U.S. And UK Forces Use FlyTrap 5.0 Counter-Drone Exercise To Shape NATO Eastern Flank Air Defense Doctrine.

U.S. soldiers and U.K. paratroopers are using Project FlyTrap 5.0 in Lithuania to test how frontline units can detect, track, and defeat drones under battlefield pressure. The exercise is significant because NATO forces on the eastern flank must be capable of countering small unmanned threats before they compromise troops, logistics routes, command posts, and air defense assets.

The drills combine counter-UAS systems, unmanned ground vehicles, FPV drones, AI-enabled command tools, and live data networks in a force-on-force environment. By putting these systems directly in the hands of infantry soldiers and paratroopers, FlyTrap 5.0 is helping shape counter-drone doctrine as an organic tactical capability linked to wider NATO air defense networks.

Related Topic: U.S. and Russia Test Anti-Drone Rounds for Standard Rifles to Counter FPV Drone Threats

U.S. and U.K. troops are using Project FlyTrap 5.0 in Lithuania to test and integrate counter-drone systems, unmanned vehicles, and AI-enabled command tools directly into frontline NATO operations (Picture Source: U.S. Army)

The Defense Visual Information Distribution Service (DVIDS) reported on May 2, 2026, that U.S. infantry soldiers and U.K. paratroopers were preparing for the force-on-force phase of Project FlyTrap 5.0 at the Pabradė Training Area in Lithuania. Conducted from May 1 to 15, the exercise places counter-unmanned aerial systems, unmanned ground vehicles, first-person view drones, AI-enabled command and control tools, and live data networks directly into the hands of warfighters. More than a conventional training event, FlyTrap 5.0 functions as a field laboratory for future counter-drone doctrine along NATO’s eastern flank, where allied forces are assessing how emerging technologies can be integrated into frontline units and connected to broader air defense networks.

At the Pabradė Training Area, Project FlyTrap 5.0 has entered a decisive phase in which experimentation is being brought closer to the realities of modern combat. U.S. soldiers from the 2nd Cavalry Regiment and paratroopers from the U.K. Parachute Regiment are preparing for a force-on-force scenario designed to test how emerging technologies perform under simulated battlefield pressure. The exercise, now in its fifth iteration, forms part of the Eastern Flank Deterrence Initiative and is intended to evaluate scalable counter-drone solutions that can support NATO’s ability to operate in a battlespace increasingly shaped by unmanned aerial threats.

The choice of Lithuania gives the exercise a broader strategic dimension. Pabradė is located in one of NATO’s most sensitive regions, near Belarus, Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave, and the Suwałki corridor, the narrow land connection between Poland and the Baltic States. In this environment, the ability to rapidly detect and defeat small drones could become essential for protecting forward-deployed units, logistics routes, command posts, artillery positions, and air defense assets during the early stages of a crisis. By conducting FlyTrap 5.0 in this setting, U.S. and allied forces are testing counter-drone capabilities in a geographical context that reflects the operational pressures faced by NATO formations deployed along the northeastern flank.

FlyTrap 5.0 is structured around a central operational question: how can small tactical units detect, track, defeat, and exploit unmanned systems while continuing to maneuver in contested environments? To answer this, the exercise brings together autonomous and unmanned ground vehicles, FPV drones, counter-UAS systems, AI-enabled command and control, and live data networks. Defeating drones is not limited to interception. It begins with detection, classification, tracking, and identification, followed by the selection of an electronic or kinetic response. FlyTrap 5.0 allows soldiers to test how these stages can be connected through mobile command systems and live data networks, creating a tactical counter-drone chain able to operate alongside existing air defense assets.

The multinational character of the exercise is also central to its value. NATO’s eastern flank is defended by an integrated network of allied formations that must be able to communicate, maneuver, and respond to threats together. By testing counter-drone systems in Lithuania with U.S. and U.K. personnel, FlyTrap 5.0 examines both the performance of individual technologies and their interoperability with allied procedures. In a future crisis, the ability of different national units to share drone-warning data, coordinate responses, and link tactical counter-UAS systems to wider air defense networks could influence how effectively NATO protects deployed forces and critical infrastructure.

One of the notable aspects of FlyTrap 5.0 is the decision to assign emerging technology roles to soldiers whose primary duties are not traditionally linked to unmanned systems. Spc. Arthur Tugman, an infantryman assigned to 1st Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, served as an unmanned ground vehicle operator during the exercise. His role involved operating UGV platforms to transport equipment, soldiers, unmanned aerial systems, and counter-unmanned aerial systems to locations where they were needed. This reflects a broader shift in ground combat operations: infantry units are no longer expected only to close with and defeat the enemy through direct fire and maneuver, but also to operate robotic platforms, manage sensor feeds, support counter-drone missions, and contribute to real-time digital battlefield networks.

The use of unmanned ground vehicles during FlyTrap 5.0 adds another layer to the exercise. Beyond transporting equipment, UGVs can help reduce soldier exposure during resupply missions, move counter-drone systems closer to threatened areas, carry sensors, support casualty evacuation concepts, and extend the reach of small units in terrain where movement may be observed by enemy drones. According to the DVIDS report, Tugman emphasized the speed with which soldiers were able to absorb and employ the new systems, noting that the equipment was easy to operate and could be rapidly integrated into unit activity. His experience illustrates one of the core assumptions behind FlyTrap: if emerging systems can be used by soldiers after limited familiarization, they can be adopted more quickly across existing formations.

The exercise also gives industry providers immediate access to soldier feedback in field conditions. U.S. soldiers from 2nd Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment worked alongside paratroopers from the U.K. Parachute Regiment and experts from multiple vendors to test low-cost counter-UAS solutions. Sgt. Connor Henrickson, an infantryman from Echo Troop, described the systems as new both for the soldiers and, in some cases, for the companies providing them. By allowing soldiers to evaluate systems directly, identify shortcomings, and suggest improvements, FlyTrap 5.0 creates a feedback loop between operational users, industry, and military planners at a time when counter-drone technologies are evolving faster than traditional procurement cycles can usually absorb.

The role given to junior soldiers and noncommissioned officers is another important dimension of FlyTrap 5.0. The proliferation of small drones has reduced the time available to detect and respond to threats, forcing tactical decisions to be made closer to the front line. By giving infantry soldiers direct access to UGVs, FPV drones, counter-UAS tools, and networked systems, the exercise reflects a shift in which the lowest tactical echelons are becoming active nodes in a wider sensor and defense architecture. Capt. Brendan Printup, commander of Echo Troop, described the activity as a concept-proofing effort in which junior soldiers are at the center of the counter-UAS fight, showing how future doctrine may depend as much on tactical adaptation as on technology itself.

FlyTrap 5.0 also reflects lessons drawn from the war in Ukraine, where small drones have become central to reconnaissance, artillery targeting, route surveillance, strike missions, and battlefield attrition. Russian and Ukrainian forces have shown that low-cost unmanned systems can generate tactical effects disproportionate to their price, accelerating the search for counter-drone solutions that are portable, affordable, rapidly deployable, and capable of being integrated into standard infantry and cavalry formations. FlyTrap 5.0 places those lessons into a NATO training environment, where the challenge is not only to acquire new systems, but also to determine how they can be used, sustained, networked, and standardized across allied forces.

At troop level, the exercise is also testing whether counter-UAS technologies can be networked together on a mounted Stryker platform in a contested environment. This point is important because the drone threat is not confined to higher echelons or strategic air defense networks. Small drones can appear suddenly over a platoon position, along a route, near a command post, or above a vehicle formation. A practical counter-drone architecture requires sensors, decision aids, effectors, and procedures that can function at the tactical edge while still contributing data to a broader air defense and command network. This is where FlyTrap 5.0 could provide useful input for future Army doctrine by showing how mounted formations can fight, maneuver, and protect themselves while under persistent aerial observation.

FlyTrap 5.0 shows how NATO’s eastern flank is becoming a testing ground for the next generation of tactical air defense and unmanned warfare integration. By placing emerging technologies directly in the hands of U.S. soldiers and U.K. paratroopers, the exercise goes beyond equipment trials and begins shaping the procedures, training standards, and operational habits needed for future combat. Its main message is clear: counter-drone defense can no longer remain a specialist function held at higher levels. It must become an organic capability for units operating at the tactical edge, connected to wider NATO air defense networks and adaptable enough to respond to threats that are evolving faster than traditional procurement cycles.

Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.