US disables oil tanker M/T Belma with Hellfire missiles near Kharg Island as Iran naval blockade resumes.

U.S. military forces disabled the Curacao-flagged commercial oil tanker M/T Belma near Iran’s Kharg Island on July 15, 2026, marking the first enforcement strike of the newly reinstated naval blockade. The precision engagement, executed via Hellfire missiles fired into the vessel's smokestack by a U.S. aircraft, was designed to selectively neutralize the ship's propulsion without rupturing its cargo tanks or causing a maritime spill. This tactical action establishes a strict enforcement threshold to systematically isolate Iranian energy exports while preserving passage for compliant international commercial traffic transiting the Strait of Hormuz.

During the first 24 hours of the renewed blockade, U.S. Central Command redirected two compliant vessels and utilized force against the non-compliant M/T Belma, which was transiting in ballast toward Iran's primary oil export hub. The interception coincided with a broader U.S. military campaign targeting Iranian coastal command infrastructure, air defenses, and naval assets to degrade Tehran's capacity to disrupt shipping lanes.

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Built in 2005, the M/T Belma has operated under several names, including Aquarius Voyager, Maran Aquarius, Leonor and Bendigo, while its registry history includes the Bahamas, Greece, Panama, the Cook Islands, Barbados and Curacao. (Picture source: CENTCOM and X/Daniel Ferro (@Gibdan1))

On July 15, 2026, U.S. forces carried out the first strike operation of the renewed naval blockade against Iran by disabling the Curacao-flagged crude oil tanker M/T Belma after it continued toward Kharg Island despite repeated warnings. The blockade had resumed at 4:00 p.m. EDT on July 14, and within its first 24 hours, U.S. Central Command redirected two compliant commercial vessels and used force against one non-compliant ship. The M/T Belma was unladen when an unidentified U.S. aircraft fired Hellfire missiles into its smokestack, leaving the tanker unable to continue toward Iran without sinking it or striking the cargo tanks.

The engagement established the immediate enforcement threshold for the second blockade period: commercial traffic could continue through the Strait of Hormuz when it was not linked to Iranian ports or cargo, but vessels attempting to enter or depart Iranian facilities faced diversion and, after repeated non-compliance, precision attack. The interception also occurred during the fifth consecutive day of U.S. strikes against Iranian coastal command facilities, air defense systems, surveillance radars, cruise missile sites, drone infrastructure and naval forces supporting operations against merchant shipping. The blockade applies to ships entering or leaving Iranian ports, coastal terminals and associated loading areas, rather than to all vessels crossing the Strait of Hormuz.

This distinction is operationally important because it seeks to isolate Iranian maritime trade while preserving passage for third-country tankers, container ships, bulk carriers and liquefied natural gas carriers using the international traffic lanes. The measure resumed 26 days after U.S. enforcement ended on June 18 following the June 17 memorandum between Washington and Tehran. During the earlier blockade, which began on April 13, U.S. forces redirected 142 vessels and disabled nine, producing a total of 151 documented enforcement actions and a disabling rate of 5.96 percent among ships that were either turned away or stopped by force. Pentagon calculations placed Iran’s lost oil revenue at $4.8 billion by May 1, only eighteen days after the blockade began, equivalent to a notional average of $266.7 million per day over that period, although the real daily effect would have varied with export schedules, crude prices and storage availability.

More than twenty U.S. Navy warships and hundreds of military aircraft remained deployed across the Middle East when the blockade restarted, providing enough force density to combine wide-area surveillance, interception, escort, air defense and strike operations. The M/T Belma was tracked in international waters while moving toward Kharg Island, which remains Iran’s principal offshore crude export terminal and one of the most consequential maritime nodes in the country’s energy system. The tanker was empty, but its condition did not reduce its relevance to blockade enforcement because an unladen very large crude carrier entering Kharg Island could load close to two million barrels before departing for an overseas buyer. Preventing an inbound voyage therefore denies future export capacity rather than intercepting an oil cargo already at sea.

U.S. forces issued several warnings before attacking, indicating that the engagement was preceded by an attempt to compel a course change rather than an immediate decision to use force. The smokestack was selected instead of the hull or cargo section, limiting the strike to the upper machinery and exhaust area and reducing the probability of catastrophic flooding, cargo tank rupture, or a large maritime spill. At the time of writing, the CENTCOM did not identify the specific Hellfire variant, aircraft type, number of missiles fired, range to target, or the precise machinery damaged, but the functional result was clear: the ship stopped proceeding toward Iran after the attack. The M/T Belma, IMO 9289491, is a 333 m-long crude oil tanker with a 60 m beam, 161,387 gross tonnage, and 299,988 deadweight tons.

Its length is more than three U.S. football fields, while its beam exceeds the wingspan of a Boeing 747-8, illustrating the scale of the vessel that was stopped with a comparatively small precision-guided weapon rather than a conventional anti-ship missile. The tanker belongs to the very large crude carrier category, whose ships typically transport 1.8 to 2 million barrels depending on crude density, loading limits and terminal draft. Built in 2005, the M/T Belma is 21 years old in 2026 and has operated under several names, including Aquarius Voyager, Maran Aquarius, Leonor and Bendigo. Its registry history includes the Bahamas, Greece, Panama, the Cook Islands, Barbados and Curacao, a sequence that complicates long-term tracking of ownership, management and commercial employment.

At the time of the interception, its AIS profile listed MMSI 306269000, call sign PJE5, a reported draft of 11 m and a speed of 5.5 to 5.6 knots. The reported draft supports the assessment that the M/T Belma was in ballast rather than fully loaded, because a VLCC carrying close to 300,000 tons of crude would normally sit substantially deeper in the water. Its speed was also significantly below its previously recorded average of 10 knots and maximum of 15.5 knots, representing a reduction of 44 to 45 percent from its average operating speed and 64 percent from its recorded maximum. AIS transmissions showed a destination code of KAZ, generally associated with Khor Al Zubair, Iraq’s deep-water commercial port complex near Basra, while U.S. military tracking placed the vessel on a course toward Kharg Island.

The discrepancy matters because AIS destination fields are manually entered and can be incomplete, outdated, abbreviated or deliberately misleading, whereas military surveillance can combine radar tracks, electro-optical imagery, airborne sensors, naval sensors and route analysis. The M/T Belma had remained at the Singapore Eastern Outer Port Limits anchorage from May 16 to June 18, 2026, a period of 32 days and 22 hours, before returning to Gulf waters. The tanker’s size, low maneuverability and slow speed made it difficult to alter course rapidly once challenged, but also made its route and movement easier to monitor continuously. The interception occurred alongside a broader U.S. campaign against Iranian military capabilities concentrated around Bandar Abbas, Greater Tunb Island, Qeshm Island, Sirik and other locations in Hormozgan Province.

On July 7, U.S. forces struck more than 80 military targets and destroyed over 60 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps fast attack craft following attacks on internationally flagged merchant vessels near the Strait of Hormuz. On July 15, U.S. forces conducted a 90-minute strike against coastal defense systems and cruise missile storage and launch positions on Greater Tunb Island, followed later by attacks against command centers, air defense sites, missile and drone capabilities and coastal surveillance facilities in Bandar Abbas and additional locations. These target sets were selected because the southern Iranian coastline contains the sensors, headquarters, launch positions, communications links and naval bases required to detect, track and attack ships moving through the strait.

Fighter jets, naval strike systems, kamikaze drones and unmanned surface vessels were used during the campaign, with the latter representing the first acknowledged U.S. combat employment of explosive sea drones. The operational objective extends beyond destroying launchers and boats because Iranian maritime attack capability depends on a sequence of interconnected functions. Coastal radars first detect a vessel and establish its position, course and speed. Command-and-control centers then combine radar information with drone feeds, electronic emissions, visual observation and intelligence data before assigning the target to a missile battery, drone unit, mine warfare force or IRGC naval element.

Anti-ship cruise missiles and ballistic missiles require updated coordinates against moving ships, while one-way attack drones and fast attack craft depend on continuous location data to approach from the correct direction and timing. Destroying a launcher removes one weapon, but disrupting radars, communications, and command centers can reduce the effectiveness of several launchers and naval units simultaneously. Suppression of integrated air defense systems further supports the campaign by reducing the threat to U.S. aircraft and allowing repeated strikes against surviving or relocated coastal assets. The destruction of more than 60 fast attack craft also directly reduces Iran’s capacity for swarm attacks, armed harassment, close approaches, boarding attempts, and coordinated short-range attacks in confined waters. 

The Strait of Hormuz, the center of these operations, narrows to 34 km and concentrates commercial shipping into limited inbound and outbound routes. Nearly 20 percent of globally traded crude oil and a comparable share of liquefied natural gas normally pass through the waterway, including exports from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Iran. Before the February 2026 conflict, close to 3,000 commercial vessels crossed the strait each month, equal to roughly 100 transits per day. Subsequently, Iran does not need to close the passage physically to create global effects.

Missile attacks, drone strikes, naval mines, warning fire and harassment can increase insurance premiums, delay loading schedules, reduce available shipping capacity and force naval escorts. The disabling of the M/T Belma clarifies that the United States is prepared to launch again strafing operations against commercial vessels that continue toward Iranian ports after repeated warnings. Still, the principal measure of operational success will be whether U.S. forces can keep Iranian coastal surveillance, command networks, air defenses, and maritime strike systems below the level required for coordinated attacks while avoiding tanker sinkings, mass casualties, major oil spills, or damage to neutral shipping that could widen the conflict.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.

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