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Russia Officially Prepares For Nuclear Weapons Tests and Explores What Systems Could Be Trialed.
The Kremlin directed key ministries and agencies to draft nuclear test proposals, with Putin reaffirming Russia would respond to any nuclear-explosive test by another power. The move signals readiness at Novaya Zemlya and adds pressure on the global moratorium and CTBT verification systems.
On 5 November 2025, the Kremlin directed the foreign and defense ministries, intelligence services, and civilian agencies to draw up coordinated proposals for possible nuclear weapons testing, with the stated caveat that Russia would mirror any nuclear-explosive tests conducted by another nuclear power, as reported by Russian News Agency TASS. This follows public remarks from U.S. President Donald Trump suggesting the United States may restart testing, a signal that has reanimated a dormant pillar of Cold War–era competition. The move is significant because it puts political direction behind technical readiness at Russia’s Novaya Zemlya range and raises the risk of a broader unraveling of long-standing test moratoria that have underpinned strategic stability for decades. It also comes after years of friction over the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which Russia de-ratified in 2023 while the United States signed but never ratified.
Russia ordered proposals for potential nuclear tests at Novaya Zemlya, signaling conditional readiness to proceed if another nuclear power resumes testing following U.S. remarks about restarting trials (Picture Source: Atomic Archives)
During a Security Council session, Defense Minister Andrei Belousov argued it is “appropriate” to begin preparations immediately, citing the ability to activate Novaya Zemlya on short notice. The site is the historical venue for Soviet-era detonations, and officials have repeatedly said its infrastructure is maintained in a ready condition. Practically, that readiness enables Russia to scale activity from diagnostics to live detonations depending on political direction and risk calculus, while preserving a public stance that any test would be contingent on U.S. moves.
If Moscow proceeds, the most likely initial pathway is subcritical or hydrodynamic experiments, zero-yield trials that stress plutonium pits and modern components without a self-sustaining chain reaction. Such work supports stockpile stewardship and modernization while signaling resolve below the threshold of an explosive test. A subsequent step could involve low-yield, fully contained underground shots to validate specific physics packages, close design margins, and qualify refurbished or miniaturized warheads. In Russia’s strategic inventory, plausible candidates for validation include updated reentry vehicles for silo- and road-mobile ICBMs and SLBMs, systems associated with the Yars, Sarmat, and Bulava families, along with configurations intended to support hypersonic glide vehicles such as Avangard. In the non-strategic realm, testing could service compact, lower-yield options compatible with dual-capable missiles fielded by land, sea, or air forces, reflecting persistent emphasis on flexible theater-range deterrence.
A separate axis involves Russia’s “exotic” systems, which have featured prominently in recent official statements. In late October, Moscow highlighted activity related to the 9M730 Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile and the Poseidon nuclear-capable underwater vehicle. While neither requires an immediate nuclear-explosive test to continue flight or platform trials, any decision to validate associated warhead designs or unique environmental survivability claims would point to underground shots tailored to unusual thermal-mechanical profiles. These programs, framed domestically as counters to missile defenses, complicate monitoring and messaging, and their renewed prominence contextualizes why the leadership now wants testing options on the table.
The political trigger for Russia’s directive is Washington’s signaling. Trump’s public statements about resuming U.S. testing, followed by mixed clarifications about “non-critical” activities, prompted Moscow to seek formal explanations even as it positioned its own bureaucracy to respond. The Kremlin’s line remains that Russia would continue to observe CTBT-consistent restraint unless another country crosses the explosive threshold; de-ratifying the CTBT in 2023 placed Moscow on “parity” footing with a United States that never ratified, without pre-committing to a test. This interplay, legal positioning, declaratory conditionality, and rapid technical readiness, drives the current escalation risk.
Russia has now coupled political authorization with site readiness, ensuring it can move from planning to execution at short notice if it judges that others have broken the testing taboo. Whether the immediate next step is zero-yield diagnostics or contained low-yield detonations aimed at strategic or theater-range warheads, the decision space has been deliberately narrowed. That recalibration will weigh on arms-control diplomacy, allied assurance, and crisis management worldwide, because once one state tests, others are more likely to follow, pushing nuclear risk back to the center of international security planning.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.