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Finland begins construction of final Pohjanmaa-class corvette at Rauma shipyard
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On January 14, 2026, steel cutting for the fourth Pohjanmaa-class corvette and keel laying for the third vessel took place at the Rauma shipyard, marking the start of final-hull production and third-ship assembly under Finland’s Squadron 2020 program.

On January 14, 2026, the Finnish Navy began construction of the fourth Pohjanmaa-class multi-role corvette at the Rauma shipyard, while the keel of the third vessel was laid on the same day. With all four Squadron 2020 ships now under construction, the program has entered its full-rate production phase following earlier starts in 2023 and 2024.
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Described as the Finnish Navy’s largest surface combatants since the coastal defence ships Ilmarinen and Väinämöinen in the 1930s, each Pohjanmaa-class corvette measures 117 m in length, with a beam of 16.5 m and a 5 m draught. (Picture source: Finnish Navy)

Rauma stated that the construction of the fourth and final Pohjanmaa-class multi-role corvette for the Finnish Navy began at its shipyard, while the keel of the third ship of the class was laid on the same day, confirming that all four vessels of the Squadron 2020 program are now under construction simultaneously. The steel-cutting marked the formal start of production for the last hull, and the keel-laying marked the physical start of assembly for the third vessel, including the placement of the keel block and traditional coins beneath it. These milestones follow the start of construction of the first ship in October 2023 and the second ship in October 2024, and they place the program firmly in its full-rate construction phase with parallel work across multiple hulls.

The Squadron 2020 program is structured to replace seven ageing surface combatants with four larger, ice-capable multi-role corvettes intended to remain in service into the 2050s. The vessels will replace four Rauma-class missile boats, two Hämeenmaa-class minelayers, and the single Pohjanmaa minelayer that was decommissioned in 2015, consolidating several mission sets into fewer hulls. The first Pohjanmaa-class corvette was launched in May 2025 and has entered the outfitting phase, the second vessel completed hull construction in December 2025, the third began construction in August 2025, and the fourth entered production in January 2026. Sea trials for the lead ship are planned for 2026, commissioning is scheduled to begin in 2027, and delivery of all four vessels is planned by 2029.

Each Pohjanmaa-class corvette has an overall length of 117 meters, a beam between 16 and 16.5 meters, a draught of five meters, and a displacement of about 4,300 tonnes, making them the largest Finnish surface combatants since the Ilmarinen and Väinämöinen coastal defence ships of the 1930s. The standard crew is about 70 to 73 personnel, with accommodation and endurance designed for 14 days at sea and a range of about 3,500 nautical miles. The hull is ice-reinforced to a level equivalent to Finnish ice class 1A, enabling independent year-round operations in the Baltic Sea, including in heavy ice conditions, without reliance on icebreaker assistance.

Propulsion is based on a combined diesel-electric and gas arrangement delivering about 28 MW of total power, using one General Electric LM2500 gas turbine and four MAN 12V175D diesel generator sets rated at 1,920 kW each. During routine operations, electric propulsion drives two ice-strengthened controllable pitch propellers, while the gas turbine can be engaged through a common gearbox to exceed speeds of 26 knots. Two of the diesel generators are installed on double-resilient mountings inside sound-insulated enclosures to reduce noise during anti-submarine operations, and two bow thrusters support low-speed maneuvering in confined coastal and archipelagic waters.

The combat system architecture is centered on Saab’s 9LV combat management system and the TactiCall integrated communications system, installed on a Saab Lightweight Integrated Mast carrying Sea Giraffe 4A fixed-face AESA radar and Sea Giraffe 1X short-range 3D radar. Fire control is handled by CEROS 200 radar and optronic directors, and the ships also include a naval laser warning capability and soft-kill countermeasures. The underwater warfare suite combines Kongsberg SS2030 hull-mounted sonar, SD9500 dipping sonar, and Patria Sonac DTS with active variable-depth sonar and a passive towed array, supporting operations against submarines in shallow and acoustically complex Baltic waters.

Armament includes a forward-mounted Bofors 57 mm Mk3 naval gun, two Saab Trackfire remote weapon stations, and four Rheinmetall MASS decoy launchers for self-protection. Surface warfare is provided by Gabriel V anti-ship missiles designated PTO 2020, while air defense relies on RIM-162 ESSM Block 2 missiles designated ITO 20, quad-packed into eight Mk 41 vertical launch cells for a total of 32 missiles per ship. Anti-submarine capability is provided by Saab Torped 47 lightweight torpedoes, and the ships can lay up to 100 PB 17 naval mines via stern rails, while aviation facilities support a medium helicopter such as the NH90 and unmanned aerial systems.

Within the current Finnish Navy fleet, the Pohjanmaa-class corvettes will operate alongside four modernized Hamina-class missile boats, which are smaller fast-attack craft armed with missiles, a main gun, and short-range air defense. The fleet also includes mine countermeasures vessels of the Katanpää class, several types of minelayers, landing craft, and auxiliary vessels supporting coastal and archipelagic operations. Once all four Pohjanmaa-class corvettes enter service, they will form the core of Finland’s surface combatant force, concentrating surface warfare, air defense, anti-submarine warfare, minelaying, and command functions into a reduced number of hulls under the Squadron 2020 structure.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
Philippines receives first Rajah Sulayman-class offshore patrol vessel from South Korea
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The BRP Rajah Sulayman (PS-20), the first of six offshore patrol vessels ordered from HD Hyundai Heavy Industries, arrived in the Philippines on January 17, 2026, and was met by the guided missile frigate BRP Jose Rizal (FF-150) off Zambales.

On January 19, 2026, the Philippine Navy confirmed the arrival of the future BRP Rajah Sulayman (PS-20), the first of six offshore patrol vessels ordered from HD Hyundai Heavy Industries, after completing its delivery transit from Ulsan, South Korea. The ship will undergo inspection and acceptance procedures before commissioning, marking the first completed delivery under the ₱30 billion offshore patrol vessel contract signed in 2022.
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The Rajah Sulayman can remain at sea far longer and further from home ports than older Jacinto-class patrol vessels, enabling sustained maritime domain presence, surveillance, and interdiction operations in the country’s expansive archipelagic waters. (Picture source: Philippine Navy)

The first of six offshore patrol vessels ordered from South Korea’s HD Hyundai Heavy Industries, arrived in the Philippines on January 17, 2026, after departing Ulsan on January 13, 2026, and completing its delivery transit. The vessel entered Philippine waters and was met off the coast of Zambales by the guided missile frigate BRP Jose Rizal (FF-150) in accordance with standard naval procedures applied to incoming ships. Following this rendezvous, the ship proceeded to begin post-delivery activities, marking the transition from delivery to acceptance. The Philippine Navy stated that the ship is scheduled for a technical inspection and assessment before its official commissioning. Until these stages are completed, the vessel continues to carry the designation “future” BRP Rajah Sulayman. The arrival represents the first physical delivery under the ₱30 billion contract signed in 2022 for six offshore patrol vessels.

The keel of the BRP Rajah Sulayman was laid on February 5, 2025, at HD Hyundai Heavy Industries’ shipyard in Ulsan, South Korea. The ship was then officially launched on June 11, 2025, marking the completion of hull construction and the transition to outfitting and trials. After launch, the vessel underwent fitting-out and sea trials in South Korean waters to verify propulsion, systems, and overall seaworthiness. These activities preceded clearance for its delivery voyage to the Philippines. The ship departed Ulsan on January 13, 2026, beginning a transoceanic transit that concluded with its arrival four days later. The timeline from keel laying to arrival spans less than one year, reflecting a compressed construction and delivery schedule. Formal commissioning is planned only after the completion of inspection and acceptance procedures in the Philippines.

The Rajah Sulayman-class offshore patrol vessels originate from the Philippine Navy’s Horizon 2 phase of the Revised Armed Forces of the Philippines Modernization Program, initiated in 2018 to replace aging patrol assets and expand offshore patrol capacity. The program included the acquisition of six next-generation offshore patrol vessels with a total contract value of about ₱30 billion, equivalent to roughly $573 million. After reviewing multiple foreign proposals, the Department of National Defense selected HD Hyundai Heavy Industries under a government-to-government procurement agreement with South Korea, with the contract signed on June 27, 2022. Hyundai’s design evolved from the HDP-1500 Neo concept to the enlarged HDP-2200 and the finalized HDP-2200+ configuration, which was selected for the Philippine Navy. The class is intended to replace older Jacinto-class patrol vessels, while complementing Jose Rizal-class frigates and upcoming corvettes built by the same shipbuilder. Deliveries for the six ships are scheduled between 2025 and 2028.

The BRP Rajah Sulayman (PS-20) has a full-load displacement ranging from 2,400 to 2,450 tonnes and measures 94.4 meters in length, with a beam of 14.3 meters and a draft of about 3.7 meters. Propulsion is provided by a combined diesel and diesel (CODAD) arrangement using two MTU-STX diesel engines driving controllable-pitch propellers, which allows for a maximum speed of 22 knots at 85 percent maximum continuous rating and a cruising speed of 15 knots. The ship has an operational range of 5,500 nautical miles at cruising speed and an endurance of up to 30 days. Crew complement is set at 72 personnel, supported by automation intended to reduce workload during extended deployments. The hull and internal layout are optimized for long-range patrol and sustained presence missions.

The BRP Rajah Sulayman’s armament consists of a forward-mounted 76mm OTO Melara Super Rapid naval gun, which has a maximum range of about 16 km with standard high-explosive ammunition, supported by two 30mm remote-controlled weapon stations, with a range of about 3 km to 4 km, and additional 12.7mm heavy machine guns, which have effective ranges out to about 1,800 m to 2,000 m for surface and light aerial targets. The ship's design also incorporates space and structural provisions for the future integration of additional defensive systems if required. Aviation facilities include a flight deck and hangar capable of operating helicopters up to 10 tonnes as well as unmanned aerial vehicles. Small-boat operations are supported by a stern ramp for a 9.5-meter rigid-hulled inflatable boat and side bays for additional boats. A stern mission area is designed to accommodate modular payloads and specialized equipment. This configuration supports roles such as maritime patrol, anti-smuggling, anti-piracy, search and rescue, and disaster response.

The sensor and combat system suite integrates a Hanwha combat management system with a Leonardo SPS-732 X-band air and surface surveillance radar, supported by a Safran PASEO XLR electro-optical identification and fire-control system. Navigation and ship handling are managed through an Anschütz Synapsis NX integrated bridge system and Hensoldt SharpEye Mk.11 navigation radars. Defensive systems include electronic support measures and C-Guard DL-6T decoy launchers providing infrared and radio-frequency countermeasures. Three of the six ships in the class are planned to receive TRAPS towed active-passive sonar systems supplied by GeoSpectrum Technologies of Canada, expanding underwater detection capability. All six vessels are designed to accommodate sonar integration, even if not initially equipped. Compared with previous Philippine Navy patrol vessels, this Rajah Sulayman-class represents a significant expansion in endurance, sensor coverage, and modular mission capacity.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
Russia may begin first sea trials of Khabarovsk nuclear submarine in 2026 as Poseidon carrier
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Russia’s Project 09851 nuclear-powered submarine Khabarovsk could begin sea trials in 2026 as construction and fitting-out activities conclude at Sevmash in Severodvinsk.

According to Izvestia, Russia’s Project 09851 nuclear-powered submarine Khabarovsk could begin sea trials in 2026 following completion of outfitting work at the Sevmash shipyard. Designed as a dedicated carrier for the Poseidon nuclear-powered unmanned underwater vehicle, the Khabarovsk was launched in November 2025 and has since entered mooring test preparations.
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Once trials and acceptance testing are completed, the Khabarovsk is expected to serve with the Pacific Fleet, potentially as part of a new submarine division based on Kamchatka. (Picture source: Sevmash)

The Project 09851 submarine was ceremonially launched on November 1, 2025, and subsequently lowered into the water on November 30, after which it entered a phase of fitting out while afloat and preparation for mooring tests. The Khabarovsk is the first submarine designed from the start as a standard carrier for the Poseidon nuclear-powered torpedo, moving beyond earlier solutions that relied on modified submarines. In Russia, the Khabarovsk is classified as a fourth-generation Project 09851 nuclear submarine intended for special missions rather than traditional patrol roles, combining characteristics associated with nuclear attack submarines and cruise-missile submarines while prioritizing the carriage of large autonomous underwater systems.

The hull design is derived from the Borei and Borei-A submarines, but omits the ballistic missile compartment, resulting in a significantly different internal arrangement optimized for mission payloads rather than SLBM launchers. Smaller than a Borei-class SSBN, the Khabarovsk nevertheless retains the endurance, propulsion, and general size associated with modern Russian nuclear submarines. Displacement figures for the Khabarovsk converge around 10,000 tonnes, with a length that is most frequently listed as 113 meters, although broader ranges extending to 135 or even 140 meters also appear, reflecting differing assessments of overall hull measurement. Beam values similarly vary, from roughly 10 meters to as much as 13.5 meters, indicating a persistent uncertainty surrounding exact external dimensions for a submarine whose detailed characteristics remain limited in public circulation.

The propulsion system is based on a nuclear power plant that allows the Khabarovsk to operate without range limitations. According to available information, it could be a pressurized-water reactor designated KTP-6-185SP with an output of about 200 MW. Power is transmitted through a turbine rated at 50,000 hp to a single shaft, driving a waterjet propulsor, with two auxiliary thrusters fitted to support maneuvering. Performance parameters consistently place underwater speed between 30 and 32 knots, while the operational diving depth is stated at up to 500 meters, situating the Khabarovsk among the higher-performance nuclear submarines in the Russian fleet in terms of mobility and depth capability.

As the Khabarovsk is associated with a Borei-derived stern configuration, it implies large vertical stabilizers combined with an X-shaped or modified cruciform control surface arrangement, rather than the classic cross-tail seen on older Soviet submarines. This configuration is said to improve hydrodynamic stability at high submerged speeds and greater control authority at depth, especially when operating a large hull with a waterjet propulsor. The vertical stabilizer integrates control surfaces and flow management around the pump-jet, supporting both directional stability and maneuverability during deep-water operations. This stern and stabilizer design choice is part of the submarine’s physical design and directly reduces cavitation and different noise profiles compared with traditional propellers.

Life and habitability aboard the submarine are designed for long deployments, with a mission duration estimated at 90 to 120 days for a crew size reported at about 100 personnel. A draft of roughly 10 meters is also cited, consistent with the submarine’s displacement and hull volume. These parameter figures reflect the need for the Khabarovsk to remain at sea for extended periods, supporting not only reactor and navigation operations but also the additional tasks linked to handling and supporting unmanned underwater vehicles during patrols, while maintaining the personnel fit for navigation, engineering, combat, and command operations.

The main reason for Russia to build the Khabarovsk is its role as a carrier for the Poseidon, with six launchers expected to be installed in the forward section of the submarine. The Poseidon, previously known as Status-6, is a nuclear-powered unmanned underwater vehicle conceived as a strategic nuclear torpedo operating independently after launch, with an operating depth of up to 1,000 meters and a reported speed of roughly 60 to 70 knots. Significantly larger than conventional torpedoes, with length estimates commonly ranging from about 16 to 24 meters, a diameter between roughly 1.5 and 2 meters, and an overall mass cited at about 100 tonnes, the Poseidon requires specially designed or modified nuclear submarines for transport and deployment. Intended to carry a nuclear warhead with a maximum yield of up to 2 megatons, its employment concept focuses on underwater detonation effects against coastal areas, naval bases, or large surface formations.

As of the most recent information, the Poseidon has not been declared fully operational. Therefore, in addition to its primary payload, the Khabarovsk is also associated with more conventional weapons to protect the submarine during transit and patrol. Systems often cited include 6 to 8 torpedo tubes of 533 mm caliber, compatible with torpedoes such as USET-80, Fizik-2, and Futlyar, as well as Kalibr missiles and naval mines. Some also mention portable air defense systems like the Igla and Verba for limited point-defense scenarios when surfaced or operating in constrained environments. Once accepted into service, Khabarovsk is expected to operate with the Pacific Fleet, potentially within a new division forming on Kamchatka, giving the fleet a dedicated submarine for Poseidon-related missions once trials and acceptance are completed. .

From a program perspective, the Khabarovsk was laid down on July 27, 2014, and experienced several schedule adjustments before its 2025 launch, with commissioning frequently associated with a 2026 timeframe following completion of trials. Order-of-battle discussions usually point to a total of three or four Project 09851 submarines in the broader program, with follow-on units potentially assigned to a related Project 09853, including a submarine named Orenburg associated with preparations for construction reportedly beginning in fall 2025 and at least one further planned hull.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
Is the U.S. investing $1.5 Billion in Peru’s main naval base to counter China’s growing influence?
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On January 15, 2026, the United States approved a possible $1.5 billion Foreign Military Sale to Peru covering the design, construction, and long-term support of maritime and onshore facilities at Callao Naval Base, as Chinese-backed port projects expand nearby.

On January 15, 2026, the United States approved a potential $1.5 billion Foreign Military Sale to Peru, covering the design, construction, and long-term support of maritime and onshore facilities at Callao Naval Base, which is Peru's primary naval base. The approved scope includes construction, engineering, and program support services and excludes weapons transfers, at a time when Peru’s Pacific coast is seeing increased Chinese investment in nearby commercial port facilities.
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The Callao Naval Base's proximity to key shipping lanes facilitates the rapid deployment of vessels into Pacific waters, and the intertwining of naval and commercial port infrastructure enables logistical efficiencies for replenishment and resupply. (Picture source: US Navy)

The request submitted by Peru focuses on equipment and services required to support the procurement and modernization of port-related and land-based facilities at Callao, and it explicitly excludes Major Defense Equipment. The approved package includes lifecycle design activities, construction, project management, engineering studies and services, technical support, facility and infrastructure assessments, surveys, planning and programming, design work, acquisition support, contract administration, and construction management. It also covers U.S. Government and contractor-provided engineering, technical, and logistics support services, as well as other related elements of logistics and program support. The total estimated cost of all activities and services combined is set at $1.5 billion, reflecting both physical construction and extended program oversight.

Callao Naval Base is the principal naval installation of the Peruvian Navy and is located immediately north of the main commercial port of Callao on the central Pacific coast near Lima. The base was originally built in the 1930s as a levee and naval arsenal and gradually expanded into a complex installation supporting fleet berthing, maintenance, and shore infrastructure. It hosts a dockyard and a naval aviation base, and it also includes the Naval Medical Center, which contains the U.S. Navy’s Naval Medical Research Unit Six. Over time, the base has remained the core hub for Peru’s naval operations on the Pacific coast, linking operational units with logistics, training, and medical support functions. Peru already initiated a multi-year effort to modernize Callao Naval Base, as a part of the infrastructure dates back to the 1930s, increasing physical constraints caused by the growth of the adjacent commercial port. The modernization effort is centered on the redesign and reconstruction of maritime and onshore facilities, with objectives that include improving port capacity for naval units, reorganizing internal circulation and access control, and reducing civilian-military interaction within the base footprint.

The geostrategic importance of Callao Naval Base, which may also explain this Foreign Military Sale, is primarily linked to its geographic position on Peru’s central Pacific coast, immediately adjacent to the country’s main commercial port and close to major trans-Pacific maritime routes connecting South America with North America and Asia. This location places the base at the center of Peru’s maritime traffic flow, naval deployments, and logistical support for operations along the entire coastline and within the country’s exclusive economic zone. Its proximity to the Port of Callao means that naval activities, port access, and infrastructure planning are directly interconnected with civilian shipping, cargo handling, and port security arrangements. As a result, decisions related to basing, access control, and facility layout at Callao have direct implications for naval mobility, logistical continuity, and the management of civilian-military interactions during routine operations and contingencies.

In addition to its naval role, Callao Naval Base incorporates a high-security detention facility that has been used to hold individuals convicted of terrorism and other high-risk crimes, integrating internal security functions within the broader military installation. The penitentiary component was proposed in 1992 and later became known for holding members of groups such as the Shining Path and the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, as well as former intelligence officials, including Vladimiro Montesinos, following his extradition in June 2001. This dual-use character has influenced how space, access, and security are organized within the base, making separation between civilian, military, and penitentiary activities a recurring structural issue. The approved redevelopment effort addresses these constraints by reorganizing facilities to reduce overlap and improve operational flow.

From an operational standpoint, the approved U.S. support is intended to improve port and base infrastructure so it can better accommodate current and future naval and logistical requirements. A stated objective is to provide a safer and more efficient platform for naval operations by reducing civilian-military interactions at the existing facility, while ensuring Peru can absorb the services and infrastructure without difficulty. The approval explicitly notes that the construction and support package will not alter the regional military balance, underscoring its focus on infrastructure, efficiency, and long-term sustainment rather than combat capability expansion. Implementation is structured to span many years, reflecting the complexity of rebuilding an active naval base.

The Callao modernization project is unfolding alongside increased attention to port infrastructure on Peru’s Pacific coast, including the emergence of the Chinese-built mega-port of Chancay, located roughly 80 kilometers north of Lima and developed with significant investment by COSCO Shipping. The modernization of Callao is framed by U.S. authorities as contributing to wider foreign policy objectives by strengthening an important regional partner, while Peru continues to balance cooperative relationships with both Washington and Beijing. Within this environment, the Callao Naval Base redevelopment stands as one of the most significant infrastructure initiatives linked to Peru’s maritime and naval posture, combining long-term construction, sustained foreign technical involvement, and strategic port geography.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
US Navy reveals FF(X) frigate specifications to rapidly restore America’s naval power
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The U.S. Navy has released specifications for its new FF(X) frigate at the Surface Navy Association (SNA) symposium 2026. The design emphasizes reduced complexity, faster acquisition, and fleet capacity restoration following the cancellation of the Constellation-class frigate.

On January 15, 2026, Chris Cavas shared that the U.S. Navy has released an official FF(X) frigate concept graphic at the Surface Navy Association symposium, outlining a new small surface combatant planned for contract award in 2026. The graphic, while confirming that the FF(X) design is based on the Legend-class National Security Cutter hull with limited structural modification to reduce risk and accelerate acquisition, also includes the first set of specifications for the new U.S. Navy frigate.
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The FF(X) frigate will have a length of 421 ft (128.3 m), a beam of 54 ft (16.5 m), a draft of 22 ft (6.7 m), and a displacement of 4,750 t, with a maximum speed of 28 knots (52 km/h), an endurance of 60 days, and a range of 12,000 nautical miles (22,224 km). (Picture source: X/Chris Cavas)

This official graphic from the U.S. Navy detailing the FF(X) frigate concept, released during the Surface Navy Association (SNA) symposium, outlines a new small surface combatant intended to be awarded in 2026. The frigate will be based on the Legend-class National Security Cutter (NSC) hull form with limited structural changes, with the stated objective of reducing technical risk while accelerating acquisition timelines. The FF(X) is positioned as a rapid substitute following the termination of the Constellation-class frigate, while remaining smaller and less complex than an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer. The overall framing indicates a ship intended to restore fleet numbers and endurance rather than replicate the high-end combat role of destroyers.

The FF(X) layout emphasizes a Flexible Weapons Station located aft, capable of embarking Naval Strike Missiles, counter-unmanned systems such as Hellfire-class missiles, or containerized payloads depending on mission requirements. This modular approach contrasts with the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer and the Constellation-class frigate, whose combat power architectures are centered on a more traditional vertical launch system (VLS) for surface-to-air missiles, anti-submarine weapons, and land-attack or anti-ship missiles. Compared with the U.S. Coast Guard Legend-class cutter, whose armament is limited to medium-caliber guns and light defensive systems, the FF(X) shifts the focus from patrol and security tasks toward surface strike, escort defense, and layered self-protection missions. At the SNA, the missile allocation specifies up to 16 Naval Strike Missiles or, alternatively, a 48-cell Hellfire counter-UAS load, combined with a single 21-cell Rolling Airframe Missile launcher.

Defensive and sensor systems shown on the graphic include the SPS-77 air search radar, the SLQ-32(V)6 electronic warfare suite, two Nulka active decoy launchers to counter incoming anti-ship missiles, and a Mk 49 RAM launcher for hard-kill defense. This combination is consistent with escort support, maritime interdiction, and counter-unmanned missions, rather than area air defense at the scale expected of an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer. The Constellation-class was intended to cover anti-air, anti-surface, anti-submarine, and electromagnetic warfare roles, but the FF(X) concept reduces system complexity in favor of faster production and modular growth. Relative to the Legend-class cutter, the inclusion of dedicated missile defense and electronic warfare systems signals a clear transition toward operations in contested environments. The defensive architecture is therefore better aligned with survivability during distributed and forward-deployed missions.

Gun armament on the FF(X) consists of a 57mm main gun and a 30mm secondary gun, supporting close-in defense, maritime security, and engagements against small surface and air threats. In comparison, Arleigh Burke destroyers rely primarily on missiles for lethality, with guns playing a secondary role, while the FF(X) concept balances guns with a reconfigurable missile fit. The Constellation-class was expected to field a more complex weapons suite tied to a larger displacement, whereas the FF(X) focuses on a simpler configuration to accelerate the serial production. Compared with the Legend-class cutter, the 57mm gun aligns with existing U.S. naval practice, but the FF(X) pairs it with explicit missile strike and counter-UAS roles. The presence of containerized mission packages further underlines the intent to adjust capability between deployments without structural redesign.

Aviation and unmanned integration are central to the FF(X) concept, with capacity for either an embarked manned helicopter or unmanned aerial vehicles. The mission set includes unmanned command-and-control, indicating that the frigate is intended to act as a coordination node for unmanned systems rather than operating in isolation. Arleigh Burke-class ships routinely operate helicopters and can support unmanned assets, but their role is dominated by fleet air defense and strike integration. The Constellation-class also incorporated aviation for multi-mission operations, yet the FF(X) graphic places unmanned coordination more prominently within its core functions. Relative to the Legend-class cutter, which also operates aviation assets, the FF(X) assigns these capabilities directly to combat escort, interdiction, and counter-UxS tasks, covering threats from unmanned surface, air, and subsurface systems. This reflects a broader shift toward manned-unmanned teaming in surface warfare.

The specifications panel lists a length of 421 ft (128.3 m), a beam of 54 ft (16.5 m), a draft of 22 ft (6.7 m), and a displacement of 4,750 t, with a maximum speed of 28 knots (52 km/h), an endurance of 60 days, and a range of 12,000 nautical miles (22,224 km). These figures could place the FF(X) well below the size and displacement of an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, while also smaller than the later Constellation-class estimates that approached 8,000 tons. At the same time, the dimensions are closely aligned with the Legend-class National Security Cutter baseline, reinforcing the design lineage. The listed crew of 148 reflects an emphasis on manageable manning while still supporting aviation and mission packages. The optionality section further defines the FF(X) size band as 350 to 450 ft (107 to 137 m), alongside unmanned vessels ranging from 75 to 250 ft (23 to 76 m) in length as part of a mixed manned-unmanned force structure, highlighting a scalable family approach.

The FF(X) programmatic framing includes a notional class size of 50 to 65 ships across multiple flights, indicating an ambition to make the frigate a major component of the surface fleet. This scale differentiates it from the truncated Constellation-class effort and complements the continued reliance on Arleigh Burke destroyers for high-end missions. The mission set listed on the graphic includes surface warfare, offensive surface strike, maritime interdiction operations, escort support, counter-UxS, and unmanned command-and-control, allowing the frigate to shift emphasis between anti-submarine warfare and strike roles across different configurations and flights. By combining a cutter-derived hull, modular weapons stations, and distributed mission concepts, the FF(X) is positioned as a volume platform intended to restore endurance and coverage across theaters. The concept therefore sits below destroyers in capability, below the original Constellation vision in complexity, and above the Legend-class cutter in combat orientation, forming a distinct layer within the U.S. Navy surface force.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
Greece welcomes first new frigate since 1998 as Belharra-class HS Kimon enters service
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Greece formally received the HS Kimon on January 15, 2026, as the first FDI HN Belharra-class frigate entered the Saronic Gulf and proceeded to Salamis naval base.

The HS Kimon, the first FDI HN Belharra-class frigate for the Hellenic Navy, arrived in Greece on January 15, 2026, following its delivery from France. The induction marks the first addition of a new frigate to the Greek fleet in 28 years and forms part of a four-ship naval modernization program, as the ship entered the Saronic Gulf and proceeded to join the Salamis naval base.
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The HS Kimon is equipped with a heavier air defense and anti-submarine fit than its French counterpart, carrying Aster-30 surface-to-air missiles in A50 vertical launchers, Exocet MM40 Block 3C anti-ship missiles, and MU90 lightweight torpedoes. (Picture source: Hellenic Navy)

The HS Kimon sailed into the Saronic Gulf shortly before noon and proceeded toward the Salamis naval base. The arrival completed the delivery voyage that followed the frigate’s handover in France and marked the first induction of a new frigate into Greek service in 28 years. HS Kimon is the lead ship of a four-vessel program that will add three further FDI HN frigates to the fleet in the coming years. The event was framed within Greece’s broader defense modernization effort launched in 2021, set against enduring tensions with Turkey and evolving security dynamics in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean.

The welcoming ceremony outside Salamis brought together Greece’s political and military leadership, including Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, President of the Hellenic Republic Constantine Tassoulas, and National Defence Minister Nikos Dendias. The introduction of the ship was also associated with the leadership of the Hellenic Navy, including the chief of the Hellenic Navy General Staff, Vice Admiral Dimitrios–Eleftherios Kataras. The reception was conducted at sea as the frigate entered Greek waters and approached its home base for the start of national acceptance activities. The sequence underscored the transition from delivery status to fleet integration, rather than the completion of operational readiness on the day of arrival.

Symbolic elements accompanied the ceremony, including the presence of a copy of an ancient Athenian trireme and the historic cruiser Georgios Averof, both positioned as part of the escort as HS Kimon approached Salamis. These elements linked earlier periods of Greek naval history to the current fleet renewal without altering the operational scope of the event. Government statements connected the frigate’s arrival to a wider rearmament trajectory that includes airpower acquisitions, with Greece having already ordered 24 Rafale fighter jets. The same framework referenced a stated plan to allocate €25 billion through 2036 for defense modernization, alongside concepts such as the integrated anti-missile, anti-aircraft, and anti-drone defensive structure known as Achilles’s Shield. Greece also reiterated its long-standing pattern of maintaining defense spending at or above NATO’s 2% of GDP benchmark, a posture historically linked to regional tensions.

HS Kimon’s route to Greece followed a defined sequence beginning with its naming ceremony and the raising of the Greek flag on December 18, 2025, at the shipbuilder’s facilities in Lorient, attended by Minister Nikos Dendias. After that ceremony, the frigate sailed to Brest with its crew of 128 personnel to receive its armament and to conduct the first full coupling of sensors, combat system, and weapon systems under operational conditions. Only after this phase did the ship begin its voyage to Greece, culminating in the January 15 arrival at Salamis. Following arrival, the ship entered an internal integration process that includes certifications, system tests, training in national procedures, and the gradual assumption of operational roles within the fleet.

The frigate displaces about 4,500 tonnes, has an overall length of approximately 122 meters, a beam of around 18 meters, and a draft suited to operations in both open sea and constrained maritime environments. Propulsion relies on a combined diesel and diesel arrangement with a total output close to 32 MW, allowing a maximum speed of about 27 knots and a range of roughly 5,000 nautical miles at a cruising speed of 15 knots. Endurance is estimated at up to 45 days, supporting long deployments without immediate logistical support. Electrical generation and digital architecture are sized to support sensor-intensive operations and future system growth. Aviation facilities include a flight deck and hangar capable of supporting an MH-60R Seahawk helicopter as well as one Schiebel Camcopter S-100 unmanned aerial vehicle, extending the ship’s surveillance, targeting, and anti-submarine capabilities.

The frigate entered service equipped with more air defense and anti-submarine warfare systems than its French counterpart, the Amiral Ronarc'h, all of which are complemented by the Sea Fire radar. Its weapons suite includes Aster-30 surface-to-air missiles housed in A50 vertical launchers on the bow, Exocet MM40 Block 3C surface-to-surface missiles, and MU90 lightweight torpedoes for anti-submarine operations. Close-range and point-defense capabilities are provided by the RAM missile system, a 76 mm Oto Melara main gun, and two 20 mm Lionfish remotely operated weapon stations. This configuration reflects a layered approach to air, surface, and sub-surface threats within a single multi-role platform. The combination of sensors and weapons is intended to support operations in both the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean.

Political leaders associated the frigate’s arrival with deterrence and force posture, describing HS Kimon as a platform capable of contributing to strategic deterrence and upgrading fleet capability in Greece’s primary maritime theaters. Prime Minister Mitsotakis linked the ship to a continuous modernization effort encompassing both equipment and personnel. President Tassoulas referred to the ship’s scope across surface operations, anti-aircraft and anti-submarine warfare, electronic warfare, and self-defense, emphasizing multi-domain utility rather than a single mission focus. The broader narrative placed the FDI HN program within long-term planning that integrates naval platforms with other defense systems under the Achilles’s Shield concept. The ship’s name, Kimon, references a 5th century BCE Athenian admiral and son of Miltiadis, reinforcing continuity in naming conventions without affecting operational roles.

The arrival of HS Kimon also set the timeline for the remaining ships of the Belharra-class, with Nearchos and Formion scheduled to join the Hellenic Navy by the end of 2026 and the fourth vessel, Themistoklis, expected in 2028. With the lead ship now in Greece, near-term priorities center on testing, certification, crew training, and phased operational integration. The broader context reiterated alongside the event includes Greece’s ongoing aircraft procurement, its €25 billion modernization plan through 2036, and the emphasis on integrated air and missile defense against aircraft, missiles, and drones. Within this framework, HS Kimon represents the first delivered surface combatant of a multi-year naval recapitalization effort aimed at renewing fleet structure and readiness in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
US seizes sixth Venezuelan oil tanker Veronica in Caribbean to expand shadow fleet blockade
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On January 15, 2026, the United States seized a sixth crude oil tanker, the Motor Tanker Veronica, in the Caribbean Sea, citing its involvement in sanctioned Venezuelan oil transport and violations of a U.S.-declared maritime blockade.

U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem announced on January 15, 2026, that U.S. forces boarded and seized the Motor Tanker Veronica in international waters of the Caribbean Sea. The vessel was identified by U.S. authorities as a sanctioned crude oil tanker linked to Venezuelan oil movements and interdicted under the maritime blockade imposed by President Donald Trump.
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The action took place in international waters and was executed by a U.S. Coast Guard tactical team, with personnel descending by rope onto the vessel, indicating a helicopter-supported boarding method. (Picture source: X/Kristi Noem)

Kristi Noem, when announcing the pre-dawn boarding and seizure of a sixth crude oil tanker, the Motor Tanker Veronica, in the Caribbean Sea, identified the vessel as a sanctioned tanker linked to Venezuelan oil movements and operating in violation of the naval blockade imposed by Donald Trump on sanctioned shipping. The action took place in international waters and was executed by a U.S. Coast Guard tactical team as part of a sustained maritime enforcement campaign. The tanker had previously passed through Venezuelan waters and was classified by U.S. authorities as part of a shadow fleet facilitating sanctioned oil transport. The seizure was carried out in the early morning hours and resulted in the vessel being taken under U.S. control without reported resistance.

U.S. officials framed the operation as a law-enforcement action focused on tanker interdiction rather than a naval engagement. The seizure occurred within the broader context of Washington asserting direct oversight over Venezuelan oil flows. The announcement of the operation was made by Kristi Noem, who confirmed that the boarding involved coordination with the Departments of War, State, and Justice. Video footage released in connection with the seizure depicted personnel descending by rope onto the vessel, indicating a helicopter-supported boarding method. U.S. military assets supported the operation, with Marines and sailors operating in conjunction with the Coast Guard.

These forces launched from USS Gerald R. Ford, following a pattern established during earlier tanker seizures in the region. The Motor Tanker Veronica has an overall length of about 249 meters and a beam of about 44 meters, dimensions consistent with a large Aframax to Suezmax-class crude carrier, and it is listed with a gross tonnage of about 61,991 tons and a deadweight of about 115,500 tons, enabling the transport of substantial crude oil cargoes. Recent AIS data list the tanker under the flag of Guyana, while historical records show multiple flag and name changes over its service life, including periods under Iranian, Russian, Liberian, and Dutch registries.

This pattern is often associated with older tankers operating in sanction-affected trade. Available information shows that the tanker’s shadow fleet carrier began in 2020, when it directly exported Iranian oil on ten occasions, reflecting ten separate voyages in which Iranian crude was carried on board from origin to destination without intermediate ship-to-ship (STS) transfer. In addition to those direct exports, the Veronica has received Iranian oil five times via ship-to-ship (STS) transfers at sea, which are practices commonly used by sanctioned fleets to conceal cargo origin or destination, and has also received Venezuelan oil twice via STS operations.

The seizure of Veronica brought to six the number of Venezuela-linked oil tankers taken under U.S. control in recent weeks. Earlier interceptions included the tanker Marinera, formerly known as Bella-1, which was seized in the North Atlantic after a pursuit lasting more than two weeks. That vessel, which had been sailing under a Russian flag at the time of interception, was about to be directly protected by a Russian submarine, and was identified as part of the same network moving sanctioned crude. Additional seizures involved the tankers Olina and Sophia, both intercepted in Caribbean waters under the same quarantine framework. Each of these vessels had either carried Venezuelan oil or had done so in the past. The cumulative number of seizures reflects a rapid escalation in tanker-focused enforcement actions.

Following the declaration in December 2025 of a naval blockade targeting sanctioned tankers entering or leaving Venezuela, tanker movements linked to Venezuelan crude shifted markedly. Several vessels reversed course after loading, while others remained anchored near Venezuelan or Caribbean waters to reduce seizure risk. U.S. authorities identified repeated patterns among targeted tankers, including frequent name changes, flag switches, and unclear ownership structures. These characteristics were present across multiple seized vessels, including those taken before Veronica. The blockade significantly reduced the number of tankers able to depart Venezuelan ports. As a result, tanker traffic associated with Venezuelan crude exports fell to a fraction of previous levels.

One core reason behind the tanker interdiction campaign is the central role of maritime transport in sustaining sanctioned oil exports. Venezuela relies almost entirely on seaborne shipments to move crude to external markets, making tankers the primary logistical enablers of sanction evasion. Shadow fleet vessels have been used to obscure cargo origin, manipulate tracking signals, and conduct ship-to-ship transfers. By targeting tankers directly, U.S. authorities seek to disrupt export capacity at the physical level. This approach contrasts with earlier reliance on financial restrictions and designation lists. The result has been a sharp contraction in unauthorized tanker movements linked to Venezuelan oil.

A second driver of the campaign is Washington’s objective to control Venezuelan oil revenues during the political transition following the capture of former President Nicolás Maduro in early January 2026. U.S. officials have stated that seized oil cargoes may be sold or otherwise managed under U.S. supervision. The stated goal is to prevent Venezuelan crude from reaching markets without U.S. authorization, particularly destinations in Asia. Under this framework, tanker seizures serve both enforcement and revenue-control functions. Only shipments coordinated with U.S. authorities are permitted to proceed. This policy has redirected remaining Venezuelan oil exports toward limited, approved routes.

Alongside these operations, the United Kingdom is preparing to authorize the direct military seizure of shadow fleet oil tankers suspected of evading sanctions linked to Russian, Iranian, and Venezuelan oil exports, marking a significant escalation in its maritime enforcement posture. British ministers have identified a domestic legal basis allowing the boarding, detention, and control of vessels that are unflagged, falsely flagged, or otherwise not legitimately registered, on the grounds that such ships fall outside standard legal protections at sea. This approach relies in particular on provisions of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, which permit shipping sanctions against specified or disqualified vessels, including those owned, operated, or controlled by designated persons or sanctioned states. While no UK military boarding has yet taken place, preparatory work has been underway for several weeks to determine how Royal Navy surface ships, supported by surveillance aircraft and potentially special forces boarding teams, could be employed if political authorization is granted.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
U.S. Navy Redirects USS Abraham Lincoln Strike Group Toward Middle East as Iran Tensions Surge
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The U.S. Navy has redirected the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East amid rising tensions with Iran. The shift underscores Washington’s intent to reinforce deterrence and protect U.S. forces and partners amid rising regional risks.

In a notable shift in American naval deployments, the U.S. Navy has ordered the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group to transit from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East, according to U.S. defense officials. The move comes as U.S. policymakers weigh growing concerns over Iranian regional activity, including actions by Tehran’s affiliated militias, and seek to ensure sufficient combat power is positioned to respond quickly if the security environment deteriorates.
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U.S. Navy USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) underway in the Pacific as part of its redeployment toward the Middle East, January 2026. The aircraft carrier leads a U.S. Navy strike group repositioning amid rising tensions with Iran and potential escalation scenarios in the CENTCOM area of operations. (Picture source: U.S. Department of War)

The U.S. Navy USS Abraham Lincoln, a Nimitz‑class nuclear‑powered aircraft carrier, had been operating under the U.S. Indo‑Pacific Command but is now believed to be transiting toward waters under the jurisdiction of U.S. Central Command. While the Pentagon has not officially affirmed the destination, defense officials and tracking data indicate the carrier strike group is repositioning to bolster deterrence amid mounting regional volatility.

The current composition of the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group includes the flagship aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) with Carrier Air Wing 9 (CVW‑9), which operates F/A‑18E/F Super Hornets, EA‑18G Growlers, E‑2D Advanced Hawkeyes, and MH‑60R/S Seahawks. The surface combatant element is now confirmed to consist of the Arleigh Burke‑class guided‑missile destroyers USS Spruance (DDG 111), USS Michael Murphy (DDG 112), and USS Frank E. Petersen Jr. (DDG 121), departing their current position in the South China Sea to steam toward the Middle East in support of the strike group’s redeployment. A fast‑attack submarine is also likely operating with the strike group, though its identity remains undisclosed due to operational security.

During recent remarks at the Surface Navy Association’s annual symposium, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Daryl Caudle underscored that the U.S. Navy can reposition carrier strike groups globally in under two weeks, highlighting the operational flexibility and strategic reach that remain central to U.S. maritime power projection. While a carrier is not essential for offensive operations, its presence in the Middle East would send a clear signal of deterrence and preparedness to both allies and adversaries.

The redeployment of Abraham Lincoln arrives amid the realignment of multiple U.S. carriers and strike groups globally. In the past 48 hours, both USS Theodore Roosevelt and USS George H.W. Bush left Norfolk for movements that analysts suggest could relate to heightened force posture requirements. Notably, neither has completed the standard Composite Training Unit Exercise (COMPTUEX), underscoring the U.S. Navy’s willingness to accelerate or adjust training timelines to meet emergent operational demands.

The U.S. Navy continues to maintain a layered maritime posture across global commands. USS Gerald R. Ford’s carrier strike group remains under U.S. Southern Command, while the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group reconstitutes in the Caribbean after a Mayport port call. Meanwhile, USS George Washington’s strike group remains forward‑deployed in Yokosuka, Japan, under U.S. Indo‑Pacific Command.

Military planners caution that the United States already fields significant air, land, and maritime strike capabilities within and adjacent to CENTCOM’s area of responsibility, including strategic bombers, forward‑based fighter wings, guided‑missile submarines, and armed drones. However, the arrival of a full carrier strike group like the Abraham Lincoln provides a unique combination of sustained airpower, electronic warfare, maritime strike capabilities, and sea control unmatched by other platforms.

The deeper significance of this redeployment lies in the evolving strategic calculus of the United States in the Middle East. While recent years saw a pivot toward great power competition in the Indo‑Pacific, the Biden administration has quietly recalibrated its posture in the Gulf amid a deteriorating security environment marked by persistent asymmetric threats, attacks on shipping, and proxy escalations.

This shifting force posture occurs amid renewed discussions in Washington about potential kinetic options against Iranian strategic targets should Tehran escalate confrontation. Past U.S. carrier redeployments to the Middle East have been explicitly tied to signaling deterrence and preparing for a range of contingencies, including possible punitive air operations in response to Iranian aggression or attacks on U.S. allies—messaging that could accompany the Abraham Lincoln’s current rerouting should high‑level policy decisions lean toward broader military options. Such force postures have historically served as both a deterrent and a hedge, demonstrating U.S. capability to apply air and naval power swiftly should diplomatic efforts fail and threats escalate.

The broader U.S. strategy in the Middle East remains anchored in three pillars: deterrence, containment, and assurance. Deterrence is maintained through a visible and credible military posture such as carrier strike groups, long‑range bomber task forces, and precision strike capabilities. Containment focuses on constraining Iran’s ability to project power via sanctions, cyber operations, and support to regional counter‑proxy forces. Assurance is delivered through enhanced security cooperation with Gulf partners and Israel, intelligence sharing, missile defense integration, and forward‑deployed U.S. assets.

This three‑pronged strategy now faces pressure as regional dynamics shift. Israel’s intensified military posture following direct attacks from Iranian‑aligned groups, coupled with Saudi Arabia’s recalibrated engagement with Tehran, has created a volatile security landscape. The United States must balance signaling strength with avoiding undesirable escalation, calibrating its visible military presence while supporting diplomatic levers.

While U.S. policymakers emphasize diplomacy, the repositioning of the U.S. Navy Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group and its escorts conveys that the U.S. Navy will remain a visible and mobile deterrent capable of decisive action across the spectrum of conflict. As the carrier strike group steams toward CENTCOM’s area of operations, regional observers are closely watching, aware that the presence of American carriers often indicates that Washington is preparing for a broad range of contingencies, including high‑stakes combat operations.

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
Philippine Navy’s first Rajah Sulayman-class offshore patrol vessel departs South Korea
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The Philippine Navy’s first Rajah Sulayman-class offshore patrol vessel, BRP Rajah Sulayman (PS-20), has departed the HD Hyundai Heavy Industries shipyard in Ulsan, South Korea, following completion of sea trials and fitting-out.

On January 13, 2025, 서각 이유충 합판 그림 조각가 shared a YouTube video showing that the Philippine Navy’s first Rajah Sulayman-class offshore patrol vessel, the BRP Rajah Sulayman (PS-20), has departed the HD Hyundai Heavy Industries shipyard in Ulsan, South Korea, following completion of sea trials and fitting-out. The ship is now underway on its delivery transit to the Philippines, with arrival expected in late January 2026, ahead of final inspections and commissioning in Subic.
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The BRP Rajah Sulayman (PS-20) has a cruising speed of 15 knots, a maximum speed of 22 knots, and an operational range of 5,500 nautical miles at cruising speed, paired with an endurance of 30 days. (Picture source: Youtube/서각 이유충 합판 그림 조각가)

Philippine Navy’s first Rajah Sulayman-class offshore patrol vessel, the BRP Rajah Sulayman (PS-20), departed the HD Hyundai Heavy Industries shipyard in Ulsan, South Korea, and began its delivery transit to the Philippines after completing fitting-out activities and sea trials in South Korean waters, with arrival in Philippine waters expected during the third or fourth week of January 2026. Once in the Philippines, the ship is expected to proceed to Subic for final inspections, acceptance procedures, and commissioning. The delivery is linked to the Horizon 2 phase of the Revised Armed Forces of the Philippines Modernization Program, which prioritizes sustained offshore patrol and maritime security capacity. Expectations associated with the departure also include the possibility that the remaining five vessels could be delivered on an accelerated timeline through 2027 or early 2028 if construction and trials continue at the same pace.

The Rajah Sulayman-class offshore patrol vessels are being built under a 2022 contract valued at ₱30 billion, equivalent to $573 million, covering six ships scheduled for delivery between 2025 and 2028. Each vessel has a full-load displacement ranging from 2,400 to 2,450 tonnes and measures about 94 to 94.4 meters in length with a beam of 14 to 14.3 meters and a draft of about 3.7 meters. Performance figures include a cruising speed of 15 knots, a maximum speed of 22 knots, and an operational range of 5,500 nautical miles at cruising speed, paired with an endurance of 30 days. Propulsion is based on a combined diesel and diesel arrangement using two MTU-STX diesel engines driving controllable-pitch propellers, with the top speed associated with operation at 85 percent maximum continuous rating. The standard crew complement is 72 personnel, supported by automation and habitability features intended for extended deployments.

Armament on the BRP Rajah Sulayman consists of a forward-mounted 76 mm OTO Melara Super Rapid naval gun supported by two Aselsan Smash 30 mm remote-controlled weapon systems and additional 12.7 mm heavy machine guns, while potential additions include point-defense missile launchers, close-in weapon systems, or other mission-specific equipment. Small-boat operations are enabled by a stern ramp for a 9.5-meter rigid-hulled inflatable boat (RHIB) and two 7.2-meter RHIBs housed in side bays, supporting boarding, interception, rescue, and maritime law enforcement tasks. A stern mission area is designed for containerized payloads and specialized modules, including equipment sets for economic zone patrols, anti-smuggling, anti-piracy, and disaster response. Aviation facilities include a flight deck and hangar capable of operating helicopters up to 10 tonnes, such as the AW109, as well as unmanned aerial vehicles.

The sensor and combat system fit integrates a Hanwha Systems combat management system with a Leonardo SPS-732 air and surface surveillance radar and a Safran PASEO XLR electro-optical identification and fire control system. Navigation and shiphandling are managed through an Anschütz Synapsis NX integrated bridge and navigation system, supported by Hensoldt SharpEye Mk.11 navigation radars. Defensive systems include electronic measures and Terma C-Guard DL-6T decoy launchers, each with six 130 mm tubes for infrared and radio-frequency countermeasures. Three of the six ships are planned to receive towed active-passive sonar systems supplied by the Canadian company GeoSpectrum Technologies to expand underwater detection capabilities. The class is also equipped with integrated communications and link-ready data systems to enable interoperability with other naval assets. Cost context associated with onboard systems includes an estimated PHP 5 billion per ship, about $95.5 million at 2021 rates, and a combined value of about $34.5 million for combat management system and tactical data link supply contracts across all six vessels.

The acquisition of the six Rajah Sulayman-class offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) followed a government-to-government process after proposals from HD Hyundai Heavy Industries and Türkiye’s ASFAT, with Hyundai’s design evolving from the HDP-1500 Neo to the HDP-2200 and ultimately the HDP-2200+ configuration. Changes associated with this evolution include increased hull length, higher displacement, and improved modularity, with the final design receiving an Approval in Principle from classification society DNV for compliance with naval standards. The program traces its origins to the Philippine Navy’s Horizon 2 modernization phase launched in 2018, which authorized six new offshore patrol ships to replace aging World War II-era vessels. The class is intended to replace older Jacinto-class patrol vessels while complementing Jose Rizal-class frigates and upcoming HDC-3100 corvettes built by the same shipbuilder. Planned roles include maritime security, border surveillance, anti-smuggling, anti-piracy, disaster relief, and sustained patrols in areas such as the South China Sea and the Luzon Strait, reducing the operational burden on older navy units and the Philippine Coast Guard.

Construction milestones for the BRP Rajah Sulayman include keel laying on February 5, 2025, and launching on June 11, 2025, followed by sea trials that began in November 2025 off the South Korean coast. The January 2026 departure marks the transition from trials to delivery, with final acceptance planned after arrival in the Philippines and handover expected by March 2026. The follow-on vessels are named BRP Rajah Lakandula (PS-21), BRP Rajah Humabon (PS-22), BRP Sultan Kudarat (PS-23), BRP Datu Marikudo (PS-24), and BRP Datu Sikatuna (PS-25), with PS-21 launched in November and expected to be delivered in the coming months. The delivery schedule officially extends through 2028, but the pace of construction and testing supports the possibility of completing all six ships by the second half of 2027 or early 2028. The lead ship is named after a 16th-century chieftain of Manila and is intended to set the operational baseline for the class.

The Rajah Sulayman-class represents the third consecutive naval project between the Philippines and HD Hyundai Heavy Industries, following earlier frigate and corvette programs initiated in 2016 and 2021. Over the past five years, the shipbuilder has delivered four frigates to the Philippine Navy, and once current projects are completed, it will have built a total of 12 warships for the service. In December 2025, an additional ₱34 billion contract, equivalent to $585 million, was signed for two new frigates, further expanding the scope of ongoing naval construction. Within the offshore patrol vessel program, the six ships are intended to form a standardized long-range patrol force capable of 30-day missions over 5,500 nautical miles, with common combat management, navigation, and electronic support systems. Their operational focus remains on low- to medium-intensity maritime tasks, deterrence support, and response missions, rather than high-end combat roles.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
U.S. Navy Explores Low-Cost Unmanned Combat Vessels with Textron’s MMUSV
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Textron Inc. says its Textron Systems division has introduced the Multi-Mission Uncrewed Surface Vessel, a fifth-generation evolution of the Common Uncrewed Surface Vessel, aimed at meeting growing U.S. Navy and allied demand for affordable maritime autonomy. The platform reflects a broader Pentagon push toward attritable, scalable unmanned systems that can extend naval reach while reducing risk to crewed ships.

On January 13, 2026, Textron Systems introduced the Multi Mission Uncrewed Surface Vessel (MMUSV), describing it as the fifth-generation evolution of its CUSV craft and positioning it as a low-cost, rapid-production answer to Navy and allied demand for unmanned surface capacity. The company says the platform is intended to stretch unmanned operations beyond dedicated mine warfare into surface warfare, ISR and SIGINT missions, with development work backed by an August 2025 Low-Cost Unmanned Maritime Solution (Large) award through the Expeditionary Mission Consortium-Crane (EMC2).
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Textron MMUSV is a multi-mission USV for mine countermeasures, ISR and SIGINT, offering up to 13,000 lb payload and fuel, autonomous navigation with swarm behaviors, and Sea State 4 operations for low-cost distributed missions (Picture source: Textron Systems).

MMUSV is being marketed as a step-change in capacity and survivability rather than a clean-sheet curiosity. Textron states the craft doubles fuel and payload capacity compared to earlier CUSV generations, reaching up to 13,000 pounds for combined fuel and mission payload, while retaining a towing rating above 4,000 pounds of force at 20 knots. In practical terms, that towing figure matters because it translates directly into the ability to pull influence-sweep or other towed payloads at tactically relevant speeds, a core requirement for modern mine countermeasures.

Sea-keeping is another deliberate design signal. Textron lists full operations in Sea State 4 and survivability up to Sea State 5, a threshold associated with roughly 4-meter waves in company literature for the CUSV family. That is not “oceanic” in the large-USV sense, but it is enough to keep unmanned craft on-station through the weather that frequently degrades small-boat operations in the Western Pacific, the North Atlantic, and the Arabian Sea.

The brochure’s most consequential line for tacticians is autonomy: collision and hazard avoidance coupled to modular mission behaviors, including “advanced swarm behaviors.” That phrasing is careful, but it hints at coordinated employment where multiple MMUSVs can distribute sensors, share contacts, and complicate an adversary’s targeting cycle. Textron also claims a 50 percent cost reduction compared to the fourth-generation CUSV and a doubled range versus that baseline, suggesting an explicit design goal of mass and persistence rather than exquisite survivability.

The mission set Textron lists maps to where the U.S. Navy feels pressure today. Mine countermeasures is the obvious anchor: Textron notes it is the originator of the CUSV used for the Navy’s Unmanned Influence Sweep System program of record, tied to the Littoral Combat Ship mine countermeasures mission package, and it is also working on next-generation minesweeping payload development. MMUSV’s larger capacity and improved sea-state operability would allow the Navy to push unmanned sweeping farther from the host ship, reducing risk to crewed platforms while sustaining tempo in mined chokepoints.

The more strategic value, however, is in distributed sensing and coercive presence inside an adversary’s weapons engagement zone. The Department of the Navy’s Distributed Maritime Operations concept explicitly addresses operating against a peer, particularly China, that can detect and strike surface ships with anti-ship missiles and other systems. In that context, a network of low-cost, unmanned surface nodes carrying ISR, SIGINT, and electronic warfare payloads becomes a way to extend the fleet’s eyes and ears without offering the opponent a single, high-value point of failure.

This is where MMUSV fits the broader U.S. turn toward attritable systems across domains. Pentagon leaders have framed Replicator as a push to field large numbers of attritable autonomous systems to offset an adversary’s mass and impose a punishing cost exchange. At sea, that logic is even more acute: recent conflict has reinforced how cheap uncrewed systems can force expensive intercepts and disrupt capital ships, and U.S. industry is already testing concepts to arm large maritime drones with missiles based on lessons drawn from Ukraine’s sea-drone campaign. MMUSV is not advertised as a missile truck in Textron’s release, but its payload capacity and modular bay architecture place it in the category of vessels that can credibly host containerized effects if the Navy chooses.

U.S. Navy’s unmanned surface push is converging with the drone revolution already reshaping land and air warfare: build cheaper platforms, accept losses, and use scale plus autonomy to destroy or neutralize assets the adversary cannot afford to trade away. If Textron can translate brochure claims into fleet-ready reliability, MMUSV offers a pragmatic bridge between today’s mission-specific mine warfare USVs and tomorrow’s larger autonomous combatants, while giving commanders a new option for persistent maritime pressure without putting sailors in the first wave.
U.S. Navy Accepts 350th MH-60R Romeo Helicopter as Pacific Maritime Threats Grow
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The U.S. Navy, on January 13, 202,6 officially accepted its 350th MH-60R Romeo helicopter at Lockheed Martin’s Owego, New York facility, transferring the aircraft to Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron 41. The milestone underscores the program’s maturity and highlights the MH-60R’s continued importance as maritime threats grow more complex across the Pacific.

The U.S. Navy marked an aviation milestone this week with the formal acceptance of its 350th MH-60R Seahawk helicopter during a ceremony at Lockheed Martin’s Owego production facility in upstate New York. Naval aviation leaders and industry representatives attended the event, which concluded with the aircraft’s transfer to Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron 41, the fleet replacement squadron responsible for training Pacific Fleet aircrews on the Romeo platform. Navy officials described the delivery as a reflection of both the aircraft’s proven operational record and its enduring role in modern maritime warfare.
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The helicopter also performs anti-surface warfare missions using AGM-114 Hellfire missiles and crew-served weapons such as the GAU-21 50 caliber machine gun(Picture source: US DoD)

Developed by Sikorsky, a Lockheed Martin company, the MH-60R Romeo represents the U.S. Navy’s standard multi-mission maritime helicopter. Entering frontline service in 2010, it consolidated anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, and maritime security missions previously distributed across several helicopter variants. The aircraft combines a glass cockpit with fly-by-wire controls, and an integrated mission system designed from the outset for networked naval operations.

In its core anti-submarine warfare role, the MH-60R relies on a layered sensor suite that includes an APS-153 multi-mode maritime radar, an AQS-22 airborne low-frequency dipping sonar and a comprehensive Electronic Support Measures system capable of detecting and classifying hostile emitters. These sensors are fused by the helicopter’s mission computer, allowing crews to build a real-time underwater and surface picture while operating from destroyers, cruisers, or frigates. The platform can carry Mk 54 lightweight torpedoes with an engagement range exceeding 9 kilometers, providing organic submarine kill capability to surface combatants.

The helicopter also performs anti-surface warfare missions using AGM-114 Hellfire missiles and crew-served weapons such as the GAU-21 50 caliber machine gun. Its ability to detect small, fast-moving surface contacts makes it particularly suited for maritime security patrols, escort missions, and interdiction operations in congested sea lanes. Recent operational deployments in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden demonstrated this versatility when MH-60R crews engaged hostile unmanned aerial systems and armed skiffs threatening commercial shipping using a combination of radar, electro-optical sensors, and rapid weapon cueing.

HSM-41 plays a central role in sustaining these capabilities across the fleet. As the U.S. Navy’s Helicopter Maritime Strike Fleet Replacement Squadron, it trains new pilots and aircrewmen while also introducing software updates, tactics and sensor employment concepts. The acceptance of the 350th aircraft reinforces the squadron’s position as a cornerstone of naval aviation readiness, particularly for Indo-Pacific operations where submarine activity continues to increase.

The delivery highlights the durability of the MH-60R production line. Lockheed Martin continues to assemble and upgrade aircraft at Owego while incorporating incremental improvements through an open-architecture avionics framework. This design approach enables the rapid integration of new data links, processing algorithms, and future weapons without requiring structural modifications. The helicopter is equipped with Link 16 Tactical Data Link and other secure communications systems, allowing seamless information exchange with surface combatants, maritime patrol aircraft, and allied forces.

Program officials expect the MH-60R to remain in service into the 2050s, supported by continuous modernization cycles. Planned upgrades include enhanced processing power, improved acoustic algorithms for complex littoral environments, and greater resilience against electronic attack. These efforts align with U.S. Navy priorities to maintain undersea dominance as potential adversaries field quieter diesel-electric submarines and advanced unmanned underwater vehicles.

The international footprint of the MH-60R further underscores its strategic value. To date, the aircraft has accumulated more than one million flight hours across multiple operators. Australia, Denmark, Saudi Arabia, India, Greece, and South Korea all field the Romeo variant, integrating it into their surface fleets with tailored mission profiles. Spain and Norway are scheduled to receive aircraft in the coming years, expanding interoperability among allied navies operating in the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Indo-Pacific theaters.

For Lockheed Martin, the 350th delivery represents more than a numerical benchmark. It reflects sustained demand for a proven maritime aviation solution at a time when naval forces are placing renewed emphasis on distributed operations and forward presence. According to company officials, the active production line ensures that both new-build customers and existing operators can access common upgrades, sustaining fleet commonality and logistics efficiency.

Within the U.S. Nav,y the MH-60R remains a critical enabler of surface warfare groups, carrier strike groups, and independent deployers. Its ability to extend the sensor and weapons reach of surface combatants has reshaped how commanders manage anti-submarine and maritime security missions. As global naval competition intensifies, the continued delivery and modernization of the MH-60R confirms its role as a foundational asset of U.S. and allied maritime power.
China Develops Type 096 Ballistic Missile Submarine to Challenge U.S. Undersea Nuclear Deterrence
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Chinese state media published new technical data on 14 January 2026 outlining the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s next-generation Type 096 Tang-Class ballistic missile submarine. If accurate, the figures suggest a major expansion in China’s sea-based nuclear deterrent, narrowing long-standing capability gaps with the United States and Russia.

Chinese state media reporting released on 14 January 2026 has offered the clearest public look yet at the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s Type 096 Tang-Class ballistic missile submarine, a platform widely viewed as the backbone of China’s future sea-based nuclear force. Although Beijing has not formally confirmed the specifications, the disclosed data point to a substantially larger, quieter, and more heavily armed submarine than the current Type 094 Jin-Class, signaling a shift toward continuous and survivable nuclear deterrence patrols.
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Conceptual illustration providing an artist’s impression of China’s Type 096 Tang-Class ballistic missile submarine (Picture source: Editing content from Army Recognition Group)

The leaked figures describe a submarine displacing between 15,000 and 20,000 tons submerged, placing the Type 096 in the same strategic weight class as the U.S. Navy’s Ohio-class and the future Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines. This increase in size over the Type 094 Jin-Class is not merely a matter of capacity. Chinese nuclear submarine design has long been constrained by reactor efficiency and limited internal volume, factors that restricted the integration of advanced quieting technologies. The Tang-Class appears to overcome these limitations, allowing for the incorporation of full raft-mounted machinery, improved hull isolation, and a propulsion architecture optimized for sustained low-noise patrols.

Acoustic performance is central to the Type 096 concept. Chinese sources cite a noise signature in the range of 95 to 100 decibels, a significant reduction compared to earlier PLAN SSBNs that were widely assessed as vulnerable to detection by U.S. and allied anti-submarine forces. This improvement is consistent with the adoption of horizontal isolation rafts and pump-jet propulsion, technologies that China struggled to implement effectively on previous classes. There is increasing speculation among Western naval analysts that Russian technical expertise, particularly in propulsion quieting and vibration control, may have contributed to accelerating Chinese progress, drawing parallels between the Tang-Class and Russia’s Borei-class SSBNs.

Sensor capability represents another major leap. Leaked data credits the Type 096 with sonar detection ranges approaching 300 miles, reflecting advances not only in onboard arrays but also in data processing and long-baseline passive detection techniques. While such ranges are highly dependent on ocean conditions, they align with China’s broader investment in undersea situational awareness and layered sensor networks designed to protect strategic submarines operating within defended patrol areas.

The most strategically consequential element of the Type 096 is its armament. The Tang-Class is reported to carry between 16 and 24 JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, a substantial increase over the 12-tube configuration of the Jin-Class. Each JL-3 is assessed to have a range of approximately 14,000 kilometers and the ability to deploy six to ten multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle warheads. This combination allows a single submarine to deliver a nuclear payload comparable to several land-based missile units while remaining concealed beneath the ocean surface. Critically, the range of the JL-3 enables strikes against the continental United States from patrol areas within the South China Sea or the Bohai Gulf, reducing the need to transit heavily monitored chokepoints during a crisis.

This capability directly addresses long-standing weaknesses in China’s sea-based deterrent. Earlier SSBNs were considered too noisy to conduct credible deterrent patrols beyond tightly controlled coastal bastions. The Type 096 appears designed to support a true continuous at-sea deterrence posture, similar in concept to that maintained for decades by the U.S. Navy with the Ohio-class and planned for the Columbia-class. There are also indications in Chinese shipbuilding research that the Tang-Class may feature an ice-strengthened hull, raising the possibility of Arctic deployments that would further complicate U.S. and allied anti-submarine warfare planning.

Despite these advances, the Type 096 is unlikely to match the acoustic refinement of the newest Western designs in every respect. Persistent features such as the prominent missile compartment hump inherited from earlier Chinese SSBNs may impose hydrodynamic penalties. Chinese reactor technology is also assessed to remain a generation behind the most advanced Western monoblock designs. Even so, the margin of advantage enjoyed by the United States under the waves appears to be narrowing at a pace that is strategically significant.

For the U.S. Navy, the implications are profound. American undersea strategy relies on a combination of attack submarines, fixed sensor networks, and airborne platforms to detect and track adversary ballistic missile submarines. A quieter Chinese SSBN force armed with long-range, high-MIRV missiles and capable of operating beyond the first island chain would stretch these assets across multiple theaters at a time when U.S. submarine availability is under increasing strain.

Taken together, the leaked specifications indicate that the Type 096 Tang-Class is not merely an incremental upgrade, but the cornerstone of China’s transition toward a mature, survivable, and globally relevant sea-based nuclear deterrent. In any future strategic confrontation, the silent presence of one or more Tang-Class submarines at sea could become a decisive factor shaping escalation dynamics and strategic leverage.
U.S. Congress approves deployment of SLCM-N nuclear cruise missiles on Trump-class battleships
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The U.S. Congress confirmed on January 8, 2026, that the Nuclear-Armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N) will equip the future Trump-class guided-missile battleship.

On January 8, 2026, the U.S. Congress confirmed that the Nuclear-Armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N) will be integrated into the future Trump-class guided-missile battleship, also known as BBG(X). The decision formally links the revived non-strategic nuclear cruise missile to a new large surface combatant program, marking the first planned deployment of a nuclear cruise missile on a U.S. surface warship since the early 1990s.
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The SLCM-N cruise missile will equip the future Trump-class battleship, marking the return of sea-based nuclear strike options beyond submarines for the U.S. Navy. (Picture source: U.S. Navy)

This decision connects a revived non-strategic nuclear cruise missile with a new large surface combatant concept for the first time, expanding the scope of sea-based nuclear options beyond attack submarines alone. The confirmation follows several announcements that unfolded between 2024 and late 2025, including an acceleration of the missile program, mandatory funding mechanisms, workforce reallocation inside the nuclear enterprise, and the political decision to revive battleship-scale surface warships as part of a broader fleet expansion concept. Together, these steps define a clearer trajectory for both the missile and the ship class, with overlapping timelines that extend from near-term limited deployment requirements into the late 2030s.

The historical background of SLCM-N reflects a reversal of post-Cold War naval nuclear policy that had removed such weapons from U.S. surface ships and most submarines. The U.S. Navy first deployed a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile in the mid-1980s with the TLAM-N, a nuclear variant of the Tomahawk, which had a stated range of 2,500 kilometers and was carried on surface ships and attack submarines. In 1991, the United States withdrew sea-based tactical nuclear weapons, leading to the removal of TLAM-N by mid-1992 and the elimination of the nuclear mission for surface ships, while retaining a latent submarine option. The Obama Administration recommended retiring TLAM-N in 2010, and the Navy completed that retirement in 2013. The first Trump Administration reversed course in 2018 by proposing the SLCM-N as a regional, non-strategic nuclear option, alongside the low-yield W76-2 warhead for submarine-launched ballistic missiles, reintroducing the concept of a sea-launched nuclear cruise missile as part of U.S. deterrence planning.

The SLCM-N capabilities and specifications have been shaped by this historical context and by the desire to minimize development risk. The missile is intended to be a nuclear-capable cruise missile deployable from naval platforms rather than ballistic missile submarines, with initial integration work focused on Virginia-class attack submarines and later expanded to surface combatants. The warhead planning centers on the W80 warhead family, derived from designs already associated with air-launched cruise missiles, reducing the need for an entirely new nuclear package. Development activity during 2025 included prototype missile design work as well as contracts for the launcher and canister, indicating preparation for platform integration rather than purely conceptual studies. The missile is intended to provide a low-yield, non-ballistic nuclear option that can be forward deployed or deployable without visible force generation, offering different signaling characteristics compared with aircraft-delivered systems or submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

The cost profile of SLCM-N reflects sustained congressional support despite repeated executive-branch efforts to terminate the program. Authorizations for the missile reached $25 million in FY2023, $190 million in FY2024, and $252 million in FY2025, with corresponding appropriations of $25 million and $130 million for the first two years, while the warhead line received $20 million in FY2023 and $70 million in FY2024, with $70 million authorized again in FY2025. Beyond annual appropriations, reconciliation legislation assumed $1.92 billion in mandatory funding for the missile and $272 million for the warhead, with additional sums of $2 billion and $400 million, respectively, allocated to accelerate work. The FY2026 NDAA authorized $210 million for the missile and $50 million for the warhead and imposed a requirement to deliver a limited number of deployable assets by September 2032, alongside an earlier statutory requirement for initial operational capability by September 30, 2034. A Congressional Budget Office estimate placed combined missile and warhead costs at $10 billion between 2023 and 2032 if the program began in 2024, excluding later production and several integration and operations costs.

The Trump-class battleship has its own historical background rooted in the absence of U.S. Navy battleships since the retirement of the Iowa class in 1992. After World War II and the Cold War, no new battleships were constructed, and attempts to replace their fire support role shifted toward destroyers, most notably the Zumwalt class, which was curtailed after three ships. Subsequent planning focused on the DDG(X) large surface combatant, but by late 2025 the administration announced a new guided-missile battleship concept as part of a wider effort to expand the surface fleet and respond to concerns about global shipbuilding competition. The Trump-class was presented as both a symbolic and functional revival of very large surface warships, intended to integrate missile firepower, command roles, and advanced defensive systems within a single platform.

Planned capabilities and specifications of the Trump-class reflect its role as a large missile-centric combatant rather than a traditional gun battleship. Current planning parameters describe a ship exceeding 35,000 tonnes in full-load displacement, with a length between roughly 256 and 268 meters, a beam of 32 to 35 meters, and a projected crew of 650 to 850 personnel. The propulsion concept targets speeds above 30 knots using an integrated power system combining gas turbines and diesel generators to meet both propulsion and electrical demands. The primary missile battery is planned to include 128 Mk 41 vertical launch cells and a separate 12-cell launcher for Conventional Prompt Strike hypersonic missiles, with the ability to embark SLCM-N adding a nuclear strike option to the surface fleet. Additional elements under consideration include two 127 mm guns, a potential 32-megajoule railgun, Rolling Airframe Missile launchers, close-in weapons, directed-energy systems rated between 300 and 600 kilowatts, modern radar and electronic warfare suites, and aviation facilities for helicopters and tiltrotor aircraft supporting fleet-level command and coordination.

The cost and timeline of the Trump-class are significant factors shaping its interaction with the SLCM-N program. The Navy has indicated that an initial design schedule would be clarified within 30 to 60 days as of January 2026, with a design phase expected to run roughly from 2026 into 2031 or 2032, followed by construction in the early 2030s and commissioning in the late 2030s or near 2040. Cost estimates range from about $10 billion per ship for later units to as much as $15 billion for the lead ship, provisionally named USS Defiant, potentially making the Trump-class battleship more expensive than a Ford-class aircraft carrier. Industrial planning anticipates a roughly 72-month design effort led by the Navy with support from major U.S. shipbuilders, and the program is intended to absorb and supersede elements of earlier DDG(X) work. These timelines overlap with SLCM-N’s mandated limited deployment by 2032, linking the missile’s early operational availability with longer-term ambitions to embed it within a new generation of large surface warships.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
U.S. Coast Guard Expands Arctic Operations With USCGC Kimball Patrol Mission
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The crew of the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Kimball has returned to Hawaii after a 120-day Arctic and sub-Arctic patrol spanning more than 16,500 nautical miles across the Bering Sea and Gulf of Alaska. The deployment underscores how U.S. Arctic presence is shifting from routine governance toward deterrence and integrated homeland defense as strategic competition accelerates in the High North.

The U.S. Coast Guard announced on January 9, 2026, that the crew of the Coast Guard Cutter Kimball (WMSL-756) returned to Honolulu on January 1 after a 120-day, 16,500-nautical-mile patrol across the Bering Sea and Gulf of Alaska, a route that increasingly functions as America’s front porch to the Arctic. The deployment mixed hard law enforcement with real-world contingency response, from fisheries inspections alongside NOAA agents to emergency support after Typhoon Halong, while also pushing new surveillance tools and joint warfighting integration. In plain terms, Kimball’s patrol was a reminder that in the High North, presence is policy, and policy now comes with sharper edges.
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USCGC Kimball returns from a 120-day Arctic patrol, showcasing U.S. Coast Guard presence and deterrence in the High North (Picture source: U.S. DoW).

The Pentagon’s 2024 Arctic Strategy calls the North American Arctic the northern approaches to the homeland, tied directly to aerospace and maritime warning missions underpinning NORAD, and even frames the region as a northern flank for projecting force toward the Indo-Pacific. The White House’s National Strategy for the Arctic Region similarly warns that climate-driven access is accelerating strategic competition, with Russia’s aggression and China’s expanding Arctic activity eroding earlier assumptions of easy cooperation. Against that backdrop, a Coast Guard cutter operating north of the Arctic Circle is not just patrolling, it is signaling.

Kimball is built for exactly this kind of long-haul, high-consequence maritime chessboard. The Legend-class National Security Cutter measures 418 feet, displaces about 4,500 long tons, reaches 28 knots, and is designed for 60- to 90-day patrol cycles with roughly 12,000 nautical miles of range. Its propulsion suite pairs two MTU 20V 1163 diesel engines with a General Electric LM2500 gas turbine, giving commanders the sprint speed to close contacts and the endurance to stay on station where support is scarce. For the Arctic and sub-Arctic, that combination matters as much as any weapon because the tyranny of distance is the region’s first and most reliable defensive system.

Kimball’s real leverage is its sensor and command-and-control architecture. The Coast Guard’s SeaCommander combat system integrates an AN/SPS-79 surface search radar and AN/SPS-75 air search radar, identification friend-or-foe, electro-optical and infrared sensors, AIS, and the AN/SLQ-32 electronic warfare suite, tied into tactical data links and a communications stack that includes Symphony, MILSATCOM, COMSATCOM, and line-of-sight circuits. That kit turns the ship into a mobile node for maritime domain awareness, able to fuse tracks, push targeting-quality data, and coordinate interagency operations without waiting for a shore headquarters to catch up.

The cutter’s tactical profile is also more muscular than many outside the community assume. Its weapons fit includes a Mk 110 57 mm naval gun with Mk 160 fire control, a Phalanx 20 mm close-in weapon system, Nulka decoys, Mk 36 chaff launchers, and crew-served machine guns, backed by a collective protection system for chemical, biological, or radiological hazards. Just as important for day-to-day sovereignty missions, Kimball can launch and recover pursuit craft, including the 35-foot Long Range Interceptor II, a high-speed boarding platform reported at roughly 40 knots, enabling rapid intercepts in rough northern seas where a slow boarding boat becomes a liability.

The deployment blended maritime governance with readiness for escalation. Kimball’s teams conducted 13 fishing vessel inspections and joint boardings with NOAA’s Office of Law Enforcement, issuing citations for violations, including illegally retained catch, an unglamorous mission with strategic consequences because illegal or coercive fishing is often the first wedge foreign actors use to normalize presence near maritime boundaries. The crew also trained extensively with MH-60 helicopters from Air Station Kodiak and practiced helicopter in-flight refueling procedures, a detail visible in Coast Guard imagery but more significant than it looks: extending rotary-wing time on station expands the cutter’s search radius, compresses response timelines, and complicates an adversary’s attempt to operate in the gaps between ship coverage and shore-based air.

Kimball also tested Shield AI’s Vertical Takeoff and Landing Battery unmanned aerial system during the patrol, evaluating how a ship-launched VTOL drone can push surveillance beyond the radar horizon and cue boardings with less risk and lower cost than constant helicopter sorties. For Arctic operations, where weather windows are short and maintenance support is thin, a deck-launched UAS that can be recovered quickly becomes a practical force multiplier, especially for spotting small targets in cluttered seas and managing wide-area search patterns.

The most strategically revealing episode came under Operation TUNDRA MERLIN. On December 9, 2025, Alaskan Command conducted simulated joint maritime strikes in the Gulf of Alaska with two U.S. Air Force B-52 Stratofortress bombers and Kimball, with the cutter helping provide target information enabling standoff target acquisition and simulated weapons employment. This is the Arctic deterrence logic in miniature: a Coast Guard ship, operating under DHS authorities in peacetime conditions, can still plug into a combatant command’s kill chain when the scenario shifts, reinforcing the idea that the northern approaches are defended as a system, not as separate service stovepipes.

Why does this matter, and against whom? Because Russia is the only Arctic power with a dense network of northern bases and a long-standing habit of treating the High North as a protected bastion for strategic forces, while China continues to press its self-declared near-Arctic interests through research, investment, and dual-use activity that can evolve into operational access. The U.S. strategy documents are explicit that the Arctic is becoming more accessible and more contested, demanding a presence that can enforce law, reassure allies, and deter gray-zone probes before they harden into faits accomplis. Kimball’s 120-day patrol shows how the Coast Guard’s high-end cutters are increasingly being used as the bridge between routine governance and homeland defense, exactly where the Arctic competition is now being waged.
U.S. Marine Corps Selects XQ-58 Valkyrie Drone to Team with F-35s in Future Air Combat
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Northrop Grumman has been competitively awarded the U.S. Marine Corps MUX TACAIR Collaborative Combat Aircraft effort, teaming its autonomy and mission systems with Kratos’ XQ-58 Valkyrie air vehicle under a $231.5 million prototype agreement. The program signals a shift toward scalable, attritable uncrewed aircraft designed to extend Marine aviation reach and absorb risk in high-threat environments.

Northrop Grumman announced on January 8, 2026, that it has secured the U.S. Marine Corps Marine Air-Ground Task Force Uncrewed Expeditionary Tactical Aircraft, or MUX TACAIR, Collaborative Combat Aircraft contract, partnering with Kratos Defense to field a Marine-tailored version of the XQ-58 Valkyrie. Structured as an Other Transaction Agreement valued at approximately $231.5 million over 24 months, the award emphasizes rapid prototyping and operational experimentation rather than a traditional, requirements-heavy aircraft development path. Under the agreement, Northrop Grumman will deliver the mission systems and its open-architecture Prism autonomy software, while Kratos provides a Valkyrie variant adapted for expeditionary Marine operations and scalable production. Company statements frame the effort as a move toward operationally relevant uncrewed combat aviation rather than a technology demonstration.
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The XQ-58 Valkyrie can carry precision weapons, decoys, and electronic-attack payloads, utilizing an internal bay for low-signature and wing hardpoints for additional effectors once defenses are weakened (Picture source: U.S. DoW).

For the Marine Corps, the timing matters as much as the platform: CCA is not marketed as a single exquisite drone, but as a combat system built around numbers, dispersion, and adaptability: uncrewed aircraft that can push sensors and effects forward, soak up risk, and force an adversary to spend high-end interceptors and radar time on targets that are intentionally attritable. Northrop and Kratos explicitly frame the outcome as air dominance in high-threat environments, and the language is telling: survivability, connectivity, lethality, and supportability are treated as the minimum viable package.

The Valkyrie brings a compact, stealthy jet baseline that has already matured through multiple flight demonstrations. Kratos describes XQ-58 as a clean-sheet collaborative combat aircraft design with runway flexibility, capable of more than 3,000 nautical miles range, speeds around Mach 0.86, and altitudes up to 45,000 feet. The aircraft sits in a roughly 6,000 lb maximum takeoff weight class and is optimized for long-range, stand-in operations rather than short-legged orbiting concepts, allowing it to operate ahead of manned formations in contested airspace.

Where the Marines are clearly shaping the design is launch and recovery flexibility, which directly drives operational credibility in the Pacific theater. The original Valkyrie concept is runway independent, using rocket-assisted launch from a static launcher and recovery by parachute with airbags, a model optimized for austere basing and rapid displacement. The Marine-focused CTOL variant adds fixed landing gear, but it can still be booster-launched from the same static launch architecture and then recover conventionally. This hybrid approach allows the Marine Corps to mix expeditionary launch options with runway recovery where available, reducing dependence on a small number of predictable airfields while enabling higher sortie rates and simpler turnarounds when infrastructure exists.

Armament is where Valkyrie shifts from a flying sensor node to a true force multiplier, even if specific loadouts remain modular and mission dependent. The air vehicle is designed to carry kinetic and non-kinetic payloads from an internal weapons bay and wing hardpoints, balancing signature management with payload flexibility. The internal bay supports carriage of compact precision-guided munitions, loitering weapons, or air-launched decoys while preserving a reduced radar cross section for early phases of contested ingress. External stations provide additional capacity for electronic attack pods, sensors, or auxiliary effectors once survivability tradeoffs become acceptable. This architecture allows commanders to tailor each sortie to the threat, rather than forcing a one-size-fits-all payload.

Northrop Grumman’s mission systems and Prism autonomy software form the digital backbone that turns Valkyrie into an operational combat asset rather than a remotely piloted aircraft. The autonomy stack is designed to manage flight operations, sensor employment, and mission execution with minimal pilot input, shifting the human role toward tasking and supervision. This enables coordinated behaviors such as autonomous route planning around threat emitters, synchronized sensing to build a common operating picture, timed electronic attack, and controlled weapons employment under predefined rules. In effect, the loyal wingman becomes an extension of the manned aircraft’s combat system rather than a separate platform competing for pilot attention.

The XQ-58 Valkyrie is optimized to accompany the Marine Corps’ F-35B, with natural applicability to F-35C operations and relevance to legacy tactical aircraft while they remain in service. Teamed operations allow the Valkyrie to operate forward as a passive sensor, decoy, or weapons carrier, extending the reach and magazine depth of the manned force. By pushing expendable or attritable assets ahead of the formation, Marine pilots can provoke enemy radar activation, draw missile launches, and expose integrated air defense nodes without placing a high-value crewed aircraft inside the densest threat envelope.

The presence of the Valkyrie is crucial in the opening phase of a high-end conflict, where attrition, uncertainty, and time favor the defender. By trading relatively low-cost uncrewed aircraft for information, targeting data, and early effects, Marine aviation can compress the enemy’s decision cycle and degrade defenses faster. Strategically, the program offers the United States a scalable, adaptable way to maintain air combat relevance against near-peer adversaries. A modular airframe, flexible basing concept, and open autonomy architecture allow rapid iteration as threats evolve, while cost-conscious design supports employment at scale. If fielded in meaningful numbers, Valkyrie-based CCAs will give the Marine Corps a practical means to extend F-35-led airpower, complicate adversary planning, and preserve manned aircraft for the missions where human judgment remains indispensable.
Indonesia starts sea trials of KRI Prabu Siliwangi offshore patrol vessel in Italy
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The Indonesian Navy announced that the KRI Prabu Siliwangi (321) offshore patrol vessel conducted its first sea trial in Italian waters on January 8, 2026, following its commissioning in December 2025.

On January 10, 2026, the Indonesian Navy announced that the KRI Prabu Siliwangi completed its first sea trial in Italian waters on January 8, 2026, following its commissioning in December 2025. The trial marked the first sailing of the former Italian Navy vessel with an Indonesian crew and focused on initial system operation and preparation for further trials prior to deployment to Indonesia.
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The Thaon di Revel class, also designated PPA, was developed by Italy in the 2010s as part of a fleet renewal program intended to replace multiple older frigate, corvette, and patrol ship classes with a single standardized hull. (Picture source: Fincantieri)

The trial represented the first time the Thaon di Revel-class offshore patrol vessel sailed with its newly assigned Indonesian crew following its commissioning in December 2025. The activity was carried out in Italian waters after departure from the Fincantieri area toward facilities used by the Italian Navy, as the ship previously served in the Italian Navy under the name Ruggiero di Lauria with the hull number P435 before its transfer. This sea trial was framed as a practical step to begin crew integration, system verification, and procedural alignment ahead of further trials planned before long-distance deployment.

The first sea trial was conducted under the command of Colonel (Navy) Kurniawan Koes Atmadja, appointed as the inaugural commanding officer of the KRI Prabu Siliwangi. Before departure, the commander led a full briefing for all embarked personnel, focusing on safety procedures, allocation of watchstanding duties, and the sequence of activities planned during the trial. Particular emphasis was placed on risk management at sea, internal coordination between departments, and clarity of responsibilities during navigation and machinery operation. The Indonesian Navy indicated that this preparatory phase was intended to ensure that the initial sailing with a new crew followed controlled and standardized routines. The briefing also served to align bridge and engineering teams ahead of live system operation under sea conditions.

During the voyage, testing activities focused on the verification of the ship’s primary systems, beginning with propulsion and steering. The vessel was operated across multiple speed profiles to assess responsiveness, stability, and coordination between propulsion control and navigation. Maneuvering exercises were carried out to evaluate handling characteristics and to familiarize bridge teams with the ship’s behavior during course changes. Navigation systems were exercised under operational conditions to confirm procedural accuracy and situational awareness workflows. Internal communications were also tested to ensure reliable coordination between compartments and command positions while the ship was underway. These checks were intended to confirm baseline functionality rather than certify final performance.

The Indonesian Navy described the first sea trial as a structured learning phase for the newly formed crew, emphasizing direct operation of the vessel rather than isolated drills. The objective was to build an integrated understanding of ship handling, where propulsion, steering, navigation, and communications are executed as a coordinated process. At the conclusion of the sailing, the commanding officer conducted a preliminary internal evaluation, highlighting that the trial represented an initial step in a longer readiness sequence. The assessment indicated satisfactory early performance by the crew, while underlining the need for further sea trials to consolidate proficiency. Additional trial periods are planned before the ship is considered ready for routine tasking.

In parallel with the sea trial announcement, Indonesian Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Muhammad Ali reiterated that the continuous modernization of major naval platforms remains a standing policy objective. He linked this approach to maintaining sovereignty and security across Indonesia’s maritime domain, rather than to a single acquisition. The statement positioned KRI Prabu Siliwangi-321 within a broader effort to introduce new platforms through phased integration and structured training. In this framework, initial sea trials are treated as a necessary transition between commissioning and operational employment. The emphasis was placed on readiness derived from both platform capability and crew competence, with trials serving as a key mechanism to align the two.

The KRI Prabu Siliwangi-321, originally known as Ruggiero di Lauria (P435), was built by Fincantieri at its Muggiano shipyard in Italy. Construction began with steel cutting on April 7, 2021, and the ship was launched on October 10, 2023, originally as Ruggiero di Lauria for the Italian Navy. Indonesia acquired the vessel as part of a €1.18 billion contract signed on March 28, 2024, covering two ships of the class, financed through a €1.25 billion loan arrangement with European financial institutions concluded in late 2024. The ship was renamed KRI Prabu Siliwangi on January 29, 2025, handed over to Indonesia, and commissioned on December 22, 2025. It is scheduled to arrive in Indonesia after completing training and trial activities in Italy.

The ship belongs to the Thaon di Revel class, a family of large offshore patrol vessels developed by Italy in the 2010s as part of a fleet renewal program intended to replace multiple older frigate, corvette, and patrol ship classes with a single standardized hull. The program, also designated as PPA for Pattugliatore Polivalente d’Altura, was launched under Italy’s 2014 naval law, which sought to reduce fleet fragmentation while increasing endurance, automation, and adaptability. Construction of the first unit began in 2017, with the class designed from the outset to be produced in several configurations, namely Light, Light+, and Full, sharing the same hull, propulsion architecture, and core systems. This design choice allows ships to enter service with limited armament and sensors, then be upgraded later without structural modification. The class introduced a large mission bay, modular spaces, and reduced crew requirements compared to earlier Italian surface combatants.

In its current Light+ configuration, the KRI Prabu Siliwangi displaces 4,994 tonnes at light load and 6,270 tonnes at full load, with an overall length of 143 meters and a beam of 16.5 meters. Propulsion is provided by a CODAG system combining a General Electric LM2500+G4 gas turbine rated at 32,000 kW, two MTU 20V 8000 M91L diesel engines rated at 10,000 kW each, and electric motors for low-speed operation, driving two controllable-pitch propellers. The ship is armed with a 127 mm main gun, a 76 mm Strales gun, and remote weapon stations, while missile and torpedo systems are fitted for but not with. It carries a Leonardo combat management system, integrated sensors, and aviation facilities for one AW101 or two AS565 helicopters, with Indonesia indicating interest in a future upgrade to the Full configuration after initial service entry.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
UK to authorize military seizure of shadow fleet tankers evading Russia oil sanctions
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The United Kingdom is preparing to authorize military seizure of shadow fleet oil tankers suspected of evading sanctions linked to Russian, Iranian, and Venezuelan oil exports.

As reported by the BBC on January 11, 2026, the United Kingdom is preparing to authorize military seizure of shadow fleet oil tankers suspected of bypassing Russia's oil sanctions. British ministers identified a domestic legal basis that could allow shipping sanctions, such as boarding and detention of unflagged or falsely flagged oil tankers, as existing financial and monitoring measures have not prevented continued maritime sanctions evasion.
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Future implications linked to this legal mechanism could include UK's Royal Navy surface ships stopping and detaining vessels, supported by surveillance aircraft and potentially special forces boarding teams if authorized. (Picture source: UK MoD)

More precisely, the United Kingdom is preparing to expand its ability to act directly against ships linked to shadow fleets, after ministers identified a domestic legal basis that could allow military boarding and detention of certain oil tankers. The focus is on vessels accused of operating without a valid national flag to bypass sanctions on oil exports linked to Russia, Iran, and Venezuela. Officials confirm that no UK military boarding has yet taken place, but say preparatory work has been underway for several weeks to examine how such forces could be used. The move reflects concern in the UK that existing sanctions and monitoring measures have not stopped continued maritime sanction evasion.

Inside government, attention has focused on the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, which includes provisions allowing shipping sanctions such as detaining or controlling the movement of specified or disqualified ships in UK waters. The Act also enables measures against vessels owned, operated, or controlled by designated persons or connected with sanctioned states, and against ships that are not legitimately registered. Ministers believe these clauses can be interpreted to authorize military involvement when enforcing shipping sanctions against sanctioned vessels that are not legitimately flagged, including the use of force if required. The legal reasoning is that unflagged or falsely flagged sanctioned vessels, a common practice in shadow fleet shipping, fall outside legal protections available to them at sea and can be treated as disqualified ships under UK law.

Officials describe this interpretation as an escalation in enforcement tools rather than a change in sanctions policy. Therefore, future implications linked to this legal mechanism could include Royal Navy surface ships stopping and detaining vessels, supported by surveillance aircraft and potentially special forces boarding teams if authorized. While no specific units or methods have been confirmed, the approach could involve controlled boarding, diversion to port, or enforced departure from UK waters. Ministers have not indicated when any UK military action might take place, and stress that operational planning and political authorization would be required before any action.

This reassessment comes as the United States has moved from sanctions enforcement to direct interdiction at sea, seizing five oil tankers over recent weeks that were linked to sanctioned oil flows from Venezuela, Russia, and Iran. Among them were the Marinera, formerly known as Bella 1, intercepted in the North Atlantic with surveillance and maritime support from the UK, as well as other tankers such as the Olina and the Skipper, which US authorities accused of attempting to move sanctioned Venezuelan or Russian oil while operating under false or rapidly changed flags. These seizures followed accusations that the vessels were evading sanctions by reflagging to states such as Guyana, Timor-Leste, or Russia, or by sailing without valid insurance and transparent ownership. The actions reflect a shift toward physically removing ships from service when financial and port restrictions alone have failed to stop oil transport. A UK Ministry of Defence spokesperson also confirmed that countering the Russian shadow fleet is considered a government priority.

Shadow fleets refer to networks of oil tankers that have expanded since 2022 to keep sanctioned oil moving outside standard regulatory systems. These ships are often older tankers purchased on secondary markets after Western owners exited Russian, Iranian, or Venezuelan trades. They commonly change names and flags, sometimes multiple times in a year, and shift registration between states such as Guyana, Panama, Liberia, Timor-Leste, or Russia itself. Vessels like Marinera, formerly Bella 1, and Olina illustrate this pattern, having changed names or flags while continuing sanctioned routes. The main users identified by Western governments are Russia, Iran, and Venezuela, which rely on these fleets to sustain oil exports despite sanctions, price caps, and insurance restrictions.

Estimates by allied governments place the global shadow fleet at more than 1,000 vessels, a figure that has grown steadily since late 2022 as sanctions tightened. Many of these tankers operate without coverage from major international insurers, relying instead on opaque or non-recognized insurance arrangements, or none at all. This increases the financial exposure of coastal states in the event of incidents such as groundings, collisions, or oil spills. Several shadow fleet vessels have already been involved in maritime incidents in the Baltic Sea, North Sea, and Mediterranean, reinforcing concerns about safety standards. Their size and dispersion across global routes make monitoring and enforcement increasingly complex.

The United Kingdom says it has sanctioned more than 500 vessels identified as part of these shadow fleet networks. Ministers state that coordinated action with allies has forced around 200 ships out of active service, either through seizure, loss of insurance, denial of port access, or logistical disruption. In parallel, UK authorities have intensified checks in nearby waters, with more than 600 ships stopped near the British Isles for insurance and compliance verification. Officials stress that many of the vessels flagged during these inspections lacked valid insurance or clear flag registration, increasing risks for UK coastal waters and shipping lanes.

Alongside maritime enforcement, the UK has expanded sanctions targeting the Russian oil industry itself. British authorities have joined the United States in sanctioning major Russian energy companies such as Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegas, as well as traders, insurers, and shipping entities linked to oil exports. Hundreds of tankers have also been designated under these measures, limiting their access to ports, finance, and insurance. The objective is to constrain revenue flows from Russian oil sales and disrupt the logistical chains that support them. Ministers argue that financial sanctions alone have proven insufficient, prompting a shift toward combined financial, maritime, and enforcement-based measures.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
Northrop Grumman's New MK54 MOD 2 Torpedo Enters Production to Redefine U.S. Anti-Submarine Warfare
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Northrop Grumman has entered full production of the MK54 MOD 2 lightweight torpedo for the United States Navy, marking a major upgrade to the fleet’s anti-submarine arsenal. The new variant enhances detection, decision speed, and lethality against modern undersea threats, including quieter diesel-electric and advanced nuclear submarines.

Northrop Grumman confirmed on January 12, 2026, that manufacturing is underway for the MK54 MOD 2, the latest evolution of the U.S. Navy’s primary lightweight torpedo. The program centers on the integration of a newly designed warhead and significantly enhanced signal processing, upgrades intended to address the growing challenge posed by increasingly quiet and technologically sophisticated adversary submarines operating in contested maritime environments.

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Northrop Grumman has begun production of the MK54 MOD 2 lightweight torpedo, delivering smarter sensors and greater lethality to strengthen U.S. Navy anti-submarine warfare against increasingly quiet submarines (Picture Source: Northrop Grumman)

Unlike earlier incremental updates to the MK54 family, the MOD 2 represents a more substantial capability insertion. Developed under U.S. Navy oversight and in cooperation with the Australian Defence Force, the system reflects a deliberate response to the rising complexity of the undersea battlespace. At its core is a Northrop Grumman–designed warhead intended to improve effectiveness against both crewed submarines and emerging classes of unmanned underwater vehicles. In parallel, upgraded processing is designed to improve target classification, tracking, and engagement in real time, particularly in environments characterized by high acoustic clutter and deceptive countermeasures.

Central to the torpedo’s evolution is the integration of adaptive acoustic processing and updated guidance logic designed to function across a wide range of ocean conditions. These enhancements are intended to improve performance in shallow and littoral waters, where variable salinity, temperature gradients, and seabed features can complicate detection and tracking. Diesel-electric submarines equipped with air-independent propulsion, long considered difficult targets in such environments, are increasingly assessed by U.S. naval planners as falling within the effective engagement envelope of the MK54 MOD 2 under realistic operational conditions.

In practical terms, this capability is expected to streamline anti-submarine warfare engagements. In a high-tension maritime area such as the South China Sea, a carrier-or destroyer-based MH-60R Seahawk could detect a submerged submarine maneuvering beneath a thermocline using a combination of shipborne and airborne sensors. The MK54 MOD 2, launched with updated targeting data, is designed to adapt its search profile as it transits complex acoustic layers, maintaining target contact even in the presence of decoys. While such engagements have traditionally relied on coordinated multi-asset responses, Navy assessments indicate that the MOD 2 is intended to consolidate more of this functionality within a single weapon system.

The $233 million contract supporting the program covers manufacturing qualification, testing, and the production of multiple torpedo units. Industrial work is currently taking place at Northrop Grumman facilities in Plymouth, Minnesota, as well as at the Allegany Ballistics Laboratory in Rocket Center, West Virginia. Company officials state that the program remains on schedule, aligning with the Navy’s objective to field enhanced undersea capabilities within its near-term force structure planning rather than deferring them to a longer modernization cycle.

Dave Fine, vice president of armament systems at Northrop Grumman, emphasized the continuity between legacy expertise and current requirements, noting that decades of torpedo development experience are being applied to accelerate delivery of the new variant. From the U.S. Navy’s perspective, this emphasis on production readiness reflects concern over the pace at which potential competitors are expanding and modernizing their submarine forces.

The broader strategic context underscores this urgency. China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy now operates a submarine fleet numbering more than 60 platforms, including both nuclear-powered and advanced conventional boats equipped with improved acoustic dampening and modern sensor suites. Russia, while fielding fewer submarines overall, continues to invest in high-end nuclear attack submarines such as the Yasen class, which Western navies assess as among the quietest currently in service. Both countries are also experimenting with unmanned underwater vehicles and distributed sensor networks intended to complicate traditional Western anti-submarine warfare concepts.

Within this environment, the MK54 MOD 2 is intended to contribute to access denial and sea control by raising the operational risk for adversary submarines. Its compatibility with a wide range of launch platforms, including Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, and MH-60R helicopters, allows it to be deployed rapidly across multiple theaters. This flexibility is viewed by planners as essential for maintaining credible deterrence in both deep-water and littoral regions, from the western Pacific to the North Atlantic.

When compared with other contemporary lightweight torpedoes, differences in design philosophy become apparent. Europe’s MU90 Impact remains optimized for NATO operating environments and multinational fleet integration, while Japan’s G-RX6 emphasizes speed and propulsion performance within a more nationally focused framework. The MK54 MOD 2, by contrast, is shaped by U.S. doctrine that prioritizes integration across a broad “kill web” of sensors, platforms, and command-and-control systems, including future unmanned assets. These distinctions reflect differing strategic priorities rather than simple measures of superiority.

For allied navies such as Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, and Japan, many of which already operate earlier MK54 variants, the MOD 2 offers a pathway toward deeper interoperability. Shared logistics, common software baselines, and aligned tactics could reduce operational friction in coalition environments. Defense officials have also indicated that cooperative production or licensing arrangements remain a possibility as demand for undersea munitions increases across allied fleets.

Equally significant is the industrial dimension of the program. Northrop Grumman’s manufacturing capacity and vertically integrated supply chain position it to scale production without major delays, an issue increasingly scrutinized by U.S. lawmakers. Recent congressional hearings on munitions readiness have highlighted torpedoes alongside missiles and precision-guided weapons as potential bottlenecks in a high-intensity maritime conflict, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. In this context, the MK54 MOD 2 is as much an industrial signal as an operational one.

Beyond the specifics of the contract or the weapon itself, the program reflects a broader shift in U.S. maritime strategy. Rather than relying solely on incremental updates, the Navy is seeking systems capable of adapting dynamically to contested environments shaped by autonomy, deception, and dense sensor networks. The MK54 MOD 2 is therefore best understood not as a standalone munition, but as one element within a wider ecosystem linking platforms, sensors, and command networks.

The introduction of the MOD 2 will drive further investment by potential adversaries in countermeasures, including more sophisticated decoys, autonomous screening systems, and advanced acoustic treatments. These developments are likely to accelerate the ongoing cycle of competition beneath the surface, reinforcing the central role of undersea warfare in future maritime conflicts.

As competition at sea increasingly shifts below the surface, the MK54 MOD 2 signals an effort by the United States and its partners to adapt their anti-submarine warfare capabilities to a more complex and contested operational reality, one in which effectiveness depends as much on integration and adaptability as on raw performance.

Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
China’s Navy Deploys Upgraded Type 054A Frigate for Escort and Anti-Submarine Warfare
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China’s PLA Navy has commissioned Linfen (hull 543), an upgraded Type 054A frigate featuring a larger main gun and expanded aviation facilities. The changes highlight Beijing’s effort to strengthen escort forces for submarine-heavy Western Pacific operations and sustained blue-water missions.

On January 13, 2026, the Chinese PLA Navy officially brought Linfen (hull 543) into active service, marking the commissioning of an upgraded Type 054A guided-missile frigate that reflects the next step in China’s escort ship modernization. The vessel introduces a larger-caliber main gun alongside a lengthened flight deck and expanded hangar, changes that Chinese military authorities describe as key to enhancing aviation-centered anti-submarine warfare, improving surface strike flexibility, and increasing survivability in increasingly contested electromagnetic environments.
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Improved Type 054A frigate Linfen (hull 543) strengthens PLA Navy escort power with enhanced anti-submarine warfare enabled by a larger flight deck and hangar for Z-20 helicopters, a new 100 mm main gun for greater surface and littoral firepower, and upgraded sensors and combat systems designed for high-intensity operations in complex electromagnetic environments (Picture source: China MoD).

For the PLAN, the story is less about a single hull and more about keeping its escort force modern while it grows in size and missions. The baseline Type 054A is a workhorse, roughly a 4,000-ton class frigate about 134 meters long, designed to sit in the uncomfortable middle ground between coastal defense and open-ocean task group escort. Its typical combat system combines 32-cell vertical launch capacity for HQ-16 medium-range surface-to-air missiles and Yu-8 anti-submarine rocket-assisted weapons, plus YJ-83 anti-ship missiles, close-in defenses, lightweight torpedoes, and a hangar for an embarked helicopter. Those attributes made the class the PLAN’s volume answer for escort, air defense in the inner layer, and day-to-day presence operations.

The operational payoff of Linfen’s most obvious change is aviation. Chinese reporting emphasizes that the enlarged flight deck and hangar are intended to support a new generation of shipborne helicopters, widely assessed as the Z-20 family in naval configuration, replacing or complementing the smaller Z-9 previously carried by many 054As. The tactical significance is straightforward: a larger helicopter brings more fuel, more endurance, and more payload for dipping sonar, sonobuoys, and lightweight torpedoes, which translates into a wider and more persistent anti-submarine search pattern ahead of a task group. In a Western Pacific fight where submarines thrive on ambiguity and time, pushing the ASW “reach” outward by even tens of nautical miles changes the geometry of escort. Chinese analysts explicitly describe the Z-20’s larger combat radius as a way to detect and prosecute submarines further from the formation, tightening the PLAN’s protective bubble around high-value units.

The second visible change, the switch to a 100 mm main gun, signals a PLAN that still values naval gunfire in the missile age. Official messaging highlights longer strike range, higher precision, and greater firepower for anti-surface work, but the subtext is broader: a modern medium-caliber gun is a flexible tool for warning shots, maritime policing escalation control, close-range surface engagements in cluttered littorals, and limited land-attack or suppressive fires during amphibious or island operations. Naval observers link the gun to newer Chinese surface combatant designs, suggesting commonality in gun systems and fire-control modernization, a classic Chinese approach to simplifying logistics across an expanding fleet.

Beyond the headline changes, imagery-based assessments and official descriptions point to quieter upgrades that matter in the first minutes of combat: tighter integration of shipborne weapons, improved signature management, and better sensor performance for detection and tracking. PLAN surface warfare doctrine increasingly assumes heavy electronic attack and dense decoy environments, so the repeated emphasis on operating in “complex electromagnetic environments” should be read as more than boilerplate. A frigate that can hold track quality under jamming, share target data reliably, and cue missiles or guns without losing the plot becomes disproportionately valuable as an escort, even if it is not the formation’s primary air-defense shooter.

Strategically, the improved 054A answers a problem the PLAN created through success: it now fields carrier task groups, large amphibious formations, and far-seas deployments that consume escorts at an industrial rate. Beijing’s defense guidance since the mid-2010s has emphasized expanding the navy’s scope beyond near seas toward broader “open seas” protection, which in practice means more sustained deployments, more convoy-style protection of high-value units, and more emphasis on safeguarding sea lines of communication. An upgraded 054A is the efficient way to keep numbers high while preserving relevance, freeing larger destroyers for air-defense command roles and long-range strike tasks.

This is also why Linfen fits cleanly into the PLAN’s force architecture despite the arrival of the newer Type 054B. The 054B can be bigger and stealthier, but China still needs a mass-produced escort that can cover the unglamorous missions: screening replenishment ships, guarding amphibious groups, patrolling chokepoints, and building layered ASW barriers around sensitive maritime approaches. Open-source reporting indicates additional improved ships are appearing, reinforcing the impression that this is not a one-off variant but a production-relevant refinement often referred to externally as Type 054AG. What is genuinely new in this variant is not a radical weapons overhaul, but a practical reshaping of the 054A’s most limiting factor, its embarked aviation, paired with a gun upgrade and incremental survivability improvements that collectively sharpen the ship’s tactical usefulness in exactly the scenarios China worries about most: submarine-heavy Western Pacific operations and contested, sensor-saturated littoral fights.
US Navy to set first Trump-class battleship schedule within 60 days
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The U.S. Navy is preparing to define the initial design schedule for the BBG(X) guided-missile battleship, also referred to as the Trump-class battleship, within the next 30 to 60 days, according to Huntington Ingalls Industries CEO Chris Kastner.

As reported by Defense Daily on January 8, 2026, the U.S. Navy is preparing to define the initial design schedule for the BBG(X) guided-missile battleship, also known as the Trump-class battleship, within the next 30 to 60 days, according to Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII) CEO Chris Kastner. The clarification would be the first defined timing guidance since the program’s announcement by U.S. President Donald Trump in December 2025.
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Cost estimates discussed alongside the Trump-class battleship program range from about $10 billion per ship for later units to as much as $15 billion for the first ship, planned to be named USS Defiant. (Picture source: U.S. Navy)

Chris Kastner, the chief executive of Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII), stated that the U.S. Navy is expected to clarify the initial design schedule of the BBG(X) guided-missile battleship within the next 30 to 60 days, marking the first concrete timing signal since the program was announced in December 2025. The BBG(X), also known as the Trump-class battleship, forms a central pillar of the Golden Fleet concept, which aims to expand the U.S. Navy’s surface fleet and revive the construction of very large warships. This clarification comes as the Navy reassesses how this new battleship could fit alongside, or replace, the future DDG(X) destroyer, while simultaneously reviewing its future FF(X) frigate plans following the cancellation of the whole Constellation-class program.

The Trump-class battleship program was publicly announced on December 22, 2025, with an initial objective of two ships and a longer-term ambition ranging from 10 and 20 to 25 hulls. The only timeframes currently indicated for the lead ship, planned to be named USS Defiant (BBG-1), point to a design phase running roughly from 2026 to 2031–2032, a construction start in the early 2030s, a launch window in the mid-to-late 2030s, and commissioning in the late 2030s or close to 2040, with no fixed or formally scheduled dates defined at this stage, as the design of the BBG(X) is still evolving. The U.S. Navy has also indicated that this program is intended to integrate and supersede work previously conducted for the DDG(X), using existing works on power generation and systems integration to accelerate development where possible. If completed, the Trump-class would represent the first class of U.S. Navy battleships built since World War II, following the retirement of the last Iowa-class battleship in 1992.

According to Navy planning parameters associated with the program, BBG(X) ships are expected to measure between 256 and 268 meters (840 and 880 feet) in length, with a beam of 32 to 35 meters (105 to 115 feet) and a full-load displacement exceeding 35,000 tonnes. Projected crew size ranges from 650 to 850 personnel, a figure well above current Arleigh Burke-class destroyers (300–380 officers and enlisted personnel) and Ticonderoga-class cruisers (roughly 330 crew members on each ship) but far below the manpower levels of the Iowa-class battleships, which required about 2,700 personnel during World War II and the Korea War, and about 1,800 personnel when modernized in the 1980s. The Trump-class is expected to achieve speeds above 30 knots (55 km/h) using a conventional integrated power system based on gas turbines and diesel generators, supplying both propulsion and electrical demand for sensors and weapon systems.

Speaking of which, the main missile battery of the BBG(X)/Trump-class is planned to include 128 Mk 41 vertical launch cells distributed between the bow and stern, complemented by a separate 12-cell launcher dedicated to the Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) hypersonic missiles, already known on the Zumwalt-class destroyers. The U.S. Navy also stated that the Trump-class battleships would have the ability to carry the SLCM-N, a nuclear-capable sea-launched cruise missile originally developed for submarines, which would add a nuclear strike option to the surface fleet. For comparison, current Arleigh Burke-class destroyers carry 96 vertical launch cells, and Ticonderoga-class cruisers carry 122, highlighting the potential missile firepower of a much larger vessel.

Gun and close-in defense systems outlined for the Trump-class battleship include two Mk 45 127 mm naval guns and a 32-megajoule electromagnetic railgun, although the railgun is described as a potential rather than guaranteed element. Point defense is expected to rely on two RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile launchers, four Mk 38 30 mm weapon systems, multiple Optical Dazzling Interdictor lasers, and additional counter-drone systems. The BBG(X) design also incorporates directed-energy weapons rated between 300 and 600 kilowatts, reflecting the Navy’s intent to use a mix of layered kinetic and non-kinetic defenses against missiles, aircraft, and unmanned systems.

Additionally, sensors and control systems are included to support air defense, missile tracking, and command roles. The Trump-class could feature the AN/SPY-6 air and missile defense radar and the AN/SLQ-32(V)7 electronic warfare suite, integrated into a command-and-control architecture sized for fleet-level operations. Aviation facilities at the stern include a flight deck and enclosed hangar sized to operate MH-60 Seahawk helicopters, CMV-22B Osprey and Bell MV-75 tiltrotors, as well as future vertical-lift aircraft, both crewed and uncrewed, such as the Bell V-247 Vigilant. This air wing is meant to support long-range surveillance, targeting, logistics, and coordination, whether the battleship operates alone, within a carrier strike group, or as the lead unit of a surface action group.

From an industrial and financial perspective, the U.S. Navy plans to lead the BBG(X)/Trump-class design effort with support from major U.S. shipbuilders over an estimated 72-month (or six-year) design phase. Early work involves Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII) and General Dynamics Bath Iron Works, with additional design support assigned to specialized naval architects. Therefore, the official procurement of the lead Trump-class battleship, the USS Defiant (BBG-1), could happen in the early 2030s, suggesting an entry into service in the late 2030s or close to 2040 after construction, trials, and commissioning. Cost estimates discussed alongside the program range from about $10 billion per ship for later units to as much as $15 billion for the first ship.

This is significantly higher than the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, which generally cost roughly $2 to $2.5 billion each, the Constellation-class (FFG-62) frigates, which were expected to be about $1.1 billion to $1.4 billion per hull, or the Zumwalt-class destroyers, which averaged roughly $7.5 billion per ship. The Ticonderoga-class cruisers, for its part, historically were about $1 billion per ship in the 1990s, meaning that the Trump-class battleship cost could approach or even surpass the pricetag of a Ford-class aircraft carrier, which can cost in excess of $10 billion each, well above the projected costs for the DDG(X) next-generation destroyer at roughly $3.3 billion to $4.4 billion per ship in recent planning estimates. For now, the next milestone is the Navy’s promised clarification of requirements and scheduling, which will determine whether the BBG(X)/Trump-class advances as a derivative design or follows a longer clean-sheet development path.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
Italy Upgrades FREMM EVO Warships with New Radar and Cyber Systems to Counter Modern Threats
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Italy’s FREMM EVO frigate program has passed its Critical Design Review, formally closing design work and clearing the way for serial construction, according to OCCAR. The milestone keeps deliveries on track for 2029 and 2030 and signals how European navies are adapting proven hulls to missile, drone, and undersea threats that also concern U.S. and NATO planners.

The Organization for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR) announced on December 19, 2025, that the Italian Navy’s FREMM EVO program has completed its Critical Design Review across the platform, combat system, and whole warship with integrated logistics support. The review confirms that the design is mature enough to begin construction without major redesign risk, keeping the schedule aligned with deliveries planned for June 2029 and June 2030, and reinforcing Italy’s approach of evolving an existing frigate class rather than launching an all-new design.
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FREMM EVO will pair a stealthy, quiet hybrid-propulsion hull with cyber-resilient combat systems, dual-band AESA radar layered air defense, advanced ASW sonars, and dedicated counter-drone capabilities for high-end NATO operations (Picture source: OCCAR).

For shipbuilders and fleet planners, a CDR is the moment the government customer accepts that the drawings, interfaces, margins, and support concept are mature enough that steel can be cut without betting the schedule on late redesign. In FREMM EVO’s case, it also signals that Italy’s next Bergamini-class pair is no longer a paper evolution but a defined combat system aimed at the threat set Italian sailors have faced from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Red Sea, where cruise missiles, one-way drones, and seabed risks now sit alongside classic submarine and surface warfare.

The official narrative already hints at where the EVO diverges from earlier ships. Fincantieri and OCCAR describe a cyber-resilient Ship Management System for the platform side, upgrades to air conditioning and electrical distribution, and measures intended to improve the ship’s “green footprint,” all of which matter for endurance, signatures, and sustained high power operation. On the combat system side, FREMM EVO is set to receive the SADOC 4 cyber-resilient combat management system and fixed-face X-C dual-band radar sensors designed to support defense against theatre ballistic missile threats, alongside enhancements to electronic warfare, artillery and missile systems, sonar, communications, and tactical data links.

Those upgrades build on a hull form and propulsion architecture that has already proven flexible. The Italian Navy’s FREMM baseline is a 144.6 m frigate with CODLAG propulsion, combining a 32 MW LM2500+ gas turbine with electric motors for quiet running, reaching about 27 knots at top speed and around 6,000 nautical miles of range at 15 knots, with an azimuth thruster for low-speed maneuvering. The design’s quiet electric mode is central to submarine hunting, while the double helicopter hangar extends both ASW reach and surface strike options.

Where FREMM EVO becomes tactically interesting is the way it appears to merge Italian Navy lessons from newer ships into the proven FREMM envelope. Reporting from recent European naval exhibitions indicates the EVO configuration keeps the FREMM hull and propulsion but introduces new superstructures able to host systems seen on Italy’s latest-generation platforms under the national naval modernization law, including an integrated Leonardo Kronos Dual-Band Radar suite with fixed AESA arrays for 360-degree coverage. The ship is also described as fielding an evolved integrated electronic warfare suite oriented toward countering drones, plus a dedicated counter-UAS package combining detection, identification, and soft-kill effects, with hard-kill potentially centered on 30 mm remotely operated mounts firing airburst ammunition. In that configuration, the ship’s defensive bubble becomes layered, with long-range surveillance and cueing from the dual-band radar, rapid reaction gun engagement with 76/62 Strales using guided DART ammunition, and close-in defeat options against small drones and fast craft.

Underwater lethality remains a backbone requirement. All anti-submarine warfare capabilities and features of Italy’s in-service FREMM ASW units are expected to carry over to the new ships, including a suite built around a hull sonar paired with CAPTAS-4C variable depth sonar and a towed array, supported by embarked helicopters and lightweight torpedoes. That combination gives commanders options across the full ASW chain, from passive search in silent mode to active prosecution with airborne sensors, while the same combat system upgrades and data links expand interoperability inside NATO task groups.

The FREMM EVO order was placed under a contract amendment signed in July 2024, with the System Design Review completed in May 2025 as the first step of the definition phase, leading to the CDR by the end of that year. The contract value is estimated at around EUR 1.5 billion, and the ships are positioned as a core element of Italy’s broader fleet renewal plan, aimed at ensuring the Marina Militare can adapt rapidly to evolving maritime threats while safeguarding sea lines of communication and national strategic interests.

Written by Evan Lerouvillois, Defense Analyst.

Evan studied International Relations, and quickly specialized in defense and security. He is particularly interested in the influence of the defense sector on global geopolitics, and analyzes how technological innovations in defense, arms export contracts, and military strategies influence the international geopolitical scene.
Vietnam Navy Ka-28 Helicopters Fire APRP-2 Missile During Anti-Submarine Drill
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Vietnam’s People’s Navy has been shown publicly conducting realistic anti-submarine warfare training with Ka-28 Helix-A helicopters, including the release of an air-launched APRP-2 weapon. The footage offers rare confirmation of Vietnam’s integrated maritime strike capability as it works to strengthen deterrence in contested regional waters.

Vietnamese television footage aired in early January and later circulated online has provided an unusual look at the Vietnam People’s Navy employing its Russian-built Kamov Ka-28 Helix-A helicopters in a full anti-submarine warfare scenario. According to Lee Ann Quann on X, the January 11, 2026, broadcast showed a Ka-28 operating alongside surface combatants and deploying an APRP-2 air-launched anti-submarine weapon, marking the first publicly observed operational use of the system rather than a scripted or ceremonial display.
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Vietnam Navy footage shows Ka-28 helicopters firing an APRP-2 weapon, offering rare insight into the country’s evolving anti-submarine warfare capability. (Picture source: VTV1)

The Ka-28 helicopters of the Vietnam People’s Navy were shown getting what observers described as “screen time,” but the footage carried a deeper message. Rather than a static lineup or a symbolic flypast, the aircraft were filmed performing mission-representative profiles associated with anti-submarine warfare. The controlled release of the APRP-2 from the helicopter underscored that the system is fully integrated into Vietnam’s naval aviation kill chain, from detection to engagement, and not simply a stockpiled munition.

The Ka-28 Helix-A is the dedicated export anti-submarine variant of the Kamov Ka-27 family and remains one of the most capable rotary-wing ASW platforms in Southeast Asia. In Vietnamese service, each Ka-28 can deploy a full sensor suite including sonobuoys for wide-area acoustic search and a dipping sonar for precise localization in littoral and blue-water environments. Once a submarine contact is classified, the helicopter can prosecute it using specialized munitions ranging from the APR-2 “Yastreb” class anti-submarine missile to the UMGT-1 “Orlan,” also known by its NATO designation AT-3 Orlan, a lightweight aerial torpedo optimized for helicopter delivery.

The APRP-2 designation used by Vietnam aligns with the Russian APR-2 Yastreb family. This missile class was developed specifically to engage modern submarines, including nuclear-powered platforms, operating at depths of up to 600 meters and speeds of up to 43 knots. Derived from the earlier APR-1 Condor and introduced into service in its modernized APR-2M Hawk-M configuration in the mid-1970s, the weapon weighs approximately 575 kilograms, measures 3.7 meters in length, and carries an 80-kilogram high-explosive warhead fitted with a non-contact acoustic fuze designed to defeat reinforced submarine hulls.

Unlike conventional lightweight torpedoes, the APR-2 employs an underwater solid-fuel rocket motor that allows it to reach very high terminal speeds, reportedly up to 62 knots, sharply compressing the engagement timeline and limiting a submarine’s ability to evade once detected. After being released from an aircraft or helicopter at altitudes between 300 and 2,000 meters, the missile enters the water following a controlled deceleration and begins a programmed dive while operating initially in passive acoustic mode. If no contact is detected, propulsion activates and the missile transitions to active hydroacoustic search, combining inertial guidance with terminal acoustic homing to deliver an effective underwater engagement range of roughly 1.5 to 2 kilometers and a reported kill probability of up to 0.85 even with significant target designation error.

Deploying a heavy ASW missile from a helicopter demands precise flight control, robust release mechanisms, and well-trained crews capable of operating at low altitude over open water. The observed release posture suggested a deliberate placement into a defined water box rather than a theatrical drop, indicating that Vietnam intended to showcase a realistic employment scenario. For professional naval observers, this choice sends a clear message that the weapon is not only possessed, but tactically usable within established ASW doctrine.

Equally important is the operational context in which the Ka-28 and APRP-2 were displayed. Vietnamese naval aviation ASW missions are designed to operate jointly with surface combatants, and recent exercises have emphasized coordination with Petya-class frigates and modern Gepard-class frigates of the Vietnam People’s Navy. In such joint operations, surface ships contribute hull-mounted sonar and command-and-control functions, while helicopters extend the sensor and strike envelope far beyond the ships’ immediate vicinity. A Ka-28 armed with an APR-2 class missile can rapidly respond to a submarine contact generated by a frigate, attack from an unexpected axis, and force the target into evasive maneuvers that expose it to follow-on engagement.

This joint ASW construct reflects Vietnam’s growing sophistication in undersea warfare. The Navy’s experience operating its own Kilo-class submarines has reinforced an understanding of submarine behavior, acoustic tactics, and vulnerabilities. By pairing ship-based sensors with helicopter-delivered high-speed weapons, Vietnam is building an ASW posture that prioritizes speed, coordination, and denial of sanctuary in key maritime approaches.

From an industrial and sustainment perspective, the APRP-2 naming convention is consistent with Vietnam’s broader effort to adapt and localize legacy Russian-origin systems through domestic maintenance, life-extension programs, and integration updates. Whether APRP-2 represents a refurbished APR-2 Yastreb, a modified packaging standard, or a configuration tailored to Vietnamese logistics and training pipelines, its public appearance signals continued investment in credible, combat-ready ASW munitions.

In strategic terms, the emergence of the APRP-2 alongside Ka-28 helicopters and frontline frigates fits neatly into the evolving security environment of the South China Sea, where submarine activity, seabed infrastructure, and contested maritime spaces have elevated the importance of rapid undersea response. By choosing to show the weapon in flight and in context, Vietnam has delivered a calculated deterrent message: its anti-submarine forces are not only searching, but are prepared to strike quickly and in coordination.
Pakistan Navy Successfully Fires Chinese LY-80N Air Defense Missile From Type 054A/P Frigate
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The Pakistan Navy has conducted a live-fire exercise using the Chinese-made LY-80(N) surface-to-air missile from PNS Taimur, a Type 054A/P-class guided-missile frigate. The successful interception highlights Pakistan’s expanding naval air defense capability and its focus on securing maritime approaches in the Indian Ocean.

According to information released by the Directorate General Public Relations of Pakistan Navy on January 10, 2026, the Pakistan Navy executed a high-profile live-fire exercise involving the LY-80(N) surface-to-air missile system aboard PNS Taimur (F-262). The missile was launched from the ship’s vertical launching system and successfully engaged an aerial target at extended range, a result Pakistani naval officials described as confirmation of the platform’s operational readiness and the service’s layered air defense concept at sea.
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PNS Taimur (F-262), a Pakistan Navy Type 054A/P-class guided-missile frigate, launches a Chinese-made LY-80(N) surface-to-air missile during a live-fire exercise on January 10, 2026, demonstrating extended-range fleet air defense capabilities. (Picture source: Pakistan Navy)

This successful live firing marks a critical milestone in Pakistan Navy’s ongoing modernization, highlighting a strategic shift from coastal defense to blue-water deterrence. Defense officials familiar with the drill confirmed that the LY-80(N) engaged a high-speed aerial target in a combat-realistic environment, effectively simulating an incoming cruise missile or hostile aircraft. The engagement occurred beyond 40 kilometers from the launch point, consistent with the missile’s stated range of up to 60 kilometers, and reaffirmed the missile's capacity to neutralize airborne threats before they can pose a threat to high-value naval assets.

The LY-80(N) is the naval variant of the LY-80 surface-to-air missile system, itself the export version of China’s HQ-16. Developed by China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), the system is derived in part from Russian Buk-M1 technology but was significantly reengineered to meet modern battlefield requirements. Marketed by China National Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation (CPMIEC), the LY-80(N) is designed to provide medium- to long-range air defense from shipborne vertical launch systems, capable of engaging multiple targets simultaneously with high accuracy.

Onboard Pakistan’s Type 054A/P frigates, including PNS Taimur, the LY-80(N) is vertically launched from a 32-cell VLS integrated with an advanced combat management system and active phased-array radar. This integration allows for 360-degree threat detection and target tracking, enabling rapid engagement cycles. The missile’s successful performance during this latest test highlights the system’s readiness to operate in high-intensity conflict scenarios involving saturation attacks, stealth threats, or coordinated airstrikes.

The PNS Taimur, commissioned in 2022 and built by China’s Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard, is one of four advanced frigates delivered under a major defense partnership between Islamabad and Beijing. The ship is equipped not only with the LY-80(N) but also with C-802 or YJ-12 anti-ship cruise missiles, torpedo launchers, CIWS, electronic warfare suites, and long-range surveillance systems. As the second vessel of the Type 054A/P class, Taimur now serves as a frontline combatant in Pakistan’s naval order of battle, extending its air and maritime strike envelope far beyond its historical range.

The live-fire exercise also carries significant geopolitical weight. As military tensions between India and Pakistan remain high - especially along contested land and maritime boundaries - the demonstration of an effective long-range naval air defense system sends a deliberate signal of deterrence. The test comes at a time when the Indian Navy is expanding its regional footprint with new aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, and long-range missile platforms, seeking to assert dominance across the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). In response, Pakistan is methodically strengthening its fleet with Chinese-built multi-role vessels that can now credibly challenge Indian air superiority at sea.

Strategically, the deployment of LY-80(N) aboard PNS Taimur marks a notable shift in regional naval dynamics. Pakistan’s ability to engage airborne threats at standoff ranges directly impacts India’s freedom of action during future crises. Indian aircraft, helicopters, and drones must now contend with Pakistani frigates capable of defending themselves far beyond the visual horizon. In essence, Pakistan Navy’s adoption of long-range SAMs enables a layered air-denial strategy, creating missile engagement zones that extend deep into contested maritime areas, such as the Arabian Sea and the approaches to the Strait of Hormuz.

Moreover, the test underscores the deepening defense collaboration between Pakistan and China. The LY-80(N), like the Type 054A/P frigates themselves, reflects the rapid transfer of high-end naval warfare capabilities from Beijing to Islamabad. This cooperation is transforming Pakistan into a regional naval power capable of disrupting adversary maritime strategies and deterring escalation through credible sea-based defenses.

Indian strategic planners are unlikely to overlook the implications. The increasing sophistication of Pakistan’s naval assets - backed by Chinese technology and doctrine - presents a two-front maritime challenge. With China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean through the PLA Navy and Pakistan’s expanding blue-water fleet, India must now recalibrate its naval posture to address a layered threat environment on both the east and west of the subcontinent.

As both navies continue to modernize, analysts warn that the Indian Ocean may become the next major theater of great-power competition and regional rivalry. The LY-80(N) test, while tactical in scope, represents a strategic pivot in how Pakistan intends to defend its sea lines of communication and maritime sovereignty under growing regional pressure.

With this successful launch, Pakistan has not only demonstrated technical proficiency but has also made a clear political and military statement: the Pakistan Navy is no longer confined to defensive waters. It is a modernizing force capable of challenging air and missile threats far from shore, projecting credible power in one of the world’s most strategically vital maritime corridors.

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
U.S. Navy Christens USNS Lansing Spearhead-Class Fast Transport Ship for Expeditionary Operations
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On 10 January 2026, the U.S. Navy christened the future USNS Lansing (EPF 16) at Austal USA’s shipyard in Mobile, Alabama, completing the Spearhead-class line. The milestone underscores continued investment in rapid sealift, intra-theater lift, and afloat medical support as logistics face pressure in the Indo-Pacific and Europe.

On 10 January 2026, the U.S. Navy christened the future USNS Lansing (EPF 16), a Spearhead-class expeditionary fast transport, during a ceremony at Austal USA’s shipyard in Mobile, Alabama. The event, highlighted by Military Sealift Command on X and by Austal USA on LinkedIn, marks the ship’s transition from construction to trials. In a context of growing maritime competition and strain on naval logistics in the Indo-Pacific and Europe, the christening of Lansing, the sixteenth and final ship of its class, underlines Washington’s intention to maintain fast, agile sealift and afloat medical support in contested theaters. For partners and competitors alike, the ceremony signals that the United States continues to invest not only in combatants but also in the enabling platforms that make large-scale naval operations feasible.

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The expeditionary fast transport is a high-speed, shallow-draft U.S. Navy vessel designed to move troops, equipment, and medical support rapidly within contested maritime theaters (Picture Source: U.S. Government)

USNS Lansing is the sixteenth Spearhead-class expeditionary fast transport and the third built in the enhanced Flight II configuration, which combines high-speed intra-theater lift with dedicated medical facilities. Built by Austal USA on an aluminum catamaran hull, the ship is approximately 103 meters long with a beam of about 28.5 meters and a shallow draft close to 3.8 meters, allowing access to ports and littoral areas closed to larger combatants. Propulsion is provided by four MTU 20V8000 diesel engines driving waterjets, enabling speeds above 35 knots and, in favorable conditions, approaching 40 knots. The ship’s core feature is its reconfigurable mission bay of roughly 20,000 square feet, designed to carry vehicles, containers and palletized cargo, complemented by a flight deck that can operate large helicopters and, in the Flight II variant, is structurally adapted to support tiltrotor aircraft such as the MV-22 or CMV-22. This combination gives Lansing a rare mix of speed, volume and aviation flexibility for an auxiliary platform.

Compared to the earlier Flight I EPFs, which were optimized almost exclusively for fast sealift, the Flight II design, beginning with EPF 14 Cody, accepts a reduced cargo capacity in exchange for enhanced medical and aviation capabilities. Cargo payload is lowered from around 600 short tons to about 330 short tons to make room for strengthened structures, additional berthing, expanded power and utilities, and Role 2 Enhanced medical spaces including treatment areas and an elevator linking the mission deck and medical facilities. Lansing, as the final Flight II hull, completes this evolution. The ship is designed to sail with a core crew of civilian mariners under Military Sealift Command while embarking mission-tailored detachments of up to around 155 personnel, including full expeditionary medical teams. This gives commanders a flexible option that can act as a high-speed connector, a forward medical node or a mobile casualty evacuation platform without requiring a dedicated hospital ship, especially in areas where access to fixed medical infrastructure is limited.

The programmatic path leading to this christening illustrates both a mature industrial line and a deliberate naming policy. Austal USA received the contract for EPF 16 in 2022, extending a class whose first units entered service in the early 2010s and that has become a regular presence in multiple theaters. Lansing’s keel was laid in September 2024 in Mobile, in parallel with the completion of EPF 15 Point Loma. The ship is named after Lansing, the capital of Michigan, following an announcement by Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro in July 2024. The choice emphasizes the city’s long history as a manufacturing hub that supported U.S. war production from the Civil War through the conversion of automotive plants in the Second World War. At the christening ceremony, Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer and Congresswoman Lisa McClain, the ship’s sponsors, carried out the traditional bottle-breaking over the bow, symbolically linking Midwestern industrial heritage, a Gulf Coast shipyard and a global naval mission. MSC Commander Rear Adm. Benjamin Nicholson delivered remarks underscoring the role of Military Sealift Command and the civilian mariners who will operate the ship in support of fleet operations worldwide.

USNS Lansing joins a class with a well-established operational record. Fifteen Spearhead-class EPFs already serve under Military Sealift Command, supporting missions that range from crisis response to theater security cooperation and humanitarian assistance. Ships such as USNS Millinocket have deployed to the Indo-Pacific as platforms for Pacific Partnership, delivering medical assistance, engineering support and civil-military engagement across countries including Kiribati, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Solomon Islands, the Philippines and Vietnam. Other ships in the class, like USNS Brunswick, have embarked systems such as the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) during exercises, demonstrating how EPFs can move long-range fires and other critical capabilities quickly between austere ports. The class has also supported activities in the Baltic, Mediterranean and Atlantic, where the combination of speed, shallow draft and modular payloads has proven useful for connecting U.S., NATO and partner forces. Lansing, with its Flight II enhancements, brings additional medical depth and aviation flexibility to a concept already validated in operations and exercises.

From a capability standpoint, Lansing’s main advantage lies in the combination of speed, access and modularity at lower operating cost than major combatants or amphibious assault ships. The EPF design is intended to bridge the gap between low-speed sealift and high-cost airlift, providing a mid-range option that can move meaningful payloads quickly without relying on fully intact deep-water port infrastructure. The shallow draft and stern ramp enable loading and unloading of vehicles and equipment at small, degraded or improvised facilities, exactly the type of ports likely to be targeted or disrupted early in a high-intensity conflict. The mission bay can be configured for containers, light armored vehicles, trucks or engineering equipment, while seating and berthing arrangements support transportation of company-sized formations or tailored joint task forces. In the Flight II configuration, this transport function is complemented by Role 2 Enhanced medical capability, easing pressure on scarce rotary-wing and fixed-wing evacuation assets by stabilizing casualties closer to the frontline and acting as an intermediate medical node during sustained operations.

These characteristics are directly relevant to the current geostrategic environment. In the Indo-Pacific, U.S. concepts such as Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations and distributed maritime operations rely on the ability to sustain small, widely dispersed units across island chains under the threat of Chinese anti-ship missiles, submarines and a dense reconnaissance-strike network. A fast, shallow-draft transport capable of shuttling troops, sensors, munitions and medical teams between small ports, beaches or temporary facilities supports that concept and complicates adversary targeting by multiplying lines of communication. In Europe, the same ship type offers a way to move equipment and forward-deployed units between North Sea, Baltic and Mediterranean ports, providing alternatives if major facilities suffer sabotage, cyber-disruption or long-range strikes. EPFs are equally relevant for crisis response and gray-zone scenarios, from the evacuation of civilians to rapid humanitarian assistance after natural disasters, missions already demonstrated by ships of the class during Pacific Partnership and other deployments that combine soft-power signaling with practical support.

Strategically, the christening of USNS Lansing signals both continuity and transition in U.S. naval logistics and support policy. It confirms that high-speed auxiliary platforms are regarded as critical enablers of sea control and power projection rather than peripheral assets, and it underlines the central role of Military Sealift Command and civilian mariners in daily fleet operations. At the same time, EPF 16 closes the Spearhead production line, opening questions about the next generation of connectors and support ships, whether more heavily protected, more autonomous or more specialized for medical, command or unmanned operations. In the meantime, Lansing and her Flight II sisters Cody and Point Loma provide an immediately available platform for experimentation with new concepts of employment while meeting the concrete demands of Indo-Pacific and European theaters and reinforcing U.S. ability to operate in contested littorals.

Beyond its technical and programmatic aspects, USNS Lansing carries a strong political and symbolic message. Naming the ship after Lansing and selecting the state’s governor and a local member of Congress as sponsors links the vessel to a broader U.S. industrial and civic base that extends well inland. For domestic audiences, this emphasizes that maritime power rests on a nationwide network of workers, factories and communities; for international observers, it illustrates how American naval presence at sea is sustained by a deep industrial and human foundation. For Military Sealift Command, the addition of a sixteenth expeditionary fast transport increases flexibility in global tasking and offers some relief to a class that has been heavily engaged in recent years. When Lansing enters service, she will not only complete the Spearhead-class EPF program but also extend U.S. sealift and humanitarian reach into littoral areas where future security challenges are likely to concentrate, making the ship an important enabler of both deterrence and crisis response.

Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
U.S. Navy Funds Northrop Grumman to Develop New Rocket Motor to Counter Hypersonic Threats
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The U.S. Navy has awarded Northrop Grumman a $94.3 million contract to develop a new 21-inch second-stage rocket motor aimed at extending the reach of the SM-6 missile family. The move highlights a near-term strategy to counter advanced air, surface, and hypersonic threats by upgrading propulsion rather than fielding an entirely new interceptor.

Northrop Grumman stated on January 7, 2026, that the U.S. Navy awarded the company a $94.3 million contract to develop and qualify a new 21-inch diameter second-stage solid rocket motor to support extended-range missile programs. The effort is explicitly framed around countering fast-moving air, surface, and hypersonic threats, and marks a notable evolution in how the Navy is approaching performance growth within its existing interceptor inventory. Rather than waiting for an entirely new missile design, the service is targeting propulsion as a near-term lever to expand reach, speed, and terminal energy.

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The U.S. Navy has awarded Northrop Grumman a $94.3 million contract to develop a larger 21-inch rocket motor aimed at extending the range and effectiveness of SM-6 missiles against advanced air, surface, and hypersonic threats (Picture Source: Northrop Grumman)

The contract covers continued design work as well as low-rate initial production of 60 motors, with manufacturing and testing centered at Northrop Grumman’s Propulsion Innovation Center in Elkton, Maryland. The quantity is significant, suggesting a full qualification pathway rather than a limited technology demonstrator. Such a batch allows for repeated static firings, environmental and vibration testing, lot acceptance trials, and early flight test integration, all of which are prerequisites for transitioning a rocket motor from development into an operational supply chain.

The technical importance of the 21-inch diameter lies primarily in geometry and physics. Compared to the 13.5-inch class motors used as sustainers in current Standard Missile-6configurations, a 21-inch motor offers roughly 2.4 times the cross-sectional area. This increase translates directly into greater internal volume for propellant, insulation, and optimized grain geometry, even before length is adjusted. The result is higher total impulse and improved energy retention across the missile’s trajectory, particularly in the terminal phase where maneuvering targets demand sustained speed and closing energy rather than an early velocity spike.

The Standard Missile‑6 occupies a unique position in the Navy’s arsenal as a multi-mission weapon capable of long-range air defense, anti-surface warfare, and sea-based terminal ballistic missile defense. Existing variants combine a 21-inch booster with a smaller second-stage propulsion package, a compromise that balances compatibility with the Mk 41 Vertical Launch System against performance constraints. For several years, the Navy has signaled interest in replacing that smaller sustainer with a full-diameter second stage to extend the missile’s kinematic envelope without fundamentally altering its external interfaces.

In that context, the most plausible near-term application for the new motor is the SM-6 Block IB, the Navy’s planned extended-range evolution of the Standard Missile family. Previous reporting by the Congressional Research Service has outlined Navy plans to develop a 21-inch dual-thrust rocket motor for SM-6, explicitly linking the propulsion upgrade to improved offensive and defensive reach and identifying the resulting configuration as Block IB. Concept imagery and program descriptions associated with that variant increasingly point toward a more uniform 21-inch body, aligning it more closely with the Navy’s larger interceptors while retaining Mk 41 compatibility.

The emphasis on hypersonic threats in the Navy’s language is deliberate rather than rhetorical. Both the Navy and the Missile Defense Agency have highlighted the need to adapt existing interceptors to address maneuvering hypersonic glide vehicles within a layered defense architecture. While a larger second-stage motor does not, by itself, solve the hypersonic interception problem, it addresses a fundamental constraint that cannot be bypassed: engaging faster targets at longer distances requires more total impulse and better energy management throughout the flight profile. In practical terms, a hotter and larger second stage increases the interceptor’s battlespace and improves the probability of a successful endgame against highly dynamic threats.

Beyond performance, the award is revealing from a programmatic standpoint. Raytheon remains the prime contractor and industrial lead for SM-6 production, positioning the missile as a “one missile, many missions” solution deployable from both ship-based and land-based launchers. However, the Navy’s decision to directly fund propulsion development through Northrop Grumman reflects a broader Department of Defense trend toward decoupling critical subsystems from missile primes when speed, capacity, or competition becomes a priority. By treating the rocket motor as government-directed common hardware, the Navy preserves the option to insert the same propulsion solution into multiple missile lines.

The industrial-base dimension reinforces that logic. Northrop Grumman has stated that it has invested approximately $1 billion since 2018 to expand solid rocket motor capacity, with propulsion work distributed across facilities in West Virginia, Utah, and Maryland, all of which are undergoing incremental expansion. In parallel, Raytheon has acknowledged propulsion supply constraints by moving to broaden its supplier base, including efforts to establish additional solid rocket motor production capacity within the United States. Together, these moves underscore how propulsion has shifted from a background manufacturing concern to a strategic dependency shaping missile production rates and readiness.

The Navy’s statement that it intends to deploy the extended-range propulsion technology “across various platforms” is therefore a key indicator of intent. If the 21-inch motor completes qualification without major redesign and production scales as planned, it could become more than a single-program upgrade. It would represent a modular propulsion building block applicable to other Mk 41-launched weapons requiring greater reach, potentially bridging the gap between today’s Standard Missile variants and future generations of hypersonic interceptors. In that sense, the contract reflects not just an incremental improvement, but a deliberate effort to buy time, performance, and flexibility through propulsion while longer-term missile programs continue to mature.

Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
U.S. Marines Launch From USS Gerald R. Ford to Seize 5th Tanker Olina in Caribbean Sanctions Crackdown
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U.S. Marines and Sailors launched a pre-dawn maritime interdiction from the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford on January 9, 2026, seizing the motor tanker Olina in the Caribbean Sea. The operation highlights Washington’s expanding effort to disrupt illegal fuel shipments linked to Venezuela and Russia that help finance hostile regimes.

U.S. Southern Command confirmed that U.S. Marines and Sailors assigned to Joint Task Force Southern Spear successfully seized control of the motor tanker Olina during a pre-dawn maritime interdiction on January 9, 2026, launching from the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford while operating in the Caribbean Sea. The boarding marked the fifth interdiction conducted under Operation Southern Spear, a growing U.S. military and interagency campaign aimed at curbing illicit energy trafficking that officials say is increasingly tied not only to Venezuelan networks but also to Russian-backed fuel flows moving through the Western Hemisphere.
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U.S. Marines from Joint Task Force Southern Spear fast-rope from a Black Hawk helicopter onto the deck of the motor tanker Olina during a pre-dawn interdiction in the Caribbean Sea on January 9, 2026. The operation marks the fifth successful seizure under Operation Southern Spear, targeting illicit oil shipments linked to Venezuela and Russia. (Picture source: U.S. Southern Command)

U.S. Defense officials confirm that the Olina, now in U.S. custody, was carrying a significant volume of petroleum product believed to have originated from a sanctioned Venezuelan refinery operating under a front company linked to transnational criminal networks. The interdiction was carried out by Special Forces fast-roping from Black Hawk helicopters in a coordinated joint strike that involved air and maritime surveillance, signals intelligence, and real-time targeting support. No resistance was reported, and the vessel was secured without incident.

This operation, while tactical in execution, reflects the growing strategic concern within the Pentagon and U.S. intelligence community about the use of illicit oil shipments as a financial lifeline for autocratic regimes facing international sanctions. Venezuela, under Nicolás Maduro’s leadership, has continued to operate a parallel export network of petroleum products, often routed through deceptive shipping practices, falsified documentation, and cooperation with non-state brokers. These shipments frequently violate U.S. Treasury Department sanctions and fund corrupt state apparatuses and regional proxy actors.

More recently, however, U.S. officials have confirmed a marked increase in energy smuggling from sources affiliated with Russia. Following Moscow’s circumvention of global oil price caps and its continued reliance on a shadow tanker fleet, some of these vessels have begun appearing in the Western Hemisphere. According to officials familiar with internal intelligence assessments, Russian-origin fuel is being blended with Venezuelan or third-country products and routed through shell companies in the Caribbean, often with altered bills of lading and obscured ownership structures.

The dual focus of Operation Southern Spear is now clear: interdict energy flows originating from sanctioned state actors, particularly Venezuela and Russia, and dismantle the maritime logistics networks that facilitate their distribution. These operations are not only designed to enforce sanctions but to disrupt the financial pipelines that fuel corruption, fund paramilitary groups, and support destabilizing influence in Latin America and beyond.

The recent interdiction of the Olina follows four earlier operations in 2024, including seizures of the Sanrelli, Elma Star, Navi Sun, and Meridian Crown, each suspected of carrying oil or petrochemicals from unauthorized sources. In several of these cases, investigators found evidence of blended cargoes, in which Russian or Venezuelan oil was mixed with fuel from third-party suppliers to obscure the origin and avoid detection.

In a closed-door congressional briefing in late 2024, U.S. Southern Command leaders warned lawmakers that the Caribbean has become a central transit corridor for black-market energy flows, with multiple nations used as transshipment hubs. The presence of Russian-linked shipping companies, operating under flags of convenience and using decoy transponders, has added a new layer of complexity to enforcement efforts.

Military officials cite the integration of the USS Iwo Jima Amphibious Readiness Group, which includes the USS San Antonio and USS Fort Lauderdale, as a force multiplier for these maritime interdiction operations. Coupled with persistent ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) coverage and diplomatic pressure on regional partners, the U.S. is building a sustained operational framework to intercept tankers before they reach port or transfer cargo to smaller vessels.

As Operation Southern Spear enters a more aggressive phase, U.S. forces are now tasked with enforcing maritime law in contested waters where legal ambiguity is often exploited. Defense analysts stress that beyond the fuel itself, these tankers carry strategic implications. Their cargos bankroll regimes that challenge U.S. influence, enable proxy conflict, and fuel economic instability throughout Latin America.

By targeting both Venezuelan and Russian energy smuggling, the United States is drawing a direct link between maritime security enforcement and the broader geopolitical contest unfolding across the Americas.

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
South Africa Hosts China-Led Naval Drill With Russia and Iran Near Cape Sea Lane
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South Africa is hosting Exercise WILL FOR PEACE 2026 from 9 to 16 January, bringing together naval forces from China, Russia, Iran, and South Africa in waters around Simon’s Town and False Bay. While officially framed as a maritime security and interoperability drill, the exercise carries broader implications by showcasing coordinated operations near one of the world’s most critical alternative shipping routes.

Information releasedby the South African Government on 30 December 2025 confirms that South Africa is hosting Exercise WILL FOR PEACE 2026 from 9 to 16 January in its territorial waters under a China-led multinational framework. Officially framed around “Joint Actions to Ensure the Safety of Shipping and Maritime Economic Activities,” the drill is presented as a maritime security and interoperability exercise. However, the choice of participants, the composition of the deployed naval assets, and the geographic setting around the Cape sea lane collectively elevate the exercise from a technical training event to a deliberate geopolitical and strategic message with implications well beyond Southern African waters.

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South Africa is hosting a China-led multinational naval drill with Russia and Iran near the strategic Cape sea lanes, underscoring growing maritime cooperation along a critical global trade route (Picture Source: Social Media / Reuters)

The geographic setting of WILL FOR PEACE 2026 is central to its strategic meaning. Conducted around Simon’s Town and False Bay, the exercise unfolds at the junction between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, adjacent to one of the world’s most critical alternative maritime routes when the Suez Canal or Red Sea axis is disrupted. From a naval perspective, this environment allows realistic escort, interception, and port-approach security drills amid dense commercial traffic. From a geopolitical standpoint, operating a multinational task group in this area signals an ability and willingness by participating states to demonstrate collective responsibility for a globally relevant sea line of communication, independent of Western-led maritime security frameworks.

China’s role as lead nation is reinforced by the deployment of the guided-missile destroyer Tangshan and the replenishment ship Taihu. Tangshan, a modern area-air-defense destroyer, brings command-and-control, escort coordination, and layered protection capabilities that are directly relevant to convoy defense and high-value shipping escort missions. Its participation enables the rehearsal of formation screening, air and surface surveillance integration, and helicopter-supported maritime patrols. Taihu, meanwhile, provides the logistical backbone that transforms the drill into an endurance-oriented task group exercise, allowing sustained operations at sea and realistic training in replenishment procedures that underpin a persistent maritime presence.

Russia’s contribution adds a complementary escort and sustainment layer through the Steregushchiy-class corvette Stoikiy and the fleet tanker Yelnya. Stoikiy’s configuration, optimized for surface surveillance, limited air defense, and anti-submarine warfare, aligns closely with maritime security scenarios such as escort station assignments and coastal approach protection. Even if operational constraints reduce its at-sea profile, the presence of a corvette-sized combatant remains well suited for interdiction drills and coordinated patrols. Yelnya reinforces the logistics dimension, highlighting that sustainment and endurance are integral to the exercise rather than peripheral considerations.

Iran’s participation introduces the most politically sensitive dimension. Visual documentation from the exercise area shows the forward base ship Makran operating alongside the assembled formation, supported by the patrol combatant Naghdi. Makran’s role as an afloat support and helicopter-capable platform demonstrates Iran’s growing emphasis on extended deployments and expeditionary reach. Within the context of WILL FOR PEACE 2026, it enables complex rescue, medical support, and maritime security serials while simultaneously signaling Iran’s capacity to operate far from home waters in coordination with other non-Western navies.

As the host nation, South Africa provides the operational anchor and regional legitimacy for the exercise. The South African Navy’s Valour-class frigates, when employed in such a scenario, offer balanced escort, air-defense, and surface-surveillance capabilities well suited to shipping protection and port-approach security. More broadly, South Africa’s role underscores a deliberate diplomatic posture: presenting the exercise as technical and non-hostile while facilitating a China-led, BRICS Plus-aligned naval activity at a strategic maritime crossroads. This duality allows Pretoria to emphasize professional naval cooperation while implicitly supporting a more diversified global maritime order.

Viewed as a whole, the force package assembled for WILL FOR PEACE 2026 goes beyond the requirements of a narrow maritime safety drill. The combination of high-end escorts, corvette-sized patrol combatants, and multiple replenishment and support ships rehearses the practical mechanics of coalition task group operations, including command relationships, logistics coordination, and sustained presence. These are precisely the capabilities required to protect maritime commerce under contested conditions, and their rehearsal under a BRICS Plus banner carries clear strategic resonance.

Exercise WILL FOR PEACE 2026 illustrates how maritime security drills can function simultaneously as professional training events and strategic communication tools. While officially focused on safeguarding shipping and economic activity, the China-led exercise brings together South Africa, China, Russia, and Iran in a sustained naval configuration at one of the world’s most important sea junctions. In operational terms, it builds interoperability and endurance for convoy protection missions. In geopolitical terms, it signals the emergence of a BRICS Plus maritime cooperation pattern designed to operate visibly and credibly outside traditional Western-led security structures, reshaping how maritime influence and responsibility are demonstrated along global sea lanes.

Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
Spain’s Frigate Almirante Juan de Borbón Takes Command of NATO’s Standing Naval Group 1
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The Spanish Navy frigate Almirante Juan de Borbon will deploy on January 10, 2026, as the command ship of NATO Standing Naval Group 1, hosting the task force headquarters at sea. The deployment highlights Spain’s growing leadership role within NATO’s forward maritime presence in northern European waters.

On Friday, January 9, 2026, the Spanish Navy announced that the frigate Almirante Juan de Borbon will sail on January 10 from the Ferrol Military Arsenal to begin an international deployment as the command ship of NATO’s Standing Naval Group 1, following completion of its highest level of operational certification. The official change of command is scheduled to take place in the coming days in Den Helder, the Netherlands, and the task force staff will operate from aboard the Spanish ship for the next few months. Rear Admiral Joaquin Ruiz Escagedo will lead the SNMG-1 command element, which the Navy notes is composed primarily of Spanish personnel. Two official images released with the announcement underline the moment’s symbolism: a national escort leaving its home base not as a participant, but as the platform expected to host the group’s headquarters functions at sea.

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Spain’s frigate Almirante Juan de Borbón has departed Ferrol to assume command of NATO Standing Naval Group 1, marking a rare moment in which a Spanish warship sails not just as an escort, but as the floating headquarters of one of NATO’s highest-readiness maritime forces (Picture Source: Spanish Navy)

Almirante Juan de Borbon is an Alvaro de Bazan class frigate, designated F-102, and its selection for flagship duties is as much about ship design as it is about crew performance. The Spanish Navy describes it as a large, command-capable escort with a full-load displacement of 5,853 tonnes, 146.7 meters of length, 18.6 meters of beam, and a maximum draft of 7.4 meters, proportions that matter when a frigate must absorb an embarked staff alongside its normal rhythm of watchkeeping, maintenance, and flight operations. The published top speed is 28 knots, and propulsion is a combined arrangement where the ship can run on either gas turbines or diesel engines in a CODOG configuration. That architecture is not trivia in the SNMG-1 context: it gives commanders the option to shift between efficient sustained steaming and higher-tempo maneuvering without treating fuel economy and responsiveness as mutually exclusive choices, a practical advantage for a formation whose missions range from steady presence to rapid repositioning.

From a warfighting perspective, Almirante Juan de Borbon is optimized as a high-end, multi-role escort designed to defend both itself and the force it leads. Its combat system is built around the AEGIS architecture and the SPY-1D phased-array radar, providing robust area air-defense capability and the capacity to manage multiple aerial threats simultaneously, a decisive attribute for a NATO flagship. The ship’s Mk 41 vertical launch system carries SM-2 surface-to-air missiles for long-range engagements and Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles for medium-range defense, forming a layered protective umbrella against aircraft and anti-ship missiles. Offensive punch against surface combatants is delivered by Harpoon anti-ship missiles, while a 5-inch naval gun supports surface warfare and secondary air-defense tasks. In the anti-submarine role, the frigate combines sonar systems, lightweight torpedoes, and its embarked SH-60B helicopter, allowing it to detect, track, and prosecute underwater threats at range. This balanced mix of offensive reach and defensive depth explains why the ship is routinely tasked not only as a front-line combatant, but also as a command platform capable of protecting and directing a multinational naval force in demanding operational environments.

The Spanish Navy stresses that this deployment follows a demanding preparation and training cycle that required high readiness across all areas simultaneously, ending in certification that validates the ship’s ability to operate in complex scenarios, integrate into multinational forces, and assume command responsibilities. That last clause is the real differentiator. A ship can be tactically capable and still be a poor flagship if it cannot host planning teams, manage a heavier communications load, and maintain a stable operational picture while coordinating multiple allied units. Captain Jesus Gonzalez-Cela, commander of the 31st Surface Squadron, spelled out what this entails in concrete terms: commanding a naval group requires an embarked staff, which brings higher responsibility, greater accommodation demands, and the need for appropriate command and control systems. In other words, the warship is being used as a floating headquarters, not just an escort with a NATO flag flown from the mast.

Commander Miguel Romero, Almirante Juan de Borbon’s commanding officer, framed the deployment in the language of daily pressure rather than ceremony. He emphasized that the crew is approaching the mission with professionalism and a strong sense of responsibility, and he highlighted that serving as a multinational flagship increases operational demands every day, especially in planning, coordination, and communications. His focus on the smooth integration of the embarked staff is a subtle but critical signal: the ship is expected to fuse ship’s company and task force headquarters into a single working organism, proving not merely that Spain can contribute high-end ships, but that it can run the alliance’s maritime tempo from the deckplates up.

The frigate’s deployed package reinforces that the flagship role is being treated as an operational task, not a symbolic appointment. Beyond its organic crew, the ship embarks an Embarked Air Unit from the 10th Squadron of Navy Aircraft with an SH-60B helicopter, and an Operational Security Team of Marine Infantry from the Northern Third. That combination supports the two realities of leading a standing force: the command ship must extend its situational reach and sustain its own protection while simultaneously serving as the platform where multinational coordination lives and breathes. A flagship that cannot maintain aviation tempo, internal security, and staff workflows at once will feel the strain quickly, especially when operating in Northern European waters where weather, traffic, and the pace of allied tasking can all compress decision time.

Standing Naval Group 1, or SNMG-1, is described by the Spanish Navy as one of NATO’s standing naval forces, operating primarily in Northern European waters with missions centered on deterrence, collective defense, naval presence, and strengthening interoperability among allied navies in what the Navy calls a particularly demanding strategic context. The word “standing” is the point: this is not an ad hoc crisis flotilla assembled after events unfold, but a persistent, ready maritime instrument that NATO can task to signal cohesion, reassure allies, and demonstrate credible response capacity without waiting for a new force to be built from scratch. That is why interoperability is treated as a mission rather than a technical footnote. The value of SNMG-1 is not simply the number of hulls under its flag, but the proof that different national ships, crews, procedures, and command cultures can be blended into a single operational force that moves quickly and speaks with one voice.

In that light, Spain’s assumption of command carries geostrategic weight beyond the immediate deployment timeline. First, it shifts Spain from contributor to orchestrator in a formation designed to operate mainly in Northern European waters, a region where alliance signaling is inherently strategic because presence and deterrence are measured in days and patrol patterns, not speeches. Second, it places a primarily Spanish command element at the center of planning and coordination for multinational operations, which is one of the quiet currencies of influence inside NATO: the navy that runs the staff cycle, sets the rhythm of tasking, and manages daily coordination shapes how the alliance functions at sea. Third, the Spanish Navy’s emphasis on certification and readiness anchors the message in capability rather than intent. In an environment the Navy itself labels demanding, credibility comes from the ability to sustain complex operations and command responsibilities without friction, and the flagship role is the most unforgiving way to demonstrate that.

The historical thread the Navy highlighted makes the moment sharper. Captain Gonzalez-Cela noted that the first Spanish frigate to join a Standing Naval Group was Almirante Juan de Borbon in 2005, coinciding with the creation of these permanent naval forces, and he stressed that Spain has routinely participated in these naval forces for decades. This deployment therefore reads as both continuity and escalation: continuity because it sits inside a long pattern of Spanish participation, escalation because the ship is now hosting the staff and exercising command, turning Spain’s routine contribution into a visible leadership role. If the handover in Den Helder proceeds as planned, Almirante Juan de Borbon will not simply be present in Northern European waters. It will be the platform through which NATO’s deterrence posture, collective defense readiness, and allied interoperability are translated into day-to-day operations.

Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
Croatia to purchase two new multipurpose corvettes in largest naval procurement to date
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Croatia plans to acquire two new multipurpose corvettes, marking the largest naval procurement in the history of the Croatian Navy by both value and ship size.

According to Jutarnji on January 6, 2026, Croatia is preparing to acquire two new multipurpose corvettes, marking the largest naval procurement in the history of the Croatian Navy by both value and ship size. The program, estimated at €660 million to €1.6 billion, aims to provide regional sea control in the Adriatic and support NATO and EU maritime operations. The possible agreement has drawn interest from eight countries and twelve shipyards and is expected to define the Croatian Navy’s core surface capability for decades.
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The future Croatian corvette will likely be a modern multipurpose corvette optimized for regional sea control, not blue-water power projection, placing it firmly above offshore patrol vessels but below light frigates, with limited but credible self-defense. (Picture source: Army Recognition)

Croatia plans to acquire two new multipurpose corvettes, representing both the largest naval procurement in the country’s history and the introduction of the biggest warships ever operated by the Croatian Navy. After years of uncertainty, the political leadership announced in 2025 that the Navy would pursue a new warship, before being refined into a program focused specifically on corvettes rather than larger frigates or smaller patrol ships. Now covering two ships rather than a single hull, the project has attracted a strong international interest, with eight countries and twelve shipyards competing to supply the ships.

Depending on the final configuration and industrial arrangements, the total value of the program is estimated between €660 million and €1.6 billion, placing it among the most expensive defense procurements since Croatia’s independence. The ships under consideration fall within the corvette category, positioned above offshore patrol vessels and missile boats but below frigates, and are intended primarily for regional sea control rather than deep-ocean power projection. Modern corvettes typically displace between 1,000 and 3,500 tonnes and measure roughly 80 to 120 meters in length, making them large enough for sustained operations but still suited to confined seas like the Adriatic and limited deployments across the Mediterranean.

These ships cover three core tasks at once: fighting enemy ships, defending against aircraft and missiles, and hunting submarines, although most designs are constrained in at least one of these domains. Air defense is usually the limiting factor compared to larger warships, as corvettes most often carry short-range systems with engagement ranges of 20 to 25 kilometers, only occasionally medium-range missiles in the 60 to 70 kilometer class, and never long-range air-defense weapons. These constraints frame the Croatian choice as a balance between survivability, cost, and mission scope rather than a pursuit of full frigate-level capability. Operational requirements described for the Croatian Navy emphasize control of Croatia’s half of the Adriatic Sea rather than distant force projection.

The geographic reality that the Adriatic Sea is narrow and largely enclosed by allied coastlines reduces the likelihood of hostile surface units entering freely, but it does not eliminate the risk posed by submarines operating below the surface, as they are harder to detect and track. For that reason, a strong anti-submarine warfare, combined with enough air defense to protect the ship itself or allow it to operate safely with allied vessels, is presented as a central requirement. Beyond national defense, the new corvettes are also expected to take part in NATO and EU missions, mainly in the Mediterranean and potentially as far as the Suez Canal and Red Sea. The decision to procure two ships instead of one is justified by availability needs, ensuring that at least one vessel remains operational at all times.

In Croatia, the current debate highlights a preference for either a lower-cost configuration or a higher-capability configuration, while portraying mid-range compromises as offering the least operational return for the investment. The warship program is also linked to systems Croatia already operates on land and at sea. The coastline is monitored by U.S.-built AESA radars acquired in the 2000s, and the Navy operates three mobile coastal missile batteries that are approaching the end of their service life. Any new ship is therefore expected to remain compatible with Croatia's existing missile inventory to avoid costly changes. Another growing concern is the spread of unmanned threats, including remote-controlled kamikaze boats, longer-range torpedoes, and underwater or semi-submerged drones, due to their low cost and potential for mass employment.

While such systems are not entirely new, they showed their effectiveness in the Ukrainian war. This has strengthened the argument that Croatia will need both well-protected ships and its own unmanned systems, some of which could be developed locally, alongside the new corvettes. Therefore, the industrial participation remains a sensitive issue, as Croatia weighs the desire to involve domestic shipyards, but difficulties with previous patrol boat programs have raised concerns about risk and delays. While the Croatian shipyards are technically capable of building hulls, the hull itself typically represents only about 25 percent of a corvette’s total cost, meaning most high-value systems, such as sensors, weapons, and electronics, would still be imported.

For this reason, the most realistic approach leans toward a foreign construction combined with offset work or partial assembly in Croatia, depending on the selected partner. Beyond the ships themselves, the acquisition of two corvettes is presented as a chance to reshape how the Croatian Navy operates, where corvettes would serve as command platforms to coordinate unmanned surface and underwater systems and operate in environments saturated with drones. If carried through as planned, the acquisition would redefine the Croatian Navy’s capabilities for decades, while failure to equip the ships with sufficient combat systems risks limiting the strategic return of a historic investment.

When it comes to weapons, the discussion focuses on proven systems rather than experimental technology. Anti-ship missile options include the Norwegian NSM, with a stated range of 180 to 200 kilometers and the ability to hit land targets, the Swedish RBS-15 Mark IV, heavier but able to reach targets close to 300 kilometers, and the French Exocet Block 3c, which also offers limited land-attack capability. The main question is usually how many launchers the future ship carries, often four or eight, rather than which missile is chosen.

For air defense, short-range protection can be provided by systems like the RAM system (using the RIM-116 missile with a reach of up to 8.9 kilometers), while medium-range options focus on missiles such as the CAMM-ER or the RIM-162 Evolved SeaSparrow, both with ranges of about 60 kilometers. Corvettes do not carry the deep vertical launch cells found on larger warships, which explains why their air-defense capability remains limited by design. A recurring theme amid Croatian media is the modularity, with modern hulls designed to accept different radar, sonar, and missile suites in a “building-block” approach rather than tightly integrated, fixed configurations.

With all of these demands, the competitive field spans across Europe, Türkiye, South Korea, and the United States, with Europe described as particularly strong in this segment. According to Jutarnji, France could offer the Gowind, which combines Exocet missiles, vertical launch cells for MICA and possibly Aster 15, and a balanced mix of sensors with possible industrial offsets, making it one of the more capable options. Germany is linked to the Braunschweig class, optimized for coastal defense, as it carries RBS-15 Mark III missiles, but only short-range air defense. Italy could offer either the European Patrol Corvette, whose future remains uncertain due to diverging national requirements, or the Al Zubarah class built for Qatar, which approaches the capability of a light frigate at a higher cost.

The Netherlands is associated with the SIGMA design, noted for its modularity but rarely produced in a high-end configuration, while Spain is linked to the Avante 2200, broadly similar in concept to the Gowind. Türkiye's Ada-class, which is seen as more affordable and optimized for anti-submarine warfare, remains limited in air defense, while carrying the Atmaca missile with a 200-kilometer range and land-attack capability. South Korea is highlighted for offering larger ships closer to light frigates, such as the Incheon-class (FFX-I) and Daegu-class (FFX-II), with hull lengths of 120 to 125 meters, medium-range air defense, competitive pricing, and a willingness to share technology. Finally, U.S. options based on the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) design, such as the Saudi HMS Saud, are generally viewed with caution due to their rapid withdrawal from service.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.