U.S. Review Finds China Used India-Pakistan Clash to Trial J-10 Fighters and HQ-9 Defenses.

A new U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission report says Beijing used the May India-Pakistan clash to trial advanced combat systems in real fighting. The findings carry major implications for South Asia’s balance of power and China’s growing export defense ambitions.

On 18th November 2025, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission published a report in which it announced that Beijing opportunistically used the May 7 to 10 India-Pakistan clash, codenamed Operation Sindoor by New Delhi, to test and promote its latest combat systems as Pakistan leaned heavily on Chinese weaponry and support. For the first time, Chinese platforms such as the J-10 fighter, HQ-9 long-range air defense system, and PL-15 air-to-air missiles were employed in high-intensity combat against a capable adversary, turning a regional crisis into a live-fire proving ground for the People’s Liberation Army and China’s export-focused defense industry.
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Pakistani J-10 and HQ-9 air defense units were used during the 2025 incident between India and Pakistan, a conflict that China used as a live test for its newest weapons and intelligence systems as Beijing deepened its role as Islamabad's primary defense partner (Picture source: Chinese MoD/ U.S. DoW).

The confrontation followed a deadly insurgent attack in Jammu and Kashmir that killed 26 civilians and prompted India’s air and missile strikes against targets in Pakistan and in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. In response, Pakistan launched massed drone and missile salvos and attempted to hit Indian air bases and logistics sites, while India countered with deeper penetrating strikes of its own. Analysts noted that both sides attacked farther into one another’s territory than at any time in fifty years, underscoring how quickly Kashmir-related incidents can climb the escalation ladder between two nuclear-armed rivals.

Behind the tactical exchanges sits a long-running doctrinal contest that has shaped South Asia’s military landscape. India has moved toward a faster-mobilizing Cold Start posture built around Integrated Battle Groups that aim to deliver shallow, punitive thrusts into Pakistani territory without triggering Pakistan’s nuclear thresholds. Pakistan, facing an expanding conventional gap, has responded with a full-spectrum deterrence doctrine that integrates tactical nuclear weapons, long-range missiles, and upgraded conventional forces into a single ladder meant to deter Indian offensives at every rung. In that environment, Chinese hardware is not merely filling Pakistan’s inventory but influencing how both sides assess escalation, survivability, and risk.

China has now consolidated itself as Pakistan’s dominant armorer, supplying the overwhelming majority of the country’s major defense imports in recent years. This hardware relationship rests atop the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and Gwadar port, giving the partnership strategic depth that stretches from Xinjiang to the Arabian Sea. Joint Warrior-VIII drills in late 2024 and China’s participation in the AMAN 2025 multinational naval exercise further tightened operational links just months before Operation Sindoor, blending training habits and interoperability.

In the air campaign, Pakistan’s J-10CE fleet formed the centerpiece of a Chinese-built kill chain. The fighter’s active electronically scanned array radar can detect medium-sized targets at long distances, giving Pakistani pilots the ability to launch PL-15E beyond-visual-range missiles well before Indian aircraft approach firing range. The PL-15E, with an active radar seeker and dual-pulse motor, provides the standoff reach that Pakistani planners have long sought, particularly when cued by Chinese-origin airborne early warning platforms such as the ZDK-03 and KJ-500. Pakistani officials privately credit this integration with enabling long-range shots against Indian strike packages, including missions flown by Rafale aircraft, even as the exact details remain contested.

Pakistan’s high-to-medium air defense belt is anchored by the HQ-9 family, which offers long-range engagement capability with phased-array radars and multiple guidance modes. The HQ-9P variant provides area defense coverage over major cities and military installations, while Pakistan is also fielding the HQ-9BE, a longer-range derivative positioned to extend engagement envelopes and enhance detection of low-observable aircraft. For Indian planners, confronting Chinese-designed air defense systems on both the western and northern fronts compresses the tactical airspace available for long-range strike and electronic warfare assets.

On land, the artillery duel highlighted the depth of Chinese penetration into Pakistan’s force structure. The SH-15 155 mm wheeled self-propelled howitzer, the export version of the PCL-181, provides rapid, mobile fire support and can employ extended-range projectiles capable of reaching more than 50 kilometers. Positioned along the Line of Control before the fighting, these units delivered counter-battery fire and interdiction missions integrated with Pakistan’s missile forces. At the same time, Pakistan has moved heavily into the VT-4 main battle tank program, with several hundred vehicles either delivered or assembled locally under license. The VT-4’s digital fire control, modular armor, and active protection options fit into Pakistan’s broader armored modernization cycle.

At sea, China has effectively rebuilt Pakistan’s fleet around high-end platforms. Four Tughril-class frigates, equipped with a vertical launch system for medium-range surface-to-air missiles, have given Pakistan its first modern area air defense surface combatants. Beneath the surface, the eight-boat Hangor submarine program, derived from the Type 039A design and featuring air-independent propulsion, marks China’s largest export defense contract and will reshape Pakistan’s undersea posture into the 2030s. Together, these naval systems are designed to complicate India’s operations in the northern Indian Ocean while locking Islamabad more firmly into Chinese training, sustainment, and doctrine.

China’s military leadership has long warned that the PLA suffers from a peace disease, the product of decades without major combat. Chinese doctrine has evolved toward a vision of informatized and intelligentized warfare that depends on real operational data to refine sensors, networks, and decision-making tools. A limited India-Pakistan war, in which an allied military bears the political and human burden while Chinese systems and software are tested against Western-origin aircraft, radars, and munitions, offers Beijing a rare, low-risk opportunity to validate its designs and sharpen its sales pitch.

Pakistan’s fragile economic situation adds to the strategic complexity. Islamabad approved a roughly 20% increase in defense spending for 2025-2026, even as it cuts social expenditures and struggles with IMF conditionality. Rising violence from Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and Baloch insurgents has strained security forces, yet Pakistan continues to prioritize Chinese acquisitions in the belief that May’s fighting demonstrated their operational value and deterrent effect.

For Western and Indian planners, the implications extend far beyond a short border clash. Chinese officials quickly presented the apparent performance of the HQ-9 and PL-15 as evidence that Chinese systems can defeat advanced Western aircraft, while Beijing simultaneously pushed to undercut European fighter sales in Southeast Asia. India, in turn, is accelerating its modernization programs and deepening defense ties with the United States and France. Operation Sindoor, therefore, becomes an inflection point: a short, violent encounter in South Asia that allowed China’s weapons to move from brochures to real combat data, altering threat perceptions from the Himalayas to the Taiwan Strait.