South Korean intelligence warns North Korea can conduct seventh nuclear test.

South Korea’s Defense Intelligence Agency told lawmakers that North Korea can carry out a seventh nuclear test at the Punggye-ri site on short notice, pending Kim Jong Un’s decision. The assessment, delivered in a closed-door National Assembly briefing, resets near-term risk for the peninsula and U.S. regional defense planning.

South Korean lawmakers said Wednesday, November 5, 2025, that the country’s Defense Intelligence Agency assesses North Korea is technically ready to execute another underground nuclear detonation at Punggye-ri, with activity centered on Tunnel No. 3, and that the only remaining trigger is Kim Jong Un’s political go-ahead. The readout, reported by Yonhap and echoed in international coverage, adds that Pyongyang is also preparing further military space activity while coordinating with Russia, indicating a broader modernization push alongside nuclear signaling.
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North Korea’s long-range nuclear tier rests on the liquid-fueled Hwasong-15 and Hwasong-17 and the solid-fueled Hwasong-18 (Picture source: KCNA)

After six detonations between 2006 and 2017, the last publicly estimated in the 100-250 kiloton range, Pyongyang claims to have crossed the thermonuclear threshold. Devices are assessed to have evolved from boosted-fission schemes to two-stage designs, with gradual miniaturization intended for ballistic delivery systems. The fissile-material pipeline remains dual track, with plutonium from the Yongbyon reactor and highly enriched uranium, amid uncertainties over stockpiles and production tempo. The choice of Tunnel No. 3, refurbished over several seasons, aims at repeatability, control of geological constraints, and reduced external signatures, compressing warning time.

North Korea’s long-range nuclear tier rests on the liquid-fueled Hwasong-15 and Hwasong-17 and the solid-fueled Hwasong-18. The two-stage, metallic Hwasong-15 has already flown on a highly lofted trajectory with a theoretical range estimated beyond 12,000 km under light payload. The larger Hwasong-17 rides an 11-axle TEL and targets heavier payloads, with Pyongyang hinting at MIRV potential not demonstrated in operational conditions. The three-stage, canisterized Hwasong-18 shortens preparation from hours to minutes, reduces exposure during pre-launch, and enables less predictable firing sequences. The weak point remains the reentry vehicle’s performance on flatter trajectories at hypersonic speeds: most tests are lofted, validating energy and staging more than the true thermal environment of an operational flight.

The regional and tactical segment revolves around the Hwasong-12 (IRBM about 4,000-4,500 km) and maneuvering SRBMs KN-23/KN-24. The KN-23, an Iskander-like quasi-ballistic missile, flies depressed profiles with a terminal pull-up, a range of about 600-700 km, and is resilient against theater defenses. The KN-24, with a rectangular cross-section reminiscent of ATACMS, covers about 400 km with tighter CEP at shorter ranges. A very heavy 600 mm MRL (often called KN-25, about 300-350 km) adds saturation, and Hwasal land-attack cruise missiles are advertised beyond 1,500 km, low-level flight, inertial guidance augmented by terrain correlation and altimetry, and sea-skimming envelopes for anti-ship variants. Mounted on road-mobile TELs, the force offers basing flexibility and thickens local deterrence by multiplying attack profiles and reducing time-to-target.

South Korean intelligence also states that Pyongyang is preparing a new military observation satellite, billed as more resolute than Malligyong-1, which was inserted into a sun-synchronous orbit at around 500 km in November 2023. Neighbors are active in this space as well. Japan has long operated its IGS satellites, Seoul placed its first military reconnaissance satellite in 2023 and plans a constellation, while China, Russia, and the United States field high-end multi-sensor imagery. For Pyongyang, even a modest optical payload revisiting the peninsula on roughly a 94-minute cycle can support a basic RMP and COP, especially when overpass windows are synchronized with other ground-based sensors.

Previous North Korean tests show material evolution. Early devices were likely plutonium-based with sub-decamegaton yields, followed by higher-yield events and claims of an H-bomb. Engineering followed suit, with improved containment, deeper galleries, and secondary portals at Punggye-ri to manage ventilation and logistics. Site upkeep despite harsh weather supports more discreet launch sequences and quicker reset to firing posture than at the start of the program.

The regional climate remains tense. Tokyo monitors launch windows and adjusts air and missile defense acquisitions. Beijing resists multilateral pressure while managing neighborhood stability. Washington maintains air and sea rotations and alliance coverage, with renewed attention to missile defense interoperability and the credibility of extended deterrence. Seoul tightens rules of engagement and a graduated response posture, while reinforcing ISR autonomy to avoid relying solely on allied windows.

A new element, mentioned on the South Korean side and requiring caution, is the possibility of Russian support to the space program and, more broadly, to North Korea’s defense ecosystem. Knowledge transfers and potentially exchanges involving equipment or personnel linked to the war in Ukraine are cited as a hypothesis without firm public confirmation at this stage. If verified, they would suggest converging interests that would complicate sanctions regimes and export-control efforts, with feedback into dual-use supply chains.

Ultimately, a seventh test would revive the cycle of UN Security Council resolutions, though diplomatic gridlock limits coercive effect. Allies would increase air and maritime patrols and exercises, with a rise in ISR sorties to sustain the COP continuously. Pressure would also return to national architectures, from theater missile defense to early warning, as well as interagency crisis plans. The most concrete risk is an action-reaction cycle in which North Korea’s technical exploration aligns with a political calendar, as elections, seasonal drills, and orbital windows overlap. In this environment, stability rests on clear deterrence, proportionate strike capacity, and careful management of allied BITD to endure over time.