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U.S. Navy Prepares Future Columbia-Class Nuclear Submarine for Trident II Ballistic Missiles
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The U.S. Navy has awarded General Dynamics Mission Systems a contract to sustain and modernize the Trident II ballistic missile fire control system used aboard its ballistic missile submarines. The upgrade ensures the missile can operate seamlessly from both existing Ohio-class boats and the upcoming Columbia-class fleet, preserving the credibility of the United States’ sea-based nuclear deterrent.

As the U.S. Navy prepares to introduce the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine, maintaining compatibility with the Trident II D5 missile remains central to the credibility of the nation’s sea-based nuclear deterrent. To support this transition, the Navy has awarded General Dynamics Mission Systems a contract to sustain and modernize the submarine fire control system that enables the employment of the Trident II. The effort is designed to ensure that both the current Ohio-class fleet and the future Columbia-class submarines can operate the missile with consistent precision and reliability. By preserving operational continuity across two generations of strategic submarines, the modernization effort supports the long-term stability of the United States’ nuclear triad.
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Artist’s rendering of the next-generation Columbia-class nuclear ballistic missile submarine with an unarmed Trident II D5 Life Extension (D5LE) missile launches from an Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine (Picture source: US DoD/Edited by Army Recognition)

General Dynamics Mission Systems has acted for decades as the primary integrator of this strategic fire control system. The Fire Control System forms the digital interface linking the submarine’s navigation systems, mission computers, and the launch tubes that house the ballistic missiles. It processes targeting data, calculates ballistic trajectories, and synchronizes launch parameters with the submarine’s position and movement. On board an Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), this architecture can manage up to 24 Trident II missiles, supervising alignment, verification, and launch preparation procedures while the submarine remains submerged.

The scope of the contract extends beyond technical maintenance. It supports the gradual transition between two generations of U.S. strategic submarines. The Ohio-class SSBN, introduced during the 1980s, currently constitutes the sea-based component of the U.S. nuclear triad. Their replacement is expected to begin during the next decade with the introduction of Columbia-class SSBN, designed to conduct deterrent patrols for several decades. Throughout this transition, the strategic missile itself remains unchanged, which requires technological continuity between current platforms and the future fleet.

The weapon system is built around the Trident II D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), which forms the core of the U.S. sea-based nuclear deterrent. This three-stage solid-propellant ballistic missile can reach ranges exceeding 7,000 kilometers, depending on payload configuration. Each missile can carry multiple nuclear warheads using the Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRV) concept, allowing a single missile to strike several targets. Guidance combines high-precision inertial navigation with stellar navigation updates during the boost phase, resulting in an estimated circular error probable of about 90 meters. Introduced in the 1990s, the Trident II is undergoing life-extension programs intended to maintain operational service into the mid-21st century.

The contract also includes continued work related to the Trident II D5 Life Extension 2 (D5LE2) program, designed to extend the missile’s service life. This effort involves replacing electronic components, upgrading guidance computers, and adapting fire control interfaces to ensure compatibility with the newer digital architectures that will equip Columbia-class SSBN.

Most of the work will take place in Pittsfield, Massachusetts, which accounts for approximately 87 percent of the program’s activities. Additional tasks will occur across several facilities connected to the U.S. strategic submarine enterprise, including Bangor, Washington, and Kings Bay, Georgia, where the U.S. ballistic missile submarine fleets are based. Technical activities are also planned in Groton, Connecticut, Cape Canaveral, Florida, Quonset Point, Rhode Island and Loanhead in the United Kingdom. If all contract options are exercised, work could continue through December 2032.

Maintaining this technical architecture has broader strategic implications. Ballistic missile submarines are generally considered the most survivable component of the U.S. nuclear triad because they operate continuously at sea and are difficult to detect. By ensuring that the Trident II missile can be employed without interruption from both existing Ohio-class SSBN and future Columbia-class SSBN, the United States preserves the continuity of its sea-based nuclear deterrent at a time when other nuclear powers, including Russia and China, are modernizing their own strategic forces.

Written By Erwan Halna du Fretay - Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Erwan Halna du Fretay is a graduate of a Master’s degree in International Relations and has experience in the study of conflicts and global arms transfers. His research interests lie in security and strategic studies, particularly the dynamics of the defense industry, the evolution of military technologies, and the strategic transformation of armed forces.
Netherlands redeploys HNLMS Evertsen air defense frigate to protect French carrier strike group
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The Netherlands is examining the redeployment of the air defense frigate HNLMS Evertsen to the eastern Mediterranean. The ship could support the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle carrier strike group following a request from France.

The Dutch government is examining whether the Royal Netherlands Navy frigate HNLMS Evertsen should join the French Charles de Gaulle carrier strike group in the eastern Mediterranean to provide air defense and escort missions. The ship has already sailed toward the Mediterranean while the cabinet and parliament review the potential redeployment following a request from France, amid regional tensions linked to Iranian attacks.
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Within task group operations, the Zr.Ms. Evertsen air defense frigate protects other vessels at short and medium ranges while maintaining situational awareness across a large airspace sector. (Picture source: Dutch MoD)

On March 4, 2026, the Dutch government announced that it is examining the possibility of deploying the Royal Netherlands Navy frigate Zr.Ms. Evertsen in the eastern Mediterranean in response to regional tensions linked to Iranian attacks on neighboring countries. The announcement was communicated to the House of Representatives by Defense Minister Dilan Yeşilgöz-Zegerius and Foreign Affairs Minister Berendsen. The Netherlands received a French request on March 3 asking that the frigate support the Charles de Gaulle carrier strike group following its redeployment in the eastern Mediterranean. The requested mission focuses on defensive tasks, mainly contributing to the protection of the carrier and its accompanying naval formation.

Both ships previously operated together in a broader carrier strike group during readiness exercises conducted in the Baltic Sea. The Dutch cabinet indicated that a decision will be taken in the near term and that parliament will be informed once the assessment is complete. While the political process continues, the Zr.Ms. Evertsen has already begun sailing toward the Mediterranean Sea alongside the French carrier. The Zr.Ms. Evertsen, also known as the HNLMS Evertsen (F805), is the fourth air defense and command frigate of the De Zeven Provinciën-class operated by the Royal Netherlands Navy. The ship was laid down on September 6, 2001, launched on April 19, 2003, and entered service in June 2005.

Full load displacement reaches 6,050 tonnes, while the hull measures about 144 meters in length with a beam of about 18 meters and a draught slightly above 5 meters. Propulsion relies on a combined diesel or gas arrangement integrating two Wärtsilä 16 V26 diesel engines and two Rolls-Royce Spey SM 1C gas turbines. Power is transmitted through two shafts driving controllable pitch propellers, allowing maximum speeds close to 28 to 30 knots depending on configuration. Crew size normally ranges between 169 and 174 personnel, rising to more than 200 when command staff and aviation elements are embarked. The ship can operate one NH90 NFH maritime helicopter from its flight deck and hangar facilities.

The De Zeven Provinciën-class was built by Damen Schelde Naval Shipbuilding and includes four air defense and command frigates commissioned between 2002 and 2005. These ships were designed to provide area air defense to naval formations and also to function as command ships with facilities for an embarked staff. Construction of the four vessels represented an investment of €1.9 billion for the Netherlands. Each vessel integrates long-range surveillance radars, missile launch systems, and command infrastructure intended to coordinate defense against aircraft, cruise missiles, and other aerial threats. Within task group operations, the ships protect other vessels at short and medium ranges while maintaining situational awareness across a large airspace sector.

The ships can also conduct anti-submarine warfare, surface warfare, and maritime security missions when required. Accommodation capacity reaches about 207 personnel, including aviation detachments and command staff. The ship’s sensor suite centers on the Thales SMART-L long-range surveillance radar combined with the APAR active phased array radar. The SMART-L operates in the L band and can detect patrol aircraft at distances up to 400 km while identifying low-observable missile targets at about 65 km. A later extended long-range configuration increases ballistic missile detection capability to more than 2,000 km. The APAR radar, for its part, uses four fixed electronically scanned arrays and tracks more than 200 aerial targets at distances up to 150 km while also monitoring more than 150 surface contacts.

The APAR can simultaneously guide up to 32 semi-active radar homing missiles in flight and maintain 16 of them in terminal guidance phases. Additional sensors include the Sirius infrared search and track system for long-distance infrared detection and the Mirador optical observation system. Underwater detection is handled by an Atlas Elektronik DSQS-24C hull-mounted sonar. Air defense weapons on the Zr.Ms. Evertsen frigate are centered on a Mk 41 vertical launching system (VLS) containing 40 cells arranged in five modules. The launcher can fire SM-2 surface-to-air missiles with engagement ranges between 74 km and 170 km, depending on flight profile and target parameters. The ship also carries Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles (ESSMs) for shorter-range interception of aircraft and anti-ship missiles. ESSM missiles can be loaded four per launcher cell, increasing the number of interceptors available during engagements.

Missile guidance relies on APAR radar illumination and command guidance during mid-course flight. The ship also carries eight Harpoon anti-ship missiles for surface engagements. Anti-submarine warfare capability includes two twin torpedo launchers firing Mk 46 torpedoes with a range of up to 11,000 m. Gun armament consists of a 127 mm naval gun originally based on the Otobreda 127/54 system and later replaced by the Otobreda 127/64 lightweight gun. The 127/64 weapon can fire conventional 127 mm ammunition with effective ranges around 30 km and guided Vulcano projectiles reaching between 70 km and 120 km. The rate of fire reaches 32 rounds per minute, and shell mass ranges from 29 kg to 31 kg.

For close defense, the ship carries two Goalkeeper close-in weapon systems (CIWS) using the GAU-8 seven-barreled 30 mm rotary cannon. Each CIWS fires up to 4,200 rounds per minute and engages incoming missiles or aircraft at distances between 350 m and 1,500 to 2,000 m, depending on ammunition type. The system’s reaction time against a sea-skimming missile approaching at Mach 2 is about 5.5 seconds from detection to destruction. Additional protection includes Browning M2 12.7 mm machine guns and FN MAG 7.62 mm machine guns positioned on deck. Throughout its operational career, the Evertsen frigate has taken part in several multinational naval operations.

In 2007, for instance, the vessel operated with Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 and assisted during an emergency following a volcanic eruption on the island of Jabal al-Tair in the Red Sea, rescuing two people from the water after a request from the Yemeni coast guard. From February to June 2008, the ship protected vessels chartered by the World Food Programme against piracy off the coast of Somalia. In 2009, the frigate served as flagship during Operation Atalanta and escorted merchant shipping through piracy-affected waters in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. During that period, Dutch naval forces captured a group of pirates suspected of attacking the merchant ship BBC Togo. These missions combined maritime security operations with command roles inside multinational naval formations.

The frigate has also been integrated into aircraft carrier strike groups and multinational naval task forces. In October 2020, the vessel joined exercises with the British aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth as part of the GROUPEX and Joint Warrior training activities. In 2021, the ship deployed with the United Kingdom Carrier Strike Group for a 26,000 nautical mile mission to the Asia Pacific region. The deployment included operations in the Mediterranean Sea followed by transit through the Suez Canal toward India, Singapore, and the South China Sea before reaching Japan. Some ships of the group, including Evertsen, later conducted visits to the Black Sea during the mission. During that phase, Russian aircraft conducted simulated attack passes against the frigate. A fire incident occurred on board on August 29, 2024, during maintenance work in Den Helder, but was limited to a generator exhaust pipe and caused minimal damage.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
Spain Deploys Aegis Frigate to Cyprus to Strengthen European Missile Defense Against Iran
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Spain is deploying its advanced Aegis-equipped frigate SPS Cristóbal Colón (F-105) toward Cyprus to strengthen European air and missile defense as Iran-linked tensions expand across the Eastern Mediterranean. The move places a high-end radar and interceptor platform inside a growing multinational naval shield protecting EU territory, allied bases, and evacuation routes.

Spain is deploying its most advanced air-defense frigate, SPS Cristóbal Colón (F-105), toward Cyprus to reinforce European air and missile defense coverage at the eastern edge of the EU as the Iran-centered conflict expands into the Eastern Mediterranean. Madrid’s decision places a high-end Aegis combat system ship inside a rapidly forming multinational protective screen intended to deter follow-on drone and missile strikes against EU territory, allied bases, and civilian evacuation corridors. Spain’s Ministry of Defense says the frigate will operate alongside France’s carrier Charles de Gaulle and Greek naval units, with the group now redirecting from northern waters toward the Mediterranean and expected off Crete around 10 March, according to the Spanish government’s official communication.
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Spain is sending Aegis frigate SPS Cristóbal Colón (F-105) to Cyprus to bolster European air and missile defense amid Iran-linked escalation, joining a wider multinational naval deployment in the Eastern Mediterranean (Picture source: Spain MoD).

The immediate driver is the increased risk of Iranian long-range retaliation and proxy-enabled strikes reaching Cyprus, which sits within operational range of cruise missiles, one-way attack drones, and ballistic trajectories transiting the Levant. The urgency sharpened after a drone attack hit the UK’s RAF Akrotiri base, triggering allied reinforcement moves that Reuters described as a combined effort by Britain, France, and Greece to add air-defense forces and naval assets to Cyprus’ protective posture. In parallel, continuing live coverage of the widening conflict has highlighted ongoing missile and drone salvos across the region, including reports of Iranian missile launches toward Israel as escalation continued.

Cristóbal Colón is the fifth and most updated ship of Spain’s Álvaro de Bazán (F-100) class, built around the U.S.-origin Aegis architecture that enables simultaneous wide-area surveillance, fire control, and multi-target engagement. The ship is widely described as the class “Flight II” variant incorporating Aegis Baseline 7.1 and the improved SPY-1D(V) radar configuration, alongside electronic-warfare enhancements and optimized combat-system architecture. In practical tactical terms, this equips the ship to function as an escort for high-value units, an air-defense commander for a surface action group, or an independent picket positioned to expand the defended footprint over sea and coastal approaches.

Open-source configuration data for the class indicates a 48-cell Mk 41 vertical launch system, typically loaded with a mix of SM-2 area-defense interceptors and ESSM for inner-layer defense, backed by illuminators and Aegis fire-control logic for rapid, repeated engagements. The platform’s multi-mission posture is reinforced by anti-surface weapons (commonly Harpoon-class missiles in current service), a 127 mm Mk 45 gun for surface engagements and naval gunfire tasks, torpedo tubes for anti-submarine warfare, and an embarked helicopter to extend ASW and surface-search reach beyond the ship’s own sensors. Those elements matter in the Cyprus mission because a ship that can defend itself, prosecute submarines, and monitor surface approaches can remain on station longer and operate closer to threat axes without being forced to retreat into a purely defensive bubble.

The ship’s most relevant contribution off Cyprus is not simply “presence” but battle-networked air defense: persistent radar coverage, identification and track fusion, and the ability to share a common tactical picture with allied aircraft and ships over standardized tactical data links. A key indicator of this interoperability is the U.S. Navy’s previously documented cooperative testing with Cristóbal Colón, including tactical data link interoperability events and live missile-firing activities tied to Aegis Integrated Air and Missile Defense scenarios. In an Eastern Mediterranean environment saturated with drones, low-altitude cruise threats, and potentially ballistic missiles, an Aegis ship can be positioned to defend critical nodes, cue other shooters, or engage threats directly while maintaining maneuver space for escorted assets.

Spain’s stated mission framing is explicitly defensive and tightly linked to EU territorial protection. The government statement says Cristóbal Colón will “offer protection and air defense,” complementing the Spanish Patriot battery deployed in Turkey, while also remaining available to support civilian evacuation if the conflict endangers noncombatants. Spanish officials have also drawn a bright line between defensive solidarity with EU partners and participation in offensive operations: Spanish public broadcaster reporting described Madrid’s position that Spain would consider actions to protect Cyprus if requested within EU frameworks, while reiterating it would not collaborate with the United States in the war.

The deployment is also part of a larger European naval movement that has accelerated since the strike on Akrotiri. France has ordered the nuclear-powered carrier Charles de Gaulle back toward the Mediterranean with escorts and supporting air-defense assets, while Britain has announced the dispatch of a Type 45 destroyer, and Greece has moved frontline frigates and fighters to bolster Cyprus’ air-defense umbrella, according to international reporting. Naval reporting from Greece further emphasizes that Athens’ newest FDI frigate, Kimon, is being used specifically for its long-range air-defense coverage, underscoring that European capitals are now treating Cyprus as a forward air-defense line rather than a rear-area sanctuary.

For Spain, sending F-105 also carries an industrial and modernization subtext. Washington approved a potential $1.7 billion Foreign Military Sale package in January 2026 to modernize Spain’s five Aegis-equipped F-100 frigates, including Aegis shipsets, Mk 41 Baseline VIII VLS upgrades, next-generation surface-search radar, and improvements to systems like Nixie torpedo countermeasures, as disclosed in official U.S. security cooperation documentation. Deploying Cristóbal Colón into a coalition air-defense screen now highlights why Spain is investing in keeping this class at the top tier of NATO interoperability: the ship is not just a frigate, it is a mobile node in Europe’s evolving integrated air and missile defense architecture.

As the group transits with logistical support, including Spain’s oiler Cantabria providing fuel and en-route sustainment, Madrid’s move signals that the EU’s eastern maritime flank will be defended with high-end naval sensors and interceptors, not declarations, consistent with Spain’s official framing. The risk calculus is straightforward: if Iran or its proxies broaden target sets to include European bases and infrastructure in Cyprus, a layered naval shield offers immediate, scalable defense and a credible deterrent, while preserving the option to protect evacuation routes and prevent a localized strike from becoming a strategic rupture in Europe’s southeastern frontier.

Written by Evan Lerouvillois, Defense Analyst.

Evan studied International Relations, and quickly specialized in defense and security. He is particularly interested in the influence of the defense sector on global geopolitics, and analyzes how technological innovations in defense, arms export contracts, and military strategies influence the international geopolitical scene.
U.S. Navy Orders Tomahawk Missile Electronics as Iran War Drives Cruise Missile Production Surge
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U.S. Mobix Labs has received a new U.S. Navy production order for Tomahawk cruise missile electronics as operational demand rises during the Iran conflict. The contract highlights how rapid wartime expenditure of precision weapons is forcing the Pentagon and industry to accelerate missile replenishment.

U.S. Mobix Labs has secureda new U.S. Navy production purchase order for Tomahawk cruise missile electronics components, a small but revealing signal that America’s premier standoff strike weapon is moving into a higher-tempo replenishment cycle as combat expenditure accelerates in the Iran war. The order, for a “high-reliability filtering component” designed to protect sensitive onboard electronics against electromagnetic interference, arrives as Pentagon leaders privately acknowledge that the opening phase of strikes burned through “hundreds” of high-end munitions, including Tomahawks, in just days.
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Mobix Labs has won a new U.S. Navy order for Tomahawkelectronics as Iran-war strike demand rapidly drains U.S. cruise missile stockpiles, pushing faster production. Tomahawk remains the Navy's key standoff weapon, offering roughly 900 nautical miles of range, low-altitude penetration, and in-flight retargeting (Picture source: U.S. DoW).

The industrial cue matters because Tomahawkdemand is no longer driven only by modernization plans and allied foreign military sales. It is now being pulled forward by operational reality: the U.S. Navy is expending long-range cruise missiles to hit defended and time-sensitive targets while keeping ships and submarines outside dense Iranian air defenses and anti-ship threat rings. Public reporting on “Operation Epic Fury” describes a campaign that rapidly expanded to thousands of targets and relied heavily on standoff weapons early, before transitioning toward cheaper stand-in munitions as air defenses were degraded. That transition is not a sign that Tomahawk is less relevant; it is a sign that magazine depth is finite and being consumed at wartime rates.

Mobix has not disclosed the contract value, but its description of the component is a reminder that cruise missile production is often constrained by specialized electronics as much as by airframes and propulsion. The company says its filtering hardware is “mission-essential” and already integrated into the Tomahawk production baseline, with demand scaling as production volumes rise. In practical terms, electromagnetic-interference filtering is a survivability enabler for a missile that must execute low-altitude terrain-following flight while navigating by blended guidance, maintaining timing stability inside its mission computer, and receiving updates over satellite communications in a high-power naval RF environment. Shipboard radars, electronic warfare systems, and the electromagnetic shock of a vertical launch are exactly the kind of conditions that punish marginal electronics design, making qualified, defense-grade filtering components a genuine “no substitute” item once a missile is in full-rate manufacture.

The modern Tomahawkremains a long-range, subsonic, all-weather cruise missile optimized for precision deep strike from surface ships and submarines. The U.S. Navy fact file describes Block IV and Block V Tomahawks as having a range of about 900 nautical miles (roughly 1,000 statute miles or 1,600 km), using an inertial navigation system combined with TERCOM terrain contour matching, DSMAC scene-matching, and GPS. It is powered by a solid-fuel booster for launch, followed by a turbofan cruise engine, and it carries a conventional 1,000-pound-class unitary warhead in the land-attack configuration.

Where Tomahawkhas evolved most is in networked employment and terminal flexibility, which directly explains why commanders reach for it first when they must strike quickly from standoff range. The Navy notes that Block IV introduced two-way satellite communications that allow in-flight reprogramming to alternative targets or to new GPS coordinates, and it can loiter over an area to service emerging targets. The same fact file credits Block IV with an onboard camera that can support battle damage assessment. These features change Tomahawk from a preplanned “fire-and-forget” cruise missile into a managed weapon that can be reassigned mid-mission as the intelligence picture shifts, which is especially valuable when mobile missile forces, command nodes, and air defense emitters are being hunted across a wide battlespace.

The Block V modernization path further reinforces Tomahawk’s role in contested warfare. A U.S. Department of Defense acquisition report states that Block V introduces an Advanced Communications Architecture, adds the Maritime Strike Tomahawk capability as Block Va, and integrates the Joint Multiple Effects Warhead System as Block Vb. The same document emphasizes Tomahawk’s small size and low-altitude flight as factors that improve survivability en route to highly defended targets. Raytheon also frames Block Va as the moving-target maritime strike variant and Block Vb as the land-attack variant with a more versatile multi-effects warhead, expanding the target set beyond what a legacy unitary charge can reliably service.

These upgrades map cleanly onto what the Iran war demands. Tomahawk gives combatant commanders a way to generate early-night, first-wave effects against air defenses, command-and-control, fixed missile infrastructure, and hardened nodes without immediately exposing manned aircraft to integrated air defense systems. Submarines add a critical advantage: they can deliver large salvos covertly and persist in theater with reduced political and force-protection footprint, while surface combatants contribute volume from Mk 41-equipped destroyers and cruisers. Yet every Tomahawk fired is also a physical depletion of shipboard vertical launch cells that cannot be reloaded at sea under combat conditions in most fleets, forcing planning tradeoffs between strike capacity and air-defense loadouts. In a campaign measured in days, that magazine arithmetic becomes strategic.

The industrial and budget context underscores why Mobix’s component order is more than a one-off supplier headline. Even before the current war, reported U.S. Navy procurement profiles were modest relative to historic combat usage, with open-source reporting pointing to planned buys on the order of dozens of missiles per year in the mid-2020s. Now, senior officials and lawmakers are openly discussing supplemental funding to replenish expended munitions, while defense reporting describes concerns about “magazine depth” across both offensive and defensive weapons as the Iran campaign widens.

The demand picture is also expanding beyond the Navy. Reuters has highlighted that the U.S. Army’s Typhon mid-range capability can fire Tomahawkmissiles, and recent deployments and demonstrations in the Indo-Pacific have reinforced that Tomahawk is becoming a joint, not solely naval, long-range strike commodity. That matters because it broadens the customer base competing for the same inventories and production slots at the precise moment wartime consumption is accelerating.

Washington is already responding with multi-year industrial action. Reuters and RTX report a set of framework agreements intended to increase annual Tomahawk production to more than 1,000 missiles, a dramatic expansion from the pre-war production baseline and a clear acknowledgment that the United States is re-learning the industrial lesson of high-intensity warfare: stockpiles that look comfortable in peacetime can evaporate in a week of real combat. If the Iran war continues to drive high burn rates for standoff strike, supplier orders like Mobix’s will likely become routine indicators of a broader shift toward sustained cruise missile production, not as a surge, but as the new normal for U.S. readiness and deterrence.

Written by Evan Lerouvillois, Defense Analyst.

Evan studied International Relations, and quickly specialized in defense and security. He is particularly interested in the influence of the defense sector on global geopolitics, and analyzes how technological innovations in defense, arms export contracts, and military strategies influence the international geopolitical scene.
U.S. Submarine Strike on Iranian Warship Highlights Combat Performance of Mk-48 Torpedo
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A U.S. Navy fast attack submarine sank an Iranian combatant vessel in the Indian Ocean on March 4, 2026, using a single Mk 48 heavyweight torpedo, according to Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Dan Caine. The engagement highlights the continuing lethality of U.S. submarine warfare and the central role of the Mk 48 torpedo in modern naval combat.

On 4 March 2026, a United States Navy fast attack submarine sank an Iranian combatant vessel in the Indian Ocean with a single Mk 48 heavyweight torpedo, Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said during a press briefing on Wednesday. Presented as the first successful sinking of an enemy warship by a U.S. submarine since 1945, the strike marks a significant operational milestone in modern undersea warfare. The engagement, described by Caine as achieving “immediate effect” and sending the ship to the bottom, underscores the combination of stealth, reach and precision that underpins U.S. submarine operations today. Beyond the tactical result, the episode highlights the central role of the Mk 48 torpedo in U.S. naval doctrine.

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A U.S. Navy fast attack submarine sank an Iranian combatant vessel in the Indian Ocean with a single Mk 48 heavyweight torpedo, marking the first confirmed wartime sinking of an enemy warship by a U.S. submarine since World War II (Picture Source: U.S. Navy / U.S. Department of War / Lockheed Martin)

U.S. officials confirmed that the Iranian warship was “effectively neutralized” in a single “fast attack” engagement, with the Mk 48 torpedo destroying the vessel after it had been hunted and tracked as an out-of-area deployer. Caine emphasized that the operation showcased America’s global reach and the ability to locate, fix and strike a hostile warship far from its home waters, a capability that remains unique in scale and sophistication. Several reports indicate the ship was operating in international waters south of Sri Lanka when it was struck, underlining the geographic breadth of the current confrontation between Washington and Tehran and the exposure of surface combatants operating beyond protective air and missile defense umbrellas.

At the center of this engagement is the Mk 48, the U.S. Navy’s standard heavyweight torpedo since the early 1970s. Designed as a dual-purpose weapon for both anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare, the Mk 48 and its Advanced Capability (ADCAP) variants equip all U.S. attack submarines, including the Los Angeles, Seawolf and Virginia classes. Measuring about 5.8 meters in length, with a diameter of 533 millimeters and a mass approaching 1.7 tons depending on the variant, the torpedo carries a high-explosive warhead of roughly 650 pounds, specifically engineered to break the back of large warships. Its performance parameters remain classified, but public sources describe a range measured in tens of kilometers and speeds more than sufficient to overtake modern surface combatants.

The latest Mk 48 Mod 7 Common Broadband Advanced Sonar System (CBASS) configuration embodies a fully digital, software-defined weapon system optimized for complex acoustic environments. The torpedo combines wire guidance from the launching submarine with advanced active and passive sonar, allowing the crew to update targeting data in flight or hand over control entirely to the weapon’s own algorithms once it closes with the target. Equipped with a pump-jet propulsion system powered by Otto Fuel II, the Mk 48 is designed to operate at significant depth and to maneuver aggressively in response to evasive actions or countermeasures. Its under-keel detonation mode focuses explosive energy beneath a ship’s hull, fracturing the keel and compromising structural integrity in a way that can sink even well-compartmented warships with a single hit.

The weapon’s capabilities tie directly into U.S. Navy undersea doctrine, which rests on sea control, sea denial and the protection of joint forces and maritime trade. By arming fast attack submarines with a torpedo able to engage both submarines and high-value surface combatants, the Mk 48 gives U.S. commanders a flexible, covert tool that can be deployed from close to the U.S. coastline to distant choke points and shipping lanes. In a contested environment, a single submarine can threaten an adversary’s surface fleet, logistics ships and submarines simultaneously, forcing potential opponents to invest heavily in anti-submarine warfare assets and defensive escorts. The successful strike against the Iranian vessel demonstrates in operational terms what U.S. doctrine has long stressed in theory: that any hostile surface combatant entering open-ocean areas patrolled by U.S. submarines must now assume that it is both detectable and vulnerable.

This event also illustrates how the Mk 48 fits into contemporary concepts such as distributed maritime operations and integrated deterrence. Because an attack submarine can operate independently, with minimal signature and no requirement for local air superiority, it offers national leaders a discreet but powerful instrument for responding to hostile actions at sea. When Caine described the operation as proof of America’s ability to “hunt, find and kill an out-of-area deployer,” he was essentially underscoring the practical application of these concepts: dispersed U.S. forces using superior sensors, networking and weapons to hold adversary assets at risk across wide oceanic spaces. In this framework, the Mk 48 functions not just as a torpedo, but as a central node in a broader kill chain linking intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance to decisive, high-confidence fires.

For Iran and other potential adversaries, the sinking of a combatant warship with a single Mk 48 is a clear reminder of the risks associated with projecting naval power beyond defended littoral zones. The strike suggests that even modern surface combatants, operating under peacetime or gray-zone rules of engagement, can be rapidly neutralized if they are judged to pose an unacceptable threat to U.S. forces, partners or critical shipping routes. At the same time, for allies and partners, the episode reinforces the perception that U.S. undersea forces remain a cornerstone of global maritime security, capable of acting quickly and decisively in support of coalition objectives, while limiting collateral damage by striking only the designated military target.

The destruction of an Iranian warship by a single Mk 48 torpedo underscores the long-recognized capabilities of U.S. fast attack submarines. Equipped with advanced heavyweight torpedoes, these vessels serve as an effective means of ensuring sea control and deterrence. The combination of stealth, precision targeting, and highly capable weapon systems demonstrates the United States’ ability to detect, monitor, and, when required, neutralize hostile naval forces. As the situation with Iran develops, this engagement highlights both the tactical effectiveness and the strategic relevance of U.S. undersea power in maintaining maritime security.

Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
China to expand submarine fleet toward 70 boats by 2027 and 80 by 2035 to challenge US Navy
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China could expand its submarine fleet to about 70 boats by 2027 and around 80 by 2035 according to U.S. naval intelligence assessments.

U.S. naval intelligence indicates China could expand its submarine fleet to about 70 boats by 2027 and around 80 by 2035, including new nuclear-powered attack submarines, guided missile submarines, and ballistic missile submarines. These new submarines would significantly increase China's naval presence across the Indo-Pacific and affect the maritime balance with the U.S. Navy.
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Current projections indicate the Chinese submarine fleet could reach roughly 80 submarines by 2035, with about half powered by nuclear reactors to increase the country's endurance and operational reach across the Indo-Pacific. (Picture source: Chinese MoD)

On March 2, 2026, Rear Admiral Mike Brookes, from the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, highlighted a rapid expansion of China's undersea forces, indicating that its submarine force could reach roughly 70 submarines by 2027 through the addition of six nuclear-powered guided-missile submarines, three smaller-class nuclear-powered attack submarines, and two ballistic missile submarines while retiring older Chinese and Russian-built units. Continued construction could expand the inventory to about 80 submarines by 2035, with roughly half of the fleet powered by nuclear reactors, representing a major shift in force composition toward longer-endurance vessels. Projections for the early 2040s indicate the possible addition of 20 to 30 new-class nuclear-powered guided-missile and ballistic missile submarines designed for blue-water operations beyond the first island chain.

Parallel investments are directed toward unmanned underwater vehicles, seabed sensor networks, and oceanographic mapping, intended to improve submarine detection and maritime area control. These would significantly expand China’s capacity for sea denial, strategic deterrence patrols, and long-range strike operations in the Indo-Pacific maritime theater. Undersea warfare now forms a central component of Chinese naval strategy across multiple operational missions, including strategic nuclear deterrence, sea-lane interdiction, intelligence collection, and precision strike against naval and land targets. For now, more than 60 submarines operate as part of the People’s Liberation Army Navy to secure maritime approaches in the East China Sea and South China Sea while extending naval reach toward the western Pacific and beyond.

This fleet is part of China's operational framework named “Near Seas Defense, Far Seas Protection,” which combines coastal defense with the ability to conduct distant maritime operations. Underwater capabilities support both defensive tasks, such as protection of ballistic missile submarine patrol areas, and offensive missions, including attacks on surface vessels and logistics routes. Chinese naval planning also emphasizes integration of submarines with air assets, surface combatants, seabed sensors, and satellite-linked surveillance networks. This integrated structure aims to monitor critical maritime corridors and reduce the freedom of maneuver of adversary submarines operating near Chinese waters.

China’s current submarine fleet includes several distinct categories of vessels with different operational roles. Nuclear-powered attack submarines include the Type 093 Shang-class, with newer Shang III variants incorporating ducted propulsors and improved acoustic quieting. At least six of eight expected Shang III submarines have been launched since 2022, and these boats feature vertical launch systems capable of firing anti-ship and land-attack cruise missiles. Nuclear-powered guided-missile submarines, such as the future Type 095 Sui-class, provide long-range precision strike capability and are intended to launch cruise missiles against maritime and land targets. Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines include the Type 094 Jin-class, which carry JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missiles capable of targeting intercontinental distances while operating within bastion areas near the first island chain.

China also operates more than 50 diesel-electric submarines, including Type 039A/B Yuan-class boats equipped with air-independent propulsion systems that increase submerged endurance and reduce exposure during snorkeling operations. Industrial development has played a central role in expanding the Chinese submarine construction capacity. China operates three major submarine shipyards where large infrastructure investments have expanded construction halls and increased assembly space for submarine production. These upgrades have more than doubled submarine production capacity and allow simultaneous construction of multiple submarines with larger hull diameters and modern reactor systems.

Production rates for nuclear-powered submarines have increased from less than one boat per year to significantly higher levels as facilities expand manufacturing throughput. Shipyard modernization includes upgraded fabrication facilities capable of building larger pressure hull sections and integrating advanced sonar arrays and propulsion systems. Increased industrial capacity supports the steady production of both nuclear-powered submarines and conventional diesel-electric boats while enabling the introduction of next-generation submarine classes. Sustained construction programs are expected to maintain fleet expansion through the 2030s. Next-generation submarine programs focus on improved propulsion, reduced acoustic signature, and expanded missile capabilities.

For instance, the Type 095 nuclear-powered guided-missile submarine is designed for long-range strike missions and incorporates improvements in nuclear reactor efficiency, sensor systems, and noise reduction technologies. The Type 096 ballistic missile submarine represents the next generation of China’s sea-based nuclear deterrent and is expected to carry JL-4 submarine-launched ballistic missiles capable of striking large portions of the United States from patrol areas near Chinese coastal waters. Earlier modernization programs produced the Shang III attack submarine equipped with a 24-cell vertical launch system that allows the launch of cruise missiles against maritime or land targets. These new submarines will soon expand China’s long-range strike capability from submerged positions.

For now, existing Jin-class submarines equipped with JL-3 missiles already enable deterrence patrols without requiring transit into distant ocean patrol areas. Changes in force composition indicate a gradual transition toward a larger nuclear-powered submarine fleet. Current projections indicate the fleet could reach roughly 80 submarines by 2035, with about half powered by nuclear reactors, increasing endurance and operational reach. Nuclear propulsion allows extended underwater operations without refueling and enables deployments across larger maritime distances compared with diesel-electric boats. Development programs include the Type 041 Zhou-class nuclear-powered attack submarine, a smaller reactor-powered design roughly comparable in size to conventional submarines but capable of longer patrol durations.

This may support regional patrol missions where full-size nuclear submarines are not required. As older diesel-electric submarines are gradually retired, new nuclear-powered submarines are expected to form a larger proportion of the fleet, extending deployments in the western Pacific and potentially other ocean regions. China is also developing a wide range of unmanned underwater systems (UUVs) designed to support reconnaissance, seabed mapping, mine warfare, and strike operations. Autonomous underwater vehicles such as the HSU001 conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions and can collect oceanographic data that improves sonar performance. Other systems, such as the AJX002, are designed for missions including mine placement and potentially torpedo delivery.

Concept vehicles such as the UUV300 incorporate modular payload bays capable of carrying sensors, torpedoes, mines, or deployable, smaller autonomous vehicles. Long-endurance underwater gliders gather oceanographic data, including water temperature, salinity, and currents, to support acoustic modeling and submarine detection. These systems can operate independently or in coordination with manned submarines, increasing underwater surveillance coverage while reducing risk to crewed vessels. Seabed surveillance systems form another component of China’s expanding undersea infrastructure. The Blue Ocean Information Network integrates seabed sonar arrays, underwater sensor nodes, satellite-linked buoys, and mobile autonomous underwater vehicles into a layered maritime detection architecture.

These assets collect hydrographic data that supports submarine tracking and improves acoustic detection accuracy in areas such as the South China Sea. Surface vessels equipped with towed-array sonar systems and embarked anti-submarine warfare helicopters expand detection capability above the water column. Small-waterplane-area twin-hull catamaran vessels support reconnaissance and surveillance missions and provide stable platforms for sensor deployment. The combination of seabed sensors, mobile surveillance assets, and autonomous underwater vehicles supports continuous monitoring of key maritime chokepoints and shipping routes. Therefore, the expansion of China’s submarine fleet, combined with advanced sensor networks and autonomous underwater vehicles, increases the scale and persistence of Chinese underwater operations.

Submarines designed for blue-water missions could extend patrols beyond the western Pacific into the Indian Ocean and Arctic approaches, with possible deployments in the Atlantic during the 2030s and 2040s. Greater numbers of nuclear-powered submarines increase the ability to conduct long-duration patrols and maintain a continuous presence in distant maritime areas. At the same time, expanded surveillance networks increase the capacity to detect and track submarines operating in contested waters. The combination of submarine modernization, unmanned systems, and seabed sensing technologies indicates that the undersea domain will remain a central area of strategic military competition with the U.S. in the coming decades.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
India Signs $238M Shtil-1 Missile Deal with Russia to Reinforce Naval Air Defense
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India has signed a $238.5 million contract with Russia to acquire Shtil-1 vertical-launch surface-to-air missiles for the Indian Navy. The purchase is intended to strengthen the fleet’s layered air defense against aircraft, drones, helicopters, and sea-skimming anti-ship missiles.

India has signed a $238.5 million contract with Russia to procure Shtil vertical-launch surface-to-air missiles for the Indian Navy, strengthening the fleet’s ability to defend frontline warships against modern aerial threats. The agreement with Russia’s state arms exporter Rosoboronexport, valued at approximately 21.8 billion Indian rupees, was reported on March 3, 2026, by the Russian state news agency TASS citing the Indian Ministry of Defence. The procurement aims to significantly enhance naval air defense capabilities and improve the protection of Indian warships against aircraft, helicopters, unmanned systems, and sea-skimming anti-ship missiles.

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India has signed a $238.5 million contract with Russia to acquire Shtil-1 vertical-launch surface-to-air missiles, strengthening the Indian Navy’s ability to protect frontline warships from aircraft, drones, helicopters, and sea-skimming anti-ship missiles (Picture Source: Russian MoD)

The contract reflects the continued operational reliance of the Indian Navy on the Shtil-1 naval air defense system, a vertical-launch maritime adaptation derived from Russia’s Buk family of medium-range surface-to-air missile systems. In naval service, the system typically uses the 9M317ME interceptor designed to engage maneuvering aerial targets at ranges of roughly 50 kilometers and altitudes of up to 15 kilometers.

The missile travels at speeds exceeding Mach 3 and employs semi-active radar homing supported by shipborne fire-control radars to intercept incoming threats. Its capability to engage high-speed cruise missiles flying at very low altitude makes it particularly suited for modern naval combat environments where sea-skimming missile attacks represent one of the most serious threats to surface combatants.

A key feature of the Shtil-1 system is its vertical launch architecture. Unlike earlier naval Buk derivatives that relied on trainable launch rails, vertical launch cells allow missiles to be fired in any direction immediately after launch. This configuration provides full 360-degree engagement coverage and significantly reduces reaction times against fast-approaching targets.

Within a layered naval defense structure, Shtil-1 operates as a medium-range interceptor positioned between long-range fleet defense missiles and short-range point-defense systems such as close-in weapon systems. This intermediate defensive layer is critical for intercepting threats before they reach the final attack phase where reaction times become extremely limited.

The missiles acquired under the contract will support Indian Navy frigates already equipped with the Shtil-1 system, particularly vessels derived from the Russian-designed Project 11356 platform widely known as the Talwar-class frigate family. These stealth-guided missile frigates form a core component of India’s escort fleet and are responsible for protecting aircraft carriers, amphibious task groups, and critical maritime trade routes.

Each of these frigates typically carries around 24 vertical-launch Shtil interceptors as part of their integrated air defense suite, allowing them to defend both themselves and nearby vessels against multiple aerial threats during naval operations. Maintaining sufficient interceptor stocks is therefore essential for ensuring sustained operational readiness during extended deployments.

Beyond the operational dimension, the procurement highlights the enduring defense partnership between India and Russia. Decades of military cooperation have resulted in deep integration of Russian-origin platforms and weapon systems across the Indian armed forces, particularly within the navy’s frigate and submarine fleets.

Strengthening shipborne air defense capabilities is becoming increasingly important as anti-ship missile proliferation accelerates across the Indo-Pacific region. By reinforcing the Shtil-based defensive shield protecting its frigates, India ensures that its naval forces retain credible survivability against evolving aerial and missile threats while continuing broader modernization efforts aimed at expanding its blue-water maritime capabilities.
North Korea Plans to Produce Two Destroyers Per Year and Expand Its Nuclear-Capable Navy
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North Korean leader Kim Jong Un spent two days inspecting the new 5,000-ton destroyer Choe Hyon and observing cruise missile launches from the ship near the western port of Nampo. During the visit, he reiterated that Pyongyang ultimately intends to equip the Korean People’s Navy with nuclear strike capabilities.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un spent two days inspecting the country’s newest 5,000-ton destroyer, Choe Hyon, and observing cruise missile launches conducted from the vessel during sea trials linked to the Nampo shipyard on the country’s west coast. State media reported that Kim reviewed the warship ahead of its commissioning and inspected another vessel under construction at the same shipyard. During the visit, he ordered the shipbuilding sector to produce two destroyers annually over the next five years as part of a broader naval expansion program. Kim also reiterated that the long-term objective is to equip the Korean People’s Navy with nuclear strike capabilities.
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North Korean leader Kim Jong Un inspects operations aboard the Choe Hyon destroyer (Picture source: French KCNA)

The Choe Hyon class destroyer, first unveiled publicly in April 2025, represents one of the most ambitious surface combatants built by North Korea in decades. According to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), the vessel displaces roughly 5,000 tons. It is designed to accommodate multiple categories of weapons, including anti-aircraft missiles, anti-ship systems, and nuclear-capable strike weapons. Photographs released by state media during the inspection show the warship conducting sea trials and launching cruise missiles described by Pyongyang as “strategic,” terminology typically used by the regime to denote systems capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

During the visit to Nampo, Kim also inspected the construction of a third destroyer belonging to the same class. KCNA indicated that the shipyard intends to complete this vessel by October, coinciding with the anniversary of the founding of the Workers’ Party of Korea. North Korean authorities present the programme as a central component of a wider naval modernization effort that also includes the development of a nuclear-powered submarine and new underwater launch capabilities for strategic missiles.

Kim also reiterates that the long-term objective is to equip the Korean People’s Navy with nuclear strike capabilities, extending the country’s deterrence posture beyond land-based missile forces. Although Pyongyang rarely discloses technical details, South Korean military officials and external analysts note that some elements of the destroyer programme may have benefited from cooperation with Russia as the two countries deepen military ties.

The Choe Hyon itself occupies an unusual position in North Korea’s fleet. The country’s navy historically relied on smaller patrol vessels, missile boats, and aging frigates, many of which date back to Cold War designs. A 5,000-ton destroyer, therefore represents a noticeable step upward in displacement and operational ambition. Ships of this size generally provide greater endurance at sea, improved sensor coverage, and the physical space required for integrated missile systems and command facilities. Even if North Korea’s domestic shipbuilding industry faces limitations in electronics and propulsion technology, the platform could serve as a testbed for more advanced naval weapons.

The cruise missiles launched during the sea trials appear intended to demonstrate the vessel’s strike capability. North Korea has developed several land-attack cruise missiles in recent years, including systems believed capable of flying at low altitude for extended distances using terrain-following guidance. Cruise missiles of this category typically rely on turbofan engines and inertial navigation combined with satellite updates, allowing them to strike targets hundreds or potentially more than a thousand kilometres away, depending on the configuration. Their relatively low flight profile complicates interception by radar-based air defence systems, particularly when launched from sea, where detection coverage may be fragmented.

The design also suggests an emphasis on layered naval firepower rather than a single mission profile. KCNA reports that the destroyer integrates anti-aircraft and anti-ship weapons alongside land-attack missiles, implying a multi-role concept. In practical terms, such a configuration allows a surface combatant to defend itself against aircraft and incoming missiles while simultaneously threatening enemy warships or coastal infrastructure. The ability to deploy nuclear-capable cruise missiles from a surface platform expands North Korea’s deterrence architecture beyond land-based launchers and ballistic missile submarines.

Kim Jong Un’s directive to construct two destroyers per year illustrates the leadership’s intention to institutionalize this naval expansion rather than treat the Choe Hyon as a one-off project. The order arrives after the troubled launch of another destroyer, Kang Kon, in 2025. That vessel suffered damage during a failed launch ceremony at the port of Chongjin and required repairs before being relaunched a month later. Despite the setback, the regime appears determined to continue the programme and accelerate production.

Beyond the introduction of new destroyers, the overall size of the Korean People’s Navy remains considerable, although its composition reflects decades of emphasis on coastal defense and asymmetric warfare rather than blue-water operations. Estimates indicate that the fleet includes roughly 60 submarines, among them about 40 Sang-O class coastal submarines, around 36 Yono class midget submarines, and approximately 20 older Type-033 diesel-electric submarines originally derived from Chinese Soviet-era designs. Surface combatants are fewer and generally older, consisting of two Najin-class light frigates, several corvettes such as the Amnok and Nampo classes, and a growing number of smaller missile craft and patrol vessels. The navy also fields dozens of torpedo boats and missile attack craft, including the indigenous Nongo class stealth missile boats and Sin Hung class torpedo boats, as well as a large inventory of patrol and landing craft intended for coastal operations and amphibious infiltration missions. This structure reflects a doctrine historically focused on swarm tactics, special operations insertion, and coastal denial rather than sustained open-ocean presence. North Korea therefore, maintains one of the numerically largest navies in Asia in terms of hull count, though the majority of its vessels remain small coastal platforms with limited endurance and sensor capabilities.

The broader strategic context reinforces the importance of these developments. North Korea has long concentrated on land-based ballistic missiles capable of striking regional targets and potentially the United States. Recent announcements suggest a parallel effort to diversify delivery platforms across sea and underwater domains. The leadership also continues to challenge the Northern Limit Line, the disputed maritime boundary separating North and South Korean waters in the Yellow Sea, where several naval clashes have occurred over the past decades.

The introduction of larger surface combatants armed with nuclear-capable missiles therefore, carries implications beyond naval modernization alone. A fleet able to operate further from North Korean shores while deploying strategic weapons introduces additional uncertainty into regional security calculations. South Korea, Japan, and the United States already maintain extensive missile defence and maritime surveillance networks in Northeast Asia, yet the appearance of mobile sea-based launch platforms complicates detection timelines and crisis management. As Pyongyang pushes forward with both naval construction and nuclear weapons development, the maritime dimension of deterrence on the Korean Peninsula is likely to occupy a growing place in regional defence planning.

Written By Erwan Halna du Fretay - Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Erwan Halna du Fretay is a graduate of a Master’s degree in International Relations and has experience in the study of conflicts and global arms transfers. His research interests lie in security and strategic studies, particularly the dynamics of the defense industry, the evolution of military technologies, and the strategic transformation of armed forces.
U.S. Central Command Reveals Strike on Iran’s New Soleimani-Class Corvette Shahid Sayyad Shirazi
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U.S. forces struck the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy missile corvette IRIS Shahid Sayyad Shirazi on March 4, 2026 during Operation Epic Fury near Bandar Abbas. The attack removes one of Iran’s newest Soleimani-class catamaran warships from the fight, further weakening Tehran’s ability to contest U.S. naval power in the Strait of Hormuz.

On March 4, 2026, during ongoing Operation Epic Fury, U.S. forces struck the Iranian Navy’s IRIS Shahid Sayyad Shirazi, a Shahid Soleimani-class missile catamaran corvette operating under the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) stated that more than twenty Iranian regime vessels have now been destroyed or disabled since the start of the campaign, adding this Soleimani-class warship to that list. This attack targets one of Iran’s newest and most capable surface combatants in the sensitive Strait of Hormuz approaches, underlining both the reach of U.S. maritime power and the rapid erosion of Iran’s naval order of battle. The strike comes less than three weeks after the ship showcased a new vertical-launch Sayyad-3G naval air-defense missile during a high-profile exercise, highlighting how quickly Iran’s attempt to field blue-water, area-air-defense assets is being rolled back.

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U.S. forces struck Iran’s IRGC Navy missile corvette IRIS Shahid Sayyad Shirazi during Operation Epic Fury on March 4, 2026, damaging one of Tehran’s newest Shahid Soleimani-class warships near the Strait of Hormuz and further eroding Iran’s naval capabilities in the Gulf (Picture Source: U.S. CENTCOM / Iranian Media)

According to CENTCOM, U.S. forces have now struck or sent to the seabed more than twenty ships belonging to the Iranian regime, and the Shahid Sayyad Shirazi was the latest high-value combatant hit under Operation Epic Fury. The catamaran corvette was reported burning at sea yet initially remained afloat, with heavy fire and smoke visible along the hull and superstructure, indicating serious damage to its combat systems, sensors and topside equipment. In a speech on March 4, Secretary of War Pete Hegeseth stated that Iran’s newest warship had been sunk, underscoring the U.S. message that even Tehran’s most modern naval platforms are vulnerable once they sortie from their home waters. While imagery suggested a vessel still on the surface immediately after the strike, U.S. officials present the ship as removed from Iran’s operational order of battle and ultimately consigned to the depths.

IRIS Shahid Sayyad Shirazi is one of a small number of Shahid Soleimani-class missile corvettes, compact wave-piercing catamarans of around 600 tons displacement designed for high-speed littoral warfare. Built with a catamaran hull and angular superstructure to reduce radar signature, the class embarks a dense missile armament on a relatively small platform, combining deck-mounted anti-ship cruise missiles with a vertical launch system (VLS) for naval surface-to-air missiles. The ship’s combat information center, integrated with modern air-search and surface-search sensors, is intended to coordinate fast attack craft, unmanned systems and coastal batteries, turning the corvette into a command node for IRGCN surface action groups operating in the confined waters of the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. In Iranian naval doctrine, these ships are meant to extend the anti-ship threat envelope and provide local air-defense cover for swarms of smaller craft, complicating U.S. carrier strike group operations near key chokepoints.

The Shahid Sayyad Shirazi had been particularly active in the weeks preceding its loss. During the “Smart Control of the Strait of Hormuz” exercise in February 2026, Iranian media showed the corvette conducting what was presented as the first public shipborne launch of the Sayyad-3G surface-to-air missile from its forward VLS module. This navalized, long-range variant of the Sayyad-3 family is credited in open sources with an engagement range in the 120–150 km bracket, intended to intercept aircraft, drones and cruise missiles and to plug into Iran’s broader integrated air-defense network. Army Recognition’s reporton the test highlighted that integrating Sayyad-3G on the Soleimani-class corvettes marked a shift toward genuine layered air defense at sea for the IRGC Navy, turning these ships into multi-mission combatants rather than simple missile carriers. Striking the very platform that showcased this capability only weeks earlier bluntly demonstrates that, despite this evolution, Iran’s new air-defense assets at sea remain exposed to superior U.S. surveillance, targeting and strike systems.

Within the wider framework of Operation Epic Fury, neutralizing Shahid Sayyad Shirazi carries disproportionate operational weight. U.S. forces are conducting a sustained maritime campaign that combines undersea warfare, long-range precision strike and air-maritime integration to degrade Iran’s ability to contest sea control from the Gulf of Oman to the northern Persian Gulf. From a naval warfare perspective, the removal of a Soleimani-class catamaran reduces Iran’s capacity to generate credible surface action groups with organic area air defense, weakens the coherence of its littoral sea-denial posture and complicates efforts to protect its remaining high-value units concentrated around Bandar Abbas. The cumulative effect of more than twenty Iranian vessels destroyed or disabled is to tilt the local balance of power even further toward U.S. and allied task forces, allowing them to maintain sea lines of communication through the Strait of Hormuz with greater freedom of maneuver.

For the United States and its partners, the Shahid Sayyad Shirazi strike sends a clear signal about the credibility of American sea power in one of the world’s most contested maritime corridors. A warship that had just been showcased as the spearhead of Iran’s emerging naval air-defense architecture is now assessed by Washington as destroyed or permanently combat-ineffective, despite operating close to its home port and under the umbrella of Iranian coastal defenses. By tracking, targeting and engaging such a platform in its own bastion waters, U.S. forces show that they can impose both sea control and sea denial at a time and place of their choosing, protect commercial shipping and friendly navies, and systematically dismantle the IRGC Navy’s most modern assets. In the context of Operation Epic Fury, the fate of Shahid Sayyad Shirazi reinforces a strategic reality that matters in Tehran and across the region: in any contest of fleets, sensors and missiles in the Gulf and its approaches, U.S. maritime forces still hold the decisive advantage.

Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
Canada considers split purchase of 12 submarines between Germany and South Korea
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Canada is assessing a proposal to divide its future submarine fleet between German Type 212CD and South Korean KSS-III Batch-II submarines as part of a program to acquire up to 12 boats.

Canada is considering splitting its planned purchase of 12 diesel-electric submarines equally between Germany’s TKMS Type 212CD and South Korea’s Hanwha Ocean KSS-III Batch-II proposals. The option would allocate six submarines from each supplier under the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project to replace the Victoria-class fleet. A final decision could be announced as early as April 2026 as Ottawa finishes evaluating operational, industrial, and cost implications.
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Canadian authorities are considering the option of dividing the procurement between Germany’s ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems and South Korea’s Hanwha Ocean, acquiring six submarines from each supplier. (Picture source: TKMS and Hanwha Ocean)

According to The Globe and Mail on March 2, 2026, Canadian authorities are considering the option of dividing its major submarine procurement between Germany’s ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) and South Korea’s Hanwha Ocean, acquiring six submarines from each supplier. Ottawa plans to acquire up to 12 conventionally powered diesel-electric submarines under the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project, a program intended to sustain undersea operations across the Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic. Final proposals from the remaining bidders were submitted earlier in the week, and the government reserved the right to submit clarification questions until April 6, with a decision potentially occurring as early as April 4, 2026.

The submarine acquisition would constitute one of the largest military purchases in Canada’s history and is closely tied to industrial policy, trade diversification, and naval modernization objectives. The program has been structured to ensure the new submarines enter service before the current boats reach the end of their operational lives in the mid-2030s, when retirement of the Victoria-class begins. According to sources speaking anonymously, under this split option, six German-built Type 212CD submarines would patrol the Atlantic coast while six South Korean KSS-III Batch-II submarines would be based on the Pacific coast with possible deployments to the Indo-Pacific.

The submarine acquisition itself is valued at more than $24 billion, while broader lifecycle costs associated with training, infrastructure, sustainment, and upgrades extend much higher over the decades-long service life of the fleet. Defense planners have also assessed potential complications associated with operating two submarine types, including increased supply chain complexity, maintenance inventories, training pipelines, and logistical support requirements. Prime Minister Mark Carney previously noted that operating a single submarine class would generate efficiency advantages in maintenance and economies of scale, while government officials continue evaluating which structure best aligns with Canada’s operational and economic priorities.

The Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP) was formally launched in 2021 to replace Canada’s four Victoria-class submarines, HMCS Victoria, Windsor, Chicoutimi, and Corner Brook. These submarines were acquired secondhand from the United Kingdom during the late 1990s and early 2000s and represent Canada’s only operational undersea warfare capability. Their age, maintenance demands, and modernization requirements have constrained operational availability, with the Canadian Navy often able to maintain only one submarine fully mission-ready at a time. Canada’s maritime geography includes the world’s longest coastline and responsibility for three ocean approaches, which place persistent surveillance and deterrence requirements on the navy.

Increasing activity in the Arctic, including expanding naval presence from other states as sea ice recedes, has further reinforced the requirement for stealthier underwater surveillance and intelligence gathering capabilities across northern waters. The CPSP progressed rapidly compared with earlier Canadian defense acquisitions. The initial information request for industry participation was issued in September 2024 after the project framework had been established in 2021. In August 2025, the competition narrowed to two companies that met the navy’s operational requirements for a stealthy, Arctic-capable diesel-electric submarine: South Korea’s Hanwha Ocean and Germany’s ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems, the latter working with Norway.

Canada intends to have the first new submarine delivered by 2035 to avoid a capability gap when the Victoria-class begins retirement. If delivery timelines slip, the Canadian Navy could face a period without sufficient operational submarines, forcing temporary mitigation measures similar to those used when Canada lost naval refuelling capability in 2015-2016 before replacement vessels became available. Germany’s ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems has offered the Type 212CD submarine developed jointly with Norway. The vessel measures roughly 73 meters in length with a beam of 10 meters and a submerged displacement of about 2,800 tonnes. Propulsion combines diesel engines with lithium-ion batteries and a polymer electrolyte membrane fuel-cell air-independent propulsion system, enabling submerged endurance of up to 41 days.

The German submarine includes six 533 mm torpedo tubes capable of firing heavyweight torpedoes, missiles, and unmanned underwater vehicles, depending on configuration. The combat system is developed by the KTA Naval Systems consortium involving TKMS, Atlas Elektronik, and Kongsberg, and the submarine integrates advanced optronic masts and sonar suites optimized for navigation, mine avoidance, and submarine detection. TKMS has said it could deliver the first submarine well before 2035, potentially as soon as 2032, with a subsequent ramp-up. On the other hand, South Korea’s Hanwha Ocean is offering the KSS-III Batch-II submarine, an ocean-going class displacing about 3,600 tonnes surfaced and more than 4,000 tonnes submerged.

The South Korean submarine is roughly 89 meters long and incorporates lithium-ion battery technology combined with air-independent propulsion to extend submerged endurance beyond three weeks. The design includes six 533 mm torpedo tubes and a vertical launch system capable of carrying multiple missile types depending on configuration. Operational range exceeds 7,000 nautical miles, enabling long-distance patrols across the Pacific and Atlantic. Hanwha indicated that if a contract is signed in 2026, the first submarine could be delivered by 2032 and four boats delivered by 2035, with additional submarines produced annually thereafter to complete the planned fleet of up to 12 vessels.

Operational requirements for the future CPSP submarine fleet emphasize endurance, stealth, and long-range patrol capability across Canada’s three-ocean environment. Submarines must be capable of conducting covert patrols over distances exceeding 7,000 nautical miles, while remaining submerged for more than 21 days and sustaining missions lasting up to 60 days without external support. The vessels must operate with a mixed-gender crew of at least 60 personnel and integrate several weapons systems, including torpedoes and missiles. Additional requirements include the ability to launch and recover unmanned underwater vehicles and maintain secure communications compatible with U.S. and NATO maritime systems.

These capabilities are intended to improve Canada's intelligence collection, anti-submarine warfare operations, and coordinated maritime surveillance across the North Atlantic, Arctic approaches, and Pacific theatre. Industrial participation and economic investment also form a central element of the submarine competition, as Canada now requires that major defense acquisitions generate long-term domestic economic activity under its Industrial and Technological Benefits policy. For instance, Ottawa requested that both Germany and South Korea incorporate automotive sector investment commitments into their proposals to support domestic manufacturing affected by U.S. tariffs on steel, aluminum, and automobiles.

Germany has discussed expanded automotive production in Canada, while Volkswagen is already building an electric vehicle battery facility in St. Thomas, Ontario, through its PowerCo subsidiary. South Korea’s Hyundai Motor Group signed a memorandum of understanding with Canada to cooperate on the production of automobiles, electric vehicles, batteries, and hydrogen-powered vehicles as part of wider industrial cooperation tied to the submarine bid. Hanwha Ocean has expanded its proposal through multiple agreements with Canadian companies across several sectors. A memorandum of understanding with Algoma Steel includes $275 million in financial support for a new structural steel beam mill and commitments to purchase Canadian steel for submarine construction and maintenance infrastructure on both coasts if the contract is awarded.

The arrangement has been valued at $345 million and requires Algoma to pay Hanwha Ocean 3 percent of net sales from the facility for ten years after its establishment. Algoma Steel experienced layoffs affecting about 1,000 workers after U.S. tariffs disrupted its access to the American market, while federal and provincial authorities provided $500 million in financial support. Hanwha Systems also established cooperation agreements with Canadian companies, including Telesat, MDA Space, Cohere, and PV Labs. However, Germany’s TKMS has also developed several industrial partnerships in Canada linked to its proposal for the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project.

For instance, the German shipbuilder signed a cooperation agreement with the Canadian artificial intelligence company Cohere to explore integrating AI-enabled decision-support tools, information management systems, and training interfaces for submarine crews. TKMS also concluded a teaming arrangement with Quebec-based manufacturer Marmen covering potential manufacturing activities and supply-chain participation associated with submarine construction and long-term sustainment. The company indicated that Canadian participation would extend to maintenance, manufacturing, and supply contracts integrated into the fleet's lifecycle support structure.

In parallel, TKMS highlighted collaboration with Kongsberg Geospatial Ltd., the Canadian subsidiary of Norway’s Kongsberg group, to support geospatial and operational software functions relevant to naval systems and mission planning. TKMS also signed agreements with Seaspan Shipyards covering long-term submarine maintenance and lifecycle sustainment in Canada, and with Magellan Aerospace concerning potential heavyweight torpedo production and in-service support. Additional cooperation with Canadian industry includes EllisDon, to develop the infrastructure required for submarine maintenance, sustainment, and training facilities in Canada.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
Israeli Navy Shoots Down Suspected Iranian Shahed-Type Drone Launched from Lebanon
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An Israeli Navy missile boat intercepted and destroyed a drone launched from Lebanese territory on 4 March 2026, according to infrared footage released by the Israel Defense Forces. The engagement underscores the expanding use of Iranian-backed UAVs in the conflict and highlights the growing role of naval platforms in Israel’s layered air-defense network.

On 4 March 2026, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) released infrared footage showing an Israeli Navy missile boat intercepting an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) launched from Lebanese territory during ongoing combat operations. The shoot-down comes amid Operation Lion’s Roar, the large-scale Israeli campaign against Iranian military infrastructure and drone capabilities launched alongside US strikes in recent days. Based on the proportions visible in the infrared sequence, the drone appears consistent with the general design of Iranian Shahed-series long-range attack UAVs, possibly from the larger 200-series such as the Shahed-228, although no official identification has been provided by the IDF. In its official announcement on X, the IDF stressed that naval forces are now fully integrated into the wider air-defense effort, intercepting UAVs approaching Israel “from all directions”.

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An Israeli Navy missile boat intercepted and destroyed a suspected Iranian drone launched from Lebanon during Operation Lion’s Roar, highlighting the expanding role of naval forces in Israel’s air-defense operations against regional UAV threats (Pictures Source: IDF / Iranian Media)

According to the IDF statement, the UAV was detected after being launched from Lebanon and was engaged by a missile fired from an Israeli Navy vessel operating off the Israeli coast. The short video sequence, released by the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit, shows an infrared view of the sky, the launch of a surface-to-air missile and a subsequent explosion as the projectile appears to hit the target. The army did not specify the exact location of the engagement, the class of the ship, or the type of missile used, nor did it report any impact on Israeli territory in this instance. The shoot-down forms part of a broader series of interceptions of rockets and drones launched from Lebanon since Hezbollah entered the conflict in support of Iran.

The engagement appears to involve a heat-seeking interceptor guided toward the drone’s thermal signature, as the video is captured in infrared and shows the missile curving onto the target rather than flying a pure straight-line course. However, the IDF has not officially identified the missile system used, and the infrared footage may in part reflect the ship’s electro-optical fire-control sensors rather than the missile’s seeker itself. Israeli Navy surface combatants are equipped with layered air-defense suites, and several types of interceptors are technically capable of engaging low-flying UAVs; without official data, any identification of the weapon remains speculative.

Based on the proportions visible in the infrared sequence, there is a resemblance to the Iranian Shahed family of long-range attack drones, which has been used extensively by Tehran and its partners in Ukraine and now across the Middle East. Within that family, the airframe appears larger and consistent with designs from the Shahed 200-series, potentially the Shahed-228, based on its apparent wingspan and fuselage length. However, as the IDF has not issued an official confirmation regarding the UAV’s specific model or variant, and given the limited footage available, such identifications should be regarded as informed assessments rather than definitive conclusions.

What makes this interception particularly notable is the launch point: Lebanon. Iranian-designed drones have been used directly by Tehran in recent days to strike targets as far away as the Gulf and the eastern Mediterranean, but this episode underlines how similar systems can also be operated from Lebanese territory, likely by Hezbollah or other groups aligned with Iran. Hezbollah has already claimed responsibility for multiple rocket and drone attacks against northern Israel in the context of the current escalation, and Israeli authorities report intercepting several UAVs crossing from Lebanon in recent days. The fact that this particular drone was engaged by a naval platform rather than land-based air defenses illustrates how Israel is now using its Navy as an additional layer in a multi-domain shield against Iranian and proxy-launched UAVs.

The engagement fits into a wider pattern in which drones have become central tools of power projection and disruption for Iran and its partners. Recent analyses describe Iran’s Shahed-type drones as relatively low-cost systems that can be fired in large numbers to saturate and economically strain sophisticated air-defense networks, forcing defenders to expend costly interceptors against comparatively inexpensive UAVs. Operation Lion’s Roar, in turn, has seen Israel prioritize the destruction of Iranian launch infrastructure and drone stockpiles while simultaneously maintaining high readiness along its northern front, where Hezbollah’s rocket and UAV capabilities pose a persistent threat to Israeli civilian and military targets. In this context, each successful interception at sea or on land is less an isolated tactical event than part of a broader contest over who can sustain their offensive and defensive chains longer.

The footage of the Israeli navy downing a suspected Iranian-made UAV launched from Lebanon encapsulates several core dynamics of the current crisis: Iran’s expanding use of long-range drones, the role of Hezbollah as a forward operator of Iranian systems from Lebanese soil, and the rapid integration of naval assets into Israel’s layered air-defense architecture. While early open-source analysis points to a Shahed-family platform, possibly in the Shahed-228 category, neither the exact drone model nor the interceptor type has been officially disclosed, underscoring how much of this technological confrontation still takes place in the shadows. What is clear is that the airspace over and around Israel now extends far out to sea and deep into Lebanon, and that naval missile boats intercepting drones at night have become a visible symbol of a wider struggle in which drones, missiles and air defenses are reshaping the operational landscape across the region.
US submarine sinks first warship with torpedo in combat since World War II with attack on Iranian frigate IRIS Dena
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The US confirms that a US Navy submarine sank the Iranian Navy frigate IRIS Dena with a torpedo in the Indian Ocean on March 4, 2026, marking the first time a US submarine has sunk a warship with a torpedo in combat since World War II.

US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth confirmed that a US Navy submarine sank the Iranian frigate IRIS Dena with a torpedo in international waters of the Indian Ocean on March 4, 2026. It is the first time a US submarine has sunk a warship with a torpedo in combat since World War II, and the sinking represents the third confirmed case of a surface warship being sunk by a submarine torpedo attack since the end of World War II, following the INS Khukri in 1971 and the ARA General Belgrano in 1982.
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The confirmation by Pete Hegseth of the US submarine attack on the Iranian frigate IRIS Dena marks the first time a US submarine has sunk a warship with a torpedo in combat since World War II. (Picture source: US DoW and Iranian MoD)

On March 4, 2026, the United States confirmed that a submarine torpedo attack sank the Iranian frigate IRIS Dena in the Indian Ocean during the expanding conflict involving Iran, Israel, and the United States. U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced that an American submarine struck an Iranian warship operating in international waters with a torpedo, resulting in the first sinking of an enemy vessel with such a US Navy attack since the end of WWII. The strike occurred during a period of intensified military operations targeting Iranian military infrastructure and missile capabilities across the region. Iran conducted retaliatory actions across the Gulf and the broader Middle East, while strikes also hit locations in Lebanon linked to Hezbollah.

The conflict caused more than 1,000 deaths in Iran and dozens in Lebanon while disrupting energy supplies and international travel across the region. In the maritime domain, the sinking of the Iranian warship in the Indian Ocean represented a rare instance of a submarine torpedo attack against a surface combatant during modern naval warfare. Submarine attacks that sink warships have been extremely uncommon since the end of the Second World War, reflecting changes in naval warfare and the limited number of fleet engagements between naval powers. During World War II, United States submarines alone sank more than 1,300 Japanese ships in the Pacific theatre, making submarine warfare a major component of maritime combat. After 1945, the frequency of such engagements declined sharply as naval forces increasingly relied on aircraft and anti-ship missiles rather than torpedoes.

One of the first confirmed postwar submarine sinkings occurred on December 9, 1971, during the Indo-Pakistani War, when the Pakistani submarine PNS Hangor fired homing torpedoes at the Indian Navy frigate INS Khukri in the Arabian Sea. The ship sank rapidly after the attack, and 176 sailors were killed. The incident marked the first confirmed case of a warship sunk by a submarine since the end of the Second World War. Another major submarine torpedo attack against a surface warship occurred on May 2, 1982, during the Falklands War. The British nuclear submarine HMS Conqueror fired three Mk-8 torpedoes at the Argentine cruiser ARA General Belgrano while the ship was operating in the South Atlantic.

Two torpedoes struck the cruiser and caused severe structural damage, leading to the sinking of the vessel. A total of 323 Argentine sailors were killed in the incident, making it one of the deadliest naval losses of the conflict. The attack also had immediate operational consequences as the Argentine Navy withdrew most of its surface fleet from open operations for the remainder of the war. These two cases illustrate how submarine attacks against warships became rare events in the decades following 1945. Modern naval combat shifted toward long-range missiles, aircraft strikes, and electronic surveillance. For the US Navy specifically, there was no confirmed case of an American submarine sinking an enemy military vessel in combat between 1945 and the early 2020s, until the sinking of the Iranian Navy frigate IRIS Dena in the Indian Ocean on March 4, 2026.

During the Cold War, U.S. attack submarines frequently tracked Soviet submarines and surface groups in the Atlantic and Pacific, but rules of engagement prevented torpedo attacks unless open war began. In later conflicts such as the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, and operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya, submarines were employed mainly for intelligence collection and land attack missions. Nuclear-powered attack submarines launched cruise missiles such as the Tomahawk against ground targets while also conducting surveillance patrols and special forces insertion missions. These missions reflected the broader shift in submarine operations toward strategic deterrence and long-range strike roles rather than direct torpedo engagements with surface ships.

The principal torpedo used by U.S. Navy submarines is the Mk-48 heavyweight torpedo, which entered operational service in 1972 and has undergone several upgrades since that time. The torpedo has a diameter of 533 millimetres, a length of about 5.8 metres, and a weight of about 1,670 kilograms. It carries a high-explosive warhead weighing about 292 kilograms and can reach speeds exceeding 55 knots depending on its operational profile. The weapon is capable of engaging both submarines and surface ships using a combination of wire guidance and active or passive sonar homing. Modern variants such as the Mk-48 Mod 7 CBASS incorporate broadband sonar processing and improved performance in shallow water environments.

The torpedo detonates beneath the keel of a ship, producing a gas bubble that lifts the hull and causes structural failure when the bubble collapses. The warship that sank near Sri Lanka was identified as the Iranian Navy frigate IRIS Dena, which issued a distress call early on March 4, 2026, before going down in the Indian Ocean. The vessel sank about 40 kilometres south of Sri Lanka near the coastal city of Galle, outside the island’s territorial waters. Sri Lankan naval and air units launched a rescue operation after receiving the distress signal and deployed two navy ships and an aircraft to the location. The frigate carried a crew of about 180 sailors at the time of the incident. Rescue teams recovered 32 critically wounded sailors from the water and transported them to the main hospital in Galle for treatment.

Search operations continued in the surrounding waters for the remaining members of the crew while the rescue effort proceeded under international maritime obligations. Before the sinking, IRIS Dena had taken part in international naval activities in India during February 2026. The frigate participated in the International Fleet Review held in the Indian port city of Visakhapatnam, which gathered naval forces from multiple countries for maritime ceremonies and fleet events. After the fleet review ceremony on February 18, the ship docked in Visakhapatnam on February 20 as part of its visit. The vessel also joined the MILAN 2026 multinational naval exercise, which combined harbour activities with a sea phase involving coordinated maritime drills between participating navies.

Iran’s naval commander Commodore Shahram Irani attended the events and met India’s Chief of the Naval Staff Admiral Dinesh K Tripathi during the visit. These activities took place shortly before the frigate departed India and continued its voyage across the Indian Ocean. IRIS Dena belonged to the Moudge class of domestically produced Iranian frigates developed for operations in the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean. The ship was constructed at naval facilities in Bandar Abbas, where construction began in 2012 before the vessel was launched in 2015 and commissioned into service in 2021.

The frigate measured about 95 metres in length with a beam of about 11.1 metres and a draught of about 3.25 metres, with a displacement reaching about 1,500 tonnes. Propulsion consisted of four diesel engines rated at 5,000 horsepower each, supported by diesel generators, enabling a maximum speed of about 30 knots. The vessel carried an Asr three-dimensional radar system and electronic warfare equipment for target detection and tracking. Armament included a 76 mm naval gun, a Fath 40 mm anti-aircraft cannon, 20 mm cannons, Noor or C-802 anti-ship missiles, Sayad 2 surface-to-air missiles, and two triple 324 mm torpedo launchers for anti-submarine warfare.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
France redeploys Charles de Gaulle carrier strike group to Middle East as US-Iran war expands
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France redeploys the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle and its carrier strike group from Sweden to the Eastern Mediterranean after the conflict between the US, Israel, and Iran continues to expand across the Middle East.

French President Emmanuel Macron has ordered the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle and its escorting warships to redeploy toward the Eastern Mediterranean as the conflict between the US, Israel, and Iran expands across the Middle East. The carrier strike group halted participation in the ORION 26 exercise in northern Europe and began a transit toward the Mediterranean. France also reinforced regional deployments with Rafale fighters, surveillance aircraft, air defense systems, and naval units.
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The Charles de Gaulle is currently the only nuclear-powered aircraft carrier operated by France and represents the central element of its naval air force. (Picture source: Swedish MoD)

On March 3, 2026, France ordered the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle and its escorting warships to redeploy toward the Eastern Mediterranean as the conflict triggered by US and Israeli strikes against Iran expanded across the Middle East. The decision was announced by President Emmanuel Macron during a national address outlining measures to protect French interests, military bases, and citizens across the region. The French carrier strike group interrupts a mission in Sweden for the ORION 26 war exercise and begins a transit route that includes the North Sea, the English Channel, the Bay of Biscay, and the Mediterranean before reaching the operational theater. The country also redeployed Rafale fighter jets, airborne surveillance aircraft, air defense systems, and escort vessels closer to the Levant and Persian Gulf theaters.

Moreover, France increased the protection of diplomatic sites and military facilities in the region, as two French military bases in the region were struck during the first phase of Iranian retaliation, causing material damage to logistics infrastructure without casualties. The redeployment follows the beginning of Epic Fury and Roaring Lion on February 28, 2026, when the United States and Israel launched coordinated air and missile strikes against Iranian targets. The operation targeted multiple cities, including Tehran, Isfahan, Qom, Karaj, and Kermanshah, striking missile launchers, air defense systems, military infrastructure, and leadership locations. Hundreds of military targets were hit during the initial phase of the campaign, which also included cyber actions against Iranian communications and infrastructure.

Iranian leadership figures and military commanders were among those killed during the opening strikes. Iranian forces responded within hours by launching drones and ballistic missiles across the Persian Gulf and the Levant regions. Targets included Israel as well as military bases hosting US personnel in Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. The confrontation rapidly developed into a multi-theater conflict involving air, missile, and naval operations across the region. Iranian retaliation included missile and drone attacks against cities and infrastructure across several countries. Missiles struck Israeli territory, including areas around Tel Aviv and Haifa, while air defense systems intercepted additional projectiles aimed at urban areas.

In the Persian Gulf region, explosions were reported near installations hosting the US Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain and near Kuwait International Airport. Interceptions and debris caused damage in residential districts of several Gulf states. Iranian strikes also targeted civilian airports, maritime ports, and energy infrastructure across parts of the Gulf. In Iraq, infrastructure near Erbil International Airport and installations hosting foreign personnel were targeted. Attacks were also reported near residential districts in Dubai and Doha, where fragments from intercepted missiles caused structural damage, further widening the geographic scope of the conflict. The redeployment of the Charles de Gaulle carrier strike group required the interruption of a deployment in northern Europe that began on January 27, 2026.

The carrier departed Toulon and sailed toward the Atlantic and northern European waters as part of a large multinational exercise named ORION 26. On February 20, the French carrier transited the Strait of Dover and entered the Baltic region, where aircraft from the carrier conducted training activities with allied forces. The ship conducted a port visit in Malmö, Sweden, and was scheduled to participate in the Cold Response exercise hosted by Norway. The exercise involved fourteen participating nations and about 25,000 personnel conducting air, naval, and amphibious operations. The French carrier strike group included escort ships and support vessels participating in joint exercises with allied navies, but the order issued on March 3 halted this deployment and redirected the formation toward the Mediterranean.

The carrier strike group centered on the Charles de Gaulle includes several types of aircraft and escort ships forming a combined naval aviation force. The embarked air wing includes about twenty Rafale Marine fighter aircraft capable of air defense, strike missions, and reconnaissance operations. Two E-2C Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft provide long-range radar coverage and airspace coordination during flight operations. Helicopters embarked on the carrier support maritime surveillance, transport missions, and search and rescue operations. The escort formation normally includes one air defense frigate and two multi-mission frigates providing anti-aircraft, anti-surface, and anti-submarine protection. A fleet replenishment ship provides fuel, ammunition, and supplies for sustained operations at sea.

A nuclear-powered attack submarine may also accompany the formation to provide underwater surveillance and protection. French naval units were already present across several maritime zones from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf before the carrier redeployment. A French air defense frigate had been deployed between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden as part of a European maritime security mission protecting commercial shipping. A multi-mission frigate remained deployed in the Persian Gulf, where it monitored maritime traffic and regional military activity. Another frigate was dispatched toward Cyprus after drone and missile activity raised concerns about threats to the island and nearby installations. The amphibious helicopter carrier Dixmude and the frigate Aconit were operating in the Red Sea after transiting the Suez Canal on February 24 and conducting exercises with Egyptian naval forces.

These ships had originally been scheduled to continue toward the Indian Ocean before the conflict intensified. Additional naval units remain on alert in the Mediterranean to provide evacuation or support operations if required. France also reinforced its military posture in the region through air deployments and defensive operations linked to regional defense agreements. France maintains defense cooperation with Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, and these states were among those targeted by Iranian missile and drone strikes during the conflict. French aircraft and air defense systems deployed in the region were reinforced with additional Rafale fighters and airborne radar capabilities.

Ground-based air defense systems were also deployed to protect allied airspace and military installations. French forces conducted defensive actions during the first hours of the conflict by intercepting drones approaching allied territories. Two French military bases in the region were struck during Iranian retaliatory attacks, causing material damage to logistics infrastructure without casualties. Protection measures were also increased around French diplomatic missions and strategic facilities across several Middle Eastern states. The aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle is currently the only nuclear-powered aircraft carrier operated by France and forms the core of its naval aviation capability.

The ship has a full load displacement of about 42,500 tonnes and a length of 261.5 meters with a flight deck width of 64.4 meters. Propulsion is provided by two K15 pressurized water nuclear reactors generating about 83,000 horsepower and allowing speeds of up to 27 knots. The ship uses a catapult assisted take off but arrested recovery configuration with two 75-meter steam catapults for launching aircraft. Defensive systems include Aster 15 surface-to-air missiles launched from vertical cells, Mistral short-range missiles, and remotely operated 20 mm guns. The carrier can embark up to forty aircraft and about 2,000 personnel, including sailors, pilots, and support crews.

The redeployment toward the Mediterranean also reflects the operational mobility associated with aircraft carriers during regional crises, as aircraft carriers allow airpower to be moved between theaters without reliance on local air bases. The redeployment occurs as maritime trade routes are disrupted by the conflict and by security threats in several strategic waterways. Iran has effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz, while missile threats and attacks have affected shipping routes connected to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. These maritime corridors carry a significant share of global oil and liquefied natural gas shipments, making their security a central issue in the current conflict.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
Qatar Deploys Aster-Armed Warships to Intercept Iranian Drones in Gulf Missile Attack
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Qatar’s navy used its new generation of air defense warships to help intercept Iranian drones during a coordinated missile and drone attack targeting the Gulf state. The engagement highlights how sea-based missile defense platforms are expanding regional air defense coverage around critical U.S. military facilities and energy infrastructure.

Qatar’s Emiri Navy has brought its new generation of air-defense surface combatants into combat conditions, helping intercept Iranian drones during a complex, multi-axis strike and effectively pushing Doha’s defensive perimeter outward over some of the Gulf’s most sensitive military and energy infrastructure. In its official account of the engagement, Qatar’s Ministry of Defense said the incoming raid combined two Iranian Su-24 aircraft with a salvo of seven ballistic missiles and five drones, all met immediately under a preplanned national air-defense posture. The ministry added that Qatari naval units and the air force jointly engaged and destroyed the drones, while land-based air-defense elements focused on defeating the ballistic missiles before they could reach critical targets.
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QENS Al Fulk is Qatar's amphibious flagship, combining an LPD mission with area air defense. With Sylver A50 VLS for Aster interceptors and a Kronos Power Shield-supported sensor suite, it can act as a forward missile-defense node while carrying troops, vehicles, and landing craft for amphibious operations (Picture source: Army Recognition Group).

While the Qatari statement did not identify which naval units fired, the engagement is significant because Qatar is one of the few Gulf states whose navy fields an organic, NATO-standard area air-defense system rather than relying purely on shore-based batteries. The fleet’s modern air-defense core is well defined: the amphibious flagship QENS Al Fulk and the four Al Zubarah-class (Doha-class) corvettes, all built by Fincantieri and fitted with Aster-family missiles integrated through the SAAM air-defense architecture.

Operational context matters: the intercept occurred amid widening regional escalation following U.S. and Israeli strikes and subsequent Iranian retaliation against Gulf states hosting U.S. assets, a pattern that has repeatedly placed Qatar’s Al Udeid Air Base and surrounding civilian infrastructure under missile and drone threat. At the same time, Iran’s pressure on maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has increased the strategic value of any Gulf state able to contribute sensor coverage and intercept capacity from the sea, where radar horizon and engagement geometry can add crucial seconds to the kill chain.

The centerpiece of Qatar’s sea-based air and missile defense is Al Fulk, a 142.9-meter, roughly 8,800-ton landing platform dock derived from the Italian San Giusto family but redesigned around a high-end defensive combat system. Unlike most LPDs, Al Fulk pairs amphibious utility with a primary anti-missile suite. The ship is equipped with the SAAM anti-missile system and full anti-tactical ballistic missile capability enabled by paired C-band and long-wavelength radar sensors and compatibility with the Aster B1NT growth path. The ship’s amphibious architecture remains intact, including a floodable dock that can launch and recover a 19-meter landing craft mechanized, additional craft stowage in the garage deck, and heavy handling equipment intended for vehicles and disaster relief loads.

Al Fulk’s combat value in an intercept operation is driven by its sensor reach and network role. The ship carries two 8-cell Sylver A50 vertical launchers for Aster 15, Aster 30, and B1NT-class munitions, plus a 76/62 Super Rapid gun and close-range mounts suited to countering low-cost drones without expending high-value missiles. The vessel is equipped with an advanced radar architecture combining a Leonardo Kronos multifunction AESA radar with the larger Kronos Power Shield early-warning radar, enabling tactical ballistic missile early warning and long-range track generation for joint defenses.

If Al Fulk is the fleet’s sensor node, the four Al Zubarah-class corvettes are its distributed shooters. Each 107-meter, 3,250-ton ship combines a frigate-like combat system with a high sprint speed of about 28 knots and endurance suitable for persistent patrol around offshore energy infrastructure. The vessels feature a 21-day endurance, a range exceeding 3,500 nautical miles, and a multi-role design that includes helicopter operations with a flight deck and hangar capable of supporting an NH90 naval helicopter.

The class carries a 16-cell Sylver A50 vertical launch system capable of firing Aster 30 Block 1 missiles, a 21-cell RAM launcher for close-in defense, MM40 Exocet Block III anti-ship missiles, and a Leonardo 76 mm/62 naval gun. This combination provides the corvettes with true multi-layered air defense capability while preserving strong anti-surface warfare potential.

The class’s tactical edge lies in the fusion of modern sensors, resilient networking, and layered effectors tailored for Gulf threat profiles. The ships integrate Leonardo’s Grand Kronos Naval AESA radar with an ATHENA-family combat management system and multiple tactical data links, including Link 11, Link 16, and JREAP. This architecture allows the corvettes to exchange tracking data with joint air defense networks and coalition forces operating in the region.

Such networking is critical because drones and cruise missiles often approach at low altitude with minimal warning, while ballistic missiles require early detection and rapid engagement decisions. The Kronos Power Shield radar is designed specifically for early warning and tactical ballistic missile surveillance and can detect ballistic targets at ranges approaching 1,500 kilometers while maintaining large track capacity. This capability allows a ship positioned at sea to act as a forward sensor, feeding targeting data to shore-based missile defenses.

Within the intercept itself, theNavy’ss most plausible contribution was defeating the drone component of the attack and strengthening the air picture for the wider engagement. Qatar’s ministry explicitly credited the navy alongside the air force for stopping five drones, but did not attribute the seven ballistic missile intercepts to naval fires. In operational terms, the corvettes’ RAM launchers and medium-caliber remote weapons provide a cost-effective terminal defense against small unmanned aerial vehicles, while Aster 30 missiles remain available for higher-end targets, including combat aircraft and maneuvering cruise missiles.

Aster 30 Block 1 is an area-defense missile designed to intercept high-speed aerodynamic targets and short-range ballistic missiles at ranges exceeding 120 kilometers. Its active radar seeker and high-agility guidance system enable engagements against maneuvering threats, making it a critical component of layered maritime missile defense.

Strategically, the engagement validates Qatar’s decade-long investment in transforming its navy into a technologically advanced maritime force capable of contributing to regional air and missile defense. The multibillion-dollar naval modernization program centered on the Fincantieri-built fleet was designed not only to protect offshore energy infrastructure but also to support multinational maritime operations in the Gulf.

In an operational environment where Iran increasingly employs drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles as tools of coercion, the addition of sea-based sensor coverage and missile intercept capability expands the defensive envelope protecting Qatar’s territory and critical infrastructure. By integrating naval air defense platforms into the broader national and coalition network, Doha has effectively added a mobile layer of protection capable of detecting, tracking, and engaging threats before they reach land-based targets.

The successful interception, therefore, represents more than a tactical event. It demonstrates that Qatar’s naval modernization program has matured into an operationally relevant capability, one capable of strengthening regional air and missile defense architecture at a moment when the Gulf faces one of its most volatile security environments in years.
UK Deploys HMS Dragon Destroyer to Eastern Mediterranean to Counter Iranian Drone and Missile Threats
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The United Kingdom has deployed the Type 45 air defence destroyer HMS Dragon to the Eastern Mediterranean alongside Wildcat helicopters capable of intercepting drones. The move strengthens protection for British sovereign bases in Cyprus and signals continued UK commitment to regional security as Iranian-linked drone activity increases.

On 3 March 2026, the UK Ministry of Defence confirmedthe deployment of the air-defence destroyer HMS Dragon and drone-intercepting Wildcat helicopters to the Eastern Mediterranean. The move comes amid an uptick in Iranian-linked drone activity targeting British and allied interests in the region, including incidents near Cyprus and across the wider Middle East. By positioning one of the Royal Navy’s most capable destroyers near RAF Akrotiri and other allied installations, the UK demonstrates its commitment to safeguarding sovereign bases, personnel, and regional stability. The deployment is framed as both a defensive measure to protect British assets and a contribution to the collective security of allied partners, reinforcing the UK’s strategic presence as a dependable security actor in the Eastern Mediterranean.

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The United Kingdom has deployed the Royal Navy destroyer HMS Dragon to the Eastern Mediterranean to strengthen air defence around Cyprus and protect key installations such as RAF Akrotiri amid rising Iranian-linked drone threats in the region (Picture Source: UK Ministry of Defence / Britannica)

The decision to send HMS Dragon comes after reporting that the UK was weighing the rapid deployment of her sister ship HMS Duncan, another Type 45 air-defence destroyer, to bolster protection of Cyprus from Iranian drone and missile threats. While that option remained on the table, the formal government statement confirms that HMS Dragon will now undertake the mission, providing a similar, high-end air-defence umbrella based on the same Sea Viper system and SAMPSON radar suite. In practical terms, this means a powerful, mobile shield can be rapidly positioned to cover RAF Akrotiri, British Sovereign Base Areas and nearby allied installations, complementing land-based radars and deployed fighter aircraft.

At the core of HMS Dragon’s value for this mission is the Sea Viper air-defence system, which combines the SAMPSON active electronically scanned array multi-function radar with the S1850M long-range air-surveillance radar and a battery of Aster family missiles housed in 48 Sylver A50 vertical launch cells. This architecture allows the ship to detect, track and classify hundreds of air targets at ranges of up to roughly 400 km, while engaging them with Aster 15 and Aster 30 interceptors that can reach out to well beyond 100 km at speeds up to around Mach 4.5. The Ministry of Defence itself highlights Sea Viper’s ability to launch eight missiles in under ten seconds and guide up to 16 simultaneously, giving Dragon the capacity to deal with saturation attacks by multiple drones, cruise missiles or aircraft, precisely the type of complex threat profile now emerging from Iranian-designed systems and their proxies.

These capabilities are not theoretical. The Type 45 destroyers have already demonstrated operational performance, including the interception of a Houthi missile in 2024, as the government statement notes, as well as high-end live-fire trials against supersonic targets during exercises such as Formidable Shield. In one recent test, HMS Dragon used Sea Viper to destroy a supersonic missile executing complex evasive manoeuvres at more than four times the speed of sound, validating the system’s ability to counter advanced threats that exceed the performance of typical one-way attack drones. Transposed to the Eastern Mediterranean, those same detection and engagement margins allow Dragon to create a protective dome around Cyprus and key sea lanes, intercepting long-range drones or cruise missiles well before they can threaten RAF Akrotiri, British personnel, or allied infrastructure on the island.

The deployment is part of a wider, layered UK air-defence posture in the region. Over the previous 24 hours announced by the Ministry of Defence, RAF F-35B Lightning II jets operating from RAF Akrotiri achieved their first combat kills by shooting down hostile drones over Jordan, supported by Typhoon fighters and a Voyager tanker, while British counter-drone units neutralised additional threats over Iraq and an RAF Typhoon from the joint UK-Qatar 12 Squadron downed an Iranian one-way attack drone directed at Qatar. Army Recognition has detailed how these F-35B engagements mark a significant step in the integration of fifth-generation fighters into coalition air-defence networks, with British jets now actively policing airspace and intercepting drones across the Levant. HMS Dragon slots into this architecture as the maritime node of a UK-led, multi-domain defence grid extending from the airspace above Jordan to the waters off Cyprus.

A key addition to this shield is the deployment of Wildcat helicopters armed with Martlet missiles, described in the government statement as drone-busting assets configured to “hunt and shoot down aerial threats.” As reported in detail by Army Recognition, AW159 Wildcat HMA2 helicopters equipped with Martlet provide a nimble, close-in counter-UAS layer, capable of patrolling sea lanes and coastal areas, detecting small, low-flying drones and neutralising them out to several kilometres. Operating from HMS Dragon’s flight deck or from Cyprus-based facilities, these helicopters can push the defensive perimeter further forward, engaging drones or uncrewed surface vessels that slip under the main radar horizon or use terrain masking around the island. Their integration with the ship’s sensors and NATO data links effectively extends Dragon’s reach into the littoral environment, where drones and low-cost systems are most likely to be employed.

For Cyprus and its population, both local residents and the thousands of British military families and civilian workers associated with RAF Akrotiri and the Sovereign Base Areas, the arrival of HMS Dragon materially alters the risk calculus. The Type 45’s long-range radar picture and Sea Viper engagement envelope provide early warning and intercept opportunities against threats that might otherwise have only seconds to impact once detected by shore-based systems. Combined with land-based radars, F-35B and Typhoon combat air patrols and ground-based air-defence assets already deployed by the UK and other allies, Dragon’s presence creates a layered, overlapping shield over the island and nearby shipping routes. This improves not only the protection of British sovereign territory and personnel, but also contributes directly to the security of Cypriot civilians, NATO forces transiting through the island, and international traffic using the Eastern Mediterranean as a strategic corridor between Europe and the Middle East.

The strategic messaging is equally significant. Iran’s continuing use of drones and missiles to project power across the region, including attacks that have targeted British interests, is explicitly cited by London as a driver for this deployment. By choosing to send one of its most sophisticated air-defence platforms rather than a lower-end escort, the UK is demonstrating that it is prepared to commit high-value assets to defend its bases and allies, not simply to rely on dispersed fighter patrols or ad hoc ground systems. At the same time, the earlier discussion of a possible deployment of HMS Duncan, as reported by Army Recognition, underscores that this is not a one-off gesture but part of a broader consideration of how to maintain a continuous Type 45 presence off Cyprus as long as the threat demands it. In effect, Britain is turning the Eastern Mediterranean into a forward air-defence hub anchored on its sovereign territory, blue-water navy and fifth-generation air power.

By sending HMS Dragon and Martlet-armed Wildcat helicopters to the Eastern Mediterranean at a moment of heightened Iranian-linked drone and missile activity, the United Kingdom is reinforcing its position as a frontline air-defence actor for Cyprus, NATO and regional partners. The destroyer’s Sea Viper system, proven in both combat and demanding live-fire trials, offers a long-range shield capable of intercepting complex salvos, while the integration with F-35B and Typhoon fighters and agile Wildcats creates a layered envelope that extends from the upper airspace down to low-flying drones skimming the sea. Grounded in an official Ministry of Defence deployment order and supported by recent operational experience documented in open sources, this posture sends a clear signal: the UK is willing to place some of its most capable ships, aircraft and crews on the line to protect its sovereign bases, the people of Cyprus and its allies, and any attempt to probe that shield will now face a far more robust and sophisticated British response.

Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
U.S. Forces Destroy 17 Iranian Warships and One Submarine in Operation Epic Fury Strikes
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U.S. Central Command says American forces destroyed 17 Iranian naval vessels and one submarine during Operation Epic Fury, a major campaign targeting Iranian military infrastructure across multiple domains. The strikes significantly reduce Tehran’s ability to threaten shipping in the Persian Gulf and disrupt traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.

U.S. Central Command reports that American forces destroyed 17 Iranian naval vessels and one submarine during Operation Epic Fury, a large-scale campaign targeting Iranian military infrastructure and combat forces across the region. According to CENTCOM’s ongoing battle damage assessment, the operation has struck hundreds of Iranian targets, including missile launch sites, air defense systems, command nodes, and naval facilities. The maritime losses represent a significant blow to Iran’s naval strike capability in the Persian Gulf, particularly its ability to threaten commercial shipping and energy transit routes through the Strait of Hormuz.
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U.S. Central Command announced that American forces destroyed 17 Iranian naval vessels and one submarine during Operation Epic Fury, significantly degrading Tehran’s maritime capabilities in the Persian Gulf. (Picture source: U.S. Central Command)

The naval losses represent one of the most substantial reported degradations of Iranian maritime warships in decades and appear aimed directly at the operational backbone of Iran’s asymmetric naval doctrine. Iranian naval power is divided between two separate forces with different missions and equipment: the conventional Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN). While the IRIN operates larger surface combatants and submarines intended for broader maritime defense, the IRGC Navy is responsible for asymmetric operations in the confined waters of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.

Defense analysts assess that most of the 17 vessels destroyed during Operation Epic Fury likely belonged to the IRGC Navy, which maintains a large fleet of fast-attack craft designed to overwhelm larger naval forces through swarm tactics. These platforms include missile boats and high-speed patrol craft, such as the Peykaap missile boats, the Zolfaghar fast-attack craft, the Seraj high-speed boats, and the Ashura-class patrol vessels. These vessels are typically armed with anti-ship missiles, rockets, torpedoes, and naval mines and are designed for rapid hit-and-run attacks against both commercial shipping and military vessels operating in the Gulf.

Iran’s asymmetric maritime strategy relies on deploying large numbers of these small vessels simultaneously to saturate the defenses of larger warships. By attacking from multiple directions at high speed, these craft are intended to complicate targeting solutions for advanced naval defense systems. The reported destruction of 17 vessels, therefore, likely represents a direct blow to the operational concept that underpins Iran’s strategy to contest U.S. naval superiority in the region.

Particularly significant in the U.S. CENTCOM (Central Command) assessment is the reported destruction of one submarine. Iran maintains a mixed submarine fleet composed of both Russian-built and domestically developed platforms. The most capable of these are the three Russian-built Kilo-class submarines Tareq, Noor, and Yunes, each displacing approximately 3,000 tons submerged and capable of launching torpedoes and deploying naval mines. These submarines provide Iran with its primary underwater strike capability and can operate not only in the Persian Gulf but also in the Gulf of Oman and the northern Indian Ocean.

However, defense specialists consider it more likely that the submarine destroyed during Operation Epic Fury belongs to Iran’s fleet of smaller coastal submarines. Iran operates more than twenty Ghadir-class midget submarines, specifically designed for operations in shallow waters such as the Strait of Hormuz. These submarines can deploy naval mines, launch torpedoes, and conduct ambush attacks against surface vessels, making them a key element of Iran’s maritime denial strategy. Iran has also introduced the domestically produced Fateh-class submarine, a medium-sized platform with a displacement of roughly 600 tons, designed to bridge the capability gap between the Ghadir mini-submarines and the larger Kilo-class boats.

Even the loss of a single submarine would reduce Iran’s capacity to conduct covert maritime operations, particularly mine-laying missions intended to disrupt tanker traffic. Naval mines remain one of Iran’s most effective tools for threatening commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, a critical global chokepoint through which approximately 20 percent of the world’s seaborne oil trade passes.

In addition to its submarine force, the conventional Iranian Navy maintains several larger surface combatants. These include the domestically produced Mowj-class frigates, such as Jamaran, Sahand, and Dena, each displacing roughly 1,300 to 1,500 tons and equipped with anti-ship missiles, naval guns, and air defense systems. Iran also continues to operate several aging Alvand-class frigates, originally built in the United Kingdom during the 1970s but subsequently upgraded with Iranian missile systems and electronic warfare equipment.

While none of these larger warships have been confirmed among the vessels destroyed, the loss of numerous smaller combatants would still significantly affect Iran’s ability to conduct swarm attacks and harassment operations in the Gulf. Iran’s naval strategy depends heavily on dispersing large numbers of fast-attack craft across coastal bases and islands throughout the Persian Gulf, allowing them to quickly converge on targets transiting the region's narrow waterways.

U.S. forces possess extensive capabilities designed to counter this type of threat precisely. Carrier-based strike aircraft, long-range precision weapons, maritime patrol aircraft, armed drones, and advanced surveillance systems enable U.S. commanders to track and engage small naval targets at sea and in coastal staging areas. Precision-guided munitions and cruise missiles enable the rapid destruction of concentrations of fast attack craft before they can disperse or launch coordinated attacks.

The reported destruction of multiple vessels during Operation Epic Fury, therefore, suggests that U.S. strikes may have targeted Iranian naval bases, docking facilities, or staging areas where fast attack craft are typically assembled prior to operations. Neutralizing these assets while they are concentrated in port can be significantly more effective than attempting to engage them individually once dispersed at sea.

Despite these reported losses, Iran still retains a sizable maritime force capable of threatening regional shipping. The IRGC Navy maintains hundreds of fast patrol craft and missile boats, supported by coastal anti-ship missile batteries, naval mines, unmanned aerial systems, and shore-based radar networks. These capabilities remain central to Tehran’s strategy of deterring Western naval operations and maintaining the ability to disrupt maritime traffic if a conflict escalates further.

Nevertheless, if confirmed, the destruction of 17 vessels and a submarine during Operation Epic Fury represents a notable setback for Iran’s maritime forces. The losses highlight the vulnerability of concentrated naval assets to precision strike operations and underscore the continuing importance of U.S. naval and air superiority in maintaining freedom of navigation in one of the world’s most strategically vital maritime corridors.

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
Iranian Navy frigate IRIS Dena sinks near Sri Lanka after possible submarine attack
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On March 4, 2026, the Iranian Navy frigate IRIS Dena sank south of Sri Lanka after issuing a distress call at dawn, potentially after being attacked by a submarine.

Sri Lanka's Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath says that the Iranian Navy frigate IRIS Dena sank about 40 km south of Sri Lankan coasts, near Galle, after issuing a distress call early on March 4, 2026. Sri Lankan naval and air units launched a rescue operation and recovered wounded sailors. Officials indicated a possible submarine attack while search operations continued for the missing crew.
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IRIS Dena, pennant number 75, belonged to the Iranian Navy’s Southern Fleet and was built at Iranian Navy factories in Bandar Abbas, laid down in 2012, launched in 2015, and commissioned into service in 2021. (Picture source: Iranian MoD)

On March 4, 2026, Sri Lanka's Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath announced that the Iranian Navy frigate IRIS Dena sank south of Sri Lanka after issuing a distress call at dawn, prompting a rescue operation by Sri Lankan naval and air assets that recovered 32 critically wounded sailors. Sri Lankan naval and defence officials suggested the possibility of a submarine attack to Reuters, though the origin of any such attack remained officially unclear. The vessel went down about 40 kilometres south of the island near Galle, just outside Sri Lanka’s territorial waters in the Indian Ocean.

The frigate carried a crew of about 180 sailors when the emergency unfolded, and authorities confirmed that the rescued personnel were transported to a hospital in southern Sri Lanka. Sri Lankan forces deployed two navy vessels and an aircraft to the area to assist the ship and evacuate survivors from the water. Police reinforced security around the hospital in Galle, located about 115 kilometres south of Colombo, as the injured sailors arrived. Sri Lanka’s response began after the distress call was received early in the morning as the frigate reported that it was sinking outside the island’s territorial waters. Two Sri Lankan navy ships and an aircraft were sent to the location, and the Sri Lankan Air Force also participated in the rescue effort.

The rescued sailors were transferred to the main hospital in Galle while search operations continued in the surrounding waters for the remaining members of the crew. Authorities confirmed that the response was carried out within Sri Lanka’s designated search and rescue area in the Indian Ocean and under international maritime obligations to assist vessels in distress. Officials indicated that the fate of the rest of the crew remained unknown while the search operation continued. During a parliamentary debate, an opposition legislator asked whether the vessel had been bombed in connection with ongoing US-Israeli attacks against Iran, but the government did not provide a response at the time of writing.

Before the sinking, IRIS Dena had participated in the International Fleet Review 2026 held in Visakhapatnam, India, which brought together naval forces from multiple countries for a large gathering of warships and maritime activities. The frigate arrived in the Indian port city in February 2026 to join the fleet review events and associated naval engagements. After the main fleet review ceremony on February 18, 2026, the ship docked in Visakhapatnam on February 20, 2026. Iran’s naval commander Commodore Shahram Irani was present in India during the events and met India’s Chief of the Naval Staff Admiral Dinesh K Tripathi during the visit. The Iranian naval delegation attended several activities connected to the fleet review. These engagements formed part of a wider set of naval events hosted by India during the same period.

MILAN 2026 was conducted alongside the International Fleet Review and involved multinational naval cooperation activities that combined harbor events with a sea phase of joint exercises. IRIS Dena participated in the exercise as part of the Iranian naval presence in Visakhapatnam during February 2026. The activities included exchanges between naval personnel and coordinated maritime drills involving participating navies. Iran’s naval commander traveled to India to attend the exercise, the fleet review, and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium. A US Navy destroyer, USS Pinckney, had been scheduled to participate in the fleet review and MILAN exercise, but did not attend because of emergent operational requirements. A US Navy P-8 maritime patrol aircraft instead took part in the engagements, and USS Pinckney had departed Singapore on February 11, 2026 after undergoing repairs.

IRIS Dena, pennant number 75, belonged to the Iranian Navy’s Southern Fleet and was named after Mount Dena. The ship was built at Iranian Navy factories in Bandar Abbas, laid down in 2012, launched in 2015, and commissioned into service in 2021. The frigate measured about 95 metres in length with a beam of about 11.1 metres and an estimated draught of 3.25 metres. Displacement reached about 1,500 tonnes. The propulsion system included four diesel engines rated at 5,000 horsepower each, supported by diesel generators, enabling a maximum speed of about 30 knots. Aviation facilities included a helipad capable of operating a Bell 212 anti-submarine warfare helicopter.

The frigate carried an Asr three-dimensional PESA radar and electronic warfare equipment. Its armament included a 76 mm dual-purpose rapid fire naval gun and a Fath 40 mm anti-aircraft cannon derived from the Bofors design. Additional weapons included crew-served 20 mm Oerlikon cannons and launchers for anti-ship missiles such as the C-802 or Noor series. Surface-to-air missiles identified as Sayad-2 were installed for air defense. Anti-submarine warfare capabilities included two triple 324 mm light torpedo launchers. Defensive countermeasures included chaff dispensers. The radar system could track multiple targets and engage several simultaneously with a coverage range extending to about 300 kilometres.

The Moudge-class is a series of domestically produced Iranian frigates developed for the Iranian Navy. Ships in the class typically displace about 1,500 tonnes and measure about 95 metres in length with a beam of about 11.1 metres and a draught of about 3.25 metres. The propulsion arrangement includes engines delivering about 20,000 horsepower combined with diesel generators and a top speed of about 30 knots. Sensors include the Asr three-dimensional long-range radar. The class also integrates electronic warfare systems and decoy launchers. Aviation facilities include a landing pad capable of supporting a Bell 214 anti-submarine warfare helicopter.

Weapons fitted to Moudge class frigates include a 76 mm Fajr-27 naval gun and either a 40 mm Fath-40 anti-aircraft cannon or a 30 mm Kamand close-in weapon system. Additional weapons include 20 mm cannons and 12.7 mm heavy machine guns. Surface-to-air missiles such as Mehrab and Sayyad variants are installed for air defense. Anti-ship missile armament includes Noor or Qader missiles, sometimes in sets of four or eight launchers, depending on the ship. Anti-submarine warfare capability is provided by triple 324 mm torpedo tubes. Chaff launchers and electronic warfare systems support defensive countermeasures. These ships were developed to replace older vessels such as the Alvand class in Iranian service.

The first ships of the Moudge class began construction in the early 2000s, and several vessels were subsequently launched including Jamaran, Damavand, Sahand, and Dena. Jamaran entered service at Bandar Abbas while other ships were built at facilities associated with the Iranian Navy and the Marine Industries Organization. The frigate Damavand ran aground on a concrete breakwater near Bandar-Anzali on January 10, 2018, during severe weather conditions. The class has continued to expand as part of Iran’s domestic naval construction program. These ships form a component of the Iranian surface fleet operating in the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean.

Iran has employed Moudge class frigates for maritime patrols, escort missions, and long-distance naval deployments beyond its immediate region. The frigate IRIS Dena and the support vessel IRIS Makran completed a long-distance mission between 2022 and 2023 that circumnavigated the globe and covered more than 65,000 kilometres of sea routes. The voyage included port visits in locations such as Jakarta, Rio de Janeiro, and Cape Town before the ships returned to Bandar Abbas after about eight months at sea. Participation in international naval gatherings such as the International Fleet Review 2026 and the MILAN exercise illustrated the use of these frigates for operational presence and diplomatic naval engagement. The sinking of IRIS Dena occurred shortly after the ship had completed these activities and departed India during its return voyage.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
U.S. Launches USNS Lansing EPF-16 Final Spearhead Fast Transport with New Medical Capability
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The U.S. Navy and Austal USA launched the future USNS Lansing (EPF 16) in Mobile, Alabama, on Feb. 25, marking the final Spearhead-class Expeditionary Fast Transport built under the current program. The ship introduces a Flight II configuration that adds Role 2 Enhanced medical facilities while preserving the class’s high-speed logistics role across distributed maritime operations.

Austal USA puts the future USNS Lansing into the water in Mobile, Alabama, closing out the U.S. Navy’s Spearhead-class Expeditionary Fast Transport production run while adding another high-speed connector that now carries a medical dimension. The yard confirms in a 27 February statement that the launch takes place on 25 February and that the ship now sits pier-side for final outfitting and system activation ahead of sea trials later in 2026. As EPF 16 and the last hull on the contract, Lansing matters less as a ceremonial milestone than as a test of whether the Navy’s logistics force can keep pace with a maritime posture that increasingly treats distance as the enemy and medical resiliency as a planning factor rather than an afterthought.
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Future USNS Lansing EPF 16 floats out as Austal USA in Mobile as the Navy's final Spearhead class fast transport pairing 35 plus knot intra-theater lift with Flight II Role 2 Enhanced medical spaces (Picture source: Austal USA).

The original EPF concept prizes speed and shallow access, moving people, vehicles, and palletized cargo across a theater without tying down high-end combatants. Flight II keeps that connective role but accepts a trade. Less pure lift is exchanged for a more flexible interior layout and upgrades that allow the ship to do more than shuttle equipment between secure ports. In the Navy’s own framing, the Flight II configuration reduces lift capacity to 330 short tons while introducing treatment spaces and support areas that enable the embarkation of a Role 2 Enhanced medical capability while still functioning as an intra-theater transport. The adjustment is deliberate and reflects a planning environment where casualty care and forward recovery increasingly compete with cargo for operational space.

Lansing remains recognizably an EPF: the vessel is a 338-foot aluminum catamaran designed for shallow-draft access, with a draft below 15 feet that broadens the range of ports and austere facilities it can reach during contingency operations. Performance revolves around the connector mission, with the class engineered for a range of roughly 1,200 nautical miles at an average cruising speed of about 35 knots in Sea State 3. The ship is also built to interface with roll-on roll-off discharge facilities and can onload or offload a combat-loaded M1A2 Abrams tank using its stern ramp, a capability that allows armored elements to move between dispersed locations without relying on major port infrastructure.

Flight II introduces a set of modifications that quietly expand the ship’s operational envelope. The design incorporates a strengthened bow and updates to the flight deck that support CMV and MV-22 launch and recovery operations. Additional features include an 11-meter rigid hull inflatable boat launched by davit and an internal elevator connecting the mission deck with medical treatment spaces. These elements may appear incremental, yet they reflect careful engineering choices intended to streamline the movement of patients, personnel, and equipment across the ship during high-tempo operations when minutes carry operational consequences.

The launch sequence itself illustrates how the EPF program has matured into a predictable industrial process. Lansing moves out of Austal’s final assembly bay on self-propelled modular transporters, lifted several feet above ground, and slowly rolled roughly four hundred feet onto a deck barge. The barge then carries the vessel downriver to a floating dry doc,k where the ship is first placed in the water before returning upriver to the shipyard for final installation work and testing. The method has become routine for the yard, with Lansing representing the twenty-sixth vessel launched through this approach. Behind the choreography of transporters, barges, and tugs lies a broader point about the Navy’s logistics fleet. Unlike the more visible combatant programs, these vessels rely heavily on a steady industrial rhythm rather than technological spectacle.

The ship’s naming and crew structure also reflect the operational model behind the Expeditionary Fast Transport fleet. Lansing becomes the first U.S. Navy vessel named after the capital city of Michigan and is intended to operate under the Military Sealift Command construct. The ship is crewed by approximately thirty-one civilian mariners and can embark up to 155 personnel, including expeditionary forces or a deployed medical team. This hybrid approach allows the Navy to maintain operational availability without drawing heavily on uniformed manpower while still providing the mobility required for expeditionary missions.

From a tactical perspective, Lansing extends the Navy’s ability to connect dispersed maritime forces across wide operational spaces. Its speed and shallow draft allow commanders to reposition personnel, spare parts, vehicles, and priority cargo between austere nodes far more rapidly than conventional sealift platforms. The addition of Role 2 Enhanced medical capability introduces another dimension by enabling surgical stabilization, triage, and short-term patient care closer to the operational area. In distributed maritime operations, where units operate across hundreds or even thousands of nautical miles, such a platform can shorten evacuation timelines and sustain forward elements without forcing them to withdraw toward large fixed facilities.

The launch of the final Spearhead-class hull also arrives at a moment when logistics increasingly defines maritime competition. A fleet that can rapidly redistribute forces, sustain remote positions, and provide medical support across dispersed theaters gains resilience in the face of long-range strike threats and contested supply chains. Lansing, therefore, represents more than the closing entry of a shipbuilding program. It reflects an enduring requirement for agile maritime connectors that enable presence and endurance across the Indo-Pacific and other regions where geography shapes strategy as much as firepower.
British Navy rolls out second Type 31 frigate HMS Active to expand global patrol capability
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The British Royal Navy rolled out the Type 31 frigate HMS Active at Babcock’s Rosyth shipyard on February 24, 2026, while officially starting the construction of HMS Bulldog on the same day with a steel cutting ceremony.

The UK's Royal Navy rolled out the second Type 31 frigate, HMS Active, at Babcock Rosyth shipyard on February 24, 2026, the same day that construction of HMS Bulldog began with a steel cutting ceremony. The events mark the transition of HMS Active to fitting out and the start of the fourth Inspiration-class frigate built to replace ageing Type 23 ships.
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The HMS Active, whose construction began with a steel cutting ceremony in January 2023, is the second vessel of the Type 31 Inspiration-class frigates and the thirteenth Royal Navy ship to carry the name Active. (Picture source: UK Navy)

On February 24, 2026, the British Royal Navy’s Type 31 frigate programme reached two industrial milestones at the Rosyth shipyard in Scotland as the HMS Active was rolled out from Babcock’s construction facility and steel was cut to begin building HMS Bulldog. The rollout marked the completion of the main construction phase for HMS Active (F08) and the transition toward fitting-out activities before launch and testing. On the same day, the steel-cutting ceremony initiated fabrication of HMS Bulldog (F09), the fourth of five ships in the class. The programme forms part of the United Kingdom’s effort to replace the ageing Type 23 general purpose frigates with a new generation of surface combatants entering service during the second half of the decade. Construction activity takes place at Rosyth in Fife, the same shipyard where the Royal Navy’s Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers were assembled.

HMS Active (F08) is the second vessel of the Type 31 Inspiration-class frigates and the thirteenth Royal Navy ship to carry the name Active. Construction began with a steel cutting ceremony on January 23, 2023, at Rosyth, followed by the keel laying ceremony on September 16, 2023. The ship emerged from the assembly hall on February 24, 2026, on a self-propelled wheeled modular transporter, marking the end of structural assembly inside the build hall. Following the rollout, the vessel proceeds to final fitting-out, which includes installation of combat systems, sensors, weapons, and other equipment before entering sea trials. Once launched, the frigate will return to Rosyth to complete further integration work prior to entering operational service with the Royal Navy. The lead ship of the class, HMS Venturer, was rolled out earlier in 2025 and is currently undergoing fitting-out ahead of a projected commissioning in 2027.

The steel cutting ceremony for HMS Bulldog on the same date, which demonstrated the building of multiple ships within the same production facility, initiated production of the fourth frigate of the class. Steel plates for the hull were cut using automated machinery within Babcock’s manufacturing facility at Rosyth. HMS Bulldog (F09) will join three other Type 31s already in various stages of construction, including HMS Venturer (F12), HMS Active (F08), and HMS Formidable (F11), while a fifth vessel, HMS Campbeltown (F10), is planned as the final ship of the class. All five ships will operate from Portsmouth Naval Base once in service. HMS Active has affiliations with the cities of Burnley and Wolverhampton, while HMS Bulldog is linked with Manchester and Swindon. For Babcock, the construction sequence illustrates the staggered production cycle in which several vessels are assembled simultaneously in different stages across the shipyard infrastructure.

The Type 31 frigates, also known as the Inspiration class, are a group of five general-purpose warships built for the Royal Navy to perform a broad range of maritime tasks. Each ship has a displacement of 5,700 tonnes and a length of 138.7 metres. The propulsion system consists of four Rolls-Royce or MTU 20V 8000 M71 diesel engines supported by four Rolls-Royce or MTU 16V 2000 M41B generators operating through a combined diesel and diesel arrangement with two shafts and MAN Alpha VBS Mk5 controllable pitch propellers. Maximum speed exceeds 28 knots, and the operational range reaches 9,000 nautical miles. Crew size is about 110 sailors with accommodation for up to 190 personnel, allowing additional mission specialists or aviation crews to embark when required. The ships include a helicopter hangar and flight deck capable of supporting either an AW159 Wildcat or AW101 Merlin helicopter.

Combat systems aboard the ships include the Thales TACTICOS combat management system, a Thales NS110 multi-beam AESA radar, Mirador Mk2 electro-optical sensors, and navigation systems produced by Raytheon and Terma. Electronic warfare capability includes the Vigile-D electronic support measures system and additional decoy launchers designed to counter incoming missile threats. The primary armament configuration consists of a 57 mm Mk110 naval gun, two 40 mm Mk4 secondary guns, and four 7.62 mm machine guns. Air defence capability is provided by Sea Ceptor surface-to-air missiles, while aviation facilities support anti-surface, surveillance, and maritime security missions through embarked helicopters. A mission bay beneath the flight deck can accommodate containerised equipment or support operations involving rigid-hull inflatable boats, unmanned surface vehicles, and unmanned underwater vehicles launched from three boat bays.

The Type 31 frigates are designed to conduct maritime security patrols, interception operations, intelligence collection, defence engagement missions with partner navies, and humanitarian assistance activities. Their modular architecture allows the integration of different mission packages and equipment during service life. The design used for the class is based on Babcock’s Arrowhead 140 design, derived from the Danish Navy’s Iver Huitfeldt-class frigate hull form, which was extensively redesigned to meet Royal Navy standards and survivability requirements. The approach allows additional weapons, sensors, or mission modules to be integrated during future capability insertion periods. The frigates are intended to operate alongside the Type 26 anti-submarine warfare frigates and Type 45 destroyers within the Royal Navy’s future fleet structure.

The shipbuilding programme supports a workforce of about 1,250 employees directly engaged in the Type 31 programme at Rosyth and across related UK facilities, while another 1,250 jobs exist within the national supply chain providing equipment, systems, and materials. An industrial investment of about £200 million has been made by Babcock at the Rosyth shipyard to expand shipbuilding capability. The Venturer Building assembly hall enables two frigates to be assembled simultaneously and supports modular construction techniques that allow systems and compartments to be installed before the hull blocks are joined. More than 400 apprenticeship positions have been created through partnerships with technical colleges in Fife and other parts of Scotland. These initiatives aim to maintain domestic expertise in ship design, engineering, and maritime manufacturing while preparing new personnel for future naval construction projects.

The Arrowhead 140 design on which the Type 31 frigate is based has also been selected for naval programmes outside the United Kingdom. Indonesia is constructing a group of frigates derived from the design under the Red-White frigate programme at PT PAL shipyard in Surabaya. Poland has adopted the design for the Wicher-class frigates under the Miecznik programme, being built at PGZ Stocznia Wojenna in Gdynia. The modular structure of the design allows different navies to integrate national weapons, sensors, and combat systems while retaining the core hull architecture. Within the United Kingdom programme, the five ships HMS Venturer, HMS Active, HMS Formidable, HMS Bulldog, and HMS Campbeltown are planned to enter service by the end of the decade, replacing five Type 23 frigates to form a key component of the Royal Navy’s future surface fleet.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
UK Weighs Deployment of HMS Duncan Destroyer to Protect Cyprus from Iranian Drone and Missile Threats
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Britain is weighing the rapid deployment of HMS Duncan, a Royal Navy Type 45 destroyer, to waters off Cyprus following Iranian-linked drone activity targeting RAF Akrotiri. The move would strengthen layered air and missile defense in the eastern Mediterranean, reinforcing NATO posture and regional deterrence.

The United Kingdom is considering deploying HMS Duncan, a Type 45 air-defense destroyer, to the waters off Cyprus following a drone attack that damaged the runway at RAF Akrotiri, according to The Guardian. Defence Secretary John Healey is reportedly evaluating plans to position the Aster missile-equipped warship offshore to expand radar coverage and provide a mobile intercept capability. Although no formal decision has been announced, such a deployment would underscore a swift British response to escalating Iranian-linked drone and missile activity in the eastern Mediterranean.

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Britain is considering deploying the Royal Navy’s Type 45 destroyer HMS Duncan to waters off Cyprus to strengthen air defenses around RAF Akrotiri after Iranian-linked drones, including a Shahed-type system, breached base defenses and damaged the runway (Picture Source: Royal Navy / Britannica)

The operational logic behind a Type 45 presence is straightforward: Cyprus is not just territory, it is a sortie-generation hub. RAF Akrotiri underwrites UK and allied reach into the Levant and Eastern Mediterranean, and any successful strike that closes runways, damages fuel infrastructure, or forces aircraft dispersal can impose an outsized operational penalty relative to the attacker’s cost. In that environment, a destroyer is not merely “reassurance.” It is a mobile extension of the defended footprint that can be positioned to meet the most likely threat axis, shifting the interception problem away from the runway and toward the sea approaches, where early detection and engagement geometry are more favorable.

Reporting indicates the strike activity around Akrotiri is being treated as linked to Iran-supplied systems and proxy launch pathways, though attribution remains politically sensitive and not all details are publicly confirmed. Reuters reported the UK had not yet decided on deploying a warship, while also noting a Cyprus News Agency report that France was planning to contribute anti-missile and anti-drone systems. That combination of uncertainty and allied movement is important because it hints at how London may be thinking about escalation control: harden defenses quickly, avoid committing to offensive action from the base, and build a coalition layer that complicates Iranian planning without forcing an immediate retaliatory ladder climb.

HMS Duncan’s relevance comes from the Type 45’s core mission as an anti-air warfare destroyer built around the Sea Viper system, the Royal Navy’s premier fleet area air-defense capability. Sea Viper combines the SAMPSON multi-function radar with long-range air surveillance from S1850M, enabling a single ship to detect, track, prioritize, and engage multiple targets in complex raid conditions. In practical terms, that means Duncan can act as a forward sensor and shooter, generating fire-control quality tracks for long-range engagements while also feeding a broader air picture to joint and allied nodes via tactical data links. When the threat set includes low-flying drones and potential cruise missiles, the ship’s value is not just “a missile battery at sea,” but an integrated engagement capability that can reshape the local air-defense timeline by detecting earlier and engaging farther out than point-defense systems around the airfield.

The ship’s primary magazine for that mission is its 48-cell Sylver A50 vertical launch system carrying Aster-family interceptors under the Sea Viper umbrella. The key operational point is not the headline range figure often associated with Aster 30, but the engagement options it creates: the ability to prosecute targets well before they reach the coastline, to engage multiple tracks in quick succession, and to continue fighting while maneuvering. That mobility matters around Cyprus because the “best” defensive position changes with the launch basket. If the assessed threat axis is Lebanon or western Syria, a ship can bias east; if launches shift, it can reposition within hours rather than waiting for land systems to be negotiated, delivered, emplaced, and integrated.

A balanced assessment must also confront the unfavorable economics of drone defense. Aster interceptors are premium weapons, while one-way attack drones are designed to be cheap, numerous, and expendable. That mismatch is exactly why a Type 45 would not be expected to solve the drone problem alone. It would more plausibly sit atop a layered defense where cheaper effects handle cheaper threats and Sea Viper is reserved for the targets that matter most: faster or more survivable drones, coordinated raids, cruise-missile-class threats, or the leakers that evade closer-in measures. The Type 45’s layered stack supports that logic: it is widely documented as carrying a medium-caliber main gun and close-in weapon systems for terminal defense, and it also fields electronic warfare and decoy systems designed to complicate seeker-based threats. The ship’s job in a Cyprus posture would be to add depth and high-confidence kill options, not to fire an Aster at every low-end track.

Where the analysis becomes strategically sharper is in what Sea Viper can do beyond drone defense: it raises the ceiling on the kind of strike package Iran or aligned actors can use to impose political effects. A drone that clips a runway is disruptive; a coordinated attack mixing drones with cruise missiles, or seeking to exploit saturation dynamics, is a different class of coercion. A Type 45 off Cyprus signals that such escalation attempts face a defender built to manage complex air battles. It also allows London to move deterrence up the ladder without immediately moving to offensive action, a distinction that matters politically when allies are trying to keep a regional conflict from expanding while still protecting sovereign assets.

The UK’s own modernization path reinforces this interpretation. London has confirmed a £405 million Sea Viper upgrade effort, described by the Royal Navy and UK government as a near-decade enhancement program aimed at coping with newer threats and building toward improved performance against more stressing target sets, including emerging missile profiles. MBDA has described Sea Viper Evolution as involving upgrades to Aster 30 and associated radar and combat system improvements to address new anti-ship ballistic missile threats while retaining anti-air warfare performance, which underscores why a Type 45 is increasingly treated as a scarce, high-demand asset in any theater where missile risk is rising. This does not make the Type 45 a full theater ballistic missile defense equivalent to U.S. Aegis BMD, but it does mean the destroyer is being deliberately pushed toward a broader missile-defense problem set than traditional aircraft defense.

If HMS Duncan were deployed, the most credible operational concept would be a “mobile defended footprint” centered on protecting Akrotiri’s ability to generate sorties and sustain operations. Stationing the ship to maximize radar horizon and intercept opportunities over water would buy decision time, reduce the chance of debris falling on the base or nearby populated areas, and create space for RAF fighters and ground-based counter-drone systems to operate with better cueing and more time to engage. The ship would also function as a visible tripwire: an attack that seriously threatens British sovereign bases in Cyprus would now be engaging a high-end Royal Navy combatant whose mission is to fight and win in the air domain.

The most important caveat remains availability and endurance. A single destroyer cannot provide an uninterrupted umbrella indefinitely, and its missile magazine is finite. That is why the allied dimension reported by Reuters, and the broader political context around evacuation planning and force protection, is central to how credible this posture becomes over time. If UK decision-makers want a durable deterrent effect, a Type 45 deployment would ideally sit inside a wider, shared architecture: allied ships, land-based sensors and short-range defenses, standing fighter coverage, and clear rules of engagement that allow rapid engagements against inbound threats without paralysis from attribution politics. In that framework, Duncan is not a standalone shield; it is the high-end keystone that makes the layered system harder to saturate and harder to politically coerce.

For Cyprus, the significance is immediate: a Type 45 off the coast would raise the probability that Akrotiri stays open even under persistent threat. For Iran and its partners, the message is subtler and more consequential: Britain is attempting to deny coercive air attack effects without automatically stepping onto the offensive rung of escalation. And for European security, it is another indicator that the region’s “rear areas” are now routinely within reach of cheap, deniable strike systems, forcing navies and air forces to treat integrated air and missile defense as a daily operational requirement rather than a contingency plan.

Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
U.S. Navy Redeploys USS Gerald R. Ford for Second Combat Operation in Epic Fury Against Iran
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The U.S. Navy aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford has deployed to the Eastern Mediterranean to support Operation Epic Fury against Iran, adding sustained sea-based strike and air defense capability. Its arrival strengthens U.S. deterrence and combat flexibility without relying on fixed regional air bases.

After its deployment in Venezuela, the U.S. Navy’s aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) has moved into the Eastern Mediterranean to generate sustained carrier airpower for Operation Epic Fury against Iran, expanding U.S. strike capacity and tightening regional air and missile defense coverage without relying on vulnerable fixed bases ashore. U.S. Navy aircraft have been launching from the carrier in support of the campaign, which is being executed in parallel with a second carrier strike group operating in the region. The Ford’s arrival places a high-end, sea-based aviation complex close enough to influence the battlespace while remaining maneuverable, protected, and politically scalable.
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USS Gerald R. Ford brings Super Hornets for precision strike and maritime attack, Growlers for electronic attack and SEAD, E-2D Hawkeyes for airborne warning and battle management, MH-60s for ASW, plus escort destroyers with Tomahawks and layered air/missile defense (Picture source: U.S. DoW).

Operation Epic Fury began with a presidential “go order” on February 27, followed by a major combined strike wave on February 28 that included more than 100 aircraft from land and sea and opened with Tomahawk cruise missile launches, according to U.S. military briefings. In capability terms, Ford’s deployment is notable not only for what it brings to the fight, but for how fast it was surged. The carrier strike group was shifted from a Caribbean tasking to the Middle East and arrived after months of continuous operations, following Ford’s support to the early January raid that captured former Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro.

That compressed operational tempo matters because Fordis the lead ship of a class built around high electrical power and higher sortie generation, and Epic Fury is the type of high-demand campaign the program was designed to enable. Ford replaces steam catapults with the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS), delivering smoother, digitally controlled launches intended to reduce stress on aircraft and broaden the launch envelope. Recovery is handled by Advanced Arresting Gear, and weapons movement is accelerated by 11 Advanced Weapons Elevators, each capable of moving up to 24,000 pounds of ordnance at 150 feet per minute. In design terms, the Ford-class aims for roughly 160 sorties per day with higher surge potential, a step-change intended to convert deck space and energy into combat power.

The ship’s combat value, however, can be seen as a system that deploys other systems. With Carrier Air Wing 8 embarked, Ford enables a mix of strike fighters, electronic attack aircraft, airborne early warning, and helicopters that can be retasked minute-to-minute between counter-air, deep strike, maritime strike, and defensive counter-drone missions. Across two carriers in theater, roughly 150 aircraft can be massed for coordinated operations, a concentration of tactical aviation that becomes operationally decisive when paired with long-range tanking and standoff munitions from land-based forces. At sea, Ford’s presence also pulls escort demand into the Eastern Mediterranean, leveraging guided-missile destroyers and other escorts that bring Tomahawk land-attack reach and layered air defense capacity into the same maritime battlespace.

Ford functions as a command-and-control node and an air defense anchor as much as a strike deck. The Navy’s Cooperative Engagement Capability is designed to fuse sensor data across ships and aircraft into a shared composite track picture and enable engagements using remote sensor inputs, effectively stretching the defended footprint of a force. In Epic Fury, that network-centric architecture sits alongside the broader U.S. and partner air and missile defense posture that has been intercepting missiles and drones, including Patriot and THAAD batteries and ballistic missile defense-capable destroyers. The operational effect is to shorten the sensor-to-shooter chain, improve raid handling against saturation threats, and keep limited interceptor inventories allocated where they matter most.

Ford’s Eastern Mediterranean stationing is also a deliberate geometry choice for the Iran problem set. From that axis, carrier air can contribute to long-range strike packages and maritime interdiction while complicating Iranian planning for air defense coverage, warning time, and counterstrike vectors. The opening phase of Epic Fury emphasized Iran’s command and control, naval forces, missile sites, and intelligence infrastructure, with Tomahawks among the first weapons employed. Within that maritime layer, U.S. forces struck Iran’s Shahid Bagheri, described as a drone and helicopter carrier and a symbol of Tehran’s attempt to push aviation to sea. Striking such a platform is less about tonnage than about collapsing Iran’s ability to disperse drones, helicopters, and sensors across maritime space.

This deployment is also a stress test of naval endurance and industrial assumptions. Navy leadership has acknowledged Ford’s extended time away from home after departing Norfolk on June 24, 2025, placing the ship more than eight months into an extended deployment. The carrier conducted a resupply stop at Souda Bay, Crete, before taking station for Epic Fury, underscoring that even nuclear-powered carriers remain tied to a logistics rhythm for aviation fuel, weapons, and critical parts. The subtext for industry is clear: whatever early developmental challenges once defined EMALS, arresting gear, and advanced elevators, the Navy is now placing Ford’s systems under real operational demand, where reliability converts directly into strike volume and response time.

Strategically, Ford’s presence matters because it is one of the few assets the United States can reposition quickly that immediately changes a theater’s balance of airpower, intelligence, and defensive capacity. A carrier strike group is not just a platform; it is a sovereign, mobile airbase with escorts that can launch strikes, provide persistent ISR and airborne warning, and defend itself while operating in contested waters. In the Epic Fury context, the two-carrier posture signals escalation control through options: Washington can widen or narrow its operational aperture without negotiating access, exposing host-nation infrastructure, or committing ground combat power. For Iran, it forces a resource-intensive response across multiple axes and compresses decision cycles, because the carrier’s location is variable and its air wing can shift from defensive counter-air to offensive strike in a single deck cycle.
U.S. Navy Positions Six Arleigh Burke-class Destroyers in Arabian Sea for Sustained Tomahawk Strikes
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The US Navy has deployed six independently operating Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers to the Arabian Sea to conduct sustained Tomahawk land-attack missile strikes as part of Operation Fury. The move expands maritime strike capacity beyond traditional carrier groups, strengthening distributed precision firepower and operational resilience in a high-risk theater.

The US Navy has massed six independently deployed Arleigh Burke-classguided-missile destroyers in the Arabian Sea to execute sustained Tomahawk land-attack missile operations under Operation Fury, marking a notable shift toward distributed maritime strike operations. Fleet positioning data first reported by USNI News indicates the ships are operating outside the framework of a carrier strike group, creating a flexible surface action network capable of launching long-range precision fires from multiple vectors. Each destroyer carries between 90 and 96 vertical launch system cells, a portion of which can be configured for Tomahawk missiles with ranges exceeding 900 miles, enabling deep inland strike coverage. By dispersing launch platforms, the Navy complicates adversary targeting, sustains continuous strike cycles, and reduces reliance on carrier air wings or regional land bases amid heightened tensions with Iran.

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The U.S. Navy has positioned six Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers in the Arabian Sea to conduct sustained long-range Tomahawk strike operations under Operation Fury, expanding distributed maritime firepower in a high-risk regional theater (Picture Source: DVIDS / U.S. Navy)

The independently deployed destroyers identified in theater include USS McFaul (DDG-74), USS John Finn (DDG-113), USS Milius (DDG-69), USS Delbert D. Black (DDG-119), USS Pinckney (DDG-91), and USS Mitscher (DDG-57). Drawn from homeports at Naval Station Norfolk, Yokosuka, and Naval Station San Diego, the force composition reflects cross-fleet surge integration from both Atlantic and Pacific commands. According to USNI’s Fleet and Marine Tracker, the ships are dispersed across the Arabian Sea rather than concentrated in a single strike group formation, underscoring a deliberate shift toward distributed offensive surface warfare.

Official imagery released by the U.S. Department of War provides unusually direct confirmation of active strike execution by multiple ships in the theater. Two separate image releases by the U.S. Department of War document Tomahawk Land Attack Missile launches from two different destroyers operating in the Arabian Sea, underscoring that the strike campaign is being executed through a distributed surface combatant force rather than a single firing platform. One image series shows USS Delbert D. Black conducting a live Tomahawk launch during operations in U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility, while another captures USS Milius supporting Operation Epic Fury with confirmed missile activity. The photographs depict the Mk 41 Vertical Launch System hot-launch sequence, with booster ignition propelling the missile vertically before transition to cruise flight, visually validating that multiple independently deployed destroyers are actively delivering long-range precision fires from separate maritime positions.

At the center of this maritime strike posture is the Tomahawk cruise missile, the Navy’s primary long-range precision land-attack weapon deployed from the Mk 41 Vertical Launch System installed aboard every Arleigh Burke-class destroyer. These ships can field a mix of Tomahawk Block IV Tactical missiles and the newer Block V variants, depending on loadout and mission assignment. Block IV introduced two-way satellite communications through the Tactical Tomahawk Weapons Control System, enabling in-flight retargeting, mission abort capability, and loitering over designated target areas before final strike authorization. This allows commanders to adjust targets dynamically as intelligence evolves during active combat operations.

The more recent Block V upgrades enhance navigation resilience, strengthen resistance to GPS jamming, and extend service life through recertification programs. In addition, the Block Va Maritime Strike Tomahawk introduces the ability to engage moving surface vessels at long range, expanding the destroyers’ mission set beyond land attack. Block Vb variants incorporate a joint multi-effects warhead optimized for a broader range of hardened and semi-hardened targets. These improvements transform the Tomahawk from a fixed-target cruise missile into a networked, adaptable strike system capable of operating in contested electromagnetic environments.

With an effective range of approximately 1,000 miles or more depending on flight profile, routing, and payload configuration, Tomahawk enables destroyers operating in the Arabian Sea to hold at risk strategic targets deep inland without entering heavily defended coastal waters. The missile employs inertial navigation combined with GPS updates, terrain contour matching, and digital scene-matching to sustain low-altitude penetration profiles designed to reduce radar detection and interception probability. Its 1,000-pound class unitary warhead is optimized for hardened command-and-control facilities, air defense batteries, logistics depots, weapons storage sites, and missile infrastructure.

The operational significance of six destroyers equipped with Mk 41 Vertical Launch Systems lies in cumulative magazine depth and sustained strike endurance. Each Arleigh Burke-class destroyer carries between 90 and 96 vertical launch cells depending on flight configuration. While these cells are allocated among air-defense interceptors such as SM-2 and SM-6, Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles, anti-submarine rockets, and potentially ballistic missile defense interceptors, a strike-oriented loadout can dedicate a substantial portion to Tomahawks. Across six hulls, this represents dozens of ready-to-fire long-range cruise missiles available without immediate replenishment, allowing commanders to sequence salvos over multiple nights while preserving defensive capacity.

Distributed positioning enhances resilience. Rather than concentrating combat power around a single high-value unit, the Navy disperses launch platforms across hundreds of nautical miles. This complicates adversary detection, tracking, and targeting cycles, particularly in an environment where coastal radar networks, unmanned systems, and anti-ship missile batteries attempt to establish maritime situational awareness. Even if one ship must reposition, conduct air-defense operations, or reallocate missile inventory, other destroyers can continue launch sequences, preserving operational tempo and pressure on designated targets.

Reporting indicates that Operation Epic Fury began with cyber and space-domain actions before transitioning to kinetic strikes that included Tomahawk employment during the opening phase. The reliance on sea-based cruise missiles aligns with a doctrinal emphasis on degrading air defenses, communications nodes, and missile launch infrastructure prior to expanding manned aircraft penetration into contested airspace.

The destroyer-heavy strike model highlights the transformation of the Arleigh Burke class from primarily an air-defense escort to a central offensive asset in high-end conflict. By combining distributed maneuver with network-enabled long-range cruise missiles, the Navy is demonstrating that surface combatants can deliver sustained, precise, and scalable firepower independent of fixed bases. In a region defined by anti-access and area-denial systems, mobile sea-based Tomahawk launchers provide a survivable and adaptable strike backbone capable of shaping the battlespace from extended range.

As Operation Fury continues, the six U.S. Navy independently deployed destroyers in the Arabian Sea form a persistent maritime strike architecture capable of modulating pressure from limited precision attacks to sustained campaign-level firepower. The confirmed Tomahawk launches illustrate that distributed lethality is not a theoretical doctrine but an operational framework, with each destroyer serving as a mobile long-range strike node integrated into a broader joint fires campaign.

Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
U.S. Deploys Rare Dual Aircraft Carriers to Strike Iranian Targets in Operation Epic Fury
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The United States has deployed the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln alongside a Gerald R. Ford-class carrier in the U.S. Central Command theater for Operation Epic Fury. The rare dual-carrier deployment comes as U.S. and Israeli forces conduct strikes on Iranian targets and Tehran responds with ballistic missiles and drones, sharply elevating regional escalation risks.

The U.S. Navy has positioned the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln alongside a Gerald R. Ford-class carrier in support of Operation Epic Fury, marking an uncommon dual-carrier deployment within U.S. Central Command. Operating two large-deck carriers from different generations significantly expands sortie generation rates, electronic warfare reach, and layered air and missile defense across the theater. The move brings together the combat-proven Nimitz design, capable of launching more than 60 aircraft, with the Ford-class platform, which features the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System and advanced radar such as the Dual Band Radar variant.
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An F/A-18F Super Hornet from VFA-41 lands aboard USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) during Operation Epic Fury, February 28, 2026. (Picture source: US DoD)

USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72), a Nimitz-class nuclear-powered supercarrier, is conducting sustained flight operations under Operation Epic Fury as part of CENTCOM’s campaign targeting Iranian missile infrastructure, drone launch networks, air defense systems, and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps command elements. Operating alongside it is a Gerald R. Ford-class carrier, the newest generation of U.S. supercarrier designed to deliver higher sortie rates, improved survivability, and reduced lifecycle manpower requirements. Concentrating both a legacy Nimitz platform and a next-generation Ford-class ship in the same theater represents a deliberate force posture decision, given the Navy’s limited inventory of 11 carriers and the constant demands of maintenance cycles and global commitments.

Dual-carrier deployments to the Middle East are uncommon. Standard rotational presence typically involves one carrier strike group assigned to the Fifth Fleet area of responsibility. Bringing both a Nimitz-class and a Ford-class carrier together reflects the requirement for expanded operational endurance and sustained air tasking capacity. It also demonstrates the Navy’s ability to integrate different carrier classes into a unified strike architecture.

A Nimitz-class carrier displaces roughly 100,000 tons and uses steam catapults to launch aircraft, while the Ford-class introduces the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System and Advanced Arresting Gear, enabling smoother launches, higher sortie generation potential, and reduced stress on airframes. The Ford-class is designed to generate up to 30 percent more sorties per day compared to Nimitz-class carriers under high-intensity operations. When operating together, the two flight decks can theoretically sustain well over 120 tactical sorties per day, depending on mission requirements.

Both carriers embark air wings composed primarily of F/A-18E/F Super Hornets for strike and air superiority missions, EA-18G Growlers for electronic attack, E-2D Advanced Hawkeyes for airborne command and control, and MH-60 helicopters for anti-submarine and surface warfare. Depending on the air wing configuration, F-35C Lightning II aircraft may also be integrated, adding fifth-generation sensor fusion and low-observable penetration capability. The presence of two carriers allows for parallel strike cycles, continuous combat air patrols, and broader electronic suppression coverage across contested airspace.

This posture provides redundancy and flexibility. One carrier can focus on deep inland strike missions while the other sustains defensive counter-air patrols and maritime security operations. The combined escort forces, including Aegis-equipped cruisers and destroyers, strengthen ballistic missile defense coverage and sea control in critical waterways within the CENTCOM theater. The distributed positioning of two carrier strike groups complicates adversary targeting while enhancing survivability through layered defense.

The pairing of a Nimitz-class and a Ford-class carrier also carries industrial and doctrinal significance. It demonstrates that the Navy’s newest carrier design is fully integrated into frontline operational planning alongside legacy platforms. The Ford-class was engineered to reduce long-term operating costs while increasing combat output, and its deployment in a high-tempo operation validates its role in sustained combat scenarios rather than limited peacetime presence missions.

As Operation Epic Fury continues, the simultaneous deployment of USS Abraham Lincoln and a Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carrier stands out as a rare but powerful concentration of U.S. naval airpower. It underscores the Navy’s capacity to combine legacy endurance with next-generation launch technology, delivering sustained multi-domain effects from the sea while reinforcing CENTCOM’s operational depth and mission continuity.
U.S. Navy sinks Iranian drone carrier IRIS Shahid Bagheri in Epic Fury naval campaign
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US CENTCOM announced the launch of a sustained naval campaign against the Iranian Navy under Operation Epic Fury, which started by the destruction of Iran's first dedicated drone carrier, the IRIS Shahid Bagheri

The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) announced the launch of a sustained naval campaign against the Iranian Navy under Operation Epic Fury, targeting key fleet assets across the Gulf of Oman and surrounding waters. Among the primary objectives was the destruction of Iran's first dedicated drone carrier, the IRIS Shahid Bagheri, a vessel designed to expand Tehran's naval drone warfare and long-range strike operations. US officials described the strikes as part of a coordinated effort with Israel to dismantle Iranian maritime power, including missile platforms, forward base ships, and command nodes.
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The IRIS Shahid Bagheri, pennant number C110-4, measures 240.79 meters in length, 32.2 meters in beam, and 11.7 meters in draft, with a displacement of 41,978 tons. (Picture source: Iranian MoD)

On March 2, 2026, U.S. Central Command confirmed that U.S. forces struck and disabled the Iranian drone carrier IRIS Shahid Bagheri within hours of launching Operation Epic Fury against Iran. The strike formed part of a broader campaign that began on February 28, 2026, targeting Iranian naval units, missile infrastructure, and command facilities across multiple domains. U.S. officials indicated that 11 Iranian naval vessels operating in the Gulf of Oman were destroyed or rendered inoperable during the initial phase of the operation, including the Shahid Bagheri and other major surface assets. The action followed escalating exchanges between Iran and a U.S. and Israeli coalition, as Tehran threatened maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, a chokepoint through which close to 20 percent of global oil shipments transit daily.

The IRIS Shahid Bagheri, pennant number C110-4, was a drone carrier developed to provide the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy with a mobile sea base capable of extending unmanned reconnaissance, strike coordination, and fast-attack craft operations beyond Iran’s coastline into the Gulf of Oman and adjacent waters. Converted from the commercial container ship Perarin between 2022 and 2024, the vessel was intended to reduce reliance on fixed shore infrastructure while enabling sustained maritime presence and distributed operations at sea. Its design centered on the integration of unmanned aerial systems, helicopters, missile armament, and small surface combatants within a single large displacement hull, allowing it to function as a forward node for intelligence, surveillance, targeting support, and asymmetric naval warfare.

To fulfill this role, the vessel embarked a diverse mix of unmanned aerial vehicles and rotary-wing aircraft, including JAS-313 unmanned jets, Mohajer-6 armed UAVs, Ababil-3 and Ababil-3N reconnaissance drones, Homa vertical takeoff drones, Shahed-136 loitering munitions, and helicopters such as the Mi-17, Mi-171, Bell 412, and Bell 206. Iranian sources indicated a capacity of up to 60 UAVs and internal storage for approximately 30 fast-attack craft deployable through side openings, aligning with swarm and hit-and-run maritime tactics. Armament included eight Noor or Qader anti-ship cruise missiles, eight Kowsar-222 short-range air defense launchers, at least one 30 mm autocannon, and additional 20 mm Gatling-type systems. The ship also incorporated electronic warfare equipment, signals intelligence systems, and command-and-control facilities intended to coordinate drone sorties, missile launches, and surface maneuver elements during extended deployments.

The Shahid Bagheri was intended to function as a mobile sea base extending Iran’s unmanned reconnaissance and strike reach beyond its coastline into the Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, and potentially the Indian Ocean. By combining UAV launch capacity, helicopter operations, missile armament, and fast-attack craft deployment in a single hull, the vessel provided the IRGC Navy with a means of conducting distributed maritime surveillance and coordinated anti-ship operations without reliance on fixed shore installations. Its endurance profile and 22,000 nautical mile range were designed to support persistent presence missions, reduce predictability in deployment patterns, and complicate adversary targeting. The integration of electronic warfare systems and signal intelligence capabilities further positioned the ship as a node for maritime ISR and targeting support for coastal missile forces.

The removal of the Shahid Bagheri from the IRGC Navy order of battle reduces Iran’s capacity to conduct sustained sea-based UAV operations and limits its ability to maintain extended maritime domain awareness beyond littoral waters. While Iran retains a significant inventory of shore-based UAV launch sites, coastal anti-ship cruise missile batteries such as Noor and Qader, and thousands of small fast-attack craft, those assets are inherently tied to coastal geography and lack the mobility and endurance of an aviation-support vessel. The loss of a large displacement drone carrier constrains Iran’s ability to deploy reconnaissance drones at extended distances over open sea lanes, affecting long-range targeting chains against naval or commercial vessels operating outside immediate coastal missile envelopes.

At the theater level, the destruction or disabling of 11 Iranian naval vessels in the Gulf of Oman alters the local surface force balance and reduces Tehran’s ability to contest control of approaches to the Strait of Hormuz using larger hulls capable of sustained operations. The elimination of sea-based aviation and forward support ships narrows Iran’s maritime options toward asymmetric tactics centered on speedboats, mines, and land-based missiles, consistent with longstanding IRGC doctrine emphasizing swarm tactics and coastal defense. However, without a mobile sea base such as the Shahid Bagheri, coordination of wide-area drone swarms and integration of ISR with offshore maneuver elements becomes more complex and geographically constrained.

Strategically, the strike underscores the vulnerability of converted commercial vessels employed as military assets when operating within reach of precision-guided munitions and long-range strike systems. The loss of a ship commissioned just over one year earlier represents a setback to Iran’s efforts to expand maritime operational depth through cost-effective conversion projects modeled on previous vessels such as Shahid Roudaki and Shahid Mahdavi. In the context of Operation Epic Fury, the neutralization of the Shahid Bagheri and associated naval units contributes to a reduction in Iran’s sea-based power projection capability, while leaving intact its substantial land-based missile and UAV inventory, thereby shifting the center of gravity of Iranian military responses from offshore maneuver to shore-based strike and deterrence systems.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
China to launch first Type 095 nuclear submarine as US naval edge narrows in Pacific
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Satellite imagery shows China’s first Type 095 nuclear-powered attack submarine being prepared at the Huludao shipyard in Liaoning Province, as part of a larger expansion of Chinese undersea forces that has outpaced US submarine production in recent years.

Satellite imagery indicates that China is preparing to launch its first Type 095 nuclear-powered attack submarine, which is being prepared at the Huludao shipyard in Liaoning Province. The Type 095 submarine, also known as Type 09V, is part of a larger expansion of Chinese naval forces that has outpaced US submarine production in recent years. US officials warn that China’s growing submarine fleet could rapidly narrow the submarine gap with the United States, especially in the case of an escalation over Taiwan.
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The entry into service of the Type 095, combined with a larger Chinese nuclear-powered submarine fleet, alters the strategic environment in the western Pacific by increasing the density and persistence of Chinese undersea patrols in key U.S. maritime approaches. (Picture source: Chinese Navy)

On March 1, 2026, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) announced that the Chinese Navy may be preparing to launch its first Type 09V guided missile nuclear submarine at Huludao in Liaoning Province after satellite imagery dated February 9 showed the boat moved into a launch bay at Bohai Shipbuilding Heavy Industry Corporation. Also referred to as the Type 095, this new-generation nuclear-powered attack submarine is intended to expand China’s undersea strike capacity in the western Pacific during a Taiwan contingency. The Type 095 Sui-class submarine appears during a period of sustained nuclear submarine construction at Huludao involving both ballistic missile and guided missile classes.

Between 2021 and 2025, China launched 10 nuclear-powered submarines totaling 79,000 tons, exceeding the US output of seven boats totaling 55,000 tons during the same period. The appearance of the Type 09V/Type 095 also coincides with China reaching a 1+2 annual nuclear submarine production rhythm in 2024 to 2025, matching the US Navy’s target for 2028. The launch preparation, therefore, could mark for China both a new class milestone and a continuation of an expanded industrial tempo. The Type 09V/Type 095 incorporates an X-tail stern arrangement with large control surfaces, replacing the cruciform rudders used on previous Chinese nuclear submarines.

This configuration improves the maneuverability and represents the first use of such a stern layout on a Chinese nuclear-powered submarine. The sail shows no visible external control planes, indicating the likely adoption of retractable hull-mounted bow planes instead of fairwater planes used on earlier nuclear and conventional classes. The submarine’s overall length is assessed at 110 to 115 meters, with a beam between 12 and 13 meters, producing a submerged displacement estimated at 9,000 to 10,000 tons. Larger than the Type 093, which displaces about 7,000 tons, the Type 09V/095 possesses an expanded internal volume for propulsion, sensors, and weapons integration.

Imagery shows an unfinished open compartment behind the dorsal sail consistent with the installation of a vertical launch system (VLS), with potentially enough space for 18 vertical launch system cells. These cells are intended for anti-ship and land-attack cruise missiles such as the YJ-18. The preceding Type 093B carries 12 vertical launch cells in a three-abreast arrangement for anti-ship and land-attack cruise missiles, indicating a continued weapon improvement across new Chinese nuclear attack submarines. Compared to ballistic missile submarines, which form part of the nuclear triad, the Type 095 will function as a guided missile attack submarine equipped for conventional anti-surface and land-attack roles in the western Pacific.

However, the open section behind the sail may alternatively relate to reactor compartment work, although missile integration remains consistent with prior Chinese SSNs. According to available information, the Type 095's design cues indicate the use of a pumpjet propulsor instead of a traditional skew-back propeller, as the pumpjet propulsion reduces acoustic signatures during higher-speed transits where conventional propellers are more vulnerable to detection. Separate Chinese assessments of the Type 09V also conclude that a pump-jet is the most probable configuration for a new-generation nuclear-powered design. The visible high waterline and red-painted lower hull suggest reduced reserve buoyancy compared with earlier Chinese submarines, implying a potential single-hull or hybrid-hull construction, whereas previous classes employed full double-hull layouts.

A single-hull configuration increases usable internal volume relative to external dimensions but requires more refined hydrodynamic shaping. The wider beam could also indicate a possible baseline compatibility with the future Type 09VI/Type 096 ballistic missile submarine expected later in the decade. The operational role of the Type 09V/Type 095 is expected to center on anti-surface warfare, as submarines capable of launching anti-ship missiles hold an advantage in surface combat because modern anti-ship missiles outrange a surface fleet’s organic anti-submarine warfare reach. This allows a guided missile submarine such as the Type 095 to fire from closer positions, while reducing exposure to retaliatory strikes compared with surface vessels.

Furthermore, the submarine can augment missile salvos launched from standoff ranges, compressing reaction time for targeted fleets. In a Taiwan contingency, the addition of a long-range undersea strike component expands the spectrum of threats facing US naval forces operating between Guam and Taiwan. China already fields long-range anti-ship capabilities across surface, air, and land domains, increasing fleet air defense complexity in the region, meaning that the Type 095 represents a new undersea launch vector into this existing network. Besides the Type 09V/Type 095, China’s nuclear submarine construction at Huludao has also expanded in scale and infrastructure capacity.

The Eastern Assembly Hall now contains 12 assembly slots measuring 144 meters in length, while the Southern Assembly Hall contains eight slots measuring 157.5 meters in length and 32.5 meters in width on 7.34-meter rails. In total, the two halls provide a theoretical accommodation for 20 nuclear attack submarine hulls simultaneously. Since May 2022, new nuclear attack submarines have been launched annually, with additional boats observed in 2023, 2024, and 2025. Up to eight hulls were launched between mid-2022 and early 2026, corresponding to a rate approaching three launches annually, including both Type 093B guided missile submarines and Type 094 ballistic missile submarines.

The 2024 to 2025 1+2 annual rhythm aligns with the US Navy's planned objective of one ballistic missile submarine and two attack submarines per year by 2028. Due to these factors, the estimated construction cost of the Type 095 is assessed at 100 billion to 150 billion yuan per submarine, equivalent to about $1.4 billion to $2.1 billion. Foreign nuclear attack submarines are more expensive, such as the US Virginia-class Block V at about $3.2 billion and the Russian Yasen-M at about $2.5 billion, but we have to note China’s lower industrial and labor costs. Parallel modernization includes ballistic missile submarines and earlier nuclear attack variants. As of early 2025, China operated 12 nuclear-powered submarines consisting of six ballistic missile units and six guided missile or attack submarines, in addition to 46 conventionally powered submarines.

The Type 094 Jin-class ballistic missile submarine measures 137 meters in length with an 11.8 meter beam and 11,000 ton submerged displacement. Each carries 12 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, initially JL-2 with a 7,200 km range and later JL-3 exceeding 10,000 km, enabling strike coverage from patrol areas in the South China Sea. The Type 093B Shang III variant entered serial production in April and May 2022, followed by five additional hulls by the end of 2024, at least two more in 2025, and a likely ninth boat in early 2026. The Type 093B, valued at about 6 billion yuan per unit, incorporates pumpjet propulsion and 12 vertical launch cells, increasing missile flexibility.

Future development includes the expected Type 096 ballistic missile submarine carrying 16 to 24 submarine-launched ballistic missiles. For the US Navy, the emergence of the Type 095 occurs amid a submarine crisis; the United States operates 65 submarines, including 14 ballistic missile boats and 51 attack or guided missile submarines. However, Virginia-class production has averaged 1.2 to 1.3 boats per year since 2022 against a target of two per year, approximately one-third of the US attack submarine fleet is unavailable at any given time due to maintenance cycles, and current projections indicate the U.S. attack submarine force may decline from 50 to 47 boats by 2030 as Los Angeles-class retirements outpace replacements.

Therefore, a larger and quieter Chinese submarine force also increases the probability that some boats, such as the Type 095, remain undetected during crisis escalation, affecting US calculations regarding preemption and maritime dominance between Hawaii, Guam, and forward bases in Japan. In strategic planning terms, this requires the United States to assume a higher baseline level of undersea risk in any Western Pacific scenario, in which freedom of maneuver and assured access can no longer be treated as given.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
U.S. Refines Indo-Pacific Amphibious Warfare Capabilities During Cobra Gold 2026 Exercise in Thailand
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U.S. forces executed sea-based amphibious and aviation operations off Hat Yao Beach in Rayong Province, Thailand, during Cobra Gold 2026, according to imagery released by the U.S. Department of Defense via DVIDS. The drills highlight how U.S. naval and Army aviation units are refining joint littoral combat capabilities central to Indo-Pacific deterrence and crisis response.

U.S. forces conducted coordinated sea-based operations off Hat Yao Beach in Rayong Province, Thailand, on 26 February 2026 as part of Cobra Gold 2026, one of mainland Asia’s largest multinational military exercises co-hosted annually by the United States and Thailand. Imagery released through the Defense Visual Information Distribution Service shows U.S. Navy LCAC 81 from Assault Craft Unit 5 delivering Marines and Sailors from Task Force Ashland, I Marine Expeditionary Force, ashore while a U.S. Army AH-64 Apache provided simulated close air support overhead. Concurrently, UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters from 1st Battalion, 229th Aviation Regiment executed sea-based maneuvers, training for air assault and logistics missions launched directly from maritime platforms. The integrated scenario reflects U.S. emphasis on contested littoral access, joint force coordination, and over-the-horizon ship-to-shore maneuver in the Indo-Pacific operating environment.

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U.S. Navy LCAC 81 and Army Apache and Black Hawk helicopters conducted coordinated sea-based amphibious operations during Cobra Gold 2026 off Thailand’s Hat Yao Beach, underscoring joint littoral combat readiness in the Indo-Pacific (Picture Source: DVIDS / Britannica)

At the heart of the scenario off Hat Yao Beach was U.S. Navy Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC) 81, assigned to Assault Craft Unit 5, delivering Marines and Sailors from Task Force Ashland of I Marine Expeditionary Force ashore. Operating from amphibious shipping positioned offshore, the LCAC used its high-speed, over-the-horizon ship-to-shore capability to move personnel and equipment directly onto the beach. By using an air cushion to hover above the water and surf zone, LCACs can land over a wide variety of coastal terrain, including soft sand and mudflats, where traditional landing craft might be restricted. This vignette illustrates how the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps integrate surface connectors to project combat power across the littorals while reducing the exposure of larger ships to potential coastal defenses.

Above this ship-to-shore movement, a U.S. Army AH-64 Apache attack helicopter maintained an overwatch position, simulating close air support for the landing force. The Apache’s combination of sensors, cannon and precision-guided munitions allows it to identify, fix and neutralize threats such as armored vehicles, coastal artillery or small boat formations that could oppose an amphibious assault. Integrating an Army attack helicopter into a largely maritime scenario reflects the joint character of modern littoral operations, in which ground, naval and aviation elements are expected to fight as a single, networked force. The presence of the Apache over the landing zone demonstrates how U.S. planners envisage layered protection for amphibious forces, combining ship-based air defense, fixed-wing aviation and rotary-wing fire support to secure a beachhead.

In parallel with the LCAC and Apache operations, U.S. Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters from Task Force Tigershark, 1st Battalion, 229th Aviation Regiment, 16th Combat Aviation Brigade, conducted their own sea-based maneuvers. Operating from the maritime environment rather than from a land base trains crews to execute air assaults, logistics runs and medical evacuation directly from ships or sea platforms to austere coastal landing zones. This kind of vertical maneuver allows ground forces to bypass heavily defended beaches, insert troops inland, or rapidly reinforce and resupply units that have already come ashore. For the Army aviation community, Cobra Gold’s maritime phase is an opportunity to validate procedures for deck landings, confined-space approaches over water and coordination with naval air traffic control, all critical skills for real-world operations in archipelagic and coastal theaters.

The LCAC landings, Apache close air support and Black Hawk sea-based operations indicate that the United States is training for complex littoral scenarios in which access cannot be assumed and forces must fight their way from the open sea toward key terrain ashore. These drills align with broader U.S. concepts such as distributed maritime operations, joint all-domain operations and the Marine Corps’ focus on stand-in forces operating from expeditionary advanced bases. Rather than practicing large, concentrated amphibious assaults alone, Cobra Gold 2026 showcases smaller, more agile force packages that combine surface connectors, rotary-wing assets and ground combat units in a highly integrated way. Such an approach is designed to complicate an adversary’s targeting, ensure continuity of logistics under fire and sustain persistent presence along strategic coastlines and chokepoints.

Beyond the purely kinetic dimension, these sea-based activities also demonstrate the dual-use nature of amphibious and aviation capabilities in the Indo-Pacific. The same LCACs, Black Hawks and Apaches that train for contested landings can be re-tasked rapidly for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, whether to bring engineering teams and medical supplies ashore after typhoons or to evacuate civilians from threatened coastal areas. By rehearsing the command-and-control relationships, deck procedures and ship-to-shore movement patterns at Hat Yao Beach, U.S. forces and their Thai counterparts refine the mechanisms that would be needed both in high-end conflict and during regional crises. For partner nations observing or participating in Cobra Gold, the exercise underscores that littoral combat power is not only about deterrence, but also about the ability to provide rapid, large-scale assistance across the region.

The images from Hat Yao Beach encapsulate the strategic message U.S. planners seek to send in the Indo-Pacific: the United States is preparing to operate as a joint, sea-based force able to project air and ground power quickly across complex littoral environments alongside allies. LCAC 81 driving Marines ashore under the cover of an Apache, while Black Hawks approach from the sea, is more than a tactical training event; it is a practical rehearsal for scenarios in which access, logistics and partner interoperability will determine the outcome of a crisis. By investing in this type of integrated amphibious and aviation training during Cobra Gold 2026, Washington signals that its commitment to regional security is backed by concrete capabilities designed specifically for the coastal and archipelagic realities of the Indo-Pacific.
Greece Deploys FDI Frigates and F-16 Fighters to Defend Cyprus from Iranian Drones and Missiles
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Greece has deployed the FDI HN frigate Kimon, the Hydra-class frigate Psara, and two F-16 Block 52+ fighters to Cyprus to establish a layered air and maritime defense posture. The move strengthens Eastern Mediterranean deterrence as drone and missile threats linked to regional escalation increase risk to Cypriot territory and allied facilities.

Greece is dispatching two frontline frigates and a pair of F-16 fighters to Cyprus to add an immediate, layered air-and-sea defense screen as drone and missile threats spill into the Eastern Mediterranean. The move places advanced Greek sensors, electronic warfare systems, and interceptor capacity within rapid reach of the island’s western approaches, where recent alerts and confirmed strikes have underscored how quickly regional escalation can translate into direct risk for Cypriot territory and allied facilities. Athens’ decision signals that it now treats the Cyprus theater as an operational perimeter requiring active protection and integrated command coordination rather than symbolic solidarity.
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Kimon's Aster SAMs and modern radar provide wide-area tracking and intercepts against aircraft, cruise missiles, and drones. Psara adds point defense with Sea Sparrow missiles, Phalanx CIWS, a 127 mm gun, and CENTAUR EW to detect and jam UAVs. F-16 Block 52+ fighters extend patrol and intercept reach (Picture source: Greece and French MoD).

The deployment comes amid widening confrontation dynamics linked to U.S. and Israeli strikes against Iran and a surge in drone incidents across the broader Levant corridor. Cyprus sits within operational reach of long-range one-way attack UAVs and cruise missile trajectories originating from multiple axes in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. The warning timeline for such threats can compress dramatically, especially against low-signature systems flying at low altitude. For Greece, reinforcing Cyprus serves both as forward defense and as a deterrent signaling that Athens will not allow security vacuums to emerge on the island.

Athens has deployed the FDI HN frigate Kimon and the Hydra-class frigate Psara, along with two Hellenic Air Force F-16 Block 52+ fighters. The selection reflects a deliberate layering of high-end area air defense, combat-proven escort capabilities, electronic counter-UAS capacity, and responsive airpower.

Kimon represents the most advanced surface combatant currently entering Greek naval service. As part of the FDI HN program, the vessel integrates a modern active electronically scanned array radar suite capable of tracking multiple aerial and surface threats simultaneously at extended ranges. Its combat management system is designed for network-centric operations, allowing sensor fusion, cooperative engagement, and real-time data exchange with allied assets. The frigate’s vertical launch system provides a significant magazine depth for Aster-family surface-to-air missiles, enabling sustained air defense operations against both conventional aircraft and high-speed missile threats.

In the Cyprus context, Kimon functions as a forward air defense node. Positioned west of the island, it can extend radar coverage over maritime approaches, detect low-flying threats earlier than land-based systems alone, and coordinate engagements with fighter aircraft. Its advanced electronic warfare suite adds resilience against jamming and deception tactics, while also contributing to the detection of UAV control signals and emissions. The ship’s architecture allows for future upgrades, ensuring adaptability against evolving drone and missile technologies.

Psara complements Kimon with a battle-proven platform optimized for multi-threat environments. Displacing approximately 3,350 tons and capable of speeds up to 30 knots, the Hydra-class frigate carries a layered weapons suite including a 127 mm Mk 45 naval gun, Phalanx close-in weapon systems, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, and a 16-cell vertical launch system for Sea Sparrow-class interceptors. This configuration provides credible point and local area air defense while retaining anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare capabilities.

What makes Psara particularly relevant in the current mission is its integration of the CENTAUR counter-drone system. This Greek-developed electronic warfare capability combines passive detection sensors with active jamming functions designed to disrupt UAV command links and navigation systems. In drone-saturated environments, the ability to neutralize threats electronically before expending costly missiles is operationally decisive. It preserves interceptor inventories while maintaining defensive coverage against massed low-cost UAV attacks. Psara’s previous deployments in high-threat maritime zones have validated this approach under real operational conditions.

The deployment of two F-16 Block 52+ fighters adds the flexibility and speed necessary for dynamic air defense. Powered by the F100-PW-229 engine and equipped with advanced radar and targeting systems, these aircraft are capable of conducting combat air patrols, rapid intercept missions, and visual identification of ambiguous tracks. Conformal fuel tanks extend their endurance, allowing sustained patrols over and around Cyprus without frequent refueling.

From a tactical standpoint, the fighters expand the defended footprint beyond shipborne radar horizons. They can intercept drones or hostile aircraft before weapon release, escort high-value transport or evacuation flights, and provide airborne early warning augmentation when integrated with naval and ground-based sensors. The synergy between frigate-based radar tracking and fighter-based engagement capability forms a distributed air defense network with improved reaction time and engagement flexibility.

Greece’s deployment serves several purposes. First, it reinforces deterrence by signaling that Cyprus is integrated into a broader Greek defensive framework capable of rapid reinforcement. Second, it strengthens NATO’s southeastern flank at a time when instability in the Middle East risks spilling into the Eastern Mediterranean. Third, it demonstrates Greece’s growing capacity to project modernized naval and air assets beyond its immediate territorial waters, reflecting the broader modernization trajectory of the Hellenic Armed Forces.

The combination of Kimon, Psara, and F-16 fighters is well-suited to counter the specific threat set facing Cyprus: low-cost drones, potential cruise missile trajectories, and ambiguous aerial tracks in congested airspace. Kimon provides high-end detection and engagement depth, Psara offers cost-effective counter-UAS and escort resilience, and the fighters deliver speed, discrimination, and flexible response.

If regional tensions escalate further, the deployed assets offer credible defensive depth capable of absorbing and mitigating a sustained drone campaign. If tensions stabilize, the mission will still have served as a real-world validation of Greece’s emerging integrated air and maritime defense architecture. In either scenario, Athens has chosen to deploy not symbolic presence forces, but operationally relevant combat systems designed to defend airspace, secure sea lines of communication, and reinforce deterrence in a theater increasingly defined by drone warfare and rapid escalation dynamics.
U.S. Navy Destroyer Deploys ODIN Laser Directed-Energy Weapon System During Operation Epic Fury
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On 28 February 2026, imagery released by the United States Central Command showed a United States Navy Arleigh Burke-class destroyer launching RGM-109 Tomahawk missiles toward targets in Iran during Operation Epic Fury. The same footage appears to confirm operational deployment of the Optical Dazzling Interdictor, Navy, linking a live combat strike with one of the Navy’s newest shipboard laser systems.

On 28 February 2026, footage and photographs released by US Central Command (CENTCOM) from Operation Epic Fury showed a US Navy Arleigh Burke-classdestroyer launching RGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles toward targets in Iran. Close examination of CENTCOM’s imagery indicates that one of the destroyers in the carrier-led task group is fitted with the Optical Dazzling Interdictor, Navy (ODIN) soft-kill laser system. This visual evidence connects a major real-world strike campaign against Iran with one of the US Navy’s newest directed-energy capabilities, highlighting how rapidly such systems are moving from trials into operational deployments. CENTCOM’s footage, offers a rare public glimpse of a shipborne laser integrated into the US layered air and missile defense and C4ISR architecture at a moment of heightened regional tension.

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Imagery released by United States Central Command shows an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer launching RGM-109 Tomahawk missiles at Iran during Operation Epic Fury, alongside additional photos of the ODIN laser during 2020 testing at Naval Support Facility Dahlgren and operationally deployed aboard the USS Stockdale, illustrating the system’s transition from evaluation to frontline service (Picture Source: USN / U.S. CENTCOM/ Edited by Army Recognition Group)

In the publicly released image sequence, the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Spruance (DDG-111) is shown firing Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles from an undisclosed location in support of Operation Epic Fury, while operating alongside at least two aircraft carriers and other surface combatants. The same material reveals the distinctive ODIN installation mounted on the superstructure of at least one destroyer in this force, adding a visible laser soft-kill capability to a task group already equipped for long-range precision strike via Mk 41 vertical launch systems. At this stage, the US Navy has not reported or confirmed any combat use of ODIN during Operation Epic Fury, and there is no official indication that the system has been employed in engagement sequences during the strikes or subsequent Iranian responses. Its documented presence in CENTCOM’s own visual products nonetheless confirms that ODIN has been brought into theatre as part of the defensive toolset protecting high-value units and preserving the integrity of the carrier strike group’s kill chain.

ODIN, officially designated AN/SEQ-4, is a solid-state, shipborne laser system designed primarily as an optical dazzler to counter unmanned aerial systems and other electro-optical threats by degrading or disabling their sensors rather than physically destroying the platform. Developed under a rapid acquisition effort led by Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren and Program Executive Office Integrated Warfare Systems, ODIN combines a steerable laser head with high-resolution electro-optical and infrared (EO/IR) cameras, allowing operators to track a drone or other target and project an intense, tightly focused beam onto its imaging payload. US-based sources describe it as a relatively low-power system compared to emerging high-energy laser demonstrators, optimized for short-range engagements within the destroyer’s close-in defensive envelope, with effects tailored to saturate or damage EO/IR sensors. Integrated into the ship’s combat system architecture, ODIN provides a non-kinetic, reusable layer inside the layered defensive construct, contributing primarily to counter-UAS and counter-ISR missions within the broader framework of integrated air and missile defense (IAMD), while preserving finite missile and gun ammunition stocks.

The US Navy first installed ODIN on the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS Dewey (DDG 105) in 2019, before expanding the fit to other Flight IIA destroyers, including USS Stockdale (DDG 106) and USS Spruance (DDG 111). These installations were conceived both as operational systems and as technology pathfinders, giving deployed surface combatants an organic counter-UAS capability while feeding operational data and fleet experience into an incremental, spiral development process supporting future higher-power naval laser programs. Imagery from recent years shows the ODIN turret replacing earlier sensor or legacy equipment positions on the forward superstructure, demonstrating that the system is compact enough to be retrofitted without major structural modifications and integrated into the ship’s combat system architecture. By 2025, the Navy had equipped multiple Arleigh Burke-class destroyers with ODIN, framing the capability as part of a broader directed-energy roadmap that also includes more powerful high-energy laser initiatives intended to counter cruise missiles and other complex aerial threats in future surface combatants.

The presence of a soft-kill laser like ODIN on an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer deployed against Iran is notable in light of Tehran’s sustained investment in drones, loitering munitions, and cruise missiles for regional power projection and anti-access/area-denial effects. In a scenario where Iranian forces respond to Tomahawk strikes with swarms of reconnaissance UAVs or one-way attack drones, ODIN offers a means of imposing non-kinetic effects on the sensors of these platforms without expending expensive interceptor missiles or depleting close-in weapon system ammunition. It complements the destroyer’s layered defence, Standard and ESSM missiles at long and medium range, Rolling Airframe Missile and close-in guns at short range, by providing a deep-magazine option that can engage multiple targets so long as electrical power is available. By degrading the quality of hostile ISR feeds, disrupting targeting sensors, and extending sensor-to-shooter timelines, ODIN supports the ship’s battle-management role within the wider IAMD network and complicates efforts to build an accurate maritime picture around high-value units such as carriers and logistics vessels.

At the strategic level, deploying an ODIN-equipped destroyer as part of the naval contribution to Operation Epic Fury sends a signal about how the United States intends to manage the evolving threat environment in the Gulf and wider Middle East. The ongoing campaign brings together long-range bomber sorties, land-based missile launches, Tomahawk strikes from surface combatants, and other precision assets in a coordinated multi-domain effort to hit Iranian command centres, air defence sites, missile and drone infrastructure, and airfields. Within this context, fielding a shipborne laser in the same theatre underlines that US force protection for major operations now includes maturing directed-energy systems explicitly oriented toward countering unmanned platforms and precision-guided weapons, capabilities that have become central to Iran’s own military toolkit and those of its partners. The Navy’s decision to send ODIN into a high-threat environment where Iranian drones and missiles are expected to feature prominently suggests a level of confidence in the system’s reliability and its integration into the surface fleet’s C4ISR and IAMD constructs.

This deployment forms part of a wider contest over unmanned systems, strike weapons, and defensive countermeasures that now shapes security dynamics in the Gulf, the Red Sea, and adjacent maritime corridors. Iran and its partners have repeatedly used one-way attack drones and cruise missiles against critical infrastructure, regional adversaries and commercial shipping, while US and allied navies have invested heavily in intercepting these threats to protect sea lines of communication and maintain a coherent regional air picture. By placing ODIN alongside Tomahawk-armed destroyers and carrier air wings, the United States is effectively adding another tier to a coalition integrated air and missile defence architecture, one that emphasises lower per-shot costs and the ability to engage multiple targets rapidly. Over time, such deployments are likely to influence regional force development, encouraging some actors to harden or diversify their seekers and others to refine saturation tactics and attack geometries designed to challenge both hard-kill interceptors and soft-kill systems such as dazzlers and electronic warfare suites.

The appearance of an ODIN-equipped Arleigh Burke-class destroyer in CENTCOM’s own visual record of Operation Epic Fury is more than a technical curiosity in a single photograph; it marks the quiet entry of shipborne lasers into front-line operations against a state adversary as part of a standard carrier strike group loadout. Even without any declared combat use, the choice to send this capability into an environment where Iranian drones and missiles are central to the threat spectrum shows that directed-energy weapons are now being woven into everyday naval practice alongside Tomahawks, carrier aviation, and traditional surface-to-air missiles. For regional militaries, the image of USS Spruance launching cruise missiles while carrying a soft-kill laser encapsulates a new operational baseline at sea, where long-range precision strike, non-kinetic effects, and multilayered air and missile defence are expected to operate in concert within the same task group.

Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
U.S. Sinks 9 Iranian Warships in Strait of Hormuz Campaign With Jamaran-Class Destroyed
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U.S. Central Command said American forces struck and sank an Iranian Jamaran-class warship at a pier in Chabahar during the opening phase of Operation Epic Fury. The strike targets Iran’s ability to threaten commercial shipping and allied naval forces near the Strait of Hormuz, a waterway critical to global energy flows.

U.S. Central Command says U.S. forces struck and sank an Iranian Jamaran-class warship at a pier in Chabahar, degrading a key surface-combatant capability Iran can use to threaten shipping and allied naval forces around the Strait of Hormuz. The sinking, attributed by CENTCOM to the opening phase of Operation Epic Fury, comes as President Donald Trump claims U.S. attacks have “destroyed and sunk” nine Iranian naval ships and severely damaged Iran’s naval headquarters, a campaign explicitly framed around preventing Tehran from closing the waterway.
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Jamaran-class ships pack a compact strike set: a 76 mm Fajr-27 gun, Noor or longer-range Qader anti-ship cruise missiles for standoff attacks, short-range SAMs for point defense, and lightweight torpedoes for limited ASW, all cued by surface and air-search radars (Picture source: OSINT/ Iranian Navy).

The operational logic is clear: Iran does not need to defeat the U.S. Navy to create strategic effects in Hormuz. It only needs to make the strait intermittently unsafe through a mix of harassment, mining, and precision fires that raise insurance rates, slow convoy cycles, and push commercial traffic to halt offshore. U.S. reporting tied to the current escalation describes Iranian messaging warning that Hormuz was “closed” and notes disrupted commercial routing around the chokepoint.

The Jamaran-class label used by CENTCOM is significant because it points to one of the Iranian Navy’s more capable domestically built surface combatants, generally associated with the Moudge program. Open-source specifications typically place Moudge-class ships at roughly 1,500 tons displacement and about 95 meters in length, with a top speed around 30 knots and a crew on the order of 140 personnel. Their combat value is anchored in a compact but credible multi-mission fit: an Iranian 76 mm Fajr-27 main gun, anti-ship cruise missiles commonly listed as Noor or Qader variants, short-range naval surface-to-air missiles often described as Mehrab or related systems, and lightweight torpedoes for basic anti-submarine warfare, paired with a modern surface-search and air-search radar suite.

A ship of this class matters less as a blue-water frigate and more as a mobile node in Iran’s layered anti-access system. In the Gulf of Oman and the approaches to Hormuz, a Moudge-type combatant can extend the detection and targeting picture, cue coastal missile batteries, and launch its own sea-skimming missiles against merchant vessels or escorts. The Noor is widely assessed as an Iranian derivative of the Chinese C-802 family, while Qader is described as an extended-range upgrade with cited ranges around 200 km, placing much of the Hormuz approaches inside a threat ring if targeting data is available.

The location of the sinking at a pier also reveals how Epic Fury is being executed. Striking a combatant in port is primarily a kill-chain problem, not a fleet-combat problem: persistent ISR, target confirmation, then a standoff weapon that can penetrate defenses with limited warning. Reporting around the operation indicates U.S. Navy destroyers fired Tomahawk land-attack missiles in support of Epic Fury, while U.S. Air Force B-2 bombers attacked hardened missile infrastructure with 2,000-pound precision weapons. That combination is consistent with a campaign designed to collapse Iran’s ability to coordinate and sustain maritime denial rather than chasing small craft at sea.

What remains less clear is the composition of the other nine naval ships claimed destroyed. The Pentagon has not published a ship-by-ship list as of March 2, and open-source analysts caution that early battle damage assessments can conflate hit, mission-killed, and sunk. Satellite imagery around Konarak and Chabahar reportedly showed smoke, debris, and a large vessel sitting low in the water at the naval wharf, with some uncertainty over whether the damaged hull was a Moudge-class ship such as IRINS Jamaran (F76) or, based on dimensions, a Bayandor-class corvette such as IRINS Naghdi (F82).

Even without confirmed names, the likely operational targets can be inferred from Iran’s order of battle and the specific threats the U.S. must suppress to keep the sea lane open. Iran’s older Alvand-class frigates remain relevant because their speed and anti-ship missiles allow them to surge quickly into firing positions, particularly under coastal air-defense umbrellas. Open specifications describe Alvand-class ships at roughly 1,100 tons displacement, about 1,540 tons full load, with gas-turbine sprint speeds approaching 39 knots and a modernized anti-ship fit that includes C-802-class missiles. Bayandor-class corvettes are smaller, around 900 tons, but are also commonly listed with C-802 missiles, a 76 mm gun, and torpedo tubes, making them useful for opportunistic strikes and patrol-denial around ports and islands.

Undersea and mining capabilities are even more central to a Hormuz denial strategy, which is why submarine facilities and command nodes matter as much as the ships themselves. Iran’s Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines are not numerous, but they are the most consequential single assets for covert mining and torpedo ambushes in constrained waters. Open references describe Kilo-class boats with six 533 mm torpedo tubes, the ability to carry a torpedo-heavy or mine-heavy loadout, and the endurance to lurk in the Gulf of Oman approaches where merchant traffic funnels. Mine-laying remains a core mission set for these submarines, a capability that can force slow, resource-intensive mine countermeasure operations even if no ship is actually sunk.

For Washington, degrading these naval tools is not primarily punitive. It is protective, aimed at reducing risk to U.S. carrier strike groups, logistics shipping, and commercial maritime traffic whose disruption quickly becomes a global economic event. The Strait of Hormuz routinely carries roughly one-fifth of global petroleum liquids consumption, making even partial disruption strategically outsized. That is why Epic Fury’s maritime dimension appears coupled to strikes on missile and drone launch infrastructure and on naval headquarters functions that coordinate Iranian patrol patterns, targeting, and escalation messaging.

The immediate outlook hinges on corroborated battle damage assessments and whether Iran shifts to its most resilient playbook: mines, shore-based anti-ship missiles, drones, and fast attack craft operating under land-based air defenses. Sinking a Jamaran-class combatant in port removes one capable launcher and sensor node, but it does not eliminate the broader maritime-denial system. If the U.S. objective is sustained traffic flow through Hormuz, the next phases will likely be defined by convoy management, rapid mine countermeasures readiness, and continued suppression of coastal targeting networks that can translate spotter data into missile-quality tracks.