Russia to deploy RS-28 Sarmat nuclear InterContinental Ballistic Missile ICBM soon says Putin.

Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that the RS-28 Sarmat nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile will soon be deployed. The confirmation signals Russia’s next major step in nuclear modernization amid ongoing tensions with the West.

According to The Moscow Times, President Vladimir Putin said during a visit to a Moscow military hospital on October 29, 2025, that the RS-28 Sarmat InterContinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) will be deployed soon. “It’s not yet deployed, but it will be soon,” Putin told wounded Russian soldiers. The statement marks a rare public confirmation of the missile’s readiness and highlights Russia’s ongoing effort to strengthen its strategic deterrent.
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Russia’s RS‑28 Sarmat, also known as "Satan II," is a next-generation heavy intercontinental ballistic missile capable of carrying multiple nuclear warheads across 18,000 km, designed to penetrate advanced missile defense systems and redefine global strategic deterrence. (Picture source: Russia MoD)

The Russian RS-28 Sarmat ICBM (InterContinental Ballistic Missile), often dubbed “Satan II” by Western analysts, has for years been portrayed by Russia as the capstone of its land‑based nuclear deterrent. Its planned deployment completes a long‑standing ambition of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN) to supplant the aging Soviet‑era R‑36M “Voyevoda” missiles with a heavy, silo‑based ICBM capable of delivering a large payload to any point on the planet, and crucially, to penetrate or circumvent advanced missile‑defence systems.

Moscow’s public signalling does not cite exact numbers or regiment designations, but the Moscow Times report states that elements of the Sarmat complex are entering “combat duty” status, with launch silos upgraded, crews trained and alert protocols activated. This follows earlier announcements in 2023 that Sarmat had entered service and was undergoing final integration.

The missile has been undergoing flight tests since 2022. According to open‑source tracking, the first test launch from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome occurred on 20 April 2022. Yet analysts have flagged multiple setbacks: four reported failures, including a major silo‑destroying blast in September 2024, cast doubt on Russia’s schedule.

Moscow’s revised timeline now appears to accept a phased entry into service: initial operational capability (IOC) followed by serial production and full regiment deployment over the next several years. Satellite imagery confirms ongoing construction at silo fields used for the Sarmat system.

The RS‑28 Sarmat is a super‑heavy, liquid‑fueled silo‑based ICBM. Key technical features include a launch weight over 200 tonnes, a length of approximately 35 metres, a diameter of about 3 metres, and a declared range of up to 18,000 km. It is designed to carry a 10 tonne-class payload, including up to 15 to 16 multiple independently targetable re‑entry vehicles (MIRVs) or combinations of warheads and decoys, and is compatible with advanced hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) such as the Avangard.

Importantly, the Sarmat is designed to employ a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) mode, allowing trajectories over the South Pole and reducing warning time for adversaries. Russian commentary emphasizes a short boost phase and heavy counter‑measure package to defeat missile‑defence systems, sending a clear strategic message.

For Washington and NATO capitals, the formal deployment of the Sarmat system constitutes a substantive enhancement of Russian strategic strike capability. While each ICBM on its own may not shift the overall numeric nuclear balance, the combination of extended range, large throw‑weight, improved counter‑defence features, and the FOBS option materially alters the deterrence and escalation calculus.

Firstly, the ability to threaten nearly any point on the globe with a land‑based missile complicates early‑warning and missile‑defence planning. The over‑the‑pole trajectory introduces additional vectors that U.S. and allied sensors must monitor. Secondly, for U.S. strategic planners who are in the midst of the LGM‑35 Sentinel ICBM replacement programme, the Sarmat deployment presents a visible reminder that Moscow is moving ahead with advanced capabilities even as the U.S. programme faces cost overruns and schedule slips. Thirdly, for Russian doctrine this move reaffirms the Kremlin’s message of credible large‑scale retaliation and deterrence escalation, especially in the context of the Ukraine conflict and expanded NATO activity.

From Moscow’s perspective, the deployment signals resilience amid sanctions and attrition of conventional forces. By highlighting its next‑generation strategic weapons, Russia strengthens its deterrent posture even as the conflict in Ukraine remains protracted and Western‑supplied long‑range missiles continue to strike deep within Russian territory.

Despite the fanfare, significant caveats remain. Independent observers highlight the missile’s development history, which includes major test failures and production and infrastructure delays. The fact that deployment is likely gradual means that full operational effectiveness across multiple missile regiments may still be years off. Moreover, while Russian sources highlight high accuracy, with some claiming a CEP of approximately 10 meters, there remains no independent verification of these metrics.

Additionally, the global strategic community will focus on whether Moscow intends to integrate the system into its nuclear posture as launch‑on‑warning, pre‑delegated strike, or a more traditional retaliatory role. Operational utility depends not only on missile performance but on secure command‑and‑control, communications hardened against cyber and electromagnetic attack, and the overall readiness of the RVSN.

The formal entry of the RS‑28 Sarmat into deployment marks a milestone in Russian nuclear modernisation. For the United States and its allies, this is a clear signal that Russia is not merely maintaining legacy Soviet systems but is actively fielding advanced strategic capabilities. The timing of the announcement, amid heightened East‑West tensions, also suggests Moscow intends the deployment as a form of strategic messaging.

Yet from a realistic military‑operational standpoint, the deployment should be seen less as an immediate transformative threat than as part of a long‑term nuclear modernization programme. NATO and U.S. planners will need to incorporate this new vector into their strategic frameworks, particularly missile‑defence planning, early warning networks, and escalation‑control protocols.

For Army Recognition readers, the RS-28 Sarmat deployment underscores several key points: the importance of silo‑based strategic forces even in an era of mobile and submarine‑launched systems, the continuing relevance of liquid‑fuel heavy ICBMs despite decades of solid‑fuel preference, and the role of advanced delivery modes such as FOBS and HGV in defeating missile‑defence systems. It also reinforces the view that Russia is investing in strategic capabilities designed to offset its conventional weaknesses and shape adversary decision‑making through a credible nuclear threat.

As deployment proceeds, additional questions will attract attention: how many missiles will be fielded initially, which regiments and silos are being activated, how the system integrates with Russia’s nuclear command‑and‑control, the pace of serial production, and whether the RS-28 Sarmat alters Moscow’s willingness to press or extend nuclear escalation thresholds. In short, the missiles may soon be in place, but how they change strategy, doctrine and crisis‑behaviour remains the key story.