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  • U.S. Navy Diverts 5 Vessels and Disables One in Iran Maritime Interdiction Near Strait of Hormuz

    U.S. Navy USS Donald Cook (DDG 75) transits the Arabian Sea alongside an MH-60S Seahawk as U.S. forces intensify maritime interdiction operations against Iran, with CENTCOM reporting five commercial vessels diverted and one disabled as of July 18, 2026.

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    U.S. Navy diverted five commercial vessels and disabled one during intensified maritime interdiction operations against Iran, according to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) on July 18, 2026. Supporting the mission in the Arabian Sea, the U.S. Navy Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Donald Cook (DDG 75) was photographed operating alongside an MH-60S Seahawk helicopter, underscoring the naval capabilities being employed to monitor and control maritime traffic near the approaches to the Strait of Hormuz.

    According to CENTCOM, the operation forms part of ongoing U.S. maritime interdiction efforts directed against Iran. While the command did not disclose the identities, cargoes, or nationalities of the intercepted vessels, the latest actions demonstrate a more assertive operational posture aimed at monitoring, intercepting, and controlling maritime traffic across the northern Arabian Sea and the approaches to the Strait of Hormuz.

    Related Topic: U.S. Expands Iran Air Campaign with Bridge Strikes to Disrupt Iranian Military Logistics

    U.S. Navy USS Donald Cook (DDG 75) transits the Arabian Sea alongside an MH-60S Seahawk as U.S. forces intensify maritime interdiction operations against Iran, with CENTCOM reporting five commercial vessels diverted and one disabled as of July 18, 2026. (Picture source: U.S. CENTCOM)

    The reported diversion of five commercial vessels and the disabling of another represent a significant operational development. Maritime interdiction operations generally involve identifying, tracking, challenging, and, when required, boarding vessels suspected of violating international regulations, transporting restricted cargo, or engaging in activities that threaten regional security. The disabling of one vessel indicates that U.S. forces employed direct action to prevent it from continuing its voyage after determining that operational circumstances required intervention. The U.S. CENTCOM has not released further details regarding the method used or the circumstances surrounding the incident.

    The U.S. Navy USS Donald Cook, an Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer,  provides U.S. CENTCOM with a highly capable command-and-control asset for these missions. While the destroyer is designed primarily for air defense, ballistic missile defense, anti-submarine warfare and long-range strike operations, its advanced sensors, communications systems and embarked aviation capability also make it particularly effective for complex maritime interdiction missions. Its ability to build and maintain a comprehensive maritime picture enables commanders to monitor hundreds of contacts simultaneously while coordinating naval, air, and intelligence assets across a vast operating area.

    The embarked MH-60S Seahawk significantly expands the destroyer's operational reach. During maritime interdiction operations, the helicopter can rapidly investigate contacts beyond the ship's radar horizon, verify vessel identity, monitor crew activity, transport Visit, Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS) teams, and provide continuous airborne overwatch during inspections. This combination enables U.S. naval forces to respond considerably faster than when relying solely on surface vessels, while improving situational awareness throughout the operation.

    Successful maritime interdiction depends heavily on maritime domain awareness. Information collected from shipboard sensors, helicopters, maritime patrol aircraft, satellites, and intelligence networks allows commanders to identify suspicious shipping patterns before deciding whether to intercept a vessel. Rather than conducting random inspections, naval forces can concentrate on vessels whose routes, ownership, communications or other indicators warrant closer examination, increasing both operational efficiency and legal justification for intervention.

    Operations of this nature require carefully controlled rules of engagement. Merchant vessels frequently operate under complex ownership structures, with ships registered under one flag, managed by companies in another country, and carrying multinational crews. Before any boarding operation is conducted, commanders must establish the vessel's identity, determine its compliance with international maritime law, and assess any potential threat to boarding personnel. The objective is to secure compliance while minimizing risks to civilian crews and legitimate commercial shipping.

    Throughout the mission, the U.S. Navy USS Donald Cook also provides force protection for boarding teams and coalition maritime traffic. The destroyer remains prepared to respond rapidly to potential threats, including unmanned aerial systems, anti-ship missiles, fast-attack craft, and other hostile actions that could emerge during an interdiction. This layered protection is particularly important in the Arabian Sea, where commercial shipping operates within range of numerous regional military capabilities.

    Although U.S. CENTCOM has not disclosed the purpose of the intercepted vessels, maritime interdiction remains a principal tool for disrupting illicit maritime activity and preventing the movement of prohibited or restricted cargo. Such operations can complicate the use of commercial shipping routes for activities that threaten regional security, even as they support broader U.S. maritime security objectives. At this stage, however, U.S. CENTCOM has not stated that the diverted or disabled vessels were transporting weapons or sanctioned cargo.

    The location of the operation further underscores its strategic significance. The Arabian Sea serves as the gateway to the Gulf of Oman and the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world's most critical maritime chokepoints through which roughly one-fifth of globally traded oil passes. Maintaining secure navigation through these waters remains a central objective for the United States and its regional partners, as any disruption can rapidly influence global energy markets, shipping costs and marine insurance rates.

    Unlike routine naval patrols intended primarily to demonstrate presence, the latest U.S. CENTCOM figures indicate that U.S. forces are actively conducting maritime interdiction operations. The diversion of five vessels and the disabling of another show that American naval forces are prepared to intervene directly when commanders determine it is operationally necessary. These actions also demonstrate the capability of U.S. naval forces to identify, intercept, and control maritime traffic in one of the world's busiest strategic waterways.

    For the U.S. Navy, assigning an Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer such as USS Donald Cook to the mission provides exceptional operational flexibility. The same warship-supporting vessel interceptions retain the capability to defend coalition naval forces against missile attacks, engage hostile surface combatants, conduct anti-submarine warfare, and launch long-range precision strikes should the regional security environment deteriorate. This versatility makes Arleigh Burke-class destroyers among the most valuable surface combatants available to CENTCOM for sustained operations in contested maritime environments.

    The operation also illustrates the growing integration of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance with naval aviation in modern maritime interdiction campaigns. By combining real-time intelligence with persistent naval presence, helicopter support and rapid-response boarding capabilities, U.S. CENTCOM can selectively intercept vessels of interest while minimizing disruption to legitimate commercial traffic. This intelligence-driven approach increases operational effectiveness while reducing unnecessary interference with international maritime commerce.

    As tensions between the United States and Iran continue to shape the regional security environment, every successful maritime interdiction carries significance beyond its immediate tactical outcome. The operation demonstrates how U.S. naval forces are combining persistent surveillance, helicopter-supported boarding capabilities and forward-deployed surface combatants to maintain control of critical sea lines of communication while increasing operational pressure on Iran. With the Strait of Hormuz remaining vital to global energy supplies, each interdiction has the potential to influence regional deterrence, commercial shipping confidence and the broader security balance across the Gulf.

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    Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
    Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.

  • U.S. Navy Delays Zumwalt Destroyer Hypersonic Missile Test to 2027 as Costs Reach $2 Billion

    USS Zumwalt is undergoing a $2 billion-class modernization to carry up to 12 Conventional Prompt Strike hypersonic missiles, but ship integration, testing, and missile-production delays have pushed the first sea-launched test to fiscal year 2027 (Picture source: U.S. DoW).

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    The U.S. Navy’s Zumwalt-class destroyers are now 24 months behind schedule in gaining the Conventional Prompt Strike hypersonic missile, delaying the fleet’s first surface-launched hypersonic strike capability. A Government Accountability Office report published on July 17, 2026, says the first ship-based flight test has slipped to the third quarter of fiscal year 2027, pushing back certification, crew qualification, and operational deployment.

    USS Zumwalt was 94 percent through modernization in January 2026, but the three-ship conversion effort has risen from $1.8 billion to at least $2 billion. With only three destroyers in the class, any delay removes a third of the planned force and makes it harder to sustain a cycle of deployment, training, and maintenance.

    Related topic: Swedish Saab Wins €788M TKMS Deal to Equip Four German F128 Frigates with 9LV and Sea Giraffe Radars.

    A Zumwalt-class destroyer is shown at sea. The U.S. Navy is modernizing all three ships of the class to carry up to 12 Conventional Prompt Strike hypersonic missiles, although the program is currently running about two years behind schedule (Picture source: U.S. DoW).

    CPS is a boost-glide missile rather than an air-breathing hypersonic cruise missile. Its All-Up Round consists of a two-stage solid-propellant booster and a Common Hypersonic Glide Body manufactured by Dynetics, a Leidos subsidiary, containing what the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation describes as a kinetic-energy projectile warhead. The booster accelerates the glide body toward the upper atmosphere; after separation, the glide body follows a lower and less predictable trajectory than a conventional ballistic missile and uses aerodynamic lift to maneuver toward the target. The Navy has disclosed a speed above Mach 5 and classifies the specific range and accuracy requirements, although recent testing and simulation demonstrated compliance with minimum range and accuracy thresholds.

    The naval launch sequence is technically important. Compressed gas ejects the nearly four-story-tall missile from its canister before the first-stage motor ignites at a safe distance above the ship, limiting the heat, pressure, and exhaust imposed on the launch tube and surrounding structure. The Army’s Dark Eagle Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon uses the same All-Up Round but ignites it inside its ground launcher. The Navy demonstrated the cold-launch method at Cape Canaveral in April 2025 after an extensive in-air-launch test campaign; the weapon-control, launch, and missile systems operated as intended, but the event was conducted from a land-based naval launcher and did not demonstrate the complete combat system aboard a moving destroyer.

    The Zumwalt modernization program removes the ship’s two 155 mm Advanced Gun Systems and installs four 87-inch Large Missile Vertical Launch System tubes, with three CPS rounds in each tube for a maximum ship load of 12. The new tubes are necessary because CPS cannot fit inside the destroyer’s 80 existing Mk 57 peripheral vertical-launch cells. Those cells remain available for weapons such as Tomahawk cruise missiles, SM-2 surface-to-air missiles, Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles, and Vertical Launch Anti-Submarine Rockets. This produces a mixed magazine in which CPS is reserved for a small number of high-priority targets, while the Mk 57 cells provide air defense, anti-submarine firepower, and less expensive land-attack capacity.

    A destroyer carrying hypersonic missiles changes operational planning primarily by making the launch point mobile. A land-based battery requires access agreements, prepared operating areas, logistics support, and protection within a host country; a destroyer can alter its location and firing azimuth without depending on permanent basing ashore. This permits strikes to originate from different maritime approaches and forces an opponent to account for a larger defended area. It does not eliminate dependence on external intelligence, surveillance, target identification, and communications. CPS is intended for high-value, time-sensitive, and heavily defended targets, including command facilities, missile units, and air-defense nodes, but engagements against moving ships would require sufficiently accurate and recent target updates throughout the joint targeting process.

    The capability is therefore different from simply adding another long-range missile. A subsonic Tomahawk offers greater magazine depth and is appropriate for many fixed targets, but its longer flight time gives mobile units more opportunity to relocate and air defenses more time to detect and engage it. CPS is intended for the opening phase of a conflict, when commanders may need to disable a small number of radars, long-range missile launchers, or command nodes before aircraft and lower-cost missiles can operate with less risk. Twelve rounds do not provide a sustained bombardment capability. They provide a limited first-salvo option whose military value depends on target quality, precise mission planning, and the ability to confirm effects after impact.

    Program development reflects an attempt to share expensive missile components between the services. Joint Army-Navy work began in 2019; the Navy selected the Zumwalt class in 2021 because the missile was too large for existing surface-ship launchers, and in 2022 expanded the plan from one test ship to all three destroyers. Successful end-to-end tests followed in December 2024 and April 2025, allowing rapid prototyping to conclude in October 2025. The current rapid-fielding phase is intended to culminate in the 2027 USS Zumwalt launch, after which CPS is expected to enter low-rate production for the other destroyers and selected Virginia-class submarines with the Virginia Payload Module in the early 2030s.

    The principal near-term constraint is production rather than launcher capacity. Each CPS missile is estimated to cost between $63 million and $71 million, averaging approximately $67 million as of April 2026. The Navy’s lifecycle estimate increased from $31 billion for 262 missiles in 2020 to $41 billion for 224 missiles in 2024, while the Army plans to spend more than $10 billion on 48 missiles and associated ground equipment. Lockheed Martin’s production facility can currently complete no more than six or seven rounds annually, compared with the 12-round rate considered necessary to stabilize production. At the present rate, manufacturing one full Zumwalt load would consume roughly two years of output before accounting for Army requirements, flight-test weapons, training rounds, or submarine inventories.

    Manufacturing problems behind that shortfall include contamination of thermal-protection coating, incomplete parts kits, missiles partially disassembled to recover missing components, work instructions written as engineering specifications that inexperienced employees could not readily follow, and workforce turnover. Lockheed Martin increased manufacturing personnel from approximately 60 to 80, but officials estimated that a new employee requires about one year to work independently. A 2023 Navy audit also found expired materials, inadequate parts inspection, and quality-assurance steps that were not consistently followed. These are not peripheral industrial issues; defects in coatings, assembly, or guidance-related components directly affect whether a missile can survive hypersonic heating and maintain the accuracy required for a conventional kinetic strike.

    Ship integration has created a separate set of delays. In August 2025, the Navy added 230,000 labor hours and $20 million to Huntington Ingalls Industries’ contract after more electrical cabling was removed from USS Zumwalt’s forward section than expected during launcher installation. Restarting major systems after the first complete shutdown of the ship’s Integrated Power System also exposed equipment failures. The destroyer can generate 78 megawatts and distribute 1,000-volt direct current to propulsion and combat loads, but the Navy found repeated Category 3 and 4 casualty reports, three-month lead times for some power-system components, and reliance on parts taken from Lyndon B. Johnson. The Navy has also deferred a decision on replacing the class-specific SPY-3 radar, Total Ship Computing Environment, and network architecture with standard Navy equipment, an additional change estimated at $1 billion to $2 billion for the three ships.

    For Congress, the relevant measure is not whether a Zumwalt destroyer can physically carry 12 hypersonic missiles, but whether the Navy can generate a deployable ship, a reliable missile inventory, and a functioning joint targeting chain at the same time. At an average estimated price of $67 million, a full 12-round load represents about $804 million in missiles, excluding the destroyer, launch system, and supporting sensors. The 2027 flight test will establish whether the weapon can be safely launched and controlled from USS Zumwalt, but it will not by itself prove sustained operational availability, adequate production or effectiveness against representative defended targets. The April 2025 demonstration was not intended to support a full assessment of operational effectiveness, suitability or survivability.

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    Written by Evan Lerouvillois, Defense Analyst.

    Evan studied International Relations, and quickly specialized in defense and security. He is particularly interested in the influence of the defense sector on global geopolitics, and analyzes how technological innovations in defense, arms export contracts, and military strategies influence the international geopolitical scene.

  • China's Type 076 Amphibious Assault Ship First to Catapult-Launch Combat Drones Ahead of U.S. and NATO

    China039;s Type 076 Sichuan is a next-generation amphibious assault ship that combines traditional marine landing capabilities with carrier-style electromagnetic catapults and arresting gear to operate fixed-wing combat drones. Designed as a hybrid assault ship and unmanned aviation carrier, it represents a new class of naval warship with no direct equivalent currently in service with the U.S. Navy or NATO fleets.

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    China’s new Type 076 amphibious assault ship Sichuan is introducing a capability that no U.S. or NATO amphibious assault ship currently possesses, combining an electromagnetic catapult and arresting gear to launch and recover fixed-wing combat drones from an amphibious platform. This marks a significant shift in naval expeditionary warfare, potentially allowing China’s amphibious forces to project longer-range surveillance and strike power without relying solely on helicopters or short-takeoff aircraft.

    Unlike the U.S. Navy’s America-class or NATO platforms such as Italy’s Trieste and Turkey’s TCG Anadolu, Sichuan is designed to operate heavier, longer-endurance unmanned aircraft from a carrier-style flight deck. The concept could redefine the role of amphibious assault ships by merging drone carrier capabilities with traditional amphibious operations, expanding China’s options for power projection and contested littoral warfare.

    Related Topic: China's Type 076 Amphibious Ship Challenges U.S. Navy America-class and Wasp-class with Aircraft Catapult

    China's Type 076 Sichuan is a next-generation amphibious assault ship that combines traditional marine landing capabilities with carrier-style electromagnetic catapults and arresting gear to operate fixed-wing combat drones. Designed as a hybrid assault ship and unmanned aviation carrier, it represents a new class of naval warship with no direct equivalent currently in service with the U.S. Navy or NATO fleets. (Picture source: China MoD TV)

    New imagery of the vessel offers the clearest evidence yet that the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is preparing to commission what is expected to become the world’s first amphibious assault ship specifically designed to routinely launch and recover fixed-wing combat unmanned aerial vehicles. The development represents a significant evolution in Chinese naval aviation, potentially allowing the PLAN to conduct long-range reconnaissance, electronic warfare and precision strike missions while simultaneously supporting amphibious operations.

    Unlike China’s existing Type 075 landing helicopter docks, the Type 076 has been designed around an entirely different operational philosophy. Rather than serving primarily as a helicopter assault ship transporting marines and landing craft, Sichuan combines traditional amphibious capabilities with a catapult-assisted aviation component that blurs the distinction between an amphibious assault ship and a light aircraft carrier.

    The most striking feature visible in recent photographs is the installation of an electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS). Until recently, this technology was reserved exclusively for the largest fleet aircraft carriers because of its enormous electrical power requirements and engineering complexity. China first introduced an operational EMALS aboard its Type 003 aircraft carrier, Fujian, becoming only the second nation after the United States to field the technology.

    Equally significant is the presence of arresting gear installed on the angled flight deck. This confirms that the ship has not simply been designed to launch unmanned aircraft but to recover them repeatedly during sustained flight operations. Together, the catapult and arresting system create a conventional CATOBAR (Catapult Assisted Take-Off But Arrested Recovery) flight operation capability that no other amphibious assault ship currently possesses.

    The introduction of EMALS provides several operational advantages over traditional steam catapults. Electromagnetic launch delivers smoother acceleration, reducing structural stress on aircraft while allowing launch forces to be precisely adjusted according to aircraft weight. This flexibility is particularly valuable for unmanned aircraft, whose lighter airframes can be optimized for endurance and payload rather than reinforced to withstand higher launch loads.

    Although Chinese authorities have not officially identified the future air wing, defense analysts widely believe the ship could operate the GJ-11 Sharp Sword stealth unmanned combat aerial vehicle or future carrier-capable derivatives currently under development. Flying-wing UCAVs equipped with low-observable features could perform intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), electronic attack, suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), anti-ship strike missions, and long-range target acquisition ahead of manned aircraft.

    Such aircraft would substantially expand the operational radius of an amphibious task force. Helicopters embarked aboard conventional landing helicopter docks generally operate within a few hundred kilometers of the ship. Fixed-wing catapult-launched drones, however, could remain airborne for many hours while extending surveillance or strike coverage well beyond 1,000 kilometers, allowing commanders to monitor contested maritime areas without exposing expensive manned aircraft to unnecessary risk.

    Another important innovation is the ship’s twin-island configuration. Similar in concept to the British Royal Navy’s Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers, separating navigation and aviation command functions improves flight deck management, increases internal mission space and enhances survivability by providing redundant command facilities should one island be damaged during combat operations.

    While official specifications remain undisclosed, most assessments estimate that the Type 076 displaces approximately 50,000 tons at full load, making it significantly larger than the 40,000-ton Type 075 class. The additional displacement is likely required to accommodate high-capacity electrical generation systems, electromagnetic launch equipment, expanded aviation fuel storage, larger maintenance facilities, and increased ammunition capacity to support continuous unmanned flight operations.

    The ship also retains a well deck capable of deploying landing craft, armored vehicles, and marine forces. This dual capability distinguishes the Type 076 from conventional aircraft carriers by allowing simultaneous expeditionary assault and persistent unmanned air operations from a single hull.

    Inside the USS America (LHA-6), the US Navy's smallest aircraft carrier, and see how it compares to larger supercarriers.

    Comparison with the U.S. Navy’s America class

    The closest American equivalent is the U.S. Navy’s America-class amphibious assault ship, represented by USS America (LHA-6), USS Tripoli (LHA-7), USS Bougainville (LHA-8) and future ships currently under construction. These vessels were designed primarily around the F-35B Lightning II, MV-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft, CH-53K heavy-lift helicopters, and AH-1Z attack helicopters.

    Although the America class delivers exceptional expeditionary aviation capability, it employs Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) operations rather than catapult-assisted launches. Consequently, the ships cannot operate conventional fixed-wing aircraft or recover catapult-launched unmanned combat aircraft.

    The F-35B remains a far more capable individual combat aircraft than any Chinese naval drone currently known. It combines stealth, supersonic speed, sensor fusion, electronic warfare, and air-to-air combat capability in a single manned fighter. However, each aircraft represents a substantial financial investment and depends upon highly trained pilots whose availability inevitably limits sortie generation during prolonged combat.

    China appears to be pursuing a different operational model. Rather than maximizing the capability of each aircraft, the Type 076 emphasizes persistent operations by larger numbers of unmanned systems. Without pilot endurance limitations, UCAVs can maintain extended surveillance, conduct repetitive strike missions and absorb greater operational risk, particularly during the opening phase of a conflict when air defenses remain intact.

    Comparison with NATO amphibious assault ships

    No NATO navy currently operates an amphibious assault ship equipped with electromagnetic catapults and arresting gear for fixed-wing combat drone operations.

    Italy’s Trieste landing helicopter dock, commissioned in 2024, represents one of Europe’s most advanced amphibious warships. Like the America class, it operates F-35B fighters using STOVL procedures while retaining extensive amphibious lift capability. However, it lacks the catapult systems necessary for conventional fixed-wing aircraft or heavier carrier-capable drones.

    Spain’s Juan Carlos I and Australia’s Canberra-class landing helicopter docks similarly employ ski-jump-assisted STOVL operations rather than CATOBAR aviation. They remain optimized for helicopter assault missions, amphibious landings, and limited fixed-wing operations rather than sustained unmanned air campaigns.

    Turkey’s TCG Anadolu has attracted considerable attention by integrating indigenous unmanned aircraft, including the Bayraktar TB3 and the future Kızılelma combat drone. Nevertheless, these aircraft are designed for short takeoff operations and do not require catapults or arresting gear. While Anadolu demonstrates the growing importance of unmanned naval aviation, its concept differs fundamentally from China’s approach: it cannot routinely operate heavier catapult-launched aircraft that carry larger payloads or additional fuel.

    France’s Mistral-class amphibious assault ships continue to emphasize helicopter operations, amphibious command-and-control and humanitarian assistance missions rather than fixed-wing naval aviation.

    As a result, while NATO navies are actively integrating unmanned aircraft into expeditionary operations, none currently field an amphibious assault ship capable of launching and recovering conventional fixed-wing combat drones using carrier-style flight operations.

    The strategic significance of the Type 076 therefore extends beyond the ship itself. It demonstrates that China is no longer simply expanding its fleet numerically but is experimenting with entirely new operational concepts intended to complement its growing carrier force. Instead of relying exclusively on traditional aircraft carriers to project airpower, the PLAN could distribute unmanned aviation across multiple amphibious task groups, complicating an adversary’s targeting calculations while expanding surveillance and strike coverage over vast maritime areas.

    For a Taiwan contingency or operations in the South China Sea, such distributed aviation could prove particularly valuable. Type 076 ships operating alongside Type 075 landing helicopter docks, Type 055 guided missile destroyers, and Type 003 aircraft carriers could establish overlapping reconnaissance networks, continuously track naval movements, identify coastal missile batteries, and provide electronic warfare support before the arrival of manned fighters. This layered approach would increase operational flexibility while reducing the burden placed on China’s aircraft carrier fleet.

    Ultimately, the Type 076 Sichuan is not simply another amphibious assault ship. It represents the emergence of a new category of warship that combines expeditionary assault capability with carrier-style unmanned aviation. If the PLAN successfully integrates stealth combat drones into routine sea-based operations, the vessel could establish a new benchmark for future amphibious warfare, potentially influencing the next generation of amphibious assault ship designs in the United States and across NATO as autonomous aviation becomes an increasingly decisive component of naval power projection.

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    Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
    Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.

  • Russian Navy launches Aleksei Shein replenishment tanker to support Baltic Fleet operations

    A Project 23130 tanker can remain at sea for 60 days and sail 8,000 nautical miles, enough to support deployments from northern Russia to the Mediterranean, the Caribbean or parts of the Indian Ocean when combined with port access or additional refueling. (Picture source: OCK)

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    Nevsky Shipyard launched the fourth Project 23130 replenishment oiler, the Aleksei Shein (904), in Shlisselburg on July 14, 2026, marking the third serial vessel produced under a December 17, 2020 contract for the Russian Navy. The medium sea tanker is structurally designated for the Baltic Fleet to support surface ships and submarines operating out of Baltiysk and Kronstadt into the North Atlantic and Arctic corridors. This program is intentionally engineered to reduce Russian naval reliance on aging Soviet-era logistics vessels and foreign port access by enabling prolonged replenishment of liquid and dry stores underway.

    The Aleksei Shein features a full-load displacement of 14,000 tons, an Arc4 ice-class double hull capable of navigating 0.8-meter thick ice, and a cargo configuration designed to transport 7,150 tons of combined liquid fuels alongside 100 tons of dry provisions. Operating with a core crew of 24, the vessel possesses a maximum cruising speed of 16 knots and an 8,000-nautical-mile range, permitting simultaneous replenishment of up to three warships at sea during a single 60-day endurance cycle.

    Related topic:Russian nuclear battlecruiser Admiral Nakhimov enters final sea trials to challenge US in the Arctic

    A Project 23130 tanker can remain at sea for 60 days and sail 8,000 nautical miles, enough to support deployments from northern Russia to the Mediterranean, the Caribbean or parts of the Indian Ocean when combined with port access or additional refueling. (Picture source: OCK)

    On July 14, 2026, Nevsky Shipyard launched the fourth Project 23130 replenishment oiler, the Aleksei Shein (904), in Shlisselburg, as the third serial vessel ordered by the Russian Navy under the December 17, 2020 contract. The medium sea tanker was laid down on March 16, 2023, and is intended for the Baltic Fleet, giving it a projected role in supporting Russian surface ships and submarines operating from Baltiysk and Kronstadt into the Baltic Sea, North Sea, and North Atlantic. The same contract also covers Vasiliy Nikitin (902), intended for the Black Sea Fleet, and Engineer-Admiral Kotov (903), intended for the Pacific Fleet. These ships also represent the largest vessels ever launched in the entire history of the USC Nevsky Shipyard, surpassing in size the Project RSD49 river-sea dry cargo ships.

    Deliveries of the three ships had originally been scheduled between 2023 and 2025, yet none had completed the full sequence of outfitting, sea trials, state acceptance, and transfer to the fleet by July 2026. The Aleksei Shein therefore increases the number of Project 23130 hulls afloat but does not immediately change the number of operational replenishment tankers available to Russian naval commanders. The distinction is important, as this program is intended to reduce Russian dependence on Soviet-built tankers and foreign port access by enabling warships and submarines to receive fuel, water, food, lubricants and spare parts while remaining at sea. 

    The Aleksei Shein measures 130 meters in length, 21.5 meters in beam and 7 meters in maximum draft, with a depth of 10 meters to the upper deck. Full-load displacement reaches 14,000 tons, while deadweight at maximum draft is 9,000 tons, meaning cargo, fuel, water, stores, crew and consumables account for a substantial share of the ship's loaded mass. The vessel uses a single-shaft diesel propulsion arrangement with a total continuous engine power of at least 4,640 kW and a bow thruster for low-speed maneuvering in confined waters. Maximum speed is 16 knots, equal to 29.6 km/h, while maximum sailing range is 8,000 nautical miles, or 14,816 kilometers. Endurance is 60 days based on water and provisions, allowing a deployment cycle of two months without replenishing the tanker itself under normal consumption conditions.

    The ship has a permanent crew of 24 and accommodation for 12 additional personnel, producing a total berthing capacity of 36. These figures may indicate a highly automated auxiliary vessel with a small crew relative to its displacement, but also place limits on the number of technicians, medical personnel, or embarked logistics specialists available during prolonged operations. The 16-knot speed is adequate for escorting frigates and auxiliary groups at economical cruising speeds, but it is below the 20-knot speed of the U.S. John Lewis-class and would constrain a formation required to sustain prolonged high-speed movement. The Project 23130 class now includes four named ships at different stages of service or construction.

    The Akademik Pashin, hull number 901, was ordered under a November 1, 2013 contract valued at 2.978 billion rubles, laid down on April 26, 2014, and launched on May 26, 2016. Factory sea trials began on Lake Ladoga on May 17, 2018; the tanker reached Murmansk for the final phase of state trials on July 22, 2019, and entered Northern Fleet service on January 21, 2020. The interval from keel laying to commissioning was five years and nine months, while the period between launch and commissioning lasted three years and eight months. The Vasiliy Nikitin was laid down on March 26, 2021, and launched on October 5, 2023, after two years and six months of hull construction. The Engineer-Admiral Kotov was laid down during 2022 and launched on December 5, 2024, while the Aleksei Shein spent three years and four months between keel laying and launch.

    Russia plans six Project 23130 tankers, leaving two further vessels to be named and constructed. If all six are completed, the class could provide at least one modern medium tanker to each major fleet, with remaining hulls assigned according to deployment tempo or concentrated in the Northern Fleet, which supports the largest share of Russia's distant-water and Arctic naval activity. The ship's cargo arrangement is centered on liquid replenishment rather than general stores transport. The Project 23130 can carry 3,000 tons of heavy fuel oil, 2,500 tons of diesel fuel, 500 tons of aviation kerosene, 150 tons of lubricating oil and 1,000 tons of fresh water. These figures produce a combined liquid load of 7,150 tons, equivalent to 79.4 percent of the ship's 9,000-ton deadweight. Dry cargo capacity is 100 tons, including provisions, replacement components, technical stores and shipboard consumables.

    The cargo system can keep as many as eight types of cargo separated through dedicated tanks, pipelines, pumps and transfer controls, reducing contamination risk and allowing the tanker to support ships using different fuels or lubricants during one deployment. The 2,500-ton diesel allocation is relevant for modern Russian frigates, corvettes and conventional auxiliaries, while the 500-ton aviation kerosene capacity can support embarked helicopters and limited shore-based aviation requirements. The 1,000 tons of fresh water can also reduce demand on shipboard desalination plants or support vessels operating with degraded freshwater production. The comparatively small 100-ton dry cargo allowance confirms that the Project 23130 is not a full-spectrum stores ship and cannot replace dedicated ammunition, repair or dry cargo vessels during large-scale operations. 

    The Project 23130 can supply fuel to three ships at the same time while the tanker and receiving vessels remain underway at separation distances of 50 to 100 meters. The ship can conduct abeam replenishment through hoses and transfer rigs or supply a vessel astern through a trailing arrangement when formation geometry or sea conditions make alongside transfer less suitable. A transverse transfer system can move food, spares, and technical stores without bringing the ships into port or requiring them to moor together. During trials, the Akademik Pashin refueled three combat ships simultaneously, with the Northern Fleet's nuclear-powered missile cruiser Pyotr Veliki and Project 22350 frigate Admiral Gorshkov participating during the test program.

    Simultaneous replenishment can shorten the period during which several combatants must maintain fixed courses, reduced maneuvering freedom, and close spacing. It also allows a task group to restore fuel levels across multiple ships during a single logistics cycle rather than servicing each vessel separately. At 16 knots, however, the tanker cannot match the sustained speed of nuclear submarines, destroyers or large surface combatants during rapid transit. The practical employment pattern is therefore likely to involve rendezvous at a designated position, replenishment at moderate speed and subsequent dispersal, rather than continuous integration with a fast maneuvering formation. The class was designed for a wider climatic and geographic envelope than a commercial tanker of comparable size.

    The Project 23130 has a strengthened steel double hull around the cargo-tank area and complies with the Arc4 ice category of the Russian Maritime Register of Shipping. It can navigate independently through sparse first-year Arctic ice up to 0.8 meters thick during summer and autumn and through ice up to 0.6 meters thick during winter and spring. Icebreaker assistance is therefore required when ice concentration, pressure, or thickness exceeds those limits, particularly during winter operations in the Barents Sea. The approved air temperature range extends from +45°C at 60 to 85 percent humidity to -30°C at 65 to 85 percent humidity. Permitted seawater temperatures extend from +34°C to -3°C, covering operations from warm-water deployments in the Mediterranean or Indian Ocean to sub-zero northern conditions.

    Navigation is unrestricted in non-Arctic seas, while the ship can operate independently in the Barents Sea during summer and autumn and with icebreaker support during winter and spring. This permits the same tanker to support Atlantic deployments, deliver fuel to Arctic bases and accompany warships operating along the Northern Sea Route, although Arc4 does not make the tanker an icebreaker or permit unrestricted independent movement through heavy multi-year ice. The program's delays are linked less to launching hulls than to completing machinery, cargo handling and control system integration. The Akademik Pashin entered service more than three years after its initial contractual deadline, partly because the lead ship incorporated Wärtsilä diesel engines and a substantial quantity of imported auxiliary equipment.

    Sanctions forced serial vessels to replace foreign machinery with Russian substitutes, requiring changes to foundations, piping, cooling, electrical distribution, control software and maintenance arrangements. A replacement engine or pump cannot be installed solely based on similar power or capacity because dimensions, vibration, heat output, electrical demand and interface protocols affect multiple ship systems. Cargo transfer equipment also became a source of delay, including components connected with the Troitsky Crane Plant. Nevsky Shipyard sought more than 441 million rubles in compensation for delayed equipment deliveries, a figure that illustrates the financial effect of supplier failures on a contract originally intended to deliver three tankers by 2025.

    Post-launch work remains extensive because the shipyard must complete propulsion alignment, electrical cabling, pipe testing, cargo pump certification, automation integration, damage control checks and harbor acceptance before sea trials can begin. The Aleksei Shein's launch is therefore only one point in the production cycle, and the interval between launch and commissioning may be measured in years if the serial ships follow the pattern established by the Akademik Pashin. The operational case for Project 23130 rests on the age of Russia's replenishment fleet and the geographic separation of its naval forces.

    The Russian Navy continues to rely on Soviet-era Boris Chilikin, Altay, Dubna and Kaliningradneft-class tankers, many of which have been in service for several decades and require increasingly intensive maintenance. The Akademik Pashin demonstrated the class's distant-support role in June 2024 when it crossed the Atlantic with the Project 22350 frigate Admiral Gorshkov, the Yasen-M-class nuclear-powered submarine Kazan and the ocean-going tug Nikolai Chiker during a deployment to Cuba. An 8,000-nautical-mile range permits a voyage from the Russian north to the Caribbean only when combined with careful fuel management, replenishment opportunities or port access, but it is sufficient for Mediterranean, North Atlantic and Arctic missions.

    Still, the Project 23130 remains substantially smaller than the U.S. John Lewis-class, which is 227.4 meters long, displaces 49,850 tons at full load, reaches 20 knots and carries 156,000 barrels of petroleum products. The Russian ship's 7,150-ton liquid load, 100-ton dry cargo capacity and 16-knot speed indicate a role supporting individual warships, submarines and small surface groups rather than sustaining a carrier strike group during continuous high-tempo operations. Distribution among the Northern, Black Sea, Pacific and Baltic Fleets will improve geographic coverage if all ships enter service, but it will also leave each fleet with only limited redundancy. Until the Vasiliy Nikitin, Engineer-Admiral Kotov, and Aleksei Shein complete acceptance, Russia's additional replenishment capacity exists as launched hulls under construction rather than as ships available for operational tasking.

    Written by Jérôme Brahy

    Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.

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  • U.S. Marines Board Wen Yao Tanker as Washington Steps Up Maritime Pressure on Iran

    U.S. Marines assigned to the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit board the commercial tanker M/T Wen Yao during a verification boarding operation in the Gulf of Oman on July 16, 2026. The inspection formed part of U.S. Central Command039;s enforcement of the maritime blockade against Iran, with the Strait of Hormuz remaining open to lawful international shipping. (Picture source: U.S. Central Command)

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    U.S. Marines from the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (11th MEU) boarded the commercial tanker M/T Wen Yao in the Gulf of Oman on July 16, 2026, as part of a verification operation supporting the U.S. maritime blockade against Iran, highlighting Washington’s expanding ability to police shipping around the Strait of Hormuz. Announced by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) on July 17, 2026, the mission underscores a more assertive U.S. effort to restrict Iranian maritime activity while safeguarding legitimate commercial navigation through one of the world’s most strategically important chokepoints.

    The operation showcases the integration of Marine boarding teams with U.S. naval and intelligence assets to strengthen maritime interdiction and sustain pressure on Iran’s regional logistics network. As tensions persist across the Middle East, this layered enforcement approach reinforces deterrence, enhances maritime security, and preserves freedom of navigation along a critical global energy corridor.

    Related Topic: CENTCOM Confirms U.S. Deployment of 3 Aircraft Carriers to Middle East in Rare Show of Power

    U.S. Marines assigned to the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit board the commercial tanker M/T Wen Yao during a verification boarding operation in the Gulf of Oman on July 16, 2026. The inspection formed part of U.S. Central Command's enforcement of the maritime blockade against Iran, with the Strait of Hormuz remaining open to lawful international shipping. (Picture source: U.S. Central Command)

    According to CENTCOM, American forces have now redirected three commercial vessels attempting to breach the blockade, disabled one vessel that failed to comply with U.S. instructions, and boarded the M/T Wen Yao to verify full compliance with the ongoing U.S. naval blockade against Iran. CENTCOM added that the Strait of Hormuz and surrounding waters remain open to international navigation, except for vessels attempting to violate what it described as America's "steel wall blockade." The announcement signals that Washington is pursuing a selective maritime enforcement campaign focused on vessels suspected of violating blockade measures rather than restricting legitimate international commerce.

    The operation demonstrates how U.S. forces are integrating Marine expeditionary units with naval assets, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, and maritime interdiction capabilities to sustain pressure on Iran's maritime network. This layered approach strengthens regional deterrence, expands maritime domain awareness, and underscores the United States' ability to enforce maritime restrictions while preserving freedom of navigation across one of the world's most critical energy corridors.

    The boarding of the M/T Wen Yao forms part of a broader U.S. campaign to establish persistent operational control over the maritime approaches to southern Iran. Rather than attempting to halt all shipping movements, U.S. forces appear to be employing intelligence-led maritime enforcement operations that combine surveillance, naval patrols, and Marine boarding teams to identify and intercept vessels suspected of supporting sanctioned Iranian trade or violating blockade measures.

    U.S. Marines from the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit boarded the commercial tanker M/T Wen Yao in the Gulf of Oman as part of U.S. Central Command's enforcement of the maritime blockade against Iran. (Video footage U.S. CENTCOM)

    The operation also reflects the broader evolution of the U.S. military campaign in the region over recent days. Following multiple waves of precision strikes against Iranian military facilities, including air defense systems, coastal surveillance radars, missile launch infrastructure, drone facilities, command-and-control nodes, and naval installations, CENTCOM has significantly strengthened its operational posture around the Strait of Hormuz. By combining air superiority, naval dominance, and Marine expeditionary capabilities, Washington is demonstrating its ability to control access to one of the world's most strategically significant maritime corridors while degrading Iran's ability to challenge that control.

    Recent U.S. operations have reportedly targeted military installations around Bandar Abbas, Jask, Bushehr, Chabahar, Konarak, Abu Musa, and Greater Tunb Island, all locations supporting Iran's anti-access and area-denial architecture. These strikes have focused on degrading coastal anti-ship missile batteries, military radar systems, drone launch facilities, naval infrastructure, and command centers capable of threatening commercial shipping or U.S. and allied naval forces operating in the Gulf.

    By reducing Iran's coastal strike capabilities while simultaneously increasing naval patrols and compliance boardings, the United States is establishing what military planners describe as localized sea control rather than complete domination of the maritime battlespace. In practical terms, this means U.S. forces possess sufficient surveillance, intelligence, naval firepower, and expeditionary capabilities to determine which vessels may transit the Strait of Hormuz while allowing legitimate commercial navigation to continue.

    Verification boarding operations are designed to confirm vessel identity, cargo documentation, ownership, destination, and compliance with applicable maritime restrictions. Depending on operational requirements, U.S. Marine Corps boarding teams may deploy from warships or helicopters to inspect documentation and verify compliance while minimizing disruption to lawful commercial traffic. CENTCOM has not disclosed the identity of the supporting U.S. warship, the cargo carried by the M/T Wen Yao, its flag state, or the vessel's disposition following the inspection, information that remains operationally sensitive.

    The participation of Marines from the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit further illustrates the expanding role of Marine expeditionary forces in maritime security operations. As highly deployable combined-arms formations operating from amphibious ready groups, Marine Expeditionary Units routinely conduct maritime interdiction, crisis response, embassy reinforcement, non-combatant evacuation operations, and expeditionary security missions. Their involvement in blockade enforcement demonstrates the growing integration of U.S. Marine Corps capabilities with U.S. Navy maritime operations under evolving expeditionary concepts.

    The Strait of Hormuz remains the world's most important maritime energy chokepoint, carrying roughly one-fifth of globally traded petroleum and significant volumes of liquefied natural gas. Any disruption to navigation through the narrow waterway immediately affects global energy markets, shipping insurance premiums, freight costs, and international supply chains spanning the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and North America.

    Unlike previous periods of regional tension that relied primarily on deterrence through naval presence, the current U.S. approach combines precision military operations ashore with continuous maritime enforcement at sea. Rather than relying solely on the presence of warships, CENTCOM is actively shaping maritime traffic through inspections, vessel diversions, selective interdictions, and verification boardings, while maintaining freedom of navigation for vessels that comply with U.S. directives.

    From Army Recognition's analysis, the boarding of the M/T Wen Yao represents a significant evolution in U.S. operational strategy around the Strait of Hormuz. The United States has moved beyond traditional deterrence and is now physically enforcing a maritime blockade by integrating precision strikes, intelligence dominance, naval superiority, and direct control over commercial shipping movements. This demonstrates an increasingly sophisticated multi-domain campaign that combines air, maritime, intelligence, and expeditionary capabilities to exert sustained military and economic pressure on Iran.

    The successive U.S. strikes carried out during the past several days have likely reduced Iran's ability to threaten maritime traffic using coastal missile batteries, surveillance radars, drone infrastructure, and command-and-control networks. Although these operations do not eliminate Iran's capacity to employ asymmetric capabilities such as naval mines, fast attack craft, submarines, mobile missile launchers, armed drones, or proxy forces, they significantly complicate Tehran's ability to conduct coordinated attacks against commercial shipping or coalition naval forces operating near the Strait of Hormuz.

    The broader strategic implications extend well beyond the Middle East. The Strait of Hormuz is the principal export route for Gulf crude oil and liquefied natural gas destined for global markets. Even limited military incidents involving commercial shipping can rapidly increase insurance premiums, delay maritime traffic, elevate freight rates, and push global energy prices higher, creating inflationary pressures that affect manufacturing, transportation, agriculture, and industrial production across Europe, Asia, and North America.

    For the United States, sustaining a maritime blockade requires a prolonged commitment of naval task groups, surveillance aircraft, intelligence assets, air defense systems, logistics support, and Marine expeditionary forces. Such a commitment inevitably consumes military resources that could otherwise reinforce deterrence missions in Europe or the Indo-Pacific, creating opportunities for strategic competitors to test U.S. commitments in other theaters.

    For NATO members, the implications extend beyond rising energy costs. Several Allied nations maintain naval forces, military installations, logistics hubs, and commercial shipping interests throughout the Gulf region. Should tensions continue to escalate, European allies could become increasingly involved in maritime security operations, intelligence sharing, air and missile defense, naval escort missions, mine countermeasure operations, or the protection of commercial shipping, even outside NATO's formal command structure.

    Iran also retains numerous options for indirect retaliation. Beyond conventional military responses, Tehran could employ cyberattacks against ports, energy infrastructure, logistics networks, financial institutions, shipping companies, or defense industries in countries supporting U.S. operations. Commercial vessels operated by European or allied companies could likewise face increased harassment or disruption as Iran seeks to impose costs without triggering a full-scale conventional conflict.

    Ultimately, the verification boarding of the M/T Wen Yao signals that U.S. maritime enforcement has entered a more active operational phase. The combination of precision strikes against Iranian military infrastructure, persistent naval patrols, intelligence-led vessel tracking, and U.S. Marine Corps boarding operations indicates that CENTCOM is implementing a sustained campaign to enforce the blockade while preserving freedom of navigation for lawful commercial traffic. Whether this strategy succeeds will depend not only on maintaining military superiority across the maritime domain but also on Washington's ability to manage escalation, sustain coalition support, and reassure the international shipping community that one of the world's most vital maritime trade routes can remain open despite an increasingly contested security environment.

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    Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
    Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.

  • US Navy's nuclear submarine USS Albany returns to active service following early delivery by Portsmouth Shipyard

    The USS Albany was the last U.S. submarine built using the traditional keel-up construction method and the last launched down a shipway before modular construction became standard. (Picture source: US Navy)

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    Portsmouth Naval Shipyard officially delivered the nuclear-powered fast attack submarine USS Albany (SSN-753) back to the U.S. Navy on July 14, 2026, following a compressed nine-month maintenance cycle at Naval Submarine Base New London. The deployment of advanced schedule-recovery protocols by shipyard technical teams successfully prevented multiple weeks of projected delays, ensuring the vessel was returned to service ahead of schedule. This rapid drydock turnaround directly restores a highly capable combat asset to the active undersea fleet to mitigate ongoing availability constraints across the Navy's submarine force.

    The Improved Los Angeles-class submarine completed its Drydocking Selected Restricted Availability at Naval Submarine Base New London after entering the auxiliary dry dock on October 2, 2025, and finishing sea trials on July 2, 2026. The technical overhaul involved extensive pressure hull structural inspections, electrical system upgrades, and operational certification of its vertical launch system and propulsion machinery.

    Related topic:USS Gerald R. Ford enters Norfolk Naval Shipyard for first maintenance period after historic deployment

    The USS Albany was the last U.S. submarine built using the traditional keel-up construction method and the last launched down a shipway before modular construction became standard. (Picture source: US Navy)

    On July 14, 2026, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard returned the USS Albany (SSN-753) to the U.S. Navy after a nine-month Drydocking Selected Restricted Availability at Naval Submarine Base New London in Groton, Connecticut. The Improved Los Angeles-class nuclear-powered attack submarine entered the Auxiliary Repair Dry Dock Shippingport on October 2, 2025, undocked on March 26, 2026, began post-maintenance sea trials on June 29, and returned to New London on July 2. The work included pressure hull and structural inspections, replacement and repair of mechanical and electrical equipment, system reactivation, pier-side testing, and final operational certification. Shipyard schedule-recovery measures prevented several additional weeks of delay, allowing delivery before the Independence Day holiday.

    The USS Albany returned to service 36 years after commissioning and less than 11 months after shifting its homeport from Naval Station Norfolk to New London on August 14, 2025. Its return restores one deployable Los Angeles submarine to a force in which maintenance duration, rather than nominal inventory alone, increasingly determines how many attack submarines are available for operations. The USS Albany first entered dry dock for access to underwater hull areas, sea-connected systems, appendages and structural elements that cannot be inspected or replaced while the submarine remains afloat.

    After undocking on March 26, the repair project moved into a pierside phase covering reinstallation, alignment, pressure testing, electrical energization and functional checks of propulsion support equipment, auxiliary machinery, hydraulic systems, atmosphere control equipment, navigation systems, communications, sonar and combat system components. The June 29 to July 2 sea trials then placed these systems under operating loads, allowing evaluation of reactor plant performance, turbine response, shaft line behavior, steering, diving and surfacing controls, electrical generation, emergency systems and ship handling. Final delivery required completion of maintenance certification rather than the mere return of the submarine to the pier.

    The recovered weeks are operationally significant because they can be converted into crew training, weapons certification, tactical evaluation and deployment preparation instead of remaining lost inside an extended maintenance period. The USS Albany was ordered on November 29, 1983, laid down by Newport News Shipbuilding on April 22, 1985, launched on June 13, 1987, and commissioned on April 7, 1990. It was the last U.S. submarine built through the traditional keel-up method and the last launched down a shipway before modular assembly became the standard approach for U.S. nuclear submarine construction. The USS Albany and USS Topeka were also built with sections of HY-100 high-yield steel in their pressure hulls instead of using only the HY-80 steel installed in earlier Los Angeles-class submarines.

    The purpose was to validate forming, welding, and inspection methods later required for the Seawolf-class, whose pressure hull made greater use of higher-strength steel. The USS Albany is 110.3 meters long, 10 meters wide, and 9.4 meters in draft. Its full displacement is listed at 6,247 tonnes, compared with 5,838 tonnes in light condition, and its normal crew totals between 129 and 134 officers and enlisted personnel depending on mission staffing. The submarine is powered by one General Electric S6G pressurized-water reactor using a D2W core rated at 165 MW thermal. Steam generated by the reactor drives two propulsion turbines producing 33,500 shaft horsepower through a reduction gear connected to a single shaft, while ship service turbine generators provide electrical power for sensors, combat systems, pumps, life-support equipment and auxiliary machinery.

    A 325-hp secondary propulsion motor, storage batteries and a diesel generator provide limited movement and emergency power if the main propulsion plant is unavailable. Official submerged speed exceeds 25 knots, equivalent to more than 46 km/h, while the precise maximum remains classified. The Los Angeles class was designed for long submerged operations, and reactor fuel is not the limiting factor during routine deployments. Endurance is instead governed by food stocks, crew fatigue, maintenance requirements, weapons expenditure and the operational tasking assigned to the boat. The USS Albany belongs to the 23-boat Flight III group, better known as the Improved 688I subclass, covering USS San Juan (SSN-751) through USS Cheyenne (SSN-773).

    These submarines introduced quieter machinery, improved acoustic isolation, retractable bow diving planes, under-ice capability, enhanced sonar processing and reduced radiated noise compared with earlier flights. The USS Albany carries 12 vertical launch cells for BGM-109 Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles in addition to four 533 mm torpedo tubes. The torpedo tubes can fire Mk 48 ADCAP heavyweight torpedoes, UGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missiles and torpedo-tube-launched Tomahawks, and can also deploy Mk 67 mobile mines and Mk 60 CAPTOR encapsulated torpedo mines. The separate vertical launch battery allows the submarine to conduct land attack without using its torpedo tubes, preserving ready weapons for anti-submarine or anti-surface engagements.

    The class can carry as many as 37 weapons when torpedoes, missiles and mines are counted together, although the actual load depends on mission planning, stowage limits and the expected threat environment. The USS Albany’s sensor suite combines bow, hull and towed-array sonar with digital combat control systems designed to generate firing solutions without exposing the submarine through active emissions. The Improved Los Angeles-class originally used the AN/BSY-1 Submarine Advanced Combat System and AN/BQQ-5E sonar architecture, including a spherical bow array, conformal hull hydrophones and long towed arrays. Later modernization introduced the AN/BQQ-10 Acoustic Rapid Commercial Off-the-Shelf Insertion system, which replaced legacy processors with an open computing architecture that can accept repeated hardware and software upgrades.

    The processing chain supports passive detection, frequency-line analysis, target classification, bearing tracking, and target motion analysis against submarines and surface ships. Updated combat control equipment integrates sonar tracks with Mk 48 ADCAP torpedo employment, Tomahawk mission planning, and tactical data exchange. This gives the USS Albany the ability to conduct anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, covert surveillance, intelligence collection, strike warfare, and Special Operations Forces support from the same hull. The USS Albany has operated across the North Atlantic, Mediterranean Sea, Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Caribbean and European waters during more than three decades of service.

    Its 1997 deployment with the USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67) carrier battle group covered both the U.S. 5th and 6th Fleet areas and included a southbound transit of the Suez Canal, operations in the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf, and port calls in Gibraltar, Italy, France, Spain, Greece, Israel, Bahrain and Cyprus. During its 2004 deployment, the USS Albany participated in Dogfish, Arabian Shark, Shark Hunt and Majestic Eagle, combining anti-submarine exercises with operations in the Mediterranean, Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf. In 2006, the submarine supported Caribbean counter-narcotics missions that contributed to the seizure of more than 2.8 tonnes of narcotics. It covered 34,500 nautical miles during its 2010 deployment and more than 40,000 nautical miles during the extended 2012-2013 deployment.

    The USS Albany completed additional deployments in 2008, 2019-2020, 2021-2022 and 2024, then participated in the multinational Cutlass Fury 25 anti-submarine warfare exercise off Canada before transferring to New London in August 2025. The USS Albany’s return has a measurable effect on the US Navy's undersea force availability because a submarine in prolonged depot maintenance remains part of the official fleet but contributes no deployment days, no forward presence, and no operational tasking. Los Angeles-class submarines still account for a major share of the U.S. Navy attack submarine inventory, but retirements are removing older hulls faster than Virginia-class construction is replacing them.

    The Virginia-class output remains constrained by skilled labor shortages, supplier limitations, module delays and competition for nuclear-certified workers and industrial capacity from the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine program. Public shipyards therefore influence force levels through the duration and predictability of overhauls, modernization periods and drydocking availabilities. Returning the USS Albany several weeks earlier than a further delayed schedule would have allowed provides immediate SSN capacity without waiting years for a new submarine to be funded, built, tested, and commissioned. It also reduces pressure on other boats that would otherwise absorb additional deployments, intelligence missions, carrier strike group support, and training commitments.

    Written by Jérôme Brahy

    Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.

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  • China Builds Full-Scale U.S. Navy Arleigh Burke Destroyer Replica for Anti-Ship Missile Tests

    A U.S. Navy Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer, the type of warship reproduced by China as a full-scale target in the Taklamakan Desert. (Picture source: US DoD)

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    China has built a full-scale three-dimensional replica of a U.S. Navy Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer at a remote weapons-testing range in the Taklamakan Desert. The mock-up gives the People's Liberation Army a realistic target for refining strike tactics against one of the U.S. Navy's primary air defense and missile warfare assets operating around Taiwan.

    The newly identified structure closely resembles an Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer, a warship that routinely escorts U.S. aircraft carriers and conducts freedom of navigation operations across the Western Pacific. Unlike earlier flat target outlines seen at Chinese test sites, the three-dimensional replica allows the PLA to evaluate sensors, targeting systems, and precision-guided weapons against a more realistic representation of an operational U.S. surface combatant. Analysts say the development underscores Beijing's continued focus on preparing for high-end maritime conflict scenarios in the Taiwan Strait.


    Related News: China's Type 076 Amphibious Ship Challenges U.S. Navy America-class and Wasp-class with Aircraft Catapult

    A U.S. Navy Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer, the type of warship reproduced by China as a full-scale target in the Taklamakan Desert. (Picture source: US DoD)

    The approximately 155-meter-long mock-up reproduces several visible elements of an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, including its hull, forward gun position, bridge, funnel, and helicopter flight deck. Unlike the flat silhouettes previously identified at Chinese desert ranges, the new structure possesses a raised superstructure that could generate more representative radar, infrared and electro-optical signatures.

    CNN reported on July 11, 2026, that the replica had been built at a missile-testing facility in Xinjiang, using satellite imagery supplied by U.S. geospatial intelligence company Vantor. Additional imagery examined by The Telegraph on July 15 placed the structure within a wider Chinese network of targets reproducing American warships and military installations. Beijing has not publicly confirmed the purpose of the new replica or identified any weapons tested against it.

    Satellite observations indicate that construction began around October 2025. Imagery captured by Vantor on May 11, 2026, showed the principal features already assembled. The target stands among large desert dunes, far from populated areas and more than 1,000 kilometers from the nearest coastline. These conditions allow China to conduct controlled weapons and sensor trials without the maritime traffic, weather variations and foreign observation associated with testing at sea.

    The structure appears to reproduce the general dimensions of an Arleigh Burke Flight IIA or Flight III destroyer, although the available imagery does not establish a specific variant. These warships measure approximately 155 meters in length and displace between 9,000 and nearly 10,000 tonnes, depending on their configuration. Flight IIA and Flight III ships carry 96 Mk 41 vertical launch cells capable of accommodating Standard surface-to-air missiles, Tomahawk cruise missiles, Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles, and anti-submarine weapons.

    Their Aegis combat system allows the destroyers to provide air and missile defense for U.S. carrier strike groups while also conducting anti-submarine, anti-surface and land-attack missions. Several Arleigh Burke-class ships are permanently based at Yokosuka, Japan, as part of Destroyer Squadron 15 and the U.S. Seventh Fleet. CNN compared the desert replica with USS Fitzgerald, a Flight I destroyer assigned to this forward-deployed force.

    The selection of an Arleigh Burke-classship is therefore operationally relevant. In a conflict around Taiwan, these destroyers would likely protect aircraft carriers, amphibious groups, logistics vessels, and forward bases from Chinese aircraft and missiles. They could also launch Tomahawk strikes and contribute to ballistic missile defense. Disabling the escorts would expose larger and less maneuverable ships to follow-on attacks while reducing the U.S. Navy’s ability to maintain an integrated defensive screen.

    China has used ship-shaped desert targets for several years. Satellite images released by Maxar Technologies in 2021 revealed a full-scale aircraft carrier outline and at least two structures resembling Arleigh Burke-class destroyers at the Ruoqiang range. One section of the complex contained a six-meter-wide rail system carrying ship-sized targets, potentially allowing engineers to simulate a moving vessel. Upright poles positioned around other mock-ups were assessed as possible radar reflectors or measuring instruments.

    A later target completed in 2023 closely reproduced the outline and dimensions of the Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carrier. That structure included a representation of the island and markings corresponding to the carrier’s flight-deck arrangement. The progressive addition of physical and electronic detail suggests that the function of these targets may extend beyond measuring whether a missile can land inside the outline of a large ship.

    A three-dimensional replica can support more demanding trials of terminal guidance systems. A missile approaching a naval formation must identify the intended vessel among escorts, auxiliaries, decoys and electronic interference. Radar, infrared or electro-optical seekers must then maintain the track and select an appropriate impact point despite the target’s movement. Reproducing the bridge, funnel and deck arrangement could help Chinese engineers assess automatic target recognition and determine whether a seeker can distinguish an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer from other vessels.

    The structure may also be used to measure how a sensor reacts to different radar reflectors, thermal sources or electronic countermeasures. Instruments positioned around the target could record the missile’s trajectory and terminal corrections without requiring the weapon to strike the structure. This would allow the range to support seeker development, target-acquisition testing and guidance calibration over multiple trials. The imagery does not, however, reveal what equipment is installed inside or around the new replica.

    According to CNN, analysts believe the target could help refine the targeting of Chinese hypersonic weapons. However, no publicly available evidence links the new replica to a specific missile or confirms that it has already been used in a weapons test. The U.S. Department of Defense’s 2025 report attributes anti-ship roles to the DF-21, DF-26, and DF-27 ballistic missiles, and describes the YJ-21 as a hypersonic anti-ship ballistic missile. The existence of these weapons explains the value of a realistic naval target, but any direct connection between them and this facility remains unconfirmed.

    The target does not demonstrate that China can reliably strike a maneuvering U.S. destroyer under operational conditions. It nevertheless shows continued investment in testing against representations of specific American warships rather than generic naval targets. Combined with mobile targets, carrier mock-ups and China’s expanding inventory of long-range anti-ship weapons, the new Arleigh Burke replica reflects preparations focused on complicating U.S. naval intervention in a future Indo-Pacific conflict.

    Written By Erwan Halna du Fretay - Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
    Erwan Halna du Fretay holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and has experience studying conflicts and global arms transfers. His research interests lie in Security and strategic studies, particularly the dynamics of the defense industry, the evolution of military technologies, and the strategic transformation of armed forces.

  • U.S. Navy F/A-18E Super Hornet Carrying an AGM-84K Reveals USS Abraham Lincoln’s Standoff-Strike Posture

    A U.S. Navy F/A-18E Super Hornet seen carrying a possible AGM-84K SLAM-ER aboard USS Abraham Lincoln signals a long-range standoff-strike posture against Iranian coastal défenses (Picture Source: U.S. Navy)

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    U.S. Navy carrier aviation may have revealed one of its most significant long-range strike capabilities during recent operations against Iran, as operational footage released by U.S. Central Command on July 16, 2026, appears to show an F/A-18E Super Hornet launching from USS Abraham Lincoln armed with an AGM-84K SLAM-ER cruise missile. If the identification is correct, the imagery highlights the carrier’s ability to conduct precision attacks against heavily defended coastal targets from well outside the reach of many Iranian air-defense systems, reinforcing its role in suppressing critical elements of Tehran’s maritime strike network.

    The AGM-84K SLAM-ER provides the Super Hornet with a long-range, precision-guided weapon capable of striking command centers, radar sites, missile infrastructure, and other high-value land or maritime targets using advanced GPS, imaging-infrared guidance, and man-in-the-loop control. Its apparent presence aboard USS Abraham Lincoln underscores the growing emphasis on standoff precision warfare, allowing carrier air wings to disrupt enemy sensor-to-shooter chains while reducing aircraft exposure and preserving operational freedom in contested environments.

    Related Topic: U.S. Corsair One-Way Attack Sea Drones Redefine Naval Strike Warfare in First Combat Use Against Iran

    A U.S. Navy F/A-18E Super Hornet seen carrying a possible AGM-84K SLAM-ER aboard USS Abraham Lincoln signals a long-range standoff-strike posture against Iranian coastal défenses (Picture Source: U.S. Navy)

    On July 16, 2026, U.S. Central Command released operational footage on X offering a rare visual window into the latest American strike campaign against Iranian military targets. CENTCOM said the July 15 wave struck command centers, air-defense sites, missile and drone capabilities, and coastal-surveillance facilities, including objectives in the Bandar Abbas area. Yet the most consequential detail may appear only briefly: a U.S. NavyF/A-18E Super Hornet launching from USS Abraham Lincoln with what appears to be an AGM-84K SLAM-ER standoff missile beneath its starboard wing. If the visual assessment is correct, the footage provides an unusually revealing indication of the long-range precision-strike missions being generated from the carrier’s flight deck.

    The aircraft appears consistent with a single-seat F/A-18E Super Hornet assigned to Strike Fighter Squadron 14, the “Tophatters,” launching from the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72). Official imagery confirms that VFA-14 was embarked aboard the carrier and conducting flight-deck operations in the U.S. 5th Fleet area shortly before the July strike wave. An editorial visual assessment of the CENTCOM sequence assigns moderate-to-high confidence, approximately 70 percent, that the weapon belongs to the AGM-84K SLAM-ER family. That percentage is an analytical estimate, not a formal U.S. government confidence rating, and is based on the store’s apparent length, cylindrical body, aerodynamic layout and underwing carriage position. Video compression and the brief camera angle do not provide a sufficiently clear view of the nose, markings, control surfaces or serial information required for a definitive identification.

    The more specific AGM-84K-1 designation, sometimes associated with an Automatic Target Acquisition-equipped configuration, cannot be established from the available footage. Differences involving seeker software, internal electronics or production standards would not necessarily be externally visible. The most supportable public assessment is that the aircraft may be carrying an AGM-84K SLAM-ER-family weapon. The sequence does not prove that the missile was subsequently launched, nor does it connect the aircraft to any individual target named by CENTCOM. It could also have been assigned to an armed reserve, contingency or mission-abort profile rather than an executed strike.

    SLAM-ER—Standoff Land Attack Missile-Expanded Response, is a high-subsonic, air-launched cruise missile developed from the AGM-84 Harpoon lineage. NAVAIR describes it as a day-or-night, adverse-weather, over-the-horizon precision weapon for pre-planned and target-of-opportunity missions against both land and maritime targets. The missile is approximately 4.4 meters long, weighs 674.5 kilograms and carries a 500-pound Tomahawk-derived titanium warhead with penetrating capability. Its publicly stated range exceeds 135 nautical miles, allowing a launch aircraft to release the weapon well outside the immediate engagement zone of many point-defense systems.

    The weapon combines ring-laser-gyro inertial navigation and multi-channel GPS with an imaging-infrared terminal seeker, a two-way data link and man-in-the-loop control. The U.S. Navy associates that control architecture with the AWW-13 Advanced Data Link pod, which can allow the operator to view the missile’s terminal imagery and refine the selected impact point. Automatic Target Acquisition is designed to assist target recognition in cluttered scenes, counter some infrared defensive measures and reduce the effect of degraded environmental conditions. These features would be particularly valuable around ports, islands and densely developed coastal areas, where positive identification and precise aimpoint selection are critical. The footage does not show the Super Hornet’s complete station configuration, so the presence of an AWW-13 pod or other mission-support equipment cannot be verified.

    Operationally, the possible loadout is closely aligned with a Standoff Outside of Area Defense, or SOAD, mission. SLAM-ER should not be confused with a dedicated anti-radiation missile such as the AGM-88 family: it does not primarily locate targets by homing on radar emissions. Against an air-defense installation, the missile would instead attack a pre-planned coordinate or visually identifiable aimpoint using GPS-aided navigation and imaging-infrared terminal guidance. Flexible approach profiles could enable it to strike from a tactically favorable direction, while its penetrating warhead would make it suitable for command buildings, hardened communications facilities, radar-support infrastructure and protected missile installations. The U.S. Navy describes SLAM-ER as its precision SOAD weapon and confirms that the missile can be launched and controlled by F/A-18 variants, including the Super Hornet.

    Among the target categories identified by CENTCOM, the highest mission compatibility would be with fixed coastal-surveillance radars, command-and-control facilities, air-defense nodes and hardened infrastructure supporting anti-ship cruise missiles. A maritime strike against a maneuvering military vessel or naval auxiliary is also technically credible, since the Navy identifies moving-ship engagement as a SLAM-ER capability. A strike against a mobile missile launcher or rapidly relocating drone system would be less straightforward and would depend on sufficiently recent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance data, a reliable target update and suitable terminal-control geometry. The apparent carriage of a single missile could reflect a mission-specific balance among standoff range, fuel, defensive weapons, data-link equipment and carrier launch-and-recovery weight limitations, but the incomplete view prevents reconstruction of the aircraft’s full combat load.

    Viewed through a maritime kill-chain framework, CENTCOM’s declared target list displays a coherent operational logic. Coastal-surveillance systems detect and classify shipping; command centers fuse and distribute tracking information; missile and drone units provide the means of engagement. Striking sensors, command nodes and weapons infrastructure within the same operational cycle attacks several links in that chain, reducing Iran’s ability to convert maritime awareness into weapons-quality targeting. A possible SLAM-ER mission would fit at the precision end of this campaign architecture, potentially assigning a single missile to a specific radar installation, command facility, hardened missile-support site or communications node whose destruction could interrupt the sensor-to-shooter sequence. This is an analytical inference from the target categories disclosed by CENTCOM, not confirmation of the targets assigned to the aircraft shown.

    The geographic focus reinforces this interpretation. CENTCOM said U.S. forces struck multiple locations, including Bandar Abbas, and separately attacked coastal-defense and cruise-missile sites on Greater Tunb Island during a 90-minute morning wave. These locations form part of the wider Iranian littoral architecture influencing access through the Strait of Hormuz. By degrading coastal sensors, missile infrastructure and command networks, U.S. forces can reduce the threat to commercial mariners while preserving freedom of navigation through a strategically vital waterway. Standoff weapons allow carrier aviation to engage selected nodes without requiring every aircraft to penetrate directly above defended territory, reducing aircrew exposure while maintaining controlled and proportionate effects.

    A SLAM-ER-equipped Super Hornet would also be only one element of a broader carrier-air-wing operation. Depending on the mission design, airborne early-warning aircraft could contribute battlespace awareness and airspace control, electronic-attack aircraft could complicate hostile radar operations, fighter escorts could protect the strike element, and aerial refueling could extend routing options or time on station. The footage does not establish which supporting assets participated in this launch, but it illustrates the depth of capability generated by USS Abraham Lincoln: a maneuverable, sea-based sortie-generation and command-and-strike node capable of repositioning across the theater while sustaining repeated precision operations.

    Whether the possible SLAM-ER was intentionally highlighted or simply appeared during routine operational documentation, its public visibility also serves as strategic communication. It reminds Iranian planners that U.S. naval aviation is not limited to direct-attack weapons or predictable overflight routes. A carrier-based F/A-18E can potentially hold defended coastal and maritime targets at risk from beyond local air-defense envelopes, forcing an adversary to protect sensors, command facilities and missile infrastructure across a far wider operational depth.

    The CENTCOM video does not officially confirm that VFA-14 carried or employed an AGM-84K SLAM-ER during the July 15 strike wave. It does, however, provide a credible visual indicator that the U.S. Navy may have configured at least one Super Hornet for a specialized long-range precision mission against a high-value land or maritime objective. If the identification is correct, the aircraft was likely prepared to attack a carefully selected component of Iran’s coastal sensor, command or missile network while remaining outside the most immediate threat envelope. Even without proof that the weapon was fired, the sequence delivers a clear message: American carrier aviation retains the reach, precision, integration and operational flexibility to dismantle hostile maritime kill chains, protect commercial navigation and impose calculated military costs from the sea.

    Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

    Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.

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  • Swedish Saab Wins €788M TKMS Deal to Equip Four German F128 Frigates with 9LV and Sea Giraffe Radars

    Saab will equip Germany’s four future F128 MEKO A-200 DEU frigates with the 9LV combat management system, Sea Giraffe radars, passive sensors and composite superstructures under an SEK 8.7 billion contract. The systems will integrate the ships’ air-defence, anti-surface and anti-submarine weapons into a common sensor-to-shooter architecture (Picture source: TKMS).

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    Saab has secured an SEK 8.7 billion contract from TKMS to equip four German Navy F128 frigates with the 9LV combat system, Sea Giraffe radars, passive sensors and lightweight composite superstructures, the company announced on July 16, 2026. The package will give the MEKO A-200 DEU ships an integrated command-and-sensor architecture for coordinating anti-air, anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare.

    Deliveries are planned between 2029 and 2032, supporting Germany’s effort to rebuild frigate capacity after ending the delayed F126 program. An option for additional ships could expand the class further, strengthening the Navy’s anti-submarine force structure and broader maritime deterrence.

    Related topic: South Korea Lands U.S. Marine Trucks from Modular Military Ferry Under Anti-Drone Netting.

    Saab will equip Germany's four future F128 MEKO A-200 DEU frigates with the 9LV combat management system, Sea Giraffe radars, passive sensors, and composite superstructures under a SEK 8.7 billion contract. The systems will integrate the ships' air-defence, anti-surface and anti-submarine weapons into a common sensor-to-shooter architecture (Picture source: TKMS).

    The German frigate is derived from TKMS’s 121-metre MEKO A-200 design, which has a beam of 16.4 metres, a design draught of 4.4 metres and a full-load displacement of approximately 3,950 tonnes. The standard design carries a core crew of 125 and accommodation for 49 additional personnel. Its CODAG-WARP propulsion arrangement combines a 20 MW gas turbine driving a centreline waterjet with two 6 MW diesel propulsion chains connected to low-noise controllable-pitch propellers. TKMS states a maximum speed above 29 knots and a range exceeding 6,500 nautical miles at 16 knots. The aviation facilities can support one helicopter in the 11-tonne class, corresponding to the German Navy’s NH90 Sea Tiger, plus two unmanned aerial vehicles. These characteristics produce a smaller and less manpower-intensive frigate than the cancelled F126, but with less internal volume, fewer weapon positions, and less margin for later additions.

    Saab’s principal contribution is the integration of the frigate’s sensors, weapons and tactical communications through the 9LV Combat Management System and 9LV Fire Control System. The 9LV software will receive tracks from the Sea Giraffe radars, passive electronic sensors, sonar systems, identification equipment, and external tactical data links, correlate those inputs, and present the command team with a single recognized tactical picture. It will also support threat evaluation, weapon assignment, and engagement sequencing. This function is operationally significant because a modern frigate does not engage a missile or aircraft using radar data alone: the combat system must establish track quality, classify the contact, verify engagement criteria, and pass an acceptable firing solution to the selected weapon. Saab reports that a typical 9LV integration project can involve approximately 50 subsystems. The company is therefore responsible for many of the technical interfaces that will determine whether the F128’s radar, electronic-warfare equipment, missiles, gun and third-party anti-submarine sensors function as one combat system rather than as separate installations.

    The primary air-surveillance sensor will be the Sea Giraffe 4A Fixed Face, an S-band active electronically scanned array radar using fixed antenna faces to maintain continuous coverage without the revisit delay associated with a mechanically rotating radar. Saab has not published the contracted German detection ranges, transmitted power, or array dimensions. It states that the radar covers 360 degrees in azimuth and more than 70 degrees in elevation, while simultaneously tracking aircraft, missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and surface contacts in coastal clutter. The smaller X-band Sea Giraffe 1X will provide a second surveillance layer optimized for low-altitude, short-range, and low-radar-cross-section contacts. The 1X searches its complete volume once per second, has a topside weight of approximately 100 kg, and is intended to detect targets such as small drones, boats, and sea-skimming missiles. Using S-band and X-band sensors gives the combat system different frequency characteristics and update rates, but it does not remove dependence on electronic-support measures, off-board surveillance, and correct radar-emission management when operating against an opponent capable of geolocating active transmissions.

    Germany has not released a final, contractually confirmed F128 weapon list. German reporting indicates that the configuration is based on the MEKO A-200 offered to Australia and is expected to include a 76 mm naval gun, 16 Kongsberg Naval Strike Missiles, 16 Mk 41 vertical-launch cells, a 21-round Rolling Airframe Missile launcher, and remotely controlled 30 mm guns. If all 16 Mk 41 cells are loaded with quad-packed ESSM Block 2 interceptors, the theoretical capacity would be 64 missiles; any allocation of cells to larger weapons would reduce that total. ESSM Block 2 uses a dual-mode active and semi-active radar seeker, reducing the requirement for continuous terminal illumination and allowing the combat system to manage more than one engagement sequence. However, 16 cells give the F128 a local-area and self-defence magazine, not the sustained air-defence capacity expected from the planned F127 frigate. The reported 16 NSMs would provide the offensive component. Each missile is 3.96 metres long, weighs 407 kg, flies at high-subsonic speed and has a stated range above 300 km. Its passive imaging-infrared seeker, autonomous target recognition and sea-skimming flight profile reduce the warning available to the target, although attacks beyond the frigate’s radar horizon will require targeting data from aircraft, unmanned systems, satellites or other NATO units. The 76/62 Super Rapid gun can fire up to 120 rounds per minute, carries 80 ready rounds, and reaches 16 km with standard ammunition, but Germany has not confirmed the gun variant or the purchase of guided DART or Vulcano ammunition.

    Saab will not supply the frigates’ complete anti-submarine warfare suite, and its announcement does not identify the sonar, torpedo or electronic-warfare manufacturers. Its role is to connect those systems to 9LV and ensure that sonar tracks, helicopter reports, and external contacts can be processed within the same command environment. This will be central to an F128 operating with an NH90 Sea Tiger, a towed sonar and lightweight torpedoes, because the helicopter may detect and attack a submarine well beyond the ship’s own acoustic detection area. Saab will also provide composite superstructures that the company says are approximately 50 percent lighter than equivalent steel or aluminium structures. That figure applies to the structure, not to the complete ship, but the reduction in weight above the waterline improves stability and preserves displacement for radar arrays, ammunition, and later modifications. The use of 9LV, Sea Giraffe 4A and Sea Giraffe 1X also overlaps with the SEK 4.6 billion modernization of Germany’s four F123 Brandenburg-class frigates, contracted in 2021. This common equipment could reduce training and software-support differences between the two classes, while the accelerated schedule and limited Mk 41 capacity remain central issues in assessing Germany’s replacement of the F126 program.

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    Written by Evan Lerouvillois, Defense Analyst.

    Evan studied International Relations, and quickly specialized in defense and security. He is particularly interested in the influence of the defense sector on global geopolitics, and analyzes how technological innovations in defense, arms export contracts, and military strategies influence the international geopolitical scene.

  • China Trains KQ-200 Aircraft for Continuous Submarine Hunts in Contested Waters Near Taiwan

    A PLA Naval Aviation KQ-200 maritime patrol aircraft conducts extended anti-submarine training focused on detection, tracking, coordinated handovers and simulated torpedo attacks against submerged targets (Picture source: China MoD).

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    China’s PLA Naval Aviation has tested continuous submarine-hunting operations with the KQ-200 maritime patrol aircraft, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense reported on June 14, 2026, with additional footage released by the China Navy on July 16. The exercise matters because sustained anti-submarine coverage depends on crews and aircraft handing off contacts without allowing a submarine to escape.

    The training covered search, classification, tracking, firing-solution development, and simulated attack while aircraft rotated through refuelling and maintenance. This capability would strengthen China’s ability to maintain pressure on submarines despite weather, evasive manoeuvres, and the operational limits of individual crews and aircraft.

    Related topic: China Expands J-15 Fighter Training to Prepare Fujian Aircraft Carrier for High-Tempo Operations.

    A PLA Naval Aviation KQ-200 maritime patrol aircraft conducts extended anti-submarine training focused on detection, tracking, coordinated handovers, and simulated torpedo attacks against submerged targets (Picture source: China MoD).

    The aircraft shown is consistent with the KQ-200, the PLA Navy’s only operational fixed-wing anti-submarine aircraft identified in open sources. It entered service around 2017, and more than 20 had been distributed among the Northern, Eastern, and Southern Theater Command naval components by early 2023. Based on the Y-9 airframe, the four-engine turboprop is credited with a maximum speed near 600 km/h, a range of approximately 5,000 km, and an endurance exceeding eight hours. Published Chinese military research and U.S. government analysis identify a surface-search radar, electro-optical turret, electronic sensors, an internal sonobuoy system, and a large magnetic-anomaly detector in the tail. A typical mission crew reportedly comprises two pilots, a tactical commander, and four radar, acoustic, and electro-optical operators. These figures remain open-source estimates because China has not released an official KQ-200 technical manual.

    The aircraft’s main search instrument is not its radar but its expendable acoustic field. The KQ-200 is widely assessed to carry about 100 sonobuoys in four rotary dispensing cabinets, including the AVIC SQ-4 acoustic buoy and SQ-5 bathythermograph buoy. The SQ-5 measures temperature conditions at different depths before operators select buoy depth and spacing; this matters because thermal layers can bend or trap sound and allow a submarine to pass below a poorly positioned array. PLA academic models have used detection radii of 1 to 2 km in shallow water, two-hour operating periods, and a 60 km radio link to the aircraft, while other Chinese studies assume six to eight hours of passive operation, two to three hours in active mode, and, under favourable conditions, passive detection out to 10 km. These are planning values rather than confirmed equipment performance, but they show that the PLA is studying buoy density, communications limits, and acoustic conditions in quantitative terms.

    A normal prosecution would begin with radar or electronic detection of a surface contact, periscope, snorkel or associated transmission, followed by passive sonobuoys placed across the submarine’s estimated route. Active buoys may then be added to reduce location uncertainty, while the KQ-200 descends for a magnetic-anomaly detector pass after the contact area has been narrowed. One Naval Aviation University study modelled magnetic search at an altitude of 100 metres and assumed an effective detection distance of 500 metres; the figure should not be treated as an official specification, but it illustrates why the tail sensor is a final localization aid rather than a wide-area search device. The tactical commander must combine acoustic bearings, buoy positions, magnetic indications and the submarine’s estimated speed and course into a sufficiently accurate firing solution.

    The KQ-200’s weapons are carried internally. U.S. Naval War College research assesses that the aircraft may accommodate as many as ten lightweight torpedoes, including the Yu-7, although the load would depend on fuel, buoy carriage, and mission duration. The larger pump-jet-propelled Yu-11 has also been associated with the aircraft, but its operational integration has not been officially confirmed; footage released in June 2023 showed a Southern Theater Command KQ-200 dropping an unidentified torpedo whose propulsion arrangement may have differed from the propeller-driven Yu-7. Chinese sources have also described air-dropped depth weapons fitted with a guidance section and control surfaces for acoustic terminal correction, rather than relying only on preset-depth detonation. Beijing has not published dependable figures for the airborne torpedoes’ range, speed, seeker logic or warhead, so highly precise values circulating online should be treated cautiously.

    The prolonged exercise appears designed to test an anti-submarine network rather than a single aircraft. PLA operational writing describes land-based command posts assigning an “on-call point” to a KQ-200, surface warships contributing hull-mounted and towed sonar data, and helicopters such as the Z-18F, Ka-28 and Z-9C conducting closer localization or attack. One published Chinese model places three or four warships between two linear sonobuoy barriers; another uses 86 buoys to search 2,318 square nautical miles over five hours, followed by a figure-eight flight pattern that keeps the aircraft within radio range of the buoy field. Those calculations are theoretical, but they explain the emphasis on coordination, handovers, and sustained coverage in the latest exercise.

    China is increasing this training because submarines remain one of the most difficult threats to its plans inside the First Island Chain. In a Taiwan blockade or invasion scenario, U.S. and allied attack submarines could target amphibious ships, replenishment vessels, carrier groups and surface escorts while remaining less exposed than aircraft or surface warships to China’s land-based missile force. The Bashi Channel, Luzon Strait and approaches east of Taiwan are therefore natural monitoring areas, while Southern Theater Command aircraft also protect the approaches to Hainan, where China bases nuclear-powered attack submarines and ballistic-missile submarines. The 2025 U.S. report to Congress identifies the First Island Chain as the geographic center of China’s current military planning and states that the PLA is refining invasion, blockade, and precision-strike options against Taiwan.

    The exercise nevertheless does not demonstrate that the PLA Navy can reliably detect a quiet submarine in wartime. The official material provides no information on target type, initial detection range, acoustic conditions, percentage of time held in contact, false-contact rate, weapon accuracy, or performance under hostile air and electronic attack. The U.S. Defense Department’s 2024 assessment still judged that China lacked a robust deep-water anti-submarine capability, despite improvements in warships and specialized aircraft. The more defensible conclusion is that the PLA Navy is using longer drills to address a known operational problem: converting intermittent sensor detections into a continuous, transferable track that can survive long enough for a torpedo attack. Whether it can reproduce that process against a modern nuclear-powered submarine under combat conditions remains unproven.

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  • US disables oil tanker M/T Belma with Hellfire missiles near Kharg Island as Iran naval blockade resumes

    Built in 2005, the M/T Belma has operated under several names, including Aquarius Voyager, Maran Aquarius, Leonor and Bendigo, while its registry history includes the Bahamas, Greece, Panama, the Cook Islands, Barbados and Curacao. (Picture source: CENTCOM and X/Daniel Ferro (@Gibdan1))

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    U.S. military forces disabled the Curacao-flagged commercial oil tanker M/T Belma near Iran’s Kharg Island on July 15, 2026, marking the first enforcement strike of the newly reinstated naval blockade. The precision engagement, executed via Hellfire missiles fired into the vessel's smokestack by a U.S. aircraft, was designed to selectively neutralize the ship's propulsion without rupturing its cargo tanks or causing a maritime spill. This tactical action establishes a strict enforcement threshold to systematically isolate Iranian energy exports while preserving passage for compliant international commercial traffic transiting the Strait of Hormuz.

    During the first 24 hours of the renewed blockade, U.S. Central Command redirected two compliant vessels and utilized force against the non-compliant M/T Belma, which was transiting in ballast toward Iran's primary oil export hub. The interception coincided with a broader U.S. military campaign targeting Iranian coastal command infrastructure, air defenses, and naval assets to degrade Tehran's capacity to disrupt shipping lanes.

    Related topic:US Navy launches first F/A-18 strafing attacks against Iranian tankers in Gulf of Oman

    Built in 2005, the M/T Belma has operated under several names, including Aquarius Voyager, Maran Aquarius, Leonor and Bendigo, while its registry history includes the Bahamas, Greece, Panama, the Cook Islands, Barbados and Curacao. (Picture source: CENTCOM and X/Daniel Ferro (@Gibdan1))

    On July 15, 2026, U.S. forces carried out the first strike operation of the renewed naval blockade against Iran by disabling the Curacao-flagged crude oil tanker M/T Belma after it continued toward Kharg Island despite repeated warnings. The blockade had resumed at 4:00 p.m. EDT on July 14, and within its first 24 hours, U.S. Central Command redirected two compliant commercial vessels and used force against one non-compliant ship. The M/T Belma was unladen when an unidentified U.S. aircraft fired Hellfire missiles into its smokestack, leaving the tanker unable to continue toward Iran without sinking it or striking the cargo tanks.

    The engagement established the immediate enforcement threshold for the second blockade period: commercial traffic could continue through the Strait of Hormuz when it was not linked to Iranian ports or cargo, but vessels attempting to enter or depart Iranian facilities faced diversion and, after repeated non-compliance, precision attack. The interception also occurred during the fifth consecutive day of U.S. strikes against Iranian coastal command facilities, air defense systems, surveillance radars, cruise missile sites, drone infrastructure and naval forces supporting operations against merchant shipping. The blockade applies to ships entering or leaving Iranian ports, coastal terminals and associated loading areas, rather than to all vessels crossing the Strait of Hormuz.

    This distinction is operationally important because it seeks to isolate Iranian maritime trade while preserving passage for third-country tankers, container ships, bulk carriers and liquefied natural gas carriers using the international traffic lanes. The measure resumed 26 days after U.S. enforcement ended on June 18 following the June 17 memorandum between Washington and Tehran. During the earlier blockade, which began on April 13, U.S. forces redirected 142 vessels and disabled nine, producing a total of 151 documented enforcement actions and a disabling rate of 5.96 percent among ships that were either turned away or stopped by force. Pentagon calculations placed Iran’s lost oil revenue at $4.8 billion by May 1, only eighteen days after the blockade began, equivalent to a notional average of $266.7 million per day over that period, although the real daily effect would have varied with export schedules, crude prices and storage availability.

    More than twenty U.S. Navy warships and hundreds of military aircraft remained deployed across the Middle East when the blockade restarted, providing enough force density to combine wide-area surveillance, interception, escort, air defense and strike operations. The M/T Belma was tracked in international waters while moving toward Kharg Island, which remains Iran’s principal offshore crude export terminal and one of the most consequential maritime nodes in the country’s energy system. The tanker was empty, but its condition did not reduce its relevance to blockade enforcement because an unladen very large crude carrier entering Kharg Island could load close to two million barrels before departing for an overseas buyer. Preventing an inbound voyage therefore denies future export capacity rather than intercepting an oil cargo already at sea.

    U.S. forces issued several warnings before attacking, indicating that the engagement was preceded by an attempt to compel a course change rather than an immediate decision to use force. The smokestack was selected instead of the hull or cargo section, limiting the strike to the upper machinery and exhaust area and reducing the probability of catastrophic flooding, cargo tank rupture, or a large maritime spill. At the time of writing, the CENTCOM did not identify the specific Hellfire variant, aircraft type, number of missiles fired, range to target, or the precise machinery damaged, but the functional result was clear: the ship stopped proceeding toward Iran after the attack. The M/T Belma, IMO 9289491, is a 333 m-long crude oil tanker with a 60 m beam, 161,387 gross tonnage, and 299,988 deadweight tons.

    Its length is more than three U.S. football fields, while its beam exceeds the wingspan of a Boeing 747-8, illustrating the scale of the vessel that was stopped with a comparatively small precision-guided weapon rather than a conventional anti-ship missile. The tanker belongs to the very large crude carrier category, whose ships typically transport 1.8 to 2 million barrels depending on crude density, loading limits and terminal draft. Built in 2005, the M/T Belma is 21 years old in 2026 and has operated under several names, including Aquarius Voyager, Maran Aquarius, Leonor and Bendigo. Its registry history includes the Bahamas, Greece, Panama, the Cook Islands, Barbados and Curacao, a sequence that complicates long-term tracking of ownership, management and commercial employment.

    At the time of the interception, its AIS profile listed MMSI 306269000, call sign PJE5, a reported draft of 11 m and a speed of 5.5 to 5.6 knots. The reported draft supports the assessment that the M/T Belma was in ballast rather than fully loaded, because a VLCC carrying close to 300,000 tons of crude would normally sit substantially deeper in the water. Its speed was also significantly below its previously recorded average of 10 knots and maximum of 15.5 knots, representing a reduction of 44 to 45 percent from its average operating speed and 64 percent from its recorded maximum. AIS transmissions showed a destination code of KAZ, generally associated with Khor Al Zubair, Iraq’s deep-water commercial port complex near Basra, while U.S. military tracking placed the vessel on a course toward Kharg Island.

    The discrepancy matters because AIS destination fields are manually entered and can be incomplete, outdated, abbreviated or deliberately misleading, whereas military surveillance can combine radar tracks, electro-optical imagery, airborne sensors, naval sensors and route analysis. The M/T Belma had remained at the Singapore Eastern Outer Port Limits anchorage from May 16 to June 18, 2026, a period of 32 days and 22 hours, before returning to Gulf waters. The tanker’s size, low maneuverability and slow speed made it difficult to alter course rapidly once challenged, but also made its route and movement easier to monitor continuously. The interception occurred alongside a broader U.S. campaign against Iranian military capabilities concentrated around Bandar Abbas, Greater Tunb Island, Qeshm Island, Sirik and other locations in Hormozgan Province.

    On July 7, U.S. forces struck more than 80 military targets and destroyed over 60 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps fast attack craft following attacks on internationally flagged merchant vessels near the Strait of Hormuz. On July 15, U.S. forces conducted a 90-minute strike against coastal defense systems and cruise missile storage and launch positions on Greater Tunb Island, followed later by attacks against command centers, air defense sites, missile and drone capabilities and coastal surveillance facilities in Bandar Abbas and additional locations. These target sets were selected because the southern Iranian coastline contains the sensors, headquarters, launch positions, communications links and naval bases required to detect, track and attack ships moving through the strait.

    Fighter jets, naval strike systems, kamikaze drones and unmanned surface vessels were used during the campaign, with the latter representing the first acknowledged U.S. combat employment of explosive sea drones. The operational objective extends beyond destroying launchers and boats because Iranian maritime attack capability depends on a sequence of interconnected functions. Coastal radars first detect a vessel and establish its position, course and speed. Command-and-control centers then combine radar information with drone feeds, electronic emissions, visual observation and intelligence data before assigning the target to a missile battery, drone unit, mine warfare force or IRGC naval element.

    Anti-ship cruise missiles and ballistic missiles require updated coordinates against moving ships, while one-way attack drones and fast attack craft depend on continuous location data to approach from the correct direction and timing. Destroying a launcher removes one weapon, but disrupting radars, communications, and command centers can reduce the effectiveness of several launchers and naval units simultaneously. Suppression of integrated air defense systems further supports the campaign by reducing the threat to U.S. aircraft and allowing repeated strikes against surviving or relocated coastal assets. The destruction of more than 60 fast attack craft also directly reduces Iran’s capacity for swarm attacks, armed harassment, close approaches, boarding attempts, and coordinated short-range attacks in confined waters. 

    The Strait of Hormuz, the center of these operations, narrows to 34 km and concentrates commercial shipping into limited inbound and outbound routes. Nearly 20 percent of globally traded crude oil and a comparable share of liquefied natural gas normally pass through the waterway, including exports from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Iran. Before the February 2026 conflict, close to 3,000 commercial vessels crossed the strait each month, equal to roughly 100 transits per day. Subsequently, Iran does not need to close the passage physically to create global effects.

    Missile attacks, drone strikes, naval mines, warning fire and harassment can increase insurance premiums, delay loading schedules, reduce available shipping capacity and force naval escorts. The disabling of the M/T Belma clarifies that the United States is prepared to launch again strafing operations against commercial vessels that continue toward Iranian ports after repeated warnings. Still, the principal measure of operational success will be whether U.S. forces can keep Iranian coastal surveillance, command networks, air defenses, and maritime strike systems below the level required for coordinated attacks while avoiding tanker sinkings, mass casualties, major oil spills, or damage to neutral shipping that could widen the conflict.

    Written by Jérôme Brahy

    Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.

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  • South Korea Lands U.S. Marine Trucks from Modular Military Ferry Under Anti-Drone Netting

    Republic of Korea personnel operate an Improved Navy Lighterage System during CJLOTS 26 at Dogu Beach on July 9, 2026. The causeway ferry carried U.S. Marine Corps vehicles ashore without fixed port infrastructure and featured overhead netting intended to reduce exposure to small drones (Picture source: U.S. DoW).

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    Republic of Korea personnel drove an Improved Navy Lighterage System causeway ferry onto Dogu Beach in Pohang during Combined Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore 26 on July 9, 2026, opening a roll-on/roll-off route for U.S. Marine Corps vehicles without relying on a fixed pier. The operation demonstrated how allied forces can sustain combat power when ports are damaged, unavailable, or under threat.

    A Marine Corps Oshkosh Logistics Vehicle System Replacement came ashore through the temporary beachhead, while released images showed netting over the ferry’s cargo deck to reduce exposure to small drones. The combination of pier-independent delivery and counter-UAS protection reflects the growing need to keep ship-to-shore supply lines mobile, dispersed, and survivable in contested environments.

    Related topic: China Expands J-15 Fighter Training to Prepare Fujian Aircraft Carrier for High-Tempo Operations.

    Republic of Korea personnel operate an Improved Navy Lighterage System during CJLOTS 26 at Dogu Beach on July 9, 2026. The causeway ferry carried U.S. Marine Corps vehicles ashore without fixed port infrastructure and featured overhead netting intended to reduce exposure to small drones (Picture source: U.S. DoW).

    The INLS is not a single landing craft but a set of interchangeable powered and unpowered modules assembled for specific cargo-transfer tasks. A nine-module Roll-on/Roll-off Discharge Facility forms a floating transfer area measuring approximately 240 by 72 feet, or 73 by 22 meters, alongside a sealift ship. Vehicles drive from the ship onto this facility and then onto a three- or four-module causeway ferry comprising a powered module, one or two intermediate cargo modules, and a beach module. Up to 19 unpowered modules can alternatively form a floating causeway approximately 1,100 feet (335 meters) long.

    The powered sections use waterjet propulsion rather than exposed propellers, an arrangement suited to shallow water and beach approaches. Fincantieri lists individual INLS-powered craft at 78 to 87 feet long, 24 feet wide and four feet in draft, with two 800-horsepower Caterpillar C18 diesels driving two fully steerable waterjets; a separate 600-horsepower engine supplies bow-thruster power. Published data give a maximum speed of 10 knots and 16 hours of endurance. A complete causeway ferry can reach roughly 270 feet in length and carry about 300 tons, although actual payload depends on module configuration, sea conditions, and deck loading.

    The beach module has a bow ramp and a forward positioning thruster, allowing the crew to align the ferry perpendicular to the shoreline and force the ramp end into the beach. This “beach stabbing” procedure transfers part of the bow load into the sand and provides a relatively stable exit for heavy vehicles. The INLS is rated for Sea State 3 operations, but the modular joints experience increasing loads as wave height and multi-body motion rise. Published engineering analysis specifically identifies connector loading as a limiting factor above the intended operating condition, meaning weather can reduce availability even when the offshore sealift ship remains capable of operating.

    The LVSR photographed during the offload illustrates the weight class that the ferry must handle. The MKR18 cargo truck is a 10×10 vehicle with a curb weight of 53,700 pounds, a gross vehicle weight rating of 106,000 pounds, a 600-horsepower Caterpillar C15 diesel engine, and four-axle steering. Its load-handling system can lift a 22.5-ton flatrack, while its rated payload is 22.5 tons on roads and 16.5 tons off-road. By mass alone, a 300-ton ferry rating corresponds to approximately five LVSRs loaded to maximum gross weight, although vehicle dimensions, axle-load distribution, securing requirements, and reserve stability may impose a lower practical number.

    There is no conventional armament visible on the causeway ferry. The released views show no machine-gun mount, remote weapon station, electro-optical director, air-surveillance radar, radio-frequency jammer, or kinetic counter-drone interceptor. The green mesh, therefore, should not be described as an onboard weapon system. The Marine Corps caption does not formally identify its purpose, but Combined Forces Command stated that CJLOTS 26 included protection of sustainment nodes against hostile drone attacks. Given its overhead position and pole-supported construction, the most defensible assessment is that the mesh was being evaluated as a passive counter-UAS barrier rather than ordinary camouflage or weather covering.

    Such netting can physically obstruct the rotors of a light quadcopter, deny a direct vertical approach, and complicate visual identification of vehicles beneath it. U.S. Joint Interagency Task Force 401 guidance identifies overhead mesh, tensioned cables, and lightweight wire as methods for creating unpredictable flight hazards around vulnerable assets. The arrangement at Dogu Beach, however, covers only part of the ferry and appears open on the sides. No information has been released on mesh aperture, fiber type, tensile strength, stand-off distance, installation time, or live-drone testing. It consequently cannot be assumed to stop a heavier one-way attack drone, a munition dropped from altitude, or an FPV drone approaching below the net edge.

    The ferry’s 10-knot speed also defines its tactical exposure. A 12-nautical-mile transit from an offshore discharge point requires about 72 minutes in calm conditions; a 30-nautical-mile leg requires three hours each way, excluding loading, securing, beach approach, and unloading. During that period, the causeway ferry follows a relatively predictable route with limited maneuver margin and no visible organic air defense. Protection therefore depends on route variation, air and surface surveillance, electronic warfare, local counter-UAS teams, and control of the beachhead. This vulnerability is central to contested maritime logistics because a ferry lost while carrying fuel, ammunition, or several heavy trucks would remove both cargo and scarce lighterage capacity.

    CJLOTS 26 demonstrated a practical method for bypassing damaged or unavailable port infrastructure, but it did not remove the requirement to secure the offshore anchorage, approach lanes, and shore exit routes. Combined Forces Command reported that American shipping was offloaded through a Korean lighterage system for the first time, an interoperability result with direct implications for wartime reception and onward movement. The anti-drone netting is a low-cost adaptation, not a substitute for layered defense. Its significance is that the exercise placed the logistics craft itself inside the threat model, consistent with the broader protection requirements now affecting sustainment units operating within range of enemy unmanned aircraft.

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    Written by Evan Lerouvillois, Defense Analyst.

    Evan studied International Relations, and quickly specialized in defense and security. He is particularly interested in the influence of the defense sector on global geopolitics, and analyzes how technological innovations in defense, arms export contracts, and military strategies influence the international geopolitical scene.

  • U.S. Navy Seeks Unmanned Aircraft for Ford and Nimitz Carriers with 1,000-Nautical-Mile Strike Reach

    A Boeing unmanned MQ-25 aircraft is given operating directions on the flight deck aboard the aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush (Picture source: US DoD)

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    The U.S. Navy has asked industry to propose a new family of carrier-based unmanned aircraft capable of striking targets at least 1,000 nautical miles away without aerial refueling. The effort could reshape future carrier air wings by extending the reach and survivability of U.S. naval aviation.

    Naval Air Systems Command released the Sources Sought notice on July 14, 2026, as part of the Navy's Air Wing of the Future strategy and the Golden Fleet initiative. The Request for Information seeks concepts that can operate from both Nimitz- and Gerald R. Ford-class nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, while emphasizing that the notice is solely for market research and does not represent a procurement commitment. Industry responses are due by 5:00 p.m. EDT on August 13.


    Related news: U.S. Navy and Industry Push Carrier-Based Unmanned Combat Aircraft Toward Deployment

    A Boeing unmanned MQ-25 aircraft is given operating directions on the flight deck aboard the aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush (Picture source: US DoD)

    The scope is broader than an unmanned fighter or carrier strike drone. The U.S. Navy identifies eight mission areas: surface warfare, land strike, anti-submarine warfare, air warfare against aircraft and missiles, electronic warfare, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting, aerial refueling, and logistics. Industry can propose a specialized aircraft, a multirole design, or a modular family using common components. The objective is not for every drone to perform all eight missions, but to identify a mix of platforms providing what the RFI describes as affordable mass and risk-tolerant capacity. Existing efforts, including the Boeing MQ-25A Stingray and Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA), are placed within this family rather than identified as programs to be replaced.

    This defines the Air Wing of the Future as more than an aircraft project. A current carrier air wing combines F-35C Lightning II and F/A-18E/F Super Hornetstrike fighters with EA-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft, E-2D Advanced Hawkeye airborne command aircraft, CMV-22B Osprey transports and MH-60R/S helicopters. The planned transition is from a force still centered on fourth-generation aircraft toward a networked combination of fifth- and future sixth-generation crewed platforms, tankers and autonomous aircraft. Unmanned systems could add sensors, weapons, electronic effects, fuel or supplies without assigning every high-risk mission to a human aircrew.

    The 1,000-nautical-mile, or 1,852-kilometer, threshold is the central operational requirement, but it must be interpreted carefully. The Navy requires systems conducting attacks to deliver effects at that distance without aerial refueling. Combat radius normally accounts for the outbound and return legs, mission profile, fuel reserves, payload and time on station, making it different from maximum range. The Navy, for example, publishes a range of more than 1,200 nautical miles for the F-35C, together with almost 20,000 pounds of internal fuel, more than 5,000 pounds of internal weapons and a further 13,000 pounds of external stores. That range figure cannot be compared directly with a 1,000-nautical-mile combat radius.

    The RFIdoes not specify a reference payload, flight profile, speed, reserve requirement or time over the target. It refers to delivering effects 1,000 nautical miles from the carrier without stating whether the distance will be measured to the aircraft's weapon-release point or to the target reached by a stand-off weapon. Those details will determine whether industry concepts are genuinely comparable. A smaller aircraft carrying a long-range missile could produce an effect farther away than its own flight path suggests, while a larger design carrying heavy internal weapons could sacrifice endurance to preserve low observability and survivability. The requirement therefore concerns a complete weapon system, not simply an airframe with large fuel tanks.

    MQ-25A Stingray conducts first flight (Picture source: Boeing)

    Operating from both carrier classes creates constraints that land-based CCA designs do not automatically satisfy. Nimitz-class ships use steam catapults and conventional arresting gear, while Ford-class carriers employ the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System and Advanced Arresting Gear. A common aircraft must remain controllable across both launch and recovery environments and withstand repeated catapult shots and arrested landings. These loads affect the landing gear, tailhook, fuselage structure and overall mass before sensors, fuel or weapons are added. Saltwater corrosion, deck contamination and the maintenance of low-observable materials at sea create further demands that are less severe at land bases.

    The U.S. Navy separately expresses interest in vertical takeoff and landing concepts able to operate from other aviation-capable vessels, including destroyers and Expeditionary Sea Base ships. This is an additional area of study, not a requirement for every carrier aircraft proposed under the RFI.

    Deck integration may prove as important as aerodynamic performance. An unmanned aircraft must taxi safely among running engines, weapons, fuel lines, vehicles and personnel despite having no pilot with direct vision of the flight deck. It must respond predictably to deck-handling instructions, align with the catapult, clear the landing area and manage emergencies without slowing launch and recovery cycles. Folding wings, tie-down points, access panels, towing arrangements and compatibility with carrier elevators determine how many aircraft can be embarked and serviced. This explains the demand for greater combat effectiveness than a fourth-generation platform at a given spot factor, meaning the deck or hangar area occupied by each aircraft.

    The Navy also asks industry to address autonomous carrier patterns and taxiing, together with dynamic tasking, threat evasion, and automated aerial refueling. Proposed aircraft must integrate with the existing Unmanned Carrier Aviation Mission Control System, which is intended to control future carrier-based unmanned aircraft. This favors common stations and interfaces rather than separate control equipment for every model. Autonomy must also manage degraded communications, an unsafe approach, a wave-off or a changing deck situation. Operators may supervise and retask the aircraft, but the air vehicle must execute flight-control and contingency functions without continuous manual input.

    The MQ-25A is directly relevant as an operational and architectural precursor, but it is not a ready-made 1,000-nautical-mile strike aircraft. Its primary mission is carrier-based aerial refueling, with a secondary maritime intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance role. It is intended to release Super Hornets from recovery-tanker duties and extend the reach of other carrier aircraft. The first operational U.S. Navy MQ-25A completed a two-hour flight on April 25, 2026, using the MD-5 ground control station. The program received approval to enter low-rate initial production in May. Earlier footage of an MQ-25 aboard USS George H.W. Bush in 2021 showed Boeing's T1 prototype, first flown in 2019 and used for refueling and deck-handling demonstrations.

    MQ-25 experience in autonomous taxiing, carrier control systems and naval sustainment can inform later aircraft. Converting the tanker into a combat platform would nevertheless require more than adding a missile. Weapon interfaces, mission computers, targeting sensors and protected communications would have to be integrated, followed by assessments of structural loads, separation safety, power, cooling, center of gravity and radar signature. An internal bay could preserve low observability but would require considerable volume. External stores would be easier to accommodate but would increase drag and signature. The MQ-25A is therefore more credible as an enabler and source of proven subsystems than as a strike solution available without major development.

    As of July 15, no company had publicly confirmed a response to the RFI. General Atomics presents Gambit 5 as the carrier-capable member of its modular Gambit family, making it one visible starting point for a Navy CCA or related requirement. Its ability to meet the new radius, payload, and carrier thresholds has not been disclosed. Northrop Grumman's X-47B offers a technological reference: the demonstrator completed autonomous carrier launches and recoveries in 2013 and autonomous aerial refueling in 2015. It was never a production aircraft, so any successor would require new development and qualification. Other land-based CCA designs could contribute engines, autonomy software, or mission systems, but navalization would require structural reinforcement, folding arrangements, corrosion protection, and carrier suitability testing.

    Armament will shape these choices even though the RFI names no weapon. Surface warfare could involve a long-range anti-ship weapon in the class of the AGM-158C Long Range Anti-Ship Missile. Land strike or suppression of enemy air defenses could require stand-off weapons or an Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile-Extended Range class payload. Air warfare would need sensors and air-to-air missiles, while anti-submarine variants might carry sonobuoys, processing equipment and a lightweight torpedo such as the Mk 54. Electronic warfare, refueling and logistics versions would impose different requirements for electrical power, volume and external carriage. These are mission-based examples, not weapons selected by the Navy.

    The Navy is also testing whether industry can build and sustain these aircraft at scale. Respondents must estimate the time to first flight, land-based and carrier arrested landings, and Initial Operational Capability. They must explain how production could expand during a surge, how unit and sustainment costs would be controlled, and how maintenance hours per flight hour would be reduced. The RFI also requests alignment with Open Mission Systems standards and government-owned interfaces, planned company investment, and proposals for sharing non-recurring engineering costs.

    A 1,000-nautical-mile unmanned combat radius could allow a carrier to generate effects from farther outside a defended maritime zone and reduce dependence on vulnerable tanker tracks during the initial phase of a mission. It would not remove the ship from long-range surveillance and strike networks. The Pentagon's 2025 assessment of Chinese military power estimated that People's Liberation Army kinetic strikes could be effective 1,500 to 2,000 nautical miles from the Chinese mainland and gave the anti-ship-capable DF-26 a range of 3,000 to 4,000 kilometers. Operational value will therefore depend not only on nominal radius, but also on payload, signature, resilient communications, deck-cycle efficiency and the number of aircraft that can be produced and sustained. The RFI begins translating the Air Wing of the Future from a broad concept into measurable choices about reach, weapons, autonomy and carrier capacity.

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    Written By Erwan Halna du Fretay - Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
    Erwan Halna du Fretay holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and has experience studying conflicts and global arms transfers. His research interests lie in Security and strategic studies, particularly the dynamics of the defense industry, the evolution of military technologies, and the strategic transformation of armed forces.

  • DC National Guard’s First Maritime Security Vessel Adds New Layer to Capital Defense

    The D.C. National Guard has commissioned its first maritime security vessel, expanding surveillance, hazard detection and interagency support across the Potomac and Anacostia rivers (Picture Source: DC National Guard)

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    The District of Columbia National Guard has commissioned its first maritime security vessel, giving Army forces in the nation's capital a dedicated capability to monitor and secure the Potomac and Anacostia rivers for the first time. Announced on July 13, 2026, the new platform strengthens protection of critical infrastructure and major national events by extending security operations into a key but often overlooked domain.

    Assigned to the 260th Special Purpose Brigade, the Navy-sourced vessel will provide maritime observation, hazard detection and interagency support alongside civilian law enforcement and emergency response agencies. As the brigade expands both its waterborne and rapid-mobility capabilities, the move reflects a broader effort to enhance urban security, improve multi-domain coordination and reinforce the defense of Washington before potential threats can escalate.

    Related Topic: U.S. Integrates Bumblebee V1 Counter-UAS System into Layered Defense of Key Sites in Washington D.C.

    The D.C. National Guard has commissioned its first maritime security vessel, expanding surveillance, hazard detection and interagency support across the Potomac and Anacostia rivers (Picture Source: DC National Guard)

    On July 13, 2026, the District of Columbia National Guard announced the commissioning of its first maritime security vessel, giving an Army unit in the nation’s capital a dedicated waterborne platform for the first time. Assigned to the 260th Special Purpose Brigade, the vessel will strengthen observation, hazard detection and interagency support across the Potomac and Anacostia rivers. The development, detailed by Joint Task Force DC in an official National Guard report, reflects a broader effort to protect critical infrastructure and major national events across multiple operational domains.

    Created under Executive Order 14339, the 260th Special Purpose Brigade was established to improve coordination between military forces and the civilian agencies responsible for securing the District. Its mission is not to replace law enforcement, but to provide additional personnel, mobility and specialized capabilities when local and federal partners require greater operational capacity.

    Washington presents a uniquely complex security environment, with protected airspace, dense federal infrastructure and overlapping jurisdictions concentrated within a compact urban area bordered by two major rivers. During National Special Security Events, brigade personnel support organizations including the Metropolitan Police Department, D.C. Fire and EMS, the U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Capitol Police, U.S. Park Police and the U.S. Marshals Service.

    Sourced through cooperation with the U.S. Navy, the new vessel will primarily serve as an observation and assessment platform. It can expand maritime overwatch alongside the Metropolitan Police Department’s Harbor Patrol and enable Civil Support Teams to conduct hazard-detection activities aboard vessels. This provides security planners with additional reach during major public gatherings, when Washington’s waterways form an important part of the wider operating environment.

    The vessel is part of a broader modernization effort within the brigade’s 547th Transportation Company. The unit is also expanding its fleet of Polaris MRZR vehicles, which can move personnel and equipment through dense crowds, restricted streets and secured areas. Together, the maritime and ground platforms support traffic-control operations, medical response, rapid personnel movement, dignitary protection and assistance to law-enforcement partners.

    These capabilities were incorporated into security support for the 2026 Fourth of July celebrations, when Guard personnel reinforced crowd management, medical services and traffic-control points. One maritime security vessel is currently operational, while four are planned. The brigade is working with the Navy to identify proven platforms that can operate effectively alongside the Metropolitan Police Department’s existing fleet.

    The vessel’s significance extends beyond the addition of a single platform. By combining maritime observation, urban mobility and close cooperation with civilian authorities, the D.C. National Guard is strengthening the network responsible for protecting the nation’s capital. The message behind the modernization is clear: defending Washington requires readiness across its streets, restricted zones and waterways, and the capacity to reinforce civilian partners before a security challenge escalates.

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  • China Expands J-15 Fighter Training to Prepare Fujian Aircraft Carrier for High-Tempo Operations

    Chinese J-15 carrier-based fighters conduct land-based takeoff and landing drills designed to expand pilot qualification, deck-handling proficiency, and sortie-generation capacity for the Liaoning, Shandong, and Fujian aircraft carriers (Picture source: Chinese MoD).

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    China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy has shown J-15-family fighters conducting land-based full-cycle takeoff and landing training, expanding the pool of pilots and ground crews needed to sustain high-tempo carrier operations. The imagery, released by the PLA Navy on July 14, 2026, highlights the service’s effort to build the personnel and procedures required for a larger and more capable carrier air arm.

    The exercise used a runway section painted to replicate a carrier landing area while crews positioned and serviced the aircraft through a complete operating cycle. Whether the jets were baseline J-15s or newer J-15Ts is less important than the operational goal: preparing Fujian’s more complex air group for sustained deployment and combat readiness.

    Related topic: Israel's Elbit Unveils Merchant Ship Drone Carrier Concept for Hermes 650 Naval Operations.

    Chinese J-15 carrier-based fighters conduct land-based takeoff and landing drills designed to expand pilot qualification, deck-handling proficiency, and sortie-generation capacity for the Liaoning, Shandong, and Fujian aircraft carriers (Picture source: Chinese MoD).

    The training appears consistent with field carrier landing practice conducted at a shore installation, probably under the PLA Naval Aviation University, although the PLA Navy did not disclose the location. China’s principal carrier aviation test and training base is at Huangdicun, near Huludao in Liaoning Province, where satellite imagery has shown ski-jump ramps, arresting gear, carrier-deck markings and land-based catapult tracks. A shore facility allows pilots to repeat approach patterns, touchdown-point control, arrested landings, touch-and-go landings, and “bolters,” in which the aircraft fails to engage an arresting wire and must immediately climb away. It also permits landing signal officers, maintenance teams, aircraft handlers and refuelling crews to practise complete sortie cycles without occupying one of China’s three carriers or consuming limited sea-training time. The exercise therefore addresses a personnel and process problem: safely generating repeated sorties, not simply teaching a pilot to land once.

    The J-15 remains the numerical core of Chinese carrier aviation. Developed by Shenyang Aircraft Corporation from the aerodynamic configuration of the Soviet Su-33, it is approximately 21.9 metres long, has a wingspan of about 14.7 metres when unfolded, and an estimated maximum takeoff weight near 33 tonnes. Published estimates indicate roughly nine tonnes of internal fuel, 12 external stations, and a maximum external load near 6.5 tonnes, although China has not released an authoritative performance manual. The aircraft has folding wings, canards, strengthened landing gear, an arresting hook, and an internal 30 mm cannon with approximately 150 rounds. Baseline J-15s have generally been observed with PL-8B infrared-guided short-range missiles and PL-12 active-radar-guided medium-range missiles. These weapons support fleet air defence, interception of maritime patrol aircraft and escort of strike formations, but the older fighters’ sensors and weapons are less capable than those fitted to the J-15T.

    The J-15T adds a strengthened twin-wheel nose landing gear, catapult launch bar, revised cockpit, Chinese WS-10-series engines, and a redesigned radome believed to contain an active electronically scanned array radar. It is associated with the PL-10 imaging-infrared missile and PL-15 active-radar-guided beyond-visual-range missile, giving the pilot better off-boresight engagement capability at close range and a longer air-to-air engagement envelope than the PL-8/PL-12 combination. The J-15 family can also employ YJ-83K anti-ship missiles, anti-radiation weapons, and guided bombs. Particularly relevant imagery published on July 9, 2026, showed a J-15T launching from Fujian with four YJ-83Ks, compared with one or two missiles commonly seen on ski-jump-launched J-15s. Each YJ-83K weighs about 725 kilograms, carries an approximately 165-kilogram warhead and has a reported range around 180 kilometres, placing the four-missile load near 2.9 tonnes before air-to-air weapons or external fuel are added.

    That load illustrates why China is training for two different launch systems. Liaoning and Shandong use short takeoff but arrested recovery, requiring the J-15 to accelerate under its own power and leave the deck over a ski-jump. Aircraft launched from the shorter bow positions face a direct trade-off between fuel and weapons, particularly in hot weather, low wind, or reduced carrier speed. Fujian, commissioned on November 5, 2025, displaces more than 80,000 tonnes and uses three electromagnetic catapults, enabling a J-15T to launch closer to its structural weight limit. Catapult launch does not automatically provide a longer combat radius; it allows commanders to choose between more fuel, more weapons, or a combination of both.

    Fujian also requires a broader set of carrier qualifications because its intended air group extends beyond the J-15T. The Pentagon’s 2025 report assessed that China plans to integrate the J-35 low-observable fighter, J-15D electronic-warfare aircraft, KJ-600 airborne early-warning aircraft, Z-20 helicopters and several unmanned aerial vehicles. The KJ-600 is operationally important because a fixed-wing radar aircraft can fly higher and remain on station longer than a helicopter, extending detection range and providing airborne control for fighter interceptions. The J-15D is intended to carry external jamming pods and support suppression of hostile radars. Operating these aircraft together requires coordinated launch sequencing, deck parking, fuel allocation, weapons handling, and recovery planning.

    The training increase also reflects higher operational demand. During Western Pacific deployments observed between May 25 and June 16, 2025, Japanese forces counted approximately 550 fighter and helicopter takeoffs and landings from Liaoning and another 230 from Shandong during the reported period. China had already conducted its first dual-carrier exercise with both ships in October 2024, moving through the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea. These figures do not establish a wartime sortie rate, since they combine fighters and helicopters and do not reveal mission duration or aircraft serviceability, but they show that the PLA Navy is accumulating deck cycles at a much larger scale than during Liaoning’s initial training years.

    The operational objective is to maintain carrier air cover and surveillance beyond the range of land-based Chinese fighters, particularly east of Taiwan, around the Philippine Sea and along approaches to the Second Island Chain. In a Taiwan conflict, a carrier would remain exposed to submarines, long-range anti-ship missiles, and allied aircraft, and would probably supplement rather than replace land-based air power. Its practical value would depend on sortie generation, airborne early warning, tanker support, ammunition stocks, maintenance capacity, and integration with Type 055 cruisers, Type 052D destroyers, and fleet replenishment ships. The July 2026 land-based exercise should therefore be assessed as evidence of force expansion and procedural standardisation, not proof that China has already achieved mature, high-tempo carrier combat operations.

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    Written by Evan Lerouvillois, Defense Analyst.

    Evan studied International Relations, and quickly specialized in defense and security. He is particularly interested in the influence of the defense sector on global geopolitics, and analyzes how technological innovations in defense, arms export contracts, and military strategies influence the international geopolitical scene.

  • USS Gerald R. Ford enters Norfolk Naval Shipyard for first maintenance period after historic deployment

    The USS Gerald R. Ford entered Norfolk Naval Shipyard only 52 days after returning to Naval Station Norfolk on May 16, 2026, at the end of a 326-day deployment that began on June 24, 2025. (Picture source: US Navy)

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    The aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) entered Norfolk Naval Shipyard in Portsmouth, Virginia, on July 7, 2026, to begin its first scheduled Planned Incremental Availability (PIA) at a public shipyard. The maintenance period is designed to restore the carrier’s material condition and transition it to the Navy’s modern maintenance continuum following a demanding 326-day deployment. Shipyard personnel will conduct depot-level machinery repairs, structural modernization, and essential system overhauls while resolving unique first-of-class engineering requirements.

    The USS Gerald R. Ford returned from an 11-month deployment during which the crew logged 57,713 nautical miles and completed 12,200 aircraft launches under multiple fleet taskings. The upcoming public shipyard availability will integrate routine depot inspections with permanent structural and electrical repairs to rectify damage caused by an onboard laundry fire in March 2026.

    Related topic:US Navy requests $4.2 Billion to accelerate USS William J. Clinton Ford-class carrier procurement

    The USS Gerald R. Ford entered Norfolk Naval Shipyard only 52 days after returning to Naval Station Norfolk on May 16, 2026, at the end of a 326-day deployment that began on June 24, 2025. (Picture source: US Navy)

    On July 7, 2026, the US Navy announced that the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) entered Norfolk Naval Shipyard in Portsmouth, Virginia, for its first regularly scheduled Planned Incremental Availability (PIA) at a public shipyard and the first Ford-class carrier maintenance period ever assigned to Norfolk. The ship entered the yard 52 days after returning to Naval Station Norfolk on May 16, following a 326-day deployment that began on June 24, 2025. During that deployment, the USS Gerald R. Ford crossed the Atlantic four times, operated in the North Sea, Mediterranean Sea, Caribbean Sea and Red Sea, and came under U.S. 2nd, 4th, 5th and 6th Fleet tasking.

    The PIA will combine depot-level inspections, machinery repairs, electrical work, aviation system maintenance, modernization, habitability restoration and permanent repair of spaces damaged by the March 2026 fire. The central issue is schedule control, as Norfolk must absorb first-of-class work on a carrier with different reactors, electrical distribution, aircraft-launch equipment, arresting systems and weapons elevators from the Nimitz-class, while avoiding the 12 to 15 month durations recorded during the two most recent carrier PIAs completed at the yard. The starting condition of the USS Gerald R. Ford is more demanding than that of a carrier entering a routine post-deployment maintenance period.

    The Ford remained deployed for 326 days, compared with 239 days away from homeport during its 2023 to 2024 deployment, and operated in four fleet areas across widely different climates. It participated in Neptune Strike 2025 in the High North, spent more than 100 days in the Caribbean and later returned across the Atlantic to conduct operations in the Red Sea. Four Atlantic crossings increased operating hours on main and auxiliary machinery, turbine generators, electrical switchboards, seawater systems, pumps, heat exchangers, valves and ventilation equipment. Flight operations increased cycles on the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS), Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG), jet blast deflectors, deck-edge services, aircraft elevators and aviation fuel equipment.

    The initial work must therefore account not only for elapsed time at sea, but for machinery hours, launch-and-recovery cycles, electrical loading, corrosion exposure and the reduced opportunity to complete depot work during an extended deployment. The principal schedule risk is that inspections will identify additional work after machinery, cables, ventilation trunks and enclosed spaces are opened. The March 2026 fire created a second repair line inside the broader PIA. The fire began in an aft laundry area and spread into nearby berthing compartments, destroying more than 100 racks and displacing sailors from normal sleeping spaces. The US Navy transferred about 1,000 mattresses from PCU John F. Kennedy (CVN-79) to restore temporary berthing capacity.

    Norfolk Naval Shipyard sent 43 personnel to the carrier while it was in the Mediterranean, where they established temporary ventilation and lighting, restored temporary power, and repaired 440-volt cabling supporting combat system spaces in the aft section of the ship. That team completed the temporary work over five days at sea, allowing the Ford to continue the deployment and later resume operations in the Red Sea. The current availability must now remove temporary electrical arrangements, replace damaged cable runs, inspect bulkheads and overheads, assess heat and smoke effects on insulation and ventilation systems, restore permanent lighting and power, and rebuild berthing spaces. Firefighting water, combustion residue and smoke can also damage equipment outside the visibly burned area, so the final repair burden will depend on inspections behind panels, under deck coverings and inside cableways and ventilation trunks. 

    Moreover, the Carrier Air Wing 8 and the strike group’s deployment profile help illustrate how intensively the ship was used during its time at sea. The air wing included 36 F/A-18E Super Hornets, 12 F/A-18F Super Hornets, 5 EA-18G Growlers, 4 E-2D Advanced Hawkeyes, 2 C-2A Greyhounds, 10 MH-60R Seahawks and 8 MH-60S Seahawks. The escort force included USS Winston S. Churchill (DDG-81), USS Mitscher (DDG-57), USS Mahan (DDG-72), USS Bainbridge (DDG-96) and USS Forrest Sherman (DDG-98), although the five destroyers did not remain with the carrier for identical periods. Every aircraft launch and recovery added operating cycles to EMALS and Advanced Arresting Gear. At the same time, sustained deck operations increased wear on jet blast deflectors, catapult troughs, deck-edge electrical connections, aircraft elevators and aviation-fuel systems.

    The air wing’s mix also imposed continuous demand on power generation, cooling, maintenance shops, weapons movement and data networks. For the shipyard, the relevant question is not the nominal number of days deployed, but how many major components have reached inspection thresholds, how many have exceeded expected operating hours and how much deferred work remained when the carrier returned to Norfolk. The USS Gerald R. Ford's Planned Incremental Availability (PIA) is therefore intended to restore material condition without removing the carrier from service for the duration of a docking period or a mid-life Refueling and Complex Overhaul. A PIA is conducted with the ship afloat and normally includes depot-level machinery work, electrical repairs, corrosion control, combat system alterations, aviation equipment maintenance and habitability improvements.

    It does not provide the same access to the underwater hull, shafts, propellers, rudders and sea valves as a Docking Planned Incremental Availability. It also does not include reactor refueling or the structural reconstruction associated with an RCOH, which normally occurs once during a carrier’s service life and lasts several years. The US Navy’s maintenance-continuum concept attempts to divide work into smaller and more frequent periods rather than allowing it to accumulate into larger packages. Under the 32-month, one-deployment carrier cycle examined in prior fleet planning, a ship spent 19 % of the cycle deployed, 24 % in depot maintenance, 46 % able to surge within 30 days, and 11 % able to respond within 30 to 90 days. An 18-month cycle increased deployment time to 31 % but also raised depot maintenance to 36 % and reduced 30-day surge availability to 15 %.

    A 42-month cycle with two deployments increased deployed time to 29 % and reduced maintenance to 18 %, but risked concentrating up to 375,000 labor-days into a single package, more than twice the workload public yards could efficiently complete within a six-month period. Norfolk Naval Shipyard’s recent carrier performance shows why the published completion date alone will not be sufficient to judge the Ford availability. The USS George H.W. Bush (CVN-77) entered PIA in November 2023 and completed the work in November 2024, requiring about 12 months. The USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69) entered PIA in January 2025 and completed it in April 2026, requiring more than 15 months and more than 4,000 personnel at peak workforce loading. Both ships finished ahead of revised internal schedules, but both remained unavailable substantially longer than the traditional six-to-eight-month PIA planning range.

    For fleet planning, an early finish against an extended yard schedule still represents additional months without a deployable carrier. The Ford adds a new coordination burden because Newport News Shipbuilding remains the Ford-class planning yard and retains the deepest design and construction knowledge, while Norfolk is responsible for physical execution. Norfolk personnel have received Ford-specific training at the Virginia Advanced Shipbuilding and Carrier Integration Center, conducted quarterly planning reviews, and exchanged information with the John F. Kennedy team. The number of repair questions requiring Newport News engineering support, the time needed to resolve them, and the amount of rework generated by incomplete configuration data will directly affect schedule performance.

    The project team is attempting to protect the critical path by dividing work among pre-availability, central-availability and post-availability periods. Advance work at Naval Station Norfolk included early testing, preparations for temporary-service installation and jet blast deflector overhaul before Ford entered the yard. The shipyard is also applying its Focus and Finish model, intended to reduce multitasking, concentrate labor on active jobs and close work areas before moving personnel to new tasks. Late-discovered work that threatens the scheduled delivery date may be transferred into a post-Window of Opportunity period rather than inserted into the central PIA. That method can reduce schedule disruption, but it can also create a gap between physical departure from the yard and actual restoration of operational readiness.

    Deferred work should therefore be measured by labor hours, safety significance, system affected, and planned completion date. Tasks involving electrical reliability, aviation operations, damage control, combat systems, weapons movement, nuclear-support equipment or crew habitability should be separated from low-priority cosmetic repairs and non-critical alterations. The decisive comparison is between the original work-package volume, the amount of new work added during inspections, the amount removed from the critical path, and the maintenance still incomplete when the ship begins sea trials. The maintenance burden is concentrated in systems that remain unique to the Ford-class.

    The USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) displaces about 100,000 tonnes at full load, measures 337 meters in length, has a 41-meter waterline beam, a 78-meter flight-deck width, and a draft of about 12 meters. The ship can carry more than 75 aircraft and embarks about 4,500 personnel with the air wing. Two A1B pressurized-water reactors drive four shafts and provide substantially more electrical capacity than the A4W plants installed in Nimitz-class carriers. That additional power supports four EMALS catapults, Advanced Arresting Gear, 11 advanced weapons elevators, electrically intensive sensors and a redesigned distribution system. However, while the EMALS was designed for an average of 4,166 launches between operational mission failures, early testing produced much lower reliability.

    The weapons elevators also required years of corrective work after the ship’s 2017 delivery. The current PIA will provide the first public-yard data on removal times, inspection hours, component wear, spare-parts demand, software-diagnostic requirements and specialized labor after a 326-day deployment. The fleet-level result will depend on the date Ford returns to deployable status, not simply the date it leaves Norfolk Naval Shipyard. The U.S. Navy operates 11 aircraft carriers, but several are normally unavailable because of PIAs, docking periods, refueling overhauls, training or certification.

    A six-month extension on one carrier therefore removes 9.1 percent of the total carrier inventory from the planning pool for an additional half-year, even before accounting for ships already unavailable for other reasons. The Navy should track total labor-days, monthly workforce loading, growth in unplanned work, material shortages, jobs completed by their scheduled finish dates, test failures, rework, deferred-maintenance volume, and the interval between yard departure and operational certification.

    Ford-specific measures should include the number of engineering dispositions requested from Newport News, the average response time, the share of work performed by Norfolk personnel, private-yard employees, contractors and ship’s force, and the number of tasks moved into the post-availability period. Follow-on milestones should include sea trials, flight-deck certification, air-wing embarkation, combat-system certification, completion of basic training and restoration of 30-day surge status. Those metrics will shape the US Navy's planning for John F. Kennedy, Enterprise (CVN-80) and Doris Miller (CVN-81), including workforce training, spare parts stocks, planning yard support and the timing of future Ford-class availabilities.

    Written by Jérôme Brahy

    Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.

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  • U.S. Navy Awards $2.2B Medium Landing Ship Contract to Boost US Marine Corps Amphibious Capabilities

    Artist039;s rendering of the U.S. Navy039;s future Medium Landing Ship (LSM), a new class of amphibious vessel designed to provide the U.S. Marine Corps with distributed littoral mobility and expeditionary logistics support under the Force Design 2030 modernization strategy. (Picture source: U.S. Navy)

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    The U.S. Navy has awarded a $2.2 billion Vessel Construction Management contract to TOTE Services LLC to oversee construction of the new Medium Landing Ship (LSM) fleet, a move announced on July 13, 2026, by the U.S. Navy, that aims to speed delivery of a critical amphibious capability while strengthening the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base. The new procurement model is designed to reduce construction delays, improve cost control, and help the U.S. Marine Corps field the vessels needed to sustain operations across contested coastal and island environments.

    The first Medium Landing Ship is scheduled for delivery in fall 2029, providing U.S. Marines with a platform optimized to move troops, equipment, and supplies between dispersed littoral positions where larger amphibious ships face greater risk. The program also reflects a broader shift toward more resilient maritime logistics and distributed force projection, reinforcing the Corps' evolving role in potential Indo-Pacific conflict scenarios.

    Related Topic: US Navy's Medium Landing Ship (LSM) Program: Transforming Amphibious Warfare for Indo-Pacific

    Artist's rendering of the U.S. Navy's future Medium Landing Ship (LSM), a new class of amphibious vessel designed to provide the U.S. Marine Corps with distributed littoral mobility and expeditionary logistics support as part of the Force Design 2030 modernization strategy. (Picture source: U.S. Navy)

    Announced by the U.S. Navy, the contract marks a significant departure from the traditional approach to naval shipbuilding. Rather than awarding separate prime contracts directly to shipbuilders, the Navy has selected TOTE Services as the prime contractor responsible for managing construction across multiple shipyards. The company will oversee subcontract execution, monitor industrial performance, and ensure vessels are delivered on schedule and within budget, while the Navy retains oversight of program requirements and capability.

    For the initial production phase of up to eight Medium Landing Ships, TOTE Services will manage subcontracts with Bollinger Shipyards for the construction of one vessel and Fincantieri Marinette Marine for four additional ships. The company will also have the flexibility to determine the most effective award strategy for up to three additional vessels, allowing production to adapt to shipyard capacity and industrial performance.

    According to U.S. Navy officials, the new acquisition strategy has already demonstrated measurable benefits. Only five months elapsed between the release of the request for proposals and contract award, representing nearly a 50 percent reduction compared with traditional naval contracting timelines. The U.S. Navy expects that applying commercial ship management practices to a proven vessel design will reduce technical risk, accelerate production, and improve cost control.

    The program is managed by the U.S. Navy's Portfolio Acquisition Executive for Maritime, a recently established organization responsible for delivering surface ships through a more centralized acquisition structure. By consolidating responsibility for shipbuilding programs, the Navy aims to streamline decision-making and align procurement more closely with operational requirements.

    Step aboard the U.S. Marine Corps' latest innovation in amphibious warfare. In this exclusive report, we explore the U.S. Navy's new Medium Landing Ship (LSM), designed to support distributed operations and rapid troop deployment across contested coastlines.

    Beyond the acquisition reform, the Medium Landing Ship fills an important operational requirement within the U.S. Marine Corps' Force Design 2030 modernization strategy. The vessel is intended to bridge the gap between small landing craft and large amphibious warfare ships by providing an affordable, dedicated connector capable of transporting Marines, vehicles, supplies, and equipment between dispersed coastal locations.

    This capability has become increasingly important as the U.S. Marine Corps shifts from concentrating forces aboard large amphibious ships toward distributed operations across island chains and contested coastlines. Future Marine units are expected to operate from numerous temporary expeditionary positions, requiring frequent movement of personnel, ammunition, fuel, engineering equipment, and tactical vehicles without relying on established ports or major logistics hubs.

    The Medium Landing Ship is specifically designed to provide that mobility. Previous U.S. Navy planning documents describe a vessel with approximately 4,000 tons of displacement and roughly 120 meters in length, capable of transporting around 75 Marines, along with tactical vehicles and mission cargo. A shallow draft and beaching capability will enable the ship to unload directly onto suitable shorelines, allowing Marine forces to sustain operations from austere locations where conventional port facilities may be unavailable or destroyed.

    The LSM is expected to become one of the principal enablers of Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO), the U.S. Marine Corps' concept for establishing temporary, highly mobile positions across strategically important islands and coastal regions. From these dispersed locations, U.S. Marines can employ anti-ship missiles, air-defense systems, sensors, unmanned systems, and reconnaissance assets while remaining difficult for an adversary to locate and target.

    Without a dedicated logistics connector such as the Medium Landing Ship, maintaining these dispersed forces would become significantly more difficult. Existing amphibious warships, including the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock and America-class amphibious assault ship, remain essential for major expeditionary operations but are considerably larger, more expensive, and optimized for different missions. Employing those ships for routine logistics movement between austere coastal sites would expose high-value naval assets to unnecessary operational risk.

    In December 2025, the U.S. Navy approved a design for the McClung-class Medium Landing Ship, a transport vessel solely dedicated to moving Marines and their equipment to better allow the sea service to support and protect joint fleet and air movements. (Video source: U.S. Marine Corps)

    The planned fleet of 35 Medium Landing Ships is intended to provide the persistent mobility required to sustain U.S. Marine units throughout extended operations. Rather than relying on a handful of large amphibious ships, commanders will be able to distribute logistics across numerous smaller vessels, increasing operational flexibility while complicating an adversary's surveillance and targeting efforts.

    The program also carries important implications for the U.S. defense industrial base. By dividing initial production between Bollinger Shipyards and Fincantieri Marinette Marine under the supervision of TOTE Services, the U.S. Navy is expanding participation among multiple American shipyards rather than concentrating work at a single facility. This approach supports workforce development, strengthens supplier networks, and increases national shipbuilding capacity at a time when the Navy is simultaneously pursuing several major construction programs.

    Both shipyards already possess significant experience supporting Navy programs. Bollinger Shipyards has built numerous patrol vessels and auxiliary ships, while Fincantieri Marinette Marine is constructing the Constellation-class guided-missile frigate. Their participation in the Medium Landing Ship program broadens the industrial base available for future fleet expansion while reducing dependence on any single production yard.

    The Vessel Construction Management concept could also influence future Navy procurement programs if it demonstrates improved schedule performance and cost control. Recent U.S. shipbuilding efforts have experienced delays, rising costs, and industrial capacity challenges, prompting the Navy to explore alternative acquisition methods that better leverage commercial expertise without compromising military requirements.

    From an operational perspective, the Medium Landing Ship represents far more than another amphibious vessel. It provides the logistical foundation required to transform the U.S. Marine Corps' distributed operations concept from doctrine into an executable battlefield capability. Long-range precision missiles, reconnaissance systems, and expeditionary forces can remain effective only if they are continuously supplied, repositioned, and sustained under combat conditions.

    In the Indo-Pacific, where thousands of islands and vast maritime distances define the operational environment, this requirement becomes even more significant. The ability to move small Marine formations rapidly between islands while avoiding predictable logistics routes will directly enhance survivability and operational flexibility during any future high-intensity conflict.

    If delivered on schedule beginning in 2029, the Medium Landing Ship fleet will strengthen the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps team's ability to conduct distributed littoral operations while simultaneously demonstrating a new acquisition model focused on commercial efficiency, industrial resilience, and accelerated delivery of critical naval capability. The success of both the ships themselves and the innovative Vessel Construction Management approach could shape future U.S. naval procurement as the service seeks to modernize its fleet amid increasingly contested maritime environments.

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    Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
    Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.

  • Australia's Matilda 1 stern landing vessel completes beach trials for US Marine Corps logistics

    The stern landing arrangement addresses the hydrodynamic disadvantages of conventional bow-ramp craft, which normally combine a shallow draft, broad bow, and flat bottom to maximize beach access. (Picture source: Seatransport)

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    The Australian-designed stern landing vessel Matilda 1 completed a successful stern-first beach landing and rapid powered withdrawal at Dundee Beach near Darwin on July 8, 2026, ahead of entering a three-year logistics lease with the U.S. Marine Corps. The tactical evaluation demonstrated the vessel's ability to lower its 12.7-meter-wide stern ramp, maintain positioning on the shoreline, and return to deeper water in less than 60 seconds without tug assistance. This test campaign directly supports the U.S. Marine Littoral Regiments by verifying a logistical transport solution capable of moving heavy vehicles and containerized supplies between dispersed coastal sites without relying on deep-water ports.

    The 73-meter Matilda 1 features a 1,500-tonne deadweight capacity, a 550-tonne beaching payload, and a 4,000-nautical-mile operational range driven by a quad-screw diesel-electric propulsion system. Recent trials at Hudson Creek and Dundee Beach successfully validated the vessel's tri-hull stern geometry, which prevents seabed hull suction and protects steering gear during active dry-out and rapid beaching cycles.

    Related topic:Australia begins sea trials of Stern Landing Vessel Matilda 1 for U.S. Indo-Pacific operations

    The stern landing arrangement addresses the hydrodynamic disadvantages of conventional bow-ramp craft, which normally combine a shallow draft, broad bow, and flat bottom to maximize beach access. (Picture source: Seatransport)

    On July 8, 2026, the 73 m stern landing vessel Matilda 1 completed a stern-first beach landing and powered withdrawal at Dundee Beach, southwest of Darwin in Australia’s Northern Territory, before entering a three-year U.S. Marine Corps lease for Indo-Pacific logistics experimentation. As reported by Baird Maritime, the vessel reversed onto the shoreline, lowered its 12.7 m-wide stern ramp, maintained its position during a simulated unloading sequence, and returned to deeper water in less than 60 seconds. The operation followed dry-out berthing trials conducted one week earlier in the mangrove mudflats of Hudson Creek near Darwin, where the vessel settled onto soft sediment during a tidal cycle and subsequently refloated.

    U.S. Marine Corps personnel participated in both trials, while Australian Defence Force personnel observed the vessel’s beach interface, hull behavior, propulsion protection and recovery sequence. The test campaign addresses a specific operational problem for U.S. Marine Littoral Regiments: transporting vehicles, ammunition, fuel, engineering equipment and containerized supplies between dispersed coastal positions without requiring a deep-water port, a large amphibious warship or a separate landing craft for the final movement ashore. During the Dundee Beach trial, the Matilda 1 approached the coast stern-first rather than grounding its bow, allowing the ship-shaped forward hull and bridge to remain oriented toward open water.

    The crew used four independently driven propellers and the bow-thruster arrangement to control alignment during the reverse approach, then placed the stern ramp directly onto the beach. The ramp’s 12.7 m width is more than twice the 5 m to 6 m width found on many similarly sized bow-loading landing craft, while the absence of bow doors removes the overhead clearance restriction that can prevent tall vehicles, loaded container handlers or engineering machinery from passing through a conventional forward opening. After holding position for the simulated discharge, the vessel powered away from the shoreline in under one minute, a relevant measure because tide, wave action and sediment movement can rapidly change the grounding load acting on a ship.

    The trial therefore examined not only beach access, but also the ability to repeat the landing cycle without tug assistance, mooring infrastructure or a rising tide to free the hull. The Matilda 1 (IMO 9553701) has an overall length of 73 m, a deadweight of 1,500 tonnes and an actual beaching payload of 550 tonnes. Its operational range is 4,000 nautical miles, equivalent to 7,408 km, which permits independent movement from northern Australia to much of Southeast Asia, Melanesia and the central approaches to the western Pacific without transport aboard another ship. The 670 m² cargo deck provides 42 TEU ground positions and can carry 84 twenty-foot ISO containers when double stacked, with longitudinal or transverse stowage depending on weight distribution and unloading order.

    The deck can instead be configured for 20 JLTVs, 18 M142 HIMARS launchers, 16 MTVR trucks or 12 Amphibious Combat Vehicles. These are maximum single-type configurations rather than complete operational packages, since a deployable HIMARS detachment would also require rocket resupply vehicles, command-and-control equipment, maintenance assets, fuel and personnel. Permanent accommodation is provided for eight crew members, while up to 36 additional personnel can embark, giving the vessel capacity for vehicle operators, US Marines, communications teams, engineers and cargo-handling personnel. The hull architecture of this stern landing vessel (SLV) combines a conventional high bow for open-water transit with a tri-hull stern optimized for beaching.

    Two side pods, off-center shafts and protective aft skegs surround the propulsion and steering equipment, limiting the risk of propeller, rudder or shaft damage when the stern enters shallow water or contacts an uneven seabed. Four fixed-pitch propellers are driven by four electric motors in a quad-screw diesel-electric arrangement, while six 450 kW diesel generators provide a total installed generating capacity of 2,700 kW. The electric motors incorporate thrust blocks and drive the shafts without conventional mechanical reduction gearboxes, reducing the number of transmission components exposed to shock, alignment changes and maintenance demands. Independent propulsion lines allow the crew to vary thrust across the stern during reversing, correct an angled approach and retain partial mobility after a single generator, motor or shaft failure.

    The ship can achieve 85 percent of its designed speed in head seas at Sea State 5, a performance criterion directly related to its ability to maintain regional schedules in weather conditions that would significantly reduce the speed of flat-bottomed landing craft. The stern landing arrangement addresses the hydrodynamic disadvantages of conventional bow-ramp craft, which normally combine a shallow draft, broad bow and flat bottom to maximize beach access. Those characteristics increase resistance in open water, worsen pitching in head seas and can generate a strong suction effect when a large flat hull settles onto sand or mud. The Matilda 1 reduces the continuous bottom area exposed to the seabed by using two side pods and a central stern geometry that preserves water channels around the hull during withdrawal.

    Its propellers remain inside protected areas behind the pods and skegs, including during an angled approach, rather than becoming the lowest exposed components near the shoreline. The vessel also trims primarily through fuel distribution instead of relying on large quantities of seawater ballast to maintain propeller immersion, reducing ballast system complexity and the volume of seawater transferred during beach operations. These features are intended to shorten the time between cargo discharge and withdrawal while limiting the risk that unloading changes the ship’s trim enough to trap the stern on the seabed. The Hudson Creek and Dundee Beach trials tested different phases of the same littoral logistics cycle.

    At Hudson Creek, the vessel dried out in mangrove mudflats as the tide receded, placing the hull, side pods and protective stern structures under static bottom loads on soft sediment. This allowed assessment of settling angle, local hull loading, watertight integrity, machinery alignment and the ability to refloat without external assistance after the tide returned. At Dundee Beach, the test shifted to a powered stern approach, active station keeping, ramp deployment and rapid de-beaching from an exposed shoreline. Together, the trials covered conditions common across northern Australia and parts of the Indo-Pacific, including shallow coastal gradients, tidal variation, river mouths, soft mud, sand movement and limited hydrographic certainty close to shore.

    The sequence also provided information on whether the vessel can use landing sites outside the narrow range of gradients and seabed conditions normally required by bow-ramp landing craft. The U.S. Marine Corps intends to use the Matilda 1 for expeditionary logistics and distributed sustainment during the three-year lease, with initial activity centered on northern Australia before wider regional employment. The service requires vessels able to move heavy equipment between shore positions supporting US Marine Littoral Regiments, including anti-ship missile batteries, sensors, communications equipment, aviation-support teams and mobile logistics nodes.

    Before the Matilda 1, the US Marine Corps tested the concept with the HOS Resolution, an offshore support vessel converted with a large stern ramp, reinforced cargo deck, landing legs and protection for its propellers and rudders. The HOS Resolution supported evaluations of ramp gradients, beach interaction, vehicle compatibility and shore-to-shore movement during events including Project Convergence Capstone 4. The Matilda 1 provides a different test case because its hull, propulsion protection, deck arrangement and stern geometry were developed for repeated beaching rather than added to an existing offshore vessel.

    The lease will allow direct measurement of cargo throughput, fuel consumption, crew requirements, loading time, maintenance burden, beach availability and mission completion rates against the converted-vessel approach. The Matilda 1 was designed by Queensland-based SeaTransport and built by Karimun Anugrah Sejati in Batam, Indonesia, before completing contractor sea trials, end-user acceptance trials, transit to Darwin, dry-out berthing and live beaching. The design evolved from Australian commercial stern landing vessels used for nearly three decades to deliver passengers, vehicles, livestock, containers and bulk cargo to remote communities, mining sites and coastal areas without developed ports, with more than 20 related vessels entering commercial operation.

    The military configuration adds reinforced beaching structure, protected propulsion equipment, distributed machinery, multiple watertight compartments, a collision bulkhead and a military communications room adjacent to the bridge. The cargo deck is separated from the bow by watertight subdivision intended to limit free surface flooding after hull damage, while fuel is stored in isolated units with redundant pumps and self-contained fire suppression. The three-year evaluation will determine whether the vessel can sustain repeated logistics missions rather than merely complete individual demonstrations, with the decisive metrics including days available at sea, cargo delivered per operating day, fuel burned per tonne-nautical mile, ramp cycle time, maintenance hours per sailing hour, number of accessible beaches under representative tidal conditions, and the frequency with which weather or seabed conditions prevent planned landings.

    Written by Jérôme Brahy

    Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.

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  • Kuwait Equips 8 Al Dorra Missile Boats With Rheinmetall MASS Against Anti-Ship Missiles

    Kuwait will equip its eight Al Dorra-class missile boats with Rheinmetall MASS launchers and OmniTrap multispectral decoys to counter radar-, infrared- and laser-guided anti-ship missiles (Picture source: U.S. DoW).

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    Kuwait will equip all eight Al Dorra-class missile boats with Rheinmetall’s Multi Ammunition Softkill System, giving the new vessels a non-kinetic defensive layer against modern anti-ship missiles. Rheinmetall disclosed the order on July 10, 2026, with deliveries running from the second quarter of 2026 through the second quarter of 2029.

    MASS deploys decoys designed to confuse radar, infrared, electro-optical, ultraviolet, and laser-guided seekers rather than destroy incoming weapons. The system will improve the boats’ survivability in contested coastal waters by disrupting missile targeting and increasing the chance that an attack misses.

    Related topic: Israel's Elbit Unveils Merchant Ship Drone Carrier Concept for Hermes 650 Naval Operations.

    Kuwait will equip its eight Al Dorra-class missile boats with Rheinmetall MASS launchers and OmniTrap multispectral decoys to counter radar-, infrared-, and laser-guided anti-ship missiles (Picture source: U.S. DoW).

    The order forms part of Kuwait’s AED 9 billion, approximately $2.45 billion, procurement of eight 62-metre missile boats under a contract signed with EDGE on June 3, 2025. EDGE is responsible for design, construction, trials, delivery, integrated logistics support, in-service support, and ammunition, while ADSB is the principal shipbuilder. ST Engineering received a separate six-year subcontract worth about S$600 million in April 2026 to provide the ship design and engineering package and construct three of the eight vessels in Singapore. The first Kuwaiti vessel, Al Noukhitha, was launched in Abu Dhabi on February 3, 2026.

    MASS is built around a trainable launcher containing 32 countermeasure rounds. Rheinmetall offers configurations with one to six launchers, each connected to its own control unit, although neither the company nor Kuwait has disclosed how many launchers will be installed on each Al Dorra missile boat. A single-launcher fit would provide 32 ready rounds per vessel; a two-launcher arrangement would double that figure and improve coverage if simultaneous threats approached from separated bearings. Each launcher weighs 342 kilograms, stands 1.1 metres high and requires a 1.3-metre sweeping radius. The launcher can rotate at 100 degrees per second on two axes, with an acceleration of 360 degrees per second squared, and uses pitch-and-roll compensation to maintain the programmed firing geometry while the ship manoeuvres.

    The ammunition ordered by Kuwait is the OmniTrap-ER generation, which Rheinmetall identifies as having extended range and an improved trajectory for use against imaging-radar and infrared-guided threats. The OmniTrap ER MK2 round measures 81 by 360 millimetres and can be deployed from 10 to 400 metres from the launcher. Its countermeasure payload covers I-, J-, and Ka-band radar frequencies, infrared wavelengths from 2 to 14 micrometres, electro-optical sensors from 0.4 to 1.1 micrometres, solar-blind ultraviolet wavelengths from 0.3 to 0.4 micrometres, and laser wavelengths including 10.6 micrometres. The two-colour infrared coverage is significant because newer imaging infrared seekers compare spatial and spectral information rather than simply steering toward the strongest heat source. A countermeasure must therefore reproduce or obscure more of the ship’s observable signature than an older flare intended for a single-band detector.

    MASS can employ different responses according to the seeker, engagement phase, and relative bearing. Before firm seeker acquisition, countermeasures can create an alternative radar or infrared return intended to draw the missile toward a false target area. After acquisition, the system can attempt seduction by generating a more attractive return and moving the apparent track away from the ship. In coastal waters, it can also create a multispectral screen intended to complicate classification by missile seekers, electro-optical directors, or laser designators. The 10-to-400-metre deployment envelope indicates that OmniTrap is intended to place countermeasures close enough to control their relationship with the ship’s signature rather than create a distant false vessel. This geometry requires accurate threat bearing, ship-motion data and timing; firing a decoy in the wrong sector can leave both the ship and countermeasure inside the seeker’s field of view.

    For the Al Dorra class, MASS should be treated as one element of a layered defensive sequence rather than a substitute for surface-to-air missiles or close-in guns. Soft-kill measures offer two practical advantages on a 680-tonne missile boat: they do not depend on physically intercepting a manoeuvring target, and their rounds are generally less demanding in weight and volume than guided interceptors. Their limitations are equally important. Effectiveness depends on detecting the threat early enough, identifying the seeker type, selecting the correct countermeasure programme, and presenting a false signature that remains credible as the missile closes. A multispectral or network-assisted missile may reject an isolated radar or infrared anomaly, while an attack arriving from several bearings can consume ready rounds quickly. The undisclosed launcher count is therefore a material measure of the class’s actual defensive capacity.

    Leonardo signed an approximately €320 million agreement with ADSB on May 20, 2026, to provide combat systems for the Kuwaiti Falaj 3 configuration, but it has not published the selected radar, combat-management system, naval gun, or missile models. MASS will need to exchange threat and engagement data with those systems through Ethernet, RS-422, or another standard interface; it can also operate independently if required. The distinction matters because automatic cueing from radar, electronic-support, and laser-warning sensors reduces the interval between detection and countermeasure launch, whereas stand-alone operation places more responsibility on local sensors and operator reaction. Rheinmetall also offers an integrated sensor suite using the SME-150 radar-warning receiver and Naval Laser Warning System, but the company has not stated that Kuwait purchased this option.

    Published data for the underlying Falaj 3 design list a length of 62.7 metres, displacement of 680 tonnes, maximum speed of 26.5 knots, range of 2,000 nautical miles at 16 knots, and operation up to Sea State 5. Those figures describe a missile boat sized for patrol, escort, and coastal combat rather than sustained area air defence. MASS addresses the resulting survivability problem directly: a small combatant has limited interceptor capacity, limited space for redundant sensors, and less tolerance for a missile hit than a frigate. The Kuwaiti order does not eliminate those constraints, but it adds 32 programmable countermeasures for every launcher installed and gives the combat system another engagement option before committing scarce hard-kill weapons. The operational value will ultimately depend on launcher quantity, sensor integration, threat-library quality, ammunition stocks, and the extent to which crews train soft-kill and hard-kill responses as one sequence.

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    Written by Evan Lerouvillois, Defense Analyst.

    Evan studied International Relations, and quickly specialized in defense and security. He is particularly interested in the influence of the defense sector on global geopolitics, and analyzes how technological innovations in defense, arms export contracts, and military strategies influence the international geopolitical scene.

  • US Navy relocates nuclear attack submarine USS Jefferson City to Pearl Harbor after forward deployment in Guam

    The USS Jefferson City becomes the seventh fast-attack submarine assigned to Submarine Squadron 7, which operates a mixed force of Los Angeles-class and Virginia-class boats from Pearl Harbor. (Picture source: US Navy)

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    The U.S. Navy fast-attack submarine USS Jefferson City (SSN 759) completed its official homeport change from Naval Base Guam to Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam on July 9, 2026. This relocation transfers the Improved Los Angeles-class vessel from Submarine Squadron 15 to Submarine Squadron 7 to address acute fleet maintenance requirements. By basing the 34-year-old submarine in Hawaii, the Pacific Fleet trades the immediate geographic proximity of Guam for the extensive nuclear maintenance, engineering capacity, and dry-docking facilities necessary to preserve the operational availability of aging hulls.

    The USS Jefferson City (SSN 759) is an active 7,038-tonne nuclear-powered submarine commissioned in 1992, equipped with 12 vertical launch system cells for Tomahawk cruise missiles and four 533 mm torpedo tubes. Its transition to Submarine Squadron 7 increases the unit to seven fast-attack submarines while keeping the overall Pacific Fleet attack submarine inventory constant.

    Related topic:US Navy inactivates 46th Los Angeles-class nuclear submarine USS Alexandria after 35 years of service

    The USS Jefferson City becomes the seventh fast-attack submarine assigned to Submarine Squadron 7, which operates a mixed force of Los Angeles-class and Virginia-class boats from Pearl Harbor. (Picture source: US Navy)

    On July 9, 2026, the U.S. Pacific Fleet announced that the USS Jefferson City (SSN 759) completed its change of homeport from Naval Base Guam to Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, transferring from Submarine Squadron 15 to Submarine Squadron 7 after operating from Guam since 2021. The move increased Submarine Squadron 7 to seven fast-attack submarines and reduced the number permanently assigned to Guam by one, but it did not increase the Pacific Fleet’s attack-submarine inventory. The USS Jefferson City is an active Improved Los Angeles-class submarine with 34 years of service, a 7,038-tonne submerged displacement, 12 vertical launch cells for Tomahawk cruise missiles and four 533 mm torpedo tubes.

    Interestingly, its relocation changes the balance between forward presence and sustainment: Guam offers shorter access to the Philippine Sea, Taiwan and the South China Sea, while Pearl Harbor offers nuclear maintenance, dry-docking, weapons support, engineering capacity and direct access to Pacific Fleet submarine command organizations. The transfer followed a Guam assignment that included Exercise Sea Dragon and the 2025 Battle Efficiency Award, indicating that the boat left Guam as an operational unit rather than as a Los Angeles submarine entering inactivation like the USS Alexandria or the USS Boise. Nevertheless, the change of homeport alters the operational cycle of the USS Jefferson City in measurable ways.

    Naval Base Guam lies roughly 2,900 km from Taiwan, 2,500 km from the northern Philippines and less than 3,500 km from much of the South China Sea, allowing an SSN to reach several Western Pacific patrol areas within a few days. Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, for its part, lies roughly 6,100 km east of Guam, 8,200 km from Taiwan and more than 8,000 km from the central South China Sea. At a sustained submerged transit speed of 15 knots, the additional Pearl Harbor-to-Guam distance alone represents roughly nine days of movement, although actual transit time depends on routing, speed restrictions, training events and tactical requirements.

    A Hawaii-based deployment therefore consumes more days in transit than a Guam-based deployment, reducing time on station unless the Navy extends the deployment or adjusts turnover periods. In contrast, the access to a much larger maintenance and supply system reduces the risk that a mechanical deficiency at Guam will require a 6,100 km transfer to Pearl Harbor or a longer movement to Puget Sound, San Diego or another continental U.S. facility. The USS Jefferson City was built by Newport News Shipbuilding under a contract awarded on November 26, 1984. Its keel was laid on September 21, 1987, the hull was launched on August 17, 1990, and the submarine was commissioned on February 29, 1992.

    This submarine measures 110.3 m in length, 10 m in beam and 9.4 m in draft, with a light displacement of 6,000 long tons and a full displacement of 6,927 long tons, equivalent to 7,038 tonnes. Propulsion is provided by one S6G pressurized-water reactor with a D2W reactor core, two steam turbines producing 33,500 shaft horsepower, one shaft and one propeller. A 325 hp secondary propulsion motor supports limited maneuvering and emergency propulsion. Official speed exceeds 20 knots both surfaced and submerged, while the actual maximum submerged speed remains classified. Like many nuclear-powered vessels, the submarine’s endurance is limited by food, crew fatigue, maintenance condition and weapons expenditure rather than fuel, as the reactor does not require conventional refueling during a normal deployment.

    The USS Jefferson City (SSN 759) belongs to the Improved Los Angeles subclass, commonly called the 688i variant, which incorporated lower acoustic signatures, strengthened under-ice capability, retractable bow planes and 12 vertical launch tubes for Tomahawk missiles. The submarine also carries four 533 mm torpedo tubes and can embark a mixed weapons load of Mk 48 Advanced Capability (ADCAP) torpedoes, Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles, UGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missiles and submarine-launched mines. A typical mission load is not publicly fixed because the balance between torpedoes, cruise missiles and mines changes according to tasking, but the vertical launch system (VLS) allows 12 Tomahawks to be carried without occupying torpedo-room stowage positions.

    The Mk 48 ADCAP torpedo weighs roughly 1,676 kg, carries a 295 kg high-explosive warhead and is designed for use against both submarines and large surface combatants. The Block III Tomahawk, used in a 1996 combat mission, had a cited maximum range of 1,700 nautical miles, or 3,100 km. The submarine can also deploy Mk 67 mobile mines and Mk 60 CAPTOR encapsulated torpedo mines, giving it a covert minelaying role in addition to strike and sea-denial missions. The submarine’s sensor fit was originally centered on the AN/BQQ-5 active-passive sonar suite, supported by the BQS-15 detecting and ranging sonar, WLR-8 and WLR-9 electronic support receivers and the BRD-7 radio direction finding system. These systems support passive detection, target classification, fire control solution development, active ranging, interception of hostile sonar transmissions and electromagnetic intelligence collection.

    Improved Los Angeles-class submarines also received later combat system, sonar processing, communications and navigation upgrades during scheduled maintenance periods. Even after modernization, the USS Jefferson City has less internal volume, electrical-generation margin, sensor aperture and payload flexibility than a Virginia-class submarine. A Block IV Virginia-class submarine displaces roughly 7,900 tonnes submerged, carries 12 Tomahawks through two Virginia Payload Tubes, and was designed with improved acoustic isolation, photonic masts, a larger special operations capacity, and greater computing growth margin. The continued use of Jefferson City therefore reflects fleet size pressure rather than technical equivalence between the two classes.

    More importantly, the USS Jefferson City has a documented combat and operational record extending across more than three decades. On September 3, 1996, it fired two Block III Tomahawk missiles against Iraqi military targets during Operation Desert Strike, marking the first combat launch of submarine-fired Tomahawks since the 1991 Gulf War. The submarine subsequently supported deterrence patrols, intelligence collection, anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, and regional deployments. After moving to Guam in 2021, it operated as part of the forward-deployed submarine force under Submarine Squadron 15. Its participation in Exercise Sea Dragon placed the boat within a multinational anti-submarine warfare activity involving coordinated detection, tracking, and simulated prosecution of submarine targets by maritime patrol aircraft and partner forces.

    In 2025, the submarine received the squadron’s Battle Efficiency Award, which evaluates performance across tactical proficiency, engineering readiness, navigation, communications, weapons employment, supply, training and personnel management. The award shows that the crew met squadron readiness standards shortly before the transfer, but it does not eliminate the age-related burden associated with valves, pumps, piping, electrical distribution, auxiliary machinery, sonar components and weapons-support equipment installed on a boat commissioned in 1992. Logistically, Pearl Harbor provides the maintenance depth required to keep such a submarine deployable.

    Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam hosts U.S. Pacific Fleet headquarters, Commander, Submarine Force U.S. Pacific Fleet, Submarine Squadron 7, Fleet Logistics Center Pearl Harbor, Pacific Air Forces headquarters, the 613th Air Operations Center, U.S. Space Forces Indo-Pacific and more than 160 commands. Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility is one of four public U.S. naval shipyards capable of depot-level work on nuclear-powered vessels and the only one located between the U.S. West Coast and the Western Pacific. Its work includes reactor maintenance, dry-docking, propulsion repair, structural work, combat-system modernization, weapons support, intermediate maintenance and emergency repair.

    The shipyard employs roughly 5,800 civilian workers and 500 military personnel. Its dry docks include facilities close to or above 300 m in length, but several were designed before the Virginia class and require modernization. The $3.42 billion Dry Dock 5 project, started in August 2023 and planned for completion in 2027, is intended to support Virginia-class submarines for a 150-year design life and reduce one of the Pacific Fleet’s principal maintenance bottlenecks. The reassignment also occurs during a period of sustained pressure on U.S. attack submarine force levels. The USS Alexandria (SSN 757), commissioned in 1991, was inactivated on June 29, 2026, after 35 years of service and was scheduled for decommissioning on August 4, 2026.

    Its departure left 23 Los Angeles-class submarines in commission, including boats approaching or exceeding three decades of service. The U.S. Navy’s long-term force plan depends on Virginia-class construction, but annual production has remained below the two-boat rate required both to replace retiring Los Angeles-class submarines and expand the fleet. Maintenance delays further reduce operational availability because submarines awaiting depot work remain in the inventory but cannot deploy. The transfer therefore reflects a practical calculation: Guam provides superior geography for immediate presence, but Pearl Harbor offers the maintenance capacity more likely to keep a 34-year-old submarine available through its remaining service life.

    Written by Jérôme Brahy

    Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.

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  • U.S. Corsair One-Way Attack Sea Drones Redefine Naval Strike Warfare in First Combat Use Against Iran

    Three U.S. Corsair unmanned surface vessels struck a submarine maintenance facility at Bandar Abbas, marking America’s first acknowledged combat use of one-way attack drone boats (Picture Source: U.S. CENTCOM / Saronic Technologies / Iranian Media / Edited By Army Recognition Group) © Army Recognition Group. All rights reserved. Unauthorized use, reproduction, or distribution prohibited.

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    Three U.S. Navy-backed Saronic Corsair one-way attack sea drones struck Iran’s Bandar Abbas Naval Base during a July 12 operation, marking the first confirmed American combat use of autonomous surface strike vessels, as revealed by U.S. CENTCOM on July 13, 2026. The attack signals a new capability that allows U.S. forces to penetrate defended naval facilities with precise, expendable platforms while keeping sailors outside the most dangerous threat zones.

    The three Corsairs targeted a submarine maintenance facility, demonstrating that unmanned surface vessels can disrupt not only frontline naval assets but also the infrastructure that sustains fleet operations. Their combat debut highlights a growing shift toward autonomous maritime strike systems that expand operational reach, reduce risk to personnel, and strengthen U.S. options for maintaining deterrence and freedom of navigation in contested waters.

    Related Topic: Blackbeard Hypersonic Missile Launch from Marauder USV Could Expand U.S. Distributed Maritime Strike Architecture

    Three U.S. Corsair unmanned surface vessels struck a submarine maintenance facility at Bandar Abbas, marking America’s first acknowledged combat use of one-way attack drone boats (Picture Source: U.S. CENTCOM / Saronic Technologies / Iranian Media / Edited By Army Recognition Group) © Army Recognition Group. All rights reserved. Unauthorized use, reproduction, or distribution prohibited.

    On July 13, 2026, U.S. CENTCOM confirmed that American forces had employed one-way attack sea drones in combat for the first time during strikes conducted the previous day. The operation formed part of a wider campaign against Iranian air-defense systems, coastal radars, missile and drone capabilities, and small boats threatening commercial navigation around the Strait of Hormuz. Three Saronic Corsair autonomous surface vessels struck a submarine and ship-maintenance facility at Bandar Abbas Naval Base, moving an emerging American naval capability from testing into combat employment. The mission demonstrated that U.S. maritime forces can now deliver precise and expendable effects inside a defended naval facility without placing sailors aboard the attacking vessels.

    Corsairs Penetrate the Bandar Abbas Naval Complex

    The most revealing image from the July 12 attack shows the forward view from a Saronic Corsair as it closes on a Ghadir-class midget submarine positioned beneath a yellow maintenance gantry. The U.S. CENTCOM image places the viewer directly inside the vessel’s terminal approach and confirms that the unmanned craft penetrated deep into the Bandar Abbas naval complex before impact. The target was not simply a submarine located in open water. It was a submarine undergoing maintenance beside infrastructure needed to lift, service, repair, and return Iranian naval platforms to operational status. U.S. CENTCOM confirmed that three Saronic Corsair unmanned surface craft hit the port, introducing redundancy and increasing the probability that the assigned aim points would be reached. The released imagery does not reveal the complete attack geometry or final battle-damage assessment, but it confirms a successful penetration of the facility and the first acknowledged American combat employment of one-way attack surface vessels.

    A Strike Against Iran’s Naval Regeneration System

    Viewed as a complete target system, the objective extended beyond the photographed Ghadir-class submarine. Maintenance gantries, workshops, electrical connections, specialist tooling, spare-parts inventories, access routes, and trained personnel form an interconnected naval regeneration network. Damage to selected elements of this network could delay repairs to several vessels, disrupt maintenance schedules, and reduce the number of Iranian platforms available for future operations. The attack may consequently represent more than the destruction or disabling of a single submarine. It points to a broader concept of fleet suppression through maintenance denial, in which the United States targets the infrastructure responsible for generating combat-ready naval forces rather than waiting for individual vessels to deploy at sea. A submarine undergoing maintenance is deprived of its main defensive advantages: underwater concealment, mobility, acoustic discretion, and the ability to exploit the complex littoral environment of the Persian Gulf.

    Corsair Combines Endurance, Speed and Modular Payload Capacity

    Corsair is a 24-foot autonomous surface vessel and the largest platform in Saronic’s original family of small autonomous craft. It has a published range exceeding 1,000 nautical miles, a top speed above 35 knots, and a payload capacity of up to 1,000 pounds. This configuration provides a balance of endurance, speed, and modular load carriage in a hull compact enough to be transported, dispersed, and deployed in numbers. Its architecture includes mission-level autonomy, adaptive navigation, multichannel communications, and modular payload integration. The same vessel can support intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, maritime domain awareness, logistics, personnel recovery, electronic effects, or kinetic missions. Public information does not disclose the explosive configuration employed at Bandar Abbas, and the vessel’s published payload capacity should not be interpreted as confirmed warhead weight.

    Corsair’s published range also introduces operational uncertainty for an opponent. A vessel capable of travelling more than 1,000 nautical miles does not need to be launched immediately outside a defended harbor. It could potentially approach from a dispersed maritime position, follow an indirect route, remain outside defended waters until required, or operate as part of a wider unmanned mission package. The launch platform, route, control method, communications architecture, and degree of human supervision during the terminal phase have not been publicly disclosed. The operation confirms combat use of an autonomous-capable vessel, but it does not establish that lethal action was conducted without human authorization.

    Risk Displacement and Coordinated Multi-Vessel Attack

    Corsair’s primary operational advantage is the transfer of risk away from American personnel. A crewed fast boat attempting to enter Bandar Abbas would expose sailors to coastal surveillance, harbor patrols, automatic weapons, mines, anti-ship systems, and the danger of capture. Corsair transfers that exposure to an attritable unmanned platform while preserving crewed combatants for missions requiring larger sensors, heavier weapons, and direct human judgment. Its low profile and shallow draft may also provide access through maritime approaches unavailable to destroyers, frigates, or submarines. Onboard electro-optical systems can support terminal observation immediately before impact, while adaptive navigation allows the vessel to alter its route, exploit coastal clutter, and approach from less predictable directions.

    The decision to employ three Corsairs also deserves tactical attention. The vessels may have been assigned separate aim points, used to provide redundancy against interception or mechanical failure, or directed into the target area within a compressed engagement window to overload harbor defenses. One craft could have served as a diversion while the others approached the primary objective. The available evidence does not confirm coordinated swarm autonomy, making “coordinated multi-vessel strike” or “multi-axis unmanned surface attack” more accurate descriptions. Whatever the precise formation, three vessels provided CENTCOM with more tactical options than a single one-way platform and reduced the possibility that one defensive interception would defeat the entire mission.

    A New Option Between Cruise Missiles and Crewed Raids

    Corsair does not replace fighter aircraft, cruise missiles, torpedoes, or special operations forces. It adds another layer to the American joint strike architecture. Fighter aircraft can reach targets rapidly and deliver heavier or specialized weapons, but operations inside defended airspace may require aerial refueling, suppression of enemy air defenses, airborne command-and-control support, and acceptance of aircrew risk. Ship-launched cruise missiles provide long-range precision and high speed, yet consume limited vertical-launch-system capacity and may be disproportionate for an exposed pier-side target accessible from the sea. A torpedo is optimized to attack a vessel afloat beneath the waterline, not a submarine positioned ashore beside maintenance infrastructure. A special operations raid could produce detailed sabotage, but with far greater personnel, intelligence, and escalation risks.

    Against a harbor installation, the one-way surface drone occupies a valuable operational middle ground. It is persistent, precise, scalable, and expendable. The price of a combat-configured Corsair has not been publicly released, preventing a reliable unit-cost comparison with cruise missiles or combat-air sorties. Its principal value lies in the cost-risk exchange. Using an unmanned surface craft against an exposed coastal target can preserve aircraft flight hours, trained aircrews, submarine availability, special operations personnel, and scarce long-range missile inventories. Even where the vessel itself is not inexpensive, accepting the loss of an unmanned platform may remain preferable to exposing a crewed asset or expending a high-end weapon needed for a more heavily defended objective.

    This calculation becomes increasingly important during prolonged operations. Modern surface combatants carry a finite number of missiles, while reloading vertical-launch cells at sea remains difficult. Employing Corsair-type vessels against suitable coastal infrastructure could allow commanders to reserve advanced missiles for mobile launchers, integrated air-defense systems, hardened command facilities, and major combatants. The sea drone becomes not only an alternative strike system, but also a tool for increasing magazine depth and preserving high-end combat power across a sustained campaign.

    Corsair Builds on Lessons from Ukrainian USVs

    The closest modern precedent is Ukraine’s campaign in the Black Sea, where explosive unmanned surface vessels helped impose sea denial against a larger Russian fleet. Ukrainian USVs forced Russian warships to operate more cautiously, strengthened the requirement for harbor barriers and patrols, and contributed to the relocation of important naval assets away from exposed facilities in Crimea. Ukraine demonstrated that comparatively small and expendable surface drones could threaten major warships, attack naval infrastructure, disrupt maritime logistics, and compel a conventionally stronger fleet to divert resources toward force protection.

    Ukraine’s MAGURA V5 offers the clearest technical and operational comparison. The craft has been reported with a range exceeding 800 kilometers, a speed of approximately 80 kilometers per hour, and a 250-kilogram warhead. Ukrainian operators have emphasized repeated attacks by multiple vessels rather than relying on one oversized explosive charge. Such tactics allow one drone to attract defensive fire or disrupt the target while additional craft pursue further impact opportunities. MAGURA V5, Sea Baby, and related Ukrainian systems evolved rapidly under combat pressure as specialized attack platforms optimized for remote operation, high-speed approach, low visual profile, and repeated tactical adaptation.

    Corsair differs in purpose, scale, and institutional support. Ukraine developed its USVs as asymmetric instruments capable of compensating for the absence of a large conventional surface fleet. Corsair enters combat as part of an established American joint-force structure. It can potentially operate alongside satellites, maritime patrol aircraft, fighters, surface combatants, submarines, aerial drones, electronic-warfare systems, and global intelligence networks. Ukraine proved that unmanned vessels could deny maneuver to a larger fleet. The United States is applying the same underlying principle while integrating the platform into a far broader sensor, command-and-control, and precision-strike architecture. Corsair is not a substitute for American naval power; it is a force multiplier designed to extend that power into areas where the use of crewed platforms would be unnecessarily dangerous or operationally inefficient.

    Multi-Domain Pressure on Iranian Defenses

    The Bandar Abbas mission occurred within a wider multi-domain strike campaign. U.S. CENTCOM reported attacks against Iranian air-defense systems, coastal radar sites, missile and drone capabilities, and small boats using fighter aircraft, naval vessels, aerial one-way attack drones, and one-way attack sea drones. The precise sequencing of these actions has not been released, but the force package would have confronted Iranian defenders with threats arriving through several domains and on different timelines. Attacks against radar and air-defense systems could reduce situational awareness, aerial drones could divide defensive attention, and naval or air-delivered weapons could place pressure on command posts while the Corsairs approached at sea level.

    The primary American advantage is not simply possession of a new drone boat. It is the ability to integrate that vessel into a wider sensor-to-shooter network connecting intelligence, surveillance, communications, electronic effects, deception, suppression, and terminal strike. An isolated unmanned vessel can be detected and destroyed. A surface drone approaching while radar sites, air defenses, missile batteries, drone infrastructure, and command systems are simultaneously under attack presents a far more complex defensive problem. Corsair’s combat value is closely tied to the wider joint force supporting it.

    Strategic Impact on the Strait of Hormuz

    Bandar Abbas was a carefully selected objective. The base supports Iranian naval activity near the Strait of Hormuz, while Ghadir-class midget submarines are designed for operations in the shallow waters of the Persian Gulf. Their compact size and littoral operating profile make them relevant to ambush missions, covert surveillance, mine warfare, special-forces insertion, and attacks against vessels moving through restricted maritime approaches. Striking the submarine while it was out of the water removed its ability to exploit concealment and mobility while placing the surrounding repair infrastructure at risk.

    At the geostrategic level, the mission expands the U.S. ability to defend freedom of navigation while preserving crewed platforms and high-end missile inventories. A deployable force of long-range autonomous craft gives American commanders another method of holding coastal radars, fast-attack boats, missile positions, logistics nodes, submarine facilities, and naval infrastructure at risk across the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. It also imposes a broader defensive burden on Iran. Every harbor entrance, maintenance quay, sheltered anchorage, and coastal installation must now be protected against low-profile surface contacts as well as aircraft, missiles, submarines, and aerial drones.

    Physical barriers, patrol craft, electro-optical surveillance, short-range radar, electronic warfare, remote weapon stations, and rapid-response interceptors consume personnel and resources even when no unmanned attack is underway. Ports such as Bandar Abbas cannot be completely sealed because they must remain accessible to friendly ships, tugboats, maintenance vessels, and logistics traffic. This creates a continuing force-protection burden capable of slowing Iranian naval activity and diverting resources away from offensive operations.

    Corsair-type vessels could also support persistent surveillance of coastal approaches, detect fast-attack craft, monitor temporary missile or drone launch areas, inspect maritime corridors, and deliver precision effects without continuously positioning large crewed warships inside the Gulf’s most exposed waters. They could be distributed across the Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea, making it harder for Iran to determine where an attack originated or which coastal sector is threatened. By expanding maritime presence without a proportional increase in sailors or crewed hulls, autonomous surface vessels can help the United States sustain pressure across a wide operating area while preserving destroyers, submarines, and aircraft for missions only those platforms can perform.

    The Bandar Abbas operation was more than an attack against a submarine-related target; it marked the combat unveiling of a new American naval strike method combining autonomy, precision, endurance, and expendability within an integrated joint-force command structure. Three Corsairs carried U.S. firepower into an Iranian naval base while American sailors remained outside the terminal threat envelope, demonstrating that hostile coastal forces can no longer assume that distance, harbor defenses, maintenance facilities, or the absence of a nearby crewed warship will provide protection. Corsair gives the United States a scalable instrument for imposing operational risk, preserving personnel, disrupting enemy fleet regeneration, defending critical maritime routes, and conserving high-end combat power. Ukraine proved that maritime drones could deny maneuver to a larger fleet; at Bandar Abbas, the United States demonstrated the next stage of that evolution by integrating autonomous surface strike into the full strength of American joint warfare.

    Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

    Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.

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  • China Pairs Type 039B Yuan AIP Submarine with Russian Kilo-class in Rare Joint Naval Exercise

    Chinese and Russian naval submarines are seen operating together during the Joint Sea-2026 exercise. (Picture source: CCTV Military, screenshot)

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    China is deploying one of its most advanced Type 039B Yuan-class Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) submarines alongside a Russian Project 636.3 Kilo-class submarine during the Joint Sea-2026 naval exercise, a development that signals deeper Sino-Russian undersea military cooperation with growing implications for Indo-Pacific maritime security. As the participating naval forces transition from the exercise to joint patrols in the Pacific Ocean, the deployment highlights increasingly coordinated submarine operations that could complicate the U.S. Navy’s and allied forces’ ability to maintain undersea dominance across the region.

    The pairing combines two of the most capable conventional submarines in Chinese and Russian service, strengthening interoperability in anti-submarine warfare, maritime strike missions, and submarine rescue operations. Beyond the exercise itself, the deployment reflects a broader trend toward closer operational integration between Beijing and Moscow, reinforcing their ability to project undersea power and challenge Western naval forces in strategically contested waters.

    Related Topic: China Navy's Type 039C submarine reportedly undergoing sea trials

    Chinese and Russian naval submarines are seen operating together during the Joint Sea-2026 exercise. (Picture source: CCTV Military, screenshot)

    The exercise, launched on July 6, 2026, and hosted by the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in Qingdao, brings together ten Chinese and Russian naval units, including surface combatants, submarines, naval aviation, and support vessels. Live-fire scenarios include joint reconnaissance, air and missile defense, anti-surface strikes, and submarine rescue, demonstrating an operational focus on high-intensity maritime conflict rather than routine bilateral naval engagements.

    Unlike previous editions of the Joint Sea series, this year's exercise places particular emphasis on underwater warfare, one of the most strategically significant domains in modern naval competition. The combined deployment of China's advanced Type 039B and Russia's Improved Kilo-class submarine demonstrates that both navies are increasingly willing to integrate sensitive undersea capabilities into bilateral training, reflecting a higher level of operational confidence and interoperability than seen in earlier exercises.

    The PLAN's Type 039B is among China's most advanced conventionally powered attack submarines. Equipped with an Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) system, it can remain submerged for significantly longer periods than conventional diesel-electric submarines, reducing the need to snorkel and making detection more difficult. Combined with improved acoustic quieting, modern sonar arrays, and the ability to launch heavyweight torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missiles, the Type 039B is optimized for sea-denial missions, intelligence collection, and operations inside contested waters such as the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.

    Joint Sea-2026 brings together warships, submarines, naval aviation, and support vessels in realistic combat training. (Video footage: Russian MoD)

    Russia's Project 636.3 Improved Kilo-class remains one of the world's quietest diesel-electric attack submarines. Armed with heavyweight torpedoes and Kalibr land-attack and anti-ship cruise missiles, it provides the Russian Navy with a versatile precision-strike capability while offering extensive operational experience in stealth submarine operations. Training with the PLAN allows Russian crews to exchange tactics with one of the world's fastest-growing submarine forces while exposing Chinese operators to decades of Russian expertise in conventional undersea warfare.

    Although neither submarine matches the speed, endurance, or global reach of U.S. Navy Virginia-class nuclear-powered attack submarines, their operational role is fundamentally different. Conventional AIP submarines are exceptionally difficult to detect in shallow coastal waters, making them particularly effective in chokepoints and littoral environments surrounding Taiwan, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea. These are precisely the areas where the U.S. Navy and allied forces would likely operate during a regional crisis, increasing the importance of anti-submarine warfare capabilities for the United States, Japan, Australia, and other Indo-Pacific partners.

    The exercise also includes one of the most technically demanding aspects of submarine operations: joint submarine rescue. Conducting bilateral rescue drills requires compatible procedures, specialized rescue vessels, deep-diving systems, and coordinated command structures. Such cooperation demonstrates growing trust between the Chinese and Russian navies and improves their ability to sustain submarine operations during prolonged deployments.

    Chinese officials stated that the sea phase included live-force and live-fire training covering joint reconnaissance, integrated air defense, anti-surface warfare, and coordinated command-and-control operations. The scenarios are designed to replicate realistic combat conditions and improve the participating forces' ability to respond collectively to complex maritime security threats.

    Before moving to sea, both navies conducted extensive operational planning in Qingdao through tabletop exercises, professional seminars, reciprocal ship visits, and mission coordination meetings. These activities helped synchronize tactical procedures and communications before transitioning to live operational training.

    Following the completion of the exercise, participating Chinese and Russian naval units are continuing joint patrols in the Pacific Ocean, extending military cooperation beyond scheduled drills to coordinated operational deployments. Such patrols enhance both navies' experience in long-range maritime operations while reinforcing their combined presence in strategically important waters stretching from the East China Sea into the broader Western Pacific.

    Now in its twelfth edition since launching in 2012, the Joint Sea series has evolved from a diplomatic confidence-building exercise into an increasingly sophisticated military training program integrating surface combatants, submarines, naval aviation, and logistics forces. The inclusion of advanced underwater assets reflects a broader trend toward deeper operational integration between Beijing and Moscow as both countries seek to improve their ability to operate together in contested maritime environments.

    For U.S. defense planners and NATO navies, the significance of Joint Sea-2026 extends well beyond a bilateral exercise. While the United States retains a decisive advantage in nuclear-powered submarines and global undersea surveillance, expanding cooperation between the PLAN and the Russian Navy is steadily improving China's proficiency in submarine operations, command and control, and coordinated maritime warfare. As Beijing continues to modernize its submarine fleet and Russia contributes decades of operational experience, these exercises could gradually complicate allied anti-submarine warfare planning across the Indo-Pacific, particularly in any future contingency involving Taiwan or freedom-of-navigation operations in the Western Pacific.

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    Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
    Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.

  • Israel's Elbit Unveils Merchant Ship Drone Carrier Concept for Hermes 650 Naval Operations

    Elbit Systems’ proposed unmanned aviation ship would operate Hermes 650 Spark UAVs for long-range maritime surveillance, target acquisition and strike support, extending naval sensor coverage against missiles, drones and unmanned surface vessels (Picture source: Elbit Systems).

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    Elbit Systems is examining a commercial-ship conversion that would operate multiple Hermes 650 Spark fixed-wing drones at sea, the company disclosed on July 13, 2026. The concept could give naval forces persistent surveillance and targeting coverage beyond the radar horizon, with greater endurance and payload capacity than vertical-takeoff unmanned aircraft.

    The converted merchant vessel would serve as a mobile airfield for intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance missions rather than as a conventional aircraft carrier. Elbit has not identified a customer, contract, conversion partner, flight-test program, or service-entry timeline, leaving the proposal at the concept stage.

    Related topic: Poland Tests StormRider Naval Drone With Frigate to Stream Live Baltic Sea Data to NATO.

    Elbit Systems' proposed unmanned aviation ship would operate Hermes 650 Spark UAVs for long-range maritime surveillance, target acquisition and strike support, extending naval sensor coverage against missiles, drones and unmanned surface vessels (Picture source: Elbit Systems).

    The Hermes 650 Spark was unveiled at the Singapore Airshow on February 21, 2024. It has a maximum takeoff weight of approximately 650 kilograms, a 140-kilogram full-fuel load, a service ceiling of 22,000 feet, and a stated endurance of up to 24 hours. Its operating-speed range is 55 to 120 knots, or about 102 to 222 kilometres per hour, while the line-of-sight control radius is 300 kilometres; satellite communications allow operations beyond that distance. Elbit also specifies automatic takeoff and landing, automatic taxiing, short-runway operation, and compliance with NATO STANAG 4671. Reporting from the aircraft’s 2024 presentation indicated that takeoff requires approximately 200 metres under land-based conditions, although Elbit has not published a shipboard launch distance, recovery distance or permissible sea state.

    Payload accounting is central to understanding what the aircraft can actually do. Elbit lists a 260-kilogram useful load distributed across two fuselage bays and six underwing attachment points, but this figure includes fuel. With the full 140-kilogram fuel load required for the advertised 24-hour endurance, approximately 120 kilograms remain for mission equipment. The forward bay is reported to accept 70 kilograms, and the rear bay up to 100 kilograms. Available payloads include electro-optical, infrared, and short-wave infrared cameras, maritime-surveillance radar, communications-intelligence equipment, electronic-intelligence receivers, and the SkEye wide-area surveillance system. A practical maritime configuration could therefore combine an electro-optical turret for identification with radar for wide-area search, but installing several heavy sensors would reduce fuel, endurance, or the mass available for external stores. This payload tradeoff is more important than the headline 260-kilogram figure.

    The six underwing attachment points should not be interpreted as evidence that an armed Hermes 650 is already available. Elbit has not publicly named a missile, bomb, or guided rocket qualified on the aircraft, and no release trials, fire-control integration, or naval weapon certification have been announced. Carrying a weapon would require structural clearance, aerodynamic testing, safe-separation trials, electromagnetic-compatibility work and integration of targeting data with the aircraft’s mission computer. A lightweight guided missile could fit within the 120-kilogram full-fuel payload allowance, but each weapon would displace sensor mass and reduce the value of the aircraft as a persistent reconnaissance asset. The aircraft is currently better documented as a multi-sensor unmanned aerial vehicle than as an operational unmanned combat aircraft.

    Elbit already offers a more mature method of separating surveillance from attack. Its SkyStriker loitering munition can be launched pneumatically from a vehicle or vessel and controlled through the company’s FAST architecture. SkyStriker uses electric propulsion, has a published range of 100 kilometres, remains airborne for up to two hours, and carries either a 5- or 10-kilogram internal warhead. Its gimballed day-and-infrared seeker supports automatic video tracking, operator authorization, attack abortion, go-around, and re-engagement. A 10-kilogram warhead can be relevant against radar antennas, communications equipment, parked aircraft, light vehicles, exposed missile launchers, or small boats; it is not equivalent to a heavy anti-ship missile intended to penetrate and disable a frigate-sized warship. Pairing Hermes 650 aircraft with vessel-launched SkyStrikers would create a more credible division of labour: the reusable aircraft would search, classify, and maintain custody of targets, while the expendable munition would conduct the attack.

    The unresolved engineering issue is recovery at sea. A 200-metre land takeoff run may be compatible with the length of a large merchant hull, particularly when ship speed and headwind generate additional airflow over the deck, but landing on a moving and pitching vessel is substantially more demanding. Elbit has not specified whether the conversion would use an arresting cable, net, barrier, or another assisted-recovery method. The donor ship would also need aviation-fuel tanks, maintenance workshops, spare engines, satellite terminals, mission-control rooms, aircraft-handling equipment, fire suppression and, if weapons are embarked, protected magazines and explosive-handling procedures. Corrosion control, deck motion, crosswinds, and launch-and-recovery cycle times would determine operational availability more than nominal aircraft endurance.

    The military requirement is nevertheless identifiable. On October 19, 2023, USS Carney destroyed 15 unmanned aerial vehicles and four land-attack cruise missiles during a ten-hour engagement in the Red Sea. The same theatre subsequently saw repeated use of one-way attack drones, anti-ship missiles, and explosive unmanned surface vessels. In the Black Sea, Ukraine used unmanned surface craft, aerial drones, missiles, intelligence, and electronic warfare to constrain a conventionally superior Russian fleet. These cases show why navies need sensors positioned farther from the defended ship. A Hermes 650 operating 300 kilometres from its vessel could search for launch craft, coastal control stations, communications emitters and approaching unmanned surface vessels before they enter a warship’s final defensive zone. At 100 knots, a 300-kilometre transit would take about 1.6 hours each way, theoretically leaving more than 20 hours for on-station activity in a maximum-endurance profile before accounting for reserves, weather and routing.

    Elbit’s proposal should therefore be assessed as a distributed surveillance and targeting concept, not as a low-cost substitute for carrier aviation. Its potential rests on persistent radar and electro-optical coverage, electronic-intelligence collection, and the ability to direct missiles or loitering munitions launched by other forces. Before a navy could make a procurement decision, Elbit would need to demonstrate shipboard recovery, sortie-generation rates, operations in representative sea states, secure communications under jamming, weapon-data transfer, maintenance requirements, and conversion cost. Until those data are available, the concept remains technically plausible but operationally unproven.

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  • U.S. Marines Advance Distributed Littoral Operations with Multi-Mission Reconnaissance Craft Bravo in Okinawa

    U.S. Marines in Okinawa trained with the MMRC-Bravo to improve reconnaissance mobility, distributed logistics, and littoral operations across the First Island Chain (Picture Source: U.S. Marines)

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    U.S. Marines with 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion have advanced their ability to operate across contested coastal environments by conducting Multi-Mission Reconnaissance Craft Bravo (MMRC-Bravo) training at Naha Military Port in Okinawa, enhancing the Corps’ capacity to move reconnaissance teams, sensors, and sustainment assets without relying on fixed ports or established logistics hubs. The activity, announced by the Defense Visual Information Distribution Service on July 13, 2026, underscores the Marine Corps’ growing focus on distributed littoral operations that strengthen survivability and operational flexibility along the strategically vital First Island Chain.

    The MMRC-Bravo provides reconnaissance Marines with a shallow-water platform capable of inserting teams, repositioning sensors, and sustaining dispersed forces while rapidly shifting launch sites to complicate enemy detection and targeting. Its integration into Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations and stand-in force concepts expands the Marine Corps’ ability to generate persistent reconnaissance, maintain sea denial, and support joint naval operations across the Indo-Pacific.

    Related Topic: U.S. Marine Corps Naval Strike Missile Launcher Expansion Advances Sea Denial Along the First Island Chain

    U.S. Marines in Okinawa trained with the MMRC-Bravo to improve reconnaissance mobility, distributed logistics, and littoral operations across the First Island Chain (Picture Source: U.S. Marines)

    On June 5, 2026, U.S. Marineswith 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion, 3rd Marine Division, conducted Multi-Mission Reconnaissance Craft Bravo training at Naha Military Port in Okinawa, Japan. The evolution highlighted how reconnaissance Marines can rapidly move personnel, sensors, mission-essential equipment, and supplies across complex littoral terrain. Far beyond a conventional boat-handling drill, the training strengthened the Marine Corps’ capacity to sustain distributed forces without continuous access to major ports, fixed support facilities, or established logistics hubs. The activity was formally announced by the Defense Visual Information Distribution Service on July 13, 2026.

    The training assembled Multi-Mission Reconnaissance Craft Bravo operators and leaders from across 3rd Marine Division to refine the tactics, techniques, and procedures required to employ the platform under realistic maritime conditions. Classroom instruction addressed engineering systems, preparatory and follow-on actions, emergency contingencies, tactical trailering, and launch-and-recovery procedures. Marines then transitioned to practical training in shallow and deep water, conducting man-overboard drills, casualty-response scenarios, and platform-handling evolutions designed to build the proficiency required for safe, responsive, and mission-focused employment across the littoral battlespace.

    The Multi-Mission Reconnaissance Craft Bravo, also known as the Whiskey Bravo, is a tactical littoral platform designed to transport reconnaissance teams, mission-essential equipment, sensors and supplies. Its shallow-water maneuverability allows Marine forces to access coastal areas that may be unsuitable for deeper-draft vessels, while its ability to support long-range transits and sensor operations expands the reach of reconnaissance elements. DVIDS imagery also showed Marines loading the craft onto a trailer attached to a Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement, demonstrating a road-to-water mobility concept that can reduce reliance on fixed maritime infrastructure.

    The MMRC-Bravo occupies a valuable position between smaller inflatable reconnaissance boats and larger amphibious connectors. Compared with lightweight inflatable craft, it offers a more substantial platform for carrying personnel, equipment and sustainment loads over extended maritime routes. Compared with landing craft and other heavy connectors, it cannot transport large vehicles or major logistics packages, but it gains a smaller support footprint, improved access to confined waters and the ability to shift between launch locations by tactical ground transport. The Bravo variant is also larger than the MMRC-Alpha previously operated by participating Marines, providing another option within the Marine Corps’ developing small-craft architecture.

    At the tactical level, the craft can help reconnaissance Marines insert and recover teams, reposition sensors, conduct limited resupply and move between dispersed coastal positions. Changing launch sites and maritime routes can reduce predictable operating patterns, support signature management and complicate an opposing force’s intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting cycle. Its mobility is especially relevant to reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance operations, in which the ability to detect an adversary, maintain awareness and displace before being located can preserve combat power and sustain the commander’s decision advantage.

    The MMRC-Bravo also supports the Marine Corps’ wider development of stand-in forces and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations. Marine Corps Force Design guidance identifies littoral mobility as a key requirement for small, distributed formations operating in support of fleet maneuver, sea denial and sea control. Within that framework, the craft can serve as a local mobility and sustainment asset connecting expeditionary positions, reconnaissance teams and sensor nodes across the littoral battlespace. Its effectiveness will grow when integrated with naval aviation, unmanned systems, intelligence networks and other joint-force capabilities.

    Okinawa gives the training substantial geostrategic significance. Its position within the first island chain places forward-deployed Marines near vital maritime approaches and strategically important sea lanes across the Western Pacific. Training at Naha Military Port allows Marines to rehearse tactical vehicle movement, port coordination, launch procedures and maritime maneuver in an environment directly relevant to regional operations. As Capt. Michael Marty of 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion explained, employing reconnaissance teams from these vessels can enable a wide range of operations across the first island chain.

    The geopolitical signal is unmistakable: U.S. Marines in Japan are reshaping their equipment, training, and operational concepts around the Indo-Pacific’s demanding maritime geography. A reconnaissance force capable of launching from multiple coastal locations, extending sensor reach, and sustaining itself through dispersed logistics creates a far more complex surveillance and targeting challenge for any potential adversary. This capability strengthens the credibility of the U.S.-Japan alliance by showing that American forces in Okinawa are not simply forward-deployed—they are being deliberately prepared to operate, endure, and generate combat power inside contested littoral spaces.

    The Naha evolution demonstrates how 3rd Marine Division is translating Force Design into an increasingly mature warfighting capability. The Multi-Mission Reconnaissance Craft Bravo is not intended to replace amphibious ships, aircraft, or heavy landing craft; its value lies in reinforcing the wider naval network by giving small Marine elements another means to maneuver, observe, resupply, and remain operational close to shore. Across the Indo-Pacific, adaptable platforms create access, but trained reconnaissance Marines convert that access into persistent awareness, distributed combat power, stronger regional deterrence, and a sharper operational advantage for the naval and joint force.


    Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

    Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.

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  • U.S. Bases Nuclear Fast-Attack Submarine USS Tucson in Guam to Deepen Deterrence Along China’s Maritime Flank

    USS Tucson’s arrival in Guam places another nuclear-powered attack submarine closer to Western Pacific flashpoints, strengthening U.S. undersea readiness and regional deterrence (Picture Source: U.S. Navy)

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    The U.S. Navy has forward-deployed the Los Angeles-class fast-attack submarine USS Tucson (SSN 770) to Naval Base Guam, a move announced following its arrival on July 10, 2026, that strengthens America’s undersea combat posture in the Western Pacific. By basing another nuclear-powered attack submarine inside the region, the Navy reduces response times, increases patrol availability near key maritime flashpoints, and reinforces deterrence across the Philippine Sea, the South China Sea, and waters around Taiwan.

    USS Tucson joins Submarine Squadron 15 as a combat-proven Improved 688-class platform capable of anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, intelligence collection, Tomahawk land strikes, and special operations support. Its deployment expands Guam’s role as the U.S. Navy’s principal forward submarine hub, enhancing operational flexibility while sustaining a layered undersea force that complicates adversary planning throughout the Indo-Pacific.


    Related Topic: U.S. Navy’s New Flight III Destroyer George M. Neal Sharpens America’s Maritime Edge

    USS Tucson’s arrival in Guam places another nuclear-powered attack submarine closer to Western Pacific flashpoints, strengthening U.S. undersea readiness and regional deterrence (Picture Source: U.S. Navy)

    The arrival of the Los Angeles-class fast-attack submarine USS Tucson (SSN 770) at Naval Base Guam on July 10, 2026, is more than a homeport change. It places another nuclear-powered attack submarine inside the U.S. Navy’s forward operating architecture in the Western Pacific, where undersea forces can respond faster, spend more patrol time near likely operating areas and support deterrence without the long approach from Hawaii or the continental United States. The move is part of the Navy’s strategic laydown of forces and reinforces Guam’s role as a central American submarine outpost in the Indo-Pacific. The transfer also shifts Tucson from a trans-Pacific deployment model toward a theater-based posture, shortening the distance between its homeport and potential operating areas around the Philippine Sea, the first island chain and the wider Western Pacific. Guam gives commanders a submarine already positioned inside the region rather than one that must first arrive from farther east.

    Tucson brings a mature 688 Improved platform and an experienced crew to Submarine Squadron 15 at Polaris Point. Commissioned on September 19, 1995, the boat was the 59th Los Angeles-class attack submarine and the 20th 688i variant; it is also the second U.S. Navy vessel named for Tucson, Arizona. Commanding officer Cmdr. Vince Bove framed the transfer around warfighting readiness, regional strategic objectives and the crew’s integration into the Guam community, while squadron commander Capt. Christopher Carter described the island as a strategic outpost supporting regional stability and deterrence. Although Tucson is described as a nuclear attack submarine, the designation refers to a nuclear-powered SSN built for attack, surveillance and strike missions, not a strategic ballistic-missile submarine. Its value lies in sustained underwater endurance, conventional land-attack capacity and the ability to hunt ships and submarines without disclosing its position.

    The transfer also shows that Guam’s submarine posture is being refreshed, not merely enlarged by counting hulls. Tucson follows the 2024 arrival of USS Minnesota (SSN 783), the first Virginia-class attack submarine forward-deployed to Guam, and comes after USS Jefferson City (SSN 759) shifted to Pearl Harbor. The Tucson release says the boat joins three forward-deployed attack submarines, while a May 31 Navy report described USS Springfield (SSN 761) as one of five after it returned from a routine Indo-Pacific deployment. Read together, the releases depict an active rotation of boats through Guam as the Navy balances forward presence against transfers, maintenance and fleet aging. The differing public counts are best treated as snapshots taken during a changing laydown rather than as a fixed order of battle. They also show why Tucson’s arrival should be viewed as part of a broader force refresh, with Los Angeles-class boats gradually giving way to Virginia-class submarines while older hulls continue to carry a heavy operational load.

    From Guam, Tucson can apply the core mission set of a U.S. attack submarine: anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare, covert intelligence collection, land attack, support to special operations, battle-group operations and mine warfare. Los Angeles-class boats carry Mk 48 torpedoes and 12 vertical-launch tubes for Tomahawk cruise missiles, giving Tucson a combined sea-denial and strike role. Its nuclear propulsion, stealth, speed and endurance allow it to leave port, disperse and operate independently, creating a responsive asset for contingencies across the Philippine Sea, the South China Sea and waters around Taiwan. In a Taiwan Strait or South China Sea crisis, its main impact might remain unseen: the possibility of a Guam-based SSN operating nearby could compel an opposing navy to dedicate submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, surface escorts and surveillance assets to a search across a wide maritime space. That diversion could reduce the forces available to protect amphibious groups, surface combatants or logistics formations, allowing one submarine to influence a much larger operational picture without revealing its patrol area.

    The main deterrent effect is the uncertainty imposed on an opponent. A forward-based SSN can threaten hostile submarines, surface combatants and shore targets while remaining difficult to locate, forcing an adversary to spread escorts, patrol aircraft, sensors and anti-submarine forces across a broad ocean area. Tucson also complements Minnesota rather than duplicating it. The older 688i offers a proven strike and hunter-killer platform, while the Virginia class brings newer sensors, payload flexibility and stronger support for littoral and special-operations missions. A mixed force gives commanders more options and reduces reliance on a single class. It also creates strategic ambiguity: an adversary may observe a submarine entering or leaving Apra Harbor but cannot easily determine its destination, mission or target set after it submerges. That uncertainty complicates planning for naval movements east of Taiwan, through the Luzon Strait or beyond the first island chain, while demonstrating to Japan and the Philippines that U.S. undersea combat power is based inside the theater.

    The tradeoff is readiness pressure. The Navy’s laydown plan explicitly seeks to balance immediate operational availability with lifecycle maintenance, modernization and future force needs. Tucson entered service in 1995, so its value in Guam will depend on disciplined upkeep, access to parts, skilled maintenance personnel and careful deployment scheduling. Springfield’s recent return illustrates the operating cycle Guam must sustain: the boat completed a Western Pacific deployment, while four Sailors advanced and 18 officers and enlisted personnel earned submarine warfare qualifications, strengthening the trained manpower base behind the forward force. The deeper question is how quickly Guam can rearm, repair, certify and return an SSN to sea after a patrol. Forward basing creates more useful time in theater only when the support system can repeatedly regenerate combat-ready submarines; otherwise, maintenance delays can consume the geographic advantage created by the homeport shift.

    Guam’s concentration of undersea power also creates a demanding protection problem. Submarines are highly survivable after dispersing at sea, but piers, maintenance sites, communications nodes, weapons-support facilities and harbor access remain fixed elements. This produces a strategic paradox: Tucson’s stealth can make the submarine extremely difficult to track on patrol, yet its combat utility still depends on a visible and concentrated shore network. The value of forward basing will hinge on the Navy’s ability to protect those facilities, disperse support functions, preserve secure communications and sortie submarines rapidly during a crisis. The same geography that places Guam closer to Western Pacific operating areas also makes the island a focal point for hostile surveillance and operational planning. A resilient Guam posture must treat submarine operations and base defense as one connected mission rather than as separate requirements.

    Tucson’s arrival deepens the practical strength of the U.S. undersea posture even if Guam’s total submarine count changes during transfers and maintenance cycles. The boat adds a combat-proven 688i to a force increasingly paired with Virginia-class capabilities, shortens the route from homeport to Western Pacific patrol areas and keeps a mission-ready submarine presence close to the region’s most contested seas. Viewed alongside Minnesota and Springfield, the move points toward a layered undersea network rather than an isolated buildup: Guam serves as the forward operational hub, Hawaii provides strategic depth and major support, and deployed submarines create uncertainty across the first and second island chains. Tucson’s deterrent value is clear, but its enduring impact will depend on sustaining an aging hull, protecting Guam’s support network and preserving enough forward boats to maintain pressure through a prolonged crisis.

    Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

    Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.

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  • Poland Tests StormRider Naval Drone With Frigate to Stream Live Baltic Sea Data to NATO

    Poland’s StormRider unmanned surface vessel operated with the frigate ORP Gen. T. Kościuszko during a NATO Task Force X demonstration, transmitting live sensor data while showcasing remote surveillance, armed patrol, and WARMATE loitering-munition integration (Picture source: WB Group).

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    Poland’s WB Group demonstrated its StormRider unmanned surface vessel with the Polish Navy frigate ORP Gen. T. Kościuszko, transmitting live Baltic Sea sensor data to NATO officials in Ankara, the company said on July 7, 2026. The test showed how a small forward platform can extend a frigate’s surveillance reach while keeping the larger warship farther from potential threats.

    StormRider provided remote reconnaissance and long-range data distribution, but the event did not include weapon firing or autonomous engagement. The capability could support monitoring around ports, shipping lanes, anchorages, and subsea infrastructure while improving maritime awareness and reducing risk to high-value naval assets.

    Related topic: Germany Buys 14 AeroVironment Puma Drones to Equip Naval Special Forces with Laser Targeting.

    Poland's Stormrider unmanned surface vessel operated with the frigate ORP Gen. T. Kościuszko during a NATO Task Force X demonstration, transmitting live sensor data while showcasing remote surveillance, armed patrol, and warmate loitering-munition integration (Picture source: WB Group).

    StormRider is approximately 8.5 meters long and 3 meters wide, with a displacement of over three tonnes. Its hull is derived from Polish fast-boat and yacht-building practice, while propulsion is provided by a combustion engine driving a waterjet. The waterjet removes an exposed propeller and improves low-speed maneuvering in shallow or cluttered waters, although WB Group has not published maximum speed, draft, fuel load, payload allowance, or endurance in hours. An operational range of about 500 kilometers has been reported, but that figure describes vessel movement, not sensor or weapon reach. The craft is optionally manned for trials and navigation in waters where regulations require personnel aboard, and its designers have discussed operation in sea states 3 to 5; no public evidence yet shows that the upper sea-state objective has completed naval acceptance testing.

    The installed surveillance equipment includes a navigation radar, sonar, echo sounder, day camera, thermal imager, and laser rangefinder. These sensors perform different tasks: radar detects and tracks surface contacts; the electro-optical head supports visual identification and evidence collection; the laser supplies range data; and the sonar and echo sounder examine the underwater environment and water depth. That combination is suited to checking harbor approaches, identifying small boats, inspecting cable or pipeline corridors, and investigating contacts detected by other ships. It does not make StormRider a wide-area ocean-surveillance asset by itself. WB Group has not disclosed radar type, frequency, mast height, detection ranges, or sonar operating modes, and the practical radar horizon of an 8.5-meter craft will be constrained by antenna and target height. The July demonstration established that collected data could be forwarded to Ankara, but public reporting does not identify the communications route, bandwidth, latency, encryption standard, or performance under jamming.

    The principal direct-fire option is Arex’s ZMU-05N naval remote weapon station, normally fitted with a 12.7×99 mm M2 heavy machine gun. The mount measures 1,630 by 710 by 660 millimeters, weighs 170 kilograms without ammunition and 208 kilograms in combat condition, and uses a 24-volt power supply. Its independently stabilized sight contains a 3,840×2,160 daylight camera, a 1,280×1,024 thermal imager, and a laser rangefinder; WB Group states stabilization accuracy of 0.2 milliradians at one sigma. At 2,000 meters, 0.2 milliradians corresponds to approximately 0.4 meter of line-of-sight error before adding ammunition dispersion, barrel vibration, wind, and hull movement. The station can automatically track a designated contact and can be controlled through a secure radio link, while its components are protected against salt spray, corrosion, and icing.

    A 12.7 mm machine gun gives StormRider a means of engaging small boats, exposed personnel, lightly protected vehicles near a waterfront, and some slow, low-flying unmanned aircraft. It does not provide anti-ship missile capability, area air defense, or a reliable answer to maneuvering missiles and fast aircraft. Engagement range and hit probability at sea will depend on wave motion, ammunition, visibility, and the quality of target tracking, none of which WB Group quantified for the StormRider installation. The weapon is therefore best understood as a force-protection armament for close contact rather than the vessel’s main contribution to naval combat.

    For engagements beyond machine-gun distance, WB Group has shown StormRider with launch tubes for WARMATE TL unmanned aircraft. The reusable TL-R version carries day and night cameras, deploys from a sealed tube, and returns by parachute with an airbag protecting the sensor payload. The TL-C strike version has been reported with interchangeable warheads of up to two kilograms and an endurance near 45 minutes, although WB Group has not released a complete StormRider-specific performance sheet. Published data for the established WARMATE family list a 5.7-kilogram maximum takeoff weight, 1.6-meter wingspan, 30-kilometer radio-line-of-sight range, 80 km/h operating speed, and 150 km/h attack speed; these values should not automatically be applied unchanged to every tube-launched variant. The practical advantage is separation of functions: TL-R can look beyond the boat’s mast-mounted sensors, while TL-C can attack a stationary or slow-moving point target without bringing StormRider within direct-fire range.

    NATO’s interest is tied to persistent Baltic surveillance rather than one Polish prototype. Task Force X-Baltic employed more than 70 air, surface and subsurface unmanned systems during three weeks of testing in June 2025, reporting 75 percent availability for eight hours daily and operating costs equal to roughly one-third of comparable frigate coverage. NATO has not published the cost assumptions behind that comparison, but the model is clear: numerous smaller sensors provide routine coverage while frigates remain available for interception, escort, and combat. Before StormRider can fill that role at fleet scale, Poland would still need to establish procurement numbers, unit cost, operator requirements, weapons-safety certification, collision-avoidance performance, recovery procedures, and resistance to electronic warfare and satellite-navigation disruption.

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    Written by Evan Lerouvillois, Defense Analyst.

    Evan studied International Relations, and quickly specialized in defense and security. He is particularly interested in the influence of the defense sector on global geopolitics, and analyzes how technological innovations in defense, arms export contracts, and military strategies influence the international geopolitical scene.

  • U.S. Navy MQ-25A Stingray Refueling Drone Completes Second Test Flight Toward Carrier Service

    The U.S. Navy039;s MQ-25A Stingray performs its second developmental test flight, successfully completing its first airborne landing gear cycle as Boeing advances the autonomous aerial refueling aircraft toward future carrier operations. (Picture source: Boeing Defense)

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    The U.S. Navy's MQ-25A Stingray aerial refueling drone has completed its second developmental test flight, bringing the world's first carrier-based autonomous aerial refueling aircraft closer to operational service. Boeing Defense announced on July 10, 2026, that the successful test further strengthens the Navy's ability to extend the range, endurance, and combat effectiveness of its carrier air wings through autonomous aerial refueling.

    During the flight, the MQ-25A successfully performed its first airborne landing gear cycling, validating a critical function of its autonomous flight control system ahead of future carrier operations. As the program progresses, the Stingray is set to reshape carrier aviation by freeing manned fighters from the tanker mission, allowing them to focus on strike, air superiority, and other high-value combat roles.

    Related Topic: U.S. Navy’s MQ-25A Stingray Aerial Refueling Drone Aboard USS Nimitz Redefines Carrier Strike Reach

    The U.S. Navy's MQ-25A Stingray performs its second developmental test flight, successfully completing its first airborne landing gear cycle as Boeing advances the autonomous aerial refueling aircraft toward future carrier operations. (Picture source: Boeing Defense)

    The latest flight expands the Boeing Defense MQ-25A's aerial refueling drone growing envelope of tested capabilities following its maiden flight earlier this year. According to Boeing Defense, the successful execution of landing gear extension and retraction while airborne demonstrates increasing confidence in the aircraft's systems integration and confirms progress toward meeting the demanding operational requirements of catapult launches and arrested recoveries aboard U.S. Navy aircraft carriers. The milestone is particularly significant because reliable landing gear operation is fundamental for safe carrier aviation, where aircraft are subjected to far greater structural loads than during conventional runway operations.

    The MQ-25A Stingray represents one of the U.S. Navy's most significant aviation modernization programs in decades. Unlike previous unmanned aircraft developed primarily for intelligence, surveillance, or strike missions, the MQ-25A has been specifically designed to restore organic aerial refueling capability to carrier air wings. By assuming the tanker mission currently performed by manned Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighters equipped with buddy refueling stores, the Stingray will free valuable combat aircraft for their intended strike, air-superiority, and fleet-defense roles.

    The U.S. Navy's MQ-25A Stingray has completed its second developmental test flight, achieving its first airborne landing gear cycle and reaching another key milestone on the path to aircraft carrier operations.

    This shift carries major operational implications. Today, a significant percentage of Super Hornet flight hours are devoted to tanker missions rather than combat operations, reducing the effective striking power available aboard every deployed carrier strike group. Once fully operational, the MQ-25A is expected to substantially reduce this burden, increasing the number of mission-ready fighters available for offensive and defensive operations while simultaneously extending the operational endurance of carrier air wings.

    The aircraft's autonomous flight control architecture is central to this transformation. Unlike remotely piloted systems that require continuous operator control, the MQ-25A employs highly automated flight management, capable of executing complex flight profiles with limited human intervention. During carrier operations, this autonomy will be essential to safely conduct launch, recovery, navigation, rendezvous, and refueling in one of the world's most demanding aviation environments.

    The successful landing gear cycles performed during the second test flight represent considerably more than a routine systems check. Carrier aircraft landing gear must withstand extreme impact forces during arrested landings and support repeated catapult launches under maximum gross weight conditions. Validating the mechanical operation, hydraulic systems, sensor feedback, and software integration during flight is therefore a prerequisite before progressing toward more demanding carrier suitability testing.

    Boeing is producing the MQ-25A under a contract awarded by the U.S. Navy to deliver the initial operational fleet of unmanned refueling aircraft. The program is expected to provide more than 70 aircraft over its production life, equipping future carrier air wings with dedicated unmanned tankers capable of transferring thousands of pounds of fuel to naval aircraft operating hundreds of nautical miles from the carrier. This significantly expands the combat radius of carrier-based tactical aviation without requiring additional manned support aircraft.

    The Stingray's design reflects its specialized mission. Powered by a single Rolls-Royce AE 3007N turbofan engine, the aircraft incorporates a blended fuselage, high-mounted wings, and an optimized internal fuel capacity tailored for aerial refueling operations rather than low-observable penetration missions. Although not designed as a stealth aircraft comparable to the U.S. Navy's future sixth-generation combat systems, it has aerodynamic efficiency and endurance that make it ideally suited for persistent tanker operations over maritime theaters.

    The aircraft is also equipped with the Cobham aerial refueling store, enabling it to refuel Navy fighters such as the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, the Lockheed Martin F-35C Lightning II, and the Boeing EA-18G Growler. This interoperability is expected to enhance the operational flexibility of future carrier strike groups by allowing multiple aircraft types to receive fuel during extended missions deep into contested operational areas.

    Beyond aerial refueling, the MQ-25A has been designed with sufficient growth potential to accommodate future mission expansion. U.S. Navy officials have previously indicated that the aircraft's architecture could support additional payloads, sensors, communications relay capabilities, or intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance equipment should operational requirements evolve. Such adaptability aligns with the Navy's broader vision of integrating autonomous aircraft alongside manned aviation assets within a networked carrier air wing.

    The program also serves as a technological bridge toward the U.S. Navy's future family of carrier-based autonomous aircraft. Operational experience gained through the MQ-25A—including autonomous deck handling, command-and-control integration, maintenance procedures, and human-machine teaming—will provide critical lessons for future unmanned combat aircraft expected to operate from aircraft carriers alongside next-generation crewed fighters under the Navy's evolving air wing modernization strategy.

    Industrial progress on the program continues in parallel with flight testing. Boeing has established dedicated production facilities to support low-rate initial production while simultaneously advancing developmental testing required before operational evaluation. Each successful flight incrementally reduces technical risk as engineers validate software, flight controls, propulsion systems, and structural performance across increasingly demanding operating conditions.

    From a broader strategic perspective, the Boeing Defense MQ-25A aerial refueling drone represents far more than the introduction of a new unmanned aircraft. It fundamentally changes how carrier aviation generates combat power by reallocating manned fighters from support duties to frontline missions. In an era characterized by growing anti-access and area-denial threats across the Indo-Pacific, extending the reach of carrier-based tactical aviation without increasing fleet size offers a significant operational advantage for U.S. naval forces. When combined with future unmanned systems and next-generation naval aviation initiatives, the Stingray is poised to become a foundational element in transforming carrier air wings into more distributed, resilient, and combat-effective forces capable of operating in increasingly contested maritime environments

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    Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
    Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.

  • U.S. Marine Corps Naval Strike Missile Launcher Expansion Advances Sea Denial Along the First Island Chain

    The U.S. Marine Corps is expanding its Naval Strike Missile launcher force under a $50.3 million Kongsberg contract to strengthen mobile sea-denial operations across the First Island Chain (Picture Source: U.S. Marine Corps)

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    The U.S. Marine Corps is expanding its land-based Naval Strike Missile capacity with a new $50.3 million contract option for Kongsberg Launcher Missile Modules supporting the Over-the-Horizon Weapon System, a move announced by the U.S. Department of War on July 9, 2026. The procurement strengthens the Corps’ ability to deploy mobile anti-ship missile batteries across the First Island Chain, reinforcing U.S. and allied efforts to deny hostile naval forces freedom of maneuver in the Western Pacific.

    The additional launcher modules will support NMESIS-equipped Marine Littoral Regiments, enabling dispersed launch teams to rapidly establish and relocate firing positions while integrating with joint and allied targeting networks. As the Marine Corps expands this distributed sea-denial architecture through deployments in Japan and the Philippines, the growing Naval Strike Missile inventory enhances deterrence by increasing the operational uncertainty and risk facing any adversary seeking to operate surface forces inside contested maritime corridors.

    Related Topic: U.S. Marines Show How NMESIS Anti-Ship Missile System Operates Under MADIS Air Defense in the Philippines

    The U.S. Marine Corps is expanding its Naval Strike Missile launcher force under a $50.3 million Kongsberg contract to strengthen mobile sea-denial operations across the First Island Chain (Picture Source: U.S. Marine Corps)

    On July 9, 2026, the U.S. Department of War disclosed a $50.3 million option for Kongsberg Launcher Missile Modules under the Over-the-Horizon Weapon System program. Financed entirely through U.S. Marine Corps procurement funds, the award is consistent with the service’s expanding role in land-based maritime strike. Far from being a routine contract action, it signals a wider effort to turn strategically located Pacific islands and coastlines into mobile anti-ship firing zones capable of complicating hostile naval movement. The modification was detailed in the department’s official contract notice.

    The deeper significance of expanding Naval Strike Missilecapacity is its potential to reshape the operational map of a future maritime conflict. Marine Littoral Regiments are structured to function as stand-in forces within contested zones, combining sensors, secure communications and precision fires to support wider naval campaigns. Deployed along the first island chain, mobile anti-ship units could turn key stretches of the East and South China seas into increasingly hazardous operating areas, placing pressure on naval movements through narrow straits, island passages and other critical approaches. III Marine Expeditionary Force has described itself as the core of a joint and coalition stand-in force positioned to operate across this strategically decisive arc.

    For Chinese naval planners, the challenge is not simply the range of an individual missile but the uncertainty created by dispersed and relocatable launch teams. A warship approaching the Ryukyu Islands, the Luzon Strait or waters near the northern Philippines could face threats from several possible firing areas rather than a single fixed coastal battery. Kongsberg lists the Naval Strike Missile’s range as exceeding 300 kilometers, although real engagement distances would depend on launch location, flight profile, targeting data and mission conditions. This creates overlapping threat zones that could force surface groups to change routes, increase defensive readiness or dedicate surveillance and strike assets to locating relatively small Marine units ashore.

    At the tactical level, NMESISgives the Marine Corps a shoot-and-displace capability built around remotely operated vehicles carrying two Naval Strike Missiles. Launcher teams can move between concealed positions, receive targeting information from external sensors, fire without remaining exposed for long periods and relocate before counterfire arrives. The missile’s passive seeker, low-altitude flight profile and terminal manoeuvrability are designed to reduce warning time and complicate interception. Its effectiveness, however, depends on a wider kill chain linking reconnaissance assets, command networks and firing units; the launcher cannot independently create a reliable targeting picture against mobile ships beyond the horizon.

    Recent exercises indicate that the Marine Corps is testing the mobility required for this concept rather than treating NMESIS as a static coastal-defence system. During Balikatan 2025, Marines transported launchers across northern Luzon and the Batanes Islands using U.S. Army and Air Force aircraft. During Balikatan 2026, NMESIS was moved by C-130J aircraft to Itbayat and through a joint ship-to-shore operation on Calayan, demonstrating the ability to insert maritime-strike systems by both air and sea. The operational value extends beyond transportation: each movement could allow Marine units to establish a temporary missile engagement zone near the Luzon Strait, relocate before an adversary completes its targeting cycle and later reappear from another position. As Army Recognition assessed, these deployments reflect a shift away from dependence on large, predictable bases toward dispersed and survivable strike nodes connected to expeditionary logistics and wider sensor-to-shooter networks. In practical terms, the exercises are testing whether U.S. and Philippine forces can turn the archipelago’s geography into a deterrent advantage by creating short-lived firing windows and forcing hostile naval forces to search a much wider battlespace.

    The approach also strengthens alliance-based sea denial. U.S. Marines have rehearsed the integration of NMESIS with Japan’s Type 12 surface-to-ship missile units in the Sakishima Islands, while deployments in the Philippines have linked American missile forces with Philippine Marines and strategically located northern islands. In a crisis, such cooperation could produce a distributed network of allied sensors and anti-ship weapons covering several maritime approaches. It would also give Washington more firing options without concentrating all long-range strike capability aboard ships and aircraft, which are likely to face intense pressure during the opening stages of a high-end conflict.

    This posture carries risks and limitations. Forward missile units require political permission to operate from allied territory, secure communications, accurate target identification, dependable resupply and protection against drones, missiles, electronic warfare and special operations forces. Each NMESIS launcher carries only two missiles, making reloading and ammunition distribution central tactical vulnerabilities. The publicized reloading drills conducted in Okinawa show that the Marine Corps is already addressing this challenge, but sustaining dispersed batteries during combat would be substantially harder than moving them during exercises.

    The arrival of NMESIS on Okinawa and its repeated deployment to the Philippines also sends a deterrent signal before any conflict begins. It demonstrates that U.S. forces are building the ability to place anti-ship missiles close to contested waterways and connect them with Japanese, Philippine and joint U.S. targeting networks. At the same time, visible deployment of such systems could increase regional tension, encourage attacks against launch areas early in a crisis and place greater political pressure on host governments whose territory could become part of an active maritime kill chain.

    The $50.3 million modification under contract N00024-25-C-5434 is significant because it supports a wider transformation in how the United States plans to contest maritime space. Rather than relying mainly on warships and combat aircraft to hold hostile fleets at risk, the Marine Corps is developing mobile land-based forces that can contribute directly to naval operations from dispersed coastal and island positions. The additional Naval Strike Missilecapacity associated with the Kongsberg contract will not independently deny access to strategic waterways, but when combined with allied basing, persistent surveillance, resilient communications and reliable logistics, it can complicate enemy planning, expand the number of potential firing locations and increase the risks facing hostile surface forces operating inside the first island chain.

    Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

    Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.

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  • Germany Awards Rheinmetall and MBDA Major Contract to Develop High-Energy Naval Laser Weapon by 2029

    Germany has awarded Rheinmetall and MBDA a major contract to turn a proven naval laser demonstrator into an operational high-energy weapon system for the German Navy by 2029 (Picture Source: Rheinmetall)

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    Germany has awarded the Rheinmetall-MBDA team a contract to develop an operational high-energy laser weapon for the German Navy, a move announced by Rheinmetall on 9 July 2026 that shifts the programme from successful trials to frontline capability. Planned to enter service by 2029, the system is designed to strengthen naval defenses against drones and other airborne, maritime, and land-based threats while accelerating Germany’s adoption of directed-energy weapons for future naval warfare.

    Building on a demonstrator that fired more than 1,000 successful shots during extensive land and sea testing, the new system will integrate the complete kill chain from target detection and tracking to laser engagement. The programme also reinforces Germany’s domestic defense industrial base by keeping key technologies, engineering expertise, and production in-country while providing the Navy with a precise, low-cost defensive capability for high-intensity and persistent operations.

    Related Topic: Lockheed Martin’s 500 kW Containerized Laser Weapon System Anchors Next-Generation U.S. Air Defense Architecture

    Germany has awarded Rheinmetall and MBDA a major contract to turn a proven naval laser demonstrator into an operational high-energy weapon system for the German Navy by 2029 (Picture Source: Rheinmetall)

    On 9 July 2026, Germany’s defence procurement authority awarded the Rheinmetall-MBDA team a major contract to develop a high-energy laser weapon system for the German Navy. The decision advances the programme from an extensively tested demonstrator to a complete maritime combat capability. Expected to become operational by 2029, the weapon will strengthen naval protection against airborne, maritime and land-based threats, including drones. Rheinmetall announced the award while outlining its technical scope, industrial framework and strategic importance for Germany.

    The Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support, BAAINBw, signed the contract with the High-Energy Laser Naval Demonstrator Working Group, known as ARGE HEL. The organisation consists of MBDA Deutschland and Rheinmetall Waffe Munition, which are currently forming a joint venture for the programme. Valued in the mid three-digit million-euro range, the agreement marks a decisive step towards fielding an operational laser weapon for the German Navy.

    The contract covers the development of a complete system for maritime applications, extending beyond the laser effector itself. Rheinmetall and MBDA will deliver the entire operational chain, from reconnaissance and target tracking to engagement. The system will be tailored to Bundeswehr requirements, creating an integrated naval capability designed around the German armed forces’ operational needs.

    German supply chains and domestic systems expertise will remain central to the development effort. By retaining key engineering capabilities and production knowledge inside the country, the programme is intended to secure German sovereignty in a strategically important defence technology. Rheinmetall has also indicated that series production will largely take place in Germany, supporting new specialist employment and training opportunities.

    The weapon system will build directly on the naval laser demonstrator previously deployed aboard the German frigate SACHSEN. During its evaluation campaign, the demonstrator travelled approximately 28,000 nautical miles across the North Sea, Baltic Sea and Mediterranean. The equipment was tested at sea under operational conditions for an entire year and demonstrated its effectiveness in adverse weather.

    Further trials were conducted at the Bundeswehr Technical Centre for Weapons and Ammunition, WTD 91, in Meppen. Across more than a year of testing and operational use, over 1,000 shots were successfully fired against airborne, maritime and land-based targets. In March 2026, the demonstrator repeatedly displayed its capabilities to senior German delegations at the facility, confirming the technological maturity needed to proceed with development of a complete operational system.

    Precision beam control is one of the system’s defining technical features. According to Rheinmetall, refined beam quality and advanced tracking allow the laser to focus its energy onto an area measuring only a few centimetres, even when engaging moving targets. The resulting energy density enables targets to be engaged more quickly, accurately and effectively while requiring less laser power.

    Roman Koehne, head of Rheinmetall’s Weapon and Ammunition Division, said the programme demonstrates the technological maturity achieved by combining the complementary capabilities of Rheinmetall and MBDA. He said the system would provide greater protection for personnel aboard naval vessels, particularly against drones. Thomas Gottschild, Managing Director of MBDA Deutschland, described the project as a technologically sophisticated programme tailored to Bundeswehr requirements and highlighted the containerised laser effector’s potential for cost-efficient port protection and other applications.

    The contract transforms Germany’s naval laser initiative from a proven demonstrator into a funded weapon-development programme with the objective of achieving operational capability by 2029. Successful delivery would give the German Navy a highly precise defensive capability against threats across the air, maritime and land domains while preserving critical industrial knowledge and production capacity inside Germany. The programme now represents a major step towards integrating directed-energy weapons into future German naval operations.

    Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

    Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.

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