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U.S. Marine Corps Retires AV-8B Harrier II Jump Jet as F-35B Assumes Full Combat Mission
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After spending tens of billions of dollars on development, procurement, and fielding, the U.S. Marine Corps has finally reached the moment that will determine whether one of the Pentagon's most controversial aviation investments was worth the cost. With the retirement of the last AV-8B Harrier II in June 2026 and the Lockheed Martin F-35B Lightning II now fully assuming its role, the long-running debate over the future of U.S. Marine Corps expeditionary aviation can finally be judged on operational results rather than promises.

The retirement of the AV-8B Harrier II marks the end of more than four decades of combat service for the iconic jump jet that became synonymous with U.S. Marine Corps expeditionary warfare. The final AV-8B flight during the Harrier Sundown Ceremony at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point closes a chapter that began during the Cold War and opens a new one dominated by fifth-generation stealth fighters, network-centric warfare, and preparations for potential high-intensity conflict in the Indo-Pacific.

Related Topic: U.S. Marine AV-8B Harrier Executes Live Precision Strike from USS Iwo Jima over Caribbean Sea

An AV-8B Harrier II of U.S. Marine Corps VMA-223 taxis at MCAS Cherry Point during the June 2026 Harrier Sundown Ceremony. The event marked the retirement of the last operational Harrier squadron and the completion of the U.S. Marine Corps' transition to the F-35 Lightning II. (Picture source: U.S. Department of War/Defense)

For years, critics questioned whether the F-35B's unprecedented acquisition costs, development delays, and technical challenges could ever be justified as a replacement for the Harrier. Supporters within the U.S. Marine Corps argued that preserving the aircraft's short takeoff and vertical landing capability while adding stealth, advanced sensors, electronic warfare systems, and networked combat capabilities would prove essential for future warfare, particularly against peer adversaries such as China. Now that the Harrier is officially retired and the F-35B is fully operational across the U.S. Marine Corps aviation, the replacement decision can be evaluated against the capability it actually delivered.

The decision to replace was never simply about acquiring a newer aircraft. The AV-8B Harrier II occupied a unique position within the U.S. military. Operated exclusively by the U.S. Marine Corps, the aircraft provided short takeoff and vertical landing capabilities that enabled fixed-wing combat operations from amphibious assault ships, damaged runways, and austere expeditionary airfields near frontline forces. Preserving this operational flexibility was considered essential to U.S. Marine Corps expeditionary warfare doctrine.

As the Harrier fleet aged, the U.S. Marine Corps examined several options. One possibility involved extending the service life of the AV-8B through additional upgrades and structural modifications. While potentially less expensive in the short term, such a solution would have left the U.S. Marine Corps dependent on Cold War-era aircraft and increasingly vulnerable to modern air defense systems. Another option was to replace the Harrier with conventional fighter aircraft, such as the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. However, these aircraft lacked the ability to operate from amphibious assault ships and short expeditionary airstrips, effectively eliminating them from consideration.

Witness the incredible AV-8B Harrier, a true icon of military aviation, showcasing its unique vertical landing and takeoff capabilities. This combat aircraft, a marvel of engineering, is operated by the us marines. See the fighter jet in action, from cockpit preparations to dynamic flight sequences, culminating in its signature vertical landing.

The F-35B ultimately emerged as the only aircraft capable of preserving the Harrier's expeditionary operating concept while introducing capabilities required for future warfare. The U.S. Marine Corps became the strongest institutional supporter of the short takeoff and vertical landing variant because no alternative could simultaneously maintain amphibious aviation operations and provide the survivability needed against advanced military powers. While acquisition costs remained controversial, U.S. Marine Corps leaders consistently argued that abandoning the F-35B would force the service to sacrifice a unique operational advantage that no other branch of the U.S. military possessed.

Two decades later, with the Harrier now retired and the F-35B fully operational, the comparison can be assessed from an operational rather than theoretical perspective.

At first glance, both aircraft perform the same core mission set. The AV-8B and F-35B can conduct close air support, battlefield interdiction, armed reconnaissance, precision strike operations, and expeditionary deployments from amphibious assault ships and austere forward operating locations. Both aircraft were designed to meet the U.S. Marine Corps requirement for tactical airpower close to ground forces, without relying on conventional aircraft carriers or large fixed air bases.

However, the AV-8B was fundamentally an attack aircraft optimized for delivering ordnance in support of ground troops. Although the AV-8B Harrier II Plus received significant upgrades, including the AN/APG-65 multimode radar and compatibility with precision-guided munitions, its effectiveness remained largely dependent on pilot workload, external targeting information, and limited onboard sensors.

The F-35B performs every mission assigned to the Harrier while dramatically expanding the aircraft's operational role. Rather than functioning solely as a strike aircraft, it serves as a multirole stealth fighter capable of collecting, processing, and distributing battlefield information across air, land, and maritime domains. Its AN/APG-81 Active Electronically Scanned Array radar, Distributed Aperture System, Electro-Optical Targeting System, advanced electronic warfare suite, and secure data links create a fused operational picture unmatched by any aircraft previously operated by the U.S. Marine Corps.

This sensor-fusion capability is one of the most significant differences between the two aircraft. An AV-8B pilot was required to interpret information from multiple independent systems while relying heavily on support from airborne warning aircraft, ground controllers, and intelligence assets. The F-35B automatically integrates information from onboard and external sensors, reducing pilot workload while dramatically increasing situational awareness. The aircraft can then share this information in real time with other aircraft, warships, missile batteries, and ground forces, creating a networked combat architecture that extends far beyond the aircraft itself.

The survivability gap is even more pronounced. The AV-8B was designed during an era when air superiority could often be assumed. While it proved highly effective during operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, and numerous expeditionary deployments, it was not designed to penetrate sophisticated integrated air-defense networks. The aircraft relied on terrain masking, tactical maneuvering, and defensive countermeasures to survive in hostile airspace.

The F-35B was specifically designed for operations against advanced air-defense systems. Its low-observable characteristics reduce radar detection ranges, while its electronic warfare systems enable the identification and suppression of hostile sensors and missile networks. In practical terms, this allows the aircraft to survive and operate in contested environments where legacy aircraft would require extensive support from electronic attack assets, escorts, and suppression-of-enemy-air-defense missions.

The difference is particularly relevant in the event of a potential conflict with China. The People's Liberation Army has invested heavily in anti-access and area-denial capabilities, including advanced surface-to-air missile systems, long-range sensors, integrated command networks, and anti-ship weapons designed to challenge U.S. military operations throughout the Indo-Pacific. While the AV-8B was optimized for expeditionary warfare against less sophisticated opponents, the F-35B was specifically developed to operate in the highly contested environments expected during a future confrontation with a peer adversary.

The contrast is equally evident in air-to-air combat. Although the AV-8B could carry AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles for self-defense, it was never intended to serve as a dedicated fighter aircraft. The F-35B can employ AIM-120 AMRAAM beyond-visual-range missiles, engage enemy aircraft, and conduct offensive counter-air operations while simultaneously carrying out strike missions. This gives U.S. Marine Corps aviation a level of multirole flexibility unavailable to previous Harrier squadrons.

Weapon employment has also evolved significantly. The Harrier could carry a broad range of bombs, rockets, and missiles on external hardpoints, making it an effective close-support aircraft. The F-35B can carry comparable weapons externally when maximum payload is required, but can also transport precision-guided munitions internally while maintaining a low radar signature. This enables the aircraft to strike defended targets while preserving its stealth advantages.

Perhaps the most important difference is that the F-35B contributes to missions that were never part of the Harrier's design. Beyond delivering weapons, the aircraft can conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations, support electronic warfare missions, identify enemy air-defense networks, and serve as a battlefield information hub linking naval, air, and ground forces. In many operational scenarios, its ability to collect and distribute information may be as valuable as its ability to launch weapons.

The strategic significance of this capability expansion is most evident in the U.S. Marine Corps' Force Design modernization initiative and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations concept. These initiatives were developed in response to growing concerns about China's military modernization and the possibility of future conflict in the Indo-Pacific. U.S. Marine Corps units are increasingly expected to operate from dispersed island locations, temporary airfields, and amphibious assault ships while remaining connected to joint and allied forces across vast distances.

In such an environment, the F-35B offers capabilities the Harrier could never provide. Acting as both a stealth fighter and a sensor node, the aircraft can help detect hostile warships, identify missile launchers, provide targeting data for long-range precision weapons, and contribute to joint maritime operations. This transforms U.S. Marine Corps aviation from a force primarily focused on supporting ground troops into a key contributor to broader naval and joint campaigns.

The retirement of the AV-8B therefore represents more than the withdrawal of an iconic aircraft. It provides a real-world measure of whether one of the U.S. Marine Corps' most expensive and controversial procurement decisions achieved its intended objective. While debates over cost and program management are likely to continue, operational experience increasingly supports the original rationale behind the replacement effort.

The U.S. Marine Corps has not simply replaced the Harrier. It has preserved the expeditionary aviation model that made the AV-8B unique while adding stealth, advanced sensing, electronic warfare, intelligence-gathering, and network-centric warfare capabilities designed for future conflicts against peer adversaries. In the F-35B versus Harrier debate, the AV-8 B's retirement allows the answer to be judged by capability rather than promises. The result is an aircraft that performs every mission of its predecessor while providing the survivability, connectivity, and combat effectiveness required for warfare in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

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Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
Poland to lease HMS Sodermanland submarine from Sweden until first Saab A26 arrives
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Poland will lease the submarine HMS Södermanland from Sweden as a bridge to its future Saab A26 fleet, a move confirmed by the Swedish Navy on June 2, 2026, that helps prevent a dangerous erosion of undersea warfare expertise while new submarines are still under construction. The arrangement gives the Polish Navy an operational vessel for training and force generation years before the first A26 enters service, preserving a critical combat capability in the Baltic region.

The rebuilt submarine brings air-independent propulsion technology, modern submarine operating practices, and relevant combat-system experience that closely align with the capabilities Poland will field on the A26 Blekinge-class submarine. By training crews, engineers, and maintainers on an operational AIP-equipped submarine, Warsaw can accelerate readiness, strengthen long-term sustainment capacity, and enter the next generation of submarine warfare with a trained force already in place.

Related topic:Saab to supply three A26 Blekinge-class submarines to Poland to improve Baltic Sea security

Polish submarine personnel will begin formal training in Karlskrona in August 2026, HMS Södermanland is expected to transfer in 2027, and the submarine will remain available until the first Polish A26 enters service. (Picture source: Swedish MoD)

On June 2, 2026, the Swedish Navy confirmed that Poland will lease the submarine HMS Södermanland from the Swedish Armed Forces as part of the wider submarine package associated with Warsaw's November 2025 selection of three Saab A26 submarines under the Orka program. The lease addresses a specific problem facing the Polish Navy: the gap between the declining operational value of its existing submarine force and the lengthy construction timeline required to field an entirely new class of submarines. Under the arrangement, Polish submarine personnel will begin formal training in Karlskrona in August 2026, HMS Södermanland is expected to transfer in 2027, and the submarine will remain available until the first Polish A26 enters service.

The project combines the temporary transfer of a submarine with crew training, technical education, maintenance preparation, industrial participation, and long-term cooperation between the Swedish and Polish submarine communities. Rather than waiting until the first A26 is delivered, Poland will gain several years to build crews, instructors, engineers, maintenance organizations, and operational procedures before the new submarines arrive, resulting effectively in a force-generation program built around an operational submarine. The urgency behind the agreement becomes clear when examining the current state of Poland's submarine force.

Today, ORP Orzeł remains the only operational submarine in Polish service. The submarine is a Soviet-built Project 877E Kilo-class boat commissioned during the 1980s and represents the last remaining element of what was once a larger Polish undersea force. The retirement of the Kobben-class submarines removed four additional boats from service and, equally important, reduced the number of available training billets, instructor positions, and maintenance opportunities that sustain long-term submarine competence. Submarine forces differ from many other naval capabilities because crews cannot be generated rapidly once experience is lost.

Commanding officers, engineering officers, sonar operators, weapons specialists, and maintenance technicians typically require years of operational experience before reaching full proficiency. Poland's November 2025 selection of the A26 solved the question of future fleet replacement, but it did not solve the problem of preserving submarine expertise during the years separating contract signature from fleet introduction. The Södermanland lease is therefore intended to prevent a situation in which Poland receives modern submarines but lacks sufficient experienced personnel to operate them at full capability from the outset. The submarine selected for the transition role is significantly different from the vessel that originally entered Swedish service.

HMS Södermanland was commissioned on April 21, 1989, as the third submarine of the Västergötland-class. Between 2000 and 2004, however, the submarine underwent a reconstruction effort substantial enough to create an entirely new class. The pressure hull was cut and lengthened by approximately 12 meters, increasing overall length from roughly 48.5 meters to 60.5 meters. Submerged displacement increased to approximately 1,500 tonnes. The reconstruction introduced an air-independent propulsion (AIP) system and required modifications extensive enough for the submarine to be redesignated as a Södermanland-class vessel rather than remain part of the Västergötland-class.

This distinction matters because Poland is not receiving a submarine preserved in its original late-Cold War configuration. Instead, Polish crews will train on a submarine rebuilt around technologies and operating concepts that remain directly relevant to modern Western conventional submarine operations. In practical terms, the gap between HMS Södermanland and the future A26 is considerably smaller than the gap between ORP Orzeł and the A26. The most important operational change concerns propulsion and underwater endurance. ORP Orzeł relies on a conventional diesel-electric propulsion system that requires periodic snorkeling to recharge batteries.

HMS Södermanland incorporates two Kockums Stirling air-independent propulsion units, which fundamentally change how a submarine is operated. A conventional diesel-electric submarine must periodically expose a snorkel mast above the surface to run diesel generators and recharge batteries. An AIP-equipped submarine can remain submerged for substantially longer periods while generating electrical power without snorkeling. This changes patrol planning, intelligence collection, surveillance operations, and tactical employment, as underwater endurance measured in weeks rather than days becomes a realistic planning factor. Crew routines, engineering procedures, maintenance requirements, and energy management practices are all affected.

The significance of the lease, therefore, lies not only in transferring a submarine but also in exposing Polish crews to the operational realities of AIP-based submarine operations years before the first A26 is delivered. Since the future Polish A26 fleet will also employ Stirling AIP technology, the training received aboard Södermanland directly supports future operational requirements. HMS Södermanland also provides a relevant environment for Swedish weapons, sensor, and combat system training. The submarine carries six 533 mm torpedo tubes and three 400 mm torpedo tubes, giving it a larger torpedo armament than the future A26 design, which is planned to carry four 533 mm tubes and two 400 mm tubes. Crew complement, for its part, normally ranges between 24 and 28 personnel.

The submarine is capable of anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, surveillance, reconnaissance, and mine-laying missions. Training programs planned for Polish personnel extend beyond navigation and seamanship and include combat system operation, weapons procedures, engineering support, submarine safety, and submarine rescue. One notable feature of the program is the decision to begin with technical personnel before operational crews. This reflects the reality that maintenance expertise often requires more time to develop than crew proficiency. Modern submarines depend on extensive support organizations capable of conducting maintenance, managing spare parts, supporting dockyard activities, and troubleshooting complex onboard systems.

A navy can train a submarine crew relatively quickly compared with the years required to build an experienced maintenance structure. The sequencing adopted by Sweden and Poland indicates that sustaining the future A26 fleet is being treated as a priority equal to operating it. However, the transfer carries measurable consequences for Sweden's own submarine force. Following the retirement of the second Södermanland-class in 2021, the HMS Östergötland, Sweden's operational submarine inventory consists of three Gotland-class submarines and one active Södermanland-class submarine. Leasing HMS Södermanland therefore reduces Sweden's active force from four submarines to three until replacement capacity becomes available.

This reduction becomes more significant when viewed alongside Sweden's recent investments in the vessel. In September 2022, Swedish authorities approved a second life-extension effort for HMS Södermanland valued at approximately SEK 470 million, which included overhaul activities, battery replacement, battery development, and additional work intended to preserve operational availability for several more years. The scale of the investment indicates that Swedish planners expected the submarine to remain active well into the late 2020s. The decision to transfer the vessel despite those investments suggests that supporting the Polish transition to the A26 has been judged more valuable than retaining a fourth operational submarine during the interim period.

Until the arrival of HMS Blekinge and HMS Skåne, Sweden will therefore rely entirely on its three Gotland-class submarines to sustain operational submarine availability. The lease is inseparable from the broader A26 program, also known as the Blekinge-class, and from Poland's emergence as the first export customer for the class. Poland announced the selection of three A26 submarines in November 2025, while Sweden is simultaneously building two submarines of the same family, HMS Blekinge and HMS Skåne. Current schedules place Swedish deliveries in 2031 and 2033. The Polish submarines will be constructed by Saab Kockums in Karlskrona with participation from Polish industry, creating a common industrial and operational ecosystem around the A26 design.

Shared logistics, common maintenance procedures, compatible training systems, and coordinated future upgrades become more practical when two Baltic Sea navies operate the same submarine class. HMS Södermanland functions as the bridge between these two phases: the political decision to acquire the A26 and the eventual introduction of the new fleet. Historically, Sweden has employed similar approaches during submarine exports. Australia received extensive training support in connection with the Collins-class submarines, which were derived from the Västergötland-class.

Denmark leased the submarine Näcken, redesignated as Kronborg, between 2001 and 2005 while developing its own submarine competence. Singapore received years of training support before taking delivery of former Swedish submarines Västergötland and Hälsingland following modernization work. The Polish arrangement follows the same model. The objective is not simply to deliver three submarines, but to ensure that when those A26 submarines arrive, Poland already possesses trained crews, qualified instructors, experienced maintainers, established operational procedures, and a functioning support structure capable of sustaining a modern submarine force from the first day of service.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
Taiwan Tests U.S.-Made TOW and Javelin Missiles Against Maritime Targets to Refine Anti-Landing Defense Strategy
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Taiwan has demonstrated an expanded coastal defense capability by employing U.S.-supplied TOW and Javelin missile systems against maritime targets during a coordinated live-fire exercise, underscoring a growing emphasis on defeating amphibious assault forces before they reach the shoreline. During drills conducted by the Fourth Combat Zone and reported by the Taiwanese Military News Agency on June 3, 2026, Taiwanese forces integrated precision-guided missiles, artillery, and mortars into a unified anti-landing defense framework designed to target hostile forces during the critical sea-to-shore transition phase.

The exercise notably included successful TOW missile engagements against simulated maritime targets, highlighting Taiwan’s efforts to adapt proven anti-armor weapons for littoral warfare. Combined with Javelin teams, mobile firing procedures, and coordinated fire-support assets, the drills showcased a layered defensive approach intended to disrupt, delay, and fragment amphibious assault formations while strengthening Taiwan’s ability to sustain mobile and resilient coastal defense operations under combat

Related Topic: Taiwan Moves Toward Autonomous Coastal Denial Network with Shield AI Hivemind-Powered Thunder Tiger Sea Drones

Taiwan tested U.S.-made TOW and Javelin missiles against maritime targets during a major live-fire exercise to strengthen its layered coastal defense strategy against potential amphibious assaults (Picture Source: Taiwanese Military News Agency)

On June 3, 2026, Taiwan’s Fourth Combat Zone conducted a coordinated multi-site live-fire exercise, the Taiwanese Military News Agency reported, deploying artillery, mortars, anti-armor missile systems, and mobile fire-support platforms to assess the combat effectiveness of the southern defense zone. Held across Xishu Beach in Tainan, Fangshan in Pingtung, and Fenggang North Training Ground in Pingtung, the drills brought together the 137th Infantry Brigade, the 333rd Combined Arms Brigade, the 43rd Artillery Command, the Infantry Training Command, the Artillery Training Command, and the 99th Marine Brigade. The firing sequence included M110A2 self-propelled guns, 155 mm and 105 mm howitzers, 120 mm and 81 mm mortars, M1167 HMMWV TOW missile vehicles equipped with M41A7 ITAS launchers, M220A2 TOW missile launchers, and M98A2 Javelin missile systems. Beyond verifying individual weapon performance, the exercise reflected Taiwan’s effort to integrate mobile missile teams, coastal artillery, mortars, and coordinated fire-control procedures into a layered anti-landing defense concept aimed at threats approaching from the sea.

A central element of the exercise was the use of TOW and Javelin missile systems against simulated maritime targets. This detail is operationally significant because it shows that Taiwan is adapting land-based anti-armor weapons for a wider littoral defense role. In a potential Taiwan Strait crisis, hostile landing craft, amphibious armored vehicles, fast assault boats, support vessels, and dismounted formations approaching the shore would be exposed during the final phase of their movement from sea to land. By training M1167 TOW missile vehicles and M98A2 Javelin teams against maritime targets, the Fourth Combat Zone demonstrated how precision anti-armor systems can support an anti-landing strategy designed to break up an assault before enemy forces can consolidate a beachhead.

The deployment of M1167 HMMWV-mounted TOW missile vehicles carrying M41A7 ITAS launchers gives Taiwan a mobile and relatively survivable coastal precision-fire capability. The Improved Target Acquisition System enhances target detection, identification, and engagement under battlefield conditions, while the TOW-2A missile provides a wire-guided precision strike option suitable for controlled engagements against selected targets. The reported accurate hit of a TOW-2A missile against a target at sea demonstrated not only the missile’s ability to strike a maritime target but also the crew’s capacity to maintain tracking, apply wire-guided correction, and complete the engagement sequence under live-fire conditions. In coastal combat, this type of discipline is essential because targets may be moving, partially obscured, or operating under covering fire.

The M98A2 Javelin missile systems add a complementary layer to this shore-defense architecture. While TOW is more suited to vehicle-mounted engagements from prepared or semi-prepared positions, Javelin gives infantry and marine teams a more portable fire-and-forget capability. This allows small units to operate from concealed terrain, urban edges, secondary defensive belts, beach exits, and road junctions where enemy landing forces would need to move after reaching shore. Together, TOW and Javelin systems create overlapping engagement zones. TOW vehicles can strike maritime and amphibious targets during the approach phase, while Javelin teams can cover closer, dispersed, or follow-on targets once hostile forces attempt to move inland.

The exercise also emphasized mobile firing procedures, target identification and lock-on, wire-guided missile correction, rapid displacement after firing, and coordinated artillery fire control. These are not secondary details but core requirements for survivability in a Taiwan Strait scenario. Any missile team or artillery battery firing from coastal positions would likely face rapid counterfire from drones, loitering munitions, attack helicopters, naval gunfire, rockets, or precision-guided weapons. The ability to fire, assess the result, displace quickly, and re-engage from another location is therefore essential. This shoot-and-scoot approach allows Taiwan to preserve combat power while forcing an adversary to search for dispersed and mobile targets rather than fixed firing points.

The artillery and mortar components gave the missile engagements broader tactical value. At Xishu Beach, 155 mm and 105 mm howitzers conducted area fire, high-angle fire, illumination missions, and airburst-fuze firing, while other firing activities included self-propelled howitzers and coordinated fire missions. At Fangshan, 120 mm and 81 mm mortars supported the live-fire sequence alongside TOW and Javelin systems. At Fenggang North, M110A2 self-propelled guns and 155 mm howitzers were used to verify fire-support procedures and key-area fire control. In a coastal defense battle, artillery and mortars can suppress landing zones, disrupt formations, illuminate night approaches, force enemy vehicles into predictable routes, and support missile teams by shaping the battlefield before precision weapons are used against priority targets.

From a strategic perspective, the exercise shows that Taiwan is preparing for the specific challenge posed by China’s ability to generate military pressure across the Taiwan Strait. Amphibious operations are among the most complex forms of warfare because they require coordination between naval, air, missile, logistics, command, and ground forces. They are also vulnerable during the transition from sea to shore. Taiwan’s defense concept seeks to exploit that vulnerability by creating layered zones of fire along likely coastal approaches. The combination of howitzers, mortars, TOW missiles, Javelin missiles, mobile firing vehicles, and dispersed infantry teams is intended to make any attempted landing costly, slow, and uncertain.

The geographic setting of the exercise also matters. Tainan and Pingtung are part of Taiwan’s southern defense space, facing waters linked to the Taiwan Strait, the southern approaches to the island, and the wider maritime routes around the Bashi Channel. These areas would be important in any scenario involving amphibious pressure, maritime interdiction, or attempts to open new axes of approach against Taiwan’s coastline. Conducting live-fire training at Xishu Beach, Fangshan, and Fenggang North therefore has operational meaning beyond local training. It allows Taiwanese forces to rehearse the use of real terrain, coastal firing zones, and defensive positions that could be relevant in wartime.

The exercise also highlights the continued value of U.S.-origin weapons in Taiwan’s defensive posture. TOW and Javelin systems are not offensive strategic weapons; they are tactical defensive systems designed to stop armored, mechanized, and amphibious threats at decisive points on the battlefield. Their importance lies in mobility, precision, relative ease of dispersion, and the ability to give small units the means to destroy high-value targets. In this context, the use of M1167 TOW missile vehicles, M41A7 ITAS launchers, TOW-2A missiles, and M98A2 Javelin systems reflects a credible deterrence-by-denial approach. It also demonstrates the practical value of U.S.-Taiwan defense cooperation in strengthening Taiwan’s ability to defend its territory with systems suited to dispersed, resilient, and mobile operations.

The June 3 live-fire exercise by Taiwan’s Fourth Combat Zone carried significance beyond the number of weapons fired. It showed how Taiwan is combining mobile anti-armor missiles, artillery, mortars, target acquisition, rapid displacement, and coordinated fire-control procedures into a coherent anti-landing defense concept. The accurate engagement of a maritime target by a TOW-2A missile, the deployment of M98A2 Javelin systems, and the integration of multiple artillery and mortar assets demonstrated a force training for the realities of coastal combat rather than symbolic display. Against the backdrop of continued Chinese military pressure, the exercise underlined Taiwan’s determination to defend its shores, use its home-field advantage, and rely on mobile precision fires as a central pillar of homeland defense.

Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
Russian nuclear battlecruiser Admiral Nakhimov enters final sea trials to challenge US in the Arctic
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Russia’s nuclear-powered battlecruiser Admiral Nakhimov has entered its final sea trials after leaving Sevmash on May 31, marking the return of one of the most heavily armed surface warships in the world after nearly three decades in overhaul, according to a June 1, 2026 announcement by the Russian Ministry of Transport. Its reactivation strengthens Russia’s ability to defend strategic Arctic waters and protect the Northern Fleet’s ballistic missile submarine bastions, a mission central to Moscow’s nuclear deterrent posture.

The rebuilt cruiser replaces its Cold War-era weapons suite with 80 universal vertical launch cells capable of firing Kalibr, Oniks, and Zircon missiles, supported by a heavily upgraded air defense network and modern combat systems. While the ship delivers exceptional missile capacity and endurance for Arctic operations, its military value depends on effective targeting networks and it concentrates a significant share of Russian naval firepower on a single, high-value platform.

Related topic:Russia's upgraded nuclear battlecruiser Admiral Nakhimov returns to sea for first time since 1997

Russia’s nuclear-powered battlecruiser Admiral Nakhimov has entered its final sea trials after leaving Sevmash on May 31, marking the return of one of the most heavily armed surface warships in the world after nearly three decades in overhaul. (Picture source: X/OSINTWarfare)

On June 1, 2026, the Russian Ministry of Transport announced that the nuclear-powered battlecruiser Admiral Nakhimov had entered the final phase of sea trials after departing Sevmash on May 31, moving a modernization effort that began before many of the sailors who will eventually serve aboard the ship were born. The Kirov-class vessel, commissioned as Kalinin on December 30, 1988, effectively disappeared from operational service after entering refit preparations in 1997 and arriving at Sevmash in 1999. By the time the ship completes trials and formally returns to service, nearly 27 years will have elapsed between its arrival at the shipyard and operational reactivation, which exceeds the period during which the cruiser operated in frontline service as a Soviet Navy ship.

The return of Admiral Nakhimov also highlights the extent to which Russia's large surface combatant force has contracted since the Soviet period. Of the four Project 1144 Orlan-class nuclear cruisers originally built, two have been scrapped, one may be retired without modernization, and only the Admiral Nakhimov is completing a full reconstruction. The result is that one of the largest naval modernization programs undertaken by post-Soviet Russia has produced a single operational cruiser rather than a class of ships, raising questions regarding opportunity costs, fleet priorities, and whether the modernization program justifies the resources consumed over nearly three decades.

What emerged from Sevmash is fundamentally different from the nuclear cruiser that entered the yard at the end of the 1990s. The original Soviet combat system was largely removed: the twenty P-700 Granit anti-ship missiles that defined the ship's Cold War strike role disappeared entirely, replaced by ten UKSK launch modules containing eighty universal vertical launch cells, which can employ Kalibr land-attack missiles, P-800 Oniks anti-ship missiles, 3M22 Zircon hypersonic missiles, and Otvet anti-submarine weapons. The air defense architecture was rebuilt around the Fort-M system, supplemented by six Pantsir-M close-range defense systems, new fire control systems, and new radar equipment.

The Admiral Nakhimov also received new communications infrastructure, digital battle management architecture, power distribution networks, electronic warfare equipment, and internal control systems. The propulsion plant underwent a similarly extensive reconstruction, as one KN-3 nuclear reactor was restarted in December 2024 and the second in February 2025, restoring the ship's nuclear propulsion for the first time in decades. In practical terms, the modernization preserved the hull, propulsion arrangement, and general dimensions of a late-Soviet cruiser while modernizing much of the equipment that determines combat effectiveness, to adapt to threat perceptions of the 2020s rather than those of the late 1980s.

The military value of Admiral Nakhimov is concentrated overwhelmingly in missile capacity. Current estimates indicate a total of 176 major launch cells, including 80 strike missile cells and 96 long-range air-defense cells. Few surface combatants currently in service approach those numbers, as it represents 57% more cells than China's Type 055, 83% more than a U.S. Navy Arleigh Burke Flight III, and 120% more than a Zumwalt-class destroyer. In short, the Admiral Nakhimov brings the equivalent firepower of several smaller combatants together on a single 28,000-ton hull. However, the United States fields 77 Arleigh Burke destroyers, while China continues serial production of the Type 055 alongside other destroyer classes.

Russia's Kalibr, Oniks, and Zircon already exist aboard frigates, submarines, and coastal formations. Like the future Trump-class battleship, the significance of the Admiral Nakhimov primarily lies in carrying the largest quantity of weapons possible on a single vessel. Still, the strategic rationale for the ship may become clearer when examined through Russia's Northern Fleet requirements rather than through comparisons with U.S. carrier strike groups. Russia's most important naval mission remains the protection of its sea-based nuclear deterrent, as Borei and Delta IV ballistic missile submarines operating from the Kola Peninsula are expected to move into protected operating areas in the Barents Sea and Kara Sea during periods of tension or conflict.

Those waters form the core of Russia's bastion-defense concept, and the Admiral Nakhimov's characteristics align closely with that specific mission. Nuclear propulsion provides effectively unlimited range and permits extended operations in Arctic waters without dependence on fuel logistics. The vessel can sustain long deployments in regions where support infrastructure is sparse and weather conditions are demanding. Its 96 long-range air-defense cells provide substantial engagement capacity against aircraft, cruise missiles, and other threats approaching fleet operating areas, such as Ukrainian drones. Its strike battery provides options against surface ships, coastal targets, and supporting infrastructure.

The ship, therefore, contributes directly to the protection of submarine operating zones. Evaluated from that perspective, Admiral Nakhimov is less relevant as an instrument of global naval presence than as a fleet-defense asset designed to strengthen the Northern Fleet's ability to secure strategically important waters near Russia's ballistic missile submarine force. However, Admiral Gorshkov-class frigates already deploy Kalibr, Oniks, and Zircon missiles, while Yasen-M nuclear submarines can carry many of the same weapons while benefiting from dramatically lower detectability. 176 cells aboard one nuclear battlecruiser generate impressive missile figures, but they do not create a capability unavailable elsewhere.

The principal change lies in magazine depth. A Project 22350 frigate typically carries sixteen UKSK cells, while the Admiral Nakhimov carries eighty. Consequently, one cruiser possesses the strike-cell equivalent of five Project 22350 frigates. The same principle applies to air defense. The ship's 96 long-range air defense cells represent one of the largest missile inventories available to any Russian surface combatant. Yet missile inventories alone do not determine combat effectiveness, as long-range weapons require target acquisition. A Zircon missile capable of engaging a target hundreds of kilometers away remains dependent on a sensor and command network capable of locating that target, tracking it, identifying it, and transmitting accurate coordinates.

The ship's effectiveness, therefore, depends heavily on external reconnaissance assets, including satellites, maritime patrol aircraft, submarines, and other fleet sensors. The larger the missile inventory becomes, the more important the supporting targeting network becomes. Survivability remains one of the most significant questions surrounding the vessel. The sinking of Moskva in April 2022 demonstrated that Russia's large missile cruisers remain vulnerable despite carrying substantial air defense systems. On paper, the Admiral Nakhimov possesses far stronger defensive capabilities than the Moskva.

The installation of six Pantsir-M systems significantly expands close-range defensive capacity, while the 96-cell Fort-M battery provides a larger engagement inventory than that available aboard the sunken Black Sea Fleet flagship. Modern radar systems, digital fire control architecture, and updated combat management systems improve coordination between sensors and weapons. Nevertheless, the Nakhimov modernization could not alter the ship's fundamental physical characteristics. Admiral Nakhimov remains a 251-meter nuclear battlecruiser displacing approximately 28,000 tons, meaning its radar and infrared signatures remain substantial. Unlike many contemporary warship designs, it was not constructed around low-observable principles.

The concentration of capability aboard a single hull also creates a strategic vulnerability. Losing one Project 22350 frigate removes sixteen strike cells. Losing Admiral Nakhimov removes eighty strike cells and ninety-six long-range air defense cells simultaneously. The ship, therefore, represents both a major concentration of naval power and a major concentration of risk. Any assessment of its military value must consider both factors simultaneously. Comparisons with contemporary U.S. and Chinese warships reveal competing approaches to naval force development. Admiral Nakhimov displaces approximately 28,000 tons. A Type 055 destroyer displaces roughly 13,000 tons. An Arleigh Burke Flight III displaces approximately 9,700 tons.

In displacement terms, Admiral Nakhimov is more than twice the size of China's most capable destroyer and nearly three times larger than the principal surface combatant of the U.S. Navy. Yet a larger size does not automatically generate greater military effectiveness. American and Chinese naval development increasingly emphasizes sensor integration, fleet networking, distributed firepower, and large numbers of interoperable combatants, except for the $700 billion Trump-class project. The USSR/Russia's approach to the Kirov-class concentrated capability into a limited number of capital ships. The cruiser prioritizes magazine depth. Western and Chinese fleets increasingly prioritize force distribution.

The distinction matters because distributed fleets absorb losses differently. Losing one destroyer from a fleet of dozens affects overall capability far less than losing a unique cruiser carrying a disproportionately large share of available missile inventory. The Admiral Nakhimov and the Trump-class battleship, therefore, illustrate a force-structure philosophy that differs substantially from the direction actually pursued by naval powers. The economics of the Nakhimov's modernization are difficult to separate from any discussion of its military effectiveness. The modernization contract signed in 2013 reportedly carried a value of approximately 50 billion rubles (roughly $667 million) and anticipated a return to service in 2018.

The ship instead entered final sea trials in 2026, while cost estimates eventually approached 200 billion rubles ($2.67 billion). The program, therefore, experienced both major cost growth and significant schedule delays. Those figures acquire greater significance when measured against alternative procurement possibilities. A Project 22350 frigate carries sixteen UKSK strike cells. Five such frigates collectively carry eighty strike cells, equivalent to Admiral Nakhimov's strike battery, while simultaneously providing five separate hulls, five separate radar systems, five separate operating areas, and greater geographic flexibility. The modernization, therefore, reflects a deliberate choice to preserve a large Soviet-era cruiser rather than expand the number of modern surface combatants.

Supporters of that approach can point to the ship's large missile inventory, endurance, and command capabilities. Critics can point to fleet shortages, prolonged delays, and the opportunity cost of concentrating resources on one vessel. The project also provides a revealing indicator of Russia's shipbuilding capacity. No cruiser-sized surface combatant has been laid down in post-Soviet Russia. No direct successor to Project 1144 exists. No replacement for the Kirov-class has entered construction. The aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov remains trapped in a prolonged and uncertain refit cycle.

Meanwhile, increasing attention has focused on the future of the other nuclear battlecruiser, the Pyotr Velikiy. Rather than receiving a modernization equivalent to Admiral Nakhimov's, the ship may ultimately be retired. These developments suggest a broader pattern. Russia retains the ability to preserve and reconstruct selected Soviet-era capital ships, maybe for prestige, but it has not demonstrated an ability to replace them with new vessels of comparable size and capability. Admiral Nakhimov itself illustrates this reality. Almost three decades were required to rebuild one cruiser, which helps explain why Russia's future fleet increasingly centers on submarines, frigates, corvettes, and missile systems rather than on new cruisers.

As Admiral Nakhimov approaches operational service, it is likely to become the most heavily armed surface combatant in the Russian Navy and one of the largest operational warships in the world outside aircraft carriers. Its return strengthens Northern Fleet air defense capacity, expands long-range strike inventory, and provides a nuclear-powered vessel optimized for extended Arctic operations. At the same time, the ship does not change the broader balance between NATO and Russian naval forces. It remains a single unit. It cannot be reproduced quickly. It does not solve shortages in surface combatant numbers.

It cannot compensate for the absence of new cruiser construction. Instead, Admiral Nakhimov should be viewed as a specialized asset that may enhance specific missions associated with Arctic operations, bastion defense, and fleet protection...if Ukrainian drones or missiles do not pay a visit. The modernization certainly demonstrates that Russia can restore selected Soviet-era capital ships to a high level of combat capability. But it simultaneously demonstrates the financial burden, industrial effort, schedule risk, and force structure limitations associated with relying on those ships as major elements of future naval power.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.

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Marauder MR-001 Medium Unmanned Surface Vessel Begins On-Water Trials To Shape Future U.S. Navy Force Structure
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Saronic Technologies has launched its first Marauder Medium Unmanned Surface Vessel, MR-001, the company confirmed in late May 2026, moving the platform from design to on-water trials in less than a year and giving the U.S. Navy a new option for distributed maritime operations. The launch marks a step toward expanding sensing, logistics, and payload delivery across contested seas without exposing sailors or high-value warships to unnecessary risk.

Marauder combines a range of up to 5,400 nautical miles, speeds above 25 knots, and containerized payload capacity for modular missions from ISR and communications relay to logistics, decoys, and seabed monitoring. If sea trials prove its autonomy, reliability, and command-and-control resilience, the vessel could help the U.S. Navy add maritime mass and persistent presence in the Indo-Pacific against China’s expanding naval and long-range strike networks.

Related Topic: U.S. Navy To Field More Than 30 Medium Unmanned Surface Vessels In Indo-Pacific By 2030 To Counter China

Saronic Technologies launched its first Marauder MR-001 medium unmanned surface vessel into on-water trials, advancing the U.S. Navy’s push toward distributed autonomous maritime operations in the Indo-Pacific (Picture Source: Saronic Technologies)

In a late May 2026 official announcement, Saronic Technologies confirmed that its first Marauder Medium Unmanned Surface Vessel, designated MR-001, had been launched into the water and had entered on-water trials after moving from initial design to launch in less than one year. The event is not only a technical milestone for a new unmanned vessel, but a signal of how the U.S. maritime industrial base is trying to accelerate the transition from experimental naval drones to operational autonomous platforms. Designed to deliver dual-use autonomous capability far from shore across defense and commercial applications, Marauder appears at a time when the U.S. Navy is preparing to integrate more than 30 Medium Unmanned Surface Vessels into the Indo-Pacific by 2030, with the aim of increasing distributed presence, persistent sensing, and operational mass in a theater shaped by China’s naval expansion, long-range strike systems, and contested sea-control requirements.

Marauder was designed in response to a basic operational problem facing modern fleets: how to maintain presence, surveillance, and payload delivery across vast ocean areas without exposing sailors and high-value warships to unnecessary risk. In the Indo-Pacific, naval operations are defined by distance, dispersed island chains, anti-access and area-denial networks, long-range anti-ship missiles, submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, satellites, and dense electronic warfare environments. A medium unmanned surface vessel gives commanders an additional maritime node that can operate far from shore, support distributed maritime operations, and extend the reach of the fleet without requiring the personnel, life-support infrastructure, and survivability requirements of a crewed surface combatant.

The technical configuration of Marauder reflects this logic. The vessel is presented with a top speed above 25 knots and a range of up to 5,400 nautical miles, placing it in the category of long-endurance autonomous surface platforms rather than short-range drone boats. Its 150-metric-ton payload capacity and ability to carry up to four 40-foot or eight 20-foot ISO containers give it a significant mission-package volume for a vessel of this class. This containerized architecture could support logistics, maritime domain awareness, persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, electronic support payloads, oceanographic systems, decoy packages, communications relays, or other mission modules without requiring a redesign of the hull. In naval terms, Marauder is less a single-purpose unmanned boat than a modular maritime payload carrier built around endurance, payload flexibility, and open-ocean persistence.

This modularity is central to the vessel’s relevance for both military and commercial users. A platform able to shift between defense missions and civilian offshore tasks can serve a broader market than a narrowly configured naval prototype. For defense customers, this means one hull type could be adapted for ISR, logistics distribution, forward sensing, seabed infrastructure monitoring, force protection, deception operations, or experimentation with new payloads. For commercial operators, similar endurance and payload characteristics could support offshore energy, undersea cable security, environmental monitoring, research, and long-distance maritime support. This dual-use logic may also help sustain production by giving Saronic a wider customer base, which is important if unmanned vessels are to move from limited trials to repeatable fleet-scale manufacturing.

The software layer is one of the most significant elements of the Marauder design. Saronic has developed a software-based fleet intelligence platform that gives operators human-on-the-loop visibility into the ship’s internal autonomous operations in real time. This is different from simple remote control. The operator is not merely steering the vessel from a distance, but supervising autonomy through telemetry, vessel state data, subsystem status, alerting, logging, diagnostics, historical replay, and remote intervention tools. By giving hardware components software interfaces for monitoring, observability, and actuation, Saronic is addressing one of the central adoption barriers for unmanned naval vessels: commanders need autonomous systems that are transparent, auditable, controllable, and able to operate inside a wider command-and-control architecture.

For the future of naval operations, the significance of Marauder lies in how it could contribute to manned-unmanned teaming. Medium unmanned surface vessels can act as distributed sensor platforms, forward scouts, communications nodes, decoys, logistics connectors, or mission-package carriers operating alongside destroyers, frigates, amphibious ships, submarines, carrier strike groups, maritime patrol aircraft, and unmanned aerial systems. In a naval kill web, additional unmanned surface nodes can widen the sensor horizon, improve maritime domain awareness, increase targeting options, and complicate an adversary’s ability to distinguish between high-value platforms, decoys, and distributed sensing assets. This creates a more dispersed fleet geometry and reduces the dependence on a limited number of large crewed ships to perform every sensing and support function.

The U.S. Navy’s MUSV effort gives this launch a broader force-structure context. The service has already used Sea Hunter and Seahawk as autonomous medium unmanned surface vessel prototypes to study long-range endurance, fleet integration, maritime domain awareness, and anti-submarine warfare support. The more recent selection of seven companies, including Saronic Technologies, for MUSV marketplace at-sea demonstrations shows that the Navy is broadening its industrial approach and testing mature commercial solutions for future unmanned fleet integration. This shift suggests that the Navy is no longer treating MUSVs only as research assets, but as potential operational platforms that could expand naval power, increase persistence, and create operational dilemmas for an adversary.

The Indo-Pacific explains why the MUSV category is gaining urgency. A fleet composed only of large crewed combatants is expensive, limited in number, and exposed to saturation targeting. Medium unmanned vessels offer a way to add sensing density and maritime presence at lower human risk. If fielded at scale, they could support persistent surveillance around key sea lanes, provide scouting ahead of carrier or amphibious groups, act as communications relays across dispersed naval formations, and help maintain contact with surface and subsurface activity across wide maritime areas. Against China’s expanding blue-water fleet and long-range strike network, such platforms could help the U.S. Navy distribute its operational footprint, complicate targeting, and strengthen deterrence without relying only on traditional shipbuilding programs.

The industrial dimension is also essential. Saronic says Marauder moved from initial design to launch in less than one year, with additional hulls already under construction and a projected shipyard capacity of up to 20 Marauders per year once expansion is complete. If sea trials validate reliability, seakeeping, autonomous navigation, communications resilience, payload integration, cyber protection, and maintenance concepts, this production model could help address one of the main constraints in U.S. naval modernization: the difficulty of generating maritime mass quickly. The platform still has to prove itself at sea, especially under demanding conditions involving electronic warfare, degraded communications, collision avoidance, refueling concepts, and integration with crewed units, but its rapid build cycle gives the Navy and industry a visible test case for accelerated autonomous shipbuilding.

The launch of Marauder MR-001 should be viewed as more than the arrival of a new unmanned vessel in the water. It represents a convergence of modular ship design, software-defined autonomy, long-range endurance, dual-use payload flexibility, and changing U.S. Navy force planning. Its future value will depend on the outcome of sea trials and on its ability to operate safely and reliably within a contested maritime command-and-control environment. If these elements mature, Marauder could contribute to a wider transformation of naval warfare in which autonomous vessels provide persistence, scale, sensing density, mission adaptability, and operational depth to a hybrid fleet built for the Indo-Pacific and other high-end maritime theaters.

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Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
US Navy accepts accelerated delivery of final Flight IIA destroyer USS Patrick Gallagher
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The U.S. Navy has accepted the future USS Patrick Gallagher (DDG-127), the final Flight IIA Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, more than two months ahead of schedule, marking the end of the SPY-1 radar generation of U.S. destroyer production. Announced on May 28, 2026, the delivery strengthens fleet readiness by giving the crew additional time for training and certification while closing a nearly three-decade evolution of the Flight I and Flight IIA destroyer lineage.

As the last Arleigh Burke built around the AN/SPY-1D radar and Aegis Flight IIA combat system, USS Patrick Gallagher preserves a proven multi-mission configuration capable of ballistic missile defense, air defense, strike warfare, and anti-submarine operations from a single platform. Its delivery also highlights the transition to Flight III destroyers equipped with the AN/SPY-6 radar, a shift that will expand the Navy’s air and missile defense capability while increasing the complexity of future ship construction and integration.

Related topic:USS Patrick Gallagher begins sea trials as last US Navy Arleigh Burke-class Flight IIA destroyer

The USS Patrick Gallagher is the final Flight IIA Technology Insertion destroyer, a variant introduced in 2016 to incorporate updated computing architecture and combat system improvements while retaining the SPY-1D radar and Aegis system. (Picture source: US Navy)

On May 28, 2026, the U.S. Navy accepted an accelerated delivery of the future USS Patrick Gallagher (DDG-127) from General Dynamics Bath Iron Works in Bath, Maine, concluding the Flight IIA Technology Insertion chapter of the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer program more than two months ahead of schedule. The delivery is notable not only because the USS Patrick Gallagher becomes the 77th Arleigh Burke-class destroyer transferred to the fleet, but also because it is the final ship constructed with the AN/SPY-1D radar and Aegis Flight IIA combat system architecture before production shifts entirely to Flight III destroyers.

The ship, therefore, closes a production lineage that evolved through Flight I, Flight II, Flight IIA, Flight IIA Restart, and Flight IIA Technology Insertion variants over nearly three decades. Ordered on September 28, 2017, fabricated from November 2018, laid down on March 30, 2022, and christened on July 27, 2024, the USS Patrick Gallagher required nearly nine years from contract award to delivery. Once commissioned, the destroyer will be based in Norfolk, Virginia, joining a U.S. Navy that continues to rely heavily on Arleigh Burke-class destroyers as its principal multi-mission surface combatants.

The accelerated delivery resulted from a decision to fundamentally alter the final testing sequence rather than reduce testing requirements. Sea trials began on April 27, 2026, when the ship departed Bath Iron Works via the Kennebec River. During the following weeks, propulsion systems, electrical generation, ship control systems, combat systems, and auxiliary machinery were tested through a consolidated builder's trial process that merged events traditionally conducted separately. The ship underwent propulsion evaluations using its four General Electric LM2500 gas turbines, which together produce approximately 100,000 shaft horsepower.

Trials included speed runs, maneuverability assessments, endurance testing, steering evaluations, and integrated system operation under combined loads. By reducing the interval between test events and shortening the period normally allocated to post-trial corrections, Bath Iron Works (BIW) and the U.S. Navy were able to advance delivery by more than sixty days. The practical consequence is that the future crew gains additional time for combat system certification, training, and qualification activities before the USS Patrick Gallagher officially enters operational service. The ship's position within the broader Arleigh Burke-class program is significant because it sits at the intersection of two generations of destroyer construction.

The USS Patrick Gallagher is the final Flight IIA Technology Insertion destroyer, a variant introduced in 2016 to incorporate updated computing architecture and combat system improvements while retaining the established SPY-1D radar and Aegis system. Unlike the USS Jack H. Lucas (DDG-125) and the USS Louis H. Wilson Jr. (DDG-126), which were incorporated into Flight III procurement, the USS Patrick Gallagher (DDG-127) remained within the Flight IIA family. This decision allowed the U.S. Navy to continue receiving mature and fully integrated destroyers while Flight III development matured.

As a result, the USS Patrick Gallagher serves as the last representative of a configuration whose combat system, radar architecture, and shipboard arrangements have already accumulated decades of operational experience across dozens of vessels. The ship effectively marks the endpoint of the SPY-1 generation of Arleigh Burke destroyers before the fleet begins relying increasingly on Flight III units. At full load, the USS Patrick Gallagher displaces approximately 9,217 tonnes, measures 156 meters in length and 20 meters in beam, and accommodates a crew of roughly 380 personnel.

Its primary combat capability is built around the Aegis weapon system and AN/SPY-1D radar, supported by a 96-cell Mk 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) divided between a 32-cell forward battery and a 64-cell aft battery. Those launch cells can accommodate a broad mix of weapons, including SM-2 missiles for area air defense, SM-3 interceptors for ballistic missile defense, SM-6 missiles for long-range air and missile engagements, Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles for point and local area defense, Tomahawk cruise missiles for land attack and Vertical Launch ASROC weapons for anti-submarine warfare.

Unlike many surface combatants designed around a single mission area, the DDG-51 architecture allows the same ship to conduct ballistic missile defense, air defense, strike warfare, and anti-submarine warfare without altering its basic configuration. This flexibility remains one of the principal reasons the class continues to be produced nearly four decades after the first ship was ordered by the US Navy on April 2, 1985. The Flight IIA configuration introduced capabilities absent from earlier Arleigh Burke variants, particularly in the field of anti-submarine warfare. The USS Patrick Gallagher incorporates dual helicopter hangars and support facilities capable of sustaining two MH-60R Seahawk helicopters simultaneously.

Earlier Flight I and Flight II ships lacked these permanent hangars, limiting aviation operations during extended deployments. The embarked helicopters significantly increase the destroyer's surveillance radius and provide additional anti-submarine warfare reach through airborne sensors, sonobuoys and torpedoes. Shipboard anti-submarine capability is further strengthened by two triple Mk 32 torpedo launchers compatible with Mk 46, Mk 50, and Mk 54 lightweight torpedoes. Combined with Vertical Launch ASROC missiles carried in the Mk 41 launch system, the destroyer can engage submarine threats at multiple ranges using several different weapon types. Surface warfare and naval fire support missions are performed by a 5-inch/62 Mk 45 naval gun, while point defense against incoming threats is provided by the Phalanx Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) and Mk 38 gun mounts.

The overall configuration allows simultaneous anti-air, anti-surface, and anti-submarine operations within U.S. carrier strike groups or independent deployments. The USS Patrick Gallagher also represents the final Arleigh Burke-class constructed around the SPY-1 radar family, which has equipped these destroyers since the class entered service in 1991. Every subsequent destroyer currently under construction for the U.S. Navy will be completed to the Flight III standard and equipped with the AN/SPY-6 Air and Missile Defense Radar. The transition involves substantially more than a radar replacement. The SPY-6 required increased electrical generation capacity, expanded cooling systems and associated modifications throughout the ship.

These changes were implemented to support a radar designed to improve detection, tracking and discrimination performance against ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and smaller aerial targets. The U.S. Navy has already ordered 23 Flight III destroyers as the future core of the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer force structure. Bath Iron Works is currently building the USS William Charette (DDG-130), USS Quentin Walsh (DDG-132), USS John E. Kilmer (DDG-134), and USS Richard G. Lugar (DDG-136), all of which incorporate the Flight III configuration and therefore face more demanding integration requirements than the USS Patrick Gallagher.

The delivery also carries implications for the U.S. naval industrial base. Arleigh Burke production remains divided between Bath Iron Works in Maine and Huntington Ingalls Industries' Ingalls Shipbuilding division in Mississippi, the only two shipyards currently producing the class. The DDG-51 program has remained in continuous production since 1988, making it one of the longest-running surface-combatant acquisition programs in U.S. history. Bath Iron Works currently holds contracts for eleven destroyers, including seven already under construction and four not yet started. The accelerated completion of DDG-127 therefore provides a useful indicator of what can be achieved on a mature production line with an established design, experienced workforce, and combat system already fielded across the fleet.

Whether the same schedule gains can be achieved on Flight III destroyers remains uncertain. Unlike the USS Patrick Gallagher, those ships incorporate the SPY-6 radar, expanded electrical generation, upgraded cooling systems, and more complex integration work. The key measure of sustained improvement will not be the delivery of Patrick Gallagher itself, but whether upcoming ships such as DDG-130, DDG-132, and DDG-134 demonstrate similar reductions in the time required to move from construction through sea trials and delivery. A single accelerated delivery demonstrates that schedule compression is possible, but repeated accelerated deliveries across multiple Flight III hulls would indicate a broader change in Arleigh Burke destroyer production performance.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.

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Russia's Newest Yasen-M Submarine Conducts Submerged Oniks Strike Beyond 200 km Near NATO's Arctic Flank
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Russia’s newest Project 885M Yasen-M nuclear-powered submarine, Arkhangelsk, has demonstrated a concealed anti-ship strike capability by launching an Oniks cruise missile from a submerged position in the Barents Sea and hitting a target more than 200 kilometers away. Reported by TASS on June 3, 2026, the exercise highlights Russia’s ability to threaten surface forces from underwater in a region that sits at the center of the strategic competition between Moscow’s Arctic bastion and NATO’s northern flank.

The launch validated Arkhangelsk’s anti-surface warfare role by combining submarine stealth with the high-speed attack profile of the Oniks missile. For NATO, the significance extends beyond missile defense, reinforcing the challenge of detecting and tracking modern Russian submarines before they can execute long-range maritime strike missions in the High North.

Related Topic: Russia Rehearses Arctic Naval Denial Strategy with Bastion Coastal Defense System at Franz Josef Land Outpost.

Russia's newest Project 885M Yasen-M submarine, Arkhangelsk, demonstrated its Arctic maritime strike capability by launching an Oniks supersonic anti-ship missile from a submerged position in the Barents Sea and successfully hitting a target more than 200 kilometers away (Picture Source: TASS / CSIS/ / Edited by Army Recognition Group)

Russian state news agency TASS reported on June 3, 2026, that the Russian Northern Fleet’s Project 885M Yasen-Mnuclear-powered multipurpose submarine Arkhangelsk carried out a submerged launch of an Oniks cruise missile in the Barents Sea, striking a naval target positioned more than 200 kilometers away. The missile’s warhead hit a floating target simulating an enemy surface combatant, while the firing zone had been closed in advance to civilian shipping and aviation and secured by ships from the Kola Flotilla of the Northern Fleet’s combined forces. Beyond the official description of a scheduled combat-training activity, the event stands out as a significant demonstration of Russia’s undersea strike capability: a newly commissioned Yasen-M submarine, operating from concealment, used a supersonic anti-ship missile in a maritime area that sits at the center of the military balance between Russia’s Arctic bastion and NATO’s northern flank.

The most important element of the exercise was the submerged launch. In naval warfare, this detail matters because it shows an anti-surface warfare engagement conducted from concealment rather than from an exposed surface platform. A submarine able to fire an anti-ship cruise missile while remaining underwater complicates the defender’s problem before the missile is even detected, because the attacking platform may not have been localized before launch and may be able to maneuver away after firing. For NATO navies, this is not only a missile-defense issue but an anti-submarine warfare challenge, as the first task is to detect, classify, track, and if necessary contain the submarine before it can create a firing opportunity.

The reported engagement distance of more than 200 kilometers should be interpreted carefully. It should not be presented as the maximum range of the Oniks missile, because live-fire exercises are normally shaped by safety zones, available target areas, telemetry requirements, and exercise-control procedures. Its operational value lies elsewhere. A target located more than 200 kilometers away represents a beyond-horizon anti-surface engagement, meaning the submarine and the target were separated by a distance at which direct organic observation from the firing platform would be limited. This makes the exercise relevant to the broader question of the kill chain: detection, classification, target designation, fire-control data, launch, missile flight, terminal seeker acquisition, and strike assessment.

TASS did not specify how the target data were generated, and this point should be treated with caution. The exercise may have relied on a pre-arranged target scenario, exercise-control data, external surveillance, or a combination of sources available to the Northern Fleet. What can be said is that a submerged missile launch at this distance is not just the release of a weapon; it is the visible end of a wider anti-surface strike process. In operational conditions, such a process could involve submarines, surface ships, maritime patrol aircraft, coastal sensors, space-based assets, electronic intelligence, or command-and-control networks. For NATO, the key issue is therefore not only how to intercept an Oniks missile in its terminal phase, but how to disrupt or deny the Russian maritime strike kill chain before launch.

Arkhangelsk is itself central to the significance of the event. The submarine belongs to Project 885M Yasen-M, the modernized version of Russia’s Yasen family of fourth-generation nuclear-powered multipurpose submarines, also associated in NATO reporting with the Severodvinsk class. Commissioned into the Russian Navy in December 2024, Arkhangelsk is one of the newest undersea platforms assigned to the Northern Fleet. TASS described the Yasen-M design as having a reduced acoustic field and being equipped with strike and electronic weapons that allow missions in distant ocean areas. For Russia, this type of submarine is designed not only for classic attack-submarine missions, but also for cruise missile strike, intelligence gathering, anti-surface warfare, and deterrent signaling.

The Yasen-M design gives the Northern Fleet a platform that can support both sea-denial and long-range strike missions. Public assessments of the class describe it as equipped with a UKSK vertical launch system able to employ different cruise missile types, including P-800/3M55 Oniks anti-ship missiles and Kalibr-family missiles, with Russian military messaging also linking the class to the 3M22 Tsirkon hypersonic missile. This flexibility is important because it allows a single submarine to generate several planning problems for NATO at once. Depending on payload and mission, a Yasen-M boat can threaten surface forces, contribute to land-attack options, support bastion defense, or create uncertainty along the approaches between the Barents Sea, the Norwegian Sea, and the wider North Atlantic.

The Oniks missile adds a specific anti-surface warfare dimension. Also known as P-800 or 3M55 Oniks and designated SS-N-26 Strobile in NATO terminology, the missile is a supersonic anti-ship cruise missile designed to attack surface combatants at range. Its value lies in speed, terminal attack profile, and the reduced reaction time it imposes on defending ships. A surface combatant facing an incoming supersonic sea-skimming missile must detect the threat, assign a track, engage with air-defense missiles or close-in systems, deploy electronic countermeasures, and prepare damage-control measures within a compressed timeline. Launched from a concealed nuclear-powered submarine, Oniks becomes part of a wider Russian sea-denial system rather than a standalone weapon.

The geography of the Barents Sea gives this firing its strategic weight. For Russia, the Barents Sea is closely linked to the defense of the Kola Peninsula, where the Northern Fleet maintains major submarine bases, surface forces, air assets, and strategic deterrent infrastructure. Western analysis often describes this posture through the concept of bastion defense, under which Russia seeks to protect the operating areas of its ballistic missile submarines and create layered defenses around key northern military facilities. In this framework, Arkhangelsk’s launch can be read as part of a wider Russian maritime-defense architecture combining nuclear-powered submarines, surface combatants, coastal missile systems, air defense, sensors, electronic warfare, and long-range precision weapons.

For NATO, the firing sits directly within the security logic of the High North. The accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO has changed the geography of the Alliance’s northern flank, while Norway remains a frontline maritime actor facing the Barents Sea approaches. NATO’s Joint Force Command Norfolk has gained renewed importance because of its role in North Atlantic defense, reinforcement routes, and the link between North America and Europe. NATO’s Arctic Sentry activity, launched to bring Allied activities in the Arctic and High North under a more coherent operational approach, reflects the same concern: the Alliance must preserve maritime domain awareness, protect sea lines of communication, and maintain credible anti-submarine warfare capacity from the Barents Sea approaches through the Norwegian Sea and toward the GIUK Gap.

The exercise should nevertheless be interpreted with political caution. The TASS report presents the launch as scheduled combat training, and the closure of the firing area to civilian shipping and aircraft indicates that the event was conducted within a managed exercise framework. There is no evidence from the announcement that the firing was connected to an imminent operation against NATO. At the same time, military drills are never neutral in their strategic effect. They validate systems, train crews, test command procedures, and communicate capability. In the current European security environment, a successful Oniks launch from a newly commissioned Yasen-M submarine will inevitably be studied by NATO as part of Russia’s wider undersea and long-range strike posture in the Arctic and North Atlantic.

The submerged Oniks missile launch by Arkhangelsk in the Barents Sea is significant because it demonstrates more than a successful hit against a floating target. It shows a newly commissioned Project 885M Yasen-M nuclear-powered multipurpose submarine progressing through combat training with the Russian Northern Fleet and validating part of its anti-surface warfare role from a concealed underwater position. The reported range of more than 200 kilometers should be treated as an exercise distance rather than a technical limit, but the event still highlights the operational problem NATO faces in the High North: Russian submarines able to combine stealth, mobility, and supersonic anti-ship firepower inside a maritime theater linked to bastion defense and North Atlantic access. The launch does not prove an imminent escalation, but it reinforces the need for NATO to sustain maritime domain awareness, anti-submarine warfare readiness, integrated air and missile defense, and careful political assessment of Russian military signaling in the Barents Sea.

Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
China Commissions 35th Type 052D Destroyer as PLAN Chinese Navy Warship Production Outpaces U.S. Navy
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China has commissioned another advanced guided-missile destroyer, but the arrival of the PLAN's 35th Type 052D-series warship highlights a development drawing increasing attention in Washington: Beijing is expanding its modern destroyer fleet at a pace the U.S. Navy currently struggles to match. As reported by Chinese sources, the new destroyer Tongchuan has entered service with the South Sea Fleet, providing further evidence of how China's vast shipbuilding industry is rapidly translating industrial capacity into frontline naval power across the Indo-Pacific.

Equipped for air defense, anti-submarine warfare, anti-ship operations, and long-range strike missions, Tongchuan strengthens China's ability to project military power in the South China Sea and around Taiwan. Its commissioning comes as U.S. defense officials continue to warn that China's growing numerical advantage in warship production could become a decisive factor in any future regional conflict, raising new questions about the long-term balance of naval power in the Indo-Pacific.

Related Topic: China Reinforces Naval Combat Superiority with New Type 052D Destroyer Equipped with AESA Radar

China's Type 052D guided-missile destroyer represents the backbone of the PLAN's modern surface fleet. With 35 vessels now commissioned, the class has become a symbol of Beijing's rapid naval expansion and growing challenge to U.S. Navy dominance in the Indo-Pacific. (Picture source: China MoD)

Assigned to the People's Liberation Army Navy's (PLAN - Chinese Navy) 9th Destroyer Flotilla of the South Sea Fleet, Tongchuan strengthens China's ability to conduct air-defense, anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, and long-range strike missions in some of the world's most strategically contested waters. The commissioning comes as U.S. defense officials continue to warn that China's vast shipbuilding industry is becoming one of Beijing's most significant advantages in a potential high-intensity conflict with the United States.

The new warship belongs to the Type 052DL subclass, an improved version of the Type 052D destroyer that has become the backbone of China's modern surface fleet. The Type 052DL incorporates a hull extension of approximately 4 meters, increasing the overall length to about 162 meters and allowing the installation of a larger flight deck. This modification enables the operation of the Harbin Z-20F naval helicopter, which offers substantially greater range, endurance, sensor capabilities, and anti-submarine warfare performance than the smaller Z-9 helicopter used by earlier Chinese destroyers.

Although the commissioning of a single destroyer may appear routine, *Tongchuan* represents a much larger strategic trend. Since the first Type 052D entered service in 2014, China has commissioned approximately 35 ships of the class while simultaneously fielding eight Type 055 large destroyers. In just over a decade, Beijing has transformed what was once a largely regional navy into a force possessing one of the world's largest concentrations of modern guided-missile destroyers.

The pace of Chinese naval construction stands in sharp contrast to that of the United States. During the same period in which China commissioned approximately 35 Type 052D destroyers, the U.S. Navyadded roughly 18 to 20 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. Chinese shipyards have therefore produced modern destroyers at nearly double the American rate over the last decade. While U.S. shipbuilders continue to deliver highly capable warships, production has been constrained by rising costs, workforce challenges, industrial bottlenecks, and the transition to the more sophisticated Flight III Arleigh Burke configuration.

This disparity is increasingly viewed in Washington as a strategic concern. Recent Pentagon assessments and congressional hearings have repeatedly highlighted China's overwhelming shipbuilding advantage. According to U.S. defense officials, Chinese shipyards possess significantly greater capacity than their American counterparts, allowing Beijing to convert industrial strength into naval combat power at a pace unmatched by any other navy.

The Type 052D was specifically designed to provide the PLAN with a modern area-air-defense destroyer capable of escorting aircraft carriers, amphibious task groups, and surface action forces. Displacing approximately 7,500 tons, the warship is equipped with a 64-cell universal vertical launch system capable of deploying HHQ-9B long-range surface-to-air missiles, YJ-18 anti-ship cruise missiles, CJ-10 land-attack cruise missiles, and anti-submarine rocket-delivered torpedoes. Combined with an active electronically scanned array radar suite and advanced combat management system, the destroyer provides a versatile multirole capability across the full spectrum of naval warfare.

The Type 052D is often compared to the U.S. Navy's Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, particularly the latest Flight III variant. While both warships perform similar operational roles, important differences remain in their capabilities, sizes, and combat systems.

The newest Arleigh Burke Flight III destroyers displace nearly 9,800 tons and carry 96 Mk 41 vertical launch cells, giving them a significantly larger missile inventory than the Chinese destroyer. The U.S. warship can simultaneously deploy a broad combination of SM-2, SM-3, SM-6, Tomahawk land-attack missiles, Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles, and anti-submarine weapons, providing greater flexibility across multiple mission sets.

Perhaps the most significant American advantage lies in radar performance and integrated air and missile defense. Flight III destroyers are equipped with the AN/SPY-6(V)1 Air and Missile Defense Radar, regarded as one of the most advanced naval radar systems currently deployed. The radar dramatically improves detection range, target tracking capacity, ballistic missile defense performance, and engagement of low-observable threats. It was specifically designed to address emerging challenges posed by advanced cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and future hypersonic weapons.

By comparison, China's Type 052D employs a modern active electronically scanned array radar that provides strong air-defense capabilities and supports long-range missile engagements. However, publicly available information indicates that the PLAN has yet to demonstrate a destroyer-based ballistic missile defense capability comparable to the SPY-6-equipped Flight III. In a high-end missile defense scenario, the U.S. destroyer continues to maintain a significant technological advantage.

Operational experience also remains an important differentiator. The U.S. Navy has spent decades refining carrier strike group operations, ballistic missile defense missions, long-range precision strike campaigns, and multinational coalition deployments. Arleigh Burke destroyers have participated in combat operations from the Middle East to the Western Pacific and routinely operate across multiple theaters simultaneously. While the PLAN has dramatically expanded its global reach, Chinese destroyers have comparatively limited operational experience in sustained high-end naval operations.

Nevertheless, the strategic challenge facing the United States increasingly revolves as much around quantity as around quality. China's destroyer fleet now includes approximately 35 Type 052D/052DL vessels, six Type 052C destroyers, and eight Type 055 large destroyers, bringing the total number of destroyers in service to roughly 50 ships. More importantly, over 40 of these vessels are modern combatants equipped with advanced radar systems and vertical launch missile batteries.

The U.S. Navy retains a larger destroyer force, operating approximately 74 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers and three Zumwalt-class destroyers, for a total of around 77. However, China's fleet has grown far more rapidly, steadily narrowing the gap while concentrating its forces in the Western Pacific, where any future conflict involving Taiwan would likely occur.

For Pentagon planners, this trend carries significant implications. A larger number of modern Chinese destroyers enables the PLAN to maintain persistent patrols in the South China Sea, expand operations around Taiwan, escort aircraft carrier strike groups, and create overlapping air-defense networks extending beyond the First Island Chain. Additional warships also increase China's capacity to generate larger missile salvos and sustain combat operations during a prolonged regional conflict.

The commissioning of Type 052D Tongchuan, therefore, represents more than the addition of a single destroyer. It serves as another indicator of China's ability to rapidly translate industrial capacity into naval power. While the U.S. Navy continues to field some of the world's most capable surface combatants through the Arleigh Burke Flight III program, Beijing's ability to produce modern destroyers at scale is emerging as a defining factor in the naval arms race that is shaping the future balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. As tensions continue around Taiwan and the South China Sea, the competition between American technological superiority and Chinese production capacity is becoming increasingly central to regional deterrence and maritime security.

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Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
Netherlands rejects China's claims of forcing away frigate De Ruyter with electronic warfare
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The Dutch frigate HNLMS De Ruyter continued its mission near the Paracel Islands despite Chinese claims that electronic warfare measures and military warnings had forced it away, highlighting a growing willingness by European navies to operate in contested Indo-Pacific waters. The confrontation, disclosed by Chinese and Dutch officials on May 27, 2026, underscores the increasing role of electronic pressure and information messaging in efforts to challenge freedom of navigation operations without triggering direct military escalation.

According to Beijing, Chinese forces employed naval, air, and electronic warfare assets against the frigate and its embarked NH90 helicopter, while Dutch authorities reported no disruption to the ship’s route, mission, or flight operations. The incident places renewed attention on China’s use of electromagnetic capabilities around the heavily militarized Paracel Islands and demonstrates how advanced Western warships equipped with long-range sensors and strike systems are becoming focal points in regional strategic competition.

Related topic:Netherlands redeploys HNLMS Evertsen air defense frigate to protect French carrier strike group

HNLMS De Ruyter, a De Zeven Provinciën-class air defense and command frigate, carries 32 SM-2 Block IIIA surface-to-air missiles, 32 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles, eight Harpoon anti-ship missiles, a 127 mm OTO Melara naval gun, and Mk 46 torpedoes. (Picture source: Dutch MoD)

On May 27, 2026, the Netherlands rejected Chinese claims that the frigate HNLMS De Ruyter (F804) had been expelled from waters near the Paracel Islands, with State Secretary for Defence Derk Boswijk stating that the ship remained on its planned route and continued operating under international navigation rules. Earlier the same day, the PLA Southern Theater Command announced that Chinese naval and air forces had taken action against the vessel, accusing it of entering waters claimed by China and repeatedly launching its embarked NH90 NFH helicopter into airspace that Beijing considers sovereign territory.

Chinese forces reported deploying surface units, military aircraft, verbal warnings and electronic jamming measures during the encounter. The incident occurred during De Ruyter's Pacific Archer deployment, a five-month Indo-Pacific mission announced in February 2026. The confrontation took place after a May 22-25 port visit to Manila and before the vessel's scheduled participation in RIMPAC 2026 near Hawaii. While encounters between Chinese and U.S. forces in the South China Sea occur regularly, publicly acknowledged confrontations involving European surface combatants remain comparatively uncommon, making the De Ruyter episode one of the most visible European-Chinese military interactions in the region during 2026.

The location of the encounter is among the most militarized sections of the South China Sea. The Paracel Islands, known in China as the Xisha Islands and in Vietnam as Hoang Sa, are situated roughly 350 kilometers southeast of Hainan Island and consist of more than 30 islands, reefs, and cays spread across approximately 15,000 square kilometers of maritime space. China, Vietnam, and Taiwan all claim sovereignty over the archipelago, but Beijing has exercised control over the entire island group since its victory over Vietnam during the Battle of the Paracel Islands in January 1974. During the past five decades, the archipelago has evolved from a collection of isolated outposts into a permanent military network supporting China's aviation, naval, coast guard, and surveillance operations.

The islands, in fact, occupy a strategic position between the Taiwan Strait to the northeast, the Luzon Strait to the east, the Gulf of Tonkin to the west, and the maritime approaches leading toward the Malacca Strait to the southwest. Control of the Paracels allows China to project military presence deep into the northern half of the South China Sea while extending surveillance coverage hundreds of kilometers from Hainan. Woody Island, known in Chinese as Yongxing Dao, constitutes the center of Chinese military activity in the Paracels. The island contains a 2,400-meter runway capable of supporting J-11 and J-16 fighters, KJ-500 airborne early warning aircraft, Y-8 maritime patrol aircraft, transport aircraft, and aerial refueling assets.

Over the last decade, China has constructed hardened aircraft shelters, ammunition storage areas, fuel farms, radar stations, HQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missile batteries, and anti-ship missile positions. The island now hosts permanent military personnel, civilian administrators, port infrastructure, desalination facilities, and power-generation systems that allow continuous operations throughout the year. From Woody Island, combat aircraft can reach most sectors of the northern South China Sea within minutes, while radar and electronic surveillance systems can monitor shipping and aviation activity across major regional transit routes.

The island also functions as a forward operating base for coast guard vessels, PLA Navy units, and maritime militia forces operating far from the Chinese mainland. According to the Chinese chronology, the encounter began when De Ruyter entered the waters surrounding the Paracels and conducted repeated NH90 helicopter operations. The PLA Southern Theater Command alleged that these flights crossed into airspace Beijing considers part of Chinese territory. Chinese authorities responded by deploying naval and air assets to monitor the Dutch vessel while implementing electronic warfare countermeasures.

The public reference to electronic jamming was notable because official PLA announcements typically focus on warnings, tracking activities, or air and maritime interceptions rather than explicitly identifying electromagnetic measures. Chinese officials further argued that the Dutch actions violated sovereignty claims associated with the archipelago and warned that the Southern Theater Command would remain at a high state of readiness. Zhang Junshe, a Chinese military affairs expert, indicated that stronger responses could be considered during future incidents, including warning shots, if Dutch military forces continue operating near islands claimed and occupied by China.

The Dutch government strongly rejected the Chinese interpretation of events and disputed the assertion that the De Ruyter frigate had been forced from the area. State Secretary for Defence Derk Boswijk stated that the vessel remained on its intended route and complied with international rules governing navigation. Foreign Minister Tom Berendsen reaffirmed Dutch support for freedom of navigation and confirmed that discussions with China were underway following the incident. Equally important was what Dutch authorities did not report. There was no indication that De Ruyter altered course, suspended helicopter operations, modified mission objectives, or experienced operational degradation.

The Dutch account, therefore, portrayed the encounter as a challenge that did not materially affect the deployment. This kind of rhetoric, which has been going on for years, does not seem to have ever produced the effect Beijing was hoping for: an end to the deployment of Western ships in areas that China considers to be its own, even though international maritime law and other countries say otherwise. Therefore, the electronic warfare component deserves particular attention because it potentially reveals more about the encounter than the physical presence of the ships involved.

Electronic interference can target tactical communications, satellite links, navigation systems, surveillance radars, and aviation support equipment. The NH90 helicopter would likely have been more vulnerable than the frigate itself because its operations depend heavily on continuous navigation updates, communications with the host ship, and data connectivity during flight operations. The Southern Theater Command possesses extensive and proven electronic warfare resources on Hainan and throughout China's South China Sea outposts, placing the Paracels within range of multiple land-based systems.

Electronic jamming offers several advantages compared with physical interception. It creates operational friction, demonstrates military reach, and imposes costs on foreign forces while remaining below the threshold associated with weapons employment. It also allows the initiating side to avoid many of the escalation risks associated with close aerial or maritime maneuvering. Moreover, the warship involved in the incident is among the most heavily armed surface combatants operated by a European navy. HNLMS De Ruyter belongs to the De Zeven Provinciën class of air defense and command frigates and entered service in March 2004. The vessel displaces approximately 6,050 tonnes at full load, measures 144.2 meters in length, and operates with a crew of roughly 174 personnel.

Its primary sensor suite combines the SMART-L long-range surveillance radar, APAR active phased-array fire-control radar, and Sirius infrared search-and-track system. Armament includes 32 SM-2 Block IIIA missiles for area air defense, 32 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles for medium-range defensive engagements, eight Harpoon anti-ship missiles, a 127 mm OTO Melara naval gun, and Mk 46 torpedoes. The ship also carries one NH90 NFH helicopter capable of anti-submarine warfare, maritime surveillance, and over-the-horizon targeting missions. Chinese interest in De Ruyter is likely influenced not only by the vessel's presence but also by its recent modernization.

The frigate received the SMART-L Multi Mission radar, which expanded its ability to detect and track ballistic missile targets at long range. During NATO Formidable Shield exercises, Dutch frigates equipped with SMART-L systems contributed tracking data supporting ballistic missile interception scenarios conducted by allied forces. On March 12, 2025, De Ruyter became the first Dutch warship to launch a Tomahawk cruise missile, introducing a land-attack capability measured in hundreds of kilometers. The combination of long-range surveillance, ballistic missile tracking, and cruise missile strike capability places the vessel in a category that attracts significantly greater military attention than routine patrol ships.

For any military monitoring foreign naval activity near sensitive areas, a ship capable of collecting high-quality sensor data while carrying long-range precision weapons presents a different intelligence and operational profile than a standard frigate conducting constabulary duties. The deployment itself provides important context. Pacific Archer was announced in February 2026 and scheduled to last approximately five months. The mission's first major port call occurred in Kochi, India, on May 6, followed by a PASSEX with Indian Navy units. After departing India, De Ruyter visited Manila from May 22 to May 25 before transiting toward Hawaii for participation in RIMPAC 2026.

The deployment consisted of a single high-capability surface combatant operating thousands of kilometers from Dutch support infrastructure rather than as part of a carrier strike group or large multinational naval formation. This made the frigate both more exposed and more visible during regional operations. The route connected several security partners across the Indo-Pacific and placed the vessel in proximity to some of the most politically sensitive maritime areas in Asia. The broader significance of the incident lies less in the tactical encounter itself than in Beijing's decision to publicize the response measures. Chinese authorities highlighted not only the alleged violation but also the use of electronic countermeasures, creating a public record of how future encounters near the Paracels might be handled.

The messaging was directed simultaneously toward European navies considering future deployments, regional governments observing Chinese reactions in disputed waters, and domestic audiences. The encounter also illustrated how sovereignty claims, military presence, electronic warfare capabilities, and information activities can be employed (or at least publicized) together during a single event. Despite the sharp rhetoric, there were no reports of warning shots, weapons employment, dangerous maneuvering, collision risks, or physical interception. Escalation remained below the level observed in several previous U.S.-China incidents, yet the encounter established a visible example of how China may respond when European military vessels equipped with advanced sensors and aviation assets operate near islands that Beijing regards as sovereign territory.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.

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Pete Hegseth confirms US cutter transfer to the Philippines to expand Coast Guard patrols
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The United States will transfer a 210-foot Reliance-class cutter to the Philippine Coast Guard, a rumour confirmed by U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth during talks with Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. at the Shangri-La Dialogue on May 30, 2026. The addition strengthens Manila’s ability to sustain a continuous presence across contested and remote maritime areas, expanding patrol capacity at a time of growing pressure in the West Philippine Sea.

Designed for long-duration offshore operations, the Reliance-class cutter can remain at sea for weeks while conducting surveillance, law enforcement, search-and-rescue, and maritime security missions. Its endurance, aviation capability, and relatively low crew requirements make it a practical force multiplier for the Philippine Coast Guard, reinforcing maritime domain awareness and operational coverage rather than adding new combat power.

Related topic:US Coast Guard transfers three Island-class patrol boats to Colombia to strengthen maritime surveillance capabilities

Designed during the early 1960s, the Reliance-class represented the first major post-World War II cutter construction program for the U.S. Coast Guard and became one of the most successful and long-serving cutter designs in U.S. maritime history. (Picture source: U.S. Coast Guard)

On May 30, 2026, U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth confirmed the rumoured transfer of a 210-foot Reliance-class medium-endurance cutter (WMEC) to the Philippine Coast Guard during a meeting with Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. The announcement occurred during the 75th anniversary year of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty and was made simultaneously with the renewal of the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) for another fifteen years.

Coming less than one month after Balikatan 2026, the largest exercise ever conducted between the two countries, the cutter transfer fits into a broader effort focused on maritime surveillance, secure communications, and operational coordination. The vessel will become one of the largest ships operated by the Philippine Coast Guard and will join a fleet that already includes three former U.S. Coast Guard Hamilton-class cutters. Unlike acquisitions centered on missiles or combat systems, this transfer directly addresses a persistent operational requirement: maintaining routine presence across a 2.2-million-square-kilometer exclusive economic zone.

For the Philippine Coast Guard, the primary value of the cutter lies therefore in its ability to remain at sea for prolonged periods while conducting surveillance, inspections, law enforcement missions, and search-and-rescue operations. The Reliance-class transfer to the Philippine Coast Guard is significant because it adds another offshore-capable hull to a service whose operational demands are driven primarily by geography. The Philippines consists of more than 7,600 islands and must monitor maritime approaches stretching from the Luzon Strait to the Sulu Sea and from the Philippine Sea to the West Philippine Sea.

In this environment, the limiting factor is often not firepower but the number of ships available to sustain patrol cycles throughout the year. A vessel that can remain deployed for weeks and travel thousands of nautical miles without refueling generates additional coverage of fishing grounds, shipping routes, and contested maritime areas. This is particularly relevant around Scarborough Shoal and other sectors where coast guard presence, vessel identification, and law enforcement activities occur on a near-continuous basis, and largely involve Chinese vessels. The practical effect is an increase in the number of simultaneous patrols that can be maintained without relying on larger naval assets.

In capability terms, the transfer strengthens fleet depth and operational availability rather than deterrence through combat power. The 210-foot Reliance-class was built between 1962 and 1968 as the first major post-Second World War cutter program undertaken by the U.S. Coast Guard. Sixteen ships entered service under the WMEC designation, standing for Medium Endurance Cutter, and twelve remained in U.S. service as of 2026. The Philippines will become the fifth foreign recipient of a retired Reliance-class vessel, as previous transfers included WMEC-622 Courageous to Sri Lanka, WMEC-623 Steadfast to Malaysia, and WMEC-628 Durable to Colombia, while WMEC-629 Decisive is scheduled for transfer to Sri Lanka.

These transfers reflect the continued utility of the class despite its age, as these ships were designed for maritime law enforcement, fisheries protection, migrant interdiction, and search-and-rescue missions rather than naval combat. Their longevity, therefore, stems from a combination of relatively simple mechanical systems, large fuel capacity, good seakeeping characteristics, and the ability to support prolonged offshore deployments with a comparatively small crew. The Reliance cutters measure 64.16 meters in length, have a beam of 10.3 meters, and displace roughly 1,145 tons at full load. Propulsion is provided by two ALCO diesel engines producing a combined output of approximately 5,000 horsepower, allowing a maximum speed of 18 knots.

While this speed is modest compared with modern naval combatants, it is sufficient for fisheries enforcement, maritime interdiction, and patrol operations where endurance is more important than rapid maneuver. The vessel can travel approximately 8,000 nautical miles at cruising speed and operate continuously for weeks before requiring replenishment. Crew complement is approximately 75 personnel, a figure that remains relatively low for a ship of its size and endurance. For the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), limited manpower requirements are an important consideration because additional ships are only useful if crews can be generated and sustained.

The combination of long range, extended endurance, and moderate crew size makes the class particularly suitable for the PCG routine offshore security missions. One of the vessel's most important attributes is its aviation capability. The Reliance-class cutter incorporates a flight deck capable of supporting helicopter operations, extending surveillance coverage well beyond the ship's radar horizon. A HH-52A Seaguard helicopter (which entered U.S. Coast Guard service during the same period) launched from the vessel can investigate contacts, photograph activities, identify vessels, and relay information back to the ship without requiring the cutter itself to leave its patrol station.

This significantly increases the area that can be monitored during a deployment. Aviation support also enables medical evacuation, rapid transport of boarding teams, logistical resupply, and search-and-rescue operations over large maritime distances. In practical terms, a helicopter can reach locations in minutes that might require hours for the ship itself to access. For maritime domain awareness missions in the West Philippine Sea, this flight deck likely contributes more operational value than the vessel's weapon systems, as the cutter might function as a mobile surveillance node as much as a patrol vessel. Armament consists of one Mk38 25 mm autocannon and two M2HB .50-caliber machine guns.

This light weapons configuration is adequate for law enforcement tasks, anti-smuggling operations, fisheries enforcement, and boarding missions, but it does not provide meaningful capability against modern naval combatants. Although the class was originally designed with provisions for heavier systems, including sonar, anti-submarine weapons, and torpedo launchers, none of those systems were ever installed by the U.S., leaving place for future upgrades. The vessel carries no anti-ship missiles, no surface-to-air missiles, and no area-defense capability. This distinction is important because the transfer should not be interpreted as an effort to increase the Philippine naval strike capacity.

Instead, the ship is optimized for persistence at sea, allowing authorities to maintain a continuous presence and conduct inspections, interceptions, and surveillance activities over extended periods. Its operational logic resembles that of a coast guard vessel tasked with enforcing sovereignty rather than a warship intended to engage enemy fleets. Comparison with the Philippine Coast Guard's Hamilton-class cutters highlights the specific niche the Reliance class is expected to occupy. Hamilton-class ships displace approximately 3,250 to 3,400 tons, nearly three times the displacement of a Reliance-class cutter, and carry larger crews, greater fuel reserves, and more substantial aviation facilities.

They are better suited for extended blue-water deployments and high-visibility presence missions. The Reliance class, however, requires fewer personnel, consumes fewer resources, and imposes a lower maintenance burden. Those factors can translate directly into higher annual operational availability if maintenance schedules and crew rotations are managed efficiently. Rather than replacing larger cutters, the transferred vessel allows those larger ships to focus on missions requiring greater endurance or capacity while the Reliance-class cutter conducts routine patrols and enforcement activities.

The resulting force structure becomes more balanced because not every offshore mission requires a 3,000-ton vessel. For the Philippine Coast Guard, the most meaningful indicator of the transfer's value will be the number of additional patrol days generated each year. An extra offshore-capable cutter increases the number of hulls available for exclusive economic zone patrols, surveillance operations, boarding activities, and search-and-rescue missions. It provides another ship capable of remaining on station in the West Philippine Sea without requiring support from naval combatants.

The cutter can contribute to monitoring fishing activity, responding to maritime incidents, conducting inspections, and maintaining a presence around disputed maritime zones. It also adds capacity for humanitarian assistance and disaster response operations, missions that frequently compete for the same limited fleet resources. The transfer does not alter the regional military balance through the introduction of new weapons systems. Its significance lies in a more measurable outcome: a larger coast guard fleet able to spend more days at sea, cover more maritime territory and sustain a broader operational presence throughout the Philippine archipelago.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
Seawolf submarine USS Connecticut to come back in U.S. Navy service in September 2026 with just five years of service remaining
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The U.S. Navy is set to return the attack submarine USS Connecticut (SSN-22) to operational service in September 2026, according to a June 1 report by CT Insider, restoring one of its most capable undersea warfare assets after nearly five years of repairs following a grounding in the South China Sea. The return matters because the 2021 accident sidelined one-third of the entire Seawolf fleet at a time when demand for high-end submarines in the Indo-Pacific continues to grow.

Built for speed, deep-diving operations, and hunting advanced enemy submarines, USS Connecticut combines heavy weapons capacity with one of the most powerful sonar suites ever installed on a U.S. attack submarine. Its reactivation strengthens U.S. undersea combat capability against peer naval forces, although current plans would leave the submarine with only about five years of service before retirement in 2031.

Related topic:US Navy deploys USS Alaska nuclear submarine to Gibraltar as Trump rejects Iran peace deal

The U.S. Navy plans to return the Seawolf-class nuclear attack submarine USS Connecticut (SSN-22) to operational service in September 2026, after a 43-month structural reconstruction following an October 2021 grounding in the South China Sea. (Picture source: US Navy)

On June 1, 2026, CT Insider reported that the U.S. Navy plans to return the USS Connecticut (SSN-22) to operational service in September 2026, nearly five years after the nuclear attack submarine was sidelined by its October 2, 2021, grounding in the South China Sea. The accident removed one of only three Seawolf-class attack submarines from the fleet, immediately reducing the operational Seawolf inventory by 33 percent. The submarine struck an uncharted seamount while conducting a high-speed submerged transit officially associated with a humanitarian evacuation mission in the Indo-Pacific.

Eleven sailors were injured, the bow structure sustained extensive damage, and the submarine subsequently lost its bow dome during the transit toward repair facilities. The restoration effort required reconstruction of unique Seawolf-class components that have not been manufactured for decades, as the class ended after only three boats were built. By the time USS Connecticut returns to service, nearly five years will have elapsed since the accident, yet current Navy shipbuilding plans still call for retirement in 2031. As a result, a submarine commissioned in December 1998 could spend almost one-sixth of its service life undergoing repairs from a single peacetime accident and, under current planning, would have only about five years of operational service remaining after reactivation.

The grounding occurred on October 2, 2021, while the USS Connecticut was operating submerged in international waters near the approaches to Hainan Island, which hosts major Chinese Navy submarine facilities and serves as an operating area for both nuclear-powered attack submarines and ballistic missile submarines. During what was officially a humanitarian evacuation transit, the submarine struck an uncharted underwater seamount in a region where bathymetric survey coverage was incomplete. The impact injured 11 crew members, including one sailor who suffered a fractured scapula. Although the collision was severe enough to cause extensive structural damage to the forward section of the submarine, the S6W nuclear reactor and propulsion plant remained fully operational.

The crew then faced additional complications while attempting to recover from the grounding. Difficulties emerged with ballast-blow systems intended to force seawater from ballast tanks and generate positive buoyancy. Sailors employed a trim pump as an alternative means of ascent, but the system became overloaded, overheated, and reportedly glowed red before igniting. The fire was hopefully extinguished, and the submarine successfully surfaced. During the subsequent transit across the Pacific, the damaged bow dome detached completely from the submarine. Later inspections identified substantial structural damage to the bow section and rocks within ballast tanks, confirming that the submarine had physically struck the seabed rather than experiencing a lesser underwater collision.

The investigation was led by Rear Admiral Christopher Cavanaugh and reached a conclusion that was unusually direct for a major operational mishap: the grounding was preventable. Investigators determined that the accident resulted from cumulative failures in navigation planning, route assessment, watch team execution, command oversight, and operational risk management. The review found that navigation personnel did not adequately account for limitations in survey coverage, chart pedigree, seabed uncertainty, or the existence of unsurveyed areas along the planned route. The USS Connecticut's navigation team failed to properly evaluate the operational implications of incomplete hydrographic data despite operating in a region where gaps in seabed mapping were known to exist.

The investigation concluded that prudent action at multiple stages of planning and execution could have prevented the grounding. Accountability measures followed rapidly. Commanding officer Cmdr. Cameron Aljilani, executive officer Lt. Cmdr. Patrick Cashin, and Chief of the Boat Cory Rodgers were relieved. The investigation generated 28 corrective actions affecting submarine navigation standards, deployment certification procedures, voyage planning requirements, operational risk-management processes, and watchstander training throughout the U.S. submarine force. Fourteen corrective actions were completed immediately, thirteen entered implementation, and one became a permanent requirement.

The review also revisited an earlier incident on April 14, 2021, when USS Connecticut struck a pier while mooring at Point Loma, California. That collision was likewise determined to have been avoidable, with investigators identifying deficiencies in navigation, planning, seamanship, and command supervision. Repair work began after USS Connecticut arrived at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in December 2021. Unlike a Virginia-class or Los Angeles-class submarine, a damaged Seawolf-class submarine cannot rely on a broad industrial support network because only three units were ever constructed: USS Seawolf (SSN-21), USS Connecticut (SSN-22), and USS Jimmy Carter (SSN-23).

One of the most difficult aspects of the repair involved the replacement of the bow dome. Because the Seawolf-class production ended years earlier, there was logically no active manufacturing line capable of supplying replacement components. Congress initially provided $50 million in funding for long-lead materials and emergent repairs, including $10 million associated with a replacement bow dome and $40 million for repair activities. Damage assessments eventually expanded the scope of the work into a reconstruction effort lasting roughly 43 months. The duration of the repair effectively removed one-third of the Seawolf fleet from operational availability for almost five years.

The restoration also occurred during a period when U.S. Navy public shipyards were already struggling with maintenance backlogs affecting attack submarines across multiple classes. Current Navy planning schedules USS Connecticut for retirement in 2031, approximately 33 years after commissioning. The submarine's construction contract was awarded to General Dynamics Electric Boat on May 3, 1991. Keel laying followed on September 14, 1992, launch occurred on September 1, 1997, and commissioning took place on December 11, 1998. The timing is notable because the boat will return to service after spending nearly five years undergoing repairs while retaining only about five years of planned operational life.

Several members of Congress have argued that the timing of its retirement should be reassessed, given both the cost of restoration and the continuing demand for attack submarines. Similar service-life extensions have previously been approved for Los Angeles-class submarines, but any decision regarding USS Connecticut would ultimately depend upon reactor fuel margins, hull condition, maintenance requirements, and projected force-structure needs. Under the current plan, the retirement of USS Connecticut would reduce the Seawolf inventory from three boats to two, leaving only USS Seawolf and USS Jimmy Carter in service.

USS Connecticut was designed during the final years of the Cold War as a successor to the Los Angeles-class and reflects a different set of operational priorities than those that later shaped the Virginia-class. The submarine measures 107.6 meters in length, has a beam of 12.2 meters, and displaces 9,138 tons submerged. As a result, USS Connecticut can carry a crew of roughly 140 personnel, including 15 officers and 125 enlisted sailors, supported by a high degree of onboard automation compared with previous U.S. submarine classes. At commissioning in 1998, it was the heaviest attack submarine ever built by the United States. Construction utilized HY-100 steel rather than the HY-80 steel used in Los Angeles-class boats, as this stronger pressure hull permits substantially deeper operations, with most estimates placing test depth above 1,600 feet and maximum operating depth beyond 2,000 feet.

Propulsion is provided by a single S6W pressurized-water reactor developed specifically for the Seawolf-class: although its output remains classified, the S6W supports submerged speeds reportedly approaching 35 to 40 knots. Those performance requirements originated from Cold War assumptions that U.S. attack submarines would need to pursue Soviet ballistic missile submarines beneath Arctic ice and across vast stretches of the North Atlantic. Speed, depth, and acoustic performance, therefore, received priority over procurement cost. The submarine's weapons and sensor architecture reflect the same design philosophy. USS Connecticut carries eight 660 mm torpedo tubes rather than the four 533 mm tubes found aboard early Virginia-class submarines.

The larger tubes can launch Mk 48 ADCAP heavyweight torpedoes, Tomahawk cruise missiles, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, and naval mines while preserving growth margins for larger future payloads. Internal weapons stowage reaches roughly 50 weapons, compared with approximately 37 aboard early Virginia-class submarines and roughly 25 aboard Los Angeles-class boats. Relocation of the torpedo tubes away from the bow created sufficient volume for the installation of a very large spherical sonar array. The sonar installation, one of the largest ever fitted to a U.S. attack submarine, includes the AN/BQQ-5D suite, wide-aperture flank arrays, towed passive arrays, and high-frequency navigation sonar.

Combat management functions were originally integrated through the AN/BSY-2 architecture, which combined navigation, sonar processing, fire control, and weapons employment within a unified system. Internal volume is unusually large for an attack submarine and provides additional capacity for sensor processing equipment, weapons storage, and special operations equipment, which contributed significantly to the class's ability to remain operationally relevant more than twenty-five years after entering service. The Seawolf-class was designed specifically to counter the Soviet Navy's most advanced submarine programs, particularly the Project 971 Akula and projected follow-on designs expected to operate at greater depths and lower acoustic signatures than previous Soviet submarines.

At approximately 9,100 tons submerged, Seawolf is 15-20 percent larger than early Virginia-class submarines and significantly larger than Los Angeles-class boats. The class combines eight large-diameter torpedo tubes, a 50-weapon capacity, high-speed performance, deep-diving capability, and extensive acoustic reduction measures, including pump-jet propulsion, raft-mounted machinery, vibration isolation systems, anechoic coatings, and a low-noise reactor cooling architecture. Unlike submarines whose acoustic signatures increase substantially at higher speeds, the Seawolf-class was designed to maintain lower detectability while maneuvering at tactically useful speeds.

The class was also optimized for Arctic operations; USS Connecticut repeatedly participated in ICEX exercises, surfacing through polar ice in regions characterized by deep water, heavy ice cover, and limited surveillance infrastructure. Paradoxically, many of the characteristics now associated with the future SSN(X) program, including greater payload volume, higher sustained speed, larger sonar apertures, increased electrical power generation, and longer endurance in the Western Pacific, are closely aligned with requirements that shaped the Seawolf-class more than three decades ago.

The primary reason the Seawolf-class program ended was cost. Development began when the U.S. Navy anticipated long-term competition with the Soviet Union and planned to acquire 29 Seawolf-class submarines. By the early 1990s, however, the Soviet Union had dissolved, defense budgets were declining, and procurement priorities shifted. USS Seawolf and USS Connecticut each costed roughly $3 billion in then-year dollars, while USS Jimmy Carter exceeded $3.5 billion after incorporation of a 100-foot Multi-Mission Platform section. In current dollars, those figures correspond to approximately $6-7 billion per submarine.

Procuring all 29 planned boats would have required more than $80 billion before accounting for infrastructure, training, modernization, and lifecycle sustainment costs. Therefore, the Virginia-class submarine emerged as a lower-cost alternative capable of supporting larger production runs and a broader mission portfolio. Yet the USS Connecticut grounding demonstrates one of the long-term consequences of operating a class of only three submarines. Maintaining spare parts, engineering expertise, maintenance procedures, training pipelines, and manufacturing capacity for a fleet of three boats provides few economies of scale.

Replacement of Seawolf-specific components after the 2021 grounding required to recreate industrial capabilities that no longer existed in routine production. The result is now a strategic paradox: the Navy curtailed Seawolf because it was considered too expensive after the Cold War, but many of the capabilities sacrificed to reduce costs, including larger payload capacity, greater speed, greater endurance, larger sonar systems, and improved performance against peer submarines, have re-emerged as core requirements for the SSN(X) program intended to operate against an increasingly capable Chinese submarine force in the Indo-Pacific.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.

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Why Australia dropped new Virginia-class submarines for three used US Navy units in new AUKUS plan
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Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom have revised the AUKUS submarine pathway, removing the only newly built Virginia-class submarine previously expected for the Royal Australian Navy and replacing it with a third boat drawn from the existing U.S. Navy fleet. Announced on May 30, 2026, in Singapore, the change preserves the planned number of submarines but increases the importance of remaining reactor life and platform age, factors that will directly shape Australia’s undersea combat capability through the 2030s.

The decision eases pressure on U.S. submarine production at a time when American shipyards are struggling to generate enough Virginia-class boats to meet fleet requirements while supporting AUKUS commitments. While greater fleet commonality could simplify Australian training, maintenance, and sustainment, the operational value of the transfer now depends heavily on which submarines are selected and how much service life remains available before the transition to SSN-AUKUS.

Related topic:US Navy confirms first Block VII Virginia-class submarine procurement by 2030

While the strategic shift is intended to maximize cost efficiencies and ease pressure on backlogged American shipyards, it fundamentally reduces the long-term operational lifespan of the Royal Australian Navy's future undersea force. (Picture source: US Navy)

On May 30, 2026, Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom announcedin Singapore a revision to the AUKUS submarine acquisition plan that removes the only newly built Virginia-class submarine previously expected to enter Australian service. Under the pathway unveiled in 2023, Australia was to receive at least three Virginia-class attack submarines beginning in 2032, consisting of two boats transferred from the U.S Navy and one submarine delivered directly from future production. Under the revised arrangement, all three submarines will come from the existing U.S Navy inventory.

The number of submarines remains unchanged, but the decision alters the age profile of the future fleet, the amount of reactor life available after transfer and the capability standard Australia can expect to operate during the 2030s. The announcement also reflects the growing mismatch between U.S submarine production and fleet requirements, a factor that has become increasingly important as Washington attempts to balance domestic force-structure demands with AUKUS commitments. The original acquisition model provided Australia with a mixed fleet containing both existing and newly produced submarines.

The new-build boat was expected to arrive in the second half of the 2030s, potentially from one of the most recent Virginia production blocks available at that time. That submarine would have entered Australian service with a full design life of roughly 33 years and would likely have remained operational into the 2060s or early 2070s. Under the revised arrangement, Australia will instead receive three submarines that have already spent part of their operational lives in U.S service. The practical significance is not the loss of a hull but the loss of future service years.

If a submarine commissioned in the early 2010s is transferred after 2035, Australia could receive a boat with more than a decade of reactor life already consumed before it enters Royal Australian Navy service. The exact impact now depends almost entirely on which submarines are selected for transfer. The U.S Navy currently operates 26 Virginia-class submarines spread across multiple production blocks with different capabilities and maintenance characteristics. Block I boats entered service beginning in 2004, while Block II submarines followed between 2008 and 2013. Block III introduced the Virginia Payload Tube system, replacing twelve individual launch tubes with two large-diameter payload tubes.

Block IV was specifically designed to increase the number of deployments achievable during a submarine's service life by reducing major maintenance periods. Block V introduced the Virginia Payload Module, adding four large payload tubes capable of carrying additional cruise missiles and substantially increasing strike capacity. The difference between receiving an early Block II submarine and a later Block IV or Block V boat affects missile capacity, maintenance requirements, deployment availability, and remaining operational lifespan. The industrial context surrounding the decision is difficult to separate from the submarine transfer question.

U.S shipyards currently produce approximately 1.1 to 1.2 Virginia-class submarines per year, significantly below the 2.33 boats annually that would effectively support both the U.S. Navy fleet requirements and long-term AUKUS planning assumptions. At the same time, Los Angeles-class attack submarines continue retiring faster than new Virginia-class boats are entering service. This means that even though the United States continues procuring submarines every year, the total attack-submarine inventory remains under pressure. Under such conditions, every newly constructed Virginia-class submarine allocated to Australia would directly reduce the number available to offset American fleet reductions.

Replacing the planned new-build transfer with an existing submarine removes that requirement and preserves future production slots for the U.S Navy at a time when force levels remain a concern. The decision also affects sustainment planning. Prior to the revision, Australia faced the prospect of simultaneously operating Collins-class submarines, older Virginia-class variants, a newer Virginia-class configuration, and eventually SSN-AUKUS submarines. Such a fleet structure would require multiple training streams, different maintenance procedures, distinct spare-parts inventories, and separate certification processes.

Acquiring submarines from a common Virginia-class configuration reduces those requirements. This matters because Australia is not only acquiring submarines but also building the supporting infrastructure required to operate them. Nuclear-qualified maintenance facilities, sustainment organizations, workforce training pipelines, and certification systems must all be established during the same period. Standardizing the Virginia fleet reduces complexity at a stage when Australia is constructing much of that support architecture from the ground up. The principal trade-off is that fleet commonality does not eliminate the issue of remaining service life.

A newly built Virginia-class submarine entering service during the late 2030s would have remained available for more than three decades. A transferred submarine commissioned between 2010 and 2020 could arrive with 10 to 20 years of service already consumed. Even if extensive maintenance work is conducted before transfer, the amount of operational life remaining cannot be restored to the level of a new submarine. The issue becomes particularly important because the Virginia-class fleet is intended to bridge the period between the Collins-class force and the arrival of SSN-AUKUS. A boat arriving with 15 to 20 years of remaining service presents a fundamentally different planning challenge than a boat entering service with 30 years or more available before retirement.

The transition period remains heavily dependent on the Collins-class life-of-type extension program. Australia's six Collins-class submarines are expected to remain operational approximately ten years longer than originally planned, with extension costs estimated at approximately A$11 billion. These submarines will continue forming the backbone of Australia's undersea force while Virginia-class boats are progressively transferred from the United States. Any delay to the transfer schedule would immediately increase pressure on the Collins fleet. Likewise, delays affecting SSN-AUKUS production would require both Collins-class and Virginia-class submarines to remain operational longer than currently planned.

The transition therefore depends on synchronized performance across three separate industrial efforts: Collins sustainment in Australia, Virginia-class availability in the United States and SSN-AUKUS production in both Australia and the United Kingdom. Virginia-class submarines remain an interim capability rather than the intended end-state force under AUKUS. Australia plans to construct five SSN-AUKUS submarines in Adelaide, while current British plans call for up to twelve boats for the Royal Navy. British SSN-AUKUS submarines are expected to enter service during the late 2030s, while Australian-built boats are scheduled for the early 2040s.

The amount of service life remaining in transferred Virginia-class submarines directly influences the schedule flexibility available to the broader program. If transferred boats arrive with substantial remaining life, delays to SSN-AUKUS become easier to absorb. If they arrive after already consuming a significant portion of their reactor lives, the timetable for SSN-AUKUS construction becomes far less forgiving. In practical terms, the May 2026 decision shifts part of the program's risk away from future U.S production capacity and toward the remaining lifespan of the submarines ultimately selected for transfer.

Alongside the submarine decision, the three AUKUS partners also elevated Pillar II efforts focused on autonomous underwater capabilities. The program is centered on unmanned underwater vehicles, sensor systems and mission payloads intended for seabed surveillance, intelligence collection, and infrastructure protection. Particular emphasis is being placed on undersea communications cables and other critical subsea infrastructure.

Initial operational capability is planned for 2027, several years before the first Virginia-class transfer. This means that the first operational output from AUKUS may not be a nuclear-powered submarine but autonomous undersea systems deployed to monitor and protect underwater infrastructure. As the submarine pathway evolves, Pillar II is becoming a parallel effort that expands the partnership beyond fleet acquisition into persistent undersea surveillance, distributed sensing, and autonomous maritime operations.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.

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U.S. Forces Disable Iran-Bound Vessel with Hellfire Missile in Gulf of Oman
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A U.S. military strike disabled the Gambia-flagged commercial vessel M/V Lian Star in the Gulf of Oman using a Hellfire missile after the ship allegedly ignored repeated warnings and continued toward an Iranian port, according to reports published on May 29, 2026. The incident is notable because it showcases the use of a weapon typically associated with precision battlefield strikes to stop a commercial vessel at sea, signaling a more aggressive approach to maritime interdiction.

The Hellfire's precision allows military forces to disable specific targets while minimizing collateral damage, making it a potent tool for enforcing blockades and controlling maritime traffic. Its use against a commercial ship highlights how weapons developed for counterterrorism and battlefield operations are increasingly being applied to contested maritime security missions in strategically vital waterways.

Related Topic: U.S. Navy Deploys MH-60R Seahawk Helicopter From USS Truxtun Destroyer to Enforce Iran Blockade

An MH-60R Seahawk helicopter assigned to Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron (HSM) 70 launches an AGM-114N Hellfire missile during exercise Baltic Operations (BALTOPS) 2019 in the Baltic Sea on June 14, 2019. CENTCOM reported that U.S. forces used a Hellfire missile to disable the engine room of the Gambia-flagged vessel M/V Lian Star in the Gulf of Oman after the ship failed to comply with repeated warnings while sailing toward an Iranian port. (Picture source: U.S. Department of War/Defense)

According to a statement released by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) on May 30, 2026, American forces observed the vessel transiting international waters toward an Iranian port and issued more than 20 warnings informing the crew that it was violating blockade measures. After the ship failed to comply, a U.S. aircraft fired a Hellfire missile into the vessel's engine room, preventing it from continuing its voyage. CENTCOM stated that the ship is no longer transiting toward Iran.

The incident represents one of the most visible enforcement actions undertaken since the implementation of blockade measures following the recent conflict with Iran. CENTCOM reported that U.S. forces have now redirected 116 commercial vessels and disabled five ships in support of the blockade while a ceasefire remains in effect. The figures indicate a sustained effort to control maritime access to Iranian ports and reinforce sanctions-related restrictions through military means.

The strike occurred in the Gulf of Oman, a strategically important waterway linking the Arabian Sea to the Strait of Hormuz. Any increase in military activity in this region attracts close attention from global shipping operators and energy markets because the Strait of Hormuz remains one of the world's most critical maritime chokepoints for oil and natural gas exports. Continued enforcement operations could increase operational risks and insurance costs for commercial shipping operating near Iranian waters.

CENTCOM did not identify the aircraft involved in the operation. The command only stated that a "U.S. aircraft" conducted the strike. Several American military assets deployed in the region are capable of employing the AGM-114 Hellfire missile, including MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles, AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, and MH-60 naval helicopters operating from surface combatants. However, no official information has been released regarding the specific aircraft used during the engagement.

The AGM-114 Hellfire is a precision-guided air-to-surface missile originally developed to destroy armored vehicles but increasingly employed against maritime targets and critical infrastructure. The missile's accuracy enables operators to strike specific ship components such as propulsion systems, steering equipment, or command spaces. In maritime interdiction missions, this capability allows military forces to disable a vessel while limiting broader structural damage and reducing risks to the crew.

The use of a Hellfire missile against *Lian Star* illustrates how modern maritime enforcement increasingly combines persistent surveillance with precision strike capabilities. Rather than relying solely on boarding teams or naval interception, commanders can monitor suspect vessels over long distances and rapidly neutralize their ability to continue their voyage if they refuse to comply. This approach expands the reach of maritime security operations while reducing the need to position warships directly alongside every non-compliant vessel.

The operation also reflects a broader evolution in U.S. military efforts to apply pressure on Iran without escalating into large-scale naval combat. By targeting a vessel's propulsion system rather than sinking the ship, U.S. forces demonstrated a controlled use of force designed to enforce blockade measures while limiting collateral effects. Such calibrated actions are intended to strengthen deterrence and signal that violations will be met with immediate consequences.

The latest interdiction adds a new chapter to decades of maritime tensions involving the United States and Iran in and around the Gulf region. Previous confrontations have included tanker seizures, attacks on commercial shipping, drone incidents, and naval encounters in the Strait of Hormuz. The current blockade enforcement campaign differs in that it combines sustained surveillance, economic pressure, and precision military action to restrict maritime access to Iran while preserving freedom of navigation for compliant vessels.

As U.S. forces continue blockade operations, the disabling of *M/V Lian Star* demonstrates the operational value of integrating intelligence, surveillance, precision-guided weapons, and maritime domain awareness. The incident also underscores the strategic importance of the Gulf of Oman and Strait of Hormuz, where even limited enforcement actions can have implications for regional security, commercial shipping, and global energy markets.

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Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
China's New Type 054B Joins Liaoning Carrier Group Challenging U.S. Naval Power in Indo-Pacific
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China has deployed its new Type 054B frigate alongside the aircraft carrier Liaoning during operations in the Western Pacific, marking the first publicly confirmed far-seas deployment of the class beyond the First Island Chain, according to monitoring by Japanese maritime and air surveillance assets. The move strengthens the People's Liberation Army Navy’s ability to protect carrier forces at greater distances and signals continued progress toward sustained blue-water operations.

The deployment places the Type 054B in a real-world carrier strike group environment, where its sensors, command systems, and escort capabilities can support long-range naval missions. Its participation highlights China’s push to refine carrier warfare doctrine, improve fleet survivability, and expand power projection across the wider Pacific.

Related News: China Ramps Up Type 054B Frigate Production to Challenge U.S. Undersea Dominance and Increase Pressure on Taiwan

China’s aircraft carrier Liaoning sails in the Western Pacific during a carrier strike group deployment that included the Type 054B frigate Luohe for the first time. (Picture source: China Military)

According to information released by Japan's Ministry of Defense, the carrier group consisted of the aircraft carrier CNS Liaoning (16), the Type 055 Renhai-class destroyer Wuxi (104), the Type 052D Luyang III-class destroyer Kaifeng (124), the Type 054B Jiangkai III-class frigate Luohe (545), and the Type 901 Fuchi-class fast combat support ship Hulunhu (901). Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force units observed repeated fighter aircraft and helicopter flight operations while maintaining surveillance of the formation southwest of Okinotorishima.

The Japanese Ministry of Defense confirmed the deployment on May 27, 2026, while China's Ministry of National Defense described the activity as routine annual training intended to improve combat readiness through tactical flight operations, live-fire exercises, integrated search-and-rescue missions, and coordinated fleet maneuvers. Although Beijing characterized the mission as a standard training deployment, the inclusion of the Type 054B Luohe represents an important step in the modernization of China's surface fleet.

The Type 054B frigate is the successor to the widely deployed Type 054A class, which currently forms the backbone of China's medium-displacement escort fleet. While Chinese authorities have released limited official technical specifications, open-source intelligence assessments indicate that the Type 054B displaces approximately 6,000 tons, making it larger than the Type 054A. The vessel is believed to incorporate an Integrated Radio Frequency (IRF) mast architecture, upgraded combat management systems, improved anti-submarine warfare sensors, and increased power-generation capacity to support future electronic systems.

Anti-submarine warfare remains one of the most critical missions within a carrier strike group. The Type 054B is expected to employ a hull-mounted sonar, variable-depth sonar, and towed-array sonar systems capable of detecting underwater threats at extended ranges. Combined with embarked anti-submarine helicopters equipped with dipping sonars and lightweight torpedoes, the frigate contributes to the carrier group's underwater defense. These capabilities are particularly relevant in the Western Pacific, where U.S. Navy nuclear-powered attack submarines maintain a substantial operational presence.

The deployment also highlights the increasingly sophisticated composition of Chinese carrier strike groups. The Type 055 Renhai-class destroyer serves as the primary area air-defense asset. With an estimated displacement exceeding 12,000 tons and 112 vertical launch cells, the vessel can carry long-range surface-to-air missiles, anti-ship missiles, and land-attack weapons. The Type 052D destroyer complements this capability through a 64-cell vertical launch system and an Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, creating multiple defensive layers against aircraft, cruise missiles, and maritime threats.

Sustained operations far from mainland bases require robust logistical support, a role performed by the Type 901 Hulunhu. Displacing approximately 45,000 tons when fully loaded, the vessel can conduct high-speed replenishment operations while accompanying carrier groups. Fuel, ammunition, spare parts, and aviation supplies can be transferred at sea, allowing naval formations to remain deployed for extended periods without returning to port. This capability is a prerequisite for long-range naval power projection and reflects practices employed by major blue-water navies.

The Liaoning itself remains a transitional aircraft carrier within China's naval aviation development. Originally built as the Soviet Varyag before being acquired and completed by China, the carrier uses a ski-jump launch configuration rather than catapult-assisted launch systems. This design limits the maximum takeoff weight of embarked aircraft and reduces sortie generation rates compared with modern U.S. Navy carriers. Nevertheless, the ship continues to play a central role in developing carrier aviation expertise, flight-deck procedures, and integrated naval air operations.

A comparison with a U.S. Navy Carrier Strike Group (CSG) highlights both China's progress and the capabilities it is still developing. A typical American formation centered on a Nimitz-class or Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carrier benefits from nuclear propulsion, larger air wings, catapult-assisted launch systems, and decades of operational experience in carrier warfare. The Gerald R. Ford class employs the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS), enabling the launch of heavier aircraft and supporting higher sortie generation rates. At the same time, the PLAN is gradually adopting an escort structure that increasingly resembles that of U.S. carrier groups through the integration of large destroyers, modern frigates, and dedicated replenishment ships.

For the United States and its regional allies, the appearance of the Type 054B within a carrier group operating beyond the First Island Chain illustrates the gradual expansion of China's ability to project naval power deeper into the Western Pacific. While the PLAN continues to develop expertise in carrier aviation, joint-force integration, and long-duration naval operations, each deployment contributes to the accumulation of operational experience. As China commissions additional destroyers, frigates, support ships, and aircraft carriers, its capacity to challenge U.S. freedom of maneuver around Taiwan, the East China Sea, and the Philippine Sea is likely to become an increasingly important consideration in Indo-Pacific defense planning.

Written By Erwan Halna du Fretay - Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Erwan Halna du Fretay holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and has experience studying conflicts and global arms transfers. His research interests lie in security and strategic studies, particularly the dynamics of the defense industry, the evolution of military technologies, and the strategic transformation of armed forces.
U.S. Marine Corps Expands NMESIS Anti-Ship Missile Force with New ROGUE-Fires Order
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The U.S. Marine Corps has awarded Oshkosh Defense a $70.6 million contract for additional ROGUE-Fires carriers, expanding its fleet of unmanned mobile launch platforms that strengthen the Corps’ ability to threaten hostile warships from dispersed positions across contested maritime regions. The award, recently announced by Oshkosh Defense, reinforces the Marine Corps’ push to create harder-to-target anti-ship forces capable of operating inside an adversary’s engagement zone.

ROGUE-Fires serves as the launch platform for the Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS), giving Marines a remotely operated precision-strike capability against surface vessels without exposing crews to direct risk. The system supports a broader shift toward distributed operations, maritime denial, and long-range fires designed to complicate enemy naval maneuver and enhance deterrence in future conflicts.

Related News: U.S. Marines Airlift NMESIS Missile System to Philippines to Secure Luzon Strait Near Taiwan

U.S. Marine Corps NMESIS launcher mounted on an unmanned ROGUE-Fires vehicle during a maritime strike exercise, providing long-range anti-ship capabilities from dispersed coastal positions. (Picture source: US DoD)

Under the contract, Oshkosh Defense will manufacture additional ROGUE-Fires carriers through September 2028. Production activities will primarily take place in Oshkosh, Wisconsin, while supporting work will be conducted in Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. The award is funded through Fiscal Year 2025 and Fiscal Year 2026 Marine Corps procurement appropriations and was issued on a sole-source basis by Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM).

According to the U.S. Department of Defense contract announcement released on May 30, 2026, the delivery order covers the procurement of ROGUE-Fires vehicles that serve as launch carriers for the NMESISweapon system. The exact number of vehicles included in the contract has not been disclosed. However, the award reflects the Marine Corps' continued investment in distributed anti-access and area-denial capabilities intended to challenge adversary naval operations in littoral regions.

NMESIS combines the Naval Strike Missile (NSM) with the unmanned ROGUE-Fires vehicle to create a mobile coastal defense and maritime interdiction system. Developed through cooperation between Oshkosh Defense, Raytheon, Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace, and the U.S. Marine Corps, the system is intended to engage hostile surface vessels from dispersed expeditionary positions. The NSM is a fifth-generation anti-ship missile with a range exceeding 185 kilometers, a sea-skimming flight profile, autonomous target-recognition capability, and resistance to electronic countermeasures. Unlike many earlier anti-ship missiles that rely primarily on radar guidance, the NSM uses an imaging infrared seeker combined with terrain-reference navigation, enabling engagement of targets in contested electromagnetic environments.

The ROGUE-Fires carrier is derived from the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) family produced by Oshkosh Defense. It has been modified to operate without an onboard crew through a robotic control architecture developed in partnership with Forterra. Configurations observed during Marine Corps demonstrations show the integration of autonomous navigation systems, remote-driving technology, and a launcher capable of carrying two ready-to-fire NSMs. The vehicle retains the mobility characteristics of the JLTV, including independent suspension, off-road performance, and the ability to operate on austere terrain where conventional missile batteries may face deployment challenges.

The development of NMESIS is closely linked to the Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) concept. This operational approach calls for small Marine units to deploy across islands and coastal regions in order to establish temporary firing positions capable of controlling maritime chokepoints and strategic sea lanes. By combining unmanned vehicles with long-range precision-guided missiles, the Marine Corps seeks to create a distributed network of firing units able to relocate rapidly after launch, reducing vulnerability to enemy surveillance and counterfire systems.

At the operational level, NMESIS provides a sea-denial capability designed to increase survivability and flexibility. Remote operation allows launch vehicles to be positioned in exposed locations while personnel remain at safer distances. The combination of autonomous mobility, long-range precision strike capability, and reduced personnel exposure complicates adversary targeting processes. In a potential conflict scenario in the Western Pacific, NMESIS-equipped units could establish overlapping anti-ship engagement zones from multiple islands, creating additional constraints on the movement of hostile naval forces.

The Marine Corps has already tested the system during several major exercises. In 2021, NMESIS successfully destroyed a surface target during Large Scale Exercise, marking one of the first operational demonstrations of an unmanned ground-based anti-ship missile system in U.S. service. Subsequent exercises conducted in Hawaii and across the Pacific integrated the capability into joint maritime strike architectures involving land, air, and naval forces. These demonstrations also validated the system's ability to receive targeting data from external sources, including aircraft, naval vessels, and intelligence networks, allowing engagements beyond the line of sight of the firing unit.

Industrial cooperation remains a central element of the program. Kongsberg supplies the NSM, while Raytheon serves as the missile's U.S. production and integration partner. Oshkosh Defense provides the launch vehicle, and Forterra contributes autonomous driving technologies. This industrial structure allows the Marine Corps to leverage existing production lines while reducing development timelines compared with the creation of a completely new missile carrier.

Beyond its immediate operational role, the continued expansion of the NMESIS inventory reflects broader changes in U.S. military doctrine. Distributed precision-strike networks are increasingly viewed as a means of countering larger naval formations, particularly in geographically fragmented regions such as the Indo-Pacific. As China continues to expand both its naval presence and missile forces in the Western Pacific, NMESIS provides the United States and its allies with an additional maritime-denial capability capable of threatening high-value surface combatants from dispersed positions. The latest ROGUE-Fires procurement therefore illustrates the growing emphasis placed on unmanned expeditionary warfare and long-range maritime strike systems within contemporary U.S. deterrence and force-employment strategies.

Written By Erwan Halna du Fretay - Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Erwan Halna du Fretay holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and has experience studying conflicts and global arms transfers. His research interests lie in security and strategic studies, particularly the dynamics of the defense industry, the evolution of military technologies, and the strategic transformation of armed forces.
Germany offers Canada four submarines by 2036 to counter South Korea's bid in $60 billion program
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Germany has offered Canada a pathway to receive four Type 212CD submarines before the Royal Canadian Navy begins retiring its Victoria-class fleet, directly challenging South Korea’s competing KSS-III proposal in the C$60 billion Canadian Patrol Submarine Project. Details disclosed by German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius to CBC News on May 28, 2026, show Berlin and Oslo are prepared to reallocate submarines from their own procurement plans, giving Canada access to an existing production line and helping avoid a potentially dangerous undersea capability gap in the mid-2030s.

The Type 212CD combines low-observable design, air-independent propulsion, and long-endurance operations tailored for North Atlantic and Arctic missions, making it closely aligned with Canada’s future operational requirements. Beyond the submarines themselves, the proposal would place Canada inside a multinational fleet shared with Germany and Norway, creating common training, sustainment, and upgrade frameworks that could strengthen allied undersea operations across NATO’s northern flank for decades.

Related topic:Germany’s TKMS advances $12 billion bid to supply 12 Type 212CD patrol submarines to Canada

Germany and Norway have offered to reallocate two of their own production slots as part of their joint Type 212CD submarine proposal to Canada, matching the delivery timeline of South Korea's competing KSS-III bid. (Picture source: TKMS)

On May 28, 2026, German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius disclosed to CBC News how Germany intends to meet Canada's most demanding Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP) requirement: delivering four operational submarines before the Royal Canadian Navy begins retiring its Victoria-class fleet in the mid-2030s. As part of the CPSP, Canada plans to acquire up to twelve conventionally powered submarines under a program valued at roughly C$60 billion, with the first submarine, maintenance infrastructure, and training systems required by 2035.

South Korea's Hanwha Ocean has offered four KSS-III Batch II submarines by 2035, placing pressure on TKMS to demonstrate comparable schedules. Germany's counteroffer now relies on reallocating existing production capacity, with Germany and Norway prepared to release one Type 212CD submarine each from their own procurement programs, allowing Canada to enter a production sequence that already exists instead of waiting for new construction slots. A final decision is expected before the end of June 2026, nearly ten months after Canada reduced the competition to TKMS and Hanwha Ocean in August 2025.

The German delivery plan is rooted in the existing German-Norwegian Type 212CD program. Berlin plans to acquire six submarines, while Oslo expanded its order from four to six boats on January 30, 2026, bringing the combined procurement to twelve submarines. The Type 212CD development was launched through a €5.5 billion contract signed in July 2021, while construction of the first submarine began in September 2023. Norway's lead submarine is scheduled for delivery in 2029, with subsequent boats entering service through 2035. By transferring one German and one Norwegian submarine to Canada, TKMS can provide earlier deliveries that would otherwise be difficult to achieve through newly assigned production positions.

Germany and Norway would recover those hulls later in the production sequence, supported by planned output increases to three or four submarines annually later in the decade. The approach effectively converts part of a national procurement program into an accelerated allied capability program without reducing the long-term force goals of either navy. The Type 212CD submarine was designed specifically for northern European waters and closely matches Canada's future operating requirements for North Atlantic and Arctic operations. The submarine displaces 2,500 tonnes surfaced and 2,800 tonnes submerged, measures 73 meters in length with a 10-meter beam, and employs a hull form designed to reduce detectability by modern active sonar systems.

Propulsion combines two MTU 4000-series diesel generators, lithium-ion batteries, and fourth-generation PEM fuel-cell air-independent propulsion, providing an endurance of up to forty-one days without external support or frequent snorkeling cycles. The ORCCA combat system supports six 533 mm torpedo tubes capable of launching heavyweight torpedoes while preserving capacity for missile systems, anti-torpedo interceptors, and unmanned underwater vehicles. Furthermore, the completion of the critical design review in August 2024 moved the program into full-rate production and significantly reduced developmental risk.

A distinguishing feature of the German proposal is that Canada would not become the sole operator of a unique submarine design. Germany and Norway already manage the Type 212CD through a common acquisition structure that includes joint responsibility for design management, procurement, and acceptance activities. Sustainment is organized through shared lifecycle arrangements extending across the projected service life of the fleet. Norway is simultaneously building dedicated infrastructure at Haakonsvern that will support maintenance, testing, and operational activities for the new submarines.

If Canada acquires the Type 212CD, the total planned fleet could increase from 12 to 24 submarines operating identical combat systems, logistics networks, training architectures, and maintenance procedures. Such a structure distributes future upgrade costs across three operators and would place Canada inside an existing multinational submarine enterprise. German officials have also raised the possibility of crew exchanges and common operational practices, reflecting a long-term framework that could remain active for four decades or more. Industrial considerations have become central to the CPSP competition because Canada requires economic benefits that extend well beyond an offshore submarine acquisition.

Germany has attached a package now estimated at C$86 billion in cumulative GDP impact and 654,695 job-years over the life of the submarine program. Planned investments include expansion of the Port of Churchill in Manitoba to support critical mineral and liquefied natural gas exports, carbon-capture cooperation in Alberta, and multiple projects involving rare earth processing, battery manufacturing, artificial intelligence, and advanced industrial production. Several investments are structured to begin shortly after contract award rather than following submarine construction milestones, making immediate and long-term economic effects a major evaluation criterion alongside military requirements.

The defence-industrial portion of the offer extends into capabilities that Canada currently imports or maintains on a limited scale. TKMS proposes maintenance and support facilities on both Canadian coasts, creating sustainment capacity for Atlantic and Pacific operations without dependence on European shipyards. The proposal also includes domestic production of heavyweight torpedoes and anti-torpedo systems, and potential facilities linked to hypersonic missile testing and development, three sectors that would become integral parts of Canada's defence-industrial base. Battery and propulsion-related manufacturing activities also remain under consideration.

CAE has already expanded its cooperation with TKMS in submarine training, simulation, and crew preparation, three areas Canada considers essential because training systems must accompany initial submarine deliveries. Additional Canadian participation includes Seaspan and a broader network of engineering and sustainment firms. Because the future fleet is expected to remain in service into the 2070s, the economic value of sustainment activities may ultimately exceed the value of initial construction work.

Beyond procurement and industrial participation, the submarine competition between Germany and South Korea has evolved into a broader question of Arctic security and alliance integration. Germany, Norway, and Canada already cooperate under several maritime security arrangements established in 2024 and share an increasing focus on the North Atlantic, the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap, the Norwegian Sea, the Barents Sea, and Arctic approaches. Norway's January 2026 decision to increase its Type 212CD fleet from four to six submarines also reflected concerns regarding military activity along NATO's northern flank.

Therefore, Canadian participation would connect Ottawa directly to a submarine force structure designed around those same operating areas. Four Indigenous development organizations are included within the German industrial framework, while cooperation opportunities involving Isar Aerospace, critical minerals, energy infrastructure, and artificial intelligence further expand its scope. Canada's decision will determine whether its future submarine force becomes part of a common European-Nordic Arctic and North Atlantic framework built around a common fleet of Type 212CD submarines, or pursues a separate industrial and strategic pathway through South Korea's KSS-III program.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
U.S. Marines Begin Operational Fielding of ACV-30 Bringing 30mm Firepower to Littoral Operations
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The U.S. Marine Corps has begun operational fielding of the ACV-30, BAE Systems announced on May 28, 2026, giving Marine amphibious units a protected 30mm direct-fire capability for contested littoral battles. The fielding strengthens ship-to-shore forces with mobile firepower designed to support Marines as they move from the beach into inland combat.

The ACV-30 combines the amphibious mobility of the baseline ACV with a remotely operated Kongsberg 30mm turret that lets crews engage targets while staying protected inside the vehicle. Its arrival gives commanders organic fire support against enemy positions, light armor, and emerging threats as the Marine Corps prepares for more dispersed and contested coastal operations.

Related Topic: Kongsberg’s RT20 Turret Deal Advances U.S. Marine Corps’ ACV-30 Amphibious Combat Vehicle Program

The U.S. Marine Corps has begun operational fielding of the ACV-30, a new amphibious combat vehicle armed with a stabilized 30mm cannon that enhances firepower, survivability, and maneuver capability for future littoral and expeditionary operations (Picture Source: BAE Systems / Edited By Army Recognition Group)

BAE Systems announced on May 28, 2026, that the first operational fielding of the Amphibious Combat Vehicle-30 to the U.S. Marine Corps is officially underway. The milestone marks the arrival of a new level of protected firepower within Marine amphibious formations as the service begins receiving a 30mm cannon-armed variant specifically designed to support expeditionary and littoral operations. More than a routine vehicle delivery, the fielding of the ACV-30 reflects the Marine Corps' broader effort to prepare for operations in contested coastal environments where mobility, survivability, and immediate direct-fire support are expected to play a decisive role.

The ACV-30 is the direct-fire variant of the Amphibious Combat Vehicle family developed by BAE Systems for the U.S. Marine Corps. While retaining the full amphibious and expeditionary capabilities of the baseline ACV platform, the vehicle introduces a significant increase in combat power through the integration of a remotely operated 30mm cannon. This combination allows Marine units not only to transport personnel from ship to shore but also to arrive on the battlefield with organic fire support capable of engaging enemy positions, light armored vehicles, and emerging threats. In effect, the ACV-30 transforms the role of the amphibious combat vehicle from a protected transport platform into a maneuver asset capable of actively shaping the battlefield alongside dismounted Marines.

The vehicle is equipped with a Kongsberg-developed remote turret mounting a stabilized 30mm weapon system, enabling crews to detect, track, and engage targets while remaining protected inside the armored hull. The remote weapon architecture enhances crew survivability while preserving internal volume for embarked Marines, mission equipment, and sustainment supplies. Beyond its firepower, the ACV-30 is designed to accompany Marine forces throughout the full spectrum of amphibious operations, from ship-to-shore assaults and beachhead security to inland maneuver across difficult terrain. The addition of a precision medium-caliber cannon provides Marine commanders with an immediately available combat capability that can suppress enemy positions, counter light armored threats, and support dispersed units operating in increasingly complex and contested battlespaces.

The first fielding follows a structured development, testing, and procurement process that reflects the Marine Corps’ long-term effort to modernize its amphibious warfare capabilities for future conflicts. BAE Systems was selected for the ACV program as the service moved to replace the aging Assault Amphibious Vehicle, a platform that had formed the backbone of U.S. amphibious armored mobility since the Vietnam War era. Recognizing the need for greater survivability, mobility, and lethality in increasingly contested environments, the Marine Corps initiated the development of several ACV variants, including the cannon-armed ACV-30. In 2022, the Marine Corps awarded BAE Systems a contract to build ACV-30 production representative test vehicles. In February 2024, the first ACV-30 test vehicle was delivered for evaluation, allowing Marines to assess the integration of the 30mm weapon system with the amphibious platform under realistic operational conditions. In April 2025, BAE Systems received a $188.5 million full-rate production contract covering 30 ACV-30 vehicles, fielding support, spare parts, and test equipment. The latest BAE Systems announcement therefore marks a significant milestone for the program, confirming the transition from developmental testing to operational fielding and bringing the Marine Corps one step closer to deploying a fully modernized family of amphibious combat vehicles across frontline formations.

Compared with the legacy AAV, the ACV-30 represents a substantial increase in mobility, protection, lethality, and operational flexibility. The AAV was conceived primarily as an armored transport vehicle intended to move Marines from ship to shore, reflecting the operational requirements of a different era. By contrast, the ACV-30 provides the Marine Corps with a platform that more closely resembles an amphibious infantry fighting vehicle, combining troop transport with organic direct-fire support. Its 30mm cannon enables Marine units to engage light armored vehicles, fortified positions, infantry concentrations, and emerging battlefield threats at greater distances and with greater precision than previously possible. Compared with the ACV-P personnel carrier, the ACV-30 introduces an immediately available combat capability within amphibious formations, reducing dependence on external fires during the critical phases of an assault. The result is a vehicle capable not only of delivering Marines to the fight but also of helping them gain and maintain tactical superiority once ashore.

The operational value of the ACV-30 is particularly significant in the context of the Marine Corps’ ongoing transformation under Force Design 2030 and the service’s growing focus on distributed maritime operations. U.S. Marines are increasingly preparing for scenarios in which relatively small, highly mobile units must operate across island chains, coastal regions, and contested littoral zones while facing advanced surveillance systems, long-range precision weapons, drones, and anti-access capabilities. In this environment, combat units require platforms capable of providing both mobility and immediate fire support without relying on large armored formations. The ACV-30 addresses this requirement by enabling Marines to transition seamlessly from ship-to-shore movement to sustained land operations. In a potential Indo-Pacific contingency, the vehicle could support the seizure and defense of key maritime terrain, reinforce expeditionary advanced bases, secure beachheads, protect logistics nodes, and provide direct-fire support to dispersed Marine elements operating across multiple islands and coastal positions.

The strategic implications extend well beyond the vehicle itself. The operational fielding of the ACV-30 strengthens the United States' ability to project combat power in contested littoral regions, particularly across the Indo-Pacific, where geography, distance, and maritime access are expected to shape future military operations. By integrating a 30mm-armed amphibious combat vehicle into frontline Marine formations, the United States enhances the survivability and combat effectiveness of forces designed to operate inside an adversary’s weapons engagement zone. The ACV-30 supports the Marine Corps’ role as a forward-deployed, rapid-response force capable of reinforcing allies, deterring potential adversaries, and maintaining freedom of maneuver from the sea. More broadly, the platform reflects Washington’s continuing investment in amphibious warfare capabilities at a time when control of strategic maritime chokepoints, island chains, and coastal areas is becoming increasingly important to regional and global security.

The program also carries an important industrial and alliance dimension. BAE Systems remains the prime contractor for the ACV family, while Kongsberg supplies the 30mm remote turret, with work supporting production and sustainment across U.S. facilities. This reflects a defense industrial model based on long-term production, common vehicle architecture, and cooperation with trusted allied suppliers. As the ACV family expands through personnel, command, recovery, and cannon-armed variants, the Marine Corps gains a more coherent fleet that can simplify training, logistics, maintenance, and future modernization.

The first fielding of the ACV-30 marks a decisive step in the evolution of U.S. Marine Corps amphibious warfare and the continued modernization of America's expeditionary forces. This vehicle is not simply another variant within the ACV family; it fundamentally enhances the role of the Marine amphibious unit by transforming it from a force transported ashore into a force that arrives with protected mobility, organic precision firepower, and the ability to immediately influence the battlefield. As the Marine Corps prepares for operations across increasingly contested littoral and maritime environments, the ACV-30 provides a critical combination of survivability, maneuverability, and combat power that aligns with the service's vision for future warfare. For the United States, the message is unmistakable: the Marine Corps is preserving its amphibious heritage while adapting it to meet the challenges of twenty-first-century conflict, ensuring that Marine forces can project power, support allies, and prevail in strategically important coastal and island regions where control of terrain, speed of response, and operational flexibility may determine the outcome of future military campaigns.

Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
ROKS Dosan Ahn Changho makes first trans Pacific crossing as South Korea eyes $80 billion Canadian submarine deal
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South Korea has deployed the submarine ROKS Dosan Ahn Changho across the Pacific for the first time, arriving at Canadian Forces Base Esquimalt on May 23, 2026, after a 14,000-kilometer voyage that directly supports Seoul’s bid for Canada’s future submarine fleet. The deployment demonstrated that the KSS-III class can sustain long-range operations across Indo-Pacific and Arctic-oriented theaters while integrating with allied naval forces, a critical factor as Canada searches for up to 12 new submarines under a program valued at up to CAD 80 billion. The patrol exposed Canadian personnel to the KSS-III during real operational conditions, including Pacific transit, typhoon exposure, anti-submarine warfare drills, and combined command-system integration with Canada’s Maritime Forces Pacific.

Equipped with air-independent propulsion, lithium-ion batteries, cruise missiles, and indigenous SLBM capability, the ROKS Dosan Ahn Changho showcased South Korea’s ability to deliver operationally mature submarines already in serial production. This deployment highlights Seoul's readiness to meet Canada's urgent naval requirements as Ottawa seeks faster fleet renewal amid growing Arctic and Indo-Pacific security demands.

Related topic:South Korea deploys KSS-III submarine on 14,000 km mission as Canada's $40 Billion deal enters final phase

The deployment marked the first time a South Korean conventionally powered submarine completed a trans-Pacific crossing, and the first time a South Korean naval vessel achieved direct C4I command-system integration with Canada's Maritime Forces Pacific outside bilateral U.S. structures. (Picture source: Canadian Navy)

On May 23, 2026, the South Korean Navy submarine ROKS Dosan Ahn Changho (SS-083) arrived at Canadian Forces Base Esquimalt after completing a 14,000 km deployment from Jinhae, South Korea, through Guam and Hawaii, marking the first Pacific crossing by a South Korean submarine and the longest deployment in South Korean Navy submarine history. The mission took place during the final phase of Canada’s Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP), which seeks up to 12 conventionally powered submarines to replace the Royal Canadian Navy’s four Victoria-class boats acquired from the United Kingdom during the late 1990s.

South Korea’s bid, led by Hanwha Ocean and HD Hyundai Heavy Industries, competes directly against Germany’s TKMS Type 212CD in a program valued between $60 billion CAD and $80 billion CAD ($43.2 billion to $57.6 billion), including sustainment and lifecycle support. The Dosan Ahn Changho deployment combined operational testing, industrial positioning, NATO-oriented interoperability demonstrations, and naval diplomacy while exposing Canadian personnel directly to the KSS-III class during real operational conditions. Seoul also used the mission to demonstrate long-range deployment capability, production maturity, and alliance integration at a time when Ottawa faces declining submarine availability and increasing Arctic and Indo-Pacific operational requirements.

The ROKS Dosan Ahn Changho departed Jinhae on March 25, 2026, transited through Guam and Hawaii, and arrived in Victoria on May 23 after nearly two months at sea under multiple Pacific operating conditions, including typhoon exposure near Guam. During the Hawaii stop, two Royal Canadian Navy submariners embarked onboard for the final operational leg to Canada, allowing direct observation of Korean submarine procedures, onboard maintenance, combat system interfaces, and crew sustainment during active deployment.

The submarine also established operational connectivity with Canada’s Maritime Forces Pacific using a combined C4I architecture, representing the first acknowledged integration between a South Korean-built submarine and Canadian Pacific naval command systems outside bilateral Korea-U.S structures. Portions of the transit were supported by the 3,100-ton Daegu-class frigate ROKS Daejeon (FFG-823), which accompanied the submarine into Esquimalt. Joint activities near Vancouver Island included anti-submarine warfare drills, operational exchanges, and command-level discussions involving South Korean Navy Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Kim Kyung-ryul and Royal Canadian Navy Commander Vice Adm. Angus Topshee.

Following Canadian operations scheduled between May 23 and June 2, the submarine is expected to continue toward Hawaii to participate in RIMPAC 2026. The KSS-III Batch-I submarine entered service in August 2021 and represents South Korea’s first domestically developed large conventionally powered submarine with indigenous vertical launch capability for cruise missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Depending on configuration, the submarine displaces between roughly 3,350 tons surfaced and 3,750 tons submerged while measuring between 83.5 and 89 meters in length with a crew complement of approximately 50 personnel.

Propulsion combines diesel-electric systems, lithium-ion batteries, and fuel-cell-based Air Independent Propulsion technology, allowing submerged endurance reportedly exceeding three weeks without snorkeling under favorable conditions. Armament includes six 533 mm torpedo tubes and six vertical launch cells compatible with indigenous Chonryong land-attack cruise missiles and Hyunmoo submarine-launched ballistic missiles, making South Korea one of the few non-nuclear submarine operators fielding indigenous SLBM-capable conventional submarines. The Pacific deployment tested long-duration systems' reliability, thermal management, electrical endurance, and operational continuity during extended oceanic transit under tropical humidity and severe weather conditions.

Batch-II variants currently under construction, for their part, increase submerged displacement beyond 4,000 tons while integrating expanded battery capacity and updated combat-management architecture. Canada’s CPSP requirement is driven by declining readiness within the Royal Canadian Navy’s Victoria-class fleet and by Ottawa’s requirement for sustained submarine operations across the Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic theaters. Canada currently operates four Victoria-class submarines originally built for the Royal Navy during the 1980s, but their operational availability has remained inconsistent due to maintenance constraints, aging systems, and trained submarine personnel shortages.

Canadian naval leadership already indicated that the current force of roughly 200 submariners would need to expand toward approximately 1,000 personnel to sustain continuous operations with a future fleet of 12 submarines. South Korea’s central argument in the competition focuses on production maturity and delivery speed, emphasizing that the KSS-III is already operational and remains in serial production, unlike competing designs still moving through development or early manufacturing stages. Hanwha Ocean proposed to deliver the first submarine by 2032 and four boats before 2035 if a contract is signed during 2026, while completing the full fleet by 2043 at a pace of one submarine annually.

The Pacific crossing, therefore, functioned as a direct operational demonstration that the KSS-III can sustain trans-oceanic deployments without permanent forward logistics infrastructure while maintaining interoperability with allied naval forces. The deployment also reflected a broader shift in South Korean naval strategy toward NATO-oriented interoperability and multinational maritime integration beyond the traditional Korea-U.S alliance structure. Combined C4I integration with Canadian naval command systems demonstrated compatibility with allied operational architectures outside exclusively U.S-centered command frameworks.

Canadian submariners embarked onboard reportedly assessed compartment layouts, operational procedures, and combat system ergonomics as broadly compatible with Western submarine operating standards, reducing transition complexity for future crews. Activities near Esquimalt included anti-submarine warfare drills, operational exchanges, and discussions regarding naval cooperation and defense-industrial coordination. Participation in RIMPAC 2026 immediately after Canadian operations further linked the deployment to multinational naval activity involving Indo-Pacific and NATO-aligned maritime forces.

South Korea increasingly integrates operational military deployments into export-oriented defense campaigns, a model already visible in Korean armored vehicle, artillery, naval, and fighter jet exports tied to industrial participation agreements and government-level strategic engagement. Hanwha Ocean’s campaign extends well beyond submarine acquisition and includes industrial participation proposals centered on domestic sustainment, local manufacturing integration, and long-term Canadian involvement in submarine support activities.

Korean firms proposed maintenance, repair, and overhaul facilities on both Canadian coasts while integrating Canadian industry into sonar systems, underwater surveillance technologies, propulsion systems, combat management integration, AI-enabled simulation, naval electronics, and digital engineering. Named industrial partners include OSI Maritime Systems, Ultra Maritime, Geospectrum Technologies, Curtiss-Wright INDAL, CAE, Ontario Shipyards, Algoma Steel, AtkinsRéalis, Telesat, and MDA Space. Hanwha also proposed the establishment of the Hanwha Arctic and Defence Innovation Centre focused on AI-enabled systems, autonomy, advanced manufacturing, digital engineering, naval systems, and Arctic-related operational technologies.

Economic projections associated with the Korean proposal estimated approximately CAD 60 billion in economic activity between 2026 and 2044, alongside support for an average of 22,500 full-time jobs annually. Workforce localization initiatives additionally incorporated agreements involving Dalhousie University, Mohawk College, the University of Toronto, and the University of New Brunswick. The Canadian submarine competition forms part of a broader South Korean defense-industrial expansion strategy accelerated during the late 2010s as Seoul increasingly positioned itself as an alternative supplier capable of shorter delivery timelines than many European or American manufacturers.

South Korean exports expanded across naval systems, tanks, self-propelled artillery, missile systems, aerospace technologies, and armored vehicles through reliance on mature domestic production lines originally developed for national military requirements. Unlike several European submarine programs facing industrial bottlenecks or developmental delays, the KSS-III manufacturing continues on an active line already delivering operational submarines while Batch-II variants remain under simultaneous construction. South Korea’s shipbuilding infrastructure, centered around Geoje and Ulsan, provides one of the world’s largest concentrations of civilian and military maritime industrial capacity, enabling simultaneous naval production, sustainment, and export manufacturing.

Even if Seoul fails to secure the CPSP contract, the Pacific deployment already achieved several objectives, including the validation of long-range submarine endurance, exposure to NATO-oriented operational structures, direct integration with Canadian naval personnel, and expansion of industrial relationships within Canadian defense sectors. The deployment, therefore, represented a coordinated military-industrial influence effort tied directly to procurement competition, alliance positioning, Arctic security requirements, and South Korea’s attempt to establish a long-term strategic presence inside North American defense markets.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
Türkiye’s ZAHA Marine Assault Vehicles Deliver a New Armored Edge for NATO Beach Landing Operations
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Türkiye’s FNSS ZAHA amphibious assault vehicles demonstrated their full sea-to-shore combat role during the EFES-2026 Combined Joint Live-Fire Exercise in İzmir, where several tracked armored vehicles emerged from the sea, landed under armor, and supported advancing Marines with suppressive fire during the assault phase. Observed by Army Recognition on May 20–21, the exercise highlighted how ZAHA strengthens Türkiye’s and NATO’s ability to conduct protected amphibious landings against contested coastlines while maintaining combat momentum from ship to inland maneuver.

Designed specifically for modern littoral warfare, ZAHA combines a hydrodynamic amphibious hull, twin water-jet propulsion, self-righting capability, STANAG-protected armored troop compartment, and the remotely operated ÇAKA turret armed with a 12.7 mm machine gun and 40 mm grenade launcher. Its ability to transport a full Marine combat group from amphibious ships directly into mechanized ground operations gives NATO a Turkish-built platform optimized for rapid reinforcement, survivability, and armored sea-to-shore assault operations from the Baltic to the Mediterranean.

Related Topic: Türkiye’s ZAHA Amphibious Assault Vehicles Lead NATO Baltic Landing in STEADFAST DART 26 Maritime Drill

During the EFES 2026 exercise in İzmir, Türkiye’s FNSS ZAHA amphibious assault vehicles showcased their ability to transport Marines from sea to shore under armor while providing suppressive fire support for NATO-style beach landing operations. (Picture Source: Army Recognition Group)

At the Distinguished Observer Day of the EFES-2026 Combined Joint Live-Fire Exercise, held on May 20–21 in Seferihisar, İzmir, Army Recognition Group had the honor of attending one of the event’s most significant amphibious assault sequences, as several Turkish FNSS ZAHAMarine Assault Vehicles came from the sea, landed on the beach, continued in coordinated maneuver during the exercise, and provided suppressive fire support during the movement of landing units. Their appearance gave a clear view of why ZAHA has become an important Turkish contribution to NATO amphibious warfare: it is a protected, armed, tracked vehicle able to swim from sea to shore, land Marines under armor, deliver firepower during the first phase of an assault, and continue inland with mechanized forces. It was not confirmed from the observation point whether the vehicles had been deployed directly from TCG Anadolu, which was present in the exercise area, but the sequence reflected the operational concept for which ZAHA was developed.

The EFES 2026 landing sequence showed the value of a vehicle built for the most demanding phase of amphibious operations. A beach assault is not only a movement from water to land. It is a race to keep cohesion, protection, fire support, and tempo while troops cross open water, pass through the surf zone, reach the shore, and move toward inland objectives before the opposing force can fix them on the beach. ZAHA fits this mission by combining the characteristics of a military marine vessel and a tracked armored combat vehicle. Its role is to move from an amphibious ship toward the coast, close the distance to the shore, and bring Marines to land inside an armored platform rather than leaving them exposed during the most vulnerable part of the operation.

The vehicle’s design reflects this dual land and sea mission. ZAHA uses a fully sealed hydrodynamic hull, hydraulic trim vane, cathodic protection, twin water-jet propulsion, hydraulic rear ramp, commander’s hatch, driver’s hatch, gunner’s compartment, personnel and cargo hatch, and integrated smoke generator. These features show that the platform was engineered around amphibious assault from the beginning. At EFES 2026, this design was visible in the way several vehicles emerged from the sea, reached the beach, and continued their movement ashore without stopping at the waterline. For Türkiye, this gives the Naval Forces a credible armored sea-to-shore tool. For NATO, it adds a Turkish-built platform able to support rapid reinforcement across contested coastlines.

The mobility of ZAHA gives the landing force the ability to keep moving after the first contact with land. The vehicle carries 21 personnel, including driver, commander, gunner, and embarked Marines, allowing a complete combat group to reach the beach under armor. It uses a diesel engine, fully automatic transmission, torsion-bar suspension, and a power-to-weight ratio of 20 hp per ton. In water, it can reach 7 knots, while on land it can reach 70 km/h. It can climb a 60 percent gradient, cross a 40 percent side slope, pass a 0.9-meter vertical obstacle, and negotiate a 2-meter trench. In practical terms, this means ZAHA can leave the exposed beach area, cross difficult coastal terrain, and operate with main battle tanks and other mechanized maneuver units once the landing force expands its beachhead.

Its amphibious performance is one of the main reasons the vehicle has strategic value for NATO. The two water jets and hydrodynamic hull give the vehicle the ability to move through the water with its own propulsion, while the self-righting capability provides an added safety margin in case of capsizing or operation in harsh sea conditions. Its long cruising range supports seaborne, land-to-sea, and land-to-land missions, giving commanders more flexibility than a vehicle limited to a single beach assault profile. In a theater such as the Mediterranean, Aegean, Black Sea approaches, or Baltic region, this kind of platform can help transform maritime access into protected ground combat power.

The firepower displayed at EFES 2026 was central to the vehicle’s combat role. ZAHA is fitted with the ÇAKA remote-controlled turret, armed with a 12.7 mm machine gun and a 40 mm automatic grenade launcher. This combination gives the vehicle the ability to suppress infantry positions, light vehicles, firing points, anti-armor teams, and threats hidden in coastal terrain. The turret offers 360-degree continuous traverse and electrical elevation from -7 degrees to +45 degrees, supported by day and night sights. Its remote-controlled configuration keeps the gunner protected inside the hull, while water-resistant construction, target acquisition, automatic target tracking, stabilization, ballistic protection, reliability, accuracy, and reduced internal volume help the weapon system remain effective after exposure to salt water, surf impact, and amphibious movement.

The protection package strengthens ZAHA’s value in modern littoral warfare. The vehicle has ballistic and mine protection under STANAG 4569 at classified levels, self-righting capability, eight smoke grenade dischargers, an integrated smoke generator, automatic fire-suppression system, CBRN protection, air conditioning, and heating. These features are critical for a force that may face mines, artillery fragments, drone observation, loitering munitions, anti-tank weapons, coastal surveillance, and contaminated areas during a landing. ZAHA also carries 360-degree situational awareness, a driver vision system, battlefield management system, navigation system, VHF/UHF radios, crew intercommunication system, and a 24-volt electrical architecture. This turns the vehicle into a connected combat node able to support coordination between crews, embarked troops, naval assets, and higher command.

The use of several ZAHA vehicles during EFES 2026 also highlighted the value of the wider platform family. The base vehicle can be configured as a personnel carrier, battlefield support vehicle, beach recovery vehicle, combat engineering vehicle, or command post. This gives the Turkish Navy more than a single troop transport system; it creates the basis for a complete armored amphibious force structure. The vehicle is fully qualified and in service with the Turkish Navy’s landing helicopter dock TCG Anadolu, placing it inside Türkiye’s wider sea-based expeditionary concept. With TCG Anadolu, naval infantry, landing assets, helicopters, unmanned systems, and ZAHA vehicles, Türkiye can generate a coherent amphibious force package able to support national missions and allied operations.

The NATO dimension had already been demonstrated before EFES 2026. In February 2026, Turkish Marines deployed FNSS-built ZAHA Amphibious Force Multiplier vehicles during NATO’s STEADFAST DART 26 maritime phase off Germany’s Baltic coast, where allied forces conducted a complex amphibious landing in the Putlos training area. That deployment showed ZAHA operating inside a multinational task group under allied air, naval, and special operations support. EFES 2026 added a second high-visibility demonstration in the Aegean, this time in a Turkish-led combined joint live-fire environment. Together, these two events show that ZAHA is moving beyond a national modernization program and becoming a NATO-compatible amphibious combat asset able to support deterrence, rapid reinforcement, and sea-to-shore maneuver from the Baltic to the Mediterranean.

The EFES 2026 demonstration confirmed the operational value of FNSS ZAHA for Türkiye and NATO. Several vehicles came from the sea, landed on the beach, supported troops with suppressive fire, and continued the maneuver ashore, showing the full logic of a modern armored amphibious assault platform. With its hydrodynamic hull, twin water jets, self-righting capability, 21-person capacity, protected troop compartment, ÇAKA remote-controlled turret, STANAG-classified protection, smoke systems, CBRN suite, digital mission equipment, and tracked land mobility, ZAHA gives Turkish Marines a powerful vehicle for one of the hardest missions in modern warfare. For Türkiye, it reflects the maturity of national defense engineering and the growing strength of its amphibious forces. For NATO, it adds a capable Turkish sea-to-shore armored platform to the Alliance’s littoral warfare architecture.

Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
U.S. Navy Plans Major Deployment of New Columbia-Class Nuclear Submarines at Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor
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The U.S. Navy plans to station up to eight Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines at Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor in Washington State by the early 2030s, reinforcing America’s nuclear deterrence posture in the Indo-Pacific as China rapidly expands its strategic forces and military pressure around Taiwan. The move will place the most advanced and stealthiest submarines ever built by the United States closer to the Pacific theater, strengthening the survivability and responsiveness of the U.S. nuclear triad against emerging regional threats.

Designed to replace the aging Ohio-class fleet, the Columbia-class submarines will deliver longer patrol endurance, lower acoustic signatures, and enhanced survivability in contested environments where Chinese anti-submarine and anti-access capabilities continue to grow. According to a report published by Stars and Stripes on May 27, 2026, the planned deployment highlights Washington’s broader effort to preserve credible nuclear deterrence and undersea dominance in a region increasingly central to strategic competition with China.

Related Topic: U.S. Invests $16.2B in Columbia-Class SSBN Submarine to Strengthen Nuclear Deterrence at Sea

Artist rendering of a U.S. Navy Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine, the next-generation strategic nuclear deterrence submarine designed to replace the Ohio-class fleet and strengthen American undersea dominance in the Indo-Pacific region. The Columbia-class will be the largest and stealthiest submarine ever built by the United States. (Picture source: U.S. Department of War/Defense)

The future homeporting of Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines at Bangor represents one of the most strategically important shifts in U.S. naval nuclear force posture in decades. The next-generation submarines will replace the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines currently stationed at the U.S. naval base west of Seattle, while dramatically improving survivability, operational endurance, stealth performance, and second-strike capability in contested maritime environments that are increasingly monitored by Chinese and Russian naval forces.

The first Columbia-class submarine is expected to arrive at U.S. Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor in 2032, following major modernization work scheduled to begin in 2027. The deployment timeline aligns with growing Pentagon concerns regarding China’s accelerated nuclear modernization program, which includes rapid expansion of intercontinental ballistic missile silos, development of advanced ballistic missile submarines, and deployment of long-range anti-submarine warfare systems designed to challenge U.S. underwater superiority in the Pacific.

The Columbia-class is the U.S. Navy’s next-generation ballistic missile submarine designed to replace the aging Ohio-class fleet beginning in the 2030s. Built by General Dynamics Electric Boat with support from HII Newport News Shipbuilding, the submarine is engineered to provide stealthy, survivable nuclear deterrence patrols through the 2080s. Measuring 560 feet in length with a submerged displacement of more than 20,800 tons, the Columbia-class will be the largest submarine ever built by the United States. It will carry 16 Trident II D5LE submarine-launched ballistic missiles and feature advanced acoustic quieting technologies, an integrated electric-drive propulsion system, and a life-of-the-ship nuclear reactor, eliminating the need for midlife refueling. The submarine is specifically designed to remain undetected in increasingly contested underwater environments dominated by advanced Chinese and Russian anti-submarine warfare systems.

U.S. Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor is one of the most critical strategic naval bases in the United States and serves as the Pacific Fleet’s principal ballistic missile submarine hub. Located along Puget Sound in Washington State, the naval base provides direct access to deep-water Pacific patrol routes while supporting continuous strategic deterrence operations across the Indo-Pacific theater. From Bangor, U.S. ballistic missile submarines can deploy rapidly into the Pacific Ocean while remaining protected by layered coastal security and highly secure strategic weapons infrastructure.

The operational importance of Bangor has increased substantially as tensions continue rising over Taiwan and the South China Sea. In a potential Indo-Pacific conflict scenario, survivable ballistic missile submarines operating from Bangor would remain among the most secure components of the American nuclear triad, ensuring the United States retains guaranteed retaliatory strike capability even during large-scale conventional or nuclear confrontation.

The Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine has been specifically engineered to preserve U.S. undersea nuclear superiority against future Chinese and Russian detection capabilities. Compared to the Ohio-class, the new submarines will incorporate significantly improved acoustic quieting technologies, advanced stealth shaping, reduced mechanical signatures, and an integrated electric-drive propulsion architecture designed to minimize underwater detectability.

With a submerged displacement exceeding 20,800 tons and a length of approximately 560 feet, the Columbia-class will become the largest submarine ever constructed by the United States. The submarines will carry 16 Trident II D5LE submarine-launched ballistic missiles capable of delivering strategic nuclear warheads across intercontinental ranges with high precision and survivability.

One of the most important tactical advantages of the Columbia-class is its extremely low acoustic signature. Chinese naval forces have invested heavily in seabed sensor arrays, maritime patrol aircraft, unmanned underwater vehicles, and low-frequency sonar systems intended to track U.S. submarines operating in the Pacific. The Columbia-class is designed to counter these emerging threats by operating with lower detectable noise levels than any previous American ballistic missile submarine.

The submarines also integrate a life-of-the-ship nuclear reactor, eliminating the need for midlife refueling, allowing significantly higher operational availability throughout their service life. This increases the percentage of submarines available for deterrence patrols while reducing long-term maintenance downtime. In operational terms, the Navy can sustain a persistent strategic presence with fewer submarines while maintaining uninterrupted nuclear patrol coverage.

The Columbia-class program is currently the U.S. Navy’s highest acquisition priority and forms a central pillar of the Pentagon’s broader nuclear modernization strategy. The lead submarine, USS District of Columbia (SSBN-826), is under construction by General Dynamics Electric Boat in Connecticut, with additional modules produced in Rhode Island and Virginia. The overall Columbia-class program is projected to cost more than $130 billion for procurement alone, making it one of the most expensive military modernization programs in American history.

The deployment of Columbia-class submarines at Bangor also carries major implications for the strategic balance in the Pacific. As China continues expanding its own Jin-class and future Type 096 ballistic missile submarine fleets, the United States is prioritizing stealth, survivability, and operational endurance to maintain undersea dominance. American strategic planners increasingly view ballistic missile submarines as essential deterrence assets capable of operating undetected even in heavily contested maritime environments.

The transition at U.S. Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor will likely require extensive upgrades to submarine support infrastructure, strategic weapons-handling systems, maintenance facilities, and security architecture to sustain decades of Columbia-class operations. These modernization efforts are intended to ensure uninterrupted strategic deterrence capability through the 2080s while preserving the Navy’s ability to maintain continuous patrol operations in both the Pacific and Atlantic theaters.

The deployment further reflects Washington’s growing emphasis on preparing for long-term strategic competition with China. In a future Taiwan contingency or broader Indo-Pacific conflict, survivable ballistic missile submarines operating from Bangor would be among the most critical components of American strategic deterrence and escalation-control capabilities.

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
Japan to begin talks to export Mogami frigates to New Zealand following Australian selection
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Japan is preparing formal negotiations to export its upgraded Mogami-class frigate, the New FFM, to New Zealand, according to Kyodo News on May 26, 2026, a move that could extend Australia’s SEA 3000 decision into a broader Indo-Pacific naval integration framework. The potential deal matters beyond ship sales because it would align three U.S.-partner navies around a shared frigate platform optimized for long-range Pacific operations, lower manpower demand, and expanded missile capacity at a time when regional maritime competition and force-distribution requirements are intensifying.

The New FFM combines a 32-cell Mk 41 VLS configuration, advanced AESA radar, anti-submarine warfare sensors, and heavy automation in a 6,200-ton platform requiring a crew of roughly 90 sailors, giving New Zealand a way to sustain blue-water combat capability despite severe personnel shortages. If Wellington selects the Japanese design over the British Type 31, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand would field a common surface combatant architecture across the Southwest Pacific, strengthening coalition interoperability, logistics integration, and distributed maritime firepower through the 2030s and 2040s.

Related topic:Japan orders 3 Upgraded Mogami-class frigates to carry more missiles in Pacific operations

Compared to Mogami-class frigates such as the JS Kumano, the New FFM doubles missile capacity, vastly increases structural and electrical margins for future weapons integration, and extends maximum cruising endurance to 10,000 nautical miles. (Picture source: NZ MoD)

According to Kyodo News on May 26, 2026, Japan began preparations for formal negotiations with New Zealand concerning a potential export of the upgraded Mogami-class frigate, designated New FFM, extending a trilateral naval-industrial structure already established through Australia’s SEA 3000 procurement decision of August 2025. The issue is expected to be addressed during a meeting in Singapore involving Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi, New Zealand Defense Minister Chris Penk, and Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Richard Marles during the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on 29–31 May 2026.

Wellington is evaluating the Japanese frigate against Babcock’s Type 31 for the replacement of HMNZS Te Kaha and HMNZS Te Mana, commissioned in 1997 and 1999. The Japanese proposal centers on a 142-meter frigate with a 6,200 tons full-load displacement, integrating 32 Mk 41 VLS cells, CODAG propulsion, OPY-2-derived AESA radar, variable-depth and towed-array sonar, and a crew requirement of roughly 90 personnel. Furthermore, Japan’s April 2025 revision of its defense export regulations permitting exports of jointly developed lethal systems created the legal basis for negotiations.

Australia’s earlier selection also transformed the New FFM into a regional production and sustainment program linking Japanese shipyards, Australian assembly infrastructure, and potentially future New Zealand Navy procurement. New Zealand’s frigate requirement is shaped primarily by manpower constraints, fleet age, operating distance, and sustainment economics. The Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) currently fields two Anzac-class frigates, two Protector-class Offshore Patrol Vessels, and HMNZS Canterbury across an Exclusive Economic Zone exceeding four million square kilometers, but the 2025 Defence Capability Plan identified all three ship classes as recapitalization priorities between the late 2020s and late 2030s.

Moreover, personnel shortages exceeded 600 unfilled naval billets by 2024, directly reducing deployment tempo and vessel availability, forcing Wellington to prioritize automation and low manpower demand in future acquisitions. The Japanese Mogami-class was designed around a crew complement of approximately 90 personnel, substantially below most Western frigates in the 5,000 to 7,000 ton category, where crews commonly range from 140 to over 200 personnel. New Zealand also requires sustained operational endurance for South Pacific territories, Southern Ocean patrol areas, and coalition operations several thousand nautical miles from domestic support facilities.

Australia’s adoption of the Upgraded Mogami-class lowers sustainment risk because Wellington could integrate into an existing regional maintenance, software support, logistics, and training network instead of financing an independent support architecture for a fleet of only two ships. The Upgraded Mogami, also known as the New FFM, emerged after Japanese planners concluded that the original Mogami-class frigate lacked sufficient reserve margins for future weapons integration, electrical generation, and blue-water operations.

The original 30FFM program entered JMSDF service beginning in 2022 and initially aimed to build 22 ships, replacing destroyer escorts and mine warfare vessels assigned to the 10th Escort Squadron and Mine Warfare Force. In January 2023, Japan’s Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA) initiated the transition toward the enlarged New FFM configuration, reducing the planned number of baseline Mogami-class ships from 22 to 12. Standard displacement increased from approximately 3,900 tons to 4,880 tons, while full-load displacement rose to approximately 6,200 tons.

Hull length expanded from roughly 133 meters to 142 meters, and beam widened from 16.3 meters to approximately 17 meters, creating additional volume for vertical launch systems, electrical reserves, command facilities, and future modernization. Japan simultaneously accelerated its procurement tempo, planning to acquire 12 New FFM hulls between fiscal years 2024 and 2028, with the FY2025 defense budget allocating approximately 314.8 billion yen for the construction of three vessels.

The propulsion arrangement remains centered on a CODAG configuration combining one gas turbine with two diesel engines driving twin shafts and conventional screw propellers, enabling speeds exceeding 30 knots while preserving long-range cruising efficiency across Pacific operating distances. The baseline Mogami-class uses a Rolls-Royce MT30 gas turbine combined with MAN Diesel 12V28/33D STC diesel engines generating roughly 70,000 horsepower, and Australia confirmed on April 21, 2026, that Rolls-Royce would supply MT30 turbines for Australian ships. Japanese naval planning also prioritized reduced manpower demand over traditional redundancy models, due to demographic and recruitment pressures affecting Japan, Australia, and New Zealand simultaneously.

The combat information center integrates navigation, engineering supervision, tactical management, machinery control, and sensor fusion into a unified digital architecture supported by panoramic displays and centralized monitoring systems. Automation now extends into propulsion management, mission system operation, damage control monitoring, and watchstanding functions, allowing the enlarged New FFM frigate to retain a target crew below 100 personnel despite significantly greater displacement and missile capacity than the original Mogami-class.

The most consequential modification introduced by the New FFM is the expansion from 16 to 32 Mk 41 vertical launch cells integrated forward of the bridge structure. The Australian variant is expected to field RIM-162 ESSM interceptors, SeaRAM close-in defense systems, Naval Strike Missiles, and Mk 54 lightweight torpedoes, while Japanese vessels will integrate the Type 23 ship-to-air missile and the Type 07 vertical-launch anti-submarine rocket. This Mk 41 configuration also creates compatibility with larger weapons, including Tomahawk-sized land-attack missiles and future long-range interceptors unavailable on the earlier Mogami layout.

Radar architecture derives from the OPY-2 AESA family, while sonar systems combine variable-depth sonar and towed-array sonar optimized for anti-submarine warfare in large oceanic environments. The combat architecture incorporates Japan’s FC-network concept, broadly comparable to the U.S. Navy cooperative engagement doctrine, enabling distributed targeting and sensor sharing between ships and aircraft. Structural reinforcement and electrical reserves were also intentionally expanded on the Upgraded Mogami to support future integration of directed-energy systems, larger radar arrays, upgraded electronic warfare suites, and next-generation unmanned systems.

Australia’s SEA 3000 decision fundamentally altered the scale and export profile of Japan's New FFM program. On August 5, 2025, Canberra formally selected the Japanese proposal over Germany’s MEKO A-200 after evaluating delivery timelines, interoperability with U.S-origin combat systems, industrial participation, and lifecycle sustainment costs. The agreement covers 11 frigates, with the first three scheduled for construction in Japan by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries before production transitions to Western Australia, where the remaining eight ships will be assembled by Austal Defence Shipbuilding at the Henderson maritime complex.

Initial operational service is expected around 2030, as Tokyo reportedly slowed portions of its own domestic procurement schedule to allocate production slots for Australia, demonstrating the political importance attached to the agreement. The deal also became Japan’s largest postwar export arrangement involving a surface combatant and represented the country’s first export of a major warship design since the easing of defense export restrictions in 2014. Japan’s broader strategy surrounding the New FFM combines industrial policy, export expansion, and long-term operational integration with Indo-Pacific partners such as New Zealand.

Tokyo revised its defense export regulations in April 2025 to authorize exports of jointly developed lethal systems to states holding defense equipment and technology transfer agreements with Japan, and Japanese authorities are considering such an arrangement with New Zealand. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Japan Marine United are already expanding their production infrastructure to sustain accelerated shipbuilding rates and preserve supplier chains supporting Japanese naval construction. Japan’s FY2025 defense budget allocated approximately 314.8 billion yen for three New FFM hulls, reflecting the shift toward higher-volume procurement.

Tokyo also views common naval systems as a mechanism for operational integration in anti-submarine warfare, maritime surveillance, missile defense, logistics coordination, and distributed fleet operations without requiring formal alliance expansion. If New Zealand adopts the Upgraded Mogami, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand would operate the same Mogami frigate family with compatible VLS systems, combat software, logistics chains, maintenance procedures, and training pipelines across the Southwest Pacific during the 2030s and 2040s.

To date, the principal alternative remains the British Type 31 frigate, which offers a different sustainment and industrial integration model to New Zealand, centered on Commonwealth naval infrastructure and an active Royal Navy production line. The Type 31 emphasizes modularity, lower acquisition cost, and production maturity, while also benefiting from existing industrial relationships within New Zealand’s support sector. The Japanese proposal instead prioritizes lower manpower demand, larger missile capacity through its 32-cell configuration, and direct interoperability with Australia’s future fleet structure.

Wellington, therefore, faces a strategic choice involving long-term integration into either a British/Commonwealth sustainment ecosystem or an emerging Japanese-Australian naval architecture. A combined Japan-Australia-New Zealand New FFM fleet would create a shared surface combatant structure across the Southwest Pacific, adding several hundred Mk 41 launch cells to allied Indo-Pacific naval inventories while simplifying coalition operations through common software baselines, sensors, logistics systems, and maintenance infrastructure.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
China Deploys Liaoning Aircraft Carrier Group for Western Pacific Combat Drills
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China’s People’s Liberation Navy has sent the aircraft carrier Liaoning and its strike group into the Western Pacific for a new round of combat drills, signaling Beijing’s expanding ability to project naval airpower far beyond China’s coastline. The deployment, announced after exercises on May 21, 2026, highlights how China is steadily improving its capacity to sustain carrier operations beyond the First Island Chain and challenge U.S. and allied freedom of maneuver across the Indo-Pacific.

The drills included tactical flight operations, live-fire training, search-and-rescue missions, and coordinated support exercises designed to simulate real combat conditions at sea. The operation underscores China’s push to build a blue-water navy capable of long-range deterrence, a sustained regional presence, and greater operational pressure on U.S., Japanese, and allied forces in the Western Pacific.

Related Topic: China deploys 42 ships and hundreds of oceanic sensors to prepare for submarine warfare against the US Navy

Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning conducts live-fire combat drills in the Western Pacific as China expands its naval power projection capabilities. (Picture source: China MoD)

According to an official PLA Navy statement released through its WeChat account, the deployment forms part of the Chinese Navy’s annual training plan and is intended to improve “realistic combat training capabilities.” The unusual decision to publicly announce the mission at the outset of the deployment suggests Beijing intended to send a strategic signal amid growing regional scrutiny from Japan, the United States, and Taiwan, while showcasing the Liaoning aircraft carrier strike group's increasing operational maturity.

The drills took place in waters east of Taiwan and near Japan’s maritime approaches, a region that has become increasingly contested as China expands blue-water naval operations. Unlike earlier deployments focused primarily on carrier aviation qualification and navigation training, the latest exercise emphasized integrated combat readiness, including live-fire operations and coordinated fleet protection missions. These activities indicate that the PLA Navy is refining operational doctrine for sustained wartime carrier operations in complex maritime environments.

The Liaoning is China’s first operational aircraft carrier and remains a central element in the PLA Navy’s transition toward a true blue-water fleet. Originally built as the Soviet Varyag-class carrier before being acquired from Ukraine unfinished, the vessel was extensively modernized by China and commissioned in 2012. Displacing around 60,000 tons at full load, the ski-jump equipped carrier serves both as an operational combat asset and as a development platform for Chinese carrier doctrine, naval aviation training, and long-range maritime power projection.

China’s aircraft carrier Liaoning has deployed into the Western Pacific for major live-fire naval drills as the PLA Navy expands its far-sea combat capabilities

In terms of air capabilities, the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning represents a major leap in Chinese naval combat aviation despite limitations associated with its ski-jump launch system. The carrier can embark approximately 24 J-15 multirole carrier-based fighter aircraft, along with helicopters dedicated to airborne early warning, anti-submarine warfare, combat search and rescue, and logistics support. The J-15 fighter, derived from the Russian Su-33 but heavily modified with Chinese avionics and weapons systems, provides the carrier strike group with long-range air defense, anti-ship strike capability, precision-guided land-attack options, and fleet-escort functions.

The J-15 can reportedly carry PL-15 beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles, YJ-series anti-ship missiles, and precision-guided munitions, allowing the Liaoning to conduct layered maritime strike operations far from the Chinese mainland. Combined with escorting Type 055 guided-missile destroyers and Type 052D destroyers equipped with advanced air defense systems, the carrier group can establish a substantial defensive and offensive air envelope in contested maritime areas.

However, unlike U.S. Navy nuclear-powered aircraft carriers equipped with catapult-assisted launch systems, the Liaoning’s ski-jump configuration limits aircraft takeoff weight and reduces the fuel and weapons load that J-15 fighters can carry during launch operations. This constrains sortie rates and operational reach compared to American carrier air wings. Nevertheless, the vessel remains highly valuable for China because it enables the PLA Navy to develop carrier warfare expertise, integrate naval aviation into joint operations, and prepare crews for future CATOBAR-equipped aircraft carriers such as the Fujian.

Particularly significant in this deployment is the emphasis on live-fire training in distant waters. Conducting live munitions exercises in the Western Pacific imposes operational demands far greater than drills near China’s coastline. Carrier groups operating in these areas must manage extended logistics, difficult sea states, complex weather conditions, and secure command-and-control links over long distances. The exercise, therefore, serves as a practical test of the PLA Navy’s ability to sustain combat operations in a high-intensity regional conflict.

The inclusion of “support and cover” missions also carries important operational implications. Such drills are typically associated with escort protection, area air defense, anti-surface warfare, and maritime control operations designed to shield amphibious assault formations or strategic naval assets. In a Taiwan contingency scenario, these capabilities would be critical for protecting amphibious task forces crossing the Taiwan Strait while complicating intervention efforts by U.S. and allied naval forces operating from Japan, Guam, or the Philippine Sea.

The exercise also reflects China’s effort to normalize regular carrier deployments beyond the First Island Chain. Japanese defense authorities have increasingly monitored Chinese naval movements in the Western Pacific, particularly after previous dual-carrier operations involving the Liaoning and Shandong. By publicly framing the exercise as a routine, transparent annual activity, Beijing appears intent on portraying Chinese carrier operations in the Pacific as standard naval practice, comparable to deployments conducted by the U.S. Navy and allied maritime forces.

For the United States, the message behind the exercise is strategic rather than symbolic. China is demonstrating that its aircraft carrier force is evolving into a credible operational instrument capable of supporting anti-access and area-denial operations designed to complicate U.S. naval intervention during a Taiwan crisis or broader Indo-Pacific conflict. The PLA Navy increasingly seeks to push American forces farther from China’s maritime approaches by combining carrier aviation with long-range missile systems, submarines, land-based airpower, and integrated fleet operations.

The deployment of the Liaoning Aircraft Carrier also highlights Beijing’s ambition to challenge the long-standing assumption that the U.S. Navy can operate uncontested inside the Western Pacific. Routine Chinese carrier operations beyond the First Island Chain signal that future regional conflicts would involve contested maritime and air domains extending deep into operational areas historically dominated by American carrier strike groups. This evolution directly affects U.S. force posture planning, distributed maritime operations concepts, and logistics survivability strategies currently being developed across the Indo-Pacific theater.

China’s expanding carrier operations also support a broader strategic objective: transforming the PLA Navy from a force primarily focused on coastal defense into a globally deployable maritime force capable of protecting overseas interests, strategic trade routes, and long-range sea lanes. As Beijing prepares to integrate the more advanced CATOBAR-equipped Fujian aircraft carrier into operational service, the current Liaoning deployment underscores the accelerating pace of China’s transition toward a multi-carrier navy capable of sustained power projection across the Indo-Pacific region.

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
South Korea officially unveils Jangbogo-N Project to launch first nuclear submarine by 2030s
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South Korea officially launched its first domestic nuclear-powered attack submarine program through the formal authorization of the Jangbogo-N Project, establishing a definitive roadmap to field an operational SSN before 2040. This structural shift addresses the acute operational limitations of the Navy's existing diesel-electric fleet, which remains highly vulnerable during long-duration tracking missions due to compulsory snorkeling intervals. By institutionalizing a requirement that existed intermittently since 2003, Seoul is establishing a persistent underwater command structure capable of continuously shadowing North Korea’s expanding sea-based nuclear delivery systems and monitoring wider Chinese naval operations across critical Pacific transit corridors.

The transition to a low-enriched uranium propulsion framework grants the South Korean Navy near-indefinite submerged endurance and sustained underwater speeds exceeding 25 knots, fundamentally altering the regional undersea balance of power. This capability eliminates the predictable exposure windows inherent to conventional hulls, allowing South Korean attack submarines to operate as continuous, un-trackable nodes within the national Kill Chain architecture for pre-launch detection and anti-submarine warfare. By maintaining persistent strategic surveillance east of Japan and inside foreign maritime corridors without relying on forward logistical lines, the Jangbogo-N Project shifts South Korea’s naval operational profile away from localized littoral defense toward sustained regional deterrence.

Related topic:South Korea could renegotiate atomic cooperation with US to launch its own nuclear submarine program

During the Future Defense Strategy Committee meeting on May 26, 2026, the South Korean government launched the Jangbogo-N Project to construct its first domestic nuclear-powered attack submarine with a target launch date in the mid-2030s. (Picture source: South Korean MoD)

On May 26, 2026, South Korea officially launched its first nuclear-powered submarine program, known as the Jangbogo-N Project, establishing a roadmap to launch the country’s first SSN during the mid-2030s and commission it before 2040 in response to North Korea’s expanding sea-based nuclear deterrent and the operational limitations of the South Korean Navy’s diesel-electric submarine fleet. The initiative institutionalizes a requirement that existed intermittently inside the South Korean Navy since the 2003 Project 362 effort launched during the Roh Moo-hyun administration.

Seoul selected a low-enriched uranium propulsion model capped below 20% U-235 instead of the highly enriched uranium fuel cycles used by the United States and United Kingdom, to avoid direct association with weapons-grade naval fuel while preserving future flexibility in domestic naval reactor operations. South Korea currently operates 21 conventionally powered submarines composed of 9 KSS-I Jang Bogo-class boats, 9 KSS-II Son Won-il-class units, and 3 KSS-III Dosan Ahn Chang-ho-class submarines equipped with Hyunmoo submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) through vertical launch systems.

Existing submarines remain constrained by snorkeling requirements, limited submerged endurance, and lower sustained underwater speed relative to nuclear-powered submarines. The principal barriers facing the South Korean SSN program are naval reactor integration, fuel authorization, safeguards exemptions, nuclear-qualified manpower generation, radiological regulation, and political approval under the revised U.S.-ROK 123 Agreement. Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back announced the roadmap during the Future Defense Strategy Committee meeting in Jinhae on May 26, 2026, defining the initiative as a national strategic industrial effort linked directly to South Korea’s nuclear engineering and maritime manufacturing sectors.

The government established an initial target of launching one nuclear-powered attack submarine during the mid-2030s and fielding an operational SSN before 2040, implying a development cycle of roughly ten years beginning during the second half of the 2020s. Seoul also linked the project to a forty-year industrial lifecycle involving submarine construction, reactor servicing, maintenance infrastructure, fuel management, and decommissioning capability. Government planning anticipates more than 40,000 long-term industrial jobs connected to reactor engineering, nuclear-qualified welding, dockyard modernization, and radiological safety infrastructure.

South Korea already controls two of the world’s largest commercial shipbuilders through HD Hyundai Heavy Industries and Hanwha Ocean, while Hanwha Ocean inherited DSME’s submarine integration capability after producing KSS-I, KSS-II, and KSS-III submarines for the South Korean Navy. The current South Korean Navy submarine fleet explains why South Korea increasingly views diesel-electric propulsion as insufficient for future regional undersea operations.

The South Korean Navy fields 9 Jang Bogo-class submarines derived from the German Type 209/1200 design, commissioned between 1993 and 2001 with a submerged displacement of nearly 1,290 tons, alongside 9 Son Won-il-class Type 214-derived submarines commissioned between 2007 and 2020 with air-independent propulsion (AIP) and submerged displacement near 1,860 tons. For their part, the indigenous KSS-III Dosan Ahn Chang-ho-class submarines marked South Korea’s transition toward domestic submarine architecture and systems integration, with Batch I boats displacing approximately 3,750 tons submerged and integrating six vertical launch tubes capable of firing Hyunmoo-series SLBMs.

Batch II increases missile capacity to ten VLS cells and raises displacement toward the 3,600 to 4,000-ton range while integrating lithium-ion battery systems. South Korea is currently the only non-nuclear state operating conventionally powered ballistic missile submarines. Despite these advances, KSS-III boats remain constrained by the operational profile of diesel-electric propulsion during long-duration tracking missions against nuclear-powered submarines operating across Pacific transit corridors. The operational limitations of the current fleet become more evident when compared with nuclear-powered attack submarines operated by the United States, China, and Russia.

Diesel-electric submarines eventually require snorkeling or diesel-generator operation to recharge batteries, creating detectable exposure windows during surveillance or pursuit missions, while nuclear-powered submarines such as the Virginia-class can sustain underwater speeds exceeding 25 knots for prolonged periods while remaining submerged for months. This capability becomes increasingly relevant as North Korea develops larger submarine-based nuclear delivery systems and China expands submarine operations into the Western Pacific. The South Korean Navy increasingly links SSNs to underwater ISR operations, anti-submarine warfare, strategic surveillance, and pre-launch detection missions integrated into the national Kill Chain architecture.

Nuclear propulsion would also permit persistent South Korean patrol operations east of Japan, inside Pacific transit corridors, or near Chinese naval operating zones without dependence on forward logistics support. The nuclear submarine program, therefore, reflects a structural shift in South Korean naval doctrine away from short-range littoral defense toward continuous regional undersea surveillance. Seoul’s decision to adopt low-enriched uranium (LEU) below the 20% threshold, like France, reflects both technical compromise and political calculation.

The United States and United Kingdom fuel naval reactors with uranium enriched above 90% U-235, allowing reactor cores to operate throughout the submarine’s full service life without refueling, while French Rubis and Barracuda-class submarines use LEU fuel requiring periodic refueling and larger reactor compartments. A South Korean LEU-powered SSN would therefore likely require at least one mid-life refueling cycle during an operational lifespan projected at roughly thirty years. Naval reactors must also remain relatively compact while sustaining high thermal output under vibration, shock, and constrained cooling conditions associated with underwater combat operations.

South Korea already operates one of the world’s largest civilian nuclear sectors outside the recognized nuclear-weapons states through Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power and KEPCO, with 26 commercial reactors producing roughly 30% of the country's national electricity. However, the transition toward submarine propulsion requires capability in compact reactor metallurgy, marine shielding, underwater radiological damage control, and naval reactor compartment survivability that currently do not exist at operational military scale inside South Korea. The operational requirement for SSNs accelerated after North Korea intensified its emphasis on submarine-launched nuclear systems in the late 2010s and early 2020s.

Pyongyang publicly displayed a submarine hull assessed at more than 100 meters in length and potentially capable of carrying Pukguksong-series SLBMs, while imagery from Sinpo South Shipyard reinforced concern regarding future North Korean sea-based deterrent capability. South Korean naval planners increasingly concluded that diesel-electric submarines could not sustain indefinite tracking operations against nuclear-powered targets because periodic snorkeling creates unavoidable detection opportunities. Nuclear propulsion provides the endurance required for persistent shadowing, strategic surveillance, and continuous tracking missions extending across large maritime operating areas.

The SSN initiative also intersects with broader concerns regarding Chinese naval expansion and increased submarine operations near Japanese and Pacific maritime corridors. The requirement, therefore, emerged from cumulative changes in the regional undersea balance involving both North Korean nuclear development and Chinese naval expansion across the Western Pacific. The revised 2015 U.S.-ROK 123 Agreement remains the principal legal obstacle because it prohibits South Korea from enriching uranium above 20% U-235 and restricts military use of U.S.-origin nuclear material without explicit bilateral authorization.

Naval propulsion creates additional safeguards complications because submarine reactor fuel may be exempted from routine IAEA inspection during operational deployment, creating concern regarding fuel accountability and diversion risk. South Korea, therefore, requires either amendments to the bilateral framework, a dedicated safeguards arrangement, or direct allied provision of naval propulsion fuel. South Korea's Minister of Foreign Affairs Cho Hyun publicly advocated revisiting the agreement during his 2025 confirmation process, arguing Seoul should secure greater flexibility regarding low-enriched uranium production and naval propulsion capability.

Washington historically resisted South Korean SSN ambitions due to proliferation concerns, regional escalation risks, and alliance management considerations involving China and Japan. U.S. industrial constraints further complicate the issue because the Virginia-class nuclear submarine program currently faces production delays estimated at two to three years, while the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine program remains under schedule pressure caused by workforce shortages and supplier bottlenecks. South Korea’s Jangbogo-N Project nuclear submarine also revives objectives originally pursued during the covert Project 362 effort initiated under President Roh Moo-hyun in 2003.

The project envisioned three nuclear-powered attack submarines derived from French Barracuda-class concepts and centered on the BANDI-60 reactor design, fueled by uranium enriched between roughly 20% and 45%. Participants included the South Korean Navy, the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, and the Defense Acquisition Program Administration, while reactor design work reportedly advanced substantially by 2004. The program collapsed after undeclared uranium enrichment experiments using AVLIS laser enrichment technology produced uranium enriched to approximately 77%, triggering IAEA scrutiny and diplomatic pressure from Washington.

Internal competition for defense funding also contributed to cancellation, particularly the rivalry between advocates of SSN procurement and supporters of expanded Aegis destroyer acquisition programs. The current Jangbogo-N initiative, therefore, represents the formal return of a naval nuclear requirement that survived institutionally inside portions of the South Korean Navy after the original program collapsed. To date, industrial infrastructure remains one of the most difficult dimensions of the program despite South Korea’s advanced shipbuilding sector.

Nuclear-powered submarine construction requires radiological control zones, reactor compartment fabrication facilities, nuclear-qualified welders, protected fuel handling infrastructure, radiation monitoring systems, and inspection regimes stricter than those used for conventional submarines. Hanwha Ocean and HD Hyundai Heavy Industries have already built destroyers, amphibious assault ships, submarines, and large naval combatants for the South Korean Navy, while the KSS-III program demonstrated domestic capability in pressure hull construction, vertical launch integration, and advanced combat system assembly.

Nuclear propulsion nevertheless requires a separate certification structure involving reactor safety oversight, radiological emergency response procedures, naval reactor maintenance organizations, and long-term radioactive waste management infrastructure. South Korea also lacks a naval nuclear officer corps comparable to the U.S. Navy Nuclear Propulsion Program, responsible for reactor operations, engineering qualification, and nuclear crew training. Additional long-term requirements include spent fuel management facilities, submarine decommissioning infrastructure, reactor dismantlement capability, and radiological disposal systems capable of supporting multiple decades of naval nuclear fleet operations.

A parallel industrial pathway emerged in October 2025 when Washington approved preliminary cooperation linked to Hanwha’s Philadelphia shipyard holdings following discussions between President Donald Trump and President Lee Jae-myung. Hanwha acquired the Philadelphia facility in December 2024 for roughly $100 million and later announced multi-billion-dollar expansion plans involving docks, cranes, and maritime infrastructure modernization. The shipyard historically specialized in commercial vessels rather than nuclear-powered warships, meaning any SSN-related activity there would require Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing, radiological monitoring systems, secure compartmentalization zones, and extensive federal oversight.

Embedding portions of the South Korean program inside the U.S. industrial base reduces congressional concern regarding unrestricted technology transfer as Washington retains leverage over propulsion fuel access, reactor handling procedures, safeguards implementation, and export controls. Even under this framework, reactor technology transfer would likely remain substantially more restricted than the AUKUS model applied to Australia. Philadelphia, therefore, functions primarily as a politically manageable industrial node allowing Washington to supervise nuclear propulsion cooperation while maintaining control over sensitive reactor technologies and fuel cycle management.

The strategic significance of the Jangbogo-N nuclear submarine program extends beyond undersea warfare because it gradually expands South Korea’s sovereign control over sensitive nuclear-industrial sectors historically constrained by the post-1970s U.S.-ROK nuclear cooperation framework. Naval nuclear propulsion creates a permanent military requirement for domestic competence in uranium fuel fabrication, reactor core management, safeguarded fuel handling, radiological containment, and military nuclear operations associated with latent nuclear weapons capability.

South Korean political discussion since 2023 has increasingly shifted away from immediate nuclear armament toward “nuclear latency,” meaning possession of the industrial and technical base necessary for rapid weaponization if regional security conditions deteriorate. Public polling between 2023 and 2025 consistently showed support rates above 70% for either indigenous nuclear weapons or nuclear-powered submarines, while elite opinion focused more heavily on fuel cycle flexibility and reduced dependence on U.S. extended deterrence.

Seoul’s emphasis on low-enriched uranium below the 20% threshold is intended to reduce opposition from Washington and the IAEA, but LEU naval propulsion still requires new legal arrangements governing safeguards exemptions, fuel custody, and reactor lifecycle management. If South Korea eventually acquires authority to domestically enrich naval fuel below the 20% threshold, the country would possess most of the industrial prerequisites necessary to shorten future nuclear breakout timelines relative to its current position under the existing 123 Agreement structure.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
US Navy redirects 100th cargo ship during naval blockade of Iran in Strait of Hormuz
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The U.S. Navy has now redirected 100 commercial vessels during its expanding blockade campaign against Iran, a milestone announced by United States Central Command on May 23, 2026, that signals Washington’s shift from protecting Gulf shipping lanes to actively disrupting Iranian maritime commerce across the wider Indian Ocean region. The operation has transformed the Strait of Hormuz into a contested naval battlespace where commercial access increasingly depends on military escort, political alignment, and the ability to survive simultaneous U.S. interdiction and Iranian coercion.

The blockade has evolved beyond traditional maritime security operations into a large-scale naval containment campaign involving carrier strike groups, destroyers, Marine boarding teams, and carrier aviation conducting live interdiction strikes against Iranian-linked shipping. By targeting tankers, cargo ships, and shadow-fleet logistics networks while Iran responds with drones, mines, missile threats, and electronic disruption, the crisis is reshaping global energy security and demonstrating how future naval conflicts can weaponize commercial shipping routes without requiring direct fleet-on-fleet combat.

Related topic:U.S. Launches Precision Strikes on Iranian Missile Sites and Mine Boats to Secure Strait of Hormuz

For this naval blockade against Iran, the U.S. deployed more than 15,000 personnel, over 200 aircraft and warships, two carrier strike groups, amphibious forces, P-8 Poseidon patrol aircraft, and multiple Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. (Picture source: US Navy)

On May 23, 2026, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that U.S. naval forces enforcing the blockade of Iran had redirected 100 commercial vessels since operations began on April 13 after the collapse of U.S.-Iran negotiations in Islamabad on April 11-12 and the failure of the April 8 ceasefire to restore unrestricted navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. CENTCOM deployed more than 15,000 personnel, over 200 aircraft and warships, two carrier strike groups, amphibious forces, P-8 Poseidon patrol aircraft, and multiple Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, while reporting four disabled vessels and 26 humanitarian ships permitted through blockade lines.

By May 2026, the Strait of Hormuz crisis evolved into a dual blockade structure in which Iranian restrictions constrained international shipping in the Gulf while U.S. interdiction operations targeted Iranian-linked maritime commerce across the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, and Indian Ocean. Before the conflict, roughly 20 million barrels of oil per day and 20% of global LNG trade transited Hormuz, but by April and May, traffic had shifted toward intermittent escorted convoys, politically approved crossings, and irregular tanker movements.

The Hormuz crisis originated after U.S. and Israeli strikes against Iran on February 28, 2026, targeting missile infrastructure, naval facilities, IRGC command centers, underground storage complexes, and senior Iranian leadership, including Ali Khamenei. Iran responded by restricting access through Hormuz, while the IRGC formally declared the strait closed to “unfriendly nations” on March 4 but maintained selective access for traffic associated with China, India, Pakistan, Russia, Malaysia, and Thailand. Maritime traffic through Hormuz subsequently fell by roughly 70% during March as shipping firms suspended Gulf transits after Iranian forces combined drone attacks, sea mines, AIS spoofing, GNSS jamming, missile threats, and fast-boat harassment against commercial shipping.

The April 8 ceasefire failed to normalize maritime conditions because Iran continued inspecting vessels, taxing approved crossings, and routing traffic through a controlled corridor north of Larak Island, with transit fees reportedly reaching $1-2 million per voyage. Following the collapse of the Islamabad talks on April 12, Washington abandoned its earlier strategy centered on escort and mine-clearing operations toward direct interdiction of Iranian maritime trade. The 2026 U.S. naval blockade of Iran operates under CENTCOM command led by Adm. Brad Cooper, with support from Adm. Samuel Paparo and INDOPACOM, as enforcement expanded beyond the Persian Gulf into wider Indian Ocean transit routes.

U.S. naval forces assigned to the operation include the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group, USS George H.W. Bush Carrier Strike Group, Tripoli Amphibious Ready Group, the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, carrier aviation squadrons, guided-missile destroyers, and helicopter-borne boarding teams. Initial enforcement emphasized warning and diversion procedures directed at vessels approaching Iranian ports, but by mid-April, operations expanded into the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean against tankers that had departed Iranian ports before the blockade entered into force.

Parallel operations included mine-clearance activity associated with Project Freedom, launched in early May to facilitate controlled merchant evacuations from Gulf waters before being terminated on May 6. Surveillance increasingly focused on vessels operating under reflagged registrations, stateless configurations, or ownership structures linked to Iranian export networks and shadow fleet logistics. This operational threshold changed on April 19, 2026, when the Iranian-flagged cargo ship Touska continued toward Bandar Abbas despite repeated warnings from the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS Spruance.

After shadowing the vessel for nearly six hours, the U.S. destroyer fired multiple 5-inch Mark 45 naval gun rounds into the engine compartment, disabling propulsion before Marines from the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit boarded the ship in the Gulf of Oman. On April 21, U.S. forces intercepted the VLCC MT Tifani in the Indian Ocean after linking its cargo to Iranian export networks, while additional tanker seizures followed near southern India, western India, and Malaysia. In early May, carrier-based F/A-18E/F Super Hornets conducted the first strafing attacks against the Iranian-flagged tankers M/T Hasna, M/T Sea Star III, and M/T Sevda in the Gulf of Oman, marking the first direct use of carrier aviation in maritime interdiction operations during the crisis.

By late May, U.S. forces had targeted container ships, VLCCs, propane carriers, and stateless commercial vessels associated with Iranian maritime commerce. For its part, Iran avoided direct fleet engagements against U.S. carrier groups and instead relied on drones, anti-ship missiles, sea mines, RPGs, electronic navigation disruption systems, and fast attack craft to increase commercial uncertainty and insurance risk across the Gulf maritime landscape. On April 22, Iranian forces seized the container ships MSC Francesca and Epaminondas after damaging them with gunfire and RPG attacks, while additional incidents targeted shipping near Oman, Fujairah, Doha approaches, and Ras Tanura.

Tehran simultaneously maintained selective transit exemptions for Chinese, Indian, Pakistani, Russian, Malaysian, and Thai-linked traffic, using maritime access as both an economic and diplomatic instrument. On May 8, however, Iranian naval forces seized the Chinese-owned tanker Ocean Koi, accusing the vessel of disrupting Iranian oil exports despite earlier tolerance toward Chinese shipping. Several tankers also bypassed U.S. blockade lines by operating closer to Pakistani and Indian coastlines, suppressing AIS transponders, or using indirect routing patterns through the Strait of Malacca and South Asian maritime corridors.

Commercial shipping conditions deteriorated rapidly in the Strait of Hormuz because vessel operators faced simultaneous exposure to Iranian interdiction, U.S. enforcement operations, elevated insurance premiums, and unpredictable transit conditions through Hormuz and adjacent waters. By late April, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) estimated that nearly 2,000 ships and 20,000 mariners remained stranded inside the Gulf because operators could not secure acceptable war-risk insurance or reliable transit windows. Major commercial operators, including Maersk, CMA CGM, Hapag-Lloyd, and MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company, suspended or sharply reduced Gulf transits during the peak escalation period.

In the same time, tanker traffic periodically fell close to zero during early March and again after renewed Iranian restrictions between April 18 and April 20. Cruise ship operations disappeared after repeated threats against civilian shipping, including direct VHF warnings against Mein Schiff 4, while Indian escort operations under Operation Sankalp and U.S. escort missions linked to Project Freedom enabled only limited evacuations and controlled movements. Concretely, the Gulf progressively shifted from a high-density commercial corridor into a militarized maritime operating environment governed by escort availability, insurance viability, and politically conditioned access.

The economic impact extended beyond Iranian export losses because Hormuz normally handles roughly one-quarter of global seaborne oil trade and one-fifth of LNG shipments. Brent crude exceeded $100 per barrel on March 8 and later approached $126 during the peak disruption phase, while Gulf producers reduced exports because tanker availability, maritime access, and insurance constraints emerged simultaneously. Saudi Arabia increased its use of the East-West Crude Oil Pipeline toward Yanbu, while the UAE redirected exports through Fujairah.

Iraq, for its part, examined expanded Mediterranean export routes, but combined bypass capacity remained below half normal Hormuz throughput. The U.S. Department of Defense estimated that 53 million barrels of Iranian oil became trapped aboard 31 tankers between April 13 and May 1 as blockade enforcement constrained export activity from Iranian ports. Iran simultaneously expanded overland export activity toward Pakistan, Iraq, and Central Asia while relying on covert maritime routing patterns close to South Asian coastlines to preserve portions of its oil trade outside U.S. interception zones.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
US Navy approves $17.45 million contract extension to modernize USS Iwo Jima for F-35B operations
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The U.S. Navy has approved a $17.45 million contract extension to continue modernizing the amphibious assault ship USS Iwo Jima (LHD-7) for sustained F-35B operations, reinforcing the Marine Corps’ shift toward fifth-generation expeditionary air power and “Lightning Carrier” concepts. Announced on May 22, 2026, the work extends a broader maintenance and upgrade effort at Norfolk through 2028 and is designed to keep the ship combat-ready into the next decade while expanding its role in distributed maritime and sea-control operations.

The modernization package focuses on the engineering demands imposed by the F-35B Lightning II, including reinforced flight deck sections, upgraded power distribution, expanded cooling systems, secure mission-data networks, and aviation support infrastructure required for high-tempo stealth fighter operations. By adapting the Wasp-class platform for larger F-35B air wings, the Navy and Marine Corps are increasing the ability of amphibious assault ships to generate strike sorties, support expeditionary advanced base operations, and provide additional sea-based combat aviation capacity alongside traditional aircraft carriers.

Related topic:U.S. Marine Corps to retire last AV-8B Harrier II jet in June 2026 as F-35B takes over

The modernization package is heavily centered on the F-35B Lightning II, as its vertical landing profiles impose significantly greater thermal stress on amphibious assault ship flight decks compared with AV-8B Harrier II operations. (Picture source: US Navy)

On May 22, 2026, the U.S Navy approved a $17.45 million contract modification for the Fiscal Year 2026 Selected Restricted Availability (FY2026 SRA) of the Wasp-class amphibious assault ship USS Iwo Jima (LHD-7), extending a maintenance and modernization program scheduled to continue through May 2028 at Norfolk, Virginia. The modification exercised options tied to a January 8, 2026, NAVSEA contract awarded to BAE Systems Maritime Solutions Norfolk with a base value of $204.16 million and a potential cumulative value of $255.88 million.

The availability combines depot-level maintenance, structural repairs, combat systems modernization, aviation infrastructure upgrades, and lifecycle extension work intended to keep the ship operational into the 2030s while adapting it for sustained F-35B Lightning II operations. USS Iwo Jima, commissioned on June 30, 2001, as the seventh and final conventionally powered Wasp-class amphibious assault ship, is being modernized under the Marine Corps transition from AV-8B Harrier II operations toward fifth-generation expeditionary aviation and Lightning Carrier force structure concepts previously implemented aboard USS Wasp, USS Essex, USS America, and USS Tripoli.

The USS Iwo Jima was laid down on December 12, 1997, launched on February 4, 2000, and commissioned on June 30, 2001, before reassignment to Norfolk as part of the Atlantic Fleet amphibious force structure. Early deployments supported Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom following the September 2001 attacks, including deployments with the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit across the Mediterranean Sea, Red Sea, and Arabian Gulf during 2003 and 2004. During Hurricane Katrina relief operations in September 2005, the ship functioned as a sea-based aviation, logistics, medical, and command hub supporting helicopter lift operations and emergency supply distribution near New Orleans.

USS Iwo Jima later participated in Operation Odyssey Dawn against Libya in March 2011, repeated Atlantic and Fifth Fleet deployments with MV-22B Osprey squadrons, and F-35B interoperability activity during late-2010s deployments. On January 3, 2026, the ship also participated in Operation Absolute Resolve, targeting Venezuelan leadership infrastructure in Caracas, during which Nicolás Maduro and Cilia Flores were transferred aboard USS Iwo Jima before transportation to the United States on federal narcoterrorism-related charges issued in 2020.

The USS Iwo Jima Fiscal Year 2026 Selected Restricted Availability is categorized as a Chief of Naval Operations maintenance period rather than a major overhaul or Extended Docking Selected Restricted Availability, keeping the work largely pier-side while concentrating on combat systems, aviation infrastructure, propulsion inspections, and material condition restoration. The contract includes labor, supervision, testing, certification, facilities usage, and production activity required to complete corrosion repair, steel replacement, preservation coatings, propulsion plant inspections, electrical distribution repairs, auxiliary systems overhaul, and aviation support modifications tied to F-35B sustainment.

The package is structured to restore the USS Iwo Jima's operational readiness after more than two decades of continuous deployments across U.S Central Command, Fifth Fleet, Mediterranean, and Atlantic operational theaters. The USS Iwo Jima displaces roughly 40,500 tons at full load and measures approximately 257 meters in length with a beam of 31.8 meters and a draft of 8 meters. Propulsion is provided by two steam turbines generating approximately 70,000 shaft horsepower through two shafts, enabling sustained speeds near 22 knots during expeditionary deployments.

The ship incorporates a full-length flight deck, hangar deck, aircraft elevators, aviation fuel infrastructure, maintenance spaces, and a well deck supporting simultaneous amphibious and aviation operations. Embarked capacity reaches roughly 1,900 Marines together with armored vehicles, helicopters, landing craft, MV-22B Ospreys, and fixed-wing aircraft. Traditional aviation detachments include 6 AV-8B Harrier II and 6 F-35B fighter jets, 4 CH-53E Super Stallion helicopters, 4 AH-1 attack helicopters, 3 to 4 UH-1 utility helicopters, and 12 MV-22B tiltrotors, at a time when current Marine Corps restructuring increasingly reorganizes those air wings around F-35B squadrons and unmanned systems supporting expeditionary advanced base operations and distributed maritime warfare.

On the Wasp-class, the F-35B integration imposes substantially higher engineering and sustainment requirements than AV-8B operations because of the aircraft’s thermal output during short takeoff and vertical landing operations. Earlier Wasp-class modifications included thermal spray non-skid coatings and reinforced landing areas beneath vertical landing zones exposed to repeated high-temperature exhaust stress. Electrical load growth associated with F-35B operations also requires upgraded power distribution systems, expanded cooling capacity, hardened maintenance facilities, and secure networking infrastructure supporting mission planning and aircraft diagnostics.

Aviation modernization packages include secure data handling systems compatible with ALIS and ODIN softwares, together with modernization of JP-5 fuel storage systems, fueling stations, aviation ordnance handling equipment, and logistics support spaces. The Marine Corps “Lightning Carrier” model also envisions the Wasp-class amphibious assault ships embarking between 16 and 20 F-35Bs during sea control operations, generating significantly greater sortie capacity than traditional amphibious ready group air wings centered on helicopter assault missions and limited Harrier detachments.

Combat systems modernization aboard USS Iwo Jima likely includes upgrades to Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) hardware and Ship’s Signal Exploitation Equipment (SSEE) Increment F systems integrated into the ship’s command, communications, and electronic surveillance architecture. CANES replaces earlier segmented shipboard information systems, while SSEE Increment F supports signals intelligence collection and electromagnetic battlespace awareness missions. Electrical modernization includes cableway inspections, circuit breaker replacement, and restoration of degraded distribution infrastructure accumulated through repeated deployments since the early 2000s.

Auxiliary systems work includes overhaul activity on pumps, valves, piping systems, ventilation infrastructure, and machinery support equipment required for long-duration amphibious operations. Integrating network, combat systems, and structural modernization into scheduled maintenance periods reduces future operational downtime and preserves amphibious force availability during sustained fleet demand. BAE Systems Maritime Solutions Norfolk operates one of the Navy’s primary East Coast private-sector maintenance facilities supporting amphibious assault ships, destroyers, cruisers, and commercial ship repair activity within the Hampton Roads industrial base.

USS Iwo Jima’s availability follows earlier F-35B integration work performed aboard USS Wasp, allowing reuse of engineering procedures, tooling, and workforce experience developed during previous amphibious assault ship modernization programs. The solicitation required contractors to demonstrate sufficient pier space, crane access, subcontractor integration capability, and workforce depth capable of sustaining simultaneous maintenance activity across propulsion, structural, electrical, combat systems, and aviation disciplines.

Amphibious assault ship availabilities involve large multi-trade labor concentrations, including welders, marine electricians, coatings specialists, pipefitters, structural technicians, network engineers, and combat systems personnel. Long-duration maintenance availabilities increasingly compete for labor and industrial capacity against aircraft carrier overhauls, submarine maintenance backlogs, and Columbia-class submarine construction activity across the broader U.S naval industrial base.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
Türkiye Advances NATO Amphibious Warfare Capabilities with M60TM Tanks and Indigenous Landing Craft at EFES 2026
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Türkiye demonstrated a NATO-compatible amphibious assault capability during the EFES 2026 exercise by landing M60TM main battle tanks directly from Turkish Navy 151 Class landing craft onto an unimproved beach and pushing them inland under live-fire conditions, as observed by Army Recognition on 22 May 2026. The exercise showed Ankara’s ability to combine tactical sealift, armored maneuver, infantry support, and direct-fire coordination into a rapid coastal breakthrough force designed for contested littoral operations and high-intensity regional warfare.

The operation highlighted the combat value of the upgraded M60TM, which integrates active protection, stabilized fire-on-the-move capability, advanced battlefield awareness systems, and protected infantry support into a single armored platform suited for amphibious assault missions. Combined with Türkiye’s indigenous 151 Class landing craft, the demonstration reflected a broader shift toward integrated naval-to-land combat operations that strengthen deterrence, reinforce NATO’s southern flank, and give Turkish forces the ability to rapidly convert sea mobility into armored combat power ashore.

Related Topic: T-129 ATAK Attack Helicopter Demonstrates Strategic Value of Türkiye’s Attack Aviation for NATO at EFES 2026

Türkiye demonstrated a NATO-compatible amphibious assault capability during EFES 2026 by landing upgraded M60TM tanks from indigenous 151 Class landing craft and rapidly pushing armored forces inland under joint-force coordination (Picture Source: Army Recognition Group)

At the Distinguished Observer Day of the EFES-2026 Combined Joint Live-Fire Exercise, held on 22 May 2026 in Seferihisar, İzmir, Army Recognition Group observed the Turkish Navy conducting a ship-to-shore armored assault using 151 Class Landing Craft Tank vessels as part of a complex amphibious warfare demonstration. Four M60TM main battle tanks were landed directly onto the beach, regrouped after armored debarkation, and advanced inland into simulated enemy-held terrain while firing on the move. Turkish soldiers were seen moving behind the armored formation in a protected infantry support role, although their exact unit has not been publicly identified. The sequence offered a rare operational view of Türkiye’s ability to integrate tactical sealift, beach landing operations, armored breakout, direct-fire support, and infantry maneuver into a single NATO-compatible amphibious assault scenario.

The maneuver demonstrated a complete amphibious assault sequence, from the approach of the LCTs to beaching, bow-ramp deployment, armored debarkation, formation regrouping, and transition from the shoreline to inland combat movement. The 151 Class vessels acted as tactical sealift and tank landing assets, delivering heavy armor directly onto an unimproved beach without requiring a port, quay, pier, or fixed landing infrastructure. In a contested littoral environment, this ability to place main battle tanks ashore at a selected beach landing site gives the commander greater freedom of action and reduces dependence on predictable maritime access points.

Once ashore, the M60TM tanks formed an armored fire-support line and moved forward in coordination, using direct-fire engagement to suppress simulated enemy positions and protect the landing force advancing behind them. The sequence illustrated the beachhead-to-breakout concept: the mission is not only to land combat power on the coast, but to expand the lodgment area, secure beach exit lanes, and push inland before a defending force can contain the assault. In operational terms, EFES 2026 showed Türkiye’s ability to turn ship-to-shore movement into a combined-arms armored push, linking naval mobility, tank shock effect, infantry protection, and inland maneuver within a single amphibious combat action.

The naval phase gave the operation a strong Turkish shipbuilding and force-projection dimension. The 151 Class LCTs were designed and built by Anadolu Shipyard for the Turkish Naval Forces, with dry-ramp landing capability, high maneuverability, a 420-ton carrying capacity, and the ability to transport up to seven tanks in a single operation. The class, associated with Türkiye’s amphibious forces and the Foça naval area, gives commanders the ability to move armor, vehicles, and follow-on echelons into a littoral battlespace where ports may be damaged, denied, mined, or unavailable. In this role, the 151 Class LCTs act as the final tactical connector between the amphibious task group at sea and the landing force ashore, allowing armored vehicles to be delivered directly onto an unimproved shoreline and immediately committed to the ground maneuver.

This naval phase was followed by an equally important ground maneuver. Once the tanks cleared the beach exit area, their role shifted from landing force protection to armored breakout, using direct fire and movement to widen the lodgment area and prevent the simulated opposing force from fixing the assault force near the shoreline. The soldiers advancing behind the tanks appeared to operate in a protected infantry support role, using the armored formation to reduce exposure while preparing to clear terrain, secure beach exit lanes, and consolidate the ground gained by the armored spearhead. This reflected a classic combined-arms assault in which tanks provide shock, protection, and firepower while infantry secures the terrain that armor alone cannot hold.

The presence of M60TM tanks added the armored spearhead required for the second phase of the amphibious operation, when a landing force must move beyond beach seizure and begin expanding the lodgment area. A force built mainly around infantry can secure the shoreline and clear immediate obstacles, but it remains vulnerable to hardened firing points, counterattack elements, anti-armor teams, and indirect fire once it starts moving inland. By landing main battle tanks early in the assault, Türkiye demonstrated a heavier and more resilient model of amphibious maneuver, in which infantry is supported from the first minutes ashore by protected mobility, direct-fire overmatch, and armored shock effect. The M60TM brings a 120 mm main gun, upgraded protection, stabilized fire-on-the-move capability, and the combat weight needed to breach or suppress a coastal defense belt, protect beach exit lanes, and support the landing force as it advances beyond the initial landing zone.

The M60TM configuration used at EFES 2026 reflects Türkiye’s effort to transform an existing main battle tank fleet into a more survivable, better protected, and more responsive armored combat platform. Under the FIRAT-M60T and TİYK-M60T modernization programs, ASELSAN integrated a Turkish mission package designed around three operational priorities: increasing crew survivability, improving target acquisition and engagement, and sustaining combat effectiveness during extended missions. The main upgrades include the PULAT Hard-Kill Active Protection System, VOLKAN Fire Control System, SARP UKSS stabilized remote-controlled weapon system, TEPES Telescopic Periscope System, Tank Laser Warning Receiver, Position and Orientation Detection System, Close-Range Surveillance System, Driver Vision System, Robust Spall Liner, Air Conditioning System, and Auxiliary Power Unit. Together, these systems give the M60TM stronger protection against anti-tank threats, improved fire-control performance, better battlefield awareness, enhanced crew endurance, and greater operational autonomy in high-tempo combat environments.

PULAT gives the tank an active defensive layer against anti-tank guided missiles and rocket-propelled grenades by detecting an incoming threat and launching a countermeasure before impact. Its countermeasure modules are positioned around the vehicle to cover several approach angles, giving the tank a better chance of surviving threats coming from the front, rear, or flanks during the first contact phase after landing. In a coastal assault, this type of protection is valuable because tanks moving away from the beach may be exposed to concealed anti-armor teams near beach exits, ridgelines, vegetation, urban edges, or prepared firing points.

The VOLKAN Fire Control System supports faster and more accurate engagements, including when the tank is moving. In an amphibious assault, this is essential because tanks leaving the beach cannot wait for a static firing position; they must suppress hostile positions while advancing and while protecting infantry. SARP UKSS, the stabilized remote-controlled weapon system, gives the crew a protected close-defense weapon against infantry, light vehicles, observation teams, and short-range threats near the landing zone, without requiring personnel to expose themselves outside the turret.

The observation package is also central to the M60TM’s role. TEPES, the Telescopic Periscope System, allows the crew to observe and acquire targets from behind cover, including terrain folds, dunes, beach obstacles, or embankments. This means the tank can support the landing force while reducing its own exposure. The Tank Laser Warning Receiver alerts the crew when the vehicle is being ranged or designated by enemy systems, while the Close-Range Surveillance System and Driver Vision System improve awareness around the tank during movement through smoke, dust, darkness, and congested beach exit lanes.

Other improvements strengthen endurance and crew protection. The Position and Orientation Detection System supports navigation, orientation, and tactical coordination, allowing the tank to remain aligned with the armored formation and the infantry element moving behind it. The Robust Spall Liner helps reduce casualties inside the crew compartment by limiting the effect of internal fragments if the armor is hit. The Air Conditioning System supports crew endurance during long missions and hot-weather operations, while the Auxiliary Power Unit allows electronic systems, sensors, communications, and turret functions to operate without keeping the main engine running continuously. This reduces fuel consumption, lowers mechanical stress, and supports silent-watch tasks.

With these improvements, the M60TM was not presented at EFES 2026 simply as a legacy main battle tank kept in service, but as a modernized armored combat platform adapted to high-threat operating environments. In a battlespace where anti-tank guided missiles, concealed infantry teams, drones, laser designation, and close-range ambushes can influence the first minutes of an amphibious assault, the upgraded M60TM gives the landing force a protected and immediately available source of heavy direct fire. Its operational value lies in the combination of firepower, crew protection, battlefield awareness, and readiness, allowing Türkiye to deploy a credible armored element in amphibious operations while newer-generation tank fleets continue to enter service and mature.

Compared with other Turkish armored platforms, the M60TM occupies a distinct role within the landing force. ZAHA is optimized for amphibious assault and the movement of marine infantry from ship to shore, ACV-15provides protected infantry mobility and follow-on maneuver after the landing, while Altay represents Türkiye’s new-generation main battle tank trajectory. The M60TM delivers a different battlefield effect by bringing heavy direct fire, upgraded protection, improved observation, and immediate armored support to the first phase of the inland advance. In this configuration, ZAHA and ACV-15 support troop movement and battlefield distribution, while the M60TM provides the direct-fire overmatch required to suppress bunkers, hardened firing points, light armored vehicles, anti-tank teams, and other threats that could slow or contain the landing force after it leaves the beach.

From a naval logistics perspective, the EFES 2026 sequence showed how Türkiye can connect sea basing with land maneuver through tactical sealift. The 151 Class LCTs give commanders the ability to select a beach landing site and place heavy armor ashore without dependence on predictable harbor infrastructure, allowing the landing force to open a maneuver corridor from the shoreline into the interior. This complicates enemy coastal defense planning, as opposing forces must cover a wider littoral frontage and prepare not only for infantry landings, but also for the arrival of main battle tanks capable of initiating a rapid armored breakout. In a contested littoral theater, the ability to land tanks directly from the sea can create immediate pressure on enemy defenses, forcing them to react before they can reorganize, shift reserves, or seal the lodgment area.

The NATO interoperability angle is equally strong. EFES 2026 showed Türkiye’s ability to combine amphibious landing operations, joint maneuver, attack aviation, unmanned systems, electronic warfare, air defense, naval support, and ground firepower inside a single operational architecture. The M60TM landing fits directly into that model. It shows that Türkiye can provide the Alliance with a regional amphibious task force able to conduct coastal entry, protect a lodgment area, move armor inland, support crisis response, reinforce exposed littoral sectors, and operate within a NATO-style command-and-control environment. For NATO’s southern and southeastern flank, this adds a Turkish capability that links national naval construction, modernized heavy armor, infantry maneuver, and joint fires.

Strategically, the event sent a clear message to both allies and potential adversaries: Türkiye can move heavy armor from the sea, land it under realistic exercise conditions, provide direct-fire support to infantry ashore, and rapidly shift from beach seizure to inland offensive action. This is a high-value capability for a country positioned at the junction of the Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, Balkans, Middle East, and Caucasus, where control of coastal access points and the ability to reinforce littoral areas can shape the opening phase of a crisis. It also supports NATO’s need for mobile, resilient, and rapidly deployable forces in contested coastal regions, where the first hours of an operation can determine whether a coastline is reinforced, opened, or denied. EFES 2026 highlighted Türkiye as a frontline NATO ally with an expanding amphibious armored capability built on national industry, operational discipline, and joint-force integration.

The deeper meaning of the demonstration lies in the connection between sea control, landing force mobility, and inland armored action. The EFES 2026 landing showed that Türkiye is developing a complete littoral combat chain, linking tactical sealift, armored debarkation, direct-fire engagement, infantry assault, protected maneuver, and NATO-compatible command-and-control into a single operational package. In a region where maritime geography directly shapes military options, this integrated capability gives Türkiye and the Alliance a stronger deterrence posture across coastal and island environments, while also demonstrating that Turkish forces can convert naval mobility into land combat power at the point and time selected by the commander.

The EFES 2026 landing of four M60TM tanks from Turkish Navy 151 Class LCTs was a clear demonstration of Türkiye’s ability to transform naval mobility into armored combat power ashore. The operation combined Turkish-built landing craft, modernized main battle tanks, infantry movement, direct-fire support, and NATO-style joint coordination into one coherent amphibious assault package. Beyond the visual impact of tanks driving from the beach while firing in formation, the demonstration carried a deeper military message: Türkiye can seize a coastal lodgment area, protect it with heavy armor, break out inland, and reinforce NATO’s southern and southeastern flank with a force shaped for high-intensity littoral warfare. By demonstrating that heavy armor can be delivered from the sea, protected by national upgrades, and pushed inland under joint-force coordination, Türkiye showed a capability that strengthens both its own deterrence posture and NATO’s operational depth across the Alliance’s southern flank.

Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
China Develops GPS-Free Submarine Navigation Capable of Evading U.S. Navy Ship Tracking
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China is moving toward fielding GPS-proof submarines that could threaten U.S. Navy tracking systems and create a major new blind spot in Pacific undersea warfare during a future Taiwan conflict. Researchers from the Xinjiang Technical Institute of Physics and Chemistry announced they achieved a record 145.2-nanometer ultraviolet wavelength needed to activate thorium-229 nuclear clocks, a breakthrough that could eventually allow Chinese submarines to navigate without GPS, external positioning updates, or vulnerable satellite networks.

The advance raises new Pentagon concerns about China’s accelerating military technology race, as GPS-independent navigation could weaken Cold War-era SOSUS tracking concepts and complicate U.S. anti-submarine warfare operations across the Indo-Pacific. In a high-end conflict involving nuclear deterrence and long-range submarine patrols, the technology could increase survivability for Chinese ballistic missile submarines while placing greater operational pressure on Virginia-class forces tasked with maintaining U.S. undersea dominance in the Pacific.

Related Topic: China works on quantum gravity sensor to detect US nuclear submarines just by their mass

A Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy nuclear-powered submarine sails during naval operations as China advances nuclear clock technology that could allow future submarines to navigate with extreme precision without GPS, potentially challenging U.S. Navy anti-submarine warfare dominance in the Indo-Pacific region. (Picture source: China MoD)

For the Pentagon and the U.S. Navy, the technology raises concerns because modern anti-submarine warfare partly depends on predicting when submarines must surface to update their navigation systems. Current submarines use inertial navigation combined with periodic satellite-based corrections to maintain precise positioning. GPS signals cannot penetrate seawater, forcing submarines to surface periodically or deploy masts near the surface to recalibrate navigation data.

These moments create vulnerabilities that U.S. Navy forces exploit using satellites, maritime patrol aircraft, electronic surveillance, and attack submarines. If Chinese submarines equipped with nuclear clocks can maintain highly accurate positioning for extended periods without external updates, they could remain submerged longer while dramatically reducing detection opportunities.

Unlike conventional atomic clocks, which rely on electron oscillations around an atomic nucleus, nuclear clocks measure energy transitions directly inside the nucleus itself. Because the nucleus is far less sensitive to environmental disturbances such as temperature changes, radiation, or electromagnetic interference, nuclear clocks are theoretically 10 to 1,000 times more accurate than current atomic clocks.

The key Chinese advance involves a fluoroborate crystal that converts laser light into deep ultraviolet radiation with significantly greater efficiency than previous materials. Existing systems generated ultraviolet light near 150 nanometers, while thorium-229 nuclear excitation requires approximately 148.3 nanometers. The new crystal exceeded that threshold, reaching 145.2 nanometers, potentially opening the way toward operational thorium nuclear clocks.

For the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), the operational implications could be substantial. China’s growing fleet of Type 093 nuclear-powered attack submarines, Jin-class ballistic missile submarines, and future Type 096 strategic submarines operates under increasing pressure from U.S. Navy anti-submarine warfare networks across the Indo-Pacific.

The U.S. Navy currently maintains one of the world’s most advanced undersea tracking architectures, combining Virginia-class attack submarines, P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, seabed sonar systems, underwater sensor networks, carrier strike groups, and space-based surveillance assets. This network is specifically designed to detect, monitor, and track adversary submarines operating near Taiwan, the South China Sea, and key Pacific maritime chokepoints.

If Chinese submarines become capable of GPS-independent navigation with near-perfect timing precision, they could operate more unpredictably while reducing electronic and physical exposure. This would complicate American tracking operations and potentially weaken a long-standing U.S. advantage in undersea warfare dominance.

The implications are particularly serious in the event of a potential Taiwan conflict. Chinese ballistic missile submarines equipped with autonomous nuclear clocks could patrol more stealthily inside protected bastions near the South China Sea or Western Pacific while maintaining secure second-strike nuclear deterrence capabilities. At the same time, Chinese attack submarines could maneuver more effectively against U.S. carrier strike groups, logistics ships, or amphibious forces supporting Taiwan.

For U.S. Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines and Virginia-class attack submarines, the challenge would not necessarily be technological inferiority, but the erosion of the asymmetric detection advantages currently enjoyed by the United States. American anti-submarine warfare doctrine relies heavily on persistent surveillance, predictive tracking, and the exploitation of navigation-related vulnerabilities. Removing or reducing those vulnerabilities could force major changes in U.S. naval operational planning.

The technology could also enhance the precision of Chinese submarine-launched cruise missiles and hypersonic weapons operating in GPS-denied combat environments. Precise navigation is essential for launch positioning and coordinated long-range strikes. A submarine capable of maintaining extremely accurate location data while remaining fully submerged would improve strike timing and survivability during high-intensity naval warfare.

Another major concern for U.S. military planners is that nuclear clock systems could reduce the effectiveness of American electronic warfare strategies. U.S. doctrine increasingly emphasizes disrupting enemy satellite navigation through jamming, spoofing, cyber operations, or anti-satellite attacks. A Chinese military less dependent on external navigation infrastructure would be more resilient in a degraded electromagnetic battlespace.

The breakthrough also aligns with broader Chinese military modernization efforts focused on strategic autonomy. Beijing has invested heavily in quantum technologies, resilient communications, artificial intelligence-assisted targeting, autonomous underwater vehicles, and alternative navigation systems designed to operate independently of vulnerable satellite networks during wartime.

Although the Chinese advance remains at the scientific research stage, major engineering challenges still remain before deployment aboard operational submarines becomes possible. Researchers must demonstrate long-term stability, miniaturization, resistance to vibration and pressure, and integration into deployable military systems capable of functioning in real combat conditions at sea.

Nevertheless, the achievement highlights the accelerating technological competition between China and the United States in next-generation navigation, autonomous warfare systems, and strategic undersea operations. If operationalized, thorium nuclear clocks could eventually enable Chinese submarines to operate with unprecedented stealth and navigational independence, potentially weakening the U.S. Navy's anti-submarine warfare dominance in the Indo-Pacific theater.

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
US Navy awards General Atomics $15 million EMALS contract for USS Enterprise Ford-class carrier
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The U.S. Navy has awarded General Atomics a new $15.58 million contract modification to continue EMALS corrective engineering aboard USS Enterprise (CVN-80), reinforcing that the Ford-class carrier program is still refining its core launch architecture more than a decade after development began. Announced by the U.S. Naval Air Systems Command on May 21, 2026, the work focuses on power-conversion reliability, network modernization, and launch-system integration issues that directly affect sortie generation, aircraft readiness and the carrier’s ability to sustain high-tempo air operations in contested environments.

The latest upgrades target transformer rectifier failures, digital synchronization weaknesses and fiber-optic network improvements inside the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System, a technology designed to replace steam catapults with precision-controlled electromagnetic launches capable of supporting both heavier strike aircraft and lighter unmanned platforms. The continued engineering effort highlights how the Ford-class program has effectively evolved into a long-term modernization cycle centered on electrical power management, automation, and next-generation carrier aviation, with EMALS remaining critical to the Navy’s future approach to distributed air warfare and high-end maritime deterrence.

Related topic:US Navy requests $4.2 Billion to accelerate USS William J. Clinton Ford-class carrier procurement

The new USS Enterprise (CVN-80) is connected directly to its two predecessors by physically recycling 16 tonnes of steel from the 1961 nuclear carrier and incorporating four original windows saved from the decorated World War II carrier. (Picture source: US DoD)

On May 21, 2026, the U.S. Naval Air Systems Command awarded General Atomics a $15.58 million modification for additional Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) work aboard the future Ford-class carrier USS Enterprise (CVN-80), extending a procurement and sustainment framework initiated on May 8, 2014. The original sole-source firm-fixed-price contract initially financed long-lead EMALS and Advanced Arresting Gear procurement for USS John F. Kennedy (CVN-79) and CVN-80 before expanding into a combined production, integration, logistics, and corrective engineering effort exceeding $1.7 billion.

The latest modification funds migration of the EMALS network architecture toward single-mode fiber infrastructure, correction of Prime Power Interface Subsystem transformer rectifier deficiencies, associated installation work aboard CVN-80, and hardware storage management through April 2028. Previous modifications included $36.4 million in May 2021 for 18 AAG Water Twister Mod-II shipsets, $9.63 million in September 2021 for Generation 3 EMALS position sensor blocks, $42.85 million in January 2023 for hardware and software integration aboard CVN-79 and CVN-80, and $27.96 million in December 2023 for 140 EMALS position sensor blocks and transformer rectifier engineering support.

The modification sequence indicates that the Ford-class launch and recovery architecture remains in an active corrective engineering phase more than a decade after the original award. EMALS replaced the C-13 steam catapult system installed aboard U.S Navy carriers since the Forrestal class during the 1950s, ending a launch architecture based on steam accumulators, hydraulic braking systems, and mechanical pistons operating through parallel launch cylinders beneath the flight deck. Steam catapults achieved high operational maturity aboard Nimitz-class carriers but required extensive steam piping networks, heavy maintenance manpower and large freshwater production capacity.

Navy engineering studies linked to the CVN-21 program concluded that steam systems conflicted with reduced crew objectives and future integration of lightweight unmanned aircraft because launch force modulation remained relatively inflexible. EMALS replaced steam pressure with electromagnetic acceleration generated through a linear induction motor integrated directly into the Ford-class electrical architecture. The transition represented the largest modification to carrier launch technology since the introduction of steam catapults during the Cold War and required Ford-class ships to incorporate substantially larger electrical generation and pulsed power distribution margins from the outset.

The EMALS architecture is organized around four principal subsystems consisting of the linear induction motor, energy storage subsystem, power conversion subsystem and digital control subsystem. The launch track itself functions as a linear electric motor roughly 91 meters long, while launch energy is stored kinetically through four rotating disk alternators providing 121 megajoules each for a combined energy capacity near 484 megajoules. During launch operations, stored rotational energy is converted into electrical output, cycloconverters regulate voltage and frequency, and energized stator coils sequentially accelerate the shuttle carrying the aircraft.

Maximum launch profiles permit aircraft masses up to 45 tonnes to reach speeds near 240 km/h within two to three seconds, while recharge intervals remain close to 45 seconds between launches. Unlike steam catapults that apply fixed mechanical acceleration curves, EMALS continuously adjusts the tow force through closed-loop digital feedback using distributed sensors and automated control software. The system was intended to reduce airframe stress, improve end-speed precision and support lighter unmanned aircraft that legacy steam systems struggled to launch efficiently.

Despite these intended advantages, EMALS entered fleet service before achieving required reliability thresholds, and testing throughout the 2010s repeatedly exposed deficiencies affecting power conversion, synchronization logic, and subsystem durability. Developmental testing at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst recorded 201 failed launches out of 1,967 attempts during a 2013 test sequence, while operational evaluations aboard USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) identified recurring issues involving transformer rectifiers, software synchronization faults, launch motor durability, overheating electrical components, and repeated position sensor failures.

A January 2021 Director, Operational Test and Evaluation assessment measured achieved reliability at 181 Mean Cycles Between Operational Mission Failure compared with a Navy requirement of 4,166 MCBOMF after 3,975 catapult launches conducted between November 2019 and September 2020. Government Accountability Office evaluations during 2022 concluded that EMALS and Advanced Arresting Gear reliability targets were unlikely to be achieved before the 2030s because several subsystems still required redesign and configuration refinement. Nevertheless, the Navy continued deployment because Ford-class carriers had already been structurally optimized around EMALS architecture.

By June 2022, EMALS and AAG aboard CVN-78 had surpassed 10,000 launch and recovery cycles while corrective modifications continued affecting braking choppers, launch motors, transformer rectifiers, and position sensors. USS Enterprise (CVN-80), the third Ford-class aircraft carrier, is under construction at Huntington Ingalls Industries Newport News Shipbuilding in Virginia. Steel cutting began during August 2017, keel laying occurred on April 5, 2022, and the ship’s delivery schedule shifted from March 2028 to July 2030 before being revised again during 2026 to March 2031 because of sequence-critical material delays, supply chain disruption, and launch system integration complexity.

The carrier will displace 100,000 tonnes at full load, measure 337 meters in length, feature a 41 meter beam and draw 12 meters of water, while propulsion will be provided through two Bechtel A1B nuclear reactors driving four shafts. Planned air wing capacity exceeds 75 aircraft, depending on operational configuration, with the ship designed around EMALS, Advanced Arresting Gear, enlarged electrical generation margins, reduced crew requirements, and redesigned sortie generation workflows intended to increase launch tempo.

Compared with Nimitz-class carriers, Ford-class ships reduce crew requirements by several hundred personnel while targeting sortie generation increases near 25%. CVN-80 is also the first Ford-class carrier constructed entirely within a fully digital design and manufacturing environment from the beginning of fabrication. CVN-80 inherits the operational legacy of USS Enterprise (CV-6), the Yorktown-class carrier commissioned in May 1938 that participated in Midway, Eastern Solomons, Santa Cruz, Philippine Sea, and Leyte Gulf while surviving repeated battle damage throughout the Pacific campaign.

The carrier displaced 20,000 tonnes, earned 20 battle stars together with the Presidential Unit Citation and became closely associated with the fast-carrier doctrine developed during the Second World War. CVN-80 incorporates direct material continuity with the wartime carrier through integration of four original portholes recovered from CV-6 and installed aboard the new ship during construction. The ship also inherits the legacy of USS Enterprise (CVN-65), commissioned in November 1961 as the world’s first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.

CVN-65 used eight Westinghouse A2W nuclear reactors, displaced 93,000 tonnes at full load, sustained speeds above 56 km/h and participated in the Cuban Missile Crisis, Vietnam War operations, Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom before deactivation in 2017. Sixteen tonnes of steel recovered from CVN-65 are being recycled into CVN-80 construction. Although CVN-80 shares the same baseline architecture as USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) and USS John F. Kennedy (CVN-79), the ship incorporates incremental modifications derived from nearly a decade of corrective engineering and operational testing aboard CVN-78.

These changes include revised EMALS hardware baselines, updated launch system networking architecture, modified power electronics, altered installation sequencing and expanded digital integration between shipyard construction workflows and onboard systems architecture. The broader Ford-class program experienced persistent schedule disruption because multiple immature technologies entered serial production simultaneously, including EMALS, Advanced Arresting Gear, Advanced Weapons Elevators, the Dual Band Radar and the new A1B reactor architecture.

Ships consequently progressed through construction while major subsystems remained under redesign, creating concurrency risks that forced corrective modifications during assembly rather than after technological stabilization. USS Gerald R. Ford required years of post-delivery corrective work before reaching stable deployment conditions, while CVN-79 and CVN-80 were additionally affected by supply-chain disruptions and integration complexity involving electrical distribution and launch system architectures. The continuing engineering modifications awarded under contract modifications increasingly transformed the Ford-class launch and recovery architecture into a long-term iterative modernization effort rather than a conventional serial production program based on stable technological baselines.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
U.S. Navy Begins USS Thomas G. Kelley Arleigh Burke-class Flight III Destroyer for Indo-Pacific Deterrence
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Bath Iron Works has begun fabrication of the future USS Thomas G. Kelley (DDG 140), marking another step in the U.S. Navy’s effort to expand its Flight III Arleigh Burke-class destroyer fleet as demand grows for more capable air and missile defense warships. The ceremony, held at the shipyard’s Structural Fabrication Facility in Bath, Maine, also underscored the Navy’s focus on sustaining high-end surface combat power in contested maritime environments across the Indo-Pacific and other strategic theaters.

As the seventh Flight III destroyer to enter production at Bath Iron Works, DDG 140 will carry the AN/SPY-6 radar and upgraded combat systems designed to improve detection, tracking, and engagement against advanced missile and air threats. The continued expansion of the Flight III fleet strengthens the Navy’s ability to conduct integrated air defense, escort carrier strike groups, and maintain deterrence against near-peer naval competitors.

Related Topic: Bath Iron Works starts building new Arleigh Burke-class Flight III destroyer USS J. William Middendorf

DDG 140 is expected to operate the Aegis Baseline 10 combat system, which combines air defense, ballistic missile defense, and surface warfare functions within a unified architecture (Picture source: AI generated by Army Recognition)

BIW President Charles F. Krugh states during the ceremony that the shipyard continues adapting its industrial processes to meet the U.S. Navy’s growing requirements regarding production schedules, construction quality, and operational readiness. His remarks also draw a direct connection between the yard’s current mission and Kelley’s wartime leadership while commanding river assault craft under enemy fire in Vietnam. That continuity between operational heritage and industrial modernization remains central to the U.S. Navy’s messaging surrounding the destroyer program, particularly as maritime competition with China intensifies and high-end naval warfare scenarios return to strategic planning discussions.

The future USS Thomas G. Kelley belongs to the Flight III evolution of the Arleigh Burke-class program, a variant designed to strengthen the U.S. Navy’s integrated air and missile defense capabilities. Flight III destroyers primarily introduce the AN/SPY-6(V)1 Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR), developed around Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) technology using gallium nitride modules. Compared with the SPY-1D radar installed aboard earlier destroyers, the SPY-6 provides substantially greater detection and tracking capacity against multiple threats, including ballistic missiles, low-observable cruise missiles, and maneuvering targets operating in electronically contested environments. Bath Iron Works confirms on May 21, 2026, that DDG 140 becomes the seventh Flight III destroyer to begin construction at the company’s Maine facility.

Integrating the SPY-6 radar nevertheless requires major modifications throughout the ship itself. To support the higher electrical and thermal demands generated by the new system, Flight III destroyers receive a modernized electrical architecture and expanded cooling capacity. Despite these internal redesigns, the vessel’s overall hull dimensions remain close to previous Arleigh Burke variants, allowing the U.S. Navy to reduce industrial risk while preserving logistical continuity with ships already in service. The changes notably affect machinery spaces, power distribution networks, and combat-system integration areas in order to maintain future modernization margins over the vessel’s service life.

Like other Flight III destroyers, DDG 140 is expected to operate the Aegis Baseline 10 combat system, which combines air defense, ballistic missile defense, and surface warfare functions within a unified architecture. The ship will likely retain the standard 96-cell Mk 41 Vertical Launching System (VLS), capable of deploying several missile families, including the SM-2, SM-6, Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM), and RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM). The SM-6 gives the destroyer especially valuable operational flexibility because the missile can engage aircraft, cruise missiles, certain terminal ballistic missile threats, and surface targets at ranges exceeding 200 nautical miles, depending on engagement profile and targeting support.

Today, May 21, 2026 — we celebrated the start of fabrication of the future USS Thomas G. Kelley (DDG 140) at our Structural Fabrication Facility.

DDG 140 is the 48th of its class built at Bath Iron Works and the seventh Flight III Arleigh Burke destroyer to start construction at… pic.twitter.com/Z0pHS7Hkaq
— General Dynamics Bath Iron Works (@GDBIW) May 21, 2026

Anti-submarine warfare capabilities also remain central to the Flight III operational profile. The ships continue using the AN/SQQ-89(V)15 undersea warfare suite combined with hull-mounted sonar and towed-array sensors designed to detect submarines operating at extended distances. Embarked MH-60R Seahawk helicopters further extend detection and engagement range through the use of sonobuoys, lightweight torpedoes, and electro-optical sensors. At the same time, Link 16 and Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) tactical data links allow the destroyer to exchange targeting information in near real-time with U.S. and allied carrier strike groups, reducing sensor-to-shooter timelines during complex naval operations.

Operationally, Flight III destroyers are designed to protect carrier strike groups, amphibious formations, and strategic maritime traffic against layered aerial threats. Their radar architecture becomes particularly relevant in the Indo-Pacific theater, where U.S. planners increasingly prepare for scenarios involving coordinated salvos of ballistic missiles, supersonic anti-ship missiles, and unmanned systems. The SPY-6 radar improves early-warning timelines while maintaining track quality against low-signature or maneuvering threats at long range. Combined with Aegis Baseline 10 and SM-6 interceptors, Flight III destroyers therefore provide the U.S. Navy and allied forces with a broader integrated air and missile defense capability across contested maritime environments.

The start of fabrication for the future USS Thomas G. Kelley also reflects the industrial and geopolitical dimensions of current American maritime strategy. Washington continues relying heavily on Bath Iron Works and Huntington Ingalls Industries to sustain destroyer production while the future DDG(X) program remains under development. That industrial continuity directly supports evolving operational requirements facing the U.S. Navy across both the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East. In the Western Pacific, Arleigh Burke-class destroyers remain at the center of the American naval posture around Taiwan, the South China Sea, and freedom of navigation operations conducted near disputed maritime zones. Forward-deployed destroyers assigned to the U.S. 7th Fleet and based in Yokosuka, Japan, maintain a near-permanent presence throughout the region while providing rapid-response capabilities against Chinese naval expansion and long-range missile forces.

Current tensions involving Iran around the Strait of Hormuz also reinforce the operational relevance of the Arleigh Burkeclass. In recent months, U.S. destroyers have participated in maritime security and mine-countermeasure support operations following renewed tensions between Washington and Tehran. In a confined maritime environment where threats can emerge simultaneously from anti-ship missiles, drones, naval mines, and fast attack craft operated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy, Arleigh Burke destroyers retain high strategic value because of their combination of Aegis-based air defense, electronic warfare systems, embarked helicopters, and network-centric command capabilities. Flight III variants equipped with the SPY-6 radar further improve the U.S. Navy’s ability to detect and react against saturation attacks or low-signature targets launched from coastal areas, an increasingly important requirement in both the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. Across the Indo-Pacific, the Gulf region, and the North Atlantic, destroyers capable of simultaneously condu

Written By Erwan Halna du Fretay - Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Erwan Halna du Fretay holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and has experience studying conflicts and global arms transfers. His research interests lie in security and strategic studies, particularly the dynamics of the defense industry, the evolution of military technologies, and the strategic transformation of armed forces.