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Türkiye’s Baykar TB3 Drone Offer to Japan Points to Emerging Drone Carrier Concepts in the Pacific.
Türkiye has offered Japan the Bayraktar TB2 and the ship-capable Bayraktar TB3 as part of expanding defense cooperation talks focused on maritime security and unmanned systems. The proposal hints at a possible new model for drone carrier operations in the Pacific, aligned with Japan’s evolving naval posture.
In a report by the Anadolu Agency dated January 7, 2026, Turkish National Defense Minister Yaşar Güler said Baykar’s Bayraktar TB2 and the follow-on Bayraktar TB3 “could contribute to Japan’s defense capabilities,” arguing that the systems’ long endurance and persistent surveillance could deliver a cost-effective maritime security boost. Güler added that, after Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani’s visit to Ankara, the two countries have continued constructive talks on maritime security, unmanned systems, training, and air defense technologies, with a Turkish defense ministry delegation expected to visit Japan in March to discuss defense-industry cooperation and a framework agreement.
Türkiye’s offer of the ship-capable Bayraktar TB3 drone to Japan underscores a potential shift toward cost-effective, unmanned carrier operations as Tokyo reassesses its maritime security posture in the Pacific (Picture Source: Army Recognition / Baykar Technologies)
For Tokyo, the TB3 proposition is not just another MALE drone pitch, because TB3 was designed from the outset around the limitations of short-deck amphibious ships and light carriers, exactly the category Japan is expanding into with its multi-functional destroyers. Baykar’s concept centers on a navalized air vehicle with folding-wing storage logic and short takeoff and landing handling so it can live in the tight choreography of a ship’s deck cycle rather than operating as a land-based add-on. That matters for Japan as it pushes the Izumo-class conversion forward and normalizes fixed-wing operations at sea, including the recent sea trial path that followed JS Kaga’s modifications for F-35B operations such as heat-resistant deck treatment, new nighttime lighting, and a reshaped bow to support fixed-wing activity.
Technically, TB3 sits in a weight and size bracket that is deliberately “ship-friendly” while still carrying meaningful sensors and weapons. Available specifications indicate that the TB3 features an airframe approximately 8.35 meters in length with a wingspan of about 14 meters, designed to accommodate a payload in the 280-kg class and an endurance exceeding 21 hours. The platform is powered by a turboprop-class engine rated in the 170 hp range and supports both line-of-sight and beyond-line-of-sight communications depending on mission configuration. Operating altitude is reported to be around 20,000 feet, with a service ceiling in the vicinity of 25,000 feet.
From other program reporting tied to the test campaign, TB3 is typically associated with a maximum speed in the 160-knot class and cruise around 125 knots, while its published operational reach is frequently cited around 1,100 nautical miles, a range figure that, in naval terms, is about pushing the sensor line well beyond a task group’s organic horizon. The altitude story is also more ambitious than the conservative “service ceiling” line suggests: in documented high-altitude system performance flights, TB3 has been reported climbing beyond 33,000 feet, with one widely cited test reaching 36,310 feet, which signals margin for maritime weather, line-of-sight geometry, and sensor performance even if day-to-day operations sit lower.
What places TB3 firmly in the “carrier conversation” is the shipboard handling milestone Türkiye has been highlighting through an expanding series of sea trials over the past year. During initial sea-based tests conducted in November 2024, a TB3 prototype successfully departed the amphibious assault ship Anadolu using the vessel’s 12-degree inclined ski-jump, flew a short maritime test profile, and then returned to land back on the moving deck without the use of arresting gear or external recovery aids. Subsequent trials carried out in late 2024 and into 2025 reportedly focused on repeating these evolutions under varying wind, deck motion, and payload conditions, progressively validating launch and recovery margins rather than a single demonstration event. Together, these tests are presented by Turkish authorities as evidence that routine short-deck UAV operations without catapults or arresting systems are achievable, supporting the broader objective of establishing a persistent sea-based aviation capability from compact flight decks in constrained maritime environments.
TB3’s appeal to Japan and other potential operators lies in the fact that it was conceived from the outset as a fully armed combat UAV rather than a reconnaissance platform adapted later for strike missions. Its airframe and six-hardpoint architecture are designed to support the carriage of a range of lightweight precision-guided munitions that Türkiye has progressively validated through successive test campaigns. The aircraft has successfully integrated and fired guided weapons from the MAM-L and MAM-T families, achieving direct hits during live-fire trials conducted after short-deck takeoffs and recoveries, thereby confirming a credible strike capability from carrier-type platforms.
Beyond these lighter munitions, TB3 has also demonstrated compatibility through test firings with larger air-to-surface weapons such as the IHA-122 supersonic missile, extending its engagement envelope and illustrating the breadth of its potential payload options. In a maritime context, this combination of endurance, sensor coverage, and scalable firepower aligns with the distributed, cost-imposing operational concepts increasingly emphasized by Japan, where unmanned systems can monitor, identify, and hold at risk small surface or littoral targets without immediately committing high-value manned aircraft or heavier strike assets.
The strategic subtext behind Güler’s remarks is that TB3 is being positioned as a “sea control enabler” for navies that do not want to depend on catapults, arresting gear, or a full-size carrier air wing to get persistent eyes and limited strike power off the deck. For Japan, the most realistic near-term value is a shipborne ISR and targeting layer that can stay airborne for long periods, work the edges of contested airspace, and feed the fleet’s wider kill chain, while Japan’s F-35B-capable ships concentrate on the high-end air battle and deterrence signaling. If the Turkey-Japan dialogue progresses from “interest” to engineering, the decisive question will not be whether TB3 can fly from a Japanese deck, the trials suggest that concept is viable, but whether Tokyo is willing to integrate Turkish unmanned aviation into its communications security, mission systems, and maritime command networks at a level that turns persistence into operational advantage.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.