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British Naval Helicopters Cleared to Operate from Norwegian Warships and Arctic Bases Under New Agreement.
Norway and the United Kingdom formalised a helicopter cooperation agreement allowing British military helicopters to operate routinely from Norwegian naval and coast guard vessels, as well as from Norwegian bases. The deal strengthens NATO’s High North posture while offsetting Norway’s current shortfall in organic shipborne helicopter capacity.
On 25 February 2026, Norway and the United Kingdom formalised a new helicopter cooperation agreement that allows British military helicopters to operate routinely from Norwegian naval and coast guard vessels, as well as from Norwegian bases. The accord is presented by the Norwegian Armed Forces (Forsvaret) as a follow-on to the “Lunna House” defence agreement signed in December, deepening integration between the two countries’ maritime forces and addressing Norway’s current lack of organic shipborne helicopters. According to Forsvaret, the deal signed by Rear Admiral Oliver Berdal and the First Sea Lord, General Sir Gwyn Jenkins, is intended to hard-wire British rotary-wing capabilities into Norwegian-led operations in the High North and North Atlantic. This official Norwegian source frames the agreement as both a practical measure to cover a capability gap and a significant contribution to NATO’s collective defence posture in the region.
Norway and the United Kingdom have signed a new defence accord allowing British naval helicopters to operate routinely from Norwegian warships and Arctic bases, strengthening NATO’s maritime posture in the High North (Picture Source: British Navy / Forsvaret)
At the core of the new arrangement lies a simple yet far-reaching provision: British naval helicopters can now embark on Norwegian navy and coast guard ships and be stationed at Norwegian bases as an integrated part of national and allied operations. Framed within the broader Lunna House framework, which already envisions a combined fleet of British-built Type 26 frigates, deeper integration between Norwegian and British forces, and collaboration on autonomous systems, the helicopter accord transforms political ambition into immediate operational capability. In practical terms, it allows Norwegian commanders to request British rotary-wing detachments as if they were an organic element of their own vessels, while granting the Royal Navy assured access to Norwegian infrastructure in the High North. This arrangement fills a critical capability gap for Norway, which currently lacks an embarked helicopter force following the withdrawal of its NH90 fleet and ahead of the full delivery of replacement MH-60R Seahawks.
This new step rests on several years of intensive cooperation at sea. During Operation Highmast in 2025, the Norwegian frigate KNM Roald Amundsen deployed for eight months with UK Carrier Strike Group 25, centred on HMS Prince of Wales. A Royal Navy Wildcat from 815 Naval Air Squadron operated daily from the Norwegian ship’s flight deck, and British aircrew were fully integrated into the frigate’s crew. Before that deployment, the Tamber Shield exercise off the Norwegian coast had already brought together British helicopter detachments and Norwegian ships to rehearse precisely the kind of cross-deck operations that are now being institutionalised.
Forsvaret highlights this as the start of a “unique Norwegian-British cooperation”, in which common procedures for deck operations, targeting, anti-submarine warfare and logistics were developed under demanding North Atlantic conditions. Today that cooperation is visible at Haakonsvern, where a British Wildcat detachment is already stationed and will participate in the major Cold Response 26 exercise; several of the same British personnel have just received the Norwegian Medal for International Service for their role in Highmast, symbolising the depth of trust that underpins the new agreement.
The new helicopter agreement essentially turns that temporary operational experiment into a standing arrangement. Forsvaret confirms that a British Wildcat is already stationed at Haakonsvern naval base near Bergen and will take part in the large-scale Cold Response 26 exercise in March, alongside Norwegian and other allied forces training for Arctic contingencies. Several of the British personnel currently at Haakonsvern served aboard KNM Roald Amundsen during Operation Highmast, and have just been awarded the Norwegian Medal for International Service, symbolising the degree of integration achieved. From now on, similar detachments will not be one-off arrangements but part of a regular pattern in which British helicopters can be assigned to Norwegian vessels or bases for operations, exercises and readiness tasks.
On the British side, the platforms most directly concerned are the Royal Navy’s dedicated maritime helicopters. The Wildcat HMA2, already proven from Norwegian frigate decks, combines a compact footprint and folding blades with a modern Seaspray radar, electro-optical sensors and a secure communications suite. It can be armed with Martlet and Sea Venom missiles to counter fast attack craft and larger surface targets, as well as Sting Ray torpedoes and a door gun, turning any Norwegian frigate or large coast guard vessel that embarks it into a far more capable anti-surface and limited anti-submarine warfare asset. The larger Merlin HM2 brings long-range anti-submarine warfare, wide-area maritime surveillance and, in some configurations, airborne early warning capabilities through the Crowsnest system. While Merlins are more likely to operate from British ships and Norwegian shore bases than from Norwegian frigates, the new framework gives planners the option of integrating Merlin flights into Norwegian-led task groups, widening the combined ASW screen across the Norwegian Sea and Barents Sea
The question naturally arises whether this framework could also cover British Apache attack helicopters, given their reputation in land warfare and their potential role in littoral defence. Short answer: almost certainly not from Norwegian ships, but possibly from Norwegian bases. Apache is an army attack helicopter, not a maritime one. The UK–Norway deal is clearly centred on naval helicopters like Wildcat and Merlin, which are designed and certified to operate from frigate and coast-guard decks, with folding blades, deck-lock systems, corrosion protection and shipboard avionics. Apache lacks this navalisation and, crucially, it is not cleared for operations from small combatant flight decks such as Norwegian frigates or coast-guard vessels.
Where Apache could realistically fit into this picture is from land bases in Norway. The agreement allows British helicopters to be stationed at Norwegian bases and, in principle, that could include Apaches if London and Oslo decided it was useful. From Norwegian territory, Apache units could support littoral defence, strikes against coastal targets, amphibious operations or the protection of critical infrastructure, especially in the north. However, that would remain a land-based army aviation role, coordinated with the naval picture rather than providing the organic, ship-embarked capability that Wildcat and Merlin deliver.
For Norway, the tactical importance of the agreement is immediate. Following the termination of the NH90 programme and the decision to return those helicopters to the manufacturer, the Royal Norwegian Navy and coast guard have been operating their major vessels without organic aviation, pending the phased delivery of MH-60R Seahawks over the coming years. That gap has a direct impact on anti-submarine warfare, over-the-horizon targeting, search and rescue and maritime interdiction. By authorising British helicopters to embark on Norwegian hulls and base out of Norwegian facilities, Oslo regains many of the functions of a shipborne helicopter capability without waiting for its national fleet to be fully regenerated. Norwegian ships can once again deploy with an embarked helicopter detachment able to extend the sensor horizon, deploy boarding teams and prosecute contacts at sea, while Norwegian crews preserve the skills associated with operating alongside aviation rather than allowing them to atrophy during the transition period.
The helicopter pact must be read alongside the wider reinforcement of the northern flank by both countries. London has announced that it will double the number of British troops rotating through Norway and take a larger role in NATO’s Arctic missions, framing Arctic and High North security as a priority in light of rising Russian threats. At the same time, the First Sea Lord has warned at a recent warfighting conference that Russia’s Northern Fleet and associated “shadow fleet” activities against seabed infrastructure demand a higher state of readiness, and he plans to convene Northern European navy chiefs in London to coordinate responses. USNI reporting underlines that such consultations will focus on the Arctic and North Atlantic, the very theatre where Norwegian ships and British helicopters will now routinely operate together. In this environment, allowing British naval helicopters to fly from Norwegian ships and bases effectively turns Norwegian hulls into forward platforms for the UK’s broader regional strategy, while anchoring British presence more firmly in the High North.
This deepened helicopter cooperation goes beyond technical arrangements about deck procedures and hangar space. It translates the political ambition of the Lunna House agreement into a visible, operationally relevant embodiment of allied solidarity in one of NATO’s most contested regions. British helicopters on Norwegian decks close a critical capability gap for Oslo, give the Royal Navy additional options for operating close to the Russian Northern Fleet and knit together national force plans into a more coherent NATO maritime posture in the High North and North Atlantic. As large-scale exercises such as Cold Response 26 unfold and as new Norwegian Seahawks and allied unmanned systems enter service, the UK–Norway helicopter framework is likely to become a model for how European navies can share high-value capabilities, cross-deck key platforms and present a more seamless front to any potential adversary.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.