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China's nuclear submarine expansion is changing the strategic balance with US Navy in the Pacific.


China's accelerating nuclear submarine expansion, spanning the Type 093B, Type 095, and Type 09X programs, at its Huludao and Jiangnan shipyards, is shifting the undersea strategic balance with the U.S. Navy in the Pacific. Between 2021 and 2025, Chinese yards launched ten nuclear-powered submarines totaling 79,000 tonnes, surpassing the 7 Virginia-class submarines totaling 55,500 tonnes delivered by the U.S. over the same period. As Beijing scales toward a projected 80-boat fleet with up to 40 nuclear hulls by 2035, the U.S. submarine force now faces sustained Virginia-class production bottlenecks, concurrent Columbia-class construction, and multi-year depot maintenance delays.


China’s accelerating nuclear submarine production, centered on the Type 093B, Type 095, and Type 09X programs, is shifting the undersea strategic balance with the U.S. Navy in the Pacific, as American shipyards face construction bottlenecks and depot maintenance delays. (Picture source: X/PLA Military Updates)


On November 17, 2026, PLA Military Updates reported that China launched five to six nuclear-powered attack submarines during 2026, compared with two Virginia-class submarines commissioned by the U.S. Navy. China's accelerating nuclear submarine construction can be partly explained by the fact that Chinese shipyards simultaneously work on three designs: the Type 093B Shang III, Type 095 Sui-class, and the future Type 09X. The claimed Chinese launch total is also plausible, as between 5 and 6 Type 093Bs were fitting out or on trials in early 2026 alongside the new Type 095 and 09X, although not all were launched within calendar year 2026, and the American figure measures commissionings rather than equivalent construction output.

Nevertheless, China's nuclear submarine construction has accelerated from seven launches during 2011-2020 to ten during 2021-2025, totaling an estimated 79,000 tonnes, compared with seven American submarines totaling 55,500 tonnes during the same period. China's annual output also reached three nuclear submarines in 2024 and 2025, while sustained U.S. Virginia-class construction remained at 1.2 to 1.3 annually against a two-per-year requirement. This divergence is becoming increasingly important, as China is adding new nuclear-powered submarine classes to a fleet still dominated by conventional designs, whereas the United States must replace retiring Los Angeles-class attack submarines and Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines, while simultaneously building the larger Virginia Block V and Columbia classes. 

Related Topic: China to expand submarine fleet toward 70 boats by 2027 and 80 by 2035 to challenge US Navy

China is now estimated to operate more than 60 submarines, compared with roughly 70 in the U.S. Navy, although the two fleets differ considerably in composition. While the U.S. submarine force is entirely nuclear-powered, China's remains predominantly conventional, with an earlier established inventory of 46 diesel-electric submarines, six nuclear attack submarines, and six Type 094 ballistic missile submarines. The nuclear attack component has since expanded through the Type 093B, with potentially nine hulls launched by early 2026. China's conventional fleet currently includes the Type 039 Song, air-independent propulsion (AIP)-equipped Type 039A/B/C Yuan boats, as well as Russian-built Project 877EKM and 636 Kilo submarines, and this fleet is primarily intended for operations in the Taiwan Strait, East China Sea and South China Sea.

How China's submarine fleet compares with the U.S. Navy in numbers and capabilities

By comparison, the U.S. Navy operates Los Angeles-, Seawolf-, and Virginia-class nuclear attack submarines, alongside four Ohio-class guided-missile submarines capable of carrying up to 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles each and 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines. China's Type 094 carries 12 JL-2 or JL-3 ballistic missiles, with the latter having an estimated range of 10,000 km, compared with 20 operational Trident II D5 missile tubes aboard an American Ohio-class submarine. Following two additional Type 094 launches assessed during 2024-2025, China's submarine fleet is now projected to reach 70 vessels by 2027 and 80 by 2035, potentially including 40 nuclear-powered submarines. This would raise the nuclear-powered share of the Chinese fleet to 50%, allowing the PLAN to conduct more operations beyond the first island chain, well into the wider Pacific.

It would also extend its nuclear threat against parts of the continental United States, while retaining conventional submarines for coastal and regional missions. In less than four years, the Type 093B became the main driver of this Chinese nuclear submarine force expansion, with six hulls launched during 2022-2024, two likely launches in 2025 and a possible ninth in early 2026. Measuring an estimated 110 meters, it incorporates improved acoustic isolation compared to earlier Type 093 and Type 093A variants, as well as a vertical missile battery estimated at up to 24 cells for anti-ship and potentially land-attack missiles. The newer Type 095, observed at Huludao in February 2026, introduces a different configuration, with an estimated submerged displacement of 9,000 to 10,000 tonnes, a potential length around 108-115 meters, a pump-jet propulsion, X-shaped stern controls, and potentially 12 to 24 vertical missile positions.

These changes could reduce propulsor noise, improve maneuverability and accommodate larger sonar and weapons arrangements, although its acoustic performance remains unmeasured. The future Type 09X, observed at Jiangnan in June 2026, differs through its estimated 120-meter length, substantially reduced sail, pump-jet propulsion, streamlined hull and X-shaped stern controls, with a possible missile compartment accommodating 24 or more weapons. Claims of two to three completed Type 09X submarines remain unverified to date. These three classes also represent different levels of maturity: the Type 093B is already contributing to the expansion of the operational fleet, the Type 095 is undergoing initial development and construction phases, and the Type 09X's eventual operational configuration remains unresolved, with a possible role as a guided-missile submarine.


Between 2016-2020 and 2021-2025, China increased its nuclear submarine launches from 3 to 10 and its launched displacement from 23,000 to 79,000 tonnes, overtaking the United States, which launched 7 nuclear submarines totaling 55,500 tonnes in each period. (Picture source: Army Recognition)


Why China is building nuclear submarines faster than the United States

China's construction acceleration is centered on Bohai Shipbuilding Heavy Industry's Huludao complex in Liaoning province, where a second large submarine assembly hall was built between 2019 and 2022, allowing several nuclear submarines to undergo assembly and fitting-out simultaneously. Chinese nuclear submarine launches subsequently increased from seven between 2011 and 2020, or 0.7 annually, to ten between 2021 and 2025, or two annually, with two Type 093B attack submarines and one Type 094 ballistic missile submarine likely launched in each of 2024 and 2025. China therefore exceeded American output by three submarines and 23,500 tonnes over five years, as, despite procuring 41 Virginia-class submarines through FY2025, the U.S. Navy has produced only 1.1 to 1.3 vessels annually since 2022, and is still purchasing generally two submarines per year, thus amplifying the problem.

U.S. submarine construction is divided between only two shipyards, General Dynamics Electric Boat and Huntington Ingalls Industries' Newport News Shipbuilding, which also constructs nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. Moreover, the industrial network includes approximately 16,000 suppliers across 50 states, with roughly 70% of critical suppliers operating as sole-source manufacturers, thus creating several bottlenecks for specialized forgings, castings, pumps, valves, electrical equipment, and nuclear-qualified components. The difference can also be measured by costs and delays: a Virginia-class submarine now costs an estimated $5 billion, delivery delays reach 24 to 36 months, and the interval between funding and delivery has increased from six to nine years.

How Virginia Block V and Columbia submarines are increasing pressure on U.S. shipyards

Moreover, the U.S. production problem has increased vastly with the larger Virginia Block V and the Columbia-class strategic submarine, both of which require substantially more industrial work. Earlier Virginia Block I-IV submarines measure 114.9 meters, have a beam of 10.4 meters, and displace approximately 7,800 tonnes submerged, with four 533 mm torpedo tubes and 12 dedicated vertical Tomahawk missile positions. However, the Block V includes the 25.6-meter Virginia Payload Module (VPM), thus increasing the submarine's length to 140 meters, displacement to 10,200 tonnes (a 30.8% rise), and vertical missile capacity to 40 through four additional tubes carrying seven Tomahawks each, and this additional module increases construction workload by an estimated 25%,

Each Columbia-class submarine, measuring 170.7 meters, with a beam of 13.1 meters and a submerged displacement of approximately 20,800 tonnes, and armed with 16 Trident II D5 missiles, also requires industrial resources equivalent to roughly 2.5 earlier Virginia-class submarines. Producing one Columbia and two Virginia submarines per year consequently demands an industrial capacity equivalent to approximately five earlier Virginia-class hulls per year. However, the same industrial workforce must also face the replacement of aging Los Angeles-class and Ohio-class submarines, meaning new American submarines must first compensate for existing fleet reductions. However, any operational comparison between Chinese and American nuclear submarine forces also depends on the maturity of their propulsion, sonar, and weapons systems, rather than just counting the number of missiles or the displacement of each vessel.

Virginia Block V carries 40 vertically launched Tomahawk missiles, four 533 mm torpedo tubes for weapons including Mk 48 ADCAP torpedoes, and integrated bow, flank and towed sonar arrays; the Type 093B's estimated 24 vertical missile cells could support YJ-series anti-ship weapons, while the Type 095's pump-jet propulsion and X-shaped stern controls could reduce propulsor noise and improve maneuverability compared with earlier Chinese designs. However, submarine detectability also depends on machinery vibration, reactor cooling pumps, turbine and reduction-gear noise, propulsor cavitation, hull-generated flow noise and the ability of sonar processors to separate weak acoustic signals from background noise, none of which can be quantified from external hull dimensions.


Only 11% of attack submarine depot maintenance periods at public shipyards finished on schedule during FY2016-2025, although active submarine idle time improved from 1,518 days in FY2022 to 166 days in FY2025. (Picture source: US DoD)


Can China's new nuclear submarines match the Virginia-class in the Pacific?

Earlier Type 093 and Type 094 submarines were assessed by the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence as noisier than late Cold War Soviet designs in 2009, although subsequent Chinese modifications have altered their acoustic characteristics. The Type 095 and Type 09X therefore introduce potentially important changes, but cannot be assigned an acoustic parity with Virginia-class submarines solely from their external configurations. China's development of an acoustic-signature database also complements its submarine modernization by improving the classification and reacquisition of surface targets, although the effective employment of YJ-series long-range missiles still requires sufficiently accurate target information.

The effect of China's submarine expansion on the Pacific balance will also depend on the number of submarines available for operations, as shown by the operational availability of U.S. submarines. Between FY2016 and FY2025, the U.S. Navy accumulated 18,687 submarine-days of maintenance delays and idle time, including 8,906 days involving active submarines awaiting maintenance, 6,494 days of depot maintenance overruns, and 3,287 days involving inactive submarines awaiting retirement-related work, and these delays generated an estimated $4.17 billion in operating and support costs. Average depot maintenance duration also increased from 744 to 809 days between FY2016-2020 and FY2021-2025, while only 11% of U.S. attack submarine maintenance periods at public shipyards finished on schedule.

Another 15 attack submarines could enter inactive idle status during FY2026-2030, potentially adding more than 14,000 idle days and $3.1 billion in costs. These maintenance requirements directly affect U.S. submarine availability because the Navy must simultaneously distribute its force across the Pacific, Atlantic, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean, and Arctic, while China can concentrate its submarines around Taiwan, the Philippine Sea, and the South China Sea. The AUKUS agreement adds another American industrial requirement, with the planned transfer of three in-service Virginia Block IV submarines to Australia in 2032, 2035, and 2038, respectively, with two further transfers possible, alongside rotational deployments at HMAS Stirling from 2027.

Reaching the longer-term American objective of 2.33 Virginia submarines annually would consequently require a 79% to 94% increase over the recent production rate, in addition to the Columbia-class construction. By 2035, a Chinese fleet of 40 nuclear-powered vessels could also increase the demand on P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, MH-60R Seahawk helicopters, surface combatants and submarine screening near Taiwan, the Philippine Sea and approaches to the first island chain, thus generating a greater regional patrol activity in the western Pacific.


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Written by Jérôme Brahy - Defense Analyst

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, focusing on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, South Korea, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters globally.


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