China challenges US Pacific control with first dual aircraft carrier operation.

As reported by Newsweek on June 10, 2025, for the first time, two Chinese aircraft carriers, CNS Liaoning and CNS Shandong, operated simultaneously beyond the Second Island Chain in the Western Pacific. The Japanese Ministry of Defense reported that the Liaoning was detected near Minamitorishima and the Shandong near Okinotorishima. The Liaoning transited through the Miyako Strait from the East China Sea, while the Shandong and its escorts likely entered the Philippine Sea via the Luzon Strait. Both carrier groups were confirmed to be operating within Japan’s exclusive economic zone but outside its territorial waters.
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China’s naval presence outside the First Island Chain has been supported by the Type 903A and Type 901 logistics vessels, which enabled the long-range deployment of its aircraft carriers. (Picture source: Chinese MoD)

Japan deployed surface ships and scrambled fighter aircraft to monitor their activities. Between May 25 and 29, the Liaoning conducted 260 fighter and helicopter takeoffs and landings near Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines. Satellite imagery showed underway replenishment operations in the Philippine Sea involving the Liaoning and its logistics vessel Hulunhu. The Shandong also carried out flight operations within Japan’s EEZ around Okinotorishima. These movements are the furthest east the PLAN has operated two carriers at once, and they occurred while both the USS Nimitz and USS George Washington were also deployed in the Western Pacific.

The Liaoning operated with two Type 055 destroyers, two Type 052D destroyers, one Type 054A frigate, a Type 901 fast combat support ship, and a Type 903A replenishment ship. The Shandong's group included a Type 055 destroyer, a Type 052D destroyer, two Type 054A frigates, and a Type 901 support ship. Japan reported that Liaoning's group was observed 600 miles northeast of Guam, conducting flight operations and maneuvering drills. Liaoning had previously been spotted near the East China Sea, operating in coordination with three other ships. The Shandong task group was tracked moving northeast, reaching waters north of Okinotorishima. During this time, the Shandong conducted helicopter and fixed-wing operations in the area. China stated that all operations were consistent with international law, and Japan’s Ministry of Defense stated that China appeared to be improving its capability for distant sea operations. Both Chinese and Japanese authorities confirmed the activity occurred in Japan's EEZ, where freedom of navigation is allowed under international law.

According to the U.S. Department of Defense's 2024 report, China’s navy has expanded its training and deployments beyond the First Island Chain. The Shandong operated in the Philippine Sea on three separate occasions in 2023, and in April 2025 led the Strait Thunder 2025A exercise east of Taiwan. The drill included joint operations with other branches of the PLA, including the Rocket Force and Air Force. The Shandong task group maneuvered as close as 24 nautical miles from Taiwan’s coast, and the exercises involved blockading maneuvers, coordinated flights with aircraft such as the J-15, J-16, Su-30MKK, H-6K bombers, and support platforms like KJ-500 and Y-20U. Surface elements included the Type 055 destroyer Xianyang, Type 052D destroyers Zhanjiang and Huainan, four Type 054A frigates, and a Type 901 supply ship. The PLA Eastern Theater Command stated that the goal was to test multi-domain coordination and integrated operations beyond the First Island Chain. During the exercise, the 613th Rocket Brigade launched Dongfeng-15B missiles, and the 72nd Artillery Brigade used PCL-191 multiple rocket launchers to simulate strikes on key infrastructure. A total of 16 rocket salvos were recorded over two days, and targets included simulated LNG terminals and air traffic control centers.

China’s third aircraft carrier, CNS Fujian, conducted its first electromagnetic catapult launch of the J-35 stealth fighter in March 2025, according to sources cited by Aviatsanta. If confirmed, this would mark a new capability for Chinese naval aviation. The Fujian is equipped with three electromagnetic catapults and is powered by an integrated electric propulsion system. The ship displaces between 80,000 and 85,000 tons. It is designed to accommodate heavier aircraft, including the J-35, KJ-600 AEW aircraft, and GJ-11 unmanned combat aerial vehicles. Reports indicate that the J-35’s integration aboard Fujian could eventually lead to China fielding up to 100 carrier-based stealth fighters by 2030, combining Fujian’s capacity for 48 aircraft with possible adaptations for Liaoning and Shandong to host reduced numbers. The J-35, a twin-engine stealth multirole fighter, is equipped with internal weapons bays, radar-absorbent coatings, and AESA radar. It has been undergoing land-based testing since at least 2021, and modified variants have been seen on static displays aboard Liaoning. Chinese sources suggest that Liaoning and Shandong may be adapted to host a limited number of J-35s in addition to J-15s and J-15D variants, though these ships rely on ski-jump ramps for launch rather than catapults.

In response to China's expanding operations, the United States has increased defensive preparations in Guam. The MK-41 Vertical Launch System and THAAD are already deployed, and Lockheed Martin has been contracted to deliver the Aegis Guam System as part of the Enhanced Integrated Air and Missile Defense (EIAMD) project. The system will include TPY-6 radar, Standard Missiles, and launchers to provide 360-degree coverage. Construction of 16 missile defense sites is expected to begin in 2026, with full operational status targeted for 2035. The installation will support 1,000 personnel and 1,300 dependents during peacetime. Senator Jack Reed and Navy Under Secretary Tom Mancinelli visited the island in late 2024, highlighting Guam’s strategic role as the anchor of the Second Island Chain. Additionally, the U.S. Marine Corps deployed NMESIS anti-ship missile systems to the Batanes Islands during Exercise KAMANDAG 9 in May 2025. The deployment included remote-controlled Maritime Key Terrain Security Operations simulating interdiction missions without live-fire. This exercise was intended to disrupt hypothetical enemy forces in the Luzon Strait. A similar operation was conducted in April as a Chinese carrier transited the strait. The kill-web concept used during the exercise integrated ISR assets to track and target opposing forces in multiple domains.

Beyond regional exercises, China has increased global naval engagement. The Pentagon’s 2024 military power report included a map showing port visits by Chinese naval vessels to every South China Sea country, as well as to Pakistan, Iran, Nigeria, and six South Pacific nations including Tonga, Fiji, and Papua New Guinea. Chinese vessels also conducted exercises with Russia in Vladivostok and with Iran and Russia in the Gulf of Oman. Chinese port visits to West Africa have raised concerns in the U.S. over potential basing on the Atlantic coast. The Chinese navy has also visited the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, areas of increasing strategic competition with the United States. While the PLAN has not yet visited ports in the Western Hemisphere, U.S. analysts continue to monitor for signs of expansion. China’s naval presence outside the First Island Chain has been supported by the Type 903A and Type 901 logistics vessels, enabling long-range deployments. The Pentagon assessed that the PLAN is now capable of sustained operations across the Indian Ocean and into the South Pacific, with a growing number of far-seas training events and participation in multinational maritime exercises.

The U.S. continues to rely on the island chain strategy developed during the Cold War. The First Island Chain includes Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines. The Second Island Chain spans from Japan to New Guinea via Guam. The Third Island Chain extends to New Zealand via Hawaii and the Aleutians. China’s 2024 circumnavigation of Australia, recent dual-carrier operations, and multiple transits through strategic straits suggest an increasing ability to challenge this strategy. According to the Atlantic Council, China’s force posture is optimized not only for wartime but also for peacetime competition in the so-called “gray zone.” U.S. analysts believe the PLAN’s strategy follows Admiral Liu Huaqing’s vision of sequential dominance of the First Island Chain, then the Second, and eventually global reach. The First Island Chain is now routinely transited by PLAN vessels. Blockade drills around Taiwan and surveillance of U.S. deployments in the Philippine Sea reflect Beijing’s interest in asserting access to open waters. U.S. officials emphasized continued commitment to partners in the Indo-Pacific, including Japan and the Philippines, and reiterated that Guam remains part of the U.S. homeland and will be defended accordingly. Analysts suggest the Fujian’s activation and J-35 integration could significantly alter the future strategic balance in the Pacific.