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U.S. to Send Two Marine Forces to Strait of Hormuz with F-35B Capability Amid Rising Iran Tensions.
The United States is deploying two aviation-heavy Marine Expeditionary Units into CENTCOM as tensions with Iran intensify around the Strait of Hormuz.
USS Tripoli (LHA-7) and USS New Orleans (LPD-18), carrying roughly 2,200 Marines from the Japan-based 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, are entering CENTCOM as Washington links added military pressure to the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, according to The Wall Street Journal. The move expands Washington’s ability to secure the choke point, deter escalation, and project rapid-response combat power from the sea.
U.S. Marine forces centered on USS Tripoli and USS Boxer are moving into CENTCOM with F-35B fighters, MV-22 Ospreys, and amphibious assault capabilities, strengthening Washington's rapid-response options for securing the Strait of Hormuz and deterring further Iranian escalation (Picture source: U.S. DoW).
The reinforcement does not stop there: Reuters reported on March 20 that the California-based 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit, embarked on USS Boxer and accompanying warships, is also being sent forward, adding a second Marine Expeditionary Unit to a region where the U.S. already has about 50,000 personnel and is considering several escalation options while stopping short of announcing a ground entry into Iran itself.
This matters because a MEU is a self-contained Marine Air-Ground Task Force with command, maneuver, aviation, and logistics already integrated for immediate crisis response. The 31st MEU is the Marine Corps’ only continuously forward-deployed MEU, while the 11th MEU is a sea-based rapid-response formation with a history that includes Desert Shield, Desert Storm, Iraq, and multiple contingency deployments; in practice, these are among Washington’s fastest tools for inserting combat power without first building a large land base.
Tripoli is especially relevant because it is an America-class Flight 0 amphibious assault ship optimized for aviation rather than traditional surface assault. Official Navy data lists a full-load displacement of about 43,745 long tons, speed above 20 knots, capacity for 1,687 embarked troops, and a defensive fit of RAM launchers, ESSM-capable NATO Sea Sparrow launchers, Phalanx CIWS, and twin .50-caliber mounts; just as important, the class was built with an enlarged hangar, more aviation fuel, added aviation maintenance spaces, and no well deck, making it a better sea base for sustained F-35B and MV-22 operations.
That design gives the 31st MEU a different combat profile from the Boxer package now following behind it. Boxer, a Wasp-class LHD, retains the classic amphibious well deck and therefore offers a more balanced mix of aviation and surface assault, while San Antonio-class LPDs such as New Orleans, San Diego, and Portland can move Marines and equipment by LCAC, LCU, AAV, helicopter, or MV-22 and serve as secondary aviation platforms; current fleet tracking identifies the Boxer ARG as Boxer, USS Portland, and USS Comstock with the 11th MEU. In simple terms, Tripoli is the more aviation-dense option for distributed strike and air assault, while Boxer gives CENTCOM a broader forcible-entry and connector package.
The embarked aviation is the real combat multiplier. Official Marine and Navy sources show the Tripoli/31st MEU team operating F-35B Lightning II fighters, MV-22B Ospreys, and rotary-wing support aircraft, while the Boxer/11th MEU package includes VMFA-122 and VMM-163 (Reinforced), with recent imagery also showing AH-1Z Vipers during strait transit training. The F-35B brings short-takeoff/vertical-landing flexibility plus stealth and sensor fusion; the MV-22 carries 24 troops at over 280 knots with a combat radius above 325 nautical miles; the CH-53E can lift 16 tons 50 miles from ship to objective; the AH-1Z provides close air support, armed reconnaissance, escort, and anti-armor fire; and the UH-1Y adds command-and-control, CASEVAC, assault support, and armed utility lift. Together, that mix is ideal for fast littoral insertions, tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel, escort of boarding forces, and rapid reinforcement of islands, ports, or coastal facilities.
The 11th MEU’s recent workup is particularly revealing for any Iran-war hypothesis. In February, the Boxer-11th MEU team completed integrated training that included simulated strait transits, defense of the amphibious task force, aviation strike packages, visit-board-search-and-seizure drills, company-sized helicopter raids, and an amphibious combat vehicle raid; one official caption explicitly said the training refined the unit’s ability to integrate with the Navy for enhanced force protection during a simulated strait transit. That is almost a template for Hormuz operations, where the likely Marine role would not be a deep inland assault, but rather escort, raid, seizure, reinforcement, and protection missions in a contested choke point.
The 31st MEU offers a complementary first-wave option because it was already forward in Japan, recently certified for deployment, and has been training for long-range inserts and expeditionary air-ground operations from Tripoli. If Washington chose to use it in combat against Iran, the most plausible employment based on previous exercises and standard MEU doctrine would be rapid air assault onto temporary littoral objectives, raids on missile or drone support nodes near the coast, reinforcement of friendly Gulf positions, noncombatant evacuation, or tactical recovery missions rather than a large amphibious landing on the Iranian mainland. That distinction matters: these units are scalable instruments of coercion and crisis control, not evidence by themselves of a decision for a major invasion.
They also plug into a much larger joint campaign already underway. In its first seven days alone, CENTCOM said Operation Epic Fury had struck more than 3,000 targets after launching on February 28 and listed a force package including B-1, B-2, and B-52 bombers, F-15s, F-16s, F/A-18s, F-22s, F-35s, EA-18Gs, P-8s, RC-135s, MQ-9s, Patriot, THAAD, HIMARS, guided-missile destroyers, and nuclear-powered carriers; Reuters later reported the campaign had expanded to more than 7,800 strikes and over 120 Iranian vessels damaged or destroyed. In that architecture, the MEUs provide the missing expeditionary layer between standoff strike and land occupation: a force that can sense, move, raid, secure, and then re-embark.
That is why these units and assets could be deployed now. They give Washington a politically controllable, sea-based toolset for reopening Hormuz, deterring further Iranian coastal action, reassuring Gulf partners, and preserving escalation options while avoiding an immediate declaration of “boots on the ground” in Iran; Reuters reported there was still no decision to send ground troops into Iran even as U.S. officials discussed options around the strait and Kharg Island. USS Tripoli and Boxer do not merely add Marines to the theater; they add mobile fifth-generation aviation, vertical assault reach, heavy-lift logistics, and a credible forcible-entry reserve that can matter in the first hours of any new phase of the war.