U.S. Approves $4 Billion HIMARS Missile Launcher Sale to Bolster Taiwan Against China.

The U.S. State Department has approved a possible $4.05 billion Foreign Military Sale of HIMARS launchers and missiles to Taiwan, according to a December 17 notification to Congress. The package significantly expands Taiwan’s long-range precision strike capacity as Washington deepens defense support amid rising cross-Strait tensions.

The U.S. State Department has approved a possible Foreign Military Sale to Taiwan valued at an estimated $4.05 billion, covering M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and a large inventory of guided rockets and missiles, according to information released by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency on December 17. The proposed sale, formally notified to Congress, represents one of the most substantial single upgrades to Taiwan’s ground-based strike forces and is part of a broader $11.1 billion set of Taiwan-related FMS cases reported by U.S. officials.
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Taiwan's HIMARS buy adds mobile, GPS-guided rockets and ATACMS missiles to strike invasion forces and key targets from 70+ km out to nearly 300 km (Picture source: U.S. Army).

The DSCA case lists 82 M142 HIMARS launchers, 420 M57 Army Tactical Missile System missiles, 756 M31A2 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System Unitary pods, and 447 M30A2 GMLRS Alternative Warhead pods. It also includes 39 M1152A1 HMMWVs, 45 International Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems, and a sizeable support train of FMTV trucks, resupply and wrecker vehicles, trailers, radios, tools, test gear, training, and contractor support. Because a GMLRS launch pod container holds six rockets, the requested pod quantities translate into thousands of guided rockets for sustained operations rather than symbolic stockpiles.

HIMARS matters to Taiwan less as a single launcher than as a survivable way to distribute firepower across the island’s road network. The system carries one pod of six GMLRS rockets or one ATACMS missile on a 5-ton truck, and U.S. Army descriptions emphasize its rapid deployability, including transportability by C-130, which speaks to a design optimized for quick displacement and repeated relocations. For Taiwan, that mobility is tactical currency: batteries can fire, move, hide, and reappear from alternate sites, complicating Chinese counterfire and air attack planning in the opening hours of a cross-strait campaign.

The munitions mix is the real story. GMLRS Unitary is a GPS-aided inertial guided rocket with a single 200-pound high-explosive warhead and a range beyond 70 kilometers, designed to hit point targets with reduced collateral damage. The M30A2 Alternative Warhead variant trades the unitary charge for wide area effects while avoiding the unexploded submunition legacy that shaped earlier cluster designs, an important political and operational detail when fighting near dense coastal terrain. At the top end, ATACMS gives HIMARS a deep strike option. The M57 family carries a 500-pound unitary warhead guided by GPS and inertial systems out to ranges approaching 300 kilometers, enabling engagement of air defenses, command posts, and other high-value targets.

Taiwan wants this package because it fits a hardening reality: the island is already under the shadow of a large Chinese missile inventory and a force built to compress warning time. Pentagon assessments have consistently highlighted the scale of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force, with hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles positioned to saturate Taiwan in the opening phase of a conflict. That threat profile helps explain why Taiwan is investing in dispersed, mobile systems that can keep fighting after the first wave. Precision rockets also offer a way to contest the maritime approach without needing to win air superiority on day one. Instead of chasing every aircraft, Taiwan can aim to break the invasion’s timetable by striking assembly areas, logistics nodes, air defense sites, and the ports and beach support infrastructure on which an amphibious campaign depends.

Taiwan is not starting from zero with HIMARS. The island has already received an initial batch of launchers under earlier contracts, with crews trained and live firing events conducted to integrate the system into operational artillery units. Those early deliveries moved HIMARS from procurement planning into unit-level readiness and validated Taiwan’s ability to absorb U.S. long-range fires technology. Against that backdrop, an 82 launcher request reads less like an incremental upgrade and more like a decision to scale long-range precision fires into a central pillar of Taiwan’s ground defense.

The DSCA paperwork is also a reminder of Taiwan’s diplomatic reality. The Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States represents Taiwan’s interests in Washington in the absence of formal diplomatic relations and functions as a de facto embassy. Its counterpart in Taiwan is the American Institute in Taiwan in Taipei, which manages unofficial U.S. relations on the island. In a Chinese invasion scenario, a HIMARS heavy force would be tasked to deny tempo. GMLRS would punish landing zones, crossing sites, and follow-on echelons within island range, while ATACMS could hold at risk key staging areas and airfields on the near coast. Combined with IFATDS-enabled digital fire control, the result is a credible ability to mass effects without massing launchers, underscoring why this sale forms a critical part of Taiwan’s broader $11.1 billion investment in its own defense.