Breaking News: U.S. President Trump considers land military action against drug cartels in Venezuela.

President Donald Trump said the United States could begin land-based action against alleged Venezuelan trafficking networks, after conducting 21 maritime strikes against suspected Venezuelan trafficking vessels since September.

As reported by CNN on November 28, 2025, President Donald Trump stated that the United States will "very soon" begin land action against alleged Venezuelan drug traffickers, marking an expansion of a campaign that since September has destroyed 22 boats across the Caribbean and eastern Pacific. He said maritime trafficking is now “about 85% stopped by sea” and that “the land is easier,” indicating that operations on Venezuelan soil or against targets inside Venezuelan territory may be forthcoming.
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A new legal basis is being explored to authorize land strikes or attacks inside Venezuela, because the current U.S. legal framework applies only to maritime targets. (Picture source: US DoD)

This follows a buildup involving more than a dozen US warships and about 15,000 troops participating in Operation Southern Spear, supported by the arrival of the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group in the Caribbean. Trump has thanked units such as the US Air Force’s 7th Bomb Wing for contributing to deterrence and said traffickers should stop sending what he calls “poison” to the United States. He has also said he may speak directly with President Nicolás Maduro at an unspecified time, presenting a combination of military pressure and potential political communication. The escalation builds on a recent U.S. shift from a law enforcement-based model to one that treats drug networks as enemy combatants who can be targeted under wartime authorities.

A classified legal interpretation authorizes lethal force against a list of 24 cartels and criminal organizations described as posing imminent threats to Americans, enabling the president to treat traffickers as targets without judicial oversight. The campaign then started with a September 2, 2025, strike against a vessel described as linked to Tren de Aragua near Venezuela, followed by 20 additional strikes in September, October, and November. The operations resulted in 83 deaths, two survivors repatriated to Colombia and Ecuador, and one survivor presumed dead after a search near Mexico. U.S. authorities characterize those killed as narco terrorists and unlawful combatants. However, officials acknowledge that identities or specific destinations of vessels are often not known before strikes but say routes, assembly points, and behavioral patterns justify action. A new legal basis is being explored to authorize land strikes inside Venezuela, because the current legal framework applies only to maritime targets.

US Special Forces are now included in a set of operational options that have been assembled for possible later stages of Operation Southern Spear, ranging from limited raids on drug infrastructure to expanded missions targeting facilities associated with the Venezuelan government or military. Planning groups within Southern Command have developed these scenarios, while also indicating that the U.S. president may choose not to advance beyond maritime strikes. Parallel authorizations increase the scope of CIA lethal activity against cartel-related actors and update older counternarcotics authorities from the 1980s, allowing CIA-operated drones with strike capability to support broader targeting. These drones already fly over Mexico and can gather intelligence on networks involved in logistics and procurement, extending beyond boat crews to higher value nodes. Additional flexibility is provided by the MV Ocean Trader, which can act as a mobile base for special operations and intelligence teams operating across Caribbean approaches.

For now, the US Navy forms the real backbone of this regional buildup and provides the main assets used for the maritime strikes, interdictions, and power projection. Surface combatants have taken part in all 21 boat strikes in the Caribbean and the eastern Pacific, serving as staging points for air operations and for holding survivors before returning them to partner governments. The arrival of the USS Gerald R. Ford and its strike group, destroyers such as the USS Winston S. Churchill and USS Stockdale, allows the US Navy to sustain long-duration air operations, maritime patrols, anti-surface warfare, and air and missile defense coordination. U.S. Navy planning includes the use of unmanned surface vessels, small robotic interceptors, and vertical take-off drones to track suspected traffickers along established maritime routes. US ships have been present near Trinidad and Tobago, while Venezuelan live fire exercises near Isla de Patos took place less than twenty-five miles from a recent US port call. The US Navy’s current deployment shows Washington’s intent to contest maritime routes used by groups it classifies as terrorist linked cartels.

The US Air Force also contributes to the Operation Southern Spear, with a mix of strategic bombers, surveillance aircraft, fighter jets, drones, and even gunships operating near Venezuelan airspace. For instance, a B-52H Stratofortress, accompanied by F/A-18 fighter jets from the Gerald R. Ford, flew near Venezuela’s northern coast in a mission described as a bomber attack demonstration intended to deter illicit trafficking. Additional B-52s, including a nuclear-capable unit, and B-1s have operated near Venezuelan airspace, especially north of Caracas and close to Isla Margarita, a location used by Venezuelan forces to train for amphibious defense. Most maritime strikes have been carried out by MQ-9 Reaper drones equipped with precision-guided weapons similar to those used in earlier conflicts. AC-130J gunships have been involved in some operations and provide additional firepower for intercepting vessels. RC-135 Rivet Joint aircraft have conducted surveillance near Venezuela’s eastern border to identify communications and track networks potentially associated with maritime trafficking. Trump has publicly thanked the 7th Bomb Wing for its role in these missions, publicly framed as counterdrug operations rather than interstate conflict.

The US Marine Corps also participates: one of its F-35Bs has been observed operating from the former Roosevelt Roads Naval Station airfield in Ceiba, Puerto Rico, demonstrating the use of dispersed basing in support of the wider campaign. Marine units, such as the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit, are capable of supporting littoral operations, unmanned surveillance, and rapid reaction tasks relevant to securing coastal areas, assisting naval units, or enabling special operations teams, if authorized. Previous U.S. Marine operations in Afghanistan could explain how their techniques, such as persistent drone surveillance and pattern identification, have been applied to Latin American narcotics interdiction. Their F-35Bs can provide close air support, precision strike, and monitoring of maritime approaches, while amphibious elements embarked aboard US Navy ships could potentially conduct interdiction or limited landing operations if authorized. Although officials maintain that no order has been given for land incursions, US Marine forces remain part of the broader toolkit prepared under Operation Southern Spear.

US deployments in the region extend beyond waters near Venezuela: Puerto Rico serves as a logistical and operational hub for aircraft and naval units, with facilities like the Ceiba airfield enabling forward placement of key military assets such as the F-35B. US ships have visited ports near Trinidad and Tobago, while Mexico became directly involved when it conducted a search for a missing survivor from the October 27 strike after receiving a direct notification from the Pentagon, prompting later meetings with US officials about coordination of future operations. Maritime and air movements around the Dominican Republic have also increased, with the country’s position along key Caribbean transit corridors making its airspace and coastal approaches relevant for US operations. Colombia remains a key partner, despite political tension between Trump and President Petro. Furthermore, additional support for potential special operations missions could also involve elements of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, whose helicopters can conduct low-visibility transport, night infiltration, and precision support flights from those regional staging areas if directed.

On the other hand, Venezuela has described the US strikes as an “undeclared war,” arguing that the United States seeks regime change under the pretext of counternarcotics enforcement and that the terrorist designation of Cartel de los Soles is an attempt to justify interference. Authorities activated a Comprehensive Defense Command in Caracas, involving the National Guard and National Police, and announced a nationwide mobilization of land, air, and naval forces and reserve units. Concrete anti-vehicle hedgehog obstacles have been placed along the Caracas La Guaira highway in locations where armored vehicles would have difficulty passing, forming part of a plan that President Maduro explained as involving defense “street by street, community by community.” Public reaction varies, with some residents expressing fear of US involvement, others saying life continues normally despite uncertainty, and some hoping external pressure could lead to political change, with individuals stating they feel ready for any scenario. Venezuelan media under state influence portray the situation as a defense of sovereignty, while social networks circulate rumors about timelines for potential foreign action, as U.S. bomber flights and naval movements occur increasingly close to Venezuelan territory.

The US designation of the Cartel de los Soles as a foreign terrorist organization forms the central justification for those expanded actions, accompanied by allegations that Venezuelan leaders, including Maduro, participate in or protect broad narcotics trafficking networks. The designation bars US persons from providing support, restricts entry into the United States, and allows sanctions on associated assets, giving the administration additional tools to pressure Venezuelan officials. Venezuelan authorities dismiss the cartel designation as a fabrication and argue that the term is used as an umbrella for accusations against specific officials rather than representing a coordinated organization. Colombian President Petro stated he has not seen evidence linking Maduro directly to Colombian drug trafficking and emphasized that Colombian investigations have not demonstrated such a link. United Nations data indicate that Colombia produces more than 2,500 of the approximately 3,700 tons of coca cultivated globally, while Venezuela does not appear as a producer, and US data show that about 84 percent of cocaine seized in the United States originates in Colombia and transits mainly along Pacific routes. Petro argues that oil interests drive US pressure, while US officials say the campaign aims to prevent harmful substances they attribute to networks associated with Maduro from reaching Americans.

It is known that Venezuela deployed a P-18-2M radar on Isla Margarita to track incoming U.S. aircraft, placed a Buk-M2E surface-to-air missile system at a base east of Caracas, and cleaned and maintained several S-125 Pechora air defense systems, signaling attempts to keep older systems functional. A sanctioned cargo aircraft recently flew to Caracas and has been linked by a Russian official to deliveries of additional Pantsir-S1 systems, Buk-M2E launchers, and updated missiles, though Venezuelan authorities have not confirmed details. There have also been unconfirmed suggestions that future shipments could include Oreshnik ballistic missiles, anti-ship missiles, or variants of Kalibr cruise missiles, but there is no confirmed evidence that such deliveries have taken place. Venezuela’s armed forces total roughly 123,000 personnel, while Maduro claims the Bolivarian militia includes eight million volunteers, though outside observers question both their number and training. F-16 and Su-30 jets have flown low over cities such as Maracay and over Isla Margarita, representing about twenty percent of the Venezuelan Air Forces, as part of a broader defense plan centered on protecting the capital and coastal approaches.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.