South Korea Lands U.S. Marine Trucks from Modular Military Ferry Under Anti-Drone Netting.

Republic of Korea personnel drove an Improved Navy Lighterage System causeway ferry onto Dogu Beach in Pohang during Combined Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore 26 on July 9, 2026, opening a roll-on/roll-off route for U.S. Marine Corps vehicles without relying on a fixed pier. The operation demonstrated how allied forces can sustain combat power when ports are damaged, unavailable, or under threat.

A Marine Corps Oshkosh Logistics Vehicle System Replacement came ashore through the temporary beachhead, while released images showed netting over the ferry’s cargo deck to reduce exposure to small drones. The combination of pier-independent delivery and counter-UAS protection reflects the growing need to keep ship-to-shore supply lines mobile, dispersed, and survivable in contested environments.

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Republic of Korea personnel operate an Improved Navy Lighterage System during CJLOTS 26 at Dogu Beach on July 9, 2026. The causeway ferry carried U.S. Marine Corps vehicles ashore without fixed port infrastructure and featured overhead netting intended to reduce exposure to small drones (Picture source: U.S. DoW).

The INLS is not a single landing craft but a set of interchangeable powered and unpowered modules assembled for specific cargo-transfer tasks. A nine-module Roll-on/Roll-off Discharge Facility forms a floating transfer area measuring approximately 240 by 72 feet, or 73 by 22 meters, alongside a sealift ship. Vehicles drive from the ship onto this facility and then onto a three- or four-module causeway ferry comprising a powered module, one or two intermediate cargo modules, and a beach module. Up to 19 unpowered modules can alternatively form a floating causeway approximately 1,100 feet (335 meters) long.

The powered sections use waterjet propulsion rather than exposed propellers, an arrangement suited to shallow water and beach approaches. Fincantieri lists individual INLS-powered craft at 78 to 87 feet long, 24 feet wide and four feet in draft, with two 800-horsepower Caterpillar C18 diesels driving two fully steerable waterjets; a separate 600-horsepower engine supplies bow-thruster power. Published data give a maximum speed of 10 knots and 16 hours of endurance. A complete causeway ferry can reach roughly 270 feet in length and carry about 300 tons, although actual payload depends on module configuration, sea conditions, and deck loading.

The beach module has a bow ramp and a forward positioning thruster, allowing the crew to align the ferry perpendicular to the shoreline and force the ramp end into the beach. This “beach stabbing” procedure transfers part of the bow load into the sand and provides a relatively stable exit for heavy vehicles. The INLS is rated for Sea State 3 operations, but the modular joints experience increasing loads as wave height and multi-body motion rise. Published engineering analysis specifically identifies connector loading as a limiting factor above the intended operating condition, meaning weather can reduce availability even when the offshore sealift ship remains capable of operating.

The LVSR photographed during the offload illustrates the weight class that the ferry must handle. The MKR18 cargo truck is a 10×10 vehicle with a curb weight of 53,700 pounds, a gross vehicle weight rating of 106,000 pounds, a 600-horsepower Caterpillar C15 diesel engine, and four-axle steering. Its load-handling system can lift a 22.5-ton flatrack, while its rated payload is 22.5 tons on roads and 16.5 tons off-road. By mass alone, a 300-ton ferry rating corresponds to approximately five LVSRs loaded to maximum gross weight, although vehicle dimensions, axle-load distribution, securing requirements, and reserve stability may impose a lower practical number.

There is no conventional armament visible on the causeway ferry. The released views show no machine-gun mount, remote weapon station, electro-optical director, air-surveillance radar, radio-frequency jammer, or kinetic counter-drone interceptor. The green mesh, therefore, should not be described as an onboard weapon system. The Marine Corps caption does not formally identify its purpose, but Combined Forces Command stated that CJLOTS 26 included protection of sustainment nodes against hostile drone attacks. Given its overhead position and pole-supported construction, the most defensible assessment is that the mesh was being evaluated as a passive counter-UAS barrier rather than ordinary camouflage or weather covering.

Such netting can physically obstruct the rotors of a light quadcopter, deny a direct vertical approach, and complicate visual identification of vehicles beneath it. U.S. Joint Interagency Task Force 401 guidance identifies overhead mesh, tensioned cables, and lightweight wire as methods for creating unpredictable flight hazards around vulnerable assets. The arrangement at Dogu Beach, however, covers only part of the ferry and appears open on the sides. No information has been released on mesh aperture, fiber type, tensile strength, stand-off distance, installation time, or live-drone testing. It consequently cannot be assumed to stop a heavier one-way attack drone, a munition dropped from altitude, or an FPV drone approaching below the net edge.

The ferry’s 10-knot speed also defines its tactical exposure. A 12-nautical-mile transit from an offshore discharge point requires about 72 minutes in calm conditions; a 30-nautical-mile leg requires three hours each way, excluding loading, securing, beach approach, and unloading. During that period, the causeway ferry follows a relatively predictable route with limited maneuver margin and no visible organic air defense. Protection therefore depends on route variation, air and surface surveillance, electronic warfare, local counter-UAS teams, and control of the beachhead. This vulnerability is central to contested maritime logistics because a ferry lost while carrying fuel, ammunition, or several heavy trucks would remove both cargo and scarce lighterage capacity.

CJLOTS 26 demonstrated a practical method for bypassing damaged or unavailable port infrastructure, but it did not remove the requirement to secure the offshore anchorage, approach lanes, and shore exit routes. Combined Forces Command reported that American shipping was offloaded through a Korean lighterage system for the first time, an interoperability result with direct implications for wartime reception and onward movement. The anti-drone netting is a low-cost adaptation, not a substitute for layered defense. Its significance is that the exercise placed the logistics craft itself inside the threat model, consistent with the broader protection requirements now affecting sustainment units operating within range of enemy unmanned aircraft.

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Written by Evan Lerouvillois, Defense Analyst.

Evan studied International Relations, and quickly specialized in defense and security. He is particularly interested in the influence of the defense sector on global geopolitics, and analyzes how technological innovations in defense, arms export contracts, and military strategies influence the international geopolitical scene.