British Army to Test CRENIC Electronic Warfare Jammer Against IED and Drone Threats in 2027.

Project CRENIC, the UK Ministry of Defence’s next-generation troop-protection jammer programme, is moving toward prototype testing in Q1 2027, according to a written parliamentary answer published on 5 June 2026. The system is designed to give British forces stronger protection against radio-controlled improvised explosive devices and other signal-based threats that can target troops, vehicles, and bases.

By detecting and disrupting hostile radio links, CRENIC could reduce the effectiveness of roadside bombs and may also provide limited protection against some drone-control signals. Its development reflects a wider push to improve force survivability as cheap, remote-triggered weapons and unmanned systems become central threats on modern battlefields.

Related topic: UK Tests Thales RapidDestroyer Radio Frequency Weapon That Downed 80 Drones in Counter-UAS Trials.

Project CRENIC personnel test the UK Ministry of Defence's future troop-protection jammer. The £45 million programme is designed to protect soldiers, vehicles, and military bases from radio-controlled IEDs and emerging radio-frequency threats (Picture source: UK MoD).

CRENIC is being delivered through a five-year, £45 million systems integration contract awarded in October 2022 by Defence Equipment & Support and Strategic Command to Team Protect, a consortium led by PA Consulting with Leonardo UK, Leidos Innovations UK and Marshall Land Systems. The 2022 contract announcement stated that the equipment would be carried by soldiers, fitted to vehicles and used to protect bases, using advanced techniques across the electromagnetic spectrum to detect and disrupt remote or radio-controlled IEDs. It also identified the British Army, Royal Marines and Royal Air Force land forces as the long-term users of the capability.

The latest schedule deserves attention: in 2022, the MoD said first deliveries of vehicle-mounted and soldier-carried equipment for operations were due in 2026; the June 2026 parliamentary answer now refers to prototype systems in Q1 2027. That does not necessarily indicate a failed programme, because a Critical Design Review normally marks the point at which a design is mature enough to proceed into build, integration, and test. It does, however, mean that Parliament now has a measurable delivery point against which to assess CRENIC: prototype availability in early 2027, followed by trials, user feedback, software refinement, and any decision on operational fielding.

The armament's effect is generated by receivers, processors, antennas, electronic attack transmitters, power amplifiers, and mission software that identify hostile or suspicious radio-frequency activity and apply jamming or disruption against selected parts of the spectrum. The MoD has not released output power, exact frequency coverage, antenna geometry, threat libraries, or quantities, which is normal for force-protection electronic countermeasures. What is clear from official and industry statements is that the system is software-defined, meaning that the main tactical effect can be modified through software and waveform updates rather than by replacing the whole equipment set every time adversaries change detonators, command links, or signal protocols.

That design choice is operationally significant because the threat has moved far beyond the relatively simple radio-triggered IEDs encountered during earlier counter-insurgency campaigns. Leonardo UK states that CRENIC is intended to address threats created by newer communications technologies, including 4G, 5G, and Internet of Things devices, which occupy a broader and more complex part of the electromagnetic spectrum. In practice, this means CRENIC must do more than transmit noise. It must support spectrum observation, signal characterization, prioritization of probable threat emitters, and controlled disruption while avoiding unacceptable interference with UK and allied radios, tactical data links, navigation aids, and drone-control systems. Leonardo specifically identifies electronic fratricide as a risk when jammers are switched on, which is a central design problem rather than a secondary issue.

For dismounted troops, the tactical requirement is likely to be dominated by size, weight, power, and battery endurance. A soldier-carried jammer that is too heavy or drains batteries too quickly will not remain with the section when terrain, heat, casualties, or ammunition loads become decisive. A useful carried system must provide a protective electronic bubble around patrols, search teams, medics, engineers, and small-unit commanders without preventing the same soldiers from using their own communications. For vehicles, the trade space is different: a protected mobility vehicle, logistics truck, or command vehicle can carry larger antennas, draw more power, and support stronger cooling, allowing wider-area protection for convoys, route-clearance teams, and temporary checkpoints. These different use cases explain why CRENIC is not a single box but a family of force-protection electronic countermeasure equipment.

For base defence, CRENIC’s value is less about mobility and more about persistence. A deployed base, airhead, ammunition holding area, or temporary operating location can exploit fixed antennas, larger power supplies, and local command displays to monitor changes in the electromagnetic environment over time. That matters because radio-controlled IEDs are rarely isolated technical events; they are usually part of a kill chain that includes surveillance, device emplacement, operator positioning, command transmission, and escape. A persistent electronic countermeasure system may therefore contribute both to immediate protection and to force-protection intelligence by helping commanders identify suspicious signal patterns near entry control points, patrol routes, or perimeter sectors.

CRENIC is also one of the first UK defence projects to use the Standards for Integrated C5ISR/EW Systems, or STICS, approach, formerly known as the Land CEMA Architecture until November 2024. STICS draws on US Sensor Open Systems Architecture and CMOSS initiatives and applies open standards such as MORA, OpenVPX, and Generic Vehicle Architecture to UK requirements. The practical objective is to reduce size, weight, and power burdens, simplify upgrades, support interchangeable modules, and improve interoperability with allies. This is important because electronic warfare equipment becomes obsolete quickly if it cannot accept new processors, radio-frequency modules, software applications, or data interfaces during service life.

The industrial model is also part of the programme’s military relevance. PA Consulting says Team Protect has built an ecosystem of 110 UK businesses, with 45 percent classed as small or micro businesses and more than half operating in innovation-related fields. This structure appears designed to give the MoD access to specialist suppliers in software, signal processing, artificial intelligence, antennas, and integration rather than relying only on traditional prime-contractor development cycles. It may help CRENIC adapt to commercial technology faster, but it also creates management risk: security accreditation, configuration control, electromagnetic safety, export controls, and test discipline become harder as the supplier base widens.

The counter-drone angle should be treated carefully. CRENIC could contribute to a layered counter-UAS architecture against drones that rely on radio command, video downlinks, satellite navigation, or cellular connectivity. It will not, by itself, solve the problem of fibre-optic FPV drones, pre-programmed autonomous attack drones, or aircraft that can continue a terminal attack after losing the operator link. For that reason, CRENIC should be assessed as part of a wider survivability package that includes passive protection, camouflage, route discipline, acoustic and optical detection, radar, directed electronic attack, and kinetic interceptors. This distinction is important because low-cost drones have repeatedly forced tactical units to combine several defensive measures rather than rely on one system.

The central question for 2027 is whether CRENIC can move from prototype testing to fieldable equipment quickly enough to remain relevant against commercial communications technology that changes every year. The programme’s open-standards architecture, integration laboratory, and continuous upgrade model are rational responses to that problem, but they will only matter if the MoD can shorten the loop between operational threat reporting, software development, safety certification, trials, and deployment. For the British Army, Royal Marines, and RAF land forces, CRENIC is best understood as an electronic shield for tactical movement and deployed locations, rather than as a stand-alone answer to every radio-controlled threat.

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Written by Evan Lerouvillois, Defense Analyst.

Evan studied International Relations, and quickly specialized in defense and security. He is particularly interested in the influence of the defense sector on global geopolitics, and analyzes how technological innovations in defense, arms export contracts, and military strategies influence the international geopolitical scene.