Japan considers transferring destroyers to Chile to maintain Navy strength before domestic frigate launch.

Japan is considering the potential transfer of Murasame-, Takanami-, or Akizuki-class destroyers to Chile to maintain the Chilean Navy's surface combat force at its statutory minimum of eight operational ships. The potential acquisition serves as a strategic bridge solution while Chile prepares for its 2025-2040 Naval Construction Policy to build replacement frigates domestically at Talcahuano starting in the 2030s. Transferring active Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyers addresses a critical multi-year operational capability gap created by the impending retirement of aging legacy frigates.

Japan's proposal offers 18 candidate destroyers across three distinct classes, equipped with 16 to 32 Mk 41 vertical launch system cells, 76 mm to 127 mm naval guns, and COGAG gas turbine propulsion systems. Operating a transferred batch would require between 330 and 400 personnel depending on the selected vessel design, balancing immediate surface fleet capacity against long-term maintenance and lifecycle support costs.

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The Akizuki-class offers the youngest hulls and strongest air defense capability, but transferring even two ships would severely deplete Japan's active front-line inventory while imposing the highest crew requirements on the Chilean Navy. (Picture source: Japanese MoD)

According to Defensa on September 7, 2026, Japan is considering a possible transfer of Murasame-, Takanami-, and/or Akizuki-class destroyers to Chile, to keep the Chilean Navy's surface combat force at eight ships while its first domestically built replacement frigates remain years from service. No class, hull, quantity, price, delivery date, weapons package, or refurbishment standard has been selected or officially confirmed. Chile currently fields one Type 22, three Type 23s, two M-class and two Adelaide-class frigates, some of which could be decommissioned before the launch of the first Chilean frigate: even one retirement without replacement would reduce it below the statutory minimum.

Chile's 2025-2040 Naval Construction Policy calls for a common frigate series built at Talcahuano from the 2030s, but detailed engineering, industrial-partner selection, and final decisions remain incomplete, while construction itself requires 4 to 5 years. The Japanese option, according to Defensa, therefore addresses a specific timing gap. Japan has 18 ships across the three candidate classes (nine Murasames, five Takanamis, and four Akizukis), but with commissioning dates spanning from 1996 to 2014, which also makes remaining hull life as important for Chile as combat capability. The potential acquisition follows a rapid expansion of bilateral defense talks. In August 2025, Chilean Defense Minister Adriana Delpiano and Japanese Parliamentary Vice-Minister Kobayashi Kazuhiro signed a cooperation memorandum covering defense policy, military technology, and cooperation for peace after Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani had signed it in Tokyo.

Chile also opened a Defense Attaché Office in Tokyo in January 2026 under Navy responsibility, headed by Captain Cristóbal Rodríguez, and Foreign Minister Francisco Pérez Mackenna met Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi on August 30, 2026, with defense cooperation again on the agenda. Naval contacts included the August 2025 Valparaíso visit of both JS Kashima and JS Shimakaze and a PASSEX with FFG-11 Arturo Prat. Any transfer would subsequently require this relationship to move into crew conversion, ammunition arrangements, maintenance training, Japanese spare parts access, and pre-transfer overhaul. The requirement favors a single class with enough remaining service life to reach the 2030s, rather than several inexpensive hulls that would create another replacement requirement before Chile's domestic frigate program matures.

The Murasame-class provides the largest destroyer pool, but age is its principal weakness. Japan commissioned nine ships between March 1996 and March 2002, making them 24 to 30 years old in 2026 and 28 to 34 in 2030. Each is 151 m long, 17.4 m wide, roughly 6,200 tonnes full load, and crewed by about 165 personnel. Its 60,000-shp COGAG plant uses two LM2500 and two Spey SM1C gas turbines, which permit a maximum speed of 30 knots and a range of 8,350 km at 18 knots. Weapons include 16 Mk 48 cells for ESSM, 16 Mk 41 cells for VL-ASROC, eight Type 90 SSM-1B anti-ship missiles, a 76 mm gun, two Phalanx CIWS, and six 324 mm torpedoes in two triple launchers; OQS-5 hull sonar, OQR-2 TASS, OYQ-103 processing, and an SH-60J/K provide the ASW chain. Two ships would provide 64 VLS cells and 16 ready anti-ship missiles but require 330 shipboard personnel; three would provide 96 cells, 24 Type 90s, and require 495 personnel.

If retained until 2038, however, the oldest transferred Murasames could exceed 40 years of service, making hull corrosion, turbine hours, generators, piping, shafts, and combat system obsolescence central to the acquisition cost. The Takanami-class offers almost the same dimensions and propulsion architecture, but with 6 to 8 additional years of chronological margin over the earliest Murasames. Five ships entered service between 2003 and 2006, making them 20 to 23 years old in 2026 and 24 to 27 in 2030. Each measures 151 m long and 17.4 m wide, displaces roughly 6,400 tonnes full load, carries about 175 personnel, and uses the same 60,000-shp combination of two LM2500 and two Spey SM1C turbines for a speed of 30 knots, but a cruising range of around 8,334 km at 24 knots.

The Murasame-class provides the largest pool of candidate hulls for immediate availability, but its advanced age risks severe structural corrosion, mechanical fatigue, and high ongoing sustainment costs. (Picture source: Japanese MoD)

Its principal change is a single 32-cell Mk 41 battery for ESSM and VL-ASROC, replacing the Murasame's separate Mk 48 and Mk 41 launchers, together with a larger 127 mm gun. Eight Type 90 missiles, two Phalanx systems, six ready lightweight torpedoes and an SH-60J/K remain, while the OPS-25B, OPS-28D, OQS-5 and OQR-2 provide air, surface and underwater surveillance. Two Takanamis would require roughly 350 sailors and provide 64 Mk 41 cells and 16 ready anti-ship missiles. For a bridge extending to 2035-2040, their age profile is materially better than the Murasame without requiring Japan to surrender ships as young and scarce as the Akizuki. The Akizuki-class provides the youngest hulls and the strongest local-area air defense capability, but Japan has only four.

These ships entered service between 2012 and 2014, meaning two transferred ships would remove 50% of the class and would still be only 16 to 18 years old in 2030. Each measures 150.5 m long and 18.3 m wide, displaces about 6,800 tonnes full load, carries roughly 200 personnel, and reaches 30 knots, thanks to four 16,000-hp Spey SM1C turbines producing 64,000 hp. Three 2,400-kW M1A-35 generators also provide 7.2 MW of generating capacity. Armament comprises 32 Mk 41 cells for ESSM and VL-ASROC, eight Type 90 missiles, a 127 mm Mk 45 Mod 4, two Phalanx CIWS, and two triple 324 mm launchers, plus an SH-60K. Its FCS-3A multifunction AESA radar uses GaN transmitter-receiver technology and supports Local Area Defense, allowing the ship to engage threats directed against neighboring vessels rather than only itself; the OQQ-22 combines bow sonar with OQR-3 TACTASS.

Two Akizukis would provide 64 Mk 41 cells but require about 400 shipboard personnel, 21% more than two Murasames, while transferring half of a four-ship active JMSDF class. Chile's existing 1-3-2-2 frigate structure already imposes a substantial standardization penalty. The eight ships are the British Type 22 Almirante Williams; the British Type 23s Almirante Cochrane, Almirante Lynch and Almirante Condell; the Australian Adelaide-class Almirante Latorre and Capitán Prat; and the Dutch M-class Almirante Blanco Encalada and Almirante Riveros. Adding Japanese ships introduces another radar, sonar, combat system, missile, electronic warfare, and maintenance ecosystem, although Chile's Adelaide experience provides some familiarity with LM2500 gas turbines, which is relevant for Murasame and Takanami destroyers.

A potential two-ship Japanese batch would constitute 25% of the eight-combatant force and require 330 personnel for Murasame, 350 for Takanami, or 400 for Akizuki destroyers before shore technicians, instructors, and relief crews are included. VLS quantity alone does not differentiate them because two ships of any candidate class provide 64 cells; the meaningful variables are subsequently cell type, radar performance, ASW equipment, age, and supportability. A mixed two- or three-class acquisition would also negate much of the standardization objective of Chile's future common frigate program. The lowest-risk structure, according to Defensa, is consequently one Japanese class replacing specific retiring frigates, followed by withdrawal as Chilean-built ships enter service.

The Takanami-class delivers an ideal balance of modern surface firepower and improved chronological life margin compared to the Murasamae or the Akizuki, but still requires Chile to integrate a completely new operational and logistics ecosystem into its fleet. (Japanese MoD)

JMSDF Chief of Staff Admiral Akira Saito did not confirm a transfer agreement on September 8, but said Chile and Japan maintain frequent naval exchanges and that Navy-to-Navy staff talks were expected in the near term. Chile also progressed from observer to member of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, giving the two services an established institutional relationship beyond bilateral port visits. No donor hull, quantity, refurbishment package, missile configuration, training schedule, or transfer date had been identified as of September 9. The potential and logical next step would be the selection and inspection of individual ships, as chronological age alone cannot establish a vessel's remaining life.

Hull steel condition, corrosion, shaft and reduction-gear condition, turbine cycles, generator hours, electrical cabling, seawater piping, sonar availability, radar reliability, and ammunition compatibility determine whether a nominally inexpensive second-hand destroyer remains economical. The class eventually offered will also reveal Tokyo's intent: an early Murasame would fit conventional retirement management, while transferring a Takanami or especially an Akizuki destroyer would mean releasing substantially younger active combatants. Japan's other 2026 naval transfers illustrate that distinction. The Philippines is moving toward five of six Abukuma-class destroyer escorts for delivery in 2028-2029, when the ships, commissioned between 1989 and 1993, will be roughly 35-40 years old.

Five ships require about 600 shipboard personnel and provide 109 m, roughly 2,900-tonne combatants without helicopter decks. Indonesia, for its part, is examining Asagiri-class destroyers commissioned between 1988 and 1991, already 35-38 years old in 2026; each displaces roughly 4,900 tonnes, measures 137 m, carries about 220 personnel and combines 54,000-shp COGAG propulsion with Harpoon, Sea Sparrow, ASROC, torpedoes, hull and towed sonars and a helicopter. Their transfer discussions include crew training, gas-turbine maintenance, restoration and sustainment, illustrating the potential support burden attached to ships of this age.

Japan's April 2026 export-policy revision removed the previous restriction on rescue, transport, warning, surveillance and minesweeping equipment, enabling armed transfers under the revised framework. Chile would therefore occupy a different position if Takanami or Akizuki were selected: instead of receiving 35- to 40-year-old escorts nearing retirement, it could receive destroyers with 32-cell Mk 41 batteries and considerably greater remaining life, making the transaction a transfer of usable JMSDF combat capacity rather than primarily the disposal of aging hulls.

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Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, South Korea, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.