What Iran Has Fired at Gulf States Since U.S. Operation Epic Fury Began.

Gulf defense ministries on March 3 released data showing the scale of drones and missiles intercepted since the start of the U.S.-Israeli air campaign against Iran. The figures highlight the growing operational strain on regional air defense networks protecting key Gulf energy infrastructure and U.S. military bases.

Defense ministries in the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait have released new data detailing the aerial threats their forces have intercepted since the U.S.-Israeli air campaign against Iran began, revealing sustained pressure across the Gulf region. According to official government briefings, the four states have faced a steady stream of drone and missile threats targeting some of the Middle East’s most strategically important energy facilities, ports, and military installations. The disclosures provide the clearest public picture yet of how Gulf air defense networks have been operating under real combat conditions, with officials highlighting a high interception rate despite the complexity and frequency of incoming threats.
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A Patriot PAC-2 missile battery moves into firing position during an exercise at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar (Picture source: US DoD)

The United Arab Emirates reports the highest volume of detected threats. Emirati air-defense networks identified 186 ballistic missiles launched toward its territory. Of these, 172 were intercepted by defensive systems before impact, while 13 fell into the sea, and a single missile reached Emirati soil. Drone attacks appear even more numerous. Authorities recorded 812 unmanned aerial vehicles approaching the country, with 755 destroyed by air-defense systems and 57 ultimately falling within the UAE. These numbers reflect sustained pressure on the Emirates’ layered air-defense architecture, which integrates U.S.-supplied radar systems and interceptor missiles designed to counter both ballistic trajectories and low-altitude drone threats.

Qatar presents a smaller but still complex picture. The Qatari military detected 101 ballistic missiles during the same period, intercepting 98 before they could reach populated areas or military installations. Thirty-nine drones were identified approaching Qatari airspace, of which 24 were destroyed in flight. Qatari authorities also reported a limited number of cruise missiles and manned aircraft entering the battlespace. Three cruise missiles were detected and intercepted, while two Sukhoi Su-24 strike aircraft were reportedly detected and neutralized before conducting attacks. The Sukhoi Su-24 is a Soviet-designed twin-engine supersonic strike aircraft capable of low-level penetration at speeds exceeding Mach 1.3 and carrying guided bombs or anti-ship missiles. Its appearance in the conflict suggests Iran or aligned forces attempted to combine unmanned and conventional strike methods to saturate regional defenses.

Elsewhere in the Gulf, Bahrain and Kuwait also faced sustained attack activity. Bahraini authorities reported destroying 73 missiles and 91 drones directed toward the island kingdom. Kuwait recorded the monitoring and interception of 178 ballistic missiles and 384 drones approaching its territory. No official figures were released for Saudi Arabia or Oman at the time of publication, although both countries maintain integrated air-defense networks and remain within range of Iranian ballistic missile forces deployed along the Persian Gulf coast.

Ballistic missiles constitute the backbone of Iran’s long-range strike inventory. Systems such as the Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile are assessed to have ranges of approximately 1,000 to 1,300 kilometers, depending on payload. The missile uses a liquid-fueled propulsion system and can deliver a conventional warhead of roughly 750 kilograms. Other Iranian systems, including the Fateh-110 family of solid-fueled short-range ballistic missiles, employ guidance updates during flight to achieve circular error probable values often estimated between 50 and 100 meters. These weapons travel along high-altitude ballistic trajectories before descending at speeds exceeding Mach 5, forcing defending states to rely on radar cueing and interceptor missiles capable of engaging targets during the terminal phase.

Iran has increasingly paired such missiles with long-endurance unmanned aerial systems. The Shahed-136 loitering munition illustrates this approach. The delta-wing drone is powered by a small piston engine driving a rear propeller and carries an explosive payload estimated between 30 and 50 kilograms. Its operational range is often assessed at around 2,000 kilometers, depending on launch profile, and the system navigates using satellite and inertial guidance. While comparatively slow, usually cruising near 180 kilometers per hour, the drone’s low altitude and small radar cross-section complicate detection, particularly when launched in large numbers.

The operational logic behind combining ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones lies in saturation. Ballistic missiles arrive quickly and at steep trajectories, forcing defenders to commit high-end interceptors early in the engagement. Slower drones then approach along low-altitude paths that challenge radar coverage and strain interceptor inventories. When employed simultaneously, these systems create layered threats that can overwhelm point-defense systems protecting air bases, desalination facilities, and energy infrastructure across the Gulf. The reported numbers indicate that regional air-defense networks are operating continuously to maintain coverage across large maritime and desert sectors.

These developments carry broader implications for regional security architecture. The Gulf states host critical U.S. and allied military installations, including air bases supporting surveillance aircraft, tanker fleets and maritime patrol operations in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea. Persistent missile and drone pressure therefore, transforms the Gulf into a forward missile-defense theater in which interception capacity, radar coverage, and early-warning coordination become strategic priorities. At the same time, the scale of launches attributed to Iran signals a willingness to expand the conflict beyond direct combat zones, potentially drawing additional regional actors into an escalating cycle of strikes and counterstrikes. The evolving pattern underscores how missile and drone warfare increasingly shapes deterrence calculations across the Middle East and places air and missile defense at the center of contemporary military planning.