Iraq’s New Air Defense Strategy Combines Korean M-SAM II Missiles With Turkish Counter-Drone Systems.

Iraq is rebuilding its air defense network with a layered architecture that combines eight South Korean Cheongung-II M-SAM II missile batteries from LIG Nex1 and a planned purchase of 20 Turkish short-range systems likely centered on ASELSAN Korkut counter-drone vehicles. The move, detailed through reporting published between May 6 and May 12, 2026, would give Baghdad a broader shield against ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, drones, and low-flying aircraft as regional air threats continue to expand in range and frequency.

The planned Turkish systems would strengthen low-altitude and counter-UAV coverage around oil infrastructure, diplomatic sites, and military facilities, while the Cheongung-II adds longer-range interception capability against more advanced aerial threats. Together, the acquisitions mark Iraq’s most important air defense modernization effort since 2003 and reflect a wider shift toward integrated, multi-layered protection against drone warfare and precision strike attacks.

Related topic: South Korea to Deploy LAMD “Korean Iron Dome” in 2029 to Counter North Korea Artillery Threat.

Iraq is pairing South Korean Cheongung-II medium-range surface air-to-air missile batteries with Turkish short-range counter-drone systems to rebuild layered air defenses against missiles, drones, and low-flying aircraft (Picture source: Army Recognition Edit).

The immediate problem is not that Iraq has no air defenses, but that its current inventory is too shallow and too local. The Iraqi Air Defense Command relies mainly on U.S.-supplied AN/TWQ-1 Avenger short-range air defense systems armed with FIM-92 Stinger missiles and Russian Pantsir-S1 gun-missile systems. These weapons can defend specific air bases, command posts, or infrastructure nodes, but they do not provide territorial coverage. The Avenger is optimized for low-altitude aircraft, helicopters, and some drones; Pantsir-S1 adds guns and radar-guided missiles, but Iraq has not fielded such systems enough to create a continuous shield over Baghdad, Basra, Erbil, Kirkuk, and the western desert approaches.

The Cheongung-II changes the upper layer of that equation. In September 2024, LIG Nex1 won a 3.71 trillion won, or about $2.8 billion, Iraqi contract for mid-range surface-to-air missile defense systems, while available information on the Iraqi package indicates eight batteries in the context of Baghdad’s move away from older Russian equipment. If that eight-battery figure is applied to the contract value, the average procurement cost is about $350 million per battery before any distinction between missiles, launchers, radars, training, spares, and support; it should not be read as a launcher unit price.

Cheongung-II is relevant because it combines mobility, medium-range coverage, and terminal anti-ballistic missile capability. Public data on the M-SAM Block II describes a battery with a truck-mounted AESA radar, a command post vehicle, and four eight-cell launchers, giving 32 ready-to-fire missiles per battery; eight Iraqi batteries would therefore field 256 ready missiles if delivered in that standard configuration, with higher ready stocks only if additional launchers are included. The interceptor uses active radar guidance in the terminal phase, has a reported range of about 40 km and altitude coverage up to 15 km, and is designed for aircraft and high-speed missile targets.

The Cheongung-II’s tactical value for Iraq lies in the terminal defense of fixed targets rather than wide national coverage. A battery placed near Baghdad could protect leadership sites, air defense command nodes, and parts of the capital’s airspace; another near Balad or Al Asad could protect aircraft shelters, fuel depots, and contractor-supported aviation facilities; batteries near Basra or Kirkuk would be more relevant to oil infrastructure. The system’s limitation is geography: Iraq is large, with exposed borders and multiple likely threat axes. Eight batteries improve survivability in selected zones, but they do not remove the need for surveillance radars, command-and-control links, identification procedures, and trained operators.

The Turkish purchase appears intended to solve a different problem: cheap, numerous, low-altitude drones. The specific Turkish system has not been publicly confirmed, but the Korkut family matches Iraq’s stated requirement. ASELSAN’s KORKUT 100/25 SB uses a 25 mm automatic cannon firing 25×137 mm ATOM programmable airburst ammunition, with reported fire rates of up to 600 rounds per minute, an ammunition load of 200 rounds, aerial target engagement around 1,200 meters, ground target engagement around 1,500 meters, AESA radar sensors, electro-optical sights, a thermal camera, laser rangefinder, and an RF jammer for non-kinetic disruption of drone control or navigation links.

That armament mix matters because Iraq’s drone problem is not economically suited to missile-only defense. A Stinger or Cheongung-II interceptor is inappropriate for a commercial quadcopter or FPV drone carrying a small warhead; even a successful intercept can impose an unfavorable cost exchange. A 25 mm programmable airburst round produces fragments near the drone rather than requiring a direct hit, giving a better probability of kill against small, maneuvering targets. The Turkish counter-UAV family also includes systems such as BUKALEMUN GNSS deception, KANGAL FPV anti-drone, SEDA 100-CUAV acoustic detection, and IHTAR equipment, indicating that the likely package belongs to a broader sensor, jammer, and gun-based air defense ecosystem.

Iraq needs these weapons because its airspace has become an operational corridor and target area in regional conflicts it does not control. In June 2025, Iraq told the UN Security Council that 50 Israeli warplanes had violated its airspace before a meeting on the Israel-Iran conflict. During the 2026 Iran war, Iraqi airspace was closed after U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran on February 28 and subsequent Iranian retaliation across the region, with aviation risk monitors noting heavy missile and drone activity over or near Iraqi territory. The new Turkish purchase followed strikes that exposed vulnerabilities around oilfields and diplomatic sites.

The geopolitical calculation is therefore as important as the hardware. South Korea gives Iraq a missile defense supplier outside the U.S.-Russia binary, avoiding the sanctions and supply risks attached to major Russian systems after 2022 while not depending solely on U.S. approvals. Türkiye offers proximity, lower procurement and sustainment costs, and a growing air defense industry linked to its Steel Dome program, which includes radars, missiles, electro-optical sensors, command centers, and air defense weapons of different ranges. For Baghdad, buying from Seoul and Ankara diversifies suppliers without formally aligning Iraq against Iran, the United States, or Türkiye.

The central uncertainty is integration. Iraq’s pre-1991 air defense network was tied to the French-built Kari command-and-control system, but that structure was destroyed in the Gulf War and dismantled after 2003. Rebuilding it now requires more than importing missiles and guns. Baghdad needs radar coverage, secure communications, national engagement authority, rules for civil aviation, protection against electronic warfare, and a maintenance system able to keep Korean radars, Turkish sensors, programmable ammunition, and missile stocks available during a crisis. If those pieces are funded and trained, Cheongung-II and Korkut could give Iraq a credible layered defense around selected strategic areas. Without them, the new systems would remain capable but isolated weapons in an airspace still shaped by other states’ military decisions.