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Taiwan to Build Integrated Defense Network With U.S. Tactical Mission Network $1.0b Sale.


The U.S. State Department has approved a possible $1.01 billion Foreign Military Sale to Taiwan for a Tactical Mission Network, according to a December 17, 2025 notification from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. The package focuses on resilient command, control, and data sharing designed to keep Taiwanese forces connected during cyber and electronic warfare attacks from China.

The U.S. State Department has approved a possible $1.01 billion Foreign Military Sale to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States for Tactical Mission Network software, equipment, and services, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency announced on December 17, 2025. Rather than a single application or radio system, the notification describes an end to end mission networking architecture that integrates unmanned aerial systems, government and commercial off the shelf software, communications hardware, hosted and managed telecommunications services, cybersecurity engineering, cloud infrastructure, data fusion tools, and full system integration to bring the network into operational use.
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Taiwan’s Tactical Mission Network links sensors, unmanned systems, artillery, and missile units into a resilient, secure digital battlefield, enabling rapid sensor to shooter coordination, decentralized command, and sustained operations under cyber and electronic warfare pressure (Picture source: Taiwan MoD).

A Taiwanese HIMARS launcher operates as part of a dispersed fire unit, with the new Tactical Mission Network designed to link launchers to sensors, unmanned systems, and command elements, enabling rapid sensor to shooter targeting and coordinated strikes under contested cyber and electronic warfare conditions (Picture source: Taiwan MoD).


For Taiwan, the operational logic is hardening command and control under pressure. Taipei’s own 2025 Quadrennial Defense Review describes sustained PRC gray zone pressure including aerial and maritime incursions, cyberattacks, and cognitive warfare, and warns that in wartime mass cyberattacks could target critical infrastructure, command and control centers, and ISR systems to disrupt responses. A Tactical Mission Network designed with security services, cloud backups, and managed communications is therefore less about convenience and more about keeping units connected long enough to execute denial operations when fixed nodes are being jammed, hacked, or physically struck.

Technically, the DSCA list points to a modern, transport agnostic tactical network stack: resilient communications nodes, network management and security tooling, and cloud based services that can ingest feeds, fuse them, and redistribute a usable common picture. The U.S. Army’s own Unified Network messaging describes the goal in similar terms, enabling secure and rapid transfer of data across the battlefield in contested electromagnetic spectrum and cyber environments, while supporting Joint All Domain Command and Control and the mission partner environment with allies. Taiwan’s TMN request mirrors that philosophy through its emphasis on interoperability, hosted services, and cybersecurity engineering rather than simply procuring radios.

At the tactical edge, readers should think in terms of how data moves, not just which platform collects it. U.S. Army mission network transport concepts blend high capacity line of sight links with satellite communications for multipath resiliency, delivering voice, video, and data and reducing setup time to keep command posts mobile. Taiwan’s package, paired with UAS and fusion services, is likely to support faster sensor to shooter handoffs, route around damaged links, and push targeting updates to dispersed formations without forcing commanders to concentrate in a single vulnerable headquarters. The DSCA notice does not identify the exact software baseline, but the ingredients align with software defined network management, secure data services, and analytics that turn raw feeds into actionable tracks.

This network purchase also lands inside a larger strategic tranche. A U.S. total of about $11.1 billion in proposed Taiwan Foreign Military Sales was notified to Congress the same day, prompting Beijing to threaten forceful measures. The U.S. Taiwan Business Council’s readout lists eight notifications including 82 HIMARS, 60 M109A7 self propelled howitzers, ALTIUS loitering munition systems, Javelin and TOW missiles, Harpoon repair follow on support, AH 1W parts, and the Tactical Mission Network. In that bundle, the TMN is the connective tissue that helps HIMARS batteries, artillery, and loitering munitions teams share coordinates, deconflict airspace, and sustain a faster kill chain when the PRC is trying to blind sensors and fracture communications.

Taipei is financing this shift with real money and explicit doctrinal language. Taiwan plans a sharp defense budget increase for 2026 to T$949.5 billion, crossing 3% of GDP, alongside debate over additional special funding lines. The 2025 Quadrennial Defense Review states the ROC Armed Forces is adopting mission command, decentralized operations, and multiple redundancies, and calls for distributed multi cloud architecture, redundant backup systems, and zero trust architecture to improve digital resilience, while also expanding electronic surveillance and jamming capabilities and tightening spectrum management. That doctrinal trajectory matches the TMN deal’s blend of cloud engineering, security services, and integration work, and it supports Taiwan’s stated intent to deepen interoperability and military exchanges with the United States, including intelligence sharing and joint tabletop exercises.

Industrial and programmatics also matter. DSCA notes principal contractors will be selected through competitive procurements under the Federal Acquisition Regulation and that the U.S. government is not aware of any offset agreement at this time, signaling a competition focused on capability delivery and integration performance rather than a pre selected prime. The presence of similar Tactical Mission Networking line items in U.S. Special Operations Command budget justification reinforces that the U.S. services treat mission networking as a discrete, fundable battlefield capability tied to UAS and payload integration, not an abstract IT upgrade.

The deeper takeaway is that Taiwan is buying survivability for decision making. Weapons like HIMARS and M109A7 add range and volume, and emerging integrated sensor to shooter concepts aim to shorten engagement timelines, but none of those investments reach full deterrent value if units cannot coordinate under cyber and electromagnetic attack. A Tactical Mission Network that is integrated, secured, and supported as a service changes the fight from isolated pockets of resistance into a distributed defense designed to keep firing solutions flowing even as the battlespace becomes increasingly transparent and contested.


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