U.S. Accelerates Taiwan Arms Deliveries as Army Targets HIMARS Launchers and Harpoon Missiles.

The United States is accelerating long-delayed arms deliveries to Taiwan as production bottlenecks ease, according to Taiwan’s defense minister. The shift could materially strengthen Taiwan’s ability to deter a Chinese invasion by closing critical gaps in long-range strike, coastal defense, and surveillance.

Bloomberg reported on February 5, 2026, that Taiwan’s Defense Minister Wellington Koo says Washington is moving to accelerate long delayed weapons deliveries as production bottlenecks ease and U.S. processing for Taiwan cases is tightened. Speaking in Taipei, Koo said phased shipments later this year should include HIMARS rocket artillery, Harpoon coastal defense missile systems, and MQ-9B drones, while other munitions such as Javelin anti-armor missiles are tracking to plan. He cast the timeline as operationally urgent, pointing to a sustained surge in Chinese air activity and naval presence around the island and warning that Taiwan must lengthen exercises and intensify reservist training to keep pace with the pressure.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link

Taiwan expects faster U.S. deliveries of HIMARS, Harpoon coastal missiles, MQ-9B drones, and Javelin missiles to sharpen its layered "porcupine" defense, pairing long-range precision fires and coastal strikes with persistent surveillance to deter and disrupt a potential Chinese invasion (Picture source: Taiwan MoD).

For Taipei, faster deliveries are not simply about replenishing stocks, but about closing specific operational gaps inside a defense concept built on denial and dispersion. Koo’s comments land as Taiwan’s legislature debates budgets that can directly affect payment schedules and acceptance milestones, and as Washington signals larger follow-on packages designed to reinforce an asymmetric “porcupine” posture that punishes an invasion fleet and fractures its timelines. U.S. arms notifications over the past year have underscored that the pipeline is widening even as Taipei presses to clear older backlogs inherited from earlier procurement cycles.

HIMARS is the most tactically flexible of the near-term deliveries because it blends road mobility with long-range precision fires in a footprint Taiwan can hide, move, and rearm under pressure. The M142 launcher carries a pod of six Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System rockets or one Army Tactical Missile System round, allowing rapid fire, relocation, and survival cycles from pre-surveyed points across Taiwan’s dense road network. ATACMS offers a maximum range of up to 300 kilometers, while standard GMLRS provides ranges beyond 70 kilometers, with extended-range variants pushing toward 150 kilometers. For Taiwan, this means credible strike options against beachheads, logistics nodes, ports, and airfields that would support an amphibious or airborne assault. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense has already signaled accelerated long-range munitions arrivals, narrowing the window in which the People’s Liberation Army could assume Taiwan lacks deep precision fires.

Harpoon coastal defense systems are designed to make the most dangerous part of an invasion unavoidable, the sea crossing, and the vulnerable moments when landing ships must slow, mass, and commit to predictable approaches. Taiwan’s mobile Harpoon architecture emphasizes dispersed launchers, radar vehicles, and command nodes rather than fixed batteries, reducing vulnerability to preemptive strikes. The Harpoon Block II missile is an all-weather, over-the-horizon weapon with an autonomous guidance package and sea-skimming flight profile, optimized to penetrate shipboard defenses when launched in coordinated salvos. With an effective range in excess of 120 kilometers, these systems force Chinese surface combatants and amphibious ships to operate under constant threat as they approach Taiwan’s littoral zones. Initial system deliveries are expected to translate rapidly into operational units, a critical step because coastal missile deterrence only matures once crews train, rehearse displacement, and integrate targeting.

MQ-9B adds the missing glue to this layered architecture, persistent wide-area surveillance. Taiwan’s acquisition focuses on four weapons-capable aircraft with fixed and mobile ground control stations, optimized for maritime and overland intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. With endurance exceeding 40 hours and satellite-controlled operations beyond line of sight, MQ-9B can maintain continuous coverage of key sea lanes and approaches. In a Taiwan contingency, that endurance is operationally decisive. It allows early detection of amphibious concentrations, tracking of surface action groups during blockade scenarios, and real-time cueing for Harpoon and HIMARS units operating from concealed positions inland.

Javelin, while less prominent than long-range fires, is the weapon that turns any successful landing into a slow and costly fight. Taiwan’s deliveries cover large quantities of FGM-148F missiles and lightweight launch units, reinforcing an infantry-centric anti-armor layer designed for ambushes in urban terrain, narrow valleys, and the immediate hinterland behind likely beaches. Javelin’s fire-and-forget imaging infrared guidance and top-attack profile are optimized to defeat modern armored vehicles at their most vulnerable point. With a qualified range of around 2,500 meters and demonstrated effectiveness at greater distances, it gives small Taiwanese units a lethal standoff without prolonged exposure.

Taken together, these accelerated deliveries reinforce the logic of Taiwan’s evolving defense strategy. The goal is not to defeat China symmetrically, but to deny it a quick win by breaking its kill chain, disrupting amphibious timelines, and forcing combat into a dispersed, attritional fight where Taiwan’s geography and prepared reserves matter more than China’s numerical advantage. Koo’s insistence on faster deliveries is therefore less about inventory and more about shaping the battlespace before a crisis, when deterrence still holds, and the cost of miscalculation is measured not in systems, but in days.