Sweden approves transfer of 16 Gripen C/D fighter jets to Ukraine to counter Russian missile attacks.

Sweden has approved the transfer of up to 16 Gripen C/D fighter jets to Ukraine, a decision announced on May 28, 2026, that gives Kyiv a fighter platform specifically designed to survive sustained missile attacks against air bases and dispersed operating sites. The package combines operational aircraft, advanced air-to-air missiles, and long-term sustainment support, strengthening Ukraine’s ability to defend critical infrastructure and maintain combat aviation operations under continuous Russian strike pressure.

The Gripen C/D’s road-based operating doctrine, low maintenance footprint, and rapid turnaround capability align closely with Ukraine’s need to disperse aircraft away from vulnerable fixed airfields targeted by Russian missiles and drones. Combined with Meteor, AIM-120 AMRAAM, and IRIS-T missiles, the Swedish fighters are expected to reinforce Ukraine’s defensive counter-air network while accelerating the country’s broader transition toward a NATO-compatible tactical air force.

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The Gripen C/D's operational doctrine is perfect for the Ukrainian Air Force because it enables fighters to operate from short road strips and decentralized highway sites with minimal maintenance personnel, directly neutralizing Russia's ability to disable permanent airbases with long-range missile strikes. (Picture source: Saab)

On May 28, 2026, Sweden approved the transfer of up to 16 Gripen C/D fighter jets to Ukraine as part of Stockholm’s 22nd military support package valued at SEK 25.2 billion, while simultaneously authorizing the procurement of replacement Gripen E/Fs for the Swedish Air Force and negotiations for a separate Ukrainian acquisition of up to 20 newly built Gripen E/F fighters financed through the EU Ukraine Support Loan mechanism. The donated Gripen C/Ds will come directly from active Swedish Air Force inventory rather than reserve storage, representing close to one-sixth of Sweden’s roughly 94 operational Gripen C/D fighters and corresponding to one tactical squadron.

Deliveries are scheduled to begin in 2027, as Ukrainian pilot and technician training begins in 2026 using Swedish instruction pipelines and the two-seat Gripen D variant. The package also includes Meteor, AIM-120 AMRAAM, and IRIS-T missiles together with sustainment support, spare parts, maintenance assistance, and long-term replacement procurement for Sweden’s own combat aviation inventory. The Gripen agreement creates a two-track modernization process in which Ukraine receives operational Gripen C/D jets for near-term air defense requirements while separately building a future Gripen E/F fleet expected to enter service from 2030 onward, following the October 22, 2025, Ukrainian-Swedish letter of intent covering a possible fleet of between 100 and 150 Gripen fighters. 

The Gripens donated to Ukraine by Sweden are operational C and D variants already integrated with NATO-standard weapons, Link 16 tactical datalink architecture, and Western Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) systems rather than downgraded export or reserve aircraft. Sweden selected the Gripen C/D because these fighters are already maintained at frontline readiness standards and can enter Ukrainian service significantly faster than new-production fighters requiring multi-year delivery timelines. The transfer package also includes spare engines, maintenance equipment, missile inventories, sustainment planning, logistics support, and technical training required to sustain operational sortie generation under wartime conditions.

The Gripen C serves as the single-seat combat variant while the Gripen D provides operational conversion and continuation training capability, allowing Ukraine to establish a domestic Gripen training structure after initial Swedish-led pilot instruction. Stockholm directly linked the donation to its procurement of replacement Gripen E/Fs for its own air force in order to avoid reducing long-term Swedish combat aviation capacity during the transition toward a predominantly E-model fleet. Ukraine’s parallel acquisition of up to 20 Gripen E/F fighters, therefore, functions separately from the immediate C/D transfer and is intended to establish a long-term NATO-compatible tactical aviation structure beyond the current conflict. 

The Gripen C/D has a maximum takeoff weight of roughly 14,000 kg and is powered by a single Volvo RM12 turbofan derived from the General Electric F404, generating roughly 80 kN of thrust with afterburner and enabling speeds close to Mach 2 at altitude. Combat radius generally ranges between 800 and 1,000 km, depending on mission profile and external fuel configuration, while ferry range exceeds 3,000 km using drop tanks. More operationally important is the C/D’s dispersed operating structure under Sweden’s Bas 90 doctrine, which allows Gripens to operate from road strips measuring roughly 800 meters and from decentralized highway operating sites and forest maintenance areas.

Saab and the Swedish Air Force also prioritized simplified turnaround procedures, decentralized maintenance, and reduced manpower requirements during its development because Swedish Cold War operational planning assumed repeated Soviet missile attacks against fixed runways, fuel depots, shelters, and command facilities. These assumptions align closely with Ukrainian operational conditions, where Russian forces continue targeting aviation infrastructure using cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, drones, and reconnaissance-strike systems to disable permanent air bases. 

The Gripen C/D fighters allocated for Ukraine are expected to include later modernization standards of the PS-05/A mechanically scanned pulse-Doppler radar developed by Ericsson and GEC-Marconi, with upgrades improving low-altitude target detection, simultaneous multi-target tracking, and look-down/shoot-down capability. The Gripen C/D integrates radar, electronic warfare, navigation, and datalink inputs into a fused cockpit architecture designed to reduce pilot workload during interception operations. Swedish operational doctrine prioritized survivability inside dense Soviet (and later Russian) integrated air defense environments, leading to the integration of an internal electronic warfare suite combining radar warning receivers, jamming functions, electronic countermeasures, and expendable countermeasure dispensers optimized for contested electromagnetic conditions.

Link 16 integration allows the Gripen C/D to exchange tactical data and targeting information with NATO-standard command-and-control systems, ground-based air defense networks, and Ukrainian F-16 formations. Compared to heavier Western fighters such as the Eurofighter Typhoon, the Gripen also requires fewer maintenance personnel, less support infrastructure, and reduced logistical concentration at operating sites, increasing its survivability under current war conditions. Stockholm identified air defense as Ukraine’s highest-priority operational requirement; therefore, the missile package accompanying the Gripen C/D transfer provides Ukraine with a complete air-intercept structure centered on the Meteor, the AIM-120 AMRAAM, and the IRIS-T.

The Meteor is operationally significant because the European missile uses a ramjet propulsion, allowing it to retain maneuverability and kinetic energy at ranges where older solid-fuel missiles lose effectiveness. The Gripen C/D was among the first operational fighter fleets certified for Meteor integration, making this aircraft-missile combination central to Sweden’s own long-range air defense doctrine, which Ukraine will benefit from. The U.S. AIM-120 AMRAAM ensures the compatibility with NATO-standard engagement procedures already being implemented around Ukrainian F-16 operations, simplifying tactical coordination, datalink-supported engagements, and missile logistics.

Finally, the German IRIS-T provides a high off-boresight short-range engagement capability integrated with helmet-mounted cueing systems, optimized for close-range combat and interception of low-flying cruise missiles and drones. The composition of the missile package indicates that Stockholm expects Gripen operations to focus primarily on defensive counter-air missions protecting Ukrainian infrastructure, logistics corridors, command facilities, and urban areas from continuing Russian missile and drone attacks. Sweden also allocated additional funding for electronic warfare systems, long-range capability support, and ammunition procurement within the same support package.

A key advantage for Ukraine is that the Gripen C/D’s maintenance structure and operational doctrine were engineered specifically for high-intensity warfare against a numerically superior adversary capable of sustained long-range strikes against fixed military infrastructure. Under Sweden’s Bas 90 doctrine, fighter jets disperse across highway strips, road bases, forest shelters, and decentralized maintenance points in order to complicate enemy targeting and preserve combat aviation capability after attacks against permanent airfields. Refueling and rearming procedures were intentionally simplified so turnaround operations could be conducted by relatively small technical teams with limited equipment support, reducing the operational signature visible to enemy reconnaissance systems.

Ukraine currently faces sustained Russian attacks against aviation infrastructure using Iskander ballistic missiles, Kh-101 cruise missiles, Shahed drones, and reconnaissance-strike complexes designed to identify and target aircraft operating locations. Therefore, the Gripen’s smaller maintenance footprint compared to heavier Western fighters directly supports Ukrainian requirements for dispersed operations because the aircraft can sustain higher sortie rates from temporary operating locations without extensive permanent infrastructure.

Swedish operational planning originally developed these procedures to counter Soviet missile and air campaigns expected to target Swedish air bases during the opening phase of a conflict, making Gripen one of the few Western fighters specifically designed around sustained, dispersed wartime operations inside contested territory. Finally, the Gripen C/D will enter a Ukrainian Air Force currently transitioning from Soviet-origin combat aviation toward NATO-standard aircraft, communications systems, weapons integration, and tactical procedures.

Ukraine continues operating MiG-29, Su-27, Su-24, and Su-25 fighters while integrating incoming F-16 fleets, with Gripen introducing a second Western fighter structure optimized for lower sustainment requirements and dispersed operations, before the arrival of the Rafale. Compared to the F-16, the Gripen requires fewer support personnel, less ground equipment, shorter turnaround cycles, and reduced maintenance infrastructure, factors likely to improve sortie generation rates under wartime conditions where operating locations remain vulnerable to Russian strikes.

Swedish authorities have already initiated Ukrainian pilot and technician training programs in 2026, while the two-seat Gripen D variant will support operational conversion and continuation training after the Gripen C enters Ukrainian service. Initial Gripen operations are expected to focus on defensive counter-air patrols and cruise missile interception over central and western Ukraine rather than offensive strike missions against heavily defended Russian territory. If Ukraine eventually proceeds toward the broader 100-150 Gripen objective outlined in the October 2025 bilateral agreement, the country would require entirely new pilot training pipelines, logistics systems, maintenance depots, weapons stockpiles, and tactical aviation command structures supporting one of Europe’s largest NATO-compatible fighter fleets.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.