U.S. Air Force Warned Planned B-21 Bomber and F-47 Fighter Fleets Insufficient for War With China.

A new Mitchell Institute report argues the U.S. Air Force must significantly increase planned buys of the B-21 Raider and F-47 to counter China in a Taiwan conflict. The authors warn that current force plans favor affordability over credibility, risking Chinese protected rear areas during a high-intensity war.

The U.S. Air Force risks entering a future conflict with China without the ability to sustain pressure inside heavily defended airspace unless it dramatically expands its next-generation bomber and fighter fleets, according to a report published 4 February 2026 by the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. Written by Heather Penney and retired Air Force Colonel Mark A. Gunzinger and relayed by Air Force Magazine, the study argues that current procurement plans for the B-21 Raider stealth bomber and the F-47 sixth-generation fighter are sized for episodic strike operations rather than the continuous, high-volume campaigns required to deny China operational sanctuary during a war over Taiwan.
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A Mitchell Institute report warns that current B-21 and F-47 fleet plans cannot sustain pressure inside Chinese air defenses in a Taiwan conflict. (Picture source: US DoD)

The analysis focuses on the planned force structure for the Northrop Grumman B-21 Raider and the future F-47 sixth-generation fighter, both intended to form the backbone of the Air Force’s penetrating strike capability from the 2030s onward. Officially, the service plans to acquire at least 100 B-21 bombers and 185 F-47s, figures largely calibrated to replace aging platforms such as the B-1B Lancer and F-22 Raptor. Penney and Gunzinger argue that these numbers are insufficient to impose continuous pressure on a peer adversary able to disperse forces across a vast and defended territory.

The B-21 Raider, developed under the Long Range Strike Bomber program, is conceived as a long-range stealth bomber designed to penetrate advanced integrated air defense systems rather than rely primarily on stand-off weapons. Building on the flying-wing architecture of the B-2 Spirit while incorporating improved low-observable shaping and radar-absorbing materials, the B-21 is optimized for survivability across a wide spectrum of threat environments. With an estimated range of up to 12,000 kilometers and an internal payload of roughly 12 to 13 tons, it is designed to employ both conventional and nuclear weapons, including the B61 gravity bomb, the Long Range Stand Off nuclear cruise missile, Joint Direct Attack Munition, Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile, and the GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator for hardened targets. Powered by stealth-optimized turbofan engines and built around an open-architecture avionics framework, the B-21 emphasizes endurance, adaptability, and repeated deep-strike capability against high-value targets.

Alongside the bomber, the Boeing F-47 is intended to restore air superiority deep inside contested airspace as part of the Next Generation Air Dominance program. Designed as the successor to the F-22 Raptor, the F-47 is the crewed core of a broader family of systems integrating advanced sensors, secure networking, and uncrewed collaborative combat aircraft. While many design features remain classified, U.S. Air Force officials have confirmed a combat radius exceeding 1,000 nautical miles and a maximum speed above Mach 2, reflecting a strong emphasis on range, persistence, and rapid maneuver across the Indo-Pacific theater. The aircraft is expected to provide escort for penetrating bombers, suppress enemy air defenses, and function as a sensor and command node within distributed kill webs, enabling sustained operations rather than isolated sorties.

According to the study, a credible sanctuary-denial posture would require at least 200 B-21 bombers and around 300 F-47 fighters. This expansion accounts not only for combat attrition and maintenance cycles but also for the operational reality that portions of the bomber force must remain dedicated to nuclear deterrence, while fighters are routinely allocated to homeland defense and other standing missions. As a result, the number of aircraft actually available for prolonged Indo-Pacific operations would otherwise be far smaller than headline procurement figures suggest.

Until those numbers can be achieved, a process likely to take more than a decade, the authors recommend halting the retirement of the remaining B-2 Spirit bombers and increasing procurement of the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II. Equipped with the AN/APG-81 active electronically scanned array radar and a fused sensor suite integrating radar, electro-optical, and electronic support measures, the F-35 already provides a level of penetration and targeting capability absent from earlier fighters, even if its combat radius and payload are more constrained than those of a bomber.

A central argument of the report challenges the growing reliance on stand-off strike systems. Long-range hypersonic weapons and the sensor architectures supporting them are often presented as a lower-risk alternative to penetrating aircraft. Penney and Gunzinger counter that these long-range kill chains are costly, technically complex, and vulnerable to disruption. They note that the U.S. Army’s Dark Eagle Long Range Hypersonic Weapon costs more than 40 million dollars per missile, meaning that even limited strikes can rapidly reach billion-dollar thresholds while delivering fewer effects than a bomber sortie carrying multiple weapons.

The report emphasizes that stand-in forces fundamentally alter the geometry of the fight. Penetrating aircraft operating from inside contested airspace can strike air bases, command nodes, logistics hubs, and missile launch infrastructure at their source, compressing an adversary’s decision cycle and degrading its ability to sustain offensive operations. Heavy bombers with long endurance can loiter, retask, and service multiple aim points, while advanced fighters provide escort, suppression of enemy air defenses, and localized air superiority. Together, these capabilities reduce reliance on fragile external sensors and impose dilemmas that a purely stand-off approach cannot replicate.

Drawing on historical precedent, the study notes that conflicts in which deep strikes were constrained, from Korea and Vietnam to more recent wars where sanctuaries remained untouched, allowed adversaries to regenerate forces and prolong hostilities. By contrast, campaigns that systematically targeted industrial capacity and military infrastructure shortened wars by denying opponents the space and time to adapt.

A visible commitment to large-scale penetrating strike forces would signal to Beijing that the United States intends to hold critical assets on the Chinese mainland at risk throughout a conflict, complicating any assumption of rear-area immunity. Such a posture could strengthen deterrence while sharpening strategic competition, reinforcing the central role of airpower in the Indo-Pacific balance. For allies and partners, it would underscore the depth of U.S. engagement, while for rivals it would confirm that future conflicts are unlikely to remain confined to the maritime periphery alone.