U.S. Marine Corps Tests Whether Industry Can Deliver 10,000 Drones in a Year at a $4,000 Cap.

The U.S. Marine Corps is preparing to acquire up to 10,000 first-person-view drones in 2026, alongside a new standardized training pipeline to certify hundreds of operators. The move reflects a broader shift toward treating FPV drones as expendable combat power rather than niche intelligence tools, shaped heavily by lessons from modern conflicts.

A newly published Sources Sought notice on SAM.gov reveals that the U.S. Marine Corps is preparing to acquire up to 10,000 low-cost first-person-view (FPV) drones as part of a rapid effort to expand organic reconnaissance and precision strike capabilities at the small-unit level. Issued through the Naval Air Systems Command, the solicitation outlines an aggressive timeline and a strict unit cost ceiling of $4,000, underscoring the Corps’ intent to field expendable, combat-ready drone systems in volume rather than pursue limited numbers of high-end platforms.
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U.S. Marine Corps FPV drones are designed to give small units low-cost, expendable reconnaissance and precision strike, enabling rapid engagement of enemy troops and light vehicles in contested, jammed environments shaped by lessons from the Ukraine war (Picture source: US DoW).

The procurement signal is coming through a Sources Sought notice on SAM.gov, which frames FPV drones as consumable combat power rather than boutique ISR assets. The Marine Corps sets a hard price marker: each air vehicle must be under $4,000, and vendors must itemize total system cost, including control gear, communication links, FPV goggles, batteries, chargers, and other required parts. Cost is described as the primary weighted measure in evaluation, a blunt indication that the service is chasing scalable mass and acceptable losses.

Just as revealing are the timelines. Industry is asked to demonstrate the ability to deliver an initial quantity by January 1, 2026, then ramp to 5,000 air vehicles within six months and 10,000 within twelve months, while also declaring how many complete systems could ship immediately from existing inventory. The notice demands a detailed bill of materials with part numbers, manufacturers, and unit prices, and it ties eligibility to compliance or a credible path to compliance with multiple legal and policy constraints aimed at limiting exposure to foreign-made drones and components.

The RFI repeatedly emphasizes field independence: Marines must be able to repair systems themselves, add third-party payloads, and convert non-kinetic drones into kinetic ones without vendor involvement. It even cites simple lethal payloads such as 30 mm mortars and grenades, while also noting non-lethal missions and the value of these aircraft as targets for counter-UAS training. On the technology side, the Corps probes for open architectures and interoperability with common tactical tools and standards like ATAK, ROS, and OpenMAVLink, plus autonomy and AI-enabled functions ranging from waypoint navigation to object recognition and target tracking. Communications options listed span analog, digital, GSM, and fiber, mirroring battlefield lessons about surviving jamming and interception.

This effort aligns with the Marine Corps’ broader Force Design transformation, which seeks to modernize forward forces for contested littorals, seize key maritime terrain, and close kill webs through distributed operations. The latest Force Design updates explicitly reference lessons drawn from high-intensity conflicts and point to an accelerated emphasis on counter-UAS capabilities and organic precision fires that can be pushed down to small units. In that context, low-cost FPV drones represent a brutally practical toolset: organic reconnaissance, rapid strike against exposed infantry and light armor, trench and urban engagement, decoying and probing air defenses, and stitching together short-range kill chains when artillery or aviation support is unavailable, delayed, or politically constrained.

The underlying driver is the battlefield reality revealed most starkly by the war in Ukraine, where the omnipresence of FPV drones has reshaped tactics at the platoon and company level. Cheap one-way attack drones have become substitutes for traditional fires, delivering precision effects at a fraction of the cost of artillery shells or guided munitions. Designs evolve every few weeks in response to jamming, camouflage, and new countermeasures, rewarding forces that can iterate fast, repair in the field, and accept high attrition rates. The Marine Corps’s insistence on modularity, open standards, and self-sustainment reflects a clear understanding of that adaptation cycle.

Institutionally, the Corps is already laying the groundwork to absorb this capability. New training constructs approved via MARADMIN define pathways for Basic Drone Operators and Attack Drone Operators open to any military occupational specialty, while Weapons Training Battalion Quantico has been designated as the interim hub for scaling instruction. Coupled with the formation of a dedicated Marine Corps Attack Drone Team, the Sources Sought notice signals that FPV drones are no longer viewed as experimental but as a core element of future Marine infantry combat power.