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China Reveals Mobile Air Defense System to Shield Maneuvering Troops from Emerging Air Threats.
China has revealed a new vehicle-mounted short-range air defense system designed to shield maneuvering ground units from aerial threats. The debut underscores Beijing’s drive to modernize its battlefield defenses against drones and precision weapons.
On 25 October 2025, China’s state media spotlighted a previously unseen vehicle-mounted short-range air defense system, signaling a push to give frontline brigades organic, on-the-move protection. In the absence of a formal technical release, available imagery provides a first sketch of its role and potential. The system matters because it appears tailored to defeat the low-altitude, low-observable threats reshaping modern battlefields, from armed drones to cruise missiles, while keeping pace with fast-moving ground forces. The news, as announced by CCTV and reported by Global Times, suggests China is tightening the weave of its layered air and missile defense architecture.
A new, Mengshi-mounted SHORAD package, likely carrying a short-range missile family akin to FB-10A and referenced by some as HQ-13, now equipping at least one unit within the 72nd Group Army (Picture Source: CCTV)
Footage shows the system installed on a Dongfeng Mengshi all-terrain 6×6 wheeled platform, with a compact rotating radar and twin roof-mounted missile launch rails integrated into a single, highly mobile fire unit. The launcher architecture closely resembles the missile module of the SWS3 gun-missile SHORAD concept but in a configuration without the 35 mm cannon, retaining the two-rail missile fit rather than expanding to four. Units of the PLA’s 72nd Group Army are depicted conducting simulated firings culminating in a live shot, an approach consistent with rapid induction protocols for new equipment. While official specifications were not disclosed, multiple observers judge the missile to be a short-range interceptor, variously linked to the FB-10A family and, in PLA service, associated by some sources with a probable HQ-13 designation, pointing to a point-defense role against helicopters, ingress/egress fixed-wing aircraft, low-flying cruise missiles, and Group 1–3 UAS at brigade level.
What makes this system stand out is the way mobility, sensor-effector integration, and autonomy appear to be fused at the vehicle level. The Mengshi chassis offers high cross-country agility and rapid shoot-and-scoot, reducing exposure to counter-battery and loitering-munition reprisal. The on-board surveillance and fire-control suite, evidenced by the rotating radar and compact electro-optical fixtures in broadcast frames, suggests each vehicle can search, track, and prosecute targets without relying exclusively on higher-echelon cueing. At the same time, its architecture seems designed for networked operations, allowing it to plug into battalion- and theater-level air picture feeds. That duality, credible autonomous kill chains with the option to operate as a node in a larger integrated air defense system, addresses one of the central challenges of contemporary SHORAD: sustaining coverage for dispersed, maneuvering formations under electronic attack and in GPS-degraded environments.
Assessed advantages cluster around survivability, responsiveness, and logistical simplicity. A single-vehicle fire unit that can move with motorized and light combined-arms brigades closes the classic air-defense gap that opens when heavy batteries are tied to static sites or slower echelons. Organic sensors shorten the sensor-to-shooter loop, improving reaction times against pop-up threats like terrain-masking helicopters or sea-skimming missiles transitioning ashore. The compact form factor lowers the signature footprint compared with towed launchers or bulkier tracked platforms, and the evident emphasis on repetitive simulated launches prior to live fire points to a training doctrine built around rapid deployment and immediate operational proficiency. Open reporting consistently characterizes the missile fit as short-range and optimized for low-altitude targets, placing this capability on the inner layer beneath systems such as HQ-22/HQ-9 and alongside very-short-range guns and MANPADS, precisely where swarming drones and subsonic cruise missiles stress defenders most.
Strategically, even with key parameters undisclosed and the designation unconfirmed, the fielding of a mobile SHORAD of this type carries clear implications. Geopolitically, it strengthens the PLA’s layered air-defense posture across flashpoints such as the Taiwan Strait and the East and South China Seas, complicating adversary air planning at low altitude and compressing safe approach corridors for rotary-wing infiltration or stand-off weapon lofts. Geostrategically, it aligns with China’s visible effort to present a dense, multi-tier IADS that extends from long-range interceptors to tactical point defense at company level, reducing the efficacy of saturation raids by distributing more interceptors across more maneuver units. Militarily, it enhances the survivability of command posts, air-defense gaps in road-march columns, and logistics nodes that have been shown in recent conflicts to be prime targets for FPV drones and small cruise missiles. The capability to operate autonomously when networks are disrupted, yet contribute to a common air picture when available, improves resilience against electronic warfare and decapitation strikes on higher-tier C2.
It is important to stress that there has been no formal Chinese publication detailing the system’s official designation, missile model, or performance envelope. The balance of evidence, imagery, broadcast narration, and expert commentary, supports a cautious working assessment: a new, Mengshi-mounted SHORAD package, likely carrying a short-range missile family akin to FB-10A and referenced by some as HQ-13, now equipping at least one unit within the 72nd Group Army. If borne out, this addition would tighten the PLA’s low-altitude shield, bring credible counter-UAS and counter-cruise protection directly to maneuver brigades, and raise the cost of low-level air operations in any contingency where Chinese ground forces are on the move.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.