North Korea Plans to Produce Two Destroyers Per Year and Expand Its Nuclear-Capable Navy.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un spent two days inspecting the new 5,000-ton destroyer Choe Hyon and observing cruise missile launches from the ship near the western port of Nampo. During the visit, he reiterated that Pyongyang ultimately intends to equip the Korean People’s Navy with nuclear strike capabilities.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un spent two days inspecting the country’s newest 5,000-ton destroyer, Choe Hyon, and observing cruise missile launches conducted from the vessel during sea trials linked to the Nampo shipyard on the country’s west coast. State media reported that Kim reviewed the warship ahead of its commissioning and inspected another vessel under construction at the same shipyard. During the visit, he ordered the shipbuilding sector to produce two destroyers annually over the next five years as part of a broader naval expansion program. Kim also reiterated that the long-term objective is to equip the Korean People’s Navy with nuclear strike capabilities.
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North Korean leader Kim Jong Un inspects operations aboard the Choe Hyon destroyer (Picture source: French KCNA)

The Choe Hyon class destroyer, first unveiled publicly in April 2025, represents one of the most ambitious surface combatants built by North Korea in decades. According to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), the vessel displaces roughly 5,000 tons. It is designed to accommodate multiple categories of weapons, including anti-aircraft missiles, anti-ship systems, and nuclear-capable strike weapons. Photographs released by state media during the inspection show the warship conducting sea trials and launching cruise missiles described by Pyongyang as “strategic,” terminology typically used by the regime to denote systems capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

During the visit to Nampo, Kim also inspected the construction of a third destroyer belonging to the same class. KCNA indicated that the shipyard intends to complete this vessel by October, coinciding with the anniversary of the founding of the Workers’ Party of Korea. North Korean authorities present the programme as a central component of a wider naval modernization effort that also includes the development of a nuclear-powered submarine and new underwater launch capabilities for strategic missiles.

Kim also reiterates that the long-term objective is to equip the Korean People’s Navy with nuclear strike capabilities, extending the country’s deterrence posture beyond land-based missile forces. Although Pyongyang rarely discloses technical details, South Korean military officials and external analysts note that some elements of the destroyer programme may have benefited from cooperation with Russia as the two countries deepen military ties.

The Choe Hyon itself occupies an unusual position in North Korea’s fleet. The country’s navy historically relied on smaller patrol vessels, missile boats, and aging frigates, many of which date back to Cold War designs. A 5,000-ton destroyer, therefore represents a noticeable step upward in displacement and operational ambition. Ships of this size generally provide greater endurance at sea, improved sensor coverage, and the physical space required for integrated missile systems and command facilities. Even if North Korea’s domestic shipbuilding industry faces limitations in electronics and propulsion technology, the platform could serve as a testbed for more advanced naval weapons.

The cruise missiles launched during the sea trials appear intended to demonstrate the vessel’s strike capability. North Korea has developed several land-attack cruise missiles in recent years, including systems believed capable of flying at low altitude for extended distances using terrain-following guidance. Cruise missiles of this category typically rely on turbofan engines and inertial navigation combined with satellite updates, allowing them to strike targets hundreds or potentially more than a thousand kilometres away, depending on the configuration. Their relatively low flight profile complicates interception by radar-based air defence systems, particularly when launched from sea, where detection coverage may be fragmented.

The design also suggests an emphasis on layered naval firepower rather than a single mission profile. KCNA reports that the destroyer integrates anti-aircraft and anti-ship weapons alongside land-attack missiles, implying a multi-role concept. In practical terms, such a configuration allows a surface combatant to defend itself against aircraft and incoming missiles while simultaneously threatening enemy warships or coastal infrastructure. The ability to deploy nuclear-capable cruise missiles from a surface platform expands North Korea’s deterrence architecture beyond land-based launchers and ballistic missile submarines.

Kim Jong Un’s directive to construct two destroyers per year illustrates the leadership’s intention to institutionalize this naval expansion rather than treat the Choe Hyon as a one-off project. The order arrives after the troubled launch of another destroyer, Kang Kon, in 2025. That vessel suffered damage during a failed launch ceremony at the port of Chongjin and required repairs before being relaunched a month later. Despite the setback, the regime appears determined to continue the programme and accelerate production.

Beyond the introduction of new destroyers, the overall size of the Korean People’s Navy remains considerable, although its composition reflects decades of emphasis on coastal defense and asymmetric warfare rather than blue-water operations. Estimates indicate that the fleet includes roughly 60 submarines, among them about 40 Sang-O class coastal submarines, around 36 Yono class midget submarines, and approximately 20 older Type-033 diesel-electric submarines originally derived from Chinese Soviet-era designs. Surface combatants are fewer and generally older, consisting of two Najin-class light frigates, several corvettes such as the Amnok and Nampo classes, and a growing number of smaller missile craft and patrol vessels. The navy also fields dozens of torpedo boats and missile attack craft, including the indigenous Nongo class stealth missile boats and Sin Hung class torpedo boats, as well as a large inventory of patrol and landing craft intended for coastal operations and amphibious infiltration missions. This structure reflects a doctrine historically focused on swarm tactics, special operations insertion, and coastal denial rather than sustained open-ocean presence. North Korea therefore, maintains one of the numerically largest navies in Asia in terms of hull count, though the majority of its vessels remain small coastal platforms with limited endurance and sensor capabilities.

The broader strategic context reinforces the importance of these developments. North Korea has long concentrated on land-based ballistic missiles capable of striking regional targets and potentially the United States. Recent announcements suggest a parallel effort to diversify delivery platforms across sea and underwater domains. The leadership also continues to challenge the Northern Limit Line, the disputed maritime boundary separating North and South Korean waters in the Yellow Sea, where several naval clashes have occurred over the past decades.

The introduction of larger surface combatants armed with nuclear-capable missiles therefore, carries implications beyond naval modernization alone. A fleet able to operate further from North Korean shores while deploying strategic weapons introduces additional uncertainty into regional security calculations. South Korea, Japan, and the United States already maintain extensive missile defence and maritime surveillance networks in Northeast Asia, yet the appearance of mobile sea-based launch platforms complicates detection timelines and crisis management. As Pyongyang pushes forward with both naval construction and nuclear weapons development, the maritime dimension of deterrence on the Korean Peninsula is likely to occupy a growing place in regional defence planning.

Written By Erwan Halna du Fretay - Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Erwan Halna du Fretay is a graduate of a Master’s degree in International Relations and has experience in the study of conflicts and global arms transfers. His research interests lie in security and strategic studies, particularly the dynamics of the defense industry, the evolution of military technologies, and the strategic transformation of armed forces.