, comprising five single-seat F/A-18Es and 12 two-seat F/A-18Fs, with deliveries scheduled from late 2026 through early 2027. Ending production does not eliminate the industrial requirement surrounding the aircraft. Engines, radar systems, electronic-warfare equipment, mission computers, structural components and depot capacity will still require sustained investment for years after the final fighter leaves the assembly line.

At the same time, the U.S. Navy is extending the useful life of existing aircraft through Block III modernization and the Service Life Modification program, which is intended to increase Super Hornet airframe life from about 6,000 to 10,000 flight hours while introducing cockpit, networking and mission-system improvements. Those upgrades only generate operational value if propulsion readiness keeps pace. A 10,000-hour airframe provides little additional combat capacity if aircraft are unavailable because engine modules or repair parts cannot move through the maintenance system quickly enough, making long-term F414 support an essential part of the U.S. Navy’s broader life-extension strategy.

The same logic applies to the EA-18G Growler. With Growler production already complete, sustainment and modernization are now the principal tools available to preserve the U.S. Navy’s carrier-based airborne electronic-attack force. Keeping its twin F414 engines serviceable is therefore tied directly to the ability of U.S. Navy carrier strike groups to disrupt hostile radars, support suppression of enemy air defenses and protect strike formations operating against increasingly dense integrated air-defense networks.

The timing of the contract also reflects uncertainty surrounding the U.S. Navy’s next-generation carrier fighter. The F/A-XX program has faced budget and schedule pressure, increasing the strategic importance of sustaining existing combat aircraft until a successor can enter operational service in meaningful numbers. Any delay in fielding the next fighter extends the period during which U.S. Navy Super Hornets must absorb fleet air-defense, strike and escort missions, while U.S. Navy Growlers remain essential for electronic attack. That makes propulsion sustainment a hedge against capability gaps during the transition rather than a routine maintenance expense.

The industrial dimension is equally significant. Boeing’s Super Hornet production line is nearing closure, but the wider F/A-18E/F and EA-18G support network must remain capable of supplying engines, components, depot repairs, upgrades and technical expertise for a fleet expected to remain operational for many years. GE’s Lynn facility remains central to that ecosystem, and long-term F414 workload helps preserve specialized engineering, repair and manufacturing skills that would be expensive and difficult to regenerate if lost.

The F414 family also has wider international importance, including service with allied combat aircraft programs and Australian F/A-18F Super Hornets and EA-18G Growlers. The newly announced U.S. Navy logistics contract should not, however, be interpreted as directly financing support for foreign fleets. Its primary significance is domestic: preserving the propulsion base required to keep U.S. carrier aviation combat-ready through a period of fleet aging, production drawdown and uncertainty over future aircraft timelines.

The $2.8747 billion ceiling therefore represents more than a routine sustainment action. As Super Hornet manufacturing winds down, U.S. Navy spending is shifting from purchasing new airframes toward preserving sortie generation, structural life, sensors, weapons integration and engine availability across the aircraft already in service. By extending F414 component support through August 2031, the U.S. Navy is protecting the readiness of the Super Hornet and Growler fleets during a period when both remain indispensable to carrier strike operations and when the schedule for their eventual successors remains uncertain.

Explore More Defense News

• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
Germany Fires LORA Ballistic Missile From Frigate Revealing New NATO Naval Strike Capability
{loadposition bannertop}

{loadposition sidebarpub}
The German Navy has successfully fired Israel Aerospace Industries’ LORA ballistic missile from a German frigate in the North Atlantic, demonstrating a potential ship-launched capability to strike high-value targets hundreds of kilometers inland. The missile was launched on the night of September 1, 2026, according to disclosures by Navy Inspector Vice Adm. Jan Christian Kaack and a German Navy spokesman to Deutsche Presse-Agentur, marking a significant expansion of the combat role German surface ships could perform.

The trial shows how a German frigate could deliver long-range precision fires from the sea against command centers, air defenses, logistics nodes and other critical targets ashore. If adopted, such a weapon would give Germany a mobile deep-strike option that could strengthen NATO deterrence and integrate naval forces more directly into long-range joint operations.

Related Topic: MBDA–Rheinmetall new shipboard laser weapon could enter German Navy service by 2029

A LORA ballistic missile is launched from a ship during an Israel Aerospace Industries maritime firing trial. Germany tested the Israeli-developed LORA from a German Navy frigate in the North Atlantic on September 1, 2026. (Picture source: IAI)

LORA, or Long-Range Artillery, is a precision ballistic missile developed by Israel Aerospace Industries for land and maritime deployment. IAI publicly lists the weapon with a range of 90 to 430 km, a launch weight of approximately 1,600 kg, a length of about 5.2 meters, and a diameter of 624 mm. The missile uses a single-stage solid-fuel rocket motor and combines inertial navigation with GPS guidance, while IAI advertises a circular error probable of around 10 meters. Its high-speed ballistic trajectory and steep terminal approach are intended to reduce enemy reaction time and improve effectiveness against strategic and operational targets such as command centers, missile launchers, air-defense sites, air bases and logistics infrastructure.

The maritime configuration is particularly significant for Germany because LORA is stored in a sealed launch canister and is designed to occupy relatively limited deck space, potentially allowing the Navy to add ballistic strike capability to an existing frigate without developing a dedicated missile ship. IAI had previously demonstrated LORA from a vessel during a 2020 firing campaign against targets at approximately 90 km and 400 km, but the German test carries greater operational relevance because it demonstrates employment from a German Navy warship and therefore implies progress in shipboard launcher installation, command-and-control procedures, safety arrangements, communications and targeting integration.

For the German Navy, the capability represents a potentially important doctrinal change. German frigates have traditionally been optimized for missions including air defense, anti-submarine warfare, escort operations, maritime security and anti-surface warfare, but a ballistic land-attack missile would allow them to influence operations far beyond the immediate maritime battlespace. A frigate operating in the Baltic Sea, Norwegian Sea, or North Atlantic approaches could potentially attack command posts, air-defense systems, missile batteries, air bases, and other critical nodes ashore while remaining mobile at sea, creating an additional strike axis that an adversary would have to locate, track, and defend against.

One major technical question remains unresolved. IAI continues to advertise LORA with a maximum range of 430 km, while the German disclosure reported by dpa indicates that Berlin intends to pursue naval weapons with ranges exceeding 500 km. No public confirmation exists that the missile fired during the September 1 trial was an extended-range LORA variant, so the discrepancy could point to an undisclosed configuration Germany is considering or simply reflect a future procurement requirement beyond the performance of the missile used in the test.

The difference between 430 km and more than 500 km would have meaningful operational consequences. Even at its published maximum range, LORA would allow a German frigate to strike targets far inland while operating beyond the immediate coastline, but additional range would enable the ship to remain farther from coastal anti-ship missile batteries, tactical aviation, submarines and other threats. In the Baltic region in particular, where naval forces would operate inside a dense surveillance and missile environment, every additional kilometer of stand-off distance would increase the number of possible firing locations and complicate an opponent's efforts to predict where a strike could originate.

LORA would also give Germany a different attack profile than conventional land-attack cruise missiles. Its solid-fuel ballistic configuration enables rapid launch and a high-speed flight path, reducing the time available for an adversary to detect the attack, move a time-sensitive target or organize an interception. This makes the weapon especially relevant against relocatable missile batteries, air-defense sites, command facilities and other targets whose destruction could help open corridors for subsequent air, missile or ground operations.

A ship-launched ballistic weapon would also strengthen distributed deterrence because a frigate can reposition over large maritime areas rather than remaining tied to a fixed land-based launcher location. That mobility forces an adversary to monitor a much wider potential firing area and could allow German naval forces to contribute precision fires from directions not normally associated with land-based strike systems. The capability would therefore complement Germany's broader effort to rebuild long-range strike capacity and could integrate naval forces more directly into NATO joint fires and theater-level targeting.

The North Atlantic test should consequently be viewed as more than a missile qualification event. Germany has demonstrated that a ballistic land-attack missile can be employed from one of its frigates, establishing a technical pathway toward turning German surface combatants into mobile contributors to NATO's long-range precision-strike network. The key questions now concern which frigate class would receive the weapon, how many missiles Germany could procure, what launcher architecture would be adopted, when an operational capability could enter service, and whether Berlin will ultimately field the currently advertised 430 km LORA or a longer-range configuration capable of meeting the reported requirement beyond 500 km.

Explore More Defense News

• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
US Navy eyes three foreign frigate designs to rapidly match China's growing production rates
{loadposition bannertop}

{loadposition sidebarpub}
On September 1, 2026, the U.S. Navy initiated formal evaluations of three foreign frigate designs (Japan’s Mogami-class, South Korea’s Chungnam-class, and Türkiye’s Istanbul-class) to rapidly restore surface fleet capacity following the truncation of the domestic Constellation-class program. The foreign procurement framework allocates $1.85 billion in FY2027 funds to acquire up to two overseas-built lead ships before transferring construction and manufacturing processes to American shipyards from hull 3 onward. This strategy aims to bypass domestic shipbuilding delays and establish serial production to counter the rapid numerical expansion of China's surface fleet.

The U.S. Navy's international assessment evaluates Japan's 5,500-ton Mogami-class, South Korea's 4,300-ton Chungnam-class, and Türkiye's 3,100-ton Istanbul-class for a foreign-to-domestic technology transfer model. Under the August 13, 2026 framework, selected contractors must acquire or build U.S. shipyard capacity, with an initial assessment deadline set for November 12, 2026.

Related topic:Brazil confirms talks with U.S. Air Force to use KC-390 Millennium as a new complementary tanker

The three foreign frigate designs being considered by the U.S. Navy are Türkiye’s Istanbul-class (top left), South Korea’s Chungnam-class (top right), and Japan’s Mogami-class (bottom left), and would complement the domestically built FF(X) program (bottom right). (Picture source: STM, X/mason_8718, Japan MoD, US DoD)

On September 1, 2026, USNI News reported that the U.S. Navy was evaluating three allied frigate families for a procurement path intended to restore a conventional frigate force faster than a new clean-sheet American design: Japan’s Mogami-class, South Korea’s Chungnam-class FFX Batch III, and Türkiye’s Istanbul-class. The concept would allow no more than the first two U.S. ships to be built at the selected foreign yard before construction transfers to the United States from hull 3 onward. The FY2027 proposal allocated $1.85 billion to the foreign warship effort, initially focused on Japan and South Korea before Türkiye entered consideration, and the U.S. Navy’s international assessment is due on November 12, 2026.

The foreign frigate track is separate from the National Security Cutter-derived FF(X), for which Ingalls Shipbuilding has already started preproduction work but has not received a construction award, and it follows the truncation of the Constellation-class program after that FREMM-derived design grew beyond 7,800 tons. The Istanbul-class, for its part, displaces roughly 3,100 tons and measures 113.2 m; the Chungnam-class reaches 4,300 tons full load and roughly 130 m; the Mogami-class reaches roughly 5,500 tons and 133 m. The procurement decision is therefore a test of whether the U.S. Navy can finally select a ship already being built in serial production, limit U.S.-specific redesign, transfer the manufacturing system to an American yard, and sustain a useful delivery rate before the Chinese frigate inventory grows significantly further.

Under the August 13, 2026 acquisition framework, the selected company would have to construct a new American shipyard, acquire an existing one or take majority ownership of a U.S. yard, then transfer production methods, train American workers, license proprietary manufacturing technologies and establish a U.S.-based construction and maintenance supply chain. The model follows the Coast Guard icebreaker arrangement under which four initial ships would be constructed in Finland and seven in the United States, but the frigate requirement is more complex because a modern combatant combines hull fabrication with combat systems, radars, VLS installation, electronic warfare, aviation facilities and much tighter shock, signature and survivability requirements. Congressional approval also remains uncertain.

Senate Armed Services Committee draft FY2027 language would remove the foreign-construction waiver, while House Armed Services Committee language would prevent authorized funds from purchasing a U.S. warship built overseas. Even if Congress permits the first two foreign-built ships, the decisive schedule is not hull 1. Hull 3 is the real test because the American yard must reproduce the foreign builder’s block construction sequence, tolerances, welding procedures, outfitting order, cable installation, supplier timing, and quality-control system while simultaneously qualifying a new workforce. Congress would therefore need to track the foreign hull 1 delivery date, hull 2 delivery date, start of U.S. hull 3, launch and delivery of hull 3, interval between hulls 3 and 4, and annual output after localization.

Japan’s Mogami-class provides the largest hull and the lowest-manning architecture of the three candidates, but it also enters the U.S. competition with a heavily committed production line. The Mogami-class reaches roughly 5,500 tons full load, 133 m in length and 16.3 m in beam, versus 4,300 tons and roughly 130 m for the Chungnam and 3,100 tons and 113.2 m for the Istanbul. That additional displacement matters because Americanization consumes volume and weight margin very quickly, as seen on the Constellation. Additional U.S. communications equipment, cryptographic hardware, electronic warfare systems, cooling machinery, larger antennas, different VLS equipment, and additional accommodation can move hundreds of tons through a design while also changing electrical demand, center of gravity, and topside stability. Japan’s automation approach is equally significant.

A frigate requiring roughly 90 sailors instead of 125 saves 35 shipboard billets per hull; across 20 ships that is 700 billets before training commands, relief crews and shore support are included. Japan has already demonstrated a serial Mogami production rhythm of roughly two ships annually across the original 12-ship program, centered principally on Mitsubishi Heavy Industries at Nagasaki and the Tamano yard. Japan is now moving directly into 12 larger New FFM or Upgraded Mogami ships, with construction beginning in 2025, the first two launches planned by 2027 and all 12 JMSDF ships scheduled for delivery by 2033. That schedule requires an average production rate in the 2-3 ship-per-year range through the main delivery period. Australia selected this larger version on August 5, 2025, and the first Australian hull is scheduled for delivery in December 2029.

Japan therefore already has 15 Upgraded Mogamis committed to Japanese construction, consisting of 12 for the JMSDF and three for Australia, before any U.S. ship is inserted into the production schedule. New Zealand narrowed its Anzac replacement competition on May 7, 2026, to the Upgraded Mogami and Type 31, while Japan offered the design to Indonesia in May 2026. For the U.S. Navy, Japan offers the most mature example of the exact industrial model Washington is considering, because Australia is already requiring Japanese-built lead ships followed by domestic construction. The corresponding risk is yard saturation: U.S. hulls would compete for design, supplier, and production capacity with 12 Japanese ships and three Australian ships before American localization even begins. South Korea’s Chungnam-class presents a smaller hull than the Mogami but a more distributed shipbuilding base and recent construction intervals that can be measured ship by ship.

The FFX Batch III measures roughly 129-130 m long, 14.8 m wide and 4.2 m in draft, displaces 3,600 tons light and about 4,300 tons full load, reaches 30 knots and has a range of roughly 4,500 nmi at economical speed. Its CODLOG propulsion system combines one Rolls-Royce MT30 gas turbine, four MTU 12V 4000 M43B diesel generators, and two Leonardo DRS permanent-magnet electric motors driving two shafts. That configuration gives the class an electric operating mode useful for reducing machinery noise during anti-submarine operations, which matters because the U.S. Navy lost much of its dedicated surface ASW capacity when the Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates retired and had intended Constellation to restore part of that role. South Korea’s strongest measurable industrial advantage is that the six Batch III ships are distributed across HD Hyundai Heavy Industries, SK Oceanplant, and Hanwha Ocean rather than concentrated at one frigate yard.

FFG-828 was laid down on April 25, 2022, and delivered on December 18, 2024, a roughly 32-month keel-to-delivery interval. FFG-829 was laid down on April 1, 2024, and delivered on June 19, 2026, reducing that interval to roughly 26 months. Hanwha Ocean then laid FFG-833 on January 27, 2026, and FFG-835 on July 23, 2026, only six months apart, demonstrating overlapping construction rather than one-for-one sequential production. Present Korean frigate output is roughly 1-2 ships annually, while simultaneous use of the three principal yards provides a realistic national capacity of roughly 2-3 per year and a potential 3-4 per year surge. U.S. interest has therefore concentrated heavily on industrial capacity. House Appropriations defense personnel visited HD Hyundai on July 10 and Hanwha Ocean on July 11, 2026, while Navy shipbuilding adviser Richard Breckenridge toured Hanwha Ocean, HD Hyundai and SK Oceanplant in late August.

Türkiye’s Istanbul-class is considerably smaller than the Japanese and Korean ships but carries a high weapons density and is already being produced simultaneously at several private yards. The frigate displaces roughly 3,100 tons and measures 113.2 m long, 14.4 m wide and 4.05 m in draft, with roughly 123 personnel. The surface strike battery is unusually large relative to displacement, with 16 Atmaca anti-ship missiles in four quadruple launchers, 16 MiDLAS VLS cells, a 76 mm/62-caliber main gun, a twin 35 mm Gökdeniz CIWS, two 25 mm SMASH remote weapon stations and 324 mm torpedoes. The lead TCG Istanbul uses a shorter tactical-length MiDLAS installation, while TCG Izmir incorporates a deeper strike-length 16-cell installation with sufficient volume for larger Siper-family interceptors and potential vertically launched strike weapons.

If all 16 cells were allocated to a quad-packed smaller interceptor, the theoretical load could reach 64 missiles, although an operational magazine would depend on mission requirements and missile integration. The production history is also compressed. TCG Istanbul was built at Istanbul Naval Shipyard and commissioned on January 19, 2024. Izmir, Izmit, and Içel all began steel cutting on April 10, 2023; Izmir and Izmit were launched on January 10 and January 11, 2025, roughly 21 months after steel cutting, while Içel followed on September 1, 2025. Serial construction then expanded across Anadolu, Sedef and Sefine, and seven İ-class frigates are now simultaneously progressing through three private shipyards. That supports an effective Turkish frigate output of roughly 2-3 ships annually, with 3-4 per year representing a conditional surge. For Washington, the principal issue is not whether Türkiye can fabricate hulls quickly but how much of the Turkish combat system architecture the Navy would retain.

On a 3,100-ton hull with less reserve volume than either the Mogami or the Chungnam, that modification burden could consume much of the schedule advantage created by the original Turkish production rate. China provides the most relevant quantitative benchmark because the PLAN is adding more and more frigates while the U.S. Navy has none in service. The PLAN operates roughly 50 frigates in 2026, predominantly Type 054A ships, compared with zero operational U.S. Navy frigates. The production structure is more important than the inventory total. China commissioned its first Type 054B in January 2025 and the second in March 2025, while at least a third Type 054B is under construction, but Type 054A production did not stop. Another Type 054A entered PLAN service in August 2026. China is therefore overlapping production of the mature Type 054A and the newer Type 054B rather than closing one frigate line before the next reaches volume production.

Both classes are associated with 32-cell VLS installations, giving the PLAN a medium surface combatant fleet with a standardized missile-cell count that the initial U.S. FF(X) is not expected to match through an equivalent fixed 32-cell Mk 41 battery. Long-run Type 054A construction at Hudong-Zhonghua and Huangpu-Wenchong, combined with Type 054B introduction, supports an estimated sustained Chinese frigate rate of roughly 2-4 ships annually. Short periods can produce higher launch or delivery totals when several hulls from both yards reach milestones together. At 2 ships per year, China adds 10 frigates in five years; at 4 per year, it adds 20. If the United States does not begin delivering a new frigate until 2028, the 2026-2028 interval alone corresponds to another 4-8 Chinese frigates at the present estimated rate.

If U.S. hull 3 then requires another three or four years to transition into American production, China could add another 6-16 frigates during that localization interval. The comparison does not mean a Type 054A frigate equals an Arleigh Burke destroyer in combat power. A Burke carries a much larger Mk 41 battery and a higher-end Aegis air defense and strike architecture. The industrial implication is different: China can use dozens of frigates for escort, ASW, patrol, task group screening, and lower-demand far-seas deployments while reserving Type 052D and Type 055 destroyers for missions requiring greater missile capacity and sensor performance. The U.S. Navy frequently assigns Arleigh Burke-class destroyers to missions that do not require the full capability of a DDG, consuming high-end surface-combatant availability.

The central procurement risk is that the U.S. Navy could select a mature foreign frigate and then change enough of it to destroy the maturity it was buying. The Constellation is the immediate precedent. The program began from the Italian FREMM family, displacing approximately 6,000 tonnes at full load, but the U.S. design accumulated enough changes that displacement rose beyond 7,800 tons and construction began before the design was sufficiently complete. The original plan called for 20 ships, but the program was reduced to two hulls in late 2025. The new National Security Cutter-derived FF(X) deliberately moves in the opposite direction, accepting a simpler initial combat configuration to target a first launch in 2028 and attempting to control requirements before construction.

The same discipline would have to govern Mogami, Chungnam, or Istanbul procurement. If the U.S. Navy retains the parent hull, propulsion, major sensors, combat system, and weapons interfaces with only limited U.S. communications and interoperability changes, the foreign shipyard’s existing production data remain relevant. If the Navy instead demands Aegis Baseline 10, EASR or another U.S. radar, Mk 41, ESSM, Standard Missile, Tomahawk, Naval Strike Missile, U.S. EW systems, or other American equipment, the program rapidly becomes a second Constellation-class. Every major substitution introduces structural foundations, electrical load, cooling demand, software integration, electromagnetic-compatibility testing, magazine changes, and additional certification.

On Mogami, the larger hull offers more margin to absorb those changes. On Chungnam, some American components such as the MT30 and Leonardo DRS electric motors already reduce unfamiliarity, but the Korean combat system chain would still require integration decisions. On Istanbul, the smaller hull and high concentration of Turkish sensors and weapons make extensive Americanization proportionally more intrusive. The Navy should therefore place an explicit ceiling on design deviation, like the FF(X), before source selection.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.

Explore More Defense News

• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News
U.S. Navy Opens Race for First Carrier-Based Loyal Wingman Combat Aircraft for Ford and Nimitz Class Carriers
{loadposition bannertop}

{loadposition sidebarpub}
The U.S. Navy is moving to field a carrier-capable autonomous combat aircraft designed to extend the reach and firepower of its crewed fighters, with Naval Air Systems Command opening industry engagement for two functional prototypes on August 31, 2026. The effort could give Gerald R. Ford- and Nimitz-class carriers weaponized, risk-tolerant uncrewed aircraft able to carry sensors and weapons deeper into contested airspace while reducing risk to pilots.

The first Collaborative Combat Aircraft increment is expected to combine extended range and autonomous operations with catapult launches, arrested landings, and a compact flight-deck footprint. Integrating these capabilities into carrier air wings would allow the Navy to distribute weapons, sensors, and operational risk across larger formations, strengthening survivability and combat mass against increasingly capable air and missile defenses.

Related Topic: Shield AI Reveals How X-BAT Autonomous Combat Aircraft Could Conduct VTOL Operations from U.S. Navy Carriers

The X-47B Unmanned Combat Air System demonstrator taxis aboard USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75), whose pioneering unmanned aircraft trials helped establish experience relevant to the U.S. Navy’s current push for carrier-capable Collaborative Combat Aircraft operating from Ford and Nimitz-class carriers (Picture Source: U.S. Navy)

On August 31, 2026, the U.S. Navy moved its Collaborative Combat Aircraft ambitions decisively toward hardware by opening industry engagement for the first increment of a carrier-capable autonomous combat aircraft. The initiative is aimed at producing two fully functional prototypes on an accelerated timeline, creating a pathway toward weaponized, extended-range and risk-tolerant uncrewed aircraft operating alongside the Navy's crewed fighters. More than another unmanned aviation program, CCA Increment 1 could reshape how a Carrier Air Wing distributes sensors, weapons, range and operational risk across contested battlespace. The development is detailed in Naval Air Systems Command RFI N00019-27-RFI-PMA228-CCA, issued for PMA-228 on August 31 and reproduced by SAM Directory, with industry responses due September 18, 2026.

From ‘Loyal Wingman’ to an Autonomous Carrier Combat System

Naval Air Systems Command, acting on behalf of the Future Advanced Capability Program Office PMA-228, is exploring an Increment 1 prototype that goes considerably beyond the conventional concept of a remotely piloted drone. The Navy describes an affordable, highly capable, risk-tolerant, carrier-capable, weaponized and extended-range autonomous unmanned air vehicle able to deploy from and recover aboard both Gerald R. Ford-class and Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. PMA-228 wants to reduce technical risk while evaluating range, payload capacity, carrier integration and a minimized flight-deck footprint, with the longer-term objective of strengthening the survivability, lethality and capacity of fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft through collaborative Manned-Unmanned Teaming, or MUM-T. The distinction is important: Navy CCA is not intended merely to fly autonomously from a runway. It must become an integrated element of the Carrier Air Wing and survive the mechanical, environmental and operational demands of naval aviation, including catapult launches, arrested landings, saltwater exposure, constrained deck handling and high-tempo cyclic operations. In this context, deck footprint itself becomes a combat-performance parameter because an aircraft that consumes excessive parking, handling or hangar volume can reduce the total striking power embarked aboard a carrier.

The operational concept also points toward a fundamental change in how U.S. naval aviation generates combat mass. A CCA does not need to reproduce every capability of an F-35C or F/A-18E/F to become operationally decisive. Autonomous teammates could push sensors farther forward, carry additional weapons, act as electronic-warfare or communications nodes, extend targeting networks or operate in threat sectors where committing another crewed aircraft would impose greater tactical and strategic risk. Such aircraft could expand the tactical geometry of a Carrier Air Wing by distributing detection, targeting and engagement functions across larger formations while retaining human judgment at the mission-command level. Navy experimentation already provides evidence of this direction. In December 2025, two BQM-177A aircraft operated autonomously in a Live Virtual Constructive environment in which a virtual F/A-18 acted as mission lead and tasked the autonomous aircraft to defend designated combat air patrol areas against simulated adversaries. NAVAIR said the demonstration advanced its Autonomy Government Reference Architecture and future CCA development. This is a critical conceptual shift: the objective is not necessarily for an aviator to remotely fly every autonomous aircraft, but for crewed platforms to issue mission-level commands to machines capable of executing tactical behaviors with increasing independence.

Ford and Nimitz Compatibility Creates a Uniquely Naval Engineering Challenge

Perhaps the most strategically consequential element of Increment 1 is the requirement to operate across both generations of America's nuclear-powered carrier fleet. Gerald R. Ford-class ships employ the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System, or EMALS, and Advanced Arresting Gear, while Nimitz-class carriers retain traditional steam-driven catapults and variants of the Mk-7 arresting system. NAVAIR describes EMALS as capable of launching aircraft across a wide weight envelope, from lightweight unmanned platforms to heavy strike fighters, while AAG is designed to recover a similarly broad range of aircraft. The legacy Mk-7 remains installed aboard the Nimitz-class. Requiring CCA to interface with both architectures creates a demanding certification challenge involving launch loads, arrestment energy, landing characteristics, structural margins, flight-control logic and carrier approach performance. It also represents a major strategic advantage if achieved: rather than restricting autonomous combat aviation to the newest Ford-class ships, the Navy could create a common CCA capability relevant across the wider CVN force. Such compatibility would accelerate fleet-wide adoption and prevent autonomous combat aviation from becoming a niche technology waiting decades for complete carrier recapitalization.

The RFI shows that the Navy is treating this challenge as an integrated digital, software and airworthiness problem rather than simply an airframe competition. NAVAIR is seeking autonomy software baselines and certification artifacts, digital design models and a digital twin, scalable manufacturing information, modeling and simulation data, Live Virtual Constructive test products, flight telemetry, instrumentation and documentation supporting Flight Clearance for CVN qualification testing. Particularly revealing is the requirement for a “Platform In A Box” digital representation separated from command-and-control, Mission Planning and Mission Autonomy systems, alongside government access to hardware-agnostic C2 and human-machine interfaces for independent verification. This points toward a modular architecture in which the aircraft, autonomy stack, mission applications and operator interface can evolve on different technological cycles rather than becoming permanently locked into one proprietary platform. Such separation could give the Navy greater freedom to migrate autonomy applications between air vehicles, introduce new payloads or tactical behaviors through software updates, and maintain competition across future CCA increments. For a combat aircraft family expected to evolve rapidly, ownership and accessibility of the digital architecture may eventually become almost as strategically important as range, signature and payload.

Affordable Combat Mass Could Redefine the Carrier Air Wing

The Navy is also entering CCA with an institutional advantage created by the MQ-25 Stingrayprogram. MQ-25 is establishing procedures, command-and-control infrastructure and shipboard experience for operating unmanned aircraft from nuclear-powered carriers, reducing the organizational distance between today's Carrier Air Wing and a future mixed crewed-uncrewed force. The Navy installed its first operational Unmanned Air Warfare Center aboard USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77), with NAVAIR explicitly stating that the Unmanned Carrier Aviation Mission Control System will initially support MQ-25 and can form the foundation for future unmanned systems including Collaborative Combat Aircraft. The MQ-25A itself conducted its first test flight in April 2026, further advancing the Navy's transition toward operational unmanned carrier aviation.

Against this backdrop, CCA Increment 1 is less an isolated drone program than another layer of an emerging naval aviation ecosystem combining autonomous aircraft, government-controlled mission architectures, digital engineering and human-machine teaming. The industrial requirements reinforce that approach: NAVAIR is asking for scalable manufacturing plans, supply-chain resilience and affordability/producibility analysis, indicating that the objective is not simply to build an exquisite demonstrator but to understand how autonomous combat capability could eventually be generated in meaningful numbers. The Air Force's experience provides additional momentum, with its YFQ-42A already in flight testing and CCA operational experimentation underway, while the Marine Corps' 2026 Aviation Plan similarly expands collaborative combat aircraft and MUM-T development. The Navy's problem remains uniquely difficult because its autonomous combat aircraft must combine tactical autonomy and affordable production with the unforgiving requirements of persistent operations at sea.

CCA Increment 1 is best understood not as an unmanned replacement for the F-35C or F/A-18E/F, but as the opening move toward a distributed, software-defined Carrier Air Wing in which crewed fighters and autonomous combat aircraft operate as a coordinated system. In a high-end maritime campaign, extended-range autonomous platforms could move sensing, electronic warfare and weapon capacity farther from the carrier, increase airborne magazine depth, complicate an adversary's targeting problem and allow commanders to expose risk-tolerant machines to threat environments that would otherwise require additional crewed fighters. This is particularly relevant to operations across the vast distances of the Indo-Pacific, where carrier aviation must balance offensive reach against increasingly sophisticated long-range surveillance, air-defense and anti-ship strike networks.

The Navy's deliberate use of the term risk-tolerant is equally important. A carrier-capable autonomous combat aircraft equipped for repeated catapult launches, arrested recoveries, sophisticated mission autonomy and reusable shipboard operations should not automatically be viewed as a disposable asset. Its value lies instead in giving commanders a different calculus of cost, survivability and acceptable operational risk than exists with a crewed fifth-generation fighter. Once autonomous aircraft can reliably launch, recover, receive mission-level tasking, integrate into naval kill webs and return to the carrier for rapid regeneration, Carrier Air Wing combat power is no longer constrained exclusively by the number of pilots and crewed cockpits embarked aboard the ship. The August 31 RFI is still an information and market-research instrument rather than a solicitation, and the Government has made no commitment to award an agreement. NAVAIR is, however, considering a potential prototype project using Other Transaction Authority under 10 U.S.C. §4022 and has indicated that industry feedback could precede a Request for White Papers and subsequent Request for Project Proposal. That acquisition pathway, combined with scalable manufacturing, modular open standards and government-accessible autonomy architecture, signals a clear emphasis on speed and technological adaptability.

If Increment 1 succeeds, its greatest contribution may extend beyond whichever prototype reaches the flight deck first. The enduring strategic advantage would be the creation of a carrier-compatible autonomy and integration architecture capable of accepting successive generations of aircraft, software and mission systems at a faster pace than traditional naval combat-aircraft development. By making autonomous combat aviation compatible with both Gerald R. Ford- and Nimitz-class carriers, the United States could gain a powerful mechanism for increasing range, mass, persistence and tactical flexibility across its existing carrier force while preserving the ability of the Carrier Strike Group to deliver sophisticated airpower without dependence on fixed land bases. That combination would represent a significant evolution of one of the U.S. Navy's defining strengths: the capacity to move, concentrate, regenerate and continuously modernize combat airpower from the sea.

Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.

Explore More Defense News

• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News
U.S. Navy Awards Textron $15.47M to Expand Sea-Based Unmanned Aircraft Intelligence Missions
{loadposition bannertop}

{loadposition sidebarpub}
The U.S. Navy has awarded Textron Systems a $15.47 million order to support sea-based unmanned aircraft ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) missions aboard two U.S. Navy vessels, expanding the fleet’s ability to collect intelligence directly from deployed ships. The contract points to a growing emphasis on persistent airborne surveillance that can extend situational awareness without relying on land-based infrastructure.

The work will support both pre-operational and operational activity at undisclosed overseas locations, linking unmanned aircraft more closely to shipboard reconnaissance missions. This capability strengthens maritime domain awareness and gives commanders more flexible options for surveillance, targeting support, and force protection in contested or remote operating areas.

Related Topic: Raytheon Demonstrates 3,700 Km HADALUS Underwater Drone for U.S. Navy Long-Range Missions

A Textron Systems Aerosonde unmanned aircraft launches from a U.S. Navy vessel during an earlier maritime operation. The U.S. Navy has not identified the unmanned aircraft or the two vessels involved in the August 31, 2026 sea-based ISR support award. (Picture source: NAVAIR)

Announced on August 31, 2026, the firm-fixed-price order covers operational support, associated data, environmental shock testing, and familiarization training through May 2028. The inclusion of operational support is significant because it moves the requirement beyond a conventional technology demonstration and toward sustained use in an operational maritime environment, with Naval Air Systems Command at Patuxent River, Maryland, managing the acquisition.

The award is fully funded with fiscal 2026 U.S. Navy operations and maintenance funding, while the locations where the work will be performed remain undisclosed. The U.S. Navy has also not identified either the unmanned aircraft involved or the two vessels that will support the ISR missions, meaning any attribution of a specific aircraft type, vessel class, operating area or fleet would be speculative.

The most important element of the award is its explicit combination of pre-operational and operational support. This indicates that Textron Systems is being contracted not simply to demonstrate technology, but to help prepare, sustain and support a sea-based unmanned ISR capability as the U.S. Navy conducts real-world maritime activity. The inclusion of familiarization training also shows that the requirement extends beyond the aircraft itself, because effective shipboard unmanned aviation depends on personnel understanding mission preparation, aircraft handling, launch and recovery procedures, payload employment, data exploitation and coordination with the vessel’s command structure.

For deployed U.S. Navy forces, unmanned aircraft operating from vessels can extend surveillance beyond the range of shipboard sensors and provide commanders with an elevated, mobile intelligence source. Depending on the sensors carried, such aircraft can contribute to detecting, locating, identifying and tracking maritime contacts while maintaining surveillance over areas that might otherwise require crewed aviation or theater-level reconnaissance assets. That capability is especially relevant during distributed maritime operations, where U.S. Navy vessels can operate across wide areas and cannot always depend on persistent coverage from crewed aircraft, satellites or other ISR assets supporting multiple units at the same time.

A sea-based unmanned aircraft can therefore help close surveillance gaps by giving a deployed vessel access to an ISR asset directly tied to its operations. Greater persistence can improve maritime domain awareness, extend warning time and give commanders more opportunity to classify activity, assess potential threats and coordinate additional surveillance or other responses. It can also reduce demand on crewed helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft for routine reconnaissance missions, preserving those assets for tasks that require greater payload, speed, range or direct human involvement.

The requirement for environmental shock testing is also operationally relevant because unmanned aircraft, sensors and supporting equipment used at sea must remain reliable despite vibration, physical shocks and demanding maritime conditions. Repeated handling, launch, recovery, and maintenance aboard vessels place different stresses on equipment than land-based operations, so survivability and reliability become essential if the U.S. Navy expects the ISR capability to remain available throughout deployment cycles, not only under controlled test conditions.

The contract’s duration through May 2028 provides a sustained support period rather than a short demonstration window. That timeframe could allow the U.S. Navy to gain operational experience, refine shipboard procedures, and assess how sea-based unmanned ISR can contribute to routine deployments, although the public announcement does not disclose mission schedules, operating regions, or the specific surveillance tasks involved.

For Textron Systems, the award adds operational maritime ISR support to its broader work in U.S. military unmanned aviation. For the U.S. Navy, the more important point is that the service is funding a sea-based unmanned surveillance capability aboard two vessels and supporting it through training, environmental qualification and operational assistance, all of which are necessary to move an unmanned aircraft from limited experimentation toward repeatable maritime use.

The $15.47 million value is relatively modest compared with major U.S. Navy aircraft acquisition programs, but its operational significance lies in the mission it supports. Sea-based unmanned ISR can expand a vessel’s surveillance reach, increase persistence over maritime areas and reduce dependence on scarce crewed aviation assets, while the two-vessel scope gives the U.S. Navy an opportunity to build operational experience across more than a single shipboard installation. If the capability proves reliable at sea, the lessons gained through 2028 could help shape how the U.S. Navy integrates unmanned aircraft into distributed surveillance, force protection and maritime situational awareness missions.

Explore More Defense News

• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
France and Sweden Sign €4.3B Deal for 4 Naval Group Frigates to Boost Baltic Air Defense
{loadposition bannertop}

{loadposition sidebarpub}
France and Sweden signed a €4.3 billion agreement on August 31, 2026, for four modern Naval Group frigates that will sharply strengthen Swedish naval air defense in the Baltic Sea. The warships will give Sweden greater ability to protect strategic sea lanes, reinforce NATO forces and counter missile threats near Russia.

Equipped with long-range weapons and advanced air-defense systems, the frigates will extend Sweden’s capacity to detect and engage airborne and ballistic threats at greater distances. Their arrival will strengthen NATO’s maritime deterrence and help protect naval operations across the increasingly contested Baltic region.

Related Topic: Greece Deploys FDI Frigates and F-16 Fighters to Defend Cyprus from Iranian Drones and Missiles

The French Navy’s FDI-class frigate Amiral Ronarc’h represents the Naval Group design Sweden selected for its four future warships under the €4.3 billion agreement signed with France on August 31, 2026. The Swedish frigates will strengthen long-range naval air defense, including protection against ballistic missile threats, while expanding NATO maritime capabilities in the Baltic Sea. (Picture source: X French defense attaché in Sweden)

The agreement was signed during French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit to Sweden, with the first frigate expected to be delivered by Naval Group in 2030. Beyond the four warships, the contract includes weapons, additional equipment and training, giving Sweden a broader high-intensity naval warfare capability at a time when NATO is reinforcing deterrence across its northern and Baltic regions.

Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson emphasized the ships’ ability to contribute to missile defense. He said the frigates will provide long-range capabilities at sea and protection against ballistic missiles, noting that Russia’s war against Ukraine has demonstrated the operational importance of defending military forces and critical infrastructure against this category of weapon. For Sweden, this requirement marks a significant shift from traditional coastal and maritime defense toward a naval force that can contribute to broader air and missile defense operations.

The Swedish frigates will be based on Naval Group’s Frégate de Défense et d’Intervention, or FDI, design, a new-generation surface combatant developed for high-intensity operations. The approximately 4,500-tonne frigate combines anti-air warfare, anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare and long-range surveillance capabilities in a hull measuring roughly 122 meters. France operates the FDI as the Amiral Ronarc’h class, while Greece has selected a heavily armed configuration known as the Kimon class, creating a growing European user base for the French design.

Air defense is expected to be one of the most important capabilities Sweden will receive. The FDI can employ Aster surface-to-air missiles, including the longer-range Aster 30 family, supported by modern radar and combat-management systems capable of detecting, tracking and engaging multiple airborne threats. Depending on the final Swedish weapons configuration, this would allow the frigates to engage combat aircraft, cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles and certain ballistic missile threats at significantly greater distances than Sweden’s existing surface combatants.

The operational effect extends beyond protecting the frigate itself. A warship equipped with long-range surface-to-air missiles can establish a defensive envelope around other naval vessels, military transports and potentially strategically important maritime areas. This would allow Swedish frigates to escort NATO reinforcement convoys or operate within multinational naval groups while providing an air-defense contribution that Sweden’s smaller Visby-class corvettes were not designed to deliver at the same scale.

The contract will also provide weapons and equipment for missions beyond air defense. French officials said the frigates can carry torpedoes and long-range cruise missiles, giving Sweden the potential to combine submarine hunting, surface warfare and extended-range strike missions within the same warship. Anti-submarine capability is particularly important in the Baltic Sea, where Russian submarines, seabed infrastructure and the protection of undersea communications and energy connections have become central elements of NATO maritime planning.

The Baltic's geography shapes these capabilities. The relatively confined sea keeps Swedish, Finnish, Danish, German, Polish, Baltic, and Russian forces within comparatively short operating distances, while Russia retains significant naval, missile, and air capabilities around Kaliningrad and the Gulf of Finland. A Swedish frigate that combines long-range sensors with air-defense missiles, anti-submarine weapons and surface-strike systems could therefore contribute simultaneously to sea control, convoy protection and the defense of NATO forces operating inside a heavily contested missile environment.

Sweden’s position makes this capability strategically important for the alliance. Its coastline dominates much of the western Baltic, while Gotland occupies a critical position in the central part of the sea and can influence military movement between the Nordic region and the Baltic states. Protecting shipping routes around Sweden would be essential during a major NATO reinforcement operation, particularly if allied forces needed to move personnel, ammunition, air-defense systems and other equipment toward Finland or the Baltic states under threat from Russian missiles, submarines and aircraft.

The new frigates will also represent a substantial change in the structure of the Swedish Navy. Sweden has traditionally emphasized smaller surface combatants optimized for operations in coastal waters and the Baltic archipelagos, including the stealthy Visby-class corvettes. Larger air-defense frigates provide greater endurance, additional weapons capacity, and more powerful sensors, allowing Swedish crews to operate longer with NATO naval formations and assume missions that previously depended more heavily on larger allied warships.

Delivery of the first vessel in 2030 gives Sweden an ambitious timeline for introducing this capability. Naval Group will have to construct the frigates while Sweden prepares crews, maintenance infrastructure, weapons support, training and command-and-control arrangements. The inclusion of training in the agreement is therefore operationally significant because introducing a sophisticated air-defense frigate requires more than ship construction; crews must be prepared to manage complex radar tracks, coordinate missile engagements and exchange targeting information with allied aircraft, ships and land-based air-defense units.

The €4.3 billion agreement also strengthens the European defense industrial relationship between France and Sweden. Naval Group gains another major European customer for the FDI design, while Stockholm obtains a frigate already connected to an established French production and weapons ecosystem. A larger European FDI fleet could eventually create opportunities for shared training, maintenance, ammunition procurement and upgrades among France, Greece and Sweden, reducing lifecycle costs while improving interoperability during NATO operations.

The deal has wider political significance because it was concluded during Macron’s push for greater European military autonomy. France has repeatedly argued that European countries need stronger domestic defense industries and must be able to assume more responsibility for their own security. Sweden’s decision to invest billions of euros in French-built warships provides Paris with a significant example of European procurement cooperation at a moment when Washington is pressing NATO’s European members to increase defense spending and conventional military capability.

For Sweden, however, the most important consequence will be measured at sea rather than politically. Four modern frigates equipped for long-range air defense would allow the Swedish Navy to protect larger areas, escort allied forces and contribute more effectively to NATO maritime operations while maintaining anti-submarine and surface-warfare capabilities. Their missile capacity and sensor reach would make them particularly valuable during the opening stages of a Baltic crisis, when Russian forces could attempt to disrupt reinforcement routes before NATO can concentrate additional combat power in the region.

The acquisition consequently strengthens both Swedish national defense and NATO’s wider northern deterrence architecture. By combining long-range surveillance, naval air defense, anti-submarine warfare and potentially long-range strike capability aboard four new frigates, Sweden is moving toward a substantially more capable blue-water and Baltic combat force. When deliveries begin in 2030, the ships could become central to protecting NATO maritime reinforcement routes and denying Russia the ability to exploit the Baltic Sea as an uncontested operating area during a regional conflict.

Explore More Defense News

• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
U.S. Navy to Build Arleigh Burke Flight III Destroyers Into 2040 as China’s Missile Threat Grows
{loadposition bannertop}

{loadposition sidebarpub}
The U.S. Navy plans to continue building Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers into 2040, positioning the Flight III configuration as a core element of its future defense against increasingly complex cruise and ballistic missile threats. Centered on the AN/SPY-6(V)1 Air and Missile Defense Radar and Aegis Baseline 10 combat system, Flight III gives U.S. carrier strike groups a more capable surface-based missile defense asset as Ticonderoga-class cruisers leave service.

According to the U.S. Navy’s FY2027 Modernized Selected Acquisition Report, effective April 21, 2026, planned Arleigh Burke deliveries extend through DDG 150 in August 2040. This long production horizon is strategically significant as the U.S. Navy prepares for operations against adversaries that can generate increasingly dense and sophisticated missile attacks, particularly in the Indo-Pacific.

Related Topic: U.S. Navy to Commission New Flight III Aegis Destroyer USS Ted Stevens for Advanced Air and Missile Defense

Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Jack H. Lucas (DDG 125), the U.S. Navy’s first Flight III destroyer equipped with the AN/SPY-6(V)1 Air and Missile Defense Radar and Aegis Baseline 10, moored at Naval Base San Diego on August 28, 2026. (Picture source: U.S. Department of War/Defense)

The program's scale makes the Arleigh Burke-class a central component of U.S. surface combat power for decades to come. The report states that 76 destroyers have been delivered since the program began in 1985, with 12 ships under construction and 24 under contract across Huntington Ingalls Industries’ Ingalls Shipbuilding in Mississippi and General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Maine. The current acquisition estimate covers 109 destroyers, meaning the delivered fleet represents almost 70 percent of the planned procurement quantity.

The next scheduled Arleigh Burke delivery is DDG 127 in September 2026. This ship is particularly significant because it is the final Flight IIA destroyer, effectively closing one major stage of the DDG 51 production program as construction increasingly transitions toward the more capable Flight III configuration.

The U.S. Navy has already started this transition. DDG 125, the first Flight III destroyer, was delivered on June 27, 2023, followed by DDG 128 in December 2025. According to the current schedule, the next Flight III ships are DDG 129, planned for delivery in August 2027, and DDG 126 in September 2027. The report identifies DDG 125, DDG 126, DDG 128, and follow-on destroyers as Flight III ships, establishing the configuration as the principal version for future production.

What distinguishes Flight III from earlier Arleigh Burke variants is primarily its ability to conduct integrated air and missile defense against multiple categories of threats simultaneously. The configuration combines Aegis Weapon System Baseline 10 with the AN/SPY-6(V)1 Air and Missile Defense Radar and introduces associated electrical-power and cooling improvements necessary to support the new sensor and combat-system architecture. The U.S. Navy specifically identifies the ability to perform anti-air warfare and ballistic missile defense simultaneously as the critical operational capability provided by Flight III.

The SPY-6(V)1 is therefore much more than a replacement radar. Its role is to give the destroyer greater capacity to search for, detect and track demanding airborne and missile targets while Aegis Baseline 10 manages the resulting tactical picture and weapon engagements. In a high-intensity naval battle, that combination is especially relevant when a formation faces multiple threat types at once, including aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles approaching from different directions and following different trajectories.

This capability directly addresses the changing threat environment in the Indo-Pacific. China has developed a large inventory of conventional ballistic and cruise missiles designed to threaten naval forces and bases at considerable distances, creating an operational environment in which U.S. surface forces could face coordinated attacks intended to saturate their defenses. For the U.S. Navy, the challenge is not limited to intercepting individual missiles; it also includes detecting attacks early enough, maintaining tracks on multiple targets, and coordinating defensive engagements across an entire naval formation.

Flight III retains the 96-cell Vertical Launching System of earlier Arleigh Burke destroyers, allowing the U.S. Navy to configure its missile inventory according to operational requirements. The cells can support weapons for air and missile defense, long-range strike, and anti-submarine warfare, giving the destroyer a substantial defensive magazine without sacrificing its offensive role. The report also specifies a 30-knot speed requirement, a 4,000-nautical-mile endurance threshold and the ability to embark two helicopters.

This combination matters operationally because Flight III is not a dedicated missile-defense ship. While SPY-6(V)1 and Aegis Baseline 10 substantially strengthen integrated air and missile defense, the destroyer can still conduct Tomahawk strike missions, anti-surface warfare, and anti-submarine operations. A single Flight III can therefore help protect a carrier strike group while retaining the weapons and sensors needed for offensive operations and maritime control.

The transition becomes more significant as the U.S. Navy retires its Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruisers. These cruisers have traditionally provided carrier strike groups with substantial missile capacity and command-and-control capability for air defense, but the FY2027 acquisition report explicitly states that introducing the more capable Flight III aligns with U.S. Navy priorities to replace cruisers in the integrated air and missile defense mission.

Flight III does not reproduce every characteristic of a Ticonderoga-class cruiser. Instead, the U.S. Navy is emphasizing improved sensor and combat-system performance within the established Arleigh Burke design. The SPY-6(V)1 and Aegis Baseline 10 combination is intended to provide the detection, tracking, command-and-control and engagement capability needed for increasingly demanding fleet-defense operations, while the 96-cell missile battery maintains significant firepower for both defensive and offensive missions.

This approach is also directly relevant to the expansion of China’s surface fleet. Chinese Type 055 large destroyers combine substantial missile capacity with modern sensors and are intended to perform missions that include area air defense and escort of major naval formations. The emergence of these warships alongside China’s land-, air- and sea-launched missile capabilities means U.S. Navy destroyers must operate in an environment where both opposing surface combatants and long-range missile forces can contribute to the threat.

Comparing Flight III and the Type 055 solely by missile-cell numbers, however, gives an incomplete picture of their combat potential. Flight III carries 96 VLS cells, while the Chinese warship has a larger missile-cell capacity, but naval air and missile defense also depends on radar detection range and sensitivity, target discrimination, combat-system performance, interceptor capability, and the ability to exchange targeting information with other forces. Flight III’s principal advantage is therefore the integration of SPY-6(V)1 with Aegis Baseline 10 within the wider U.S. Navy air and missile defense architecture.

The Flight III Aegis Weapon System includes the Command and Decision System Mk 2, Weapons Control System Mk 7, Missile Fire Control System Mk 99, Operational Readiness and Test System Mk 9, and Aegis Display System Mk 2. These systems collectively process sensor information, build the tactical picture and control engagements, allowing the destroyer to operate as part of a wider defensive network rather than relying exclusively on its own radar and weapons.

That networked capability becomes particularly valuable during a mass missile attack. The operational objective is to identify threats as early as possible, establish reliable tracks and provide commanders with sufficient time and information to allocate interceptors efficiently. By combining a more capable radar with an established Aegis engagement architecture, Flight III increases the U.S. Navy’s capacity to defend high-value forces without transforming the Arleigh Burke into a narrowly specialized warship.

The long-term production schedule will progressively expand that capability across the fleet. The report lists DDG 143 for delivery in August 2036, DDG 145 in August 2037, DDG 146 in August 2038, DDG 147 in August 2039, and finally DDG 150 in August 2040. This means SPY-6-equipped Arleigh Burke Flight III destroyers are expected to continue entering U.S. Navy service for about 14 more years under the current schedule.

For the U.S. Navy, maintaining Arleigh Burke construction for that long provides an important bridge between the current surface fleet and future large surface combatants. It allows the service to keep producing a proven multi-mission destroyer while progressively increasing radar performance, missile-defense capacity, and networked combat capability, rather than waiting for an entirely new ship design to deliver those improvements.

The strategic importance of Arleigh Burke Flight III therefore extends beyond the longevity of the DDG 51 production line. As Ticonderoga-class cruisers disappear from the fleet and China continues developing long-range missiles and increasingly capable naval forces, the SPY-6-equipped Flight III gives the U.S. Navy a means to sustain and expand high-end integrated air and missile defense while preserving strike, anti-surface and anti-submarine capabilities. Continuing deliveries through 2040 indicate that the U.S. Navy expects this combination of SPY-6 radar, Aegis Baseline 10 and 96-cell missile capacity to remain central to protecting American naval forces well into the next generation of maritime competition.

Explore More Defense News

• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
USS North Dakota rejoins US Navy battle force as new GAO report highlights worsening US submarine crisis
{loadposition bannertop}

{loadposition sidebarpub}
On August 29, 2026, the U.S. Navy officially returned the Virginia-class attack submarine USS North Dakota (SSN 784) to operational service following a 40-month Extended Drydocking Selected Restricted Availability (EDSRA) at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. The completion marks the shipyard’s first successful depot-level maintenance and modernization cycle performed on a Block III Virginia-class submarine. The availability integrated critical structural repairs, system overhauls, and upgraded bow array technologies to ensure readiness across the attack submarine fleet.

In parallel, a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report released in late August 2026 found that severe shipyard maintenance delays and backlogs caused the U.S. Navy to lose over 15,000 operational attack submarine days and incur $3.4 billion in idle sustainment costs between 2016 and 2025. The audit notes that attack submarine depot overhauls averaged 809 days between FY2021 and FY2025, and projects that 15 additional submarines will incur 14,000 inactive idle days costing $3.1 billion through FY2030. These maintenance backlogs effectively tie up roughly one-third of the 44-boat attack submarine inventory away from active deployments.

Related topic:US Navy destroyer USS Benfold suffers four-day power blackout in South China Sea amid growing fleet crisis

The USS North Dakota's availability period had originally been planned for about 33 months and was valued at roughly $347 million, but the interval from arrival at Portsmouth to formal completion reached 40 months, seven months longer than planned. (Picture source: US Navy)

On August 29, 2026, the Virginia-class submarine USS North Dakota (SSN 784) returned to U.S. Navy service after completing its Extended Drydocking Selected Restricted Availability (EDSRA) at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Kittery, Maine, closing a maintenance and modernization period that had begun with the submarine's arrival on April 28, 2023. The availability had originally been planned for about 33 months and included roughly $347 million in system upgrades and associated work, but the interval from arrival at Portsmouth to formal completion reached 40 months, seven months longer than that planning benchmark. The USS North Dakota entered Portsmouth's Dry Dock No. 2 in September 2023 and remained there until February 26, 2026, meaning the dry-docking phase itself lasted close to 30 months.

The submarine then required almost another six months of pierside completion, integration, testing, and certification before departing Portsmouth for sea trials on August 20, 2026. It arrived at Pier 32N at Naval Submarine Base New London on August 27, two days before the availability formally ended. The submarine had entered the yard less than six months after returning on October 27, 2022, from a seven-month deployment that began on March 29 and included operations in the North Atlantic and European waters with port calls at Tromsø, Faslane, Toulon and Rota. The significance for the wider Virginia fleet is that Portsmouth has now completed its first full depot-level maintenance cycle on the configuration introduced by the USS North Dakota and shared by all eight Block III boats.

The USS North Dakota is the 11th Virginia-class attack submarine, the first Block III boat and the second U.S. Navy warship to carry the state name after the Delaware-class battleship USS North Dakota (BB-29). Its construction contract was awarded to General Dynamics Electric Boat on August 14, 2003. The keel was laid on May 11, 2012; the submarine was launched on September 15, 2013, christened on November 2, 2013, and delivered to the Navy on August 29, 2014. Delivery occurred two days ahead of the contractual date and more than $30 million below the target cost, although the program had encountered quality control and certification problems before commissioning. A May 2014 commissioning had to be postponed after defects in vendor-assembled components required an unscheduled dry-docking, while additional work was necessary to certify the new Block III bow configuration.

The USS North Dakota was ultimately commissioned on October 25, 2014. The submarine is 114.9 m long, with a beam of about 10.3 m, and a submerged displacement of about 7,800 tons. It is powered by one S9G pressurized-water reactor driving steam turbines and a single-shaft pump-jet propulsor, with speed exceeding 46 km/h and test depth greater than 240 m. The Virginia-class baseline crew is 132 personnel, including 15 officers and 117 enlisted sailors, although the USS North Dakota could reach 134. Its reactor core is intended to last for the submarine's full roughly 33-year service life without a mid-life refueling overhaul, which removes one major depot event compared with older U.S. nuclear submarines but does not eliminate long-duration maintenance periods for hull, propulsion, electrical, combat, and auxiliary systems. Block III changed about 40% of the Virginia-class bow, making the USS North Dakota structurally and functionally different from USS Virginia (SSN 774) through USS Minnesota (SSN 783).

The first ten Virginia-class submarines used 12 individual vertical-launch tubes (VLTs) for Tomahawk cruise missiles and a spherical main bow sonar array. The USS North Dakota replaced those 12 dedicated launchers with two large-diameter Virginia Payload Tubes (VPTs), each capable of carrying six Tomahawks, retaining a total capacity of 12 missiles while changing the launcher architecture from 12 small cells to two multipurpose tubes. The VPT design drew on the multiple all-up-round canister arrangement used aboard converted Ohio-class guided-missile submarines. The second major change was the replacement of the spherical sonar with the Large Aperture Bow (LAB) array. The LAB system uses a water-backed configuration rather than the older air-backed spherical arrangement and combines passive and medium-frequency active sonar functions.

These two modifications accounted for most of the roughly 40% bow redesign and altered hull structure, internal arrangements, sonar installation, and payload handling. The Block III purpose was mainly to lower acquisition and lifetime support costs while introducing larger-diameter payload spaces that could later support more flexible weapons and mission packages. Portsmouth's 2023-2026 work therefore provided the shipyard with direct maintenance experience on the first Virginia generation whose bow structure, launchers, and main sonar differ substantially from the original Block I and II design. The USS North Dakota has four 533 mm torpedo tubes for Mk 48 heavyweight torpedoes in addition to the two VPTs holding up to 12 vertically launched Tomahawks. Its acoustic suite includes the Large Aperture Bow sonar, a wide-aperture fiber-optic flank array using three flat panels on each side of the hull, high-frequency active sonar associated with the bow and sail, and tactical and long-range towed arrays.

Systems associated with the class include the TB-16 and TB-34 larger-diameter towed arrays and TB-29 or TB-33 thin-line arrays for longer-range passive detection. Two photonics masts replaced traditional optical periscopes. Those masts use digital color, high-resolution black-and-white, and infrared cameras, allowing visual and infrared imagery to be transmitted electronically into the control room rather than through a hull-penetrating optical tube. Removing the optical periscope requirement allowed the control room to move one deck lower, eliminating the need to position it directly below the sail. Virginia-class boats also use fly-by-wire ship-control systems intended to improve maneuvering in shallow or confined waters, incorporate a lock-in/lock-out chamber for divers, and can reconfigure the torpedo room to accommodate special-operations personnel and equipment.

The USS North Dakota's use in a six-week operational-testing period in the Mediterranean in 2015 that involved unmanned underwater vehicles was therefore consistent with a class increasingly designed to operate external sensors and unmanned systems in addition to torpedoes and cruise missiles. However, the duration of the USS North Dakota's Portsmouth availability is more important for force generation than the date on which the submarine left dry dock. A 33-year service life equals 396 months. The original 33-month maintenance plan would consume 8.3% of that nominal lifetime, while the actual 40-month interval from April 28, 2023, to August 29, 2026, consumed 10.1%. Put another way, more than one-tenth of a 33-year submarine life passed during a single depot availability. The planned $347 million work package equated to $10.5 million for each of the 33 scheduled months, although that ratio includes modernization and component replacement and is not a measure of normal operating cost.

The USS North Dakota's timeline also demonstrates why counting dry-dock days alone understates the readiness burden. The submarine left Dry Dock No. 2 on February 26, 2026, but did not depart for sea trials until August 20, a gap of 175 days. During those 175 days, the dry dock was available for other work, but the USS North Dakota itself was still not operationally available. For the U.S. Navy's fleet-level readiness, the relevant interval is the full period between induction and return to service, because a submarine undergoing pierside integration, certification, or post-maintenance testing contributes as little deployed presence as one physically sitting in a dry dock. With only 44 attack submarines in the FY2025 inventory, several additional months of post-docking work on each boat quickly translate into multiple submarine-years of unavailable capacity across the force.

Portsmouth itself illustrates why attack submarine maintenance cannot be measured simply by the number or length of dry docks. The yard dates to 1800, ended submarine construction after USS Sand Lance in 1969, and now concentrates on overhaul, repair, and modernization of nuclear-powered submarines. Naval Support Activity Maine covers more than 120 hectares across its main and associated facilities and supports roughly 8,000 civilian employees and 1,000 military personnel. The yard normally supports about four submarine crews in addition to Coast Guard units. Its three principal dry docks have markedly different dimensions. Dry Dock No. 1 is 132.7 m long, 31.7 m wide and 7.6 m deep. Dry Dock No. 2 is 209.2 m long, 39.3 m wide and 9.25 m deep. Dry Dock No. 3 is 148.1 m long, 21.6 m wide and 11.3 m deep. At 114.9 m, North Dakota occupied only 54.9% of the length of Dry Dock No. 2, leaving more than 94 m of unused longitudinal space, but that does not mean the dock could simultaneously process another SSN.

Nuclear maintenance depends on certified work boundaries, cranes, temporary services, nuclear-qualified trades, electrical and water systems, radiological controls, production shops, engineering support, component availability, testing teams, and specialized tooling. Portsmouth has also had other Virginia-class boats in its workload, including USS Washington (SSN 787) and USS New Mexico (SSN 779). The limiting factor is therefore not whether a 114.9-m hull physically fits inside a 209.2-m dock, but whether the complete industrial organization can move multiple nuclear submarines through disassembly, repair, reassembly, testing, and certification at the scheduled rate. The wider attack submarine fleet also shows why the USS North Dakota's return cannot be treated as an isolated maintenance event.

The U.S. Navy had 44 attack submarines in FY2025, yet maintenance backlogs and shipyard delays had already produced roughly 15,000 lost operational days, according to a new GAO report. Fifteen thousand days equal 41.1 submarine-years of lost availability, nearly the equivalent of removing the entire FY2025 SSN force from service for 11 months. Sustaining Virginia submarines and crews during those unavailable periods generated about $3.4 billion in costs, equivalent to roughly $226,700 for each lost operational day. Maintenance performance also deteriorated between consecutive five-year periods. Attack submarine depot delays totaled 3,040 days in FY2016-FY2020 and 3,454 days in FY2021-FY2025, an increase of 414 days, or 13.6%. Average depot duration increased from 744 days to 809 days, a rise of 65 days, or 8.7%.

An 809-day average equals 26.6 months, meaning a typical depot period now removes a submarine from normal availability for more than two years before additional schedule disruption is considered. Roughly one-third of the SSN force has at times been in maintenance or waiting for maintenance. Applied to a 44-boat inventory, one-third represents 14.7 submarines, leaving only 29.3 outside that maintenance population before accounting for training, certification, transit, crew workups, or other non-deployed status. That is significantly different from a headline inventory figure of 44. The cost of keeping submarines idle compounds the operational loss. A Los Angeles-class attack submarine can cost nearly $220,000 per inactive day and a Virginia-class submarine more than $237,000.

At the Virginia rate, 100 idle days cost more than $23.7 million, one year costs more than $86.5 million, and an 809-day period corresponds to more than $191 million if the daily sustainment figure were applied continuously. The problem is projected to continue. Fifteen attack submarines could enter inactive-idle status between FY2026 and FY2030, creating more than 14,000 additional inactive days. Fourteen thousand days equal 38.4 submarine-years. Expected operating and support costs therefore exceed $3.1 billion, corresponding to more than $221,000 per inactive day. Separate from those boats, submarines awaiting disposal generated about $722 million in costs between 2016 and 2025. The result is a three-part burden on the U.S. Navy: operational submarines are removed from fleet tasking while waiting for or undergoing maintenance, inactive boats continue consuming money and personnel, and decommissioned or decommissioning submarines still require resources before they can be fully disposed of.

Increasing the nominal submarine inventory, subsequently, does not solve that problem unless maintenance throughput increases at the same time. The USS Boise (SSN 764) provides the clearest example of how delay can eventually destroy the economic case for returning a submarine to service. The Los Angeles-class boat last deployed in 2015 and lost its dive certification in 2017. In 2024, the U.S. Navy awarded a $1.2 billion overhaul contract intended to restore the submarine. By April 2026, about $800 million had already been spent, but only about 22% of the work was complete. Finishing the overhaul was expected to require another $1.9 billion, increasing projected total expenditure to roughly $2.7 billion. At that point, the USS Boise was expected to have only about 20% of its planned service life remaining after completion. Therefore, the U.S. Navy terminated the overhaul plan on April 10, 2026, rather than commit the additional funding.

The case demonstrates why maintenance delay is not simply a scheduling issue. Each year spent waiting for work reduces the number of service years available after overhaul, while inflation, labor costs, emergent repairs, and equipment obsolescence can increase the cost of restoring the boat. Eventually, the cost per recovered operational year can become higher than the U.S. Navy is willing to accept, and the fleet loses the submarine permanently even though it remains part of the force structure problem that maintenance was originally supposed to solve. The construction side of the problem provides little margin to replace those losses. The U.S. Navy's force plan requires roughly two Virginia-class submarines per year, while sustaining U.S. requirements and planned AUKUS transfers raise the necessary production rate to about 2.33 annually. Actual sustained output has been closer to 1.0 to 1.2 submarines per year.

At 1.2 boats annually, the industrial base reaches only 60% of the U.S. Navy's two-per-year requirement and 51.5% of the 2.33-per-year U.S.-AUKUS requirement. The annual shortfall is 0.8 submarines against the U.S. Navy-only requirement and 1.13 against the combined requirement. Sustained over five years, production at 1.2 per year yields six submarines, compared with ten needed for the U.S. Navy alone and 11.65 for the combined requirement. The shortfall would therefore reach four submarines against the U.S. Navy target or 5.65 against the higher requirement before accounting for construction delays. The two Virginia-class submarines accepted in 2025 were each more than three years late, showing that nominal annual procurement plans do not translate directly into on-time fleet deliveries.

Virginia production also competes with the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine program for nuclear-qualified welders, engineers, shipfitters, machining capacity, specialized suppliers, and production space. Moreover, the Columbia-class receives the priority because late delivery of those boats could affect both the replacement of the Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarine fleet and the continuity of the U.S. sea-based nuclear deterrent. The USS North Dakota's August 29 return therefore adds one attack submarine to the usable force at a time when the central SSN problem is the gap between inventory, construction output, and actual operational availability. A force of 44 attack submarines can fall effectively below 30 boats outside maintenance or maintenance queues when roughly one-third of the inventory is unavailable for those reasons.

The U.S. operational submarine force is therefore determined by four interacting rates: how quickly new Virginias are delivered, how many older Los Angeles-class boats retire, how long submarines remain in depot maintenance, and how many boats are waiting for maintenance that shipyards do not yet have capacity to begin. Portsmouth completing the first Block III depot cycle removes one submarine from that backlog and provides experience relevant to seven other boats of the same block, but it does not change the basic arithmetic. As long as construction remains near half the combined U.S.-AUKUS requirement and major maintenance periods routinely consume more than two years, the number of SSNs available for deployment will remain materially below the number carried in the U.S. Navy's inventory, a crucial point against Chinese and Russian naval forces.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.

Explore More Defense News

• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News
U.S. Marines Board Suspect Vessel in Pacific as SOUTHCOM Expands Counter-Drug Mission
{loadposition bannertop}

{loadposition sidebarpub}
U.S. Marines with Littoral Combat Force-24 and sailors aboard the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock USS San Antonio (LPD 17) boarded a suspect vessel in the Pacific Ocean on August 28, 2026, as U.S. Southern Command widened its campaign against maritime drug trafficking. The interception moved the 24th MEU from boarding rehearsals into an operational counter-drug mission, giving the force a direct role in disrupting trafficking networks before narcotics can move closer to the U.S. homeland.

The operation demonstrated an amphibious force's ability to locate, approach, board, and secure suspect vessels during a live interdiction mission. That capability extends beyond counter-narcotics, reinforcing the value of embarked Marines and amphibious ships for maritime security, sea-control support, and rapid-response operations across dispersed Pacific routes.

Related Topic: U.S. Launches ISR and Air Mobility Operations in Ecuador as Counter-Cartel Campaign Expands

U.S. Marines with Littoral Combat Force-24 and U.S. sailors aboard the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock USS San Antonio (LPD 17) prepare to board a vessel of interest during a Maritime Interdiction Operation in the Pacific Ocean on August 28, 2026.(Picture source: U.S. Department of War/Defense)

The U.S. Department of War announced the operation on August 30, stating that U.S. forces are deployed across the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility in support of Joint Task Force Western Hemisphere, Department-directed operations and presidential priorities to disrupt illicit drug trafficking, deter malign actors and protect the U.S. homeland. The mission gives SOUTHCOM a mobile boarding force able to turn surveillance and tracking into direct action against vessels suspected of supporting narcotics trafficking.

Littoral Combat Force-24 is centered on the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, or 24th MEU, with USS San Antonio serving as its principal afloat base. The August 28 interception is significant because it shows the force moving from preparation into operational employment, expanding the role of embarked Marines from amphibious readiness and crisis response into sustained maritime interdiction.

The operation followed several weeks of rehearsals involving boat assaults, boarding procedures and integrated maritime interdiction training with Navy warships, including USS San Antonio and the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Gridley. That progression from rehearsal to interception indicates that SOUTHCOM is building a repeatable operational capability rather than conducting an isolated boarding event.

USS San Antonio provides the endurance and mobility needed to sustain that capability across a wide maritime area. The amphibious transport dock can carry hundreds of U.S. Marines and support helicopters, MV-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft, landing craft and small-boat operations, allowing the 24th MEU to remain at sea for extended periods and reposition boarding teams without depending on permanent bases ashore.

That mobility is especially relevant along Pacific drug routes, where trafficking organizations rely on long-distance maritime corridors, refueling networks and support vessels to move narcotics toward Central America, Mexico and the United States. A Marine force embarked aboard USS San Antonio can shift with changing trafficking patterns, giving SOUTHCOM greater flexibility to concentrate forces where intelligence identifies emerging activity.

A small boat is destroyed during a Maritime Interdiction Operation in the Pacific Ocean on August 28, 2026. (Picture source: U.S. Department of War/Defense)

The deployment also strengthens Joint Task Force Western Hemisphere by adding an expeditionary force that can physically intercept and secure vessels once surveillance assets locate them. This shortens the operational chain between detection and action and gives U.S. commanders another option to apply pressure on trafficking networks beyond surveillance alone.

The August 28, 2026, boarding also reflects a broader expansion of U.S. counter-drug operations in the SOUTHCOM region. Washington is increasingly combining military surveillance, Navy presence, partner-nation cooperation and direct action to disrupt maritime logistics networks before shipments reach onward transfer points or approach the U.S. homeland. Related Army Recognition coverage of U.S. counter-drug operations in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific highlights this shift toward a more persistent, military-supported interdiction model.

For the U.S. Marine Corps, the mission demonstrates how the 24th MEU can be used for more than traditional amphibious assault. Marines operating from USS San Antonio can conduct maritime security, vessel boarding, reconnaissance and crisis-response missions while remaining available for higher-intensity contingencies, reinforcing the U.S. Marine Corps’ broader move toward distributed naval operations.

Strategically, the use of the 24th MEU along Pacific drug routes raises the operational risk for trafficking organizations. Smuggling networks must now account not only for Coast Guard patrols and surveillance assets, but also for Navy warships carrying Marine boarding forces able to intervene directly at sea and remain deployed across large areas for extended periods.

The August 28 interception therefore represents a visible escalation in SOUTHCOM’s drug interdiction campaign. By moving from rehearsal to operational boarding, the 24th MEU and USS San Antonio are giving U.S. commanders a mobile force able to disrupt trafficking activity at sea, sustain pressure across Pacific drug routes and support a wider campaign intended to prevent illicit narcotics from moving toward the U.S. homeland.

Explore More Defense News

• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
U.S. Navy Prepares Arresting Gear Upgrade for Gerald R. Ford Aircraft Carrier to Boost Flight Operations
{loadposition bannertop}

{loadposition sidebarpub}
The U.S. Navy is preparing a major reliability upgrade for the Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) aboard USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), with newly released acquisition data detailing a planned fourth-engine solution and additional hardware and software improvements intended to strengthen aircraft recovery during sustained high-tempo flight operations. The modernization effort is expected to reach the carrier in fiscal year 2029.

The new details come from a U.S. Navy Modernized Selected Acquisition Report dated April 21, 2026 and subsequently released by the Pentagon. The report also provides fresh insight into AAG performance during Gerald R. Ford's second operational deployment, when the system reached an instantaneous operational availability rate of 0.987 during the first six months.

Related Topic: U.S. Navy considers Ford-class aircraft carrier redesign to match Trump's WWII island style preference

USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) aircraft carrier operates at sea as the U.S. Navy advances reliability upgrades to its Advanced Arresting Gear, a key system for sustaining high-tempo aircraft recovery and sortie generation during carrier operations. (Picture source: U.S. Department of War/Defense)

The report states that the U.S. Navy USS Gerald R. Ford CVN 78 aircraft carrier had recovered 36,863 fixed-wing aircraft since commissioning in 2017, including 9,634 during its second operational deployment as of March 2026. These figures indicate that the U.S. Navy is now evaluating the Advanced Arresting Gear under sustained fleet conditions rather than only through developmental testing, an important step after reliability problems affected the system during the early years of the Ford-class program. AAG was developed to replace the hydraulic arresting equipment used on Nimitz-class aircraft carriers and is designed to recover a wider range of aircraft weights and speeds, including heavier combat aircraft and future lightweight unmanned aerial vehicles, while reducing maintenance demands over the carrier’s service life.

One of the strongest indicators of improved performance came during a four-day Sortie Generation Rate demonstration involving U.S. Navy USS Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier and Carrier Air Wing Eight. During the event, the carrier established a new single-day cyclic operations recovery record of 134 aircraft while averaging 19 combat-loaded sorties per cycle, with AAG maintaining an instantaneous operational availability of 1.000 and recording no operational mission failures. This matters operationally because carrier effectiveness depends not only on the number and capability of embarked aircraft, but also on how quickly they can be launched, recovered, rearmed and returned to combat. Any interruption in arresting gear availability can disrupt the entire flight-deck cycle and reduce sustained sortie generation during high-tempo operations.

The U.S. Navy’s performance data also shows that CVN 78 achieved a 45-second operational aircraft recovery interval on July 7, 2025. System analysis supports recovering 28 aircraft in 21 minutes, while earlier land-based testing demonstrated 28 recoveries in 22.3 minutes using a single-wire configuration. Together, these figures indicate that AAG is moving closer to the recovery tempo needed for dense cyclic flight operations, where rapid aircraft turnaround is essential to maintaining strike, air-defense, electronic-warfare and surveillance missions over extended periods.

The improvement is particularly significant because the system installed aboard Gerald R. Ford currently uses a three-wire, three-engine configuration, while the original operational availability requirement was established around a three-wire, four-engine design. The Navy reports that cumulative operational availability remains below the formal threshold, but it has addressed the principal reliability degraders and substantially improved instantaneous performance. During the first six months of the carrier’s second deployment, AAG reached an instantaneous operational availability of 0.987, close to the 0.985 threshold defined for system maturity.

The next major reliability step is planned for 2029, when the U.S. Navy expects to field an alternative fourth-engine solution. According to the acquisition report, this modification is expected to improve reliability by roughly an order of magnitude while also increasing operational availability. Other upgrades planned for the same period include engine-room isolation changes, a Wire 2 backup barricade capability and enhanced high-power fuse protection, which the Navy estimates could more than triple reliability compared with the current configuration. These changes are intended to reduce the risk that a component failure could interrupt aircraft recovery during sustained carrier operations.

The U.S. Navy is pursuing software modernization in parallel. The U.S. Navy is evaluating AAG software performance in the operational environment aboard CVN 78 and has already resolved several high-priority issues through targeted software patches. A longer-term stability effort is intended to address latency and non-deterministic behavior, with installation aboard the carrier also expected in fiscal year 2029. For Gerald R. Ford, the combined hardware and software improvements are directly linked to combat endurance because greater arresting gear reliability reduces the likelihood that aircraft recovery becomes a limiting factor during prolonged periods of high sortie demand.

AAG is also being prepared for expanded interoperability with the F-35C carrier-based stealth fighter. The Navy conducted F-35 risk-reduction testing in fiscal year 2022, followed by deadload compatibility testing in 2023 and manned compatibility testing beginning in January 2024, with the Aircraft Recovery Bulletin expected in fiscal year 2027. Completing that process is important as the F-35C assumes a larger role in carrier air wings, because combining the fighter’s low-observable strike and sensor capabilities with a more reliable launch-and-recovery architecture strengthens the Ford class as a means of sustaining tactical aviation at sea.

The AAG program is tied directly to the broader expansion of the Ford class, with four shipsets planned for CVN 78 Gerald R. Ford, CVN 79 John F. Kennedy, CVN 80 Enterprise and CVN 81 Doris Miller. The Navy’s April 2026 fielding plan identifies operational fielding for CVN 79 in fiscal year 2027, CVN 80 in fiscal year 2031 and CVN 81 in fiscal year 2032. General Atomics is responsible for AAG production under contracts that also cover the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System, including a combined EMALS/AAG production contract for CVN 79 and CVN 80 valued at about $1.74 billion and a separate CVN 81 pre-production and production contract valued at approximately $1.27 billion.

The modernization effort nevertheless carries long-term cost and sustainment pressure. The Navy estimates total AAG acquisition spending at $3.123 billion in then-year dollars under the fiscal year 2027 budget position, while operating and support costs are projected at roughly $3.76 billion in constant 2017 dollars across four shipsets and an expected 50-year service life. The program has also identified 40 bundled obsolescence changes that must be incorporated into production and retrofitted into CVN 78, CVN 79 and CVN 80 to maintain a common fleet configuration, making configuration control and supportability increasingly important as more Ford-class aircraft carriers enter service.

As previously examined by Army Recognition in its coverage of Ford-class carrier modernization, the combat value of the class depends on the combined performance of its nuclear propulsion, electromagnetic launch equipment, arresting gear and increasingly advanced carrier air wing. The same technologies are also drawing international interest, with France working with the U.S. Navy on AAG and EMALS integration for its future aircraft carrier and Rafale compatibility testing already completed as part of that effort. Army Recognition’s coverage of France’s future nuclear-powered aircraft carrier has highlighted how these systems could shape the next generation of French naval aviation.

For the U.S. Navy USS Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier, the operational significance of the 2029 AAG upgrade lies in reducing the probability that aircraft recovery becomes the bottleneck during intense flight operations. If the U.S. Navy achieves the reliability gains projected in the April 2026 acquisition report, Ford-class aircraft carriers will be better positioned to sustain high sortie rates, recover a broader mix of manned and unmanned aircraft, and preserve combat tempo during prolonged operations against a capable adversary.

Explore More Defense News

• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
U.S. Navy to Commission New Flight III Aegis Destroyer USS Ted Stevens for Advanced Air and Missile Defense
{loadposition bannertop}

{loadposition sidebarpub}
The U.S. Navy will add a new Flight III Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer to its fleet when the future USS Ted Stevens (DDG 128) is commissioned on October 3, 2026, in Whittier, Alaska. Its entry into service will increase the Navy’s capacity for integrated air and missile defense as ballistic, cruise, and potentially hypersonic weapons pose growing threats to U.S. naval forces.

USS Ted Stevens combines the AN/SPY-6 radar with an upgraded combat system designed to detect, track, and engage increasingly complex missile threats. The destroyer will strengthen protection for carrier strike groups and forward-deployed forces while expanding U.S. naval air and missile defense capacity in high-end combat.

Related Topic: Inside U.S. Navy Flight III Arleigh Burke Destroyer and Its Unmatched Capabilities.

The future USS Ted Stevens (DDG 128), a Flight III Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer, arrives at Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia, on May 15, 2026. The U.S. Navy will commission the SPY-6-equipped destroyer on October 3, 2026, in Whittier, Alaska. (U.S. Navy photo)

The U.S. Navy announced the commissioning date on August 28, 2026, after Ted Stevens, a Flight III Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer, had already been delivered by Huntington Ingalls Industries and arrived at its future homeport of Naval Station Norfolk in May. Its entry into commissioned service is particularly significant because Flight III represents the largest capability upgrade yet introduced into the long-running DDG 51 program.

USS Ted Stevens will become one of the U.S. Navy's relatively small but growing force of Flight III destroyers built around the AN/SPY-6(V)1 Air and Missile Defense Radar and Aegis Baseline 10 combat system. Unlike incremental improvements in earlier Arleigh Burke variants, Flight III was designed primarily to meet the requirement to conduct more demanding integrated air and missile defense missions against simultaneous and increasingly difficult threats.

That distinction matters as the U.S. Navy prepares its surface force for operations against adversaries capable of combining aircraft, anti-ship cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles in coordinated attacks. A Flight III destroyer can contribute both to the defense of a carrier strike group and to wider-area missile defense while retaining the anti-submarine, surface warfare and long-range strike roles that make the Arleigh Burke class the backbone of the U.S. surface fleet.

The central improvement is the AN/SPY-6(V)1 radar, which replaces the AN/SPY-1D(V) radar installed aboard Flight IIA destroyers. The new S-band active electronically scanned array uses four fixed faces, each containing 37 Radar Modular Assemblies, providing 360-degree coverage and substantially greater sensitivity for long-range detection, discrimination and tracking.

The U.S. Navy rates SPY-6(V)1 at SPY+16 dB sensitivity, representing a major increase over the radar fitted to earlier Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. The improvement is designed to address capability gaps in both ballistic missile defense and conventional air defense as potential adversaries field faster, lower-observable and more maneuverable weapons.

Operationally, the greater radar sensitivity gives the combat system more opportunity to detect difficult targets earlier, maintain tracks in cluttered or electronically contested environments and provide higher-quality data for missile engagements. Digital beamforming and gallium-nitride semiconductor technology also improve rapid search and tracking against ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles and emerging high-speed threats.

Flight III combines the SPY-6(V)1 radar with Aegis Baseline 10, allowing the destroyer to conduct air warfare and ballistic missile defense concurrently with substantially greater efficiency. This simultaneous air and missile defense capability is one of the principal reasons the U.S. Navy developed Flight III, particularly as carrier strike groups and other naval formations face saturation attacks involving threats arriving at different speeds, altitudes, and trajectories.

The increased radar and combat-system performance required substantial changes below deck. Flight III replaces the earlier three 3-megawatt, 450-volt ship-service gas turbine generators with three 4-megawatt, 4,160-volt units, providing significantly more electrical generation capacity to support SPY-6 and its associated electronics.

Cooling capacity was also increased from five 200-ton air-conditioning plants to five 350-ton units. These modifications show how extensively the existing Arleigh Burke-class design had to be adapted to meet the additional electrical and thermal demands of Flight III sensors and combat systems.

These changes distinguish Flight III from the preceding Flight IIA configuration, even though the two variants retain the same basic hull family and much of the established DDG 51 weapon architecture. Flight IIA introduced two helicopter hangars and supports two MH-60R helicopters while retaining the Mk 41 Vertical Launching System, Mk 45 5-inch gun, Standard family surface-to-air missiles, Tomahawk land-attack missiles, Vertical Launch ASROC and torpedoes.

Flight III preserves those multi-mission capabilities but substantially increases the destroyer's ability to sense, classify and manage complex air and missile battles. The principal improvement is therefore not simply additional firepower, but a significant increase in the quality, range and volume of sensor information available to commanders.

USS Ted Stevens consequently does not simply add another missile magazine to the U.S. Navy. Its principal value is the additional high-end sensor and command capacity it can provide to carrier strike groups, surface action groups and joint forces operating inside increasingly contested missile environments.

That capability is particularly relevant in the Indo-Pacific, where long-range anti-ship cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, unmanned systems and increasingly sophisticated targeting networks have become central elements of regional military competition. Flight III destroyers give the U.S. Navy additional capacity to establish defensive coverage around high-value ships while contributing sensor data to the wider joint force.

The capability becomes increasingly important as the U.S. Navy gradually retires its remaining Ticonderoga-class cruisers and shifts more air-defense responsibility onto Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. A Flight III destroyer equipped with SPY-6 and Aegis Baseline 10 can assume a greater share of the surveillance, threat discrimination and engagement-management workload required to protect multiple ships across a large battlespace.

The enhanced detection and tracking capacity also gives commanders more time to decide which interceptor to assign to an incoming threat. The destroyer's 96-cell Mk 41 Vertical Launching System can accommodate combinations of Standard Missile family interceptors, Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles, Tomahawk land-attack missiles and Vertical Launch ASROC weapons.

This allows the ship's missile loadout to be tailored for fleet air defense, ballistic missile defense, offensive strike or anti-submarine warfare. Combined with SPY-6, the Mk 41 system gives Flight III destroyers the ability to detect threats at greater distances and employ different weapons according to the type and trajectory of the incoming target.

This combination of powerful radar coverage and a large missile magazine is especially relevant to defending carrier strike groups and other high-value forces from saturation attacks. Earlier warning and improved track quality do not increase the physical number of interceptors available, but they can improve how efficiently those missiles are employed by supporting engagement sequencing and reducing uncertainty.

Ted Stevens also adds capacity to a destroyer force already carrying a large proportion of the U.S. Navy's day-to-day combat workload. Arleigh Burke-class ships routinely provide carrier escort, forward presence, ballistic missile defense, anti-submarine warfare and land-attack capability, making the class the principal surface combatant of the U.S. fleet.

As of August 29, 2026, the U.S. Navy has 75 commissioned Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers in active service. USS John Basilone (DDG 122), commissioned in November 2024, became the 74th ship of the class, while USS Harvey C. Barnum Jr. (DDG 124) entered commissioned service on April 11, 2026, bringing the active total to 75.

That figure should be distinguished from destroyers already delivered to the U.S. Navy but still in pre-commissioning status. The future USS Patrick Gallagher (DDG 127), the final Flight IIA destroyer, was delivered on May 28, 2026, while Ted Stevens has also been delivered but will not enter commissioned service until October 3.

The commissioning of USS Ted Stevens would therefore raise the active Arleigh Burke-class force to 76 destroyers if no other DDG 51 enters commissioned service beforehand. This growing force includes multiple generations of the class, ranging from early Flight I and Flight II ships to Flight IIA and the new Flight III configuration.

Flight I encompasses the earliest DDG 51 ships, followed by Flight II and the much larger Flight IIA production run. Flight III began with later hulls incorporating the SPY-6(V)1 radar, Aegis Baseline 10, and extensive electrical, cooling, and structural changes necessary to support the new combat-system architecture.

Additional Flight III destroyers are under construction or contract at Huntington Ingalls Industries' Ingalls Shipbuilding and General Dynamics Bath Iron Works. Continuing production at both shipyards gives the U.S. Navy a sustained pipeline of high-end surface combatants while preserving the specialized industrial base required to construct large guided-missile destroyers.

The continued procurement is therefore also an industrial strategy. Maintaining production at both major destroyer shipyards sustains skilled labor, suppliers, and production infrastructure while providing the U.S. Navy with a steady flow of ships incorporating SPY-6 and other modern systems.

The commissioning in Whittier adds an additional strategic dimension to the event. The ship is named for former Alaska Senator Ted Stevens, a World War II Army Air Corps pilot and longtime supporter of U.S. defense programs, while the U.S. Navy has emphasized Alaska's role in protecting northern maritime approaches and Arctic sea lanes.

The U.S. Navy conducts high-latitude maritime security patrols, cold-weather warfare training and joint exercises in the region as strategic competition increasingly extends into the Arctic. Commissioning the destroyer in Alaska therefore connects the ship's namesake with a region whose military importance is increasing as Russia and other powers devote greater attention to northern maritime routes.

Following commissioning, USS Ted Stevens will be homeported at Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia. Its principal contribution will extend well beyond adding another hull to the Atlantic Fleet because Flight III gives the U.S. Navy another destroyer capable of combining long-range surveillance, ballistic missile defense, fleet air defense and offensive strike capability within a single heavily armed warship.

For the U.S. Navy, that is DDG 128's central operational value. As missile speed, maneuverability and attack density increase, fleet survivability increasingly depends on detecting threats sooner, resolving more tracks simultaneously and coordinating defensive weapons before an attack reaches its terminal phase.

USS Ted Stevens brings another SPY-6-equipped Flight III destroyer into that architecture. Its commissioning will strengthen the U.S. Navy's capacity to protect carrier strike groups, defend joint forces, and maintain sea control in missile-intensive operating environments likely to define future high-end naval warfare.

Explore More Defense News

• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
U.S. Navy Deploys Freedom-Class Littoral Combat Ship to Peru for Major 24-Nation Naval Exercise
{loadposition bannertop}

{loadposition sidebarpub}
The U.S. Navy has deployed the Freedom-class littoral combat ship USS Minneapolis-Saint Paul (LCS 21) from Naval Station Mayport for UNITAS 2026, placing the fast, shallow-draft warship alongside forces from 23 other nations in a major multinational exercise off Peru. The deployment highlights how the Navy can use smaller surface combatants to sustain forward presence, operate close to shore and support missions that do not require the full firepower of an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer.

During UNITAS 2026, USS Minneapolis-Saint Paul will take part in combined maritime operations focused on tactical coordination, maritime security and distributed naval activity. Its speed, maneuverability and ability to operate in shallower waters give the multinational force an additional platform for coastal missions while allowing larger U.S. warships to remain available for higher-end combat requirements.

Related Topic: U.S. Navy accepts last Freedom-class USS Cleveland as LCS program ends

The U.S. Navy Freedom-class littoral combat ship USS Minneapolis-Saint Paul (LCS 21) departs Naval Station Mayport, Florida, on August 27, 2026, ahead of a deployment that will begin with participation in the 24-nation UNITAS 2026 maritime exercise off Peru. (Picture source: U.S. Department of Defense)

The U.S. Navy announced on August 28, 2026, that Minneapolis-Saint Paul departed Mayport on August 27 and is scheduled to begin its deployment by joining the 67th iteration of UNITAS off Lima, Peru, starting September 10. The exercise will bring together 24 nations, giving LCS 21 an immediate role in combined maritime operations rather than beginning its deployment with a routine independent transit or presence mission.

UNITAS is the world’s longest-running multinational maritime exercise and is designed to improve tactical proficiency and interoperability among participating military and security forces. For the United States, the exercise provides a recurring framework for practicing how different navies communicate, maneuver, and operate together before those same procedures are required during real-world maritime security operations or regional contingencies.

This makes the selection of Minneapolis-Saint Paul operationally relevant. The Freedom-class littoral combat ship was designed to operate at high speed in near-shore environments while remaining capable of open-ocean operations, allowing it to move between coastal operating areas and broader naval formations during multinational missions.

In the eastern Pacific, those characteristics support missions that depend on mobility, maritime presence, and access to coastal approaches. A smaller surface combatant can support partnership operations, maritime security activities, and distributed presence without requiring the Navy to assign a larger warship to every mission involving U.S. participation.

This is where the role of Minneapolis-Saint Paul differs from that of an Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer. A destroyer provides substantially greater air-defense, missile-strike, anti-submarine warfare, and command capabilities, but many multinational training and presence missions do not require the full combat capacity of an Aegis-equipped surface combatant.

A Freedom-class LCS can therefore fill a different operational niche. Its value during UNITAS will be less about matching a destroyer's firepower and more about providing a maneuverable U.S. Navy warship that can operate with regional partners, support maritime security activities, and maintain a presence across coastal and open-water areas.

This approach also allows the U.S. Navy to preserve higher-end surface combatants for missions in which their larger missile inventories, advanced sensors, and air-defense systems are essential. Using an LCS for multinational engagement can give fleet commanders additional flexibility when U.S. naval forces must sustain commitments across several regions simultaneously.

UNITAS provides a useful environment in which to test that role because multinational operations require more than simply placing ships in the same area. Participating forces must establish communications, coordinate maneuvers, understand common procedures, and operate effectively despite differences in ship design, command structures, and national doctrine.

For Minneapolis-Saint Paul, the exercise will therefore test how effectively the ship and its crew can integrate into a multinational force immediately after completing pre-deployment preparations. The Navy said the departure followed months of maintenance, training, and certification intended to prepare LCS 21 for a wide range of maritime operations.

The ship’s speed and near-shore operating characteristics are particularly relevant to an exercise conducted off Peru. Coastal operating areas can require rapid movement between maritime sectors, interaction with multiple naval forces, and the ability to shift between open-ocean and littoral missions without relying on the deeper operating space generally preferred by larger warships.

That flexibility can support a distributed approach to maritime operations. Instead of concentrating every mission around a small number of large surface combatants, the Navy can employ smaller warships across a wider operating area for presence, surveillance support, maritime security, and cooperation with allied and partner forces.

The deployment also carries broader strategic significance because UNITAS provides Washington with an established mechanism for maintaining military relationships across the Western Hemisphere, particularly along the Pacific-facing coast of South America. Regular multinational exercises help participating navies build operational familiarity that can matter during humanitarian missions, maritime security operations, or higher-intensity contingencies.

For the United States, such cooperation also supports continued access and engagement along strategically important Pacific maritime routes. The eastern Pacific connects North and South American coastal waters with the wider Pacific basin, making regional naval relationships increasingly relevant to the United States' and its partners' ability to monitor and secure maritime activity.

Minneapolis-Saint Paul’s participation should therefore be viewed as more than simply another deployment of a Freedom-class littoral combat ship. UNITAS 2026 gives the Navy an opportunity to demonstrate why it continues to employ ships of this type for missions in which speed, coastal access, multinational integration, and persistent presence may be more important than the larger weapons load carried by a destroyer.

The deployment consequently highlights a practical division of labor within the U.S. surface fleet. High-end destroyers remain essential for missile defense, long-range strike, and major combat operations, while ships such as Minneapolis-Saint Paul can support regional engagement and maritime security missions that might otherwise consume the availability of more heavily armed warships.

By beginning its deployment as part of a 24-nation exercise, U.S. Navy LCS 21 will provide an early indication of how effectively that concept works in practice. Its contribution to UNITAS will depend on how successfully the ship can translate its speed, maneuverability, and ability to operate near shore into useful multinational operational effects while reinforcing U.S. naval presence and improving the ability of participating forces to operate together in the Pacific.

Explore More Defense News

• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
U.S. Navy Tests Harpoon Coastal Missile Defense System to Strike Warships From Shore
{loadposition bannertop}

{loadposition sidebarpub}
The U.S. Navy has successfully tested the Harpoon Coastal Defense System (HCDS), launching a land-based Harpoon anti-ship missile that intercepted a target vessel in littoral waters at California’s Point Mugu Sea Range. The July 2026 developmental test validates HCDS as a mobile coastal defense missile capable of protecting strategic waterways while potentially allowing U.S. forces to threaten hostile warships from shore without exposing U.S. Navy surface combatants to the same level of risk.

The U.S. Navy announced the DT-1 milestone on August 28, 2026, following two days of testing involving the Precision Strike Weapons program office PMX-201, Point Mugu Sea Range, Naval Air Weapons Station technical personnel, and Boeing. The milestone is particularly relevant to Indo-Pacific operations, where land-based anti-ship missiles could reinforce sea denial around islands, naval bases, and maritime chokepoints that Chinese naval forces may use.

Related Topic: U.S. Navy Completes Final Harpoon Block II Missile Update Test for Littoral and Land-Strike Operations

The U.S. Navy Harpoon Coastal Defense System (HCDS) fires a land-based Harpoon anti-ship missile during Developmental Test 1 (DT-1) at Point Mugu Sea Range in California in July 2026, validating its ability to engage maritime targets in littoral waters. (Photo courtesy of Boeing)

DT-1, or Developmental Test 1, is the first formal live-fire stage used to verify that a new or modified weapon system performs as intended under controlled but operationally relevant conditions. For HCDS (Harpoon Coastal Defense System), the test focused on validating the land-based launch sequence, missile integration, targeting process, and the ability to engage a maritime target before the system advances to more demanding evaluation and operational testing.

During the test, a Harpoon missile launched from land successfully engaged a vessel operating in near-shore waters. The U.S. Navy did not disclose the missile variant, firing distance, target characteristics, or engagement geometry, but the event demonstrated HCDS's ability to launch from a coastal position and attack a surface vessel in a complex littoral environment.

The operational importance of HCDS (Harpoon Coastal Defense System) comes from moving proven Harpoon anti-ship firepower ashore. Instead of relying exclusively on destroyers, submarines, aircraft, or other U.S. Navy forces to threaten enemy ships, commanders could position mobile missile launchers near strategic coastlines and waterways, creating additional firing locations that an adversary would have to locate and suppress.

That concept is especially important in the Indo-Pacific. The region contains numerous straits, island passages, and constrained maritime approaches where mobile anti-ship missile batteries could complicate China Navy operations by threatening surface combatants attempting to transit strategically important waters. A battery deployed near a chokepoint would not necessarily need to physically prevent passage to have an operational effect; the possibility of a Harpoon attack could force Chinese destroyers, frigates, amphibious ships, or support vessels to remain farther offshore, alter routes, dedicate additional surveillance assets to finding launchers, or allocate weapons to suppress suspected coastal missile positions.

This capability could reduce the need for U.S. Navy warships to remain continuously inside heavily contested waters simply to provide an anti-surface warfare presence. A concealed land-based missile battery can use terrain, dispersion, mobility, and camouflage in ways that a large surface combatant cannot, potentially allowing the U.S. military to maintain an anti-ship threat while preserving destroyers and other vessels for air defense, long-range strike, escort, and wider fleet operations.

HCDS is based on Boeing’s Harpoon missile family, a combat-proven anti-ship weapon integrated on ships, submarines, aircraft, and land-based launchers. Current Harpoon Block II missiles use GPS-aided inertial navigation and an active radar seeker to conduct over-the-horizon attacks against maritime targets, including in complex coastal environments.

Boeing lists Harpoon Block II with a 227 kg (500 lb) penetration and high-explosive blast warhead and a range exceeding 124 km (67 nautical miles). The U.S. Navy has not confirmed that the missile used during the HCDS developmental test was specifically a Block II configuration.

Harpoon’s low-altitude sea-skimming approach reduces the reaction time available to a targeted vessel. During the terminal phase, its active radar seeker guides the missile toward the ship, requiring defending forces to rapidly detect, track, jam, decoy, or intercept the incoming weapon. For HCDS, however, the missile itself represents only part of the combat capability, because a mobile coastal defense battery also requires accurate maritime targeting information, reliable communications, command-and-control connectivity, and the ability to distinguish hostile vessels within crowded littoral environments.

External sensors could therefore be critical to HCDS operations. Unmanned aerial vehicles, maritime patrol aircraft, satellites, surface vessels, shore-based sensors, and other intelligence assets could potentially provide targeting data to a concealed missile unit operating beyond its own radar horizon. This distributed targeting architecture would be particularly useful across the first island chain, where U.S. and allied forces could deploy anti-ship weapons around key maritime approaches.

As Army Recognition has examined in coverage of U.S. Indo-Pacific coastal missile deployments, dispersed land-based weapons are increasinglypart of American efforts to complicate Chinese naval freedom of maneuver. HCDS would fit directly into this approach by adding another land-based anti-ship missile option to a wider network of sensors and shooters.

The HCDS (Harpoon Coastal Defense System)would also complement the U.S. Marine Corps’ Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System, or NMESIS, which uses the Naval Strike Missile. Both systems provide land-based anti-ship firepower, but they use different missiles and are being developed around different operational requirements.

The U.S. Marine Corps Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) launches a Naval Strike Missile during a live-fire exercise, demonstrating the mobile land-based anti-ship capability designed to support sea denial and threaten hostile surface vessels from dispersed coastal positions. (Photo courtesy of U.S. Marine Corps)

NMESIS is specifically designed around highly mobile Marine Littoral Regiment operations and uses unmanned launcher vehicles to support expeditionary sea denial. The Naval Strike Missile employs an imaging infrared seeker and advanced navigation optimized for complex littoral environments, while HCDS instead exploits the existing Harpoon missile family and its mature U.S. and international support infrastructure.

Using both Harpoon and Naval Strike Missile could provide U.S. forces with complementary anti-ship weapons and force an adversary to prepare defenses against different seekers, flight characteristics, and potential launch locations. For Chinese naval forces, the broader problem would be uncertainty, because a surface force operating near contested islands could potentially face anti-ship attacks from U.S. Navy aircraft, submarines, surface combatants, Marine Corps NMESIS units, allied missile batteries, and eventually HCDS launchers hidden ashore.

That distribution of firepower could make suppressing U.S. maritime strike capability much harder. Destroying or forcing away a U.S. Navy warship would not necessarily eliminate the anti-ship threat if mobile coastal missile batteries remained concealed elsewhere in the operating area.

Survivability will nevertheless be critical. Once detected, an HCDS battery could become a priority target for aircraft, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, or other long-range weapons. Effective employment would therefore require mobility, camouflage, emissions control, deception, dispersed firing positions, and rapid relocation after launch.

The Point Mugu engagement is also significant because the target was attacked in near-shore waters rather than an uncomplicated open-ocean environment. Coastlines, islands, commercial traffic, and land clutter can make target identification and missile navigation more difficult, making littoral testing directly relevant to the coastal-defense mission.

The U.S. Navy described developmental testing as part of the process used to evaluate combat readiness and effectiveness through live-fire, tracking, and at-sea events. Additional testing will be required before HCDS can demonstrate the reliability, targeting integration, mobility, and survivability necessary for operational deployment.

The U.S. Navy has not disclosed when HCDS could enter service, how many systems it could acquire, or which units might operate them. Those decisions will determine whether Harpoon coastal defense remains focused on protecting specific strategic sites or becomes a broader U.S. sea-denial capability.

Industrial capacity will also influence its military value. Portfolio Acquisition Executive Munitions, the U.S. Navy organization responsible for developing, procuring, and delivering naval munitions and strike capabilities, is working to align weapons programs and expand production capacity across the defense industrial base.

Harpoon already benefits from decades of operational use and a broad international customer base. This existing infrastructure could give HCDS advantages in training, logistics, sustainment, and interoperability compared with developing a completely new missile. Army Recognition reporting on international Harpoon coastal defense systems has previously highlighted how land-based anti-ship missiles can allow relatively small military units to influence much larger maritime areas.

The same principle is increasingly relevant to U.S. planning as Washington prepares for operations in an Indo-Pacific theater dominated by long distances and strategically important islands. A mobile land-based ship-killing capability can force an adversary to account for threats from concealed shore positions while allowing U.S. Navy warships greater freedom to maneuver outside the most heavily contested zones.

The successful HCDS test therefore represents more than another Harpoon launch. It demonstrates progress toward a mobile U.S. Navy coastal defense missile capable of placing anti-ship firepower on land, expanding the number of locations from which U.S. forces can threaten enemy vessels and reinforcing sea denial around strategic maritime terrain.

Against China, that could make key chokepoints increasingly dangerous for surface forces while allowing U.S. Navy warships to operate more flexibly outside the most heavily contested areas. Combined with NMESIS, submarines, aircraft, surface-launched missiles, and allied coastal defenses, HCDS could contribute another layer to a distributed Indo-Pacific sea-denial network.

The July 2026 Point Mugu test is therefore an important first step: the U.S. Navy has demonstrated that Harpoon can be launched from its HCDS configuration and successfully engage a target vessel in littoral waters. If subsequent testing validates mobility, networked targeting, and combat survivability, the same system could eventually give U.S. forces a concealed, land-based ship-killing capability that can defend key coastlines, threaten Chinese naval forces around strategic waterways, and do so without requiring a U.S. Navy warship to occupy every contested chokepoint.

Explore More Defense News

• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
Australia's first Hunter-class frigate reaches keel laying stage ahead of planned 2034 service entry
{loadposition bannertop}

{loadposition sidebarpub}
On August 24, 2026, BAE Systems Australia officially laid the keel for the first Hunter-class frigate, NUSHIP Hunter, at the Osborne Naval Shipyard in South Australia. Joining two major lower-hull blocks marked the commencement of full structural integration for the Royal Australian Navy's next-generation anti-submarine warfare platform. The milestone transitions the heavily modified British Type 26 design from individual module fabrication into continuous hull assembly following extensive industrial prototyping.

The NUSHIP Hunter features an 8,800-tonne full-load displacement, a quiet CODLOG propulsion system, and an integrated sensor suite comprising CEAFAR2 phased-array radar, S2150 hull sonar, and CAPTAS-4 towed arrays. Representing the lead ship in a revised six-vessel program, the frigate incorporates a 32-cell Mk 41 VLS and the Aegis combat system, with operational delivery projected for 2032.

Related topic:Australian Hunter-class frigates gain direct link to US Aegis missile defense system

Each Hunter-class frigate is assembled from 78 production units consolidated into 22 major blocks, with 20 to 22 of the HMAS Hunter's blocks already under construction by the time of the ceremony. (Picture source: BAE Systems Australia)

On August 24, 2026, BAE Systems Australia laid the keel of the first Hunter-class frigate, the NUSHIP Hunter, at Osborne Naval Shipyard in South Australia, eight years and two months after Australia selected the Type 26-derived design in June 2018 and 26 months after production steel was cut on June 21, 2024. The ceremony joined two lower-hull blocks and marked the point at which separate fabricated sections began forming the first continuous structure of the ship. The HMAS Hunter is being assembled from 78 production units consolidated into 22 major blocks; by mid-2026 more than 60% of the first frigate had entered fabrication or construction, and by the keel event work had started on essentially the entire block set.

This followed a four-year industrial preparation phase beginning in December 2020, during which Osborne constructed five prototype hull blocks to establish welding sequences, dimensional tolerances, panel-line processes, block movement procedures and workforce proficiency before production material for the operational ship was cut. The first construction contract covers the HMAS Hunter, HMAS Flinders and HMAS Tasman, the initial three ships of what is now a six-frigate class. Australia had selected nine Hunters under SEA 5000 Phase 1, but in February 2024, a surface combatant review cut that number to six, eliminating one-third of the planned class before the first ship reached keel assembly.

Current scheduling places the HMAS Hunter's delivery in 2032 and operational entry around 2034, implying about eight years from first production steel to delivery, roughly ten years from first steel to operational service, and approximately 16 years from design selection to operational availability. The HMAS Flinders and HMAS Tasman are expected to follow in 2035 and 2036. The HMAS Hunter's physical dimensions make the frigate class closer in size to a destroyer than to the Anzac-class frigates it replaces. The hull is 151.4 m long and 20.8 m wide, compared with 147.2 m for the Hobart-class destroyer, while the Hunter's lightship displacement is approximately 8,167 to 8,200 tonnes, rising to about 8,800 tonnes at full load. Despite its greater displacement, the ship carries only 32 Mk 41 Vertical Launching System cells, compared with 48 on Hobart.

Unconfirmed reports suggest that the final design, or a future configuration, could exceed 10,500 tonnes. Its VLS density is approximately 3.9 Mk 41 cells per 1,000 tonnes at 8,200 tonnes, compared with about 6.9 cells per 1,000 tonnes for a 7,000-tonne Hobart, making Hunter's cell density about 43 percent lower. That difference reflects the volume committed to acoustic isolation, sonar handling equipment, aviation, mission-space capacity, and the larger internal arrangements required for long-duration ASW operations. Propulsion uses one Rolls-Royce MT30 gas turbine, four MTU 20V 4000 M53B high-speed diesel generators, and two electric propulsion motors in a CODLOG arrangement. Electric propulsion is central to the ship's ASW role because the diesel generators can produce electrical power while being acoustically isolated from the propulsion train, reducing shaft-line vibration and machinery noise transmitted into the sea.

Maximum speed exceeds 27 knots, while electric-drive range is 7,000 nmi, equivalent to 13,000 km. The normal complement is about 180 to 183 personnel, including aviation personnel, while accommodation supports 208, leaving 25 to 28 berths for additional specialists, mission personnel, or expanded aviation detachments. The ship's ASW architecture is built around persistent detection at different ranges and depths rather than one principal sonar. Ultra Maritime's S2150 hull-mounted sonar provides active and passive submarine detection, mine and obstacle avoidance, underwater communications, and automated torpedo detection, classification, and localization from the ship itself. Its principal long-range sensor is the Thales Sonar 2087, the British designation of the CAPTAS-4, which combines a low-frequency active source with a passive towed array and variable-depth deployment.

The key advantage of the variable-depth body is physical rather than simply electronic: the active source can be lowered beneath temperature gradients and surface layers that bend sound energy away from a hull-mounted sonar, placing the sensor at a depth where acoustic propagation is more favorable. A cited maximum detection distance of up to 60 km gives a useful scale for the system, but that figure is not constant because submarine acoustic detection depends on water temperature, salinity, sea state, seabed characteristics, water depth, target speed, target machinery noise, and whether the contact is above or below a thermocline. The Towed Body Handling System and Towed Array Handling System completed factory acceptance activity at Brest in 2025, covering the machinery that physically deploys and recovers the active body and passive array.

Above the waterline, one MH-60R Seahawk forms the mobile part of the ASW system. The helicopter can move tens of kilometres from the HMAS Hunter, deploy its own sensors and attack a submarine with Mk 54 lightweight torpedoes, allowing prosecution to continue beyond the ship's immediate sonar position. The Hunter-class itself has two twin torpedo launchers for MU90 Impact lightweight torpedoes, giving the frigate a ship-launched close-range anti-submarine weapon in addition to helicopter-delivered Mk 54s. The tactical chain is therefore explicit: the S2150 monitors the local area, the Sonar 2087 searches farther from the hull and across depth layers, the MH-60R investigates or prosecutes contacts outside the ship's position, and the electric propulsion configuration reduces the ship-generated noise competing with those passive sensors. The Hunter's missile magazine is more constrained than its displacement would suggest.

Each ship has 32 Mk 41 cells, so six ships provide 192 cells across the class. The three Hobart destroyers carry 48 each, or 144 in total, which means Australia's six Hunters and three Hobarts would together field 336 Mk 41 cells across nine Tier 1 crewed surface combatants. Had all nine Hunters been retained, the Hunter class alone would have provided 288 cells, 96 more than the six-ship force, so the 2024 reduction removed the equivalent of two complete Hobart VLS magazines from the future fleet's theoretical cell count. The Hunter's 32 cells have to support several roles. SM-2 uses one cell per missile; Tomahawk would also require one strike-length cell per missile if integration proceeds, while ESSM can be quad-packed at four interceptors per cell. A Hunter carrying eight Tomahawks and 12 SM-2s would already have 20 of 32 cells occupied, leaving 12 cells for up to 48 ESSMs.

Conversely, filling all 32 cells with quad-packed ESSMs could theoretically produce 128 missiles, but would eliminate the long-range air defense and land-attack roles expected from the same launcher. Surface strike is partly separated from this competition by two four-canister Naval Strike Missile launchers, giving eight NSMs per ship without consuming Mk 41 capacity. Using the cited 185 km class range, those eight dedicated missiles provide the ship's principal anti-ship battery while leaving the VLS for air defense and possible land attack. Close defense is also independent of the Mk 41, with two 21-cell Mk 49 launchers for 42 RIM-116C RAM missiles, four quad Nulka active decoy launchers, three MASS Omnitrap infrared and RF decoy launchers, and the Surface Ship Torpedo Defence system.

The result is a layered defensive fit, but the 32-cell strike-length magazine remains a hard numerical limit whenever Australia wants the HMAS Hunter to combine SM-2, ESSM and Tomahawk in the same deployment. The Hunter-class's combat system is also substantially different from that of the British Type 26 despite the common hull origin. The British configuration combines the Type 997 Artisan radar with 48 Sea Ceptor CAMM missiles and 24 strike-length Mk 41 cells. Australia instead selected the Aegis combat system, Saab Australia's 9LV tactical interface and CEA Technologies' CEAFAR2 radar, creating a ship whose combat management and radar architecture is Australian rather than British. The CEAFAR-2L is an L-band gallium-nitride AESA optimized for long-range volume surveillance and early warning, while the CEAFAR-2S is an S-band AESA providing higher-resolution multifunction surveillance and fire control support; the CEAMOUNT supplies additional missile fire control functionality.

The division between L-band and S-band is operationally important because the longer L-band wavelength is useful for wide-area search and track initiation, while S-band supports more precise tracking and engagement-quality functions. The Hunter-class therefore combines the Type 26 hull and acoustic design with a sensor architecture closer to Australia's Hobart modernization path than to the Royal Navy's Type 26 fit. Anschütz completed the Critical Design Review of the Warship Integrated Navigation and Bridge System in March 2026. The WINBS is intended to distribute validated navigation information to bridge and operations-room workstations and into the Aegis combat environment rather than maintaining navigation as a separate ship-control function. Rohde & Schwarz Australia supplies the NAVICS Multi-Level Security integrated communications system, while the ship uses twin configurable communications masts adapted from the Type 26 arrangement.

The engineering burden is consequently not limited to installing Australian equipment into available compartments. Radar tracks, navigation information, communications, electronic interfaces, weapon control, fire control data and tactical displays have to function through Aegis and 9LV as one integrated combat system before the ship can conduct missile engagements or coordinate submarine prosecutions. The mission bay adds another measurable difference between the Hunter-class and more conventionally configured frigates. The Rolls-Royce Mission Bay Handling System supports alternative payloads including a second MH-60R, four 11 m RHIBs, ten 20-foot ISO containers, UAVs and UUVs. Ten 20-foot containers represent 200 ft, or 61 m, of combined nominal container length, although the usable arrangement depends on securing points, access, handling equipment, and the payload carried inside each container.

A separate starboard boat bay accommodates one 9.5 m RHIB, so routine boat operations do not necessarily consume the flexible mission-space allocation. The enclosed hangar supports the standard MH-60R aviation detachment, while the flight deck can accept a CH-47 Chinook for landing, personnel transfer, or cargo movement even though the heavy helicopter is not permanently embarked. The important limitation is that the mission-bay figures are alternative capacities. A second MH-60R requires aviation support equipment, maintenance access, fuel, and weapons-handling arrangements that reduce the area available for containers or boats. Four 11 m RHIBs similarly occupy handling and stowage space that cannot simultaneously be filled with ten ISO containers. UUV operations require more than the vehicle itself, because batteries, chargers, control consoles, spares, recovery gear and maintenance equipment consume additional volume.

The Hunter-class can therefore be configured differently for ASW, maritime security, unmanned system operations or logistic support, but mission modularity does not increase the fixed number of missiles, sonar systems or hulls available to the fleet. For a navy operating across the Indian Ocean, South Pacific and approaches to northern Australia, that distinction is material: one Hunter may carry more mission equipment than an Anzac, but it can still occupy only one geographic position at a time. The reduction from nine Hunters to six therefore has effects that can be measured beyond the loss of three hull numbers. At 32 Mk 41 cells per ship, the reduction removes 96 future VLS cells. At one normally embarked MH-60R per ship, it removes three simultaneous helicopter embarkation positions.

It also removes three sets of S2150 hull sonar, Sonar 2087/CAPTAS-4, CODLOG acoustic propulsion, mission-bay capacity, and command facilities that would otherwise have been available for independent ASW deployments. Using a nominal complement of 180, nine ships would require about 1,620 shipboard positions before shore, training and rotation requirements, while six require roughly 1,080, a difference of about 540 shipboard billets at the simplest hull-complement level. Canberra's replacement for those three Hunters is not another high-end ASW class. The revised force structure instead calls for at least seven and potentially 11 general-purpose frigates of roughly 6,200 tonnes, based on a Japanese Upgraded-Mogami class design path, with the first vessel expected around 2030 and subsequent building shifting to Henderson in Western Australia.

These ships are intended to carry out undersea warfare, escort, strike, force protection and independent operations without reproducing the full cost, size and acoustic specialization of the Hunter. Australia also plans six large optionally crewed surface vessels with vertical launch capability. This produces a different fleet logic from the original three-Hobart plus nine-Hunter model: expensive specialized ASW capacity is capped at six Hunter hulls, routine surface combatant numbers move to the general-purpose frigates, and part of the future missile magazine requirement moves to optionally crewed vessels.

If all currently planned categories are delivered, the future Royal Australian Navy surface combatant force would comprise three Hobart-class destroyers, six Hunter-class frigates, up to 11 Upgraded Mogami general-purpose frigates and six large optionally crewed surface vessels, or as many as 26 combatant hulls across those four groups. That represents more hulls than the earlier model of three Hobarts and nine Hunters, but not more Hunters, and the increase comes from distributing functions across ships of different size, crew requirements and cost. Hobart will remain the fleet's principal high-end air and missile defense ship with 48 Mk 41 cells per hull.

Moreover, its A$4.29 billion Destroyer Capability Enhancement introduces Aegis Baseline 9 and supports weapons including SM-6 and Tomahawk without increasing the physical 48-cell magazine. Hunter contributes 32 cells per hull but concentrates the fleet's highest-end surface ASW architecture through S2150, Sonar 2087, electric propulsion, and MH-60R integration. The general-purpose frigates are intended to supply hull numbers so that routine escort, patrol, and independent missions do not consume one of only nine Hobart/Hunter Tier 1 ships, while the six optionally crewed vessels are intended to add VLS capacity without duplicating the roughly 180-person complement and full aviation and sonar suite of a Hunter.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.

Explore More Defense News

• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News
U.S. Navy Accepts New 90,000-Ton Expeditionary Sea Base for Marine Corps and Joint Operations
{loadposition bannertop}

{loadposition sidebarpub}
The U.S. Navy has accepted delivery of USNS Hector A. Cafferata Jr. (ESB 8), a 90,000-ton Expeditionary Sea Base handed over by General Dynamics NASSCO in San Diego on August 25, 2026, giving U.S. forces a large mobile support hub for operations far from established bases. The ship extends naval reach by bringing aviation support, personnel and equipment closer to contested or remote areas where access to ports may be limited.

ESB 8 is designed to support naval, U.S. Marine Corps and joint missions from the sea, reducing reliance on fixed shore infrastructure. Its combination of mobility, logistics capacity and aviation support strengthens distributed operations and gives commanders more options for sustaining forces across wide maritime theaters.

Related Topic: U.S. President Trump Orders Fifth U.S. Navy Shipyard to Put More Nuclear Submarines & Carriers Back to Sea

An Expeditionary Sea Base is a 90,000-ton mobile offshore support ship that acts as a floating military hub, providing aviation facilities, mission spaces, personnel accommodation, and logistics support for the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, special operations, and joint forces without relying on fixed ports or airfields. (Picture source: U.S. Department of War/Defense)

The U.S. Navy announced the delivery on August 26, 2026, following successful integrated sea trials earlier this summer. ESB 8 gives U.S. commanders another large, relocatable support ship able to sustain distributed forces across multiple theaters, increasing operational flexibility and reducing dependence on fixed logistics infrastructure that could be threatened in a high-intensity conflict.

An Expeditionary Sea Base is essentially a mobile offshore military support hub designed to stage aircraft, personnel, equipment and specialized mission forces at sea. The class combines a four-spot flight deck, aviation hangar, large mission deck, berthing, equipment-staging areas and command-and-control facilities, allowing forces to conduct aviation, special operations, airborne mine countermeasures, maritime security and other expeditionary missions far from conventional bases. The ships are about 239 meters long, displace roughly 90,000 tons fully loaded and can reach approximately 15 knots.

The four-spot flight deck is central to that role because it lets several rotary-wing aircraft operate simultaneously, while the hangar provides maintenance and support space. The class can support aircraft including the MV-22 Osprey and heavy-lift helicopters, giving embarked forces the ability to move personnel, equipment and mission systems without first securing a major airfield ashore.

For the U.S. Marine Corps, that aviation and staging capacity can help move troops and equipment between ships, temporary positions and expeditionary operating areas. For the Navy, the large mission deck can accommodate mission-specific equipment and small craft, while command-and-control spaces support embarked forces, enabling the ship to adapt to different missions based on theater requirements.

This flexibility is increasingly relevant as the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps prepare for distributed operations across the Indo-Pacific and other contested maritime regions. An ESB positioned offshore can move aviation, logistics and mission support closer to dispersed units while avoiding the geographic predictability of a permanent port, airfield or logistics installation.

The ships are particularly valuable because their mission extends beyond conventional logistics. Expeditionary Sea Bases can support airborne mine countermeasures, special operations, maritime security, counter-piracy, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, giving combatant commanders a configurable offshore location from which different military units can operate.

With ESB 8 delivered, the U.S. Navy’s Expeditionary Sea Base force comprises USS Lewis B. Puller (ESB 3), USS Hershel “Woody” Williams (ESB 4), USS Miguel Keith (ESB 5), USS John L. Canley (ESB 6), USS Robert E. Simanek (ESB 7) and Hector A. Cafferata Jr. (ESB 8).

The existing fleet already demonstrates how the U.S. Navy uses these ships to maintain support capacity across geographically separated theaters. Lewis B. Puller supports U.S. 5th Fleet operations from Bahrain, Hershel “Woody” Williams supports U.S. 6th Fleet from the Mediterranean region, while Miguel Keith and John L. Canley support U.S. 7th Fleet operations in the Indo-Pacific.

That distribution places Expeditionary Sea Bases near some of the most strategically important operating areas for U.S. naval forces. Rather than concentrating support capability at a small number of large bases, the Navy can use these ships as movable nodes that support aircraft, personnel, and mission equipment wherever operational demand is greatest.

ESB 8 therefore adds more than another auxiliary ship to the fleet. Its military value comes from allowing the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps to move part of their support infrastructure with the force, giving commanders additional options across large maritime distances or in regions where access to established installations may be restricted.

The ship’s size contributes directly to that capability. At approximately 90,000 tons fully loaded, an ESB offers substantial space for aviation operations, embarked personnel, equipment staging and specialized mission packages while retaining the endurance required for extended deployments. Unlike a destroyer or frigate, its principal purpose is not to deliver offensive firepower but to enable other combat forces to remain effective farther from established support facilities.

This makes the class especially relevant to U.S. concepts for distributed maritime operations and U.S. Marine Corps expeditionary operations. As examined in [Army Recognition coverage of U.S. naval modernization], dispersing ships and forces over wider areas creates a corresponding requirement for logistics and support nodes that can move with them rather than remain tied to vulnerable shore installations.

Relocating a major support hub also improves survivability. Ports, airfields, fuel facilities and established logistics centers have fixed coordinates and could be targeted by long-range precision weapons, while a ship can change position according to the threat environment and operational requirement. ESB 8 therefore helps distribute critical functions across a wider maritime area rather than concentrating them at a small number of predictable locations.

That mobility is particularly important in the Indo-Pacific, where operations may extend across thousands of kilometers and access to suitable ports and airfields cannot be assumed. A sea base capable of supporting aviation, personnel and specialized forces gives commanders another way to sustain operations between established bases and forward operating locations.

The same characteristics also make the ship relevant outside the Pacific. Expeditionary Sea Bases can reinforce special operations and maritime security missions in the Middle East, support U.S. and allied operations around Europe and Africa, or provide aviation and logistical support during contingency operations, giving the Navy a worldwide asset it can reassign as strategic priorities change.

Built by General Dynamics NASSCO, ESB 8 also reinforces the industrial importance of maintaining U.S. capacity to construct very large naval support ships. The program sustains shipyard expertise in large auxiliary construction while expanding the fleet infrastructure needed to support combat forces at range.

The U.S. Navy USNS Hector A. Cafferata Jr. does not primarily increase the number of missiles, guns or combat aircraft available to the fleet. Its significance lies in giving those combat forces a large, mobile support hub that can reposition with operational demand, sustain embarked personnel and aircraft, and reduce dependence on fixed facilities.

For the United States, that combination of capacity and mobility is strategically significant. By placing aviation facilities, mission spaces, logistics functions, and accommodations aboard a 90,000-ton ship that can operate across multiple theaters, ESB 8 expands the geographic reach, flexibility, and survivability of U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps and gives commanders another means of sustaining distributed operations when access to conventional bases cannot be guaranteed.

Explore More Defense News

• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
U.S. Navy Moves Attack Submarine USS North Carolina Closer to Indo-Pacific Return After Modernization
{loadposition bannertop}

{loadposition sidebarpub}
The U.S. Navy is moving closer to returning the Virginia-class attack submarine USS North Carolina to Indo-Pacific operations after major lifecycle maintenance at Pearl Harbor, with the service announcing its successful undocking on August 25, 2026. Bringing SSN 777 back into the rotation will restore a high-demand undersea platform able to hunt submarines, strike land targets, gather intelligence, and operate covertly across the Pacific.

The undocking shifts USS North Carolina into the waterborne phase of its maintenance period, where final work and testing will prepare the submarine for operational service. Its return will strengthen U.S. undersea warfare and sea-denial capacity at a time when survivable, long-range submarines remain central to deterrence and combat power in the Indo-Pacific.

Related topic: U.S. Navy Reclassifies 19 Planned Virginia-Class Submarines to Form Next-Generation Strike Fleet

U.S. Navy Virginia-class fast-attack submarine USS North Carolina (SSN 777) transits Pearl Harbor on August 12, 2026, after completing its undocking, moving the nuclear-powered submarine closer to renewed operational availability for Indo-Pacific missions including anti-submarine warfare, Tomahawk strike, ISR, and special operations support. (Picture source: U.S. Navy)

The U.S. Navy USS North Carolina left Dry Dock 1 on August 12 and shifted to a pier-side location to continue operational preparations after completing the dry-dock phase of its restoration and modernization work. This milestone matters for U.S. Pacific readiness because attack submarines remain among the most requested assets by U.S. combatant commanders, while maintenance delays continue to reduce the number available for operational tasking.

Commissioned on May 3, 2008, the U.S. Navy USS North Carolina is the fourth Virginia-class submarine and is assigned to Submarine Squadron 1 at Pearl Harbor. Its homeport places the submarine directly within the Pacific Fleet’s undersea force structure, where nuclear-powered attack submarines can support deterrence, surveillance, sea-control and strike missions across the Indo-Pacific.

The importance of returning another attack submarine to operational service is reinforced by pressure on the wider U.S. submarine force. In a report released on August 27, 2026, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) said maintenance delays and idle periods had cost the Navy more than 15,000 operational attack-submarine days over the previous decade, while the service had incurred an estimated $3.4 billion supporting submarines and crews that were not providing operational capability.

The GAO also described attack submarines as some of the assets most frequently requested by U.S. combatant commanders because of their ability to collect intelligence covertly and strike enemy targets. Against that background, progress toward returning USS North Carolina to service carries a broader readiness significance than the undocking event alone, because each available SSN expands the force commanders can assign to deployments, exercises and contingency missions.

USS North Carolina belongs to the initial group of Virginia-class submarines designed around a combination of stealth, endurance, advanced sensors and multimission weapons. The submarine is approximately 114.8 meters long, has a beam of 10.36 meters and displaces about 7,800 tons submerged. Its nuclear propulsion system drives a single shaft and provides an officially stated speed exceeding 25 knots.

As one of the first ten Virginia-class submarines, USS North Carolina carries 12 vertical launch system tubes for Tomahawk cruise missiles in addition to four torpedo tubes for Mk 48 Advanced Capability heavyweight torpedoes. This weapons arrangement gives SSN 777 the ability to conduct covert long-range strikes against targets ashore while retaining a powerful anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare capability against hostile submarines and warships.

The Tomahawk capability is particularly relevant to Indo-Pacific operations because a submerged attack submarine can position strike weapons inside or near heavily monitored maritime areas without requiring the visible forward presence of a surface combatant. Combined with nuclear endurance, this allows an SSN to remain concealed, reposition over long distances, and provide commanders with a survivable conventional strike option.

The Mk 48 torpedo provides the complementary undersea and anti-surface element of USS North Carolina’s combat role. Its combination of sonar, acoustic discretion and heavyweight torpedoes allows the submarine to detect, track and engage adversary submarines while presenting a difficult targeting problem for opposing naval forces.

Virginia-class submarines were also designed to perform intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions in addition to traditional submarine warfare. Their ability to operate covertly for extended periods enables them to monitor naval movements, collect information in contested waters and support wider joint-force targeting and situational awareness without revealing their presence.

The class incorporates photonics masts instead of conventional hull-penetrating optical periscopes, using digital visible-light and infrared sensors to support surveillance and navigation. The design also includes a reconfigurable torpedo room and a large lockout trunk supporting special operations forces and associated equipment, allowing Virginia-class submarines to contribute to clandestine insertion and other specialized missions.

USS North Carolina’s progression toward operational status therefore forms part of a wider effort to increase the number of attack submarines available for combatant-command requirements. The Navy must simultaneously maintain boats already in service, introduce newly built Virginia-class submarines and modernize the industrial base supporting both construction and sustainment.

Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard has a particularly important role in that effort because of its location in the central Pacific. As a major repair and maintenance facility for nuclear-powered submarines and surface ships, it allows Pacific-based fast-attack submarines to undergo restoration and modernization closer to their principal operating region.

According to Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, USS North Carolina has been undergoing restoration and modernization during its scheduled lifecycle maintenance period. The U.S. Navy has not publicly detailed the complete modernization package, meaning no specific new combat-system configuration or weapons upgrade should yet be attributed to the submarine beyond its established Virginia-class capabilities.

The U.S. Navy said keeping the project on schedule required close coordination between USS North Carolina’s crew and the civilian shipyard workforce. Project supervisor Khonsa Phommavong and commanding officer Cmdr. Michael Fritts coordinated priorities and technical risks, and Fritts said the combined team overcame challenges tied to the overhaul's complexity without missing the planned schedule.

USS North Carolina is also informally known as the “Lucky Girl,” a reference to its SSN 777 hull number. The submarine incorporates teak wood salvaged from the World War II-era battleship USS North Carolina, preserving a physical connection with an earlier U.S. Navy warship bearing the state’s name.

The submarine is not yet ready for deployment, and the Navy has not announced when the overall maintenance availability will conclude. Its transition from dry dock to the waterborne phase nevertheless brings the Pacific Fleet closer to recovering another nuclear-powered fast-attack submarine capable of Tomahawk strike, anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare, ISR and special operations support.

For U.S. Indo-Pacific readiness, the central issue is operational availability. Completing the remaining work on U.S. Navy USS North Carolina, a Virginia-class submarine, and returning SSN 777 to Submarine Squadron 1 will add another multimission attack submarine to a force whose stealth, endurance and strike capability make it one of the Navy’s most heavily demanded elements for deterrence and combat operations across the Pacific.

Explore More Defense News

• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
Will the U.S. Navy change future Ford-class carrier name from USS Doris Miller to USS Donald Trump?
{loadposition bannertop}

{loadposition sidebarpub}
The U.S. Navy is considering renaming its fourth Gerald R. Ford-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, CVN-81, with USS Donald Trump emerging as a potential alternative to the current designation, USS Doris Miller, according to CNN. The potential name change coincides with a directive from the White House to produce a plan replacing the ship's planned Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System and Advanced Weapons Elevators with legacy steam catapults and hydraulic elevators. This dual review reflects ongoing evaluations of naval acquisition costs, industrial shipyard capacity, and fleet naming conventions ahead of the vessel's planned late-2026 keel-laying ceremony.

Procured in January 2019 alongside CVN-80 for $15.2 billion, the Ford-class carrier USS Doris Miller (CVN-81) faces construction delivery shifts to February 2034 due to shipyard footprint constraints at Newport News. Technical reconfigurations under review include swapping the $1.2 billion General Atomics EMALS contract for steam machinery and shifting the carrier's island 140 feet forward.

Read full defense news at this link:US Navy considers Ford-class aircraft carrier redesign to match Trump's WWII island style preference

The USS Doris Miller (CVN-81) is the fourth Ford-class carrier planned after the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78), USS John F. Kennedy (CVN-79), and USS Enterprise (CVN-80). (Picture source: HII)

On August 20, 2026, CNN revealed that the U.S. Navy was considering renaming the fourth Gerald R. Ford-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, the USS Doris Miller (CVN-81), with USS Donald Trump among the potential replacement names, although the Navy and Department of Defense have made no final naming decision. CVN-81 was procured with CVN-80 USS Enterprise in January 2019; first steel was cut on August 25, 2021; keel laying is planned before the end of 2026; and delivery has already moved to February 2034 because Newport News Shipbuilding lacks sufficient construction footprint to build modules at the originally planned rate. The Navy's FY2026 estimate placed CVN-81 procurement cost at $15.2 billion. The potential renaming coincides with a more consequential examination of the Ford-class carrier's configuration.

On August 13, Trump directed that a plan be produced within 60 days to replace the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System and Advanced Weapons Elevators planned for CVN-81 with steam catapults and hydraulic elevators. A separate examination concerns moving the island roughly 140 ft, or 42.7 m, forward from the Ford-class position toward the location characteristic of older carriers. At the same time, Cao's office has increasingly used CVN-81 rather than USS Doris Miller in internal references, and the August 13 presidential memorandum itself identified the ship as CVN-81. Removing the name would consequently reverse two carrier-naming firsts established six years earlier, during Trump's first administration: the first U.S. aircraft carrier named for an African American and the first named for an enlisted sailor.

Born in Waco, Texas, on October 12, 1919, Doris Miller enlisted in the U.S. Navy in 1939 and served as a mess attendant, one of the occupational categories to which Black sailors were largely restricted under the Navy's racial policies of the period. On December 7, 1941, he was aboard USS West Virginia (BB-48) at Pearl Harbor when Japanese aircraft attacked the Pacific Fleet. Because damage prevented Miller from reaching his normal battle station, he helped move wounded personnel, including the battleship's commanding officer, Capt. Mervyn S. Bennion, who had been mortally wounded by fragments from a bomb strike on the nearby USS Tennessee. Miller then operated a .50-caliber Browning anti-aircraft machine gun despite not having been formally trained as a gunner and continued firing until its ammunition was exhausted. Miller was officially credited with two, while other estimates have ranged from one to six.

Adm. Chester W. Nimitz personally presented Miller with the Navy Cross aboard USS Enterprise on May 27, 1942. He was the first African American awarded the Navy Cross, then, and now, the Navy's second-highest decoration for combat valor after the Medal of Honor, and he subsequently became the first Black sailor included in a national War Bond tour. Miller later served aboard the Casablanca-class escort carrier USS Liscome Bay (CVE-56). On November 24, 1943, during operations near Makin in the Gilbert Islands, Japanese submarine I-175 struck Liscome Bay with a torpedo that detonated the carrier's aircraft bomb magazine; Miller was among the sailors killed. His name first went to the Knox-class frigate USS Miller (FF-1091), commissioned on June 30, 1973. On January 20, 2020, Acting Secretary of the Navy Thomas Modly announced that CVN-81 would be named USS Doris Miller.

A Ford-class carrier, such as CVN-81, is 332.8 m long, has a flight deck width of roughly 78 m, and displaces around 100,000 tonnes at full load. Propulsion comes from two Bechtel A1B nuclear reactors driving four shafts. The carrier has four aircraft catapults, three deck-edge aircraft elevators, and 11 Advanced Weapons Elevators, compared with four aircraft elevators on the Nimitz class. Its electrical plant was designed with substantially more generating capacity than the preceding class because electromagnetic launch, electromechanical arresting equipment, weapons elevators, sensors, and future directed-energy loads place electricity at the center of the ship's architecture. The Ford was also designed to reduce required manning by about 15% relative to the previous carrier generation.

CVN-80 and CVN-81 were bought together to save close to $4 billion by ordering common material, reducing duplicated engineering, maintaining supplier production, and avoiding workforce breaks between the two hulls. The USS Doris Miller's delivery schedule has already been moved from February 2032 to February 2034, due to physical congestion at Newport News, where CVN-80 modules and other carrier work consume the construction footprint needed for CVN-81. Moving a major system, such as the EMALS or the island, can propagate changes through adjacent compartments, while replacing an already contracted system can leave the government paying both termination or sunk costs on existing hardware and development, qualification, procurement, and installation costs for its replacement.

The USS Doris Miller was designed for four EMALS catapults, which use stored kinetic energy and solid-state electrical power conversion to accelerate aircraft rather than tapping reactor-generated steam. NAVAIR identifies more precise end-speed control, smoother acceleration, and the ability to launch aircraft across a wider weight range, from lightweight unmanned aircraft to heavy strike aircraft, among the system's principal differences from steam. Returning to steam therefore requires much more than exchanging the machinery immediately beneath four launch tracks. A steam installation needs high-pressure steam distribution from the propulsion plant toward the flight deck, accumulators, launch valves, cylinders, water brakes, control equipment and supporting machinery, together with the shielding, drainage, maintenance access and compartment volume associated with that equipment.

The Ford class was not laid out with the extensive catapult steam network of a Nimitz-class ship, so those requirements would have to be incorporated into an electrical carrier architecture after construction began. The industrial base would simultaneously have to restart manufacturing for new U.S. steam-catapult equipment after roughly two decades without a new carrier steam-catapult procurement. The government has already committed substantial money in the opposite direction. On June 7, 2023, the Navy awarded General Atomics a $1.204 billion modification covering production of the complete CVN-81 EMALS and Advanced Arresting Gear shipsets, deliveries, engineering changes, obsolescence work, installation support and certification through 2032. By August 2026, work on that equipment was well advanced.

Similarly, the proposed 140-ft, or 42.7-m, forward movement of the USS Doris Miller's island creates a different engineering problem because the Ford flight deck was deliberately reorganized around the present aft position. Compared with the Nimitz class, Ford's island is about 30% smaller and located farther aft, increasing usable deck area ahead of the superstructure and changing how aircraft move between parking positions, fueling and arming locations, catapults, and the landing area. Ford also reduced the number of deck-edge aircraft elevators from four to three while installing 11 Advanced Weapons Elevators capable of moving weapons directly between magazines and flight-deck areas. The concept was to eliminate unnecessary aircraft and weapons movements rather than simply move more aircraft vertically.

Fueling points were integrated into the deck layout, weapons staging was reorganized, and parking locations were arranged so aircraft could be serviced with fewer crossings of the flight deck. These changes were designed against a quantitative requirement. The Nimitz-class benchmark is roughly 120 sorties during a 12-hour flying day and 240 during a 24-hour surge. Ford's original sustained objective was 160 sorties in 12 hours, 40 more than Nimitz and a 33.3% increase, with the class also designed around a 270-sortie 24-hour surge objective, 30 more sorties and a 12.5% increase over the 240-sortie Nimitz figure. The February 2026 test subsequently produced 120% to 130% of the Nimitz sortie rate, placing Ford's demonstrated test performance broadly in the range for which the redesigned deck was intended.

Even a small increase in recovery interval matters when repeated over dozens of landings, as an additional five seconds applied to 120 recoveries represents ten minutes of additional recovery-cycle time before accounting for wave-offs, bolters, or deck repositioning. Schedule effects extend beyond the USS Doris Miller because the carrier is part of the retirement of ten Nimitz-class ships commissioned between 1975 and 2009. USS Nimitz (CVN-68), commissioned in 1975, has already crossed the 50-year point, and each subsequent retirement creates a new pressure for a Ford-class replacement if the Navy is to maintain an 11-carrier force. A two-year CVN-81 delay therefore cannot automatically be absorbed by extending the predecessor indefinitely.

Nuclear refueling history, reactor life, hull fatigue, catapult and arresting-gear condition, maintenance requirements, and the cost of keeping a five-decade-old carrier operational all affect whether an additional service-life extension is practical. At the same time, Newport News is the only U.S. shipyard that constructs nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and performs their Refueling and Complex Overhaul, so carrier construction and major carrier maintenance draw on overlapping engineering, nuclear-qualified labor and facilities. The wider naval nuclear industrial base is simultaneously trying to increase Virginia-class attack submarine production, deliver the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine program, and support AUKUS at a time when U.S. public shipyards face substantial submarine-maintenance backlogs. CVN-81 redesign therefore has a measurable opportunity cost even if the additional engineering can technically be completed.

Every naval architect, nuclear engineer, electrician, pipefitter, planner, and supplier reassigned to carrier redesign is capacity unavailable elsewhere unless the industrial workforce expands correspondingly. The comparison with future foreign aircraft carriers also matters because electromagnetic launch is no longer exclusively an American technology path. China's Fujian uses electromagnetic catapults and is being developed around a carrier air wing that includes catapult-capable J-15T fighters, the J-35 stealth fighter, and KJ-600 airborne early-warning aircraft. France has selected General Atomics' EMALS and AAG for the PA-NG, the nuclear-powered successor to Charles de Gaulle expected to enter service around 2038. A U.S. decision to end domestic EMALS installation after CVN-80 would therefore occur while China is fielding electromagnetic launch and France is preparing to adopt the American system.

The industrial consequence is important because production quantity affects supplier retention, component cost, and engineering continuity. If CVN-81 and later U.S. carriers abandon EMALS, General Atomics and its suppliers would lose the principal recurring domestic carrier market for a system in which the Navy has already invested billions of dollars. The central acquisition question is consequently whether Trump's proposed changes about steam catapults, hydraulic weapons elevators, or a forward island exceed the combined value of already purchased equipment, redesign expenditure, supplier restart costs, shipyard rework, and any additional months or years added to a carrier already delayed from 2032 to 2034. Still, there has never been a single continuous U.S. rule requiring aircraft carriers to bear presidential names. The naming history began with USS Langley (CV-1), commissioned on March 20, 1922, and named for aviation pioneer Samuel Pierpont Langley.

The next two carriers, USS Lexington (CV-2) and USS Saratoga (CV-3), inherited names associated with Revolutionary War battles and earlier U.S. warships, while USS Ranger (CV-4) continued a historic naval name. The fleet carriers that followed reinforced the battle and historic ship convention: Yorktown, Enterprise, Wasp and Hornet before and during the opening of World War II, followed by Essex-class names including Essex, Intrepid, Franklin, Bunker Hill and Ticonderoga. Wartime losses also led the Navy to recycle carrier names quickly. CV-16, originally intended to become Cabot, was renamed Lexington after CV-2 was lost in the Battle of the Coral Sea, while CV-10 became the second Yorktown after CV-5 was lost at Midway. Presidential commemoration emerged alongside rather than immediately replacing those traditions. CV-42 was renamed USS Franklin D. Roosevelt after Roosevelt's death in 1945.

USS Forrestal (CV-59), commissioned in 1955, honored James Forrestal, the first U.S. Secretary of Defense and a former Secretary of the Navy. USS Kitty Hawk, USS Constellation, USS America, and USS John F. Kennedy demonstrate how battle locations, historic names, national concepts, and presidents continued to coexist during the supercarrier era. The first nuclear carrier, USS Enterprise (CVN-65), commissioned in 1961, again used a historic Navy name. USS Nimitz (CVN-68) honored Fleet Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, while USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) honored a congressman rather than a president. Presidential naming became dominant during the Nimitz program, but it never became exclusive. USS John C. Stennis (CVN-74) again commemorated a senator, and the Ford-class subsequently combined presidential and non-presidential names through Gerald R. Ford, John F. Kennedy, Enterprise, and Doris Miller.

The historical pattern is therefore better understood as an evolution from battles and inherited Navy names toward individual national figures, with presidents becoming predominant as the nuclear carrier became the Navy's most prominent individual warship. CVN-81's 2020 name did not violate a fixed convention, while extending individual commemoration for the first time to an enlisted sailor. Presidential names nevertheless dominate the current nuclear carrier force. Seven of the ten Nimitz-class ships honor presidents: USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69), USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71), USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72), USS George Washington (CVN-73), USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75), USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) and USS George H.W. Bush (CVN-77). The three exceptions are USS Nimitz (CVN-68), USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70), and USS John C. Stennis (CVN-74).

The Ford-class continues the presidential concentration but also preserves two non-presidential cases among its first four hulls: USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78), USS John F. Kennedy (CVN-79), USS Enterprise (CVN-80) and, under the existing designation, USS Doris Miller (CVN-81). In January 2025, President Joe Biden announced the names USS William J. Clinton for CVN-82 and USS George W. Bush for CVN-83, meaning four of the first six named Ford-class carriers commemorate presidents, one preserves the Enterprise lineage, and one honors Miller. Naming a carrier for a living person would not itself create a precedent. Rep. Carl Vinson was alive when CVN-70 was named for him; Sen. John C. Stennis was alive when CVN-74 received his name; Ronald Reagan was alive when CVN-76 was named in 1995; and George H.W. Bush was alive when the CVN-77 name was announced in 2002.

The important distinction is presidential incumbency. Reagan left office in January 1989, six years before CVN-76 received his name, while George H.W. Bush left office in January 1993, nine years before the CVN-77 naming decision. No U.S. aircraft carrier has been named for the sitting president who controlled the executive branch when the name was selected. A USS Donald Trump designation made while Trump remains president would therefore create that specific precedent, not merely another example of a living namesake. It would also be a reversal within Trump's own administrations: Acting Secretary Thomas Modly assigned Doris Miller's name to CVN-81 on January 20, 2020, during Trump's first term, while a second Trump administration would remove it before keel laying.

The numerical effect on the Ford-class naming pattern would be straightforward. Five of the first six named Ford-class carriers would then commemorate presidents, with Enterprise as the sole exception, instead of the current four presidential names, one historic Navy name, and one enlisted sailor. The decision over CVN-81 therefore combines an unusually specific naming precedent with a potentially much larger acquisition precedent: the same carrier could become both the first named for a sitting U.S. president and the first Ford-class hull deliberately redesigned to return to steam catapults and hydraulic weapons handling after three ships were built around electromagnetic launch and an increasingly electrical aviation architecture.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.

Explore More Defense News

• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News
Indonesia eyes Japan's Upgraded Mogami-class frigates during trilateral defense talks with Australia
{loadposition bannertop}

{loadposition sidebarpub}
Japan and Indonesia held preliminary trilateral talks with Australia on August 26, 2026, during which Jakarta renewed its strategic interest in acquiring eight units of Japan's Upgraded Mogami-class frigate (New FFM). The prospective deal revives a ¥300 billion procurement framework first discussed in 2021, shifting focus to an enlarged 6,200-ton design equipped with expanded strike capacity. This renewed push allows the Indonesian Navy (TNI AL) to capitalize on Australia's SEA 3000 export precedent while working to resolve parallel negotiations over second-hand Asagiri-class destroyers.

The Upgraded Mogami-class frigate increases overall length to 142 meters and full-load displacement to 6,200 tonnes, incorporating a doubled 32-cell Mk 41 Vertical Launch System alongside specialized mine-warfare and anti-submarine suite options. Operating with an automated 90-person crew, an eight-ship fleet would reduce overall personnel requirements compared to traditional warship design alternatives while offering local construction at PT PAL in Surabaya.

Related topic:Japan to begin talks to export Mogami frigates to New Zealand following Australian selection

The earlier Mogami-class talks between Japan and Indonesia envisaged four frigates built in Japan and four constructed by PT PAL in Surabaya under a package valued at roughly ¥300 billion. (Picture source: Japanese MoD)

On August 26, 2026, the Japan Times announced that Indonesia renewed its interest in acquiring Japan's Upgraded Mogami-class frigate, or New FFM, during the first trilateral defense talks between Japan, Indonesia and Australia, bringing back an eight-ship procurement talk first pursued in 2021 with the original Mogami-class, but now involving a frigate that carries twice as many Mk 41 cells and has become the basis of an 11-ship Australian program. Jakarta has not yet moved to contract negotiations because the government is expected to settle its parallel discussions over second-hand Asagiri-class destroyers first. Those working-level Asagiri talks began in June 2026, one month after Indonesia and Japan signed a Defence Cooperation Arrangement on May 4 covering equipment, technology and maritime cooperation.

The Mogami proposal itself goes back to 2021, when Japan planned to supply four ships from Japanese yards and have four more built by PT PAL in Surabaya under a package valued at roughly ¥300 billion. Financing became one of the obstacles because Jakarta's rules required 10-20% upfront funding, which on ¥300 billion equated to ¥30-60 billion before the remainder of the acquisition could be distributed across later budgets. The proposal lost momentum, but Japanese engagement continued through JS Kumano's visit to Indonesia in 2023, JS Yahagi's visit in 2025, and separate 2025 visits by Defence Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin and TNI AL Chief of Staff Adm. Muhammad Ali aboard Kumano at Yokosuka. In April 2026, Adm. Ali had confirmed that Tokyo had again offered the frigate.

Indonesian Ambassador Heri Akhmadi was also pressing for technology transfer and cooperation that would increase Indonesia's access to Japanese production methods and naval systems rather than limit the transaction to imported ships. The acquisition being reconsidered in 2026 is therefore materially different from the one that stalled five years earlier. The original Mogami-class measures 133 m in length, 16.3 m in beam and roughly 4.5 in draught, displaces 3,900 tonnes standard and about 5,500 tonnes at full load. Its CODAG machinery combines one Rolls-Royce MT30 gas turbine with two MAN 12V28/33D STC diesel engines on two shafts, producing roughly 70,000 hp and allowing a maximum speed above 30 knots. The New FFM increases the overall length to 142 m, beam to roughly 17 m, standard displacement to 4,880 tonnes and full-load displacement to about 6,200 tonnes.

The enlarged hull creates space for a larger missile battery, greater electrical capacity, additional command and sensor equipment, and more reserve margins for later modifications. Japan subsequently reduced the original Mogami program from 22 to 12 ships after the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA) began the transition toward the New FFM configuration in 2023. Japan intends to acquire roughly 12 New FFMs between FY2024 and FY2028, which implies an average procurement rate of two to three ships annually. The largest quantifiable combat change is the vertical launching system (VLS). The baseline Mogami carries 16 Mk 41 VLS cells, while the New FFM carries 32 strike-length Mk 41 cells forward of the bridge, doubling the cell count.

Japanese New FFMs are intended to use the launcher for Type 23 surface-to-air missiles and Type 07 vertical-launch anti-submarine rockets, while the Australian variant will use RIM-162 ESSM and demonstrates that the launcher can support a customer-specific load. If every cell were assigned to quad-packed ESSM, 32 cells could theoretically hold 128 missiles, compared with 64 in a Mogami-class, although a realistic wartime load would reserve cells for several weapon types rather than dedicate the entire magazine to one interceptor. The Upgraded Mogami also retains a 127 mm Mk 45 naval gun, SeaRAM close-in defense, 324 mm lightweight torpedo armament, and helicopter facilities, while Japan intends to integrate an improved Type 12 anti-ship missile. The baseline Mogami carries eight Type 17 SSM-2 anti-ship missiles in two quadruple launchers, with an estimated engagement range of 200 to 250 km, compared with roughly 150 to 200 km for the Type 90 missile it replaced.

The Type 07 VL-ASROC provides a separate anti-submarine attack option beyond 30 km before delivering its lightweight torpedo into the target area. The SeaRAM adds an 11-round terminal-defense magazine with an engagement envelope of roughly 9 to 10 km, while the 127 mm Mk 45 can engage conventional surface or shore targets at roughly 24 km with standard ammunition. Anti-submarine and mine warfare are equally important because Indonesia operates across narrow straits, deep-water basins and approaches where submarines can exploit complex acoustic conditions. The baseline Mogami combines the OPY-2 X-band AESA multifunction radar, OAX-3 electro-optical and infrared system, OQQ-25 variable-depth and towed-array sonar, OQQ-11 mine-hunting sonar, OYQ-1 combat management system and NOLQ-3E electronic warfare system.

The OQQ-25 allows the frigate to vary sonar depth instead of relying only on a fixed hull installation, which is particularly relevant where thermoclines can mask submarine contacts. The towed array provides a longer acoustic aperture for passive detection, while an embarked SH-60 helicopter can move the search beyond the ship's immediate sonar horizon using its own sensors and lightweight torpedoes. Once a contact is localized, the ship can use Type 07 VL-ASROC at distances above 30 km or its own 324 mm torpedo tubes at shorter range. The New FFM retains that anti-submarine architecture while adopting an improved radar derived from the OPY-2 and providing greater power and space margins for later sensor changes. The mine warfare package further differentiates the design from many frigates of similar displacement.

The Mogami-class can carry a UUV, USV, mine-disposal craft, mine-hunting sonar and simplified mine-laying equipment, allowing the ship to survey routes, investigate suspected minefields and support mine-clearance operations while still carrying its normal anti-submarine, anti-surface and air defense weapons. For Indonesia, that combination has direct geographic relevance because the loss or temporary closure of a narrow strait, naval-base approach or commercial channel can affect fleet movement and national shipping without requiring an enemy to defeat the Indonesian surface fleet in conventional combat. Western frigates in the 5,000-7,000-ton range commonly require 140 to more than 200 sailors, while the Mogami family was structured around roughly 90, despite the New FFM's growth to about 6,200 tonnes full load.

The New FFM achieves its reduced complement through centralized machinery control, propulsion monitoring, navigation, damage-control supervision and combat management rather than by simply removing positions from a traditional frigate organization. The Mogami's Advanced Integrated CIC combines navigation, engineering, and tactical functions within a heavily automated control environment, while panoramic displays and centralized monitoring reduce the number of operators required for routine watchstanding. This matters more for Indonesia than it would for a navy replacing one standardized frigate class with another because the Indonesian Navy (TNI AL) is introducing several unrelated ship families simultaneously.

Every additional class creates new requirements for propulsion engineers, radar technicians, sonar operators, missile personnel, electronic warfare specialists, aviation crews, and dockyard workers, so saving 480 to 880 embarked billets across an eight-ship class can influence how many ships are actually crewed and deployable rather than merely reducing salary costs. Like for the Indonesian Air Force, the main procurement risk is therefore not insufficient capability but the accumulation of different naval suppliers. Indonesia is already constructing two Merah Putih frigates derived from the British Arrowhead 140 at PT PAL in Surabaya, and a January 2026 agreement for two additional Arrowhead 140 ships could bring the family to four. It also signed for two Turkish Milgem Istif/I-class frigates with TAIS Shipyards at IDEF 2025.

Another €1.18 billion contract signed in 2024 covers two Italian Thaon di Revel/PPA vessels, while an Italian package announced in 2021 included six FREMM frigates, two modernized Maestrale-class frigates and associated logistics support, although funding continues to constrain implementation. Indonesia is also receiving the former Italian aircraft carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi. The French Naval Group contract for two Scorpène Evolved Full LiB submarines entered into force on July 23, 2025, with construction in Indonesia and technology transfer included, while Jakarta has separately examined second-hand Japanese submarines. If all of the principal surface programs proceeded without offsetting cancellations or reductions, the prospective frigate-sized pipeline could include four Arrowhead 140/Merah Putih ships, two I-class frigates, two PPAs, up to six FREMMs and eight New FFMs.

That equals as many as 22 ships across five major design families before legacy frigates, corvettes and possible Maestrale transfers are counted. Each family brings a separate combination of engines, reduction gears, radar modules, sonar hardware, combat management software, electronic warfare equipment, missiles, torpedoes, data links, training simulators and depot-maintenance procedures. A fleet of 22 new ships can therefore create greater operational output only if Indonesia can simultaneously fund ammunition stocks, spare engines and components, dockyard capacity, software support, crew training and periodic modernization. Otherwise, nominal fleet growth can outpace actual availability. Japan's production record reduces some schedule risk, but an Indonesian order would still have to compete for shipyard capacity.

The JMSDF commissioned JS Nagara, FFM-10, on June 29, 2026, bringing the baseline Mogami fleet to ten operational ships. Nagara was laid down on July 6, 2023, launched on December 19, 2024, and delivered on June 29, 2026, producing a roughly 36-month keel-to-delivery cycle. Japan's FY2025 budget allocated roughly ¥314.8 billion for three New FFMs, equivalent to ¥104.9 billion per ship when divided evenly. That number is substantially higher than the ¥42.9 billion arithmetic average produced by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries' ¥128.6 billion February 16, 2026 contract for New FFM hulls three through five. The gap is important because it shows why hull construction contract values cannot be compared directly with complete acquisition budgets: major sensors, weapons, VLS equipment and other government-furnished systems can appear on separate funding lines.

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries has built 10 of the 12 baseline Mogami hulls at Nagasaki and is moving directly into New FFM production, preserving workforce continuity and reducing the disruption associated with restarting a dormant line. However, those yards must now support Japan's own 12-ship requirement and Australia's first three ships. If Indonesia ordered four Japanese-built frigates before moving construction to PT PAL, delivery would depend on when those hulls could be inserted alongside domestic and Australian production rather than simply applying Nagara's 36-month construction cycle four times. Australia gives Jakarta the clearest indication of what a revised Indonesian agreement could look like because Canberra has already negotiated the industrial and configuration questions that remained unresolved in Indonesia's earlier proposal.

Australia selected the New FFM on August 5, 2025, after considering Germany's MEKO A-200, South Korea's FFX Batch II/III and Spain's Alfa 3000. The program covers 11 frigates for roughly AU$10 billion, with the first three built by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in Japan and eight at Henderson in Western Australia. That equates to 27% Japanese construction and 73% Australian construction by hull count, compared with the 50-50 four-plus-four division proposed for Indonesia in 2021. First delivery is planned for 2029 and operational service from 2030, five years earlier than the 2034 first-delivery schedule associated with Australia's previous planning baseline. Australia also rejected a simple duplication of the JMSDF weapons fit. Its ships are planned to use Kongsberg Naval Strike Missiles instead of Type 17 anti-ship missiles, Mk 54 lightweight torpedoes, SeaRAM and RIM-162 ESSM in the 32-cell Mk 41 VLS.

That matters for Indonesia because it establishes that the exported frigate can retain the Japanese hull and propulsion architecture while integrating customer-selected weapons. Jakarta could therefore negotiate not only four Japanese-built and four Indonesian-built hulls, but also which missiles occupy the VLS, whether the anti-ship weapon remains Japanese or comes from another supplier, which combat system elements are localized, what software access PT PAL receives, and which maintenance functions are transferred to Surabaya. Australia has already established the basic precedent that New FFM export does not require the foreign customer to adopt the JMSDF configuration unchanged.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.

Explore More Defense News

• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News
Former Italian aircraft carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi departs for Indonesia after final flag lowering
{loadposition bannertop}

{loadposition sidebarpub}
On August 24, 2026, the former Italian aircraft carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi (C 551) departed Taranto under a mixed Italian-Indonesian crew bound for Indonesia, where it is scheduled to be commissioned as KRI Gajah Mada on September 25. Italy transferred the retired 14,150-tonne STOVL vessel free of charge to eliminate a €5 million annual inactive maintenance liability and an estimated €18.7 million dismantlement bill. Jakarta accepted the transfer to establish its first carrier-based command and aviation capability, budgeting between €350 million and €818 million for reactivation, structural refit, and technical modernization.

The zero-cost transfer agreement shifts long-term operational responsibility to Indonesia, which faces minimum refit and delivery costs of €404 million and potential maximum modernization expenditures exceeding €872 million. Built in 1985 and featuring a 174-meter ski-jump flight deck, the platform requires extensive electrical, sensor, and combat system upgrades alongside base expansion at Ratai Bay to support planned multi-service helicopter and potential Bayraktar TB3 drone operations.

Related topic:Italy approves free transfer of Garibaldi aircraft carrier to Indonesia after final parliamentary vote

Commissioned on September 30, 1985, the Giuseppe Garibaldi served the Italian Navy for 39 years, operating as a carrier and command ship in Somalia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Libya. (Picture source: Italian Navy archives)

As reported by the Cronache Tarantine on August 24, 2026, the former Italian aircraft carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi (C 551) departed Taranto for Indonesia after the Italian flag was lowered for the last time, beginning a transit of more than 20 days through the Suez Canal and Red Sea before an expected arrival between September 15 and 20 and an Indonesian commissioning ceremony on September 25. The ship remains Italian during the delivery voyage, retains the Giuseppe Garibaldi name, and is sailing with a mixed Italian-Indonesian crew, and Italian frigates are expected to escort it during portions of the passage. Indonesia is receiving the aircraft carrier free of charge from Italy, but the transfer itself is expected to cost Jakarta about €54 million, while the subsequent refurbishment has been estimated at Rp7.2 trillion to Rp16.8 trillion (€350 million to €818 million) depending on the final package.

That puts the minimum transfer-plus-refit cost at about €404 million, and the maximum at about €872 million before recurring operating expenditure, aviation procurement, ammunition, spare parts, additional training and long-term maintenance are included. The Indonesian Navy has already sent 100 prospective crew members to Italy for theoretical and practical instruction, compared with an expected basic ship complement of about 500 personnel, while Ratai Bay in Lampung is being prepared as a principal operating base. The base work includes dredging and channel deepening, heavy-duty mooring facilities and increased electrical capacity, with the berthing area 76% complete in July 2026 and the project entering its finishing phase by August 25.

The economics explain why Italy was willing to transfer the ship without compensation rather than converting it into a museum and why the Indonesian side faces a much more complicated cost equation. Italy's authorization process began with a ministerial decree on February 19, 2026, followed by Senate approval on March 24, Budget Committee approval on April 14, and final parliamentary authorization on April 28 under Article 311 of the Italian military code. The mechanism permits military equipment declared technically obsolete and no longer operational to be transferred free of charge under specified legal conditions. The Garibaldi still had an Italian residual accounting value of €54,022,426.67, but keeping it inactive cost about €5 million each year for electrical power, security, surveillance, and minimum technical upkeep.

Dismantlement was estimated at €18.7 million and would have required at least 24 months, meaning that four years of inactive maintenance alone would have exceeded the nominal dismantlement cost. Italy therefore avoids both a recurring €5 million annual liability and a future scrapping bill, while Indonesia assumes the cost of delivery and reactivation. The Indonesian calculation is materially larger than the residual hull value: a €350 million lower-end refurbishment is 6.5 times the €54.0 million accounting value, while an €818 million upper-end package is 15.1 times greater. The €468 million difference between the low and high modernization estimates by itself equals 8.7 times the ship's Italian residual value.

Indonesia had already approved foreign loan ceilings in August 2025 of up to $450 million for the carrier and associated equipment, $250 million for transport helicopters, and $300 million for utility helicopters, potentially creating a $1 billion financing framework. Even this figure does not represent the full lifecycle bill because a carrier program must finance fuel, depot-level maintenance, aviation spares, deck equipment, shore infrastructure, personnel training, ammunition, communications, software support, and periodic overhaul for as long as the ship remains in service since its commissioning in 1985. The Giuseppe Garibaldi will become Indonesia's first aircraft carrier, but it will also come with engineering constraints. The Italian carrier was laid down on March 26, 1981, launched on June 11, 1983, and commissioned on September 30, 1985, so the ship is entering Indonesian service almost 41 years after commissioning and more than 45 years after construction began.

In its later configuration, the Giuseppe Garibaldi (C 551), it displaced about 10,100 tonnes standard and 14,150 tonnes at full load, with a length of 180.2 m, a beam of 33.4 m and a draught of about 8.2 m. The flight deck measures about 174 m by 30 m and incorporates a 4-degree ski-jump, while the aviation arrangement could accommodate about 12 aircraft in the hangar and another six on deck depending on the mission. Four General Electric/Avio LM2500 gas turbines generate a combined 60,400 kW, or about 81,000 hp, through two shafts, providing a speed above 30 knots and a range of about 7,000 nautical miles at 20 knots. The electrical system relies on six diesel generators and one emergency generator, and this may become one of the most important technical bottlenecks if Indonesia installs new radars, drone control stations, additional communications systems, electronic warfare equipment, and server capacity because every new subsystem increases power and cooling demand.

Italian-service manning could reach about 830 personnel in a full configuration, divided into roughly 550 ship crew, up to 180 aviation personnel, and approximately 100 command staff. Indonesia currently speaks of about 500 personnel for ship operation, but its own officers have indicated that the eventual number could exceed 500 once non-core personnel are included. The combat system is where the difference between the former Italian carrier and the Indonesian potential configuration is most pronounced. The Garibaldi's historical defensive armament included two Mk 29 eight-cell launchers for Aspide surface-to-air missiles, three twin 40 mm OTO Melara DARDO close-in weapon systems, and two triple 324 mm torpedo launchers, while four Otomat Mk 2 anti-ship missile launchers originally installed on the ship were removed during the 2003 modernization.

The sensor and electronic suite included the MM/SPS-768 long-range air-search radar, AN/SPS-52C early-warning radar, SPS-702 CORA surface-search radar, additional navigation and fire control radars, SLQ-732 electronic warfare equipment, SCLAR decoy launchers, satellite communications and tactical data links including Link 11, Link 14 and Link 16. In Italian service, this combination allowed the Garibaldi to participate in NATO naval networks, maintain its own air and surface surveillance picture, exchange tracks with accompanying ships and aircraft, and provide point defense while operating an embarked air group. Indonesia is not receiving that combat configuration in working condition. The transfer is legally based on the ship's obsolete and non-operational status, and the weapons are not being restored before handover.

Jakarta therefore has to decide whether the €350 million to €818 million modernization includes only hull, machinery, aviation and communications work or also a complete replacement of the combat management system, surveillance radars, identification equipment, tactical data links, electronic support measures, decoys and short-range air defense. If those systems are not replaced or modernized, the Garibaldi may be able to embark aircraft and act as a command ship but would require escorting frigates or other combatants for air defense, anti-submarine protection and surface warfare. If Indonesia does replace them, the work would extend well beyond fitting new boxes because new radar arrays, missile launchers and electronic systems may require changes to cabling, cooling, electrical distribution, antenna placement, magazines, topside weight and command spaces.

Nevertheless, the Garibaldi's operational record provides measurable evidence of what the hull could sustain when backed by a complete aviation organization. The ship was designed for STOVL operations, but Italian law initially prevented the Navy from operating its own fixed-wing combat aircraft until a legislative change in 1989. Italy subsequently acquired the AV-8B Harrier II Plus, with the first training aircraft delivered in the United States in 1991 and transported to Italy aboard the Garibaldi. A normal air group later consisted of roughly eight to 12 AV-8B jets and four to six SH-3D or AW101 helicopters, for a total aviation complement generally between 16 and 18 aircraft. During the 1995 Ibis III deployment near Somalia, embarked Harriers flew more than 100 sorties. In 1999, the carrier participated in NATO operations over Kosovo, where its aircraft conducted 30 sorties.

The Garibaldi departed Taranto on November 18, 2001, for Enduring Freedom operations and subsequently remained at sea for 87 consecutive days without a technical port call while covering about 20,000 nautical miles. Its Harriers completed 288 missions and 860 flight hours, while operating against Afghanistan from distances greater than 1,500 km. In 2011, the Garibaldi spent 78 consecutive days at sea during operations over Libya. Its embarked Harriers generated 173 sorties, more than 1,200 flight hours, and more than 140 weapon releases over the full period. Indonesia, therefore, receives the hangar, deck, fuel system, and support spaces that enabled these operations, but not the Italian pilots, maintainers, weapons personnel, mission planners, air controllers, deck crews, intelligence specialists, and supply system that produced the sortie rates.

Personnel and shore infrastructure are consequently immediate constraints rather than secondary issues. Indonesia's first training group consists of 100 personnel sent to Italy for theoretical instruction, practical work aboard the ship, and participation in the delivery voyage. Against a projected 500-person ship complement, that represents only 20% of the basic manpower requirement, and Rear Admiral Yayan Sofiyan has indicated that the ultimate total may be higher because the initial estimate does not necessarily include every support category. Compared with the Thaon di Revel-class offshore patrol vessel KRI Brawijaya, which operates with about 203 personnel, a 500-person Garibaldi crew is 2.46 times larger before a full aviation organization is added.

This creates manpower requirements in engineering, damage control, electrical maintenance, aviation handling, firefighting, communications, logistics, navigation, and command functions that Indonesia has not previously had to concentrate on a single carrier-sized ship. Admiral Muhammad Ali has also indicated that helicopters from the Indonesian Navy, Air Force and Army are expected to operate from the Garibaldi and that pilots from those services will require deck-landing training. The shore component, for its part, is being developed at Ratai Bay in Lampung, facing the Sunda Strait. Work there includes dredging and deepening navigation channels, constructing heavy-duty mooring infrastructure, and increasing shore electrical capacity; the berthing works were 76% complete in July and had moved into the finishing phase by August 25.

The Garibaldi will remain under the Italian flag until arrival, after which it is expected to become KRI Gajah Mada, with President Prabowo Subianto scheduled to attend the September 25 commissioning ceremony. It is also planned to participate in the Indonesian Armed Forces' 81st anniversary sailing pass in October. These milestones can be met relatively quickly, but they do not represent full operational capability, which will depend on how fast Indonesia can expand from 100 initially trained personnel to a complete crew and maintain certification across engineering, aviation, and combat functions. The proposed Bayraktar TB3 role is subsequently the most consequential part of the modernization because it would potentially give the ship a function different from which it was originally optimized.

Indonesia's broader agreements with Baykar and Republikorp call for the local production of 60 navalized TB3 UAVs and nine Akincis, although those numbers apply to the national program and are not a confirmed Garibaldi air wing. The TB3 is relevant because it has folding wings, reinforced landing gear, and demonstrated ski-jump takeoffs and landings aboard Türkiye's TCG Anadolu in November 2024. The Garibaldi already has a 174-meter deck and a 4-degree ski-jump, so the basic geometry is compatible with this type of short takeoff operation. At Indo Defence 2025, a conversion model showed the Garibaldi with two island structures and TB3 models, while a Fincantieri delegation including engineers and a former ship commander visited Jakarta in July 2025 and divided potential modernization into four principal work areas.

If confirmed, the main engineering challenge is not whether a TB3 can physically move along the deck but whether the ship can sustain an operational UAV cycle. That would require dedicated control rooms, secure line-of-sight and beyond-line-of-sight communications, satellite links where required, mission-planning consoles, servers, recording and exploitation equipment, maintenance workshops, spare parts storage, revised hangar arrangements and deck procedures for launching, recovering, refueling and rearming multiple unmanned aircraft. A TB3-centered air group could potentially place more aircraft aboard than the historical 16 to 18 Harrier-and-helicopter mix because of the smaller footprint and folding wings, but higher deck density would also increase aircraft movement, maintenance workload and communications demand.

Legacy power generation capacity, internal architecture and deck-handling systems have already been identified as limitations for high-density drone operations. Indonesia would also need to decide how the TB3's sensor data enters the Navy's wider command network, who controls the drone beyond line of sight, how targeting data is passed to ships or land-based units, what weapons are authorized for carrier operations, and how many UAVs are permanently assigned to the ship. The central question after September 2026 will be whether Indonesia can obtain enough operational availability from a 1980s carrier to justify a refurbishment that may reach €818 million. The Garibaldi had already undergone a major modernization in 2003 and another extensive overhaul in 2013.

During the 2013 work, more than 30,000 kg of steel were replaced, 4,880 m of piping were renewed, 29,348 m³ of tanks were cleaned, about 5,200 m² of hull were treated and roughly 4,400 m² of flight deck were recoated, while propulsion, flight support and C4I systems also received attention. Despite that work, structural aging, rising maintenance requirements, electrical generation limits and declining compatibility with the more modern F-35 and networked combat systems contributed to the ship's withdrawal from active Italian service in 2024. Indonesia is therefore considering spending 6.5 to 15.1 times the ship's residual accounting value on refurbishment alone, up to 43.7 times Italy's dismantlement estimate.

The ship will also require at least 500 personnel, versus roughly 203 aboard KRI Brawijaya 320, meaning Garibaldi imposes a manpower requirement roughly 146% higher than the PPA-derived combatant before aviation personnel are fully counted. Indonesia has also identified a longer-term objective of operating at least four amphibious helicopter carriers, which gives the Garibaldi a possible secondary role as a training and doctrine-development ship for future operations, potentially under the name KRI Gajah Mada.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.

Explore More Defense News

• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News
U.S. Navy Accelerates Blackbeard Hypersonic Missile Toward Early Operational Capability With $90M Award
{loadposition bannertop}

{loadposition sidebarpub}
The U.S. Navy has awarded Castelion nearly $90 million to push its Blackbeard hypersonic strike weapon toward early operational use, according to an August 25, 2026 contract announcement, marking a significant shift from technology development toward weapons the fleet can actually field. What makes Blackbeard especially important is not speed alone, but the Navy’s effort to pair long-range hypersonic strike with manufacturability and inventory depth, two factors that could determine whether such weapons become routinely available for high-end combat rather than remain scarce strategic assets.

The contract supports development of 50 Early Operational Capability weapons while expanding the engineering, logistics, manufacturing, and sustainment base needed to move Blackbeard into regular Navy service. If that approach succeeds, the program could give the fleet a more scalable long-range strike option able to reinforce deterrence, increase magazine depth, and sustain offensive operations against heavily defended targets in a major conflict.

Related Topic: U.S. Navy F/A-18F Super Hornet Armed with AGM-158C LRASM Shows How America Prepares for High-End Pacific Warfare

The image is an unofficial edited illustration intended to show how the Blackbeard missile could potentially be integrated with the F/A-18; while the missile imagery and the photograph of the carrier-based F/A-18 are real, their combination in this scene is not an authentic operational photograph (Picture Source: U.S. Navy/ Castelion / Edited By Army Recognition Group)

On August 25, 2026, the U.S. Navyawarded Castelion Corp. a nearly $90 million contract to advance its Blackbeard hypersonic strike weapon toward Early Operational Capability (EOC). The award represents another important step in the Navy’s effort to transform advanced hypersonic technology into a deployable, supportable and producible long-range strike capability. Beyond speed, Blackbeard is increasingly significant because its development combines a path toward operational fielding with an emphasis on manufacturability and inventory scale, two factors that will determine whether hypersonic weapons can evolve from limited-inventory capabilities into weapons available at operationally relevant scale. According to the U.S. Department of War’s official contract announcement, the new effort will support the development of 50 EOC weapons and Blackbeard’s transition toward a Navy Program of Record.

From Prototype Development to Early Operational Capability

The $89,997,162 firm-fixed-price order was awarded under Small Business Innovation Research Phase III Topic AF231-D026, titled “Low Cost Highly Manufacturable Long Range Strike Weapon Production.” Castelion will provide engineering, technical, logistics and manufacturing services intended to move Blackbeard closer to an operational configuration, with work in Torrance, California, scheduled for completion in August 2028. The emphasis on engineering, logistics and manufacturing is particularly important because it shows that the program is addressing more than flight performance: the Navy is building the technical, industrial and sustainment framework required to turn Blackbeard into a weapon that can be produced, supported and eventually absorbed into routine Fleet operations.

The Navy’s drive toward EOC can be understood as an effort to shorten the distance between successful prototype development and militarily useful capability. Earlier Navy contracting activity in February 2026 funded full-scale prototypes, flight testing and operational fielding, while an April modification added final EOC requirements, test and integration configurations and live-fire test events in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command area of responsibility. Taken together, these awards indicate a structured progression from prototype validation toward integration, certification, fielding and production readiness. More importantly, EOC allows the Navy to begin resolving the less visible but decisive elements of combat employment, including weapons handling, maintenance, logistics, mission planning, platform interfaces and support procedures, while Blackbeard continues to mature technically.

Extending the Carrier Air Wing’s Long-Range Strike Options

Blackbeard could become particularly relevant to U.S. carrier aviation. Castelion announced in April that its Navy work includes integration of Blackbeard with the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, alongside system-safety and airworthiness certification, flight testing and activities associated with carrier-based operations, with EOC targeted for 2027. An air-launched hypersonic strike weapon would give a carrier air wing a high-speed conventional strike option whose launch point can itself be repositioned by the aircraft and the carrier strike group. This is a key operational distinction: rather than presenting an adversary with a fixed launch axis, naval aviation can continuously alter the geography from which a high-speed weapon might be employed, increasing uncertainty across an opponent’s surveillance, warning and defensive planning architecture.

The importance of this configuration lies in the combination of speed, mobility and guided long-range strike capability. A carrier-based aircraft can reposition before launch, creating uncertainty over potential launch geometry and forcing an adversary to account for a broader and less predictable threat envelope. For U.S. naval commanders, such a capability could provide additional options for rapid long-range strike missions in contested environments while complementing existing maritime strike systems. Blackbeard could consequently add a new decision-making tool to the carrier air wing: not simply another missile, but a weapon capable of exploiting the mobility of naval aviation to generate multiple potential avenues of attack across a contested battlespace.

Manufacturability and Magazine Depth as Strategic Advantages

Another major element of the Blackbeard effort is production scale. The Navy’s SBIR topic explicitly identifies the requirement as a “Low Cost Highly Manufacturable Long Range Strike Weapon Production” effort, while the August contract calls for manufacturing services and development of 50 EOC weapons. This language indicates that the Navy is placing increasing emphasis on turning Blackbeard into a repeatably manufactured capability rather than maintaining it as a limited experimental system. That distinction is strategically significant because the value of a long-range strike weapon is shaped not only by individual performance, but also by whether sufficient quantities can be delivered to operational units when they are needed.

That production philosophy could become one of Blackbeard’s most strategically important characteristics. Hypersonic weapons provide limited campaign value if inventory levels are too small to support sustained operations. A weapon designed around lower production complexity and higher manufacturing throughput could help the Navy build greater magazine depth, support repeated conventional strike missions and improve its ability to replenish inventories during an extended contingency. For the United States, this connects advanced weapon performance with a broader industrial requirement: credible deterrence increasingly depends not only on possessing sophisticated systems, but also on being able to manufacture them in militarily relevant quantities. Castelion’s progression from an innovative U.S. small business into a company supporting prototype production, flight testing, carrier integration and EOC also illustrates how newer defense firms can contribute to expanding the industrial base beyond traditional prime-contractor structures.

Strategic Impact on U.S. Maritime Deterrence

Strategically, a fleet equipped with scalable air-launched hypersonic strike weapons would give U.S. planners another means of imposing uncertainty on a potential adversary. Mobile naval forces capable of launching high-speed conventional weapons could complicate calculations surrounding defensive coverage, force protection and response timelines, while providing U.S. commanders with more flexible options for conventional deterrence. The combination of carrier mobility, tactical aviation and a high-speed long-range weapon also strengthens the Navy’s ability to distribute striking power across contested maritime areas. In practical terms, an opponent would have to plan not only against the weapon itself, but also against a launch architecture whose position, timing and approach geometry can change as U.S. naval forces maneuver.

Blackbeard’s broader significance may ultimately depend less on hypersonic velocity as an isolated technical achievement than on whether Castelion and the Navy can combine that performance with reliable integration, repeatable manufacturing and sufficient inventory depth. If those elements mature together, the weapon could increase the responsiveness and resilience of U.S. long-range strike operations while forcing potential adversaries to devote greater resources to detection, tracking, dispersal and defensive planning. In that sense, Blackbeard could strengthen deterrence not simply because it is fast, but because a sufficiently mature and producible system would make high-speed conventional strike a more persistent element of U.S. maritime power rather than a niche capability reserved for a limited number of missions.

The August 25 award signals that Blackbeard is moving into a more consequential phase of its development. The central achievement is no longer simply demonstrating hypersonic performance, but proving that the weapon can be integrated, certified, supported, manufactured and ultimately incorporated into sustained Fleet operations. By backing Castelion with a nearly $90 million Phase III effort, supporting the development of 50 EOC weapons and establishing a pathway toward a Navy Program of Record, the U.S. Navy is positioning Blackbeard as a potential operational capability rather than an experimental technology. If Castelion successfully delivers the required performance, production reliability and integration milestones, Blackbeard could provide U.S. naval aviation with a valuable combination of speed, guided long-range strike capability, mobility and inventory depth, strengthening long-range maritime strike capacity while demonstrating that advanced American hypersonic capability can be paired with the production scale and operational flexibility required for credible maritime deterrence.

Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.

Explore More Defense News

• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News
Ukraine Debuts MV11 MAGURA Naval Drone Signaling Evolution Toward Maritime Drone Mothership Operations
{loadposition bannertop}

{loadposition sidebarpub}
Ukraine has unveiled the larger MV11 MAGURA naval drone during its August 24, 2026 Independence Day display in Kyiv, marking a shift toward longer-range and more complex unmanned maritime operations. The platform points to a future in which Ukraine can push drone activity farther from shore while coordinating multiple unmanned assets across the same mission.

The MV11 moves the MAGURA family beyond stand-alone strike craft by adding the size and endurance needed for broader support and deployment roles. That creates the potential for a maritime drone mothership able to extend reconnaissance, strike, and sustainment operations across a wider battlespace.

Related Topic: Ukraine Presents New Generation of Sea Baby Naval Drones to Sustain Pressure in the Black Sea

Ukraine has unveiled the new MV11, the largest MAGURA naval drone, signaling a shift toward longer-range maritime operations in which larger unmanned vessels could support, deploy, and coordinate multiple drones at sea (Picture Source: Ukrainian National Television)

On August 25, 2026, attention turned to a new addition to Ukraine’s expanding unmanned maritime portfolio after the MV11 made its public debut during Independence Day events in Kyiv the previous day. According to reporting by Militarnyi and Defence Blog, UFORCE introduced the new platform during the August 24 unmanned-systems parade on the Dnipro River, positioning it within the broader MAGURA family already associated with Ukraine’s transformation of warfare at sea. More than a larger naval drone, the MV11 points toward a new phase in which Ukraine is seeking greater endurance, logistical reach and coordination between multiple unmanned assets.

MV11 Takes the MAGURA Concept Into a New Operational Category

Ukraine’s Independence Day display carried significance beyond the unveiling of another unmanned vessel. UFORCE presented the MV11 as part of a broader MAGURA portfolio, allowing the larger platform to be viewed alongside systems developed around different maritime roles. That presentation underscored how the MAGURA concept is becoming less dependent on a single type of drone and increasingly resembles a layered family of specialized platforms. For Ukraine, this evolution suggests that experience accumulated through maritime drone operations is now being translated into a more structured unmanned force in which strike, sensing, protection and support functions can be distributed across different vessels.

The MV11 represents a substantial departure from the compact MAGURA platforms that established the family’s reputation. With a stated payload capacity of up to 2,200 kilograms and an endurance reaching seven days, the vessel introduces considerably more carrying capacity and persistence into the series. Its design emphasis is centered on moving equipment and supporting other unmanned assets rather than simply reproducing the mission profile of earlier strike-oriented designs. This distinction could be crucial: the MV11’s value may ultimately be measured less by what the vessel can accomplish independently than by how much additional operational reach it can provide to the systems working around it.

A particularly important element of the concept is the MV11’s ability to transport and deploy other unmanned systems. That opens the possibility of using the vessel as an offshore node from which smaller assets could be dispatched, sustained or repositioned without depending entirely on shore-based launch points. Reconnaissance, persistent observation, logistical support and assistance to maritime operations are among the functions associated with the platform, including moving fuel and equipment for other unmanned craft. Such a configuration could gradually turn the MAGURA family from a collection of individual drones into a networked maritime formation, with the MV11 acting as an endurance and logistics multiplier for smaller systems operating farther from their bases.

A visual assessment of the MV11 also shows a large central deck area divided into multiple rectangular hatch-like sections, suggesting that the vessel may incorporate enclosed payload or drone-storage compartments. If these sections are designed to open for launch operations, the configuration could potentially allow the MV11 to carry and deploy several smaller unmanned systems, including interceptor, reconnaissance or attack drones. Such an arrangement could give the vessel additional utility in offshore air-defense, surveillance or strike-support missions while extending the operating reach of smaller platforms. However, the visible deck layout alone does not establish the purpose of these compartments, and UFORCE has not publicly confirmed the MV11’s armament configuration, the number or types of drones it may carry, or its exact operational mission set.

A Maritime Mothership Could Extend Ukraine’s Unmanned Reach

For Ukraine, the development reflects lessons accumulated during several years of unusually rapid experimentation with unmanned warfare at sea. MAGURA systems have demonstrated that relatively small robotic vessels can force a much larger conventional navy to devote significant resources to detection, protection and countermeasures. The MV11 indicates that Ukrainian developers are now exploring the next challenge: not only sending unmanned platforms into contested waters, but sustaining groups of them across greater distances and for longer periods. If that approach proves operationally viable, Ukraine could gain additional maritime persistence without attempting to recreate the manpower, infrastructure and financial burden associated with a conventional surface fleet.

The Independence Day appearance also highlighted what the MAGURA lineup represents as a whole. Multiple configurations point toward growing specialization, with different platforms potentially optimized for attack, reconnaissance, aerial defense, transportation or maritime support. Developing separate vessels around distinct mission requirements can offer greater flexibility than concentrating every capability aboard a single design. It can also create a more demanding operational picture for an adversary: identifying a MAGURA-family vessel may no longer immediately reveal its function, payload or the other unmanned systems it could be supporting. The MV11 adds another layer to that uncertainty by introducing a platform capable of enabling operations rather than merely conducting them itself.

From Individual Drones to an Integrated Maritime Ecosystem

The MV11 also reflects the increasingly international dimension of Ukraine-linked defense innovation. The program carries a European industrial dimension, with UFORCE conducting MV11 development work in Portugal while drawing on international financing and requirements shaped by Ukraine’s defense needs. This combination is significant because it connects Ukrainian wartime experience with European engineering capacity and outside capital, creating a model that could allow technologies developed under battlefield pressure to mature beyond short production cycles. In the longer term, such an ecosystem may also give MAGURA-derived technologies relevance for European and allied navies examining how autonomous platforms can supplement traditional maritime forces.

The MV11’s appearance during Ukraine’s August 24 Independence Day drone parade represents more than the arrival of the largest platform yet associated with the MAGURA family. Its greater importance lies in the shift toward supporting, transporting and extending the reach of other unmanned systems, creating the foundations for a more interconnected maritime architecture. By presenting the MV11 together with other MAGURA platforms, Ukraine offered a glimpse of an unmanned force evolving through specialization rather than simple enlargement. The development reinforces Kyiv’s broader technological approach to maritime security, where endurance, distributed operations and rapid innovation can provide alternatives to the traditional advantages of a larger conventional fleet.

Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.

Explore More Defense News

• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News
Turkish Navy Chief confirms September 2027 launch for first domestic MUGEM aircraft carrier
{loadposition bannertop}

{loadposition sidebarpub}
Turkish Naval Forces Commander Adm. Ercüment Tatlıoğlu confirmed at Teknofest Blue Homeland on August 23, 2026, that Türkiye will launch its first indigenous aircraft carrier, the MUGEM (Milli Uçak Gemisi), on September 27, 2027. The 60,000-tonne STOBAR-configured platform represents an operational pivot to multi-domain carrier architecture by integrating manned fighters with jet-powered unmanned combat air vehicles and autonomous maritime systems. Construction of the 285-meter hull continues at Istanbul Naval Shipyard toward a scheduled commissioning date in 2032.

The MUGEM features a 285-meter length, 72-meter beam, 10.1-meter draught, and a 60,000-tonne displacement, powered by a propulsion arrangement designed for speeds exceeding 26 knots and a 10,000-nautical-mile operational range. Equipped with a 12-degree modular ski-jump, 32 Midlas vertical launch cells, and capacity for 52 aircraft, the carrier is designed to deploy the Hürjet, Bayraktar Kızılelma, Anka-3, and TB3 alongside integrated unmanned surface and underwater vehicles.

Related topic:Discover how Türkiye’s first aircraft carrier will make drones a key weapon for naval warfare

The MUGEM's planned air wing will combine the manned naval Hürjet with three unmanned fixed-wing aircraft, the Kizilelma, Anka-3, and Bayraktar TB3, with a total capacity of 52 aircraft and the option to embark up to 52 Kizilelma in a single-type configuration. (Picture source: Turkish Defence Agency)

On August 23, 2026, Turkish Naval Forces Commander Adm. Ercüment Tatlioğlu confirmed at Teknofest Blue Homeland that Türkiye plans to launch its first indigenous aircraft carrier, the MUGEM (Milli Uçak Gemisi), on September 27, 2027, roughly 33 months after construction began at Istanbul Naval Shipyard on January 2, 2025. The MUGEM program began in 2023 with Concept of Operations development, feasibility work, and analysis of alternatives; moved through concept and preliminary design; and entered detailed and contract design activity during 2026, while hull construction was already underway. The Turkish aircraft carrier is planned for delivery in 2032, leaving roughly four to five years after launch for outfitting, system integration, harbor testing, sea trials, and verification.

The MUGEM is a purpose-designed STOBAR carrier rather than a derivative of the TCG Anadolu amphibious assault ship: the carrier is planned at 285 m length, 72 m maximum beam, 10.1 m draught, and roughly 60,000 tonnes displacement, making it 55 m longer and about 2.2 times heavier than the TCG Anadolu by displacement. Accommodation is planned for as many as 2,500 personnel, compared with earlier ship crew figures near 800, because the larger total now includes aviation personnel, maintainers, command staff and other embarked elements. The flight deck combines a 12-degree ski-jump, three take-off lanes, an arrested landing area and capacity for 52 aircraft, while the hull also incorporates facilities for unmanned surface and underwater vehicles.

Tatlioğlu additionally said the ship can carry 52 Kizilelma unmanned combat aircraft, as part of a mixed air wing planned around the Hürjet, the Kizilelma, the Anka-3, the TB3, and potentially a navalized variant of the Kaan. The MUGEM's propulsion and hydrodynamic requirements are driven by a 60,000-tonne hull expected to sustain more than 26 knots at maximum speed while retaining a 10,000-nautical-mile range at 14 knots. At 14 knots, 10,000 nautical miles corresponds to 714.3 hours of continuous steaming, or 29.8 days, before replenishment if the entire nominal range is used. Earlier propulsion planning centered on four GE LM2500 gas turbines rated at roughly 23 MW each, giving roughly 92 MW of combined output, together with electric-drive functions and a twin-shaft arrangement using controllable-pitch propellers.

The logic of the electric component is operational rather than cosmetic: gas turbines are efficient at high power but comparatively inefficient at low speed, so the PTI-PTO arrangement allows propulsion and electrical generation loads to be managed without relying continuously on all four turbines. Hull-form development has included towing-tank testing and CFD analysis at 26 knots to examine bow-wave formation, resistance, and water reaching the forward flight deck. Bow optimization has been associated with a 1.5% fuel-consumption reduction, while the Turkish Naval Design Project Office is developing the propellers through physical-model production, towing-tank trials, and numerical analysis with an efficiency target of at least 70%. Seakeeping work includes active stabilizers and air-wake studies, while cooperation with ODTÜ/Middle East Technical University has included wind-tunnel testing to define the airflow over the deck and around the island.

The ship is also being designed for unrestricted aviation operations through Sea State 6, a condition associated with significant wave heights of roughly 4 to 6 m. The aviation arrangement is initially a STOBAR (Short Take-Off But Arrested Recovery), which means the MUGEM will not use catapults in its first configuration. Like on China's Shandong and India's INS Vikrant, aircraft will accelerate under their own engine thrust and use the 12-degree ski-jump at the bow to obtain the required departure trajectory, while returning aircraft will engage arresting gear during landing. The current deck arrangement includes three take-off lanes and one landing area, compared with earlier configurations associated with two take-off lanes, while total capacity has increased from 50 to 52 aircraft. The earlier 50-aircraft arrangement divided the air group between 30 aircraft in the hangar and 20 on the flight deck, equivalent to a 60% internal and 40% deck-stowed distribution.

Raising the nominal total to 52 increases capacity by only two aircraft, or 4%, but that additional capacity has to come from deck spotting, hangar organization, aircraft dimensions, or handling practices rather than a hull increase. The ski-jump itself is modular, allowing its removal if Türkiye's indigenous catapult program reaches operational maturity and the Navy later converts the ship toward CATOBAR (Catapult-Assisted Take-Off But Arrested Recovery) operations. That would improve launch-weight constraints, as a catapult could provide external launch energy instead of forcing each aircraft to reach the required speed only through its own engines and the ski-jump. Until then, aircraft performance has to be matched to deck run, acceleration distance, wind-over-deck conditions, take-off mass, and ski-jump geometry. This is why land-based test ramps and carrier aircraft compatibility work are being pursued in parallel by Türkiye, rather than after the MUGEM delivery.

The planned air group is unusual because three of the four fixed-wing families are unmanned. The Kizilelma is the main jet-powered unmanned combat aircraft associated with the MUGEM, and Tatlioğlu's remark indicates that the carrier's deck, hangar, and handling concept can accommodate an all-Kizilelma loadout if required. The Anka-3 adds a second jet-powered unmanned aircraft but uses a flying-wing configuration, creating a different deck footprint and different low-speed aerodynamic behavior from the Kizilelma. The Bayraktar TB3 is substantially smaller and was designed specifically for short-deck naval operations, making it suitable for missions where larger jet-powered aircraft would consume unnecessary hangar and deck space. The Hürjet is the only manned fixed-wing aircraft family currently included in the carrier plan, but the intended aircraft is a naval variant rather than the existing land-based trainer/light combat aircraft.

Shipboard adaptation requires the aircraft to withstand arrested-recovery loads, repeated hard deck landings, saltwater corrosion, and a different low-speed approach environment, while landing gear, arresting-hook installation, structural fatigue margins, and flight-control logic must be matched to carrier operations. The original 30-hangar and 20-deck allocation therefore represented more than a capacity figure: it established how many aircraft could be protected and maintained internally while preserving enough deck space for launch, recovery and aircraft movement. The 52-aircraft configuration pushes those margins slightly further without increasing the hull dimensions.

Air-wake analysis and wind-tunnel testing are directly linked to this issue because the island, flight deck and bow distort airflow during approach, and those effects will differ for a conventional Hürjet, a Kizilelma with a different control layout, a flying-wing Anka-3 and the much smaller TB3, even though there are also rumours of an adapted carrier-based version of the Kaan fighter jet. The MUGEM is also being configured to operate unmanned vehicles on the surface and below the waterline, not only aircraft. Tatlioğlu said the Turkish Naval Forces already field five USV types, two types of kamikaze USVs and three UUV types, creating an existing inventory that can potentially be connected to the carrier's command architecture. Aselsan's relevant USVs include the Albatros-K and the Albatros-S for reconnaissance, surveillance, and swarm operations, the Marlin for ISR, anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, and electronic warfare, and the Tufan for high-speed autonomous missions.

In the underwater domain, the Kiliç 10 and the Kiliç 200 provide autonomous strike options, while the Deringöz is intended for underwater ISR and mine-countermeasure work. Havelsan's Sancar can conduct ISR, surface warfare, and mine countermeasures and is already integrated with the Advent CMS, while the Çaka and the USV-12 address hybrid multi-domain and smaller coastal surveillance requirements. STM's Neta family covers reconnaissance, seabed mapping, and mine countermeasures underwater, while the Yaktu provides another high-speed USV option. Meteksan's Ulaq family includes modular configurations for ISR, electronic warfare and anti-surface missions, while the Ulaq Kama is oriented toward high-speed autonomous attack; Dearsan's Salvo and MKE's Pirana add further options, with the Pirana intended as a kamikaze USV.

The MUGEM's dedicated USV and UUV deployment and recovery areas are therefore not simply storage spaces but interfaces between the ship and a broader unmanned force. The Advent CMS is intended to provide the common command layer linking these vehicles with the carrier, manned aircraft, unmanned aircraft and other Turkish warships, allowing sensor data and mission orders to move between air, surface and underwater assets. The carrier's own defensive suite is built around 32 Midlas vertical launch cells, arranged in two 16-cell modules, plus short-range missile and gun systems intended to protect the ship inside the outer defensive layers provided by escorts. The 2026 configuration includes three CIWS, four remote-controlled weapon stations and two point-defense missile systems, replacing the earlier 2024 arrangement of four Gökdeniz CIWS and six 25 mm Stop mounts.

Counting individual positions, the current layout therefore combines 32 VLS cells with nine separate close-range or point-defense weapon positions. The sensor mast includes the Çafrad multifunction and long-range radar functions, an LPI radar, IFF, an electro-optical director, and HF communications. Passive sensing is provided by infrared tracking and electronic support systems, allowing target detection without depending exclusively on active radar transmission. Electronic warfare includes both electronic support and electronic attack functions as well as laser electronic attack, creating several countermeasure options in the RF and electro-optical bands. Satellite communications use X-, Ku-, and Ka-bands, providing three separate frequency ranges for beyond-line-of-sight connectivity, while the Advent integrates the carrier's own sensors, weapons, and unmanned systems into the wider naval network.

The operational limitation is equally important: 32 VLS cells are not enough to make a 60,000-tonne carrier independently responsible for wide-area fleet air defense during prolonged high-intensity combat. The MUGEM's organic weapons are therefore better understood as an inner defensive layer, while destroyers and frigates, particularly future TF-2000 air defense warfare destroyers, would be required to provide larger missile inventories, broader radar coverage and additional engagement channels around the carrier. The period between the September 2027 launch and the planned 2032 delivery will logically be dominated by integration. For the MUGEM construction, Türkiye is using a mega-block approach, allowing large sections to be produced with participation from multiple Turkish shipyards and then incorporated into the Istanbul Naval Shipyard assembly sequence, increasing the amount of work that can proceed in parallel.

Plans call for the four LM2500 turbines to be installed before launch, which avoids cutting open a more complete hull later to insert major propulsion machinery and leaves more of the post-launch workload concentrated on auxiliaries, electrical distribution, sensors, weapons, communications, accommodation, elevators, arresting equipment and aviation support systems. The maximum accommodation figure of 2,500 also demonstrates the scale of internal support required for carrier operations. Earlier figures near 800 personnel referred primarily to the ship's crew, while the larger number includes the air wing, maintainers, command personnel, medical staff, mission specialists and other embarked elements. Medical facilities are therefore planned to Role 2 Enhanced level and include two operating rooms, two dental clinics, a dental surgery room, triage areas, intensive care, burn treatment, radiology, an isolation room, 30-bed wards, a laboratory and pharmacy.

That allows the carrier to perform surgery, trauma stabilization, and inpatient treatment at sea rather than limiting medical capability to basic first aid and casualty holding. Vehicle and equipment ramps are planned at the stern and starboard side, providing additional logistics routes for stores, vehicles, and mission equipment. These facilities help explain the long post-launch interval: putting the hull into the water in 2027 is a structural milestone, while turning it into a carrier capable of coordinating 52 aircraft, unmanned maritime vehicles, missile defenses, sensors, communications, and a crew population potentially reaching 2,500 requires several additional years of integration and trials. The MUGEM aircraft carrier is also being built inside a Turkish naval construction cycle substantially larger than the carrier program itself.

In August 2026, Tatlioğlu said 37 vessels were already under construction for the Turkish Naval Forces and the construction of another 10 would begin during the month, increasing the simultaneous domestic workload to 47 warships. Turkish shipyards were also building 24 warships for foreign customers, producing a combined workload of 71 military vessels. The domestic group includes the MUGEM, the national fast attack craft, the national mine-hunting vessel, and the Kocatepe, the first TF-2000 air defense warfare destroyer. The existing surface fleet includes the Ada-class corvettes TCG Heybeliada, TCG Büyükada, TCG Burgazada, and TCG Kinaliada, while the İstanbul-class frigate program has already produced the TCG İstanbul and is continuing with TCG İzmir and TCG İzmit.

The submarine force is simultaneously transitioning to Reis-class AIP submarines, with TCG Piri Reis and TCG Murat Reis already launched and Hizir Reis approaching service. Naval weapons are being introduced at the same time: the Atmaca has replaced the U.S.-made Harpoon, and Tatlioğlu said a Turkish submarine fired an Atmaca at a target 190 km away roughly one month before his August 2026 remarks; the Akya heavy torpedo and the Malaman smart naval mine have also entered Turkish naval use.

For the MUGEM, these parallel programs are operationally relevant: an aircraft carrier requires destroyers for area air defense, frigates and helicopters for anti-submarine protection, submarines for underwater screening, replenishment ships for endurance, secure communications for distributed operations and indigenous weapons that can be replenished and sustained without depending entirely on foreign inventories. The September 2027 launch therefore marks the beginning of the ship's transition from hull construction to system integration, while its planned 2032 delivery is tied to a broader Turkish effort to field the escorts, submarines, missiles, torpedoes, mines and unmanned systems needed to make a 60,000-tonne carrier operationally usable as part of a complete naval force.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.

Explore More Defense News

• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News
Australia's HMAS Hobart destroyer completes first upgrade with Tomahawk and Aegis ballistic missile defence
{loadposition bannertop}

{loadposition sidebarpub}
Royal Australian Navy Vice Admiral Matthew Buckley confirmed on August 20, 2026, that HMAS Hobart has completed the yard phase of its Destroyer Capability Enhancement (DCE) program at Osborne Naval Shipyard under Project SEA 4000 Phase 6. The A$4.29 billion modernization replaces legacy combat systems with Aegis Baseline 9 and Saab’s 9LV Australian Interface while integrating Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles, Standard Missile 6 (SM-6), and Naval Strike Missiles. This mid-life upgrade establishes Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) across the class, maintaining a fixed 48-cell Mk 41 Vertical Launch System configuration per ship for the next two decades.

The A$4.29 billion SEA 4000 Phase 6 program modernizes three Hobart-class destroyers, combining Aegis Baseline 9 with a 48-cell Mk 41 VLS to support 1,500 km Tomahawk strike weapons, SM-6, and SM-2 Block IIIC missiles. Canister-launched Naval Strike Missiles preserve vertical-launch capacity, balancing fleet air defense, terminal ballistic missile defense, and long-range precision surface attack.

Related topic:Australian Hunter-class frigates gain direct link to US Aegis missile defense system

The Destroyer Capability Enhancement (DCE) transforms the HMAS Hobart from an air defence destroyer into a multi-mission combatant by adding Aegis Baseline 9 integrated missile defence, Tomahawk, SM-6, and NSM missiles, upgraded electronic warfare and communications, and a new Saab 9LV-based Australian combat-system interface. (Picture source: Australian MoD)

On August 20, 2026, Australia's Vice Admiral Matthew Buckley confirmed that HMAS Hobart was the first Hobart-class destroyer to complete the yard phase of its Destroyer Capability Enhancement (DCE) program at Osborne Naval Shipyard under SEA 4000 Phase 6. The yard period began in February 2026 and forms part of an A$4.29 billion effort covering HMAS Hobart, HMAS Brisbane and HMAS Sydney. The DCE replaces major elements of the ships' combat system architecture, integrates Tomahawk and SM-6, introduces Naval Strike Missile in place of Harpoon, updates electronic warfare and communications equipment, and installs a new Australian combat system interface associated with Saab's 9LV architecture. The three destroyers are expected to remain in service for another two decades and beyond, so the DCE program is effectively a mid-life upgrade rather than a routine maintenance cycle.

Each ship nevertheless retains the same 48-cell Mk 41 Vertical Launching System (VLS) it had before the upgrade. That leaves the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) with 144 Mk 41 cells across the entire Hobart class, a fixed physical ceiling that now has to support long-range land attack, conventional air defence and terminal ballistic missile defence at the same time. The principal combat system change is the transition from the earlier Hobart-class Aegis configuration to Baseline 9 through the replacement of computing hardware, software and associated shipboard interfaces. The previous configuration was centered mainly on fleet air defence against aircraft and anti-ship missiles. Baseline 9 expands the combat system into Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD), allowing the ship to process and manage aircraft, cruise missile and ballistic missile tracks in a common combat environment.

The practical addition is not simply a larger air picture but a new class of engagement: terminal ballistic missile defence requires the destroyer to detect or receive tracks on missiles descending toward their targets, maintain sufficiently accurate engagement-quality data, and cue an interceptor within much shorter timelines than those associated with conventional aircraft interception. The ship can therefore contribute to the defence of a naval task group, an operating area or selected assets against mixed air and missile threats rather than functioning only as an escort against aircraft and sea-skimming missiles. The important constraint is that Baseline 9 creates new demand for the ship's missile magazine without increasing that magazine. Every SM-6 embarked for ballistic missile defence occupies a cell that cannot simultaneously hold an SM-2 or Tomahawk.

Speaking of which, the Tomahawk integration gives the Hobart-class a new ship-launched land-attack missile exceeding 1,500 km and changes the operational reach of the destroyer force. Australia is acquiring more than 200 Tomahawk cruise missiles through an investment of approximately A$1.3 billion. At that range, a Hobart-class destroyer can strike fixed targets such as air bases, command facilities, missile sites and logistics hubs from well outside the distances associated with legacy ship-launched anti-ship weapons. HMAS Brisbane became the first RAN vessel to fire a Tomahawk in December 2024, about twenty months before HMAS Hobart completed its August 2026 yard milestone, so the weapon had already entered fleet introduction before the first DCE ship returned to the water. The central limitation is magazine arithmetic. Eight Tomahawks consume 16.7 percent of a 48-cell VLS, 12 consume 25 percent, 16 consume 33.3 percent, and 24 consume 50 percent.

If HMAS Hobart carried 16 Tomahawks, only 32 Mk 41 cells would remain for SM-2, SM-6, and any other compatible weapons. If all three destroyers carried 16 Tomahawks, the class would allocate 48 of its 144 cells, one-third of total VLS capacity, to land attack before loading a single Standard Missile. For its part, the SM-6 places additional pressure on the same 48-cell magazine because it adds several missions without adding launch positions. Australia has committed A$7 billion to its inventories of SM-2 Block IIIC and SM-6. The SM-6 adds extended-range air defence, terminal ballistic missile defence and a secondary anti-surface capability, while the SM-2 Block IIIC remains part of the broader air defence inventory. HMAS Sydney fired SM-6s in 2024, establishing another missile milestone before the HMAS Hobart entered the DCE yard period in February 2026. The resulting loadout problem is straightforward.

A configuration with 16 Tomahawks, 12 SM-6 and 12 SM-2 would consume 40 cells and leave only eight for additional VLS weapons. A configuration with 12 Tomahawks, 18 SM-6 and 18 SM-2 would fill all 48 cells. Repeated across the class, that second example would produce 36 Tomahawks, 54 SM-6 and 54 SM-2 in 144 cells. Those are illustrative distributions rather than RAN load plans, but they quantify the trade-off created by the upgrade: every increase in offensive strike capacity logically reduces defensive depth unless another mission receives fewer rounds. The Naval Strike Missile (NSM) partly separates anti-ship warfare from that competition because it replaces the Harpoon in dedicated canister launchers rather than occupying Mk 41 cells. Australia has committed more than A$1 billion to NSM inventories across the fleet.

The missile provides a high-subsonic, sea-skimming precision anti-ship weapon while preserving the destroyer's 48 vertical-launch cells for Tomahawk, SM-2 and SM-6 missiles. That distinction is operationally important on a ship with limited magazine depth. Eight Mk 41 cells represent 16.7 percent of total VLS capacity, so moving the primary anti-ship missile outside the vertical launcher preserves a meaningful share of the ship's defensive and land-attack inventory. The SM-6 can still be used against surface targets, but doing so would draw from missiles also needed for air and ballistic missile defence. The resulting weapons arrangement divides missions across different launcher types: the NSM handles the dedicated anti-ship role from canisters, the Tomahawk handles long-range land attack from Mk 41, and SM-2s and SM-6s provide the principal air and missile defence capacity.

The DCE also required substantial reconstruction inside the HMAS Hobart, particularly in the combat information center, which was completely dismantled before the installation of Saab Australia's new Australian Interface. The system replaces the earlier Australian Tactical Interface and links Aegis with Australian-specific combat system functions, ship systems and tactical networks through an architecture associated with Saab's 9LV Combat Management System. This type of refit requires new computing equipment, electrical distribution, cooling, cabling, consoles, equipment racks, data interfaces, communications links and weapons connections to be integrated inside a 147-meter hull whose internal arrangement predates the new systems.

BAE Systems Australia is conducting the work at Osborne; BAE Systems Australia, Saab Australia and Lockheed Martin Australia form the Combat Systems Integration – Integrated Project Team (CSI-IPT); and Navantia Australia carries responsibility for platform-system design and physical integration work. The same broad Aegis Baseline 9 and Australian Interface combination is planned for the Hunter-class frigates, although the Hunter will use CEA Technologies' CEAFAR 2 phased-array radar. That creates a new combat system commonality between Australia's destroyer and future frigate forces while retaining different radar, hull and platform architectures. The program's cost and fleet-size relationship is also significant. SEA 4000 Phase 6 assigns A$4.29 billion to three destroyers, and the ships are being upgraded sequentially because removing more than one at a time would sharply reduce available fleet capacity.

With only three Hobart-class hulls, one ship in a deep modernization period represents 33.3 percent of the class unavailable for normal employment before maintenance, training and readiness demands on the remaining two ships are considered. The work is centered at Osborne under the wider maritime sustainment framework established through Plan Galileo in 2019 and creates requirements across electrical work, fabrication, insulation, machining, mechanical services, platform maintenance and combat system integration. Hobart-class support expenditure in 2023-24 reached A$242 million against a revised estimate of A$239 million, with preparations increasing for the Aegis upgrade and Tomahawk integration.

Aegis Combat System expenditure in the same financial year was A$89 million against a revised estimate of A$117 million, a A$27 million negative variation associated with lower Foreign Military Sales case disbursements, Australian industry cost efficiencies and reduced demand for inventory repair and replacement. The modernization follows SEA 4000 Phase 3, which delivered all three destroyers and their support system, with the last ship commissioned in May 2020. Operationally, the Destroyer Capability Enhancement (DCE) program moves the Hobart-class from a destroyer focused primarily on conventional air defence and anti-ship warfare into a multi-mission vessel able to conduct integrated air and missile defence, terminal ballistic missile defence, long-range land attack and networked operations alongside its existing roles.

The Tomahawk extends the class's reach beyond 1,500 km, the SM-6 adds a ballistic missile defence and extended-range air defence capability, the NSM replaces Harpoon without using Mk 41 cells, and the upgraded combat system allows these weapons and sensors to be managed within a common Australian interface. The ships therefore gain greater flexibility in how they support a task group or joint force: they can defend against aircraft and missiles, contribute to protection against ballistic missiles, strike land targets at long range, and conduct anti-ship operations within the same deployment. The DCE does not change the number of destroyers or their 48-cell Mk 41 launchers, but it substantially expands what each ship can do with those existing hulls and launch systems.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.

Explore More Defense News

• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News
Japan’s Surface-to-Ship Missile Training Reveals a New Maritime Defense Architecture
{loadposition bannertop}

{loadposition sidebarpub}
Japan has conducted live-fire Type 88 surface-to-ship missile training in Hokkaido, with the JGSDF Northern Army confirming the August 16-22, 2026 exercise as part of a broader effort to strengthen land-based maritime defense. Beyond testing crews and weapons, the firing shows Japan is building a more reliable domestic training architecture for forces tasked with denying hostile ships access to strategically important waters.

The exercise gives Japanese missile units a repeatable way to practice the detection-to-engagement cycle needed to attack ships from dispersed positions on land. Expanding this training capacity supports a wider shift toward mobile coastal firepower and maritime denial, reducing dependence on overseas firing ranges while improving readiness for operations around Japan’s northern and southwestern approaches.

Related Topic: Japan’s Submarine-Launched Hypersonic Missile Plan Signals a New Era in Indo-Pacific Deterrence

Japan’s latest Type 88 surface-to-ship missile exercise highlights a broader effort to build a more resilient, repeatable domestic training architecture for land-based maritime defense forces (Japanese MoD)

From August 16 to 22, 2026, the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force’s Northern Army conducted live-fire surface-to-ship missile training at the Shizunai Anti-Aircraft Firing Range in Hokkaido. While the Northern Army’s post-exercise announcement referred generically to a surface-to-ship missile, the JGSDF had officially identified the FY2026 annual exercise in advance as involving the Type 88 Surface-to-Ship Missile, with formations from both the Northern and Western Armies participating. The activity goes beyond a routine missile firing by highlighting Japan’s effort to secure a stable domestic training infrastructure for its land-based maritime-defense forces amid what Tokyo officially describes as an increasingly severe security environment. Strategically, the significance lies not only in the missile launched, but in Japan’s effort to make complex anti-ship training more routine, repeatable and less dependent on overseas firing opportunities.

From Overseas Training to a Sustainable Domestic Missile Base

This was Japan’s second domestic Type 88 live-fire exercise. The first took place at Shizunai on June 24, 2025, following years in which JGSDF surface-to-ship missile formations had used training ranges in the United States for realistic long-range firing. Ahead of the 2026 exercise, the JGSDF identified the participating formations as the Northern Army’s 3rd Surface-to-Ship Missile Regiment and the Western Army’s 8th Surface-to-Ship Missile Regiment, with training conducted at regimental scale from information collection through engagement. Bringing formations from separate regional commands into the same annual training framework can reasonably be assessed as supporting common procedures and greater interoperability across Japan’s land-based anti-ship force, although the JGSDF has not linked the activity to any specific regional contingency. The deeper operational value is force-generation resilience: a dependable domestic live-fire base gives Japan greater freedom to sustain proficiency, rotate more personnel through realistic training cycles and preserve readiness even when access to overseas ranges is constrained.

Type 88 as the Foundation of Japan’s Land-Based Anti-Ship Capability

The Type 88 Surface-to-Ship Missile, or SSM-1, remains one of the foundational systems behind Japan’s land-based anti-ship capability. According to the JGSDF, the missile was developed from technology associated with the Air Self-Defense Force’s Type 80 ASM-1 air-launched anti-ship missile. Its mobile launcher carries six missiles, while the weapon was designed to exploit Japan’s geography by launching from positions behind coastal terrain, following a programmed route around geographical obstacles and transitioning to low-altitude flight over the sea toward its target. This combination of road mobility and terrain utilization has allowed Japan to maintain a dispersed coastal-defense capability without relying exclusively on fixed firing positions. In doctrinal terms, the Type 88 helped establish a model that remains relevant today: concealment, mobility and the use of Japan’s complex geography to make land-based maritime forces harder to locate, predict and neutralize.

The Type 88 also represents an earlier stage of the technological progression that produced the Type 12 SSM and Japan’s newest domestically developed stand-off weapons. Japan’s Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency states that the Type 12 improved firing efficiency and survivability compared with the Type 88. On March 31, 2026, the Ministry of Defense announced that development of the upgraded ground-launched Type 12 had been completed and that the weapon had been formally designated the Type 25 SSM, with initial deployment at Camp Kengun in Kumamoto Prefecture. The Type 88 is no longer Japan’s most advanced anti-ship weapon, but its established force structure remains relevant for maintaining missile-unit proficiency while newer systems are introduced. Seen through this longer development cycle, Japan is not replacing one coastal missile with another in isolation; it is preserving the operational knowledge of an established force while progressively shifting toward longer-range, more survivable and more information-dependent stand-off capabilities.

Linking Electronic Warfare, Information and Firepower

One of the most significant elements of the 2026 training concerned the operational architecture surrounding the missile rather than the missile alone. Before the exercise, the JGSDF Chief of Staff confirmed that surface-to-ship missile formations would train in cooperation with units equipped with the Network Electronic Warfare System, or NEWS. The electronic-warfare element was intended to support the missile regiment through the collection and analysis of electromagnetic information, information sharing, situational assessment and command-staff activities. Asked whether this activity could broadly be regarded as part of targeting training, the Ground Staff Chief confirmed that it could be understood as one element of such training. He also noted that the participation of a regimental headquarters and NEWS represented a development from the previous year’s exercise. This is a noteworthy evolution because it moves the training focus away from the launcher as an isolated weapon and toward the wider network of sensors, information flows and command decisions required to employ missile forces effectively.

From an operational perspective, this introduces a dimension potentially more consequential than the performance of the Type 88 itself. The JGSDF described the concept as cooperation between “information and firepower” and between electronic-warfare and firepower elements. Modern maritime-defense operations increasingly depend on the ability to gather information, assess the operational picture, distribute relevant data and connect command decisions with available firing units. Japan has not stated that the Shizunai exercise was specifically intended to prepare personnel for operation of the Type 25 SSM, and such a direct connection should not be assumed. Still, as engagement ranges increase, the quality and speed of information available to commanders become increasingly important. In that sense, Shizunai can be viewed as an exercise in the institutional processes behind maritime strike—testing how information is converted into decisions and how those decisions can be linked to dispersed firing elements in a contested environment.

Strategic Implications for Japan’s Maritime Defense Posture

The strategic significance of Shizunai is best understood within Japan’s broader effort to improve readiness across an archipelago facing several distinct maritime approaches. Hokkaido anchors the country’s northern defense axis, while Western Army formations are responsible for areas including Kyushu and Japan’s southwestern region. Training missile units from different regional commands under a common framework provides opportunities to standardize skills and reinforce operational flexibility across geographically separated formations. This comes as Japan’s official defense assessments continue to highlight China’s growing military capabilities and activities, North Korea’s missile development and Russian military activity in the Far East. These circumstances do not establish that the Shizunai exercise was directed against China, Russia, North Korea or any single scenario. A more supportable assessment is that Japan is strengthening its ability to respond to a broader range of demanding maritime-defense contingencies in which mobility, resilient command structures, electronic warfare, information sharing and precision engagement could play important roles. From a geostrategic perspective, the combination of northern and western formations is particularly relevant because it demonstrates how Japan can build common missile-force proficiency across widely separated defense axes without publicly tying the capability to one geographic threat.

Japan’s August 2026 Type 88 training is more significant than a routine firing of an established anti-ship missile. By sustaining domestic live-fire opportunities, training formations from separate regional commands, incorporating electronic-warfare and headquarters functions, and conducting the activity as a new generation of domestically produced stand-off weapons enters service, Tokyo is reinforcing the operational foundations of a more resilient maritime-defense posture. The clearest signal is one of readiness and deterrence rather than imminent escalation. The Type 88 may represent an earlier generation of Japanese missile technology, but the training structure developing around it points toward a force increasingly focused on integration, resilience and the protection of Japan’s maritime approaches. The deeper strategic shift is from possessing individual coastal-defense weapons toward building an interconnected system in which mobility, information, electronic warfare and precision fires work together to increase the operational challenges facing any force that could threaten the Japanese archipelago.

Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.

Explore More Defense News

• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News
South Korea accelerates Jangbogo-N nuclear attack submarine project amid major shift in US-South Korea alliance
{loadposition bannertop}

{loadposition sidebarpub}
On August 18, 2026, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung ordered the defense ministry to accelerate the development of the Jangbogo-N nuclear-powered attack submarine while confirming plans to complete the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) during his term. The decision aims to establish long-endurance, independent undersea tracking capabilities against regional missile threats and expand Seoul's tactical contribution to the U.S. alliance. The move builds on the May 2026 formal project launch following a bilateral consensus reached with Washington to allow low-enriched uranium propulsion.

The Jangbogo-N program seeks to indigenously build three to four 8,000-ton conventionally armed nuclear attack submarines designed for multi-month submerged endurance and speeds exceeding 25 knots. Managed across a 40-year development and operational lifecycle, the low-enriched uranium SSN effort integrates domestic shipbuilders Hanwha Ocean and HD Hyundai Heavy Industries under specialized acquisition and safety legislation.

Related topic:Trump orders reduction of US-South Korea military exercises citing Kim Jong Un ties and Seoul refusal on Iran War

The Jangbogo-N represents South Korea’s first transition from a conventionally powered submarine force to an independent nuclear-powered attack submarine capability able to continuously track North Korean and Chinese operations across the Western Pacific. (Picture source: South Korean MoD)

On August 18, 2026, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung ordered faster progress on the Jangbogo-N nuclear-powered attack submarine program while reaffirming that Seoul intends to regain wartime operational control (OPCON) of South Korean forces during his term. The timing was significant because U.S. President Donald Trump had ordered the Pentagon on August 16 to substantially reduce Ulchi Freedom Shield, the principal South Korean-U.S. combined exercise then underway, after arguing that the drills sent an unnecessarily hostile signal to North Korea and emphasizing his personal relationship with Kim Jong-un. Lee did not frame the response as disengagement from Washington.

He instead argued that stronger South Korean capabilities would increase Seoul's value inside the alliance, while ordering the government to continue OPCON transfer preparations, accelerate nuclear submarine development and improve the training of officers for integrated operations across conventional, cyber and other military domains. This places the Jangbogo-N inside a larger shift in South Korean defense planning: the submarine is intended not only to improve undersea warfare, but also to provide Seoul with a national-level capability that can operate independently for long periods, support South Korean command requirements and reduce reliance on U.S. submarines for persistent tracking of North Korean and regional underwater targets.

The current program revives a South Korean nuclear submarine requirement that first became concrete under President Roh Moo-hyun in 2003. Project 362 aimed to develop three nuclear-powered attack submarines influenced by French Barracuda-class concepts, with work centered on the BANDI-60 reactor and participation by the South Korean Navy, the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute and the Defense Acquisition Program Administration. The planned fuel concept considered uranium enriched between roughly 20% and 45%, considerably above the less-than-20% LEU approach now associated with Jangbogo-N. Reactor work had advanced by 2004, but the effort was terminated after undeclared South Korean uranium enrichment experiments attracted IAEA scrutiny and U.S. pressure, including laser enrichment work that produced uranium enriched to roughly 77%. The program also faced internal budget competition with Aegis destroyer procurement.

Washington subsequently resisted South Korean SSN ambitions for more than two decades due to proliferation concerns, regional escalation risks involving China and Japan, and restrictions under bilateral nuclear cooperation arrangements. That policy changed after Trump and Lee met in Gyeongju on October 29, 2025. Washington then accepted South Korea's plan for conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarines and agreed to work with Seoul on requirements including nuclear fuel sourcing. South Korea formally launched the Jangbogo-N project on May 26, 2026 and set an initial schedule to launch the first submarine in the mid-2030s and place it into operational service in the late 2030s, creating a development cycle of roughly ten years from program authorization to first hull delivery.

The South Korean Navy had previously identified a requirement for four SSNs, while current military planning has been associated with at least three boats of roughly 8,000 tons. Neither number has been formally locked, but an 8,000-ton design would place the Jangbogo-N broadly in the same size category as the U.S. Virginia-class and at more than twice the displacement of South Korea's current KSS-IIIs. The government intends to design and build the submarines inside South Korea, despite Trump's October 2025 statement that they would be constructed at Hanwha Philly Shipyard in Philadelphia. Hanwha acquired that yard for roughly $100 million in December 2024 and later announced a $5 billion expansion, but the facility has primarily built commercial ships and lacks the nuclear-certified production areas, reactor-handling infrastructure, radiological systems and trained workforce required for SSN construction.

Seoul therefore chose a domestic industrial path based on Hanwha Ocean, HD Hyundai Heavy Industries, the national nuclear sector and defense research organizations. The program is being planned across more than 40 years, combining roughly ten years of development and construction with more than 30 years of operation, maintenance, reactor servicing, fuel management and eventual decommissioning. Government planning associates this industrial cycle with more than 40,000 jobs. No final program cost has been published, which remains a major budgetary uncertainty because the expense will extend far beyond submarine hulls to nuclear infrastructure, fuel, crew training, specialist maintenance, shore facilities, waste handling and reactor disposal. The operational baseline for the Jangbogo-N is a South Korean submarine fleet that has expanded steadily but remains entirely conventionally powered.

The Navy operates roughly 21 submarines: nine KSS-I Jang Bogo-class boats derived from the German Type 209/1200, nine KSS-II Son Won-il-class submarines based on the Type 214 and three KSS-III Dosan Ahn Chang-ho-class boats commissioned or entering service. KSS-I boats entered service between 1993 and 2001 and displace roughly 1,290 tons submerged. KSS-II submarines entered service between 2007 and 2020, displace roughly 1,860 tons submerged and use hydrogen fuel-cell AIP that can support roughly two weeks of underwater endurance without normal snorkeling. The KSS-II measures about 65.3 m in length, 6.3 m in beam and 6.0 m in draught, uses two MTU 16V 396 diesel engines, Piller generators, two BZM120 fuel-cell modules and a Siemens Permasyn motor driving a single shaft, and reaches up to 20 knots submerged. Its eight 533 mm torpedo tubes can employ heavyweight torpedoes, Harpoon Block II missiles, Haeseong II cruise missiles and mines.

The KSS-III marked the switch to indigenous submarine design, with Batch I displacing roughly 3,750 tons submerged and carrying six vertical launch cells for Hyunmoo-series missiles, while Batch II increases missile capacity to ten cells and incorporates lithium-ion batteries. Seoul is not replacing these submarines immediately. A 468.9 billion won KSS-II modernization program launched in November 2025 is replacing combat systems and sonar equipment on selected boats through 2033. The Jangbogo-N is therefore being introduced to perform missions that existing submarines cannot sustain. The operational difference is persistence at speed. Even an AIP submarine must eventually recharge batteries, run diesel machinery or otherwise accept operational constraints that create detectable periods and limit sustained pursuit.

Nuclear propulsion removes that cycle and permits a submarine to remain submerged for months, maintain underwater speeds above 25 knots for prolonged periods and rapidly reposition over thousands of kilometers without refueling. That matters against ballistic missile submarines, because successful tracking is not achieved by detecting a target once. It requires maintaining contact for days or weeks while the target changes depth, speed and patrol area. A diesel-electric submarine can lose that contact when it has to snorkel or reduce speed to conserve battery power. A nuclear-powered boat can remain submerged and maintain a much higher sustained pace. Reactor output also provides far more electrical power for large sonar arrays, processing hardware, communications, electronic warfare equipment and future unmanned systems. Hanwha Ocean's MADEX 2025 SSN concept incorporated a rim-driven propulsor, X-form rudder, 360-degree electro-optical mast, AI-based combat management system, diver lockout and manned-unmanned teaming.

These features are not all confirmed for the Jangbogo-N, but a vertical-launch missile section is expected. The engineering burden remains substantial. South Korea must integrate a compact reactor while controlling acoustic emissions from pumps and coolant circulation, ensure reactor and piping survivability under shock, provide shielding within a limited pressure hull volume, maintain cooling under combat damage conditions and prevent the propulsion plant from compromising submarine quieting. South Korea operates 26 commercial nuclear reactors that generate roughly 30% of national electricity, but civilian reactor expertise does not remove the need to develop naval reactor metallurgy, shock qualification, acoustic isolation and underwater radiological damage-control procedures. The fuel choice is equally important because it determines reactor size, refueling requirements, legal arrangements and proliferation risk.

Seoul has selected low-enriched uranium (LEU) below 20% U-235 for the Jangbogo-N rather than the uranium enriched above 90% used in U.S. and British naval reactors. The South Korean approach is closer to the French model, where LEU supports nuclear propulsion but requires periodic refueling. A South Korean boat with a projected service life of roughly 30 years would therefore likely need at least one major mid-life refueling, with consequences for reactor compartment access, fuel handling and dockyard design. The United States and United Kingdom use highly enriched fuel partly because it can support extremely long core life and minimize refueling. Seoul's LEU choice lowers the direct proliferation sensitivity of the fuel, but it does not eliminate the legal problem. South Korea's existing 2015 civil nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States does not provide a complete basis for military naval propulsion.

After June 2-3, 2026 talks with U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Allison Hooker, First Vice Foreign Minister Park Yoon-joo said a separate arrangement would be required because submarine propulsion constitutes military nuclear use. Seoul must therefore resolve who provides the fuel, where enrichment occurs, who retains custody, how the fuel is fabricated and transported, how loading and unloading are controlled, how spent fuel is handled and how safeguards apply while the submarine is deployed. South Korea has committed itself to the NPT and to a specific safeguards arrangement with the IAEA for naval propulsion. That distinction is central to the program because the boats are intended to carry conventional weapons, not nuclear warheads. The infrastructure required to support three or four South Korean SSNs will itself be comparable to a separate long-term defense program.

South Korea needs nuclear-certified production areas inside naval shipyards, radiological control zones, reactor compartment manufacturing, nuclear-qualified welders, shielded fuel-handling facilities, radiation monitoring, dedicated emergency response procedures and a certification regime separate from conventional submarine construction. It also needs a permanent naval nuclear personnel structure. Reactor operators, engineering officers, nuclear-maintenance personnel, safety inspectors and shore specialists must be trained, certified and retained over several decades. South Korea currently lacks a naval nuclear officer corps comparable in scale and specialization to the U.S. Navy's nuclear propulsion structure. It will also need spent-fuel management facilities, radioactive waste infrastructure, reactor dismantlement capability and procedures for decommissioning submarines at the end of service.

A land-based demonstration installation for a shipboard small modular reactor is being built at the Munmu Daewang Science Research Institute in Gyeongju, with the primary facility targeted for opening in January 2027 and associated radioactive waste facilities targeted for completion later in 2027. A ten-agency whole-of-government structure also began operating on December 18, 2025. On August 14, 2026, the Defense Ministry upgraded its Nuclear-Powered Submarine Acquisition Task Force into a Nuclear-Powered Submarine Policy Planning Bureau responsible for legislation, international cooperation, nuclear fuel and safety, while DAPA created a larger Nuclear-Powered Submarine Program Office with separate teams for submarine construction and nuclear propulsion.

A special law placed into public consultation on July 29 would establish a prime minister-level strategy committee, reactor and fuel facility approvals, inspection rules, personnel certification, training structures, radioactive waste controls and streamlined procurement procedures. Seoul now wants that law enacted before the end of 2026. The military requirement is increasingly tied to North Korea's attempt to create a survivable sea-based nuclear force and to Chinese submarine activity in the Western Pacific. North Korea identified a nuclear-powered submarine as a strategic objective at the January 2021 Workers' Party Congress and by late 2025 had displayed what it identified as an 8,700-ton nuclear-powered missile submarine under construction.

The maturity of its reactor and propulsion machinery is uncertain, but North Korea already possesses nuclear weapons, has developed several submarine-launched ballistic missiles and is modernizing its surface fleet with 5,000-ton Choe Hyon-class destroyers. South Korean Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back said in October 2025 that North Korea was likely receiving Russian assistance for its submarine program, raising the prospect that Moscow could shorten development timelines in propulsion, missile integration, sonar or other naval areas. The Jangbogo-N will also support South Korea's underwater Kill Chain by detecting and continuously tracking missile submarines before launch, a mission for which long submerged endurance and sustained speed matter more than simple maximum speed.

Nuclear propulsion would also allow South Korean SSNs to patrol east of Japan, operate through Western Pacific submarine transit corridors and monitor Chinese naval activity without forward refueling. The program therefore supports a shift from peninsula-focused undersea defense toward sustained regional submarine operations. Lee's August 18 order nevertheless links this capability directly to the wider OPCON debate. South Korea recovered peacetime control of its military in 1994, but wartime operational control remains within the U.S.-led Combined Forces Command structure.

If Seoul is to assume greater wartime authority while combined training is politically constrained or reduced, it must independently sustain surveillance, targeting, command, undersea warfare and long-range operations. The Jangbogo-N is one of the clearest material expressions of that transition because, if the current schedule is maintained, South Korea will move during the late 2030s from a force of roughly 21 conventional submarines to a mixed fleet combining upgraded KSS-II boats, KSS-III ballistic missile submarines and several nuclear-powered attack submarines capable of remaining submerged for months and sustaining operations well beyond Korean waters.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.

Explore More Defense News

• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News
U.S. Navy Advances MH-60 Sea Hawk Modernization for Future Naval Operations Through 2050
{loadposition bannertop}

{loadposition sidebarpub}
The U.S. Navy is rebuilding the MH-60 Sea Hawk’s digital architecture to keep the helicopter combat-relevant through 2050, with the U.S. Department of War announcing the TALON prototype effort with the Royal Australian Navy on August 21, 2026. The shift to an open avionics foundation is intended to let MH-60R and MH-60S crews field new sensors, weapons and mission software faster as threats evolve, without waiting for major aircraft redesigns.

The new architecture is designed to reduce electronics obsolescence and make future capability upgrades easier to integrate across the Sea Hawk fleet. For a helicopter family central to anti-submarine warfare, surface warfare, mine countermeasures and fleet support, that flexibility could preserve its operational value while accelerating adaptation to increasingly networked and contested maritime warfare.

Related Topic: US-Australia Carrier Interoperability Sharpens Allied Sea Power in the South China Sea.

The MH-60 TALON project will rebuild the Sea Hawk’s digital architecture with open systems designed to speed upgrades, reduce obsolescence, and extend combat relevance through 2050 (Picture Source: U.S. Navy)

On August 21, 2026, the U.S. Department of War revealed a major new step in the U.S. Navy's effort to keep the MH-60 Sea Hawk relevant, supportable and combat-ready through the 2050 timeframe. Rather than replacing one of naval aviation's most heavily used helicopter families, the Navy is preparing to rebuild the digital foundation beneath its avionics and mission systems. The initiative could transform the Sea Hawk from a mature platform facing electronics obsolescence into an aircraft able to absorb new technology far more rapidly. According to the U.S. Department of War, the modernization is being pursued jointly with the Royal Australian Navy under the MH-60 Tailorable Architecture Leveraging Open Systems, or TALON, prototype project.

A Proven Fleet Workhorse Rebuilt for the 2050 Battlespace

The importance of the program stems from the extraordinary breadth of missions performed by the two principal Sea Hawk variants. The MH-60R Romeo is the Navy's primary helicopter for anti-submarine warfare and surface warfare, while also supporting electromagnetic warfare, command and control, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and other missions. The MH-60S Sierra provides anti-surface warfare, combat support, special-operations support, personnel recovery, search and rescue, logistics, humanitarian assistance and airborne mine-countermeasure capabilities. Together, the variants form a deeply embedded component of U.S. naval aviation, operating from carriers and other aviation-capable warships and linking airborne sensors, weapons, surface forces and embarked commanders across the maritime battlespace.

That position was built over more than two decades of operational evolution. The Navy fielded the MH-60S in 2002 as part of a broader effort to consolidate several legacy helicopter roles around the H-60 family. The first MH-60R flew in July 2001, with the Romeo later reaching initial operational capability in the mid-2000s and full operational capability in 2010 as it replaced the older SH-60B and SH-60F fleets. Both variants were developed around significant commonality, including a common cockpit concept, helping reduce training and logistics burdens while providing specialized aircraft for combat support and high-end maritime warfare. The result is a mature ecosystem of aircraft, aircrews, maintainers, weapons, training systems and shipboard infrastructure that would be expensive and operationally disruptive to replace prematurely.

TALON Targets the Digital Bottleneck Behind Future Sea Hawk Capability

TALON targets the part of the aircraft where technological age can become most restrictive: its avionics and mission-system architecture. The Department of War says the project will modernize the MH-60's avionics and mission-system architecture while addressing multiple obsolescence issues, including work on a flight-critical avionics segment and a new digital backbone built around modular open-system principles. Sierra Nevada Corp. has been identified for physical and structural integration design on the MH-60S, while Lockheed Martin Rotary and Mission Systems has been identified for the MH-60R. Rockwell Collins and Lockheed Martin were identified for flight-critical avionics and digital-backbone integration, while Technology Security Associates is expected to support third-party assessment of open-system implementation. Phase 1 will concentrate on preliminary design, creation of a collaborative digital-engineering environment and preparation of aircraft for testing, while Phase 2 is planned to move into prototype development and verification. Crucially, the Department stressed that the industry selections do not yet constitute formal contract or agreement awards, which remain dependent on successful negotiations and finalized Phase 1 statements of work.

The technological advantage lies less in one new display, computer or sensor than in changing how future capabilities reach the aircraft. A modular open architecture built around defined interfaces can potentially allow processors, software applications, sensors and other components to evolve without requiring major portions of the helicopter's electronic architecture to be redesigned whenever technology or operational requirements change. For an aircraft family the Navyintends to sustain through the 2050 timeframe, that approach could make future modernization faster and more competitive while helping contain the cost and complexity associated with technological obsolescence. The significance is not simply that the Sea Hawk could receive another avionics upgrade; it is that TALON is intended to create a digital foundation capable of supporting repeated upgrades over decades as threats, computing technologies and fleet requirements evolve.

Militarily, extending the Sea Hawk's relevance toward 2050 is particularly significant because the helicopter operates where some of the Navy's most demanding missions converge. Anti-submarine warfare increasingly depends on the rapid processing and exchange of acoustic, radar, electronic and off-board sensor information, while surface warfare and electromagnetic operations are evolving alongside longer-range weapons, distributed sensors and more networked fleet concepts. A flexible digital backbone could give the Navy greater freedom to integrate future sensors, communications technologies, computing hardware and mission applications as those requirements change. TALON could also have consequences beyond the MH-60 itself: the Department of War says the prototype project is intended to help streamline future vertical-lift development through a portable open core architecture, potentially allowing lessons from Sea Hawk modernization to influence the digital foundation of future aircraft.

U.S.-Australian Interoperability Raises the Strategic Stakes

The Australian dimension makes TALON more than a U.S. fleet-sustainment project. The Royal Australian Navy operates the MH-60R and is participating directly in the modernization effort, creating an opportunity for future upgrades to reinforce not only aircraft commonality but deeper allied operational integration. That strategic relevance was demonstrated separately on August 11, 2026, when a Royal Australian Navy MH-60R assigned to the Anzac-class frigate HMAS Perth landed aboard the U.S. aircraft carrier USS George Washington while the two warships operated in the South China Sea. Official U.S. Navy imagery confirmed the Australian helicopter conducting flight-deck operations aboard the forward-deployed carrier, providing a visible demonstration of the practical compatibility already possible between two allied navies operating the same helicopter family.

Geostrategically, the connection is important. In the South China Sea and wider Western Pacific, where long distances, submarine activity, contested sea lanes and distributed naval operations place increasing pressure on allied forces, common aircraft can provide commanders with additional flexibility across cooperating flight decks. The August cross-deck operation does not by itself establish complete interchangeability in maintenance, weapons support, mission data or national logistics systems, but it demonstrates an operational foundation on which deeper interoperability can be built. If TALON eventually produces compatible, upgradeable digital architectures across U.S. and Australian MH-60R fleets, the value could extend beyond individual helicopters toward more resilient coalition aviation operations, faster introduction of common capabilities and greater flexibility in how maritime forces distribute aviation assets during high-intensity operations.

The strategic effect could be particularly important for maritime deterrence. A helicopter capable of operating from allied flight decks while progressively receiving updated sensors, processing capabilities, communications systems and mission software would be more adaptable to a battlespace expected to become increasingly dependent on distributed sensing and networked warfare. Rather than being conceptually restricted to a single parent ship, allied MH-60Rs could gain more options for diversion, personnel movement, cross-deck operations and, where support arrangements permit, increasingly integrated maritime aviation missions. For an adversary, the challenge is therefore not simply the number of Sea Hawks available, but the growing number of combinations in which U.S. and allied naval forces may be able to employ them across a dispersed fleet.

The Navy's 2050 plan is ultimately about preventing a proven helicopter from becoming trapped by the technology of the era in which it was built. If TALON delivers the modular architecture envisioned by the U.S. Department of War, the MH-60 could remain valuable deep into the middle of the century not because its basic airframe is new, but because its digital foundation can continue evolving around it. That would turn what might otherwise appear to be a conventional service-life modernization effort into something far more consequential: a pathway for the United States and its closest maritime allies to preserve a deeply established naval aviation capability while continuously renewing the software, computing power, sensors and mission systems that will determine whether the Sea Hawk can survive, connect and fight in the battlespace of the 2040s and beyond.

Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.

Explore More Defense News

• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News
U.S. Navy Reveals 463-km AIM-424 Malice Missile for F-35C Super Hornet and Future F/A-XX Fighter Jets
{loadposition bannertop}

{loadposition sidebarpub}
The U.S. Navy has unveiled the Raytheon AIM-424 Malice, a new long-range air-to-air missile designed to extend the defensive reach of U.S. carrier aviation, according to a disclosure published on August 22, 2026. With an officially stated range exceeding 463 km (250 nautical miles), the missile is intended to let U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps fighters engage advanced airborne threats from much greater stand-off distances.

The Malice missile could give carrier air wings more room to intercept long-range bombers, airborne support aircraft, and missile-launch platforms before they can threaten the fleet. In a Pacific conflict, that added reach could help U.S. carriers disrupt coordinated air and missile attacks while keeping their fighters farther from heavily defended Chinese airspace.

Related Topic: U.S. Expands SM-3 Missile Production to Strengthen Navy Ballistic Missile Defense

Four AIM-424 Long Range Air-to-Air Missiles are loaded onto a U.S. Navy F/A-18E Super Hornet for testing. The next-generation missile is designed to extend the engagement range, lethality, and defensive reach of Navy and Marine Corps aviation against advanced airborne threats. (Picture source: U.S. Department of War/Defense)

The AIM-424 was publicly revealed during the Tailhook Symposium in Reno, Nevada, where the U.S. Navy confirmed that the missile is already undergoing flight testing and is being developed for the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, the F-35C Lightning II, and the future F/A-XX carrier fighter. Its integration across fourth-, fifth-, and sixth-generation combat aircraft matters because it could let the carrier air wing establish a much wider defensive perimeter around U.S. naval forces while remaining compatible with both existing and future fighter fleets. The Navy describes Malice as a next-generation air-to-air missile designed to preserve a “first look, first shot, first kill” advantage. In practical terms, the weapon is intended to allow naval aviators to engage hostile fighters, bombers, and potentially high-value support aircraft before those threats can reach effective weapon-launch positions against a carrier strike group.

According to the U.S. Navy’s official specification sheet, the AIM-424 measures 13.5 feet, or 4.11 meters, in length and 13.5 inches, or 0.34 meters, in diameter, with a wingspan of 26.2 inches, or 0.67 meters. The missile weighs approximately 1,500 pounds, or 680 kg, and carries a blast-fragmentation warhead. A solid-propellant rocket motor powers it. Its disclosed range of more than 250 nautical miles (463 km) places Malice in a substantially different engagement class from conventional medium- and long-range fighter weapons such as the AIM-120 AMRAAM.

More importantly, that reach lets carrier aircraft shift air interception hundreds of kilometers away from the ships they protect, increasing the distance at which incoming raids can be disrupted and complicating an adversary’s ability to coordinate fighters, bombers, airborne early-warning aircraft, and long-range missile carriers. The missile’s size also indicates that the Navy is accepting significantly greater weapon mass in exchange for increased range and retained energy at long distances. At roughly 680 kg, the AIM-424 is about three times as heavy as an AIM-120, giving designers more internal volume for propulsion, fuel, guidance equipment, and a larger warhead while still remaining compatible with tactical aircraft.

One of the most operationally important details released by the U.S. Navy is the AIM-424’s integration with the F-35C’s internal weapons bay. An official U.S. Navy image dated August 1, 2026, shows an AIM-424 installed internally in an F-35C while an AIM-120 is carried on a weapons-bay door station, demonstrating that the stealth fighter can combine an extreme-range missile with a conventional air-to-air weapon without relying entirely on external carriage. Internal carriage is particularly important in a high-threat environment because external weapons increase an aircraft’s radar signature and can reduce the survivability advantages of the F-35C. Carrying Malice internally would let the aircraft penetrate or operate close to contested airspace, exploit its sensors and low-observable characteristics, and launch a long-range interceptor before an adversary can reliably detect or target it.

The U.S. Navy has also released imagery showing an F/A-18 Super Hornet assigned to Air Test and Evaluation Squadron 23 (VX-23) carrying four AIM-424 missiles during testing. That configuration suggests the weapon is not being designed solely as a specialized F-35C munition, but as a fleet-wide air-combat capability that could give existing Super Hornet squadrons a major increase in engagement reach. For carrier air wings, combining the Super Hornet’s payload capacity with the F-35C’s low observability and advanced sensors could create a distributed long-range engagement architecture. An F-35C operating forward could detect or classify a target and contribute targeting information, while a Super Hornet positioned farther from the threat could carry a larger missile load, reducing the requirement for every aircraft participating in the kill chain to expose itself equally.

The AIM-424 will also coexist with the U.S. Navy’s AIM-174B Gunslinger, an air-launched derivative of the SM-6 already carried by the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. The AIM-174B weighs about 1,830 pounds and uses the SM-6’s active radar seeker, giving naval aviation another very-long-range air-intercept capability, although the Navy continues to classify its operational range. Malice appears to address a different integration requirement because it can fit inside the F-35Cwhile remaining substantially smaller than the AIM-174B. This could give commanders a layered long-range air-to-air inventory in which the larger AIM-174B provides specialized reach from externally armed Super Hornets, while the AIM-424 delivers a combination of very long range, broad fighter compatibility, and stealthy internal carriage.

The U.S. Navy has not publicly disclosed the AIM-424’s guidance architecture, seeker configuration, datalink arrangement, or detailed propulsion cycle. Contemporary reporting on the Tailhook disclosure describes the missile as a two-stage design, although the U.S. Navy’s public fact file identifies its propulsion more generally as a solid-propellant rocket motor. Accordingly, detailed conclusions about its internal configuration should remain provisional until additional technical information is released.

A missile capable of engagements beyond 463 kilometers also depends heavily on off-board sensing and networked targeting because the launching fighter may not independently detect or continuously track targets at the weapon’s maximum range. Its military value will therefore be closely tied to the U.S. Navy’s broader airborne and maritime sensor network, including F-35C sensors, E-2D Advanced Hawkeye airborne early-warning aircraft, surface combatants, and other joint assets that can contribute targeting data. That networked approach is becoming increasingly important as potential adversaries field longer-range anti-ship missiles and supporting aircraft designed to attack carrier groups without entering traditional fighter-interception zones.

Extending the air-to-air engagement boundary outward gives U.S. fighters a greater opportunity to destroy missile-carrying aircraft before they release their weapons, rather than relying primarily on shipboard defenses to defeat missiles after launch. The development therefore complements the U.S. Navy’s broader effort to enlarge the defensive and offensive radius of the carrier strike group while giving naval aviation a more direct role in fleet-level air defense at ranges once associated mainly with surface combatants.

Malice could also become particularly important against airborne early-warning and command aircraft, aerial refueling tankers, and other support aircraft whose destruction could reduce the effectiveness of an entire opposing air operation. Even when such aircraft remain outside the missile’s final engagement envelope, forcing them farther from contested airspace could shorten fighter endurance, reduce radar coverage, and weaken the coordination of long-range strikes. For the F/A-XX program, integrating the AIM-424 from the outset would help ensure that the Navy’s future carrier fighter enters service with an established extreme-range weapon rather than having to wait for a new missile-development cycle. That approach would more closely integrate aircraft, sensor, and weapons development and could allow the F/A-XX to exploit longer-range sensing and networking capabilities immediately upon entering operational service.

Raytheon’s identification as the AIM-424 contractor also places the program within a U.S. industrial base already producing several major Navy missile families. The Navy has not yet disclosed production quantities, unit costs, initial operational capability dates, or a procurement schedule, so the scale and pace at which Malice could enter frontline inventories remain important unanswered questions. Those production factors will matter because extreme-range air combat requires sufficient missile inventory depth, not merely exceptional performance from individual weapons. A carrier air wing able to launch long-range interceptors in meaningful numbers could threaten successive waves of hostile aircraft, whereas limited inventories would force commanders to reserve the weapon for only the highest-value targets.

The AIM-424 disclosure also reflects the accelerating competition in long-range air-to-air warfare as the United States prepares for operations against adversaries equipped with increasingly capable missiles and sophisticated airborne sensor networks. By combining a range exceeding 250 nautical miles with F-35C internal carriage and compatibility with the Super Hornet and future F/A-XX, the AIM-424 could materially change how U.S. carrier groups establish air superiority. Instead of waiting for hostile aircraft to penetrate toward the fleet, Navy fighters could attempt to disrupt enemy air operations much farther from the carrier by targeting the aircraft and support systems that enable long-range missile attacks.

The strategic effect is therefore greater than the missile’s maximum range alone would suggest. If the U.S. Navy can integrate Malice effectively with distributed sensors and procure it in sufficient numbers, the weapon could expand the carrier strike group’s defensive depth, increase the survivability of naval aviation, and impose a larger exclusion zone on hostile air forces. In doing so, it could strengthen U.S. deterrence by making coordinated attacks against naval forces harder to organize and far more dangerous to execute.

Explore More Defense News

• Land Defense News
• Naval Defense News
• Defense Aerospace News

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.