U.S. Considers Ground Forces to Dismantle Iran’s Coastal Defenses and Secure Strait of Hormuz.

The United States is preparing options to deploy ground forces in the Gulf to secure critical energy infrastructure and prevent disruption in the Strait of Hormuz, a maritime chokepoint through which a substantial share of global oil supply transits. The move reflects a shift from a campaign centered on strikes toward the potential control of strategic terrain directly tied to global energy stability.

Proposals discussed on March 18 focus on deploying small, specialized units to defend ports, tanker routes, and chokepoints alongside naval forces. The objective is to block Iranian interference at the source by physically securing infrastructure, reducing the risk of supply shocks, and reinforcing U.S. control over one of the world’s most vital maritime corridors.

Read Also: US strikes Iran missile sites with 5,000-pound bunker buster bombs in Strait of Hormuz

Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Thomas Hudner DDG 116 launches a Tomahawk land-attack missile during Operation Epic Fury on March 1 2026 (Picture source: US DoD)

The current campaign already provides the operational foundation for such a transition. Since the launch of Operation Epic Fury on 28 February, US forces have conducted sustained strikes against Iranian naval units, missile stockpiles, and elements of the defense industrial base. Reuters reported on March 18, 2026, that more than 120 Iranian vessels had been neutralized, indicating a deliberate effort to reduce Tehran’s capacity to contest maritime access and to shape conditions for follow-on operations.

US forces deployed in the region are structured for prolonged joint operations. Carrier strike groups, supported by Arleigh Burke-class destroyers equipped with the Aegis combat system, provide layered air and missile defense. Their AN/SPY-1 radars can track hundreds of targets simultaneously and guide SM-2 and SM-6 interceptors at ranges exceeding 150 to 200 km, offering protection against both aircraft and certain missile threats. These assets are complemented by F/A-18E Super Hornet aircraft, with a combat radius of around 700 km, enabling sustained strike operations, as well as MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles capable of remaining airborne for over 24 hours to conduct persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance along the Iranian coastline. Reinforcements also include an amphibious ready group centered on the USS Tripoli, a America-class amphibious assault ship, carrying a Marine Expeditionary Unit of approximately 5,000 personnel trained for expeditionary operations in contested littoral environments.

Such a force posture is adapted to the missions under consideration. Securing the Strait of Hormuz, where navigation channels are narrow and highly constrained, would require continuous surveillance, rapid interception capabilities, and the immediate neutralization of coastal threats. The potential seizure of Kharg Island, located roughly 25 km off the Iranian coast, would involve amphibious insertion under persistent air cover, followed by the rapid establishment of defensive systems to counter missile and drone strikes.

On March 18, 2026, U.S. Central Command confirmed strikes using 5,000-pound deep-penetration munitions against hardened Iranian coastal missile sites, illustrating a deliberate effort to degrade Iran’s coastal defense network and its capacity to disrupt maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran’s defensive architecture is designed to counter precisely this type of operation. Rather than relying on a conventional navy, Tehran has developed a distributed anti-access and area denial approach combining coastal missile batteries, fast attack craft, naval mines, and unmanned systems. Anti-ship missiles such as the Noor, derived from the Chinese C-802, provide ranges estimated between 120 and 170 km with active radar guidance in the terminal phase. More recent systems like the Qader and Ghadir are assessed, based on Iranian claims, to reach up to 300 km, allowing coverage of large sections of the Strait from inland positions. In parallel, anti-ship ballistic systems such as the Khalij Fars introduce a high-speed threat with a reported range of around 300 km, complicating interception despite uncertainties regarding accuracy.

Unmanned systems reinforce this architecture by linking detection and strike functions. Loitering munitions such as the Shahed-136 can be employed in saturation attacks against naval defenses, while platforms like the Mohajer-6 provide electro-optical surveillance and targeting, enabling a sensor-to-shooter chain that shortens reaction times and supports mobile launch operations.

Naval forces of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps rely on asymmetric tactics designed to overwhelm defenses. Fast attack craft, often exceeding 40 to 50 knots, can be armed with rockets, light anti-ship missiles, or torpedoes and are deployed in coordinated swarm attacks aimed at saturating systems such as Aegis. Ghadir-class midget submarines, adapted to shallow waters, add a subsurface component by deploying mines or launching torpedoes at short range in confined maritime spaces.

Naval mines remain one of the most disruptive tools available to Iran. Its inventory includes both contact mines and more advanced influence mines triggered by magnetic or acoustic signatures. Even limited mining activity in the Strait of Hormuz could disrupt global shipping flows. These mines can be deployed rapidly by small vessels, while clearance operations require time, specialized assets, and sustained protection against follow-on attacks.

US operational planning appears structured around a phased sequence. Initial actions would aim to suppress coastal radars, missile batteries, and command-and-control networks through precision strikes and electronic warfare. This would be followed by efforts to secure maritime corridors through escort operations, missile defense coverage, and intensive mine countermeasure activities. Only once these conditions are established would limited ground forces be introduced to secure specific objectives, including port facilities on Kharg Island or coastal positions controlling access to the Strait.

Kharg Island occupies a central role due to its economic importance. The island accounts for approximately 90 percent of Iran’s crude oil exports, making it both a critical revenue node and a strategic pressure point. Securing it would allow the disruption of Iranian export capacity while preserving infrastructure, creating leverage within a framework of controlled escalation.

Allied support remains uncertain. European partners have adopted a cautious posture, focusing on defensive missions such as escorting commercial shipping rather than direct participation in offensive operations. Their contribution would likely center on maritime security, surveillance, and reinforcement of air and missile defense, enabling US forces to concentrate on higher-intensity operations.

The introduction of US ground forces on Iranian territory would represent a clear escalation. Moving from a strike-based campaign to the control of strategic terrain would expose US units to sustained asymmetric attacks and increase the risk of regional spillover. Control over the Strait of Hormuz and Kharg Island would not only shape immediate military outcomes but also redefine security dynamics in the Gulf, with direct implications for global energy markets and the broader balance of deterrence among regional and international actors.

Written By Erwan Halna du Fretay - Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Erwan Halna du Fretay holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and has experience studying conflicts and global arms transfers. His research interests lie in security and strategic studies, particularly the dynamics of the defense industry, the evolution of military technologies, and the strategic transformation of armed forces.