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ALERT: Venezuela launches major air defense drills following possible U.S. military actions.


Venezuela’s armed forces have begun large-scale air and coastal defense drills after the USS Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group deployed near its northern maritime border. Army Recognition analysis suggests the U.S. deployment enables rapid strike capability, while Venezuela’s defenses offer strong range but limited resilience.

Venezuela launched major air and coastal defense drills on October 25, 2025, after the U.S. Navy’s USS Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group deployed near its northern maritime border. Army Recognition analyzes that the U.S. deployment could allow for rapid precision or maritime strike operations if ordered, while Venezuela’s air defense network, built around Russian-made S-300VM, Buk-M2E, and Pechora-2M systems, provides strong long-range coverage but remains limited against complex or electronic attacks. Venezuelan officials said the exercise represents a direct response to what they called “escalating U.S. military movements,” marking the country’s most extensive air defense readiness test since 2019.
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Venezuelan Armed Forces have launched a large military exercise to protect national airspace and coastal areas against possible U.S. air and naval attacks, showcasing the country’s air defense systems in full operational readiness.

Venezuelan Armed Forces have launched a large military exercise to protect national airspace and coastal areas against possible U.S. air and naval attacks, showcasing the country’s air defense systems in full operational readiness. (Picture source: Venezuela TV video footage)


According to deep analysis from the Army Recognition editorial team, the likely spectrum of U.S. offensive actions against Venezuela, should tensions escalate into open confrontation, would center on precision air and naval strikes aimed at crippling strategic command-and-control nodes, disabling key airbases, neutralizing coastal radar coverage, and disrupting anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities across the Venezuelan littoral. These operations would almost certainly be executed through a joint campaign combining carrier-based F/A-18E/F Super Hornet sorties, Tomahawk cruise missile salvos from Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, and potential use of stealth platforms like the F-35C operating in electronic warfare-supported strike packages.

However, Venezuela is not without layered defenses. The country’s integrated air defense system, while aging and unevenly maintained, still poses a credible threat to low and medium-altitude air operations, particularly in the northern corridors surrounding Caracas, Maracay, and the Paraguaná Peninsula.

The centerpiece of Venezuela’s long-range air defense network remains the Russian-supplied S-300VM “Antey-2500” system, also known by its NATO designation SA-23 Gladiator or Giant. Venezuela is believed to operate at least 12 S-300VM launchers, deployed in a semi-mobile configuration with coverage extending deep into the Caribbean basin. These systems are specifically optimized for countering both aerodynamic targets and tactical ballistic missiles, with engagement ranges of up to 200 km and capabilities to track and engage multiple high-speed targets simultaneously using phased-array radar. In any conflict scenario, these would be the first layer of resistance against U.S. stand-off strikes and could significantly complicate cruise missile ingress routes.

At the medium tier, Venezuela maintains nine 9K317M2 Buk-M2E batteries, NATO designation SA-17 Grizzly, delivered under a $1 billion arms package from Russia in the early 2010s. These systems offer enhanced coverage against low-flying aircraft, UAVs, and cruise missiles, with a maximum range of up to 50 km. Although not networked to the degree of NATO-standard integrated air defense systems, the Buk-M2E systems are road-mobile and capable of autonomous operation using target acquisition radars and command vehicles, which increases their survivability in the event of suppression efforts.

Venezuela's legacy systems, including 44 upgraded S-125 Pechora-2M launchers (SA-3 Goa variants), remain deployed in static or semi-mobile configurations around strategic infrastructure. While technologically outclassed by modern electronic countermeasures, these systems can still pose a danger to aircraft operating without jamming support or at medium altitude.

The lower tier of Venezuela’s defense includes man-portable air defense systems, or MANPADS, such as the 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch), which are widely distributed among regular army formations and National Guard units. Combined with short-range systems like the Swedish RBS-70 and French Mistral, these create a localized threat envelope around critical sites. In urban and coastal areas, these could be used effectively against low-slow flyers like drones or helicopters during close air support missions.

On the gun-based side, Venezuela retains over 400 air defense artillery pieces, including over 200 ZU-23-2 twin 23mm towed guns and more than 114 40mm L/70 Bofors variants, many of which have been updated with optical fire control systems. The Rafaga turret variant of the AMX-13 light tank, outfitted with a 40mm autocannon, adds a layer of mobile point defense near critical government and military sites.

Despite the breadth of this inventory, Venezuela’s primary vulnerability lies in its limited command-and-control networking and lack of a fully digitized sensor-fusion architecture. Its radar systems, while numerous, are not believed to be fully integrated into a real-time battlespace awareness framework, leaving interceptors heavily reliant on localized radar tracks rather than a national-level common operating picture.

Nonetheless, the Ford Carrier Strike Group’s presence within strike range of Venezuela’s northern coast raises significant operational challenges. Any hypothetical U.S. air campaign would need to neutralize the S-300VM batteries early, likely via coordinated electronic warfare suppression and stand-off cruise missile attacks. The resilience and dispersal of Venezuela’s mid-tier and point-defense systems could delay or complicate follow-on manned aircraft operations, especially in contested air corridors.


U.S. Naval Forces continue their deployment in the Caribbean region, citing possible operations against drug cartels operating within Venezuelan territory, amid rising military tensions. (

U.S. Naval Forces continue their deployment in the Caribbean region, citing possible operations against drug cartels operating within Venezuelan territory, amid rising military tensions. (Pictures source from X Social Network)


Analytical Assessment: What Venezuela’s Air Defenses Mean for U.S. Airpower

The Venezuelan air defense architecture presents a complex, multi-tiered threat environment that the U.S. military cannot afford to underestimate. While not on par with the integrated air defense systems (IADS) of near-peer adversaries like China or Russia, Venezuela’s Russian-built platforms offer real combat capability that could degrade or delay U.S. air operations in the early phases of a strike campaign.

The S-300VM air defense missile systems, in particular, pose the most serious risk to high-value U.S. assets. With engagement ranges exceeding 200 kilometers and the ability to track dozens of targets simultaneously, these systems threaten not only penetrating aircraft like F/A-18s and EA-18G Growlers but also support platforms such as AWACS and aerial refueling tankers if they stray too close to the defended airspace. The missile’s high-speed intercept profile and advanced radar capabilities mean that even stealth aircraft like the F-35C must carefully consider their radar cross-section and flight paths to avoid detection and engagement. The potential for Venezuela to deploy these systems in dispersed and camouflaged configurations further complicates targeting and suppression.

The Buk-M2E air defense systems fill a critical mid-altitude gap, offering highly mobile and radar-guided surface-to-air capabilities capable of intercepting cruise missiles and fast-moving fighters. Their presence forces U.S. strike planners to allocate additional electronic warfare and SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses) assets just to neutralize mobile launchers that can reposition between sorties. The fact that these systems can operate independently and relocate quickly after firing increases their survivability.

Legacy systems like the S-125 Pechora-2M still pose risks to slow-moving or unsupported aircraft, especially in cluttered urban environments where radar performance is less predictable and electronic jamming is more difficult. Combined with dense layers of MANPADS and gun-based defenses, Venezuela can generate localized zones of high attrition risk for helicopters, drones, and low-flying strike aircraft.

For U.S. carrier aviation, the threat is compounded by geography. The proximity of the Venezuelan coast to international waters means that any air operation launched from the Ford Strike Group must penetrate a dense umbrella of SAM coverage with minimal warning time and limited maneuver space. This compresses the engagement envelope and shortens the timeline for U.S. pilots and mission commanders to respond to evolving threats.

In short, while the Venezuelan air defense network may not withstand a sustained U.S. air campaign, its systems are capable of inflicting early operational losses, delaying air superiority, and forcing U.S. planners to commit additional resources to suppression and destruction missions. This in turn affects strike tempo, increases operational risk, and extends the timeline for any potential campaign. If Caracas intends to impose a tactical cost on any attempted U.S. intervention, its air defense forces remain the most credible pillar of its military deterrent.

Army Recognition will continue to provide exclusive technical and strategic insights as this volatile situation continues to evolve.

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.


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