Russia Claims Successful Launch of Poseidon Nuclear Submarine Drone Said to Create “Tsunamis”.

President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia has “successfully tested” its Poseidon nuclear-powered underwater drone, reportedly launching from a submarine and activating its onboard reactor. Analysts say the move signals strategic messaging to the West while highlighting new challenges for U.S. naval defenses and arms control.

On October 29, 2025, Russian News Agency TASS published a video in which Russian President Vladimir Putin said Russia had “successfully tested” the Poseidon nuclear-powered unmanned underwater vehicle, describing a launch from a carrier submarine followed by activation of its onboard reactor. He added that Poseidon’s “power” exceeds that of the Sarmat intercontinental missile and claimed there are “no means of interception.” Moscow released no telemetry, imagery, or location details, and the announcement has not been independently verified. Russian state media amplified the remarks during Putin’s visit to a Moscow military hospital.
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Poseidon is a nuclear-powered UUV with a multi-megaton warhead, deep-diving and long-range, built to bypass defenses and strike coasts (Picture source: Daily Mail Illustration).

Here is the translation of Russian President Vladimir Putin's statement: "You should know that yesterday we conducted another test of yet another promising system - the Poseidon unmanned underwater vehicle with a nuclear power unit. For the first time, we managed not only to launch it with a launch engine from a carrier submarine, but also to launch the nuclear power unit on which this vehicle passed a certain amount of time. This is a huge success. Poseidon's power significantly exceeds that of even our most promising Sarmat intercontinental range missile. There is nothing like that Sarmat in the world. We do not have it on duty yet, but it will be soon. But Poseidon far exceeds Sarmat in power. Moreover, in terms of speed and the depths at which this unmanned vehicle can operate, there is nothing comparable in the world; it is unlikely anything similar will appear in the near future, and there are no means of interception."

The wording and timing are strategic. Putin’s description matches an integration test, not a warhead detonation: cold launch from a submarine, safe separation, transition to autonomous cruise, and a sustained reactor run “for a certain amount of time.” That is a meaningful milestone for a bus-sized nuclear UUV first teased in a 2015 “leak” and unveiled in 2018, yet it is also classic signaling bundled with broader nuclear messaging around other “novel” systems such as Burevestnik. The lack of instrumentation data is a red flag for analysts accustomed to post-test evidence.

What Poseidon is, and what it is not, matters to operators. In open sources, Poseidon, also known as 2M39 and NATO codename Kanyon, is assessed as an extra-large autonomous undersea vehicle intended to carry a multi-megaton nuclear warhead across oceanic distances. Many technical claims are unconfirmed, but recurring estimates describe a liquid-metal-cooled reactor driving a pump-jet, operating depths near 1,000 meters, and burst speeds far beyond conventional torpedoes. The concept is blunt: a long-endurance, deep-diving nuclear delivery system designed to bypass ballistic-missile defenses and threaten coastal infrastructure or carrier groups from below.

Launch platforms define the real force. The first known carrier, K-329 Belgorod (Project 09852), was delivered in 2022 and is widely believed to embark up to six Poseidon rounds. A follow-on dedicated class, Project 09851 Khabarovsk, is frequently cited as nearing fleet introduction at Sevmash. Open naval reporting and imagery since 2021 align on Belgorod’s special-mission role and its pairing with Poseidon.

Parsing Putin’s claim against requirements suggests what the test did not show. Guidance accuracy at interoceanic range, quieting in stealth mode, robust command and control in the deep ocean, safe carriage of a high-yield warhead, and terminal-phase navigation in shallow coastal waters all remain unproven in the public record. Until Moscow or independent sensors reveal more, the announcement marks progress in propulsion integration rather than an operational debut.

If performance is even close to design intent, Poseidon adds a survivable, slow-burn second-strike pathway outside the traditional triad. In a crisis, a deep-diving, nuclear-powered UUV could be pre-positioned to loiter at depth, then sprint in terminal approach. Using notional figures often cited in open reporting, a 3,300-nautical-mile run from the Norwegian Sea to the U.S. East Coast would take roughly 66 hours at 50 knots or about 110 hours at 30 knots, with most of the transit at slower speeds for stealth and a late sprint to the target. That timeline is not instantaneous, but it is fast enough to complicate crisis management over several days and to pressure coastal defenses.

Western navies have invested for decades in fixed seabed arrays, mobile towed systems, and maritime patrol aviation, and are now fielding their own large UUVs. Detecting and engaging a deep, reactor-powered vehicle in blue water is exceptionally hard, yet not impossible; chokepoints, littoral shallows, and harbor approaches compress the problem and enable mine-like barriers and nets. Serious U.S. Navy commentary on autonomous nuclear torpedoes underscores these uncertainties and the likelihood of a drawn-out undersea cat-and-mouse rather than immunity.

Warhead yield and the “radioactive tsunami” narrative require context. Russian outlets and tabloids toggle between two-megaton and apocalyptic 100-megaton storylines. Credible open assessments lean toward low multi-megaton yields, and history shows underwater nuclear bursts produce devastating base-surge contamination and crippling shock effects in confined waters, as the Baker shot at Bikini Atoll demonstrated on a 23-kiloton scale. They do not generate trans-oceanic, skyscraper-height tsunamis; bathymetry and energy dispersion limit wave formation far from the detonation. A large near-shore burst would still devastate a port, irradiate sediments and coastlines, and shut down naval infrastructure and commerce for years.

Arms control and legality are the missing pieces in most briefings. New START counts deployed strategic launchers and warheads in ICBM, SLBM, and heavy-bomber categories, while a nuclear UUV launched from a special-mission submarine sits outside those definitions and verification mechanics. That gray zone complicates any follow-on treaty, raises hard verification questions for a reactor-powered delivery system that can loiter for days or weeks, and invites legal debate over deliberate, lasting contamination of coastal zones under the law of armed conflict. Western planners are likely to read Poseidon less as a numbers problem than as a verification and signaling problem, which is precisely where Moscow has sought leverage since 2018.

Even if yesterday’s run was exactly as advertised, scaling from a one-off demonstration to repeatable patrols is nontrivial. Each round would need a compact naval reactor, hardened guidance and a pressure hull, and a very high-yield warhead, all under sanctions while Russia channels resources into its land war. Carrier availability is a limiter: Belgorod is in service and Khabarovsk is expected to follow, but a boutique inventory of two or three boats with a handful of rounds each constrains patrol tempo, crew training, and maintenance cycles. In practical terms, this looks like a niche deterrent and a potent psychological instrument rather than a massed coastal-strike magazine.

If such a weapon were used, the consequences would be immediate and strategic. A nuclear detonation in or near a major port would inflict mass casualties from shock and collapse, devastate critical infrastructure and warships, expose first responders to acute radiation, and create a durable maritime exclusion zone that throttles trade. In strategic terms, a nuclear strike on or near NATO or U.S. territory would almost certainly be treated as strategic nuclear use, inviting retaliation under existing doctrine. That escalatory ladder is precisely why many analysts judge Poseidon’s primary value to be psychological and political rather than a change in the nuclear balance Russia already holds with ICBMs and SLBMs.

What this brings to Russian capability is diversification, not dominance. If fielded at scale, Poseidon broadens Russia’s second-strike portfolio outside missile-defense debates and pressures NATO to invest in seabed sensors, large-diameter interceptors, and layered barriers around key harbors. It strengthens Moscow’s coercive toolkit by making threats against specific ports and carrier operations seem less abstract if an unseen system might plausibly approach from below. Yet the opacity that gives Poseidon a deterrent theater also limits its military utility: effectiveness depends on performance that remains unproven, the carriers are few, and any operational use would collapse the political value Moscow seeks from calibrated nuclear signaling. A final note on sourcing and the statement itself: Vladimir Putin’s quotes, including that Poseidon “far exceeds Sarmat in power” and is impossible to intercept, are drawn from his on-camera remarks carried by international and Russian outlets. Until there is corroborating evidence, professionals should treat these claims as information operations layered over a plausible propulsion test.

Written by Evan Lerouvillois, Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group.

Evan studied International Relations, and quickly specialized in defense and security. He is particularly interested in the influence of the defense sector on global geopolitics, and analyzes how technological innovations in defense, arms export contracts, and military strategies influence the international geopolitical scene.