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Philippines secures five Abukuma-class destroyers from Japan in historic defense deal.


The Philippines confirmed a formal defense agreement with Japan on July 7, 2026, to acquire five retired Abukuma-class destroyer escorts under Tokyo's Official Security Assistance framework. The transfer is structured as a cost-free equipment allocation to rapidly scale Manila's surface combat fleet amid escalating maritime territorial frictions in the Indo-Pacific. Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. stated that delivery is expected within two to three years, requiring the Philippine Navy to upgrade domestic port infrastructure and absorb all future logistical, sustainment, and operational integration expenses.

The five 2,000-tonne general-purpose warships will provide the Philippine Navy with immediate hull numbers armed with 76 mm guns, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, and anti-submarine rocket systems. However, the service must sustainably manage structures that will be 35 to 40 years old upon entry into active service without organic helicopter decks or modern sensor fusion capabilities.

Related topic: Japan starts talks with Indonesia to transfer Asagiri-class destroyers to Indonesian Navy

The six Abukuma-class destroyer escorts were intended for local escort groups and coastal sea-lane defense during the late Cold War, when the central threat was Soviet submarine activity in waters surrounding Japan. (Picture source: Japanese MoD)

The six Abukuma-class destroyer escorts were intended for local escort groups and coastal sea-lane defense during the late Cold War, when the central threat was Soviet submarine activity in waters surrounding Japan. (Picture source: Japanese MoD)


On July 7, 2026, the Philippines confirmed that it will receive five Abukuma-class destroyer escorts from Japan under the Official Security Assistance (OSA) framework, when Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. said that the acquisition had been agreed and that only administrative arrangements remained. The transfer is expected within two to three years, placing the likely delivery window in 2028 and 2029 after decommissioning, inspection, refurbishment, legal clearance, crew conversion and infrastructure preparation. The ships will come from the six-vessel class of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force formed by JS Abukuma (DE-229), JS Jintsu (DE-230), JS Ōyodo (DE-231), JS Sendai (DE-232), JS Chikuma (DE-233) and JS Tone (DE-234), commissioned between December 12, 1989, and February 8, 1993.

Japan's 2022 Defense Buildup Program requires the class to leave service by FY2027 as Mogami-class frigates replace older escort ships. For Manila, the Philippine Navy would receive five new missile-armed surface combatants with anti-submarine weapons, but it would also require the service to sustain hulls that will be 35 to 40 years old when they enter service. Discussions between the Philippines and Japan began in 2025 and moved quickly from an initial interest in inspecting at least five ships to an agreement in principle on transferring five of the six hulls. The process included talks between Japanese and Philippine defense officials, preparations for joint visual inspections, and the creation of a working mechanism to accelerate the transfer after Japanese retirement.

On May 31, 2026, Japanese Defense Minister Shinjirō Koizumi and Teodoro agreed to advance the handover after decommissioning, followed by Teodoro's confirmation on July 7, 2026. The final hull selection will depend on steel condition, corrosion, machinery hours, electrical reliability, sonar performance, weapons status, and the availability of spare parts. Delivery dates will also depend on whether Japan transfers the ships with their Harpoon launchers, ASROC system, torpedo tubes, electronic warfare equipment and associated ammunition support. Japan created the Official Security Assistance (OSA) in April 2023 to provide defense equipment and assistance to partner states, but the transfer of armed combatants still requires compliance with Japanese export rules, end-use controls and restrictions on third-party transfer. 

The Abukuma-class was designed for coastal sea-lane protection, local escort and anti-submarine operations around Japan during the late Cold War. The original requirement covered 11 ships, but only six were built after the Japanese Navy chose to continue producing larger destroyers and to move older Hatsuyuki-class ships into lower-priority formations. The class has a standard displacement of 2,000 tonnes and a full-load displacement of 2,900 tonnes, with a length of 109 m, a beam of 13.4 m, a draft of 3.8 m and a crew of 120. Five ships would therefore require about 600 Filipino shipboard personnel before adding instructors, maintenance teams, shore technicians and relief crews. The hull uses a long-forecastle form with outer sides inclined by about 7 degrees, a feature that reduced radar reflection even though it was primarily adopted to improve internal volume and hydrodynamic performance.

Propulsion is based on a CODOG arrangement with two Kawasaki-Rolls-Royce Spey SM1A gas turbines, two Mitsubishi S12U-MTK diesels and two shafts with controllable-pitch propellers. The gas-turbine plant produces 27,000 hp, the diesels 9,300 hp, maximum speed is 27 knots, and endurance is 5,624 nautical miles at 18 knots. The combat system architecture is compact yet increasingly dated compared with current frigates. Air surveillance is provided by the OPS-14C radar, while the OPS-28C covers surface search and low-altitude tracking. Later ships received the OPS-20 navigation radar, and earlier units were fitted with OPS-26 navigation sets. The OQS-8 bow sonar, derived from the U.S. DE-1167 medium-frequency design, is the only organic submarine-detection sensor because the class never received the planned towed array.



This means detection performance is concentrated ahead of the ship and is affected by own-ship noise, speed, water temperature, salinity layers and bottom conditions. The FCS-2 controls the 76 mm gun, while the SFCS-8 supports underwater weapons. Electronic protection includes the NOLR-8 radar-warning receiver, OLT-3 jammer and two Mk.137 SRBOC launchers for chaff and other expendable decoys. The ships also carry the OAX-1B infrared night vision system, originally intended to support surveillance of straits, coastal traffic and ships moving through designated monitoring areas. The class lacks the sensor fusion, digital combat-management capacity and multi-link integration now standard on newer frigates such as the Mogami-class, which will complicate connection with Philippine Navy networks unless modernization is funded.

Still, each ship carries eight RGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missiles in two quadruple launchers, one Type 74 eight-cell ASROC launcher, two HOS-301 triple 324 mm torpedo launchers, one 76 mm OTO Melara gun and one Phalanx Block 1 20 mm close-in weapon system. The Harpoon battery gives each hull eight over-the-horizon anti-ship weapons, equal in missile count to many larger frigates, although missile age, variant, storage history and transfer approval will determine actual combat value. The ASROC launcher carries eight ready rounds, and no reload magazine, so the ship has only one full salvo available before returning to port or receiving shore-side replenishment. The two triple torpedo launchers provide six ready lightweight torpedoes for close-range anti-submarine engagements. The Abukuma-class has no medium-range or long-range surface-to-air missile system.

A RAM point-defense launcher was considered and space was reserved between the gun and the bridge, but the installation never occurred. The ship therefore relies on one Phalanx mount, the 76 mm gun, jamming and decoys for air and missile defense, which is now inadequate against swarm attacks involving multiple sea-skimming missiles, aircraft or loitering munitions, as it also provides no air defense coverage for nearby vessels. The absence of a helicopter deck and hangar, like on the Asagiri-class, imposes another measurable limit on anti-submarine operations. The stern can support VERTREP and helicopter in-flight refueling, but it cannot embark, refuel, rearm and maintain an organic helicopter. Without a helicopter, the ship cannot place dipping sonar, sonobuoys, or torpedoes tens of nautical miles from the hull and must depend on the OQS-8, ASROC, and ship-launched torpedoes.

This narrows the search area and increases the time required to classify and prosecute a contact. A helicopter-equipped frigate/destroyer escort can separate the sensor and weapon from the ship, search beyond the ship's acoustic horizon and attack while the surface combatant remains outside the immediate submarine threat envelope. An Abukuma must instead rely on shore-based AW159 helicopters, maritime patrol aircraft, another ship's aviation detachment or external cueing from coastal sensors and allied units. Its most realistic anti-submarine role is therefore barrier patrol, convoy screening, harbor-approach defense and local protection of high-value ships rather than independent wide-area submarine hunting. The principal acquisition risk is not nominal firepower but material condition and sustainment.



The JS Abukuma entered service on December 12, 1989, the JS Jintsu on February 28, 1990, the JS Ōyodo on January 23, 1991, the JS Sendai on March 15, 1991, the JS Chikuma on February 24, 1993, and the JS Tone on February 8, 1993. By 2028, the oldest hull will be 38 years old and the youngest 35; by 2029, the range will be 36 to 39 years. Philippine inspectors must therefore assess each plate thinning, frame cracking, tank corrosion, piping, valves, watertight doors, electrical cabling, reduction gears, shaft lines, controllable-pitch propellers, gas-turbine hot sections, diesel wear, generator capacity and cooling systems. Weapons and sensors also require life-cycle review, particularly the OQS-8, FCS-2, NOLR-8, OLT-3 and older navigation radars.

A five-ship fleet would also require a stock of Spey turbine components, Mitsubishi diesel parts, translated manuals, specialized test equipment, ammunition-handling procedures and trained shore personnel. Berths must support 109 m hulls, while dockyards must accommodate a 13.4 m beam and provide shore power, cranes, workshops, missile storage, torpedo support and dry-docking. If modernization is limited, availability could be constrained by cannibalization, long repair cycles and low spare-parts stocks. The transfer also reflects a widening gap between the Abukuma class and Japan's current fleet requirements.

The Mogami-class frigates replacing it displace more than twice as much, use smaller crews, carry modern radars, support embarked helicopters, incorporate vertical launchers and combine anti-air, anti-surface, anti-submarine and mine warfare functions in one hull. Japan gains by retiring six ships with aging machinery and electronics, reducing training and logistics burdens and reallocating crews to newer vessels. Manila gains five hulls faster than it could build an equivalent number of new frigates, but receives ships with limited air defense, no organic aviation and aging combat systems.

Their operational value will therefore depend on mission assignment. They are suited to exclusive economic zone patrols, maritime interdiction, convoy escort, sea-lane security, anti-submarine screening near ports and high-value units, surface surveillance and presence missions in lower-threat waters. They are not suited to independent operations inside dense air and missile threat zones. In Philippine service, the class should be treated as a numerical and specialized capability increase that can release newer frigates for higher-risk missions, not as a substitute for modern multi-mission combatants.


Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.


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