U.S. Navy Selects Kongsberg and Oceaneering to Develop 1000-Mile CAMP XLUUV Undersea Drone.

Kongsberg of Norway and U.S.-based Oceaneering International have been selected to define an extra-large uncrewed undersea vehicle for the U.S. Navy’s CAMP program, a step that could expand the Navy’s ability to deploy long-range undersea payloads in contested waters while reducing risk to crewed platforms. The selection, announced by the Defense Innovation Unit on July 15, 2026, covers concept definition, system architecture, and design trade studies, with a preliminary design expected in the third quarter of 2026.

The vehicle is being shaped to travel more than 1,000 nautical miles, operate below 200 meters, navigate without GPS, communicate through acoustic and radio-frequency links, and deploy payloads up to 21 feet long and 21 inches in diameter. These requirements point to a platform designed for long-endurance missions such as intelligence collection, seabed operations, logistics, or future strike support, reflecting the U.S. Navy’s broader push toward autonomous undersea systems with greater reach, survivability, and operational flexibility.

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The U.S. Navy's Orca XLUUV during basin testing illustrates the scale and mission profile of the long-range autonomous undersea vehicles being pursued under the CAMP program for payload delivery, surveillance, and operations in contested waters (Picture source: Boeing).

The distinction matters because the government’s published requirement refers to payload emplacement, not to launching a torpedo through a conventional tube. The 21-inch diameter matches the U.S. Navy’s Mk 48 heavyweight torpedo, which weighs 3,744 pounds and carries a 650-pound high-explosive warhead, but no public document confirms Mk 48 integration with CAMP. A bay that can physically accept a torpedo-sized object still requires a release mechanism, weapon power, and data interfaces, fire-control software, safe-separation logic, trim compensation, and authorization procedures before it becomes an operational weapon system. The same cylindrical volume could instead carry encapsulated mines, seabed sensors, communications nodes, electronic-intelligence equipment, or smaller autonomous vehicles. The Navy would therefore gain more from a standardized payload interface than from designing the hull around one weapon, particularly as Mk 48 software, propulsion, and guidance configurations continue to change.

Kongsberg’s relevant technical reference is HUGIN Endurance, but it should not be treated as the announced CAMP design. HUGIN Endurance uses pressure-tolerant lithium-ion batteries, has a stated range of 1,200 nautical miles, an endurance of up to 15 days, and a depth rating of 6,000 meters. Its Sunstone inertial navigation system can use sonar-derived micronavigation to limit position error during long GPS-denied missions, while available sensors include HISAS synthetic-aperture sonar and EM-series multibeam sonars. These characteristics address navigation and seabed-mapping requirements, but CAMP will impose different engineering demands because a large disposable payload changes displacement, center of gravity, and hydrodynamic behavior during the mission. Releasing a payload weighing several thousand pounds can cause an immediate buoyancy and trim change that must be corrected without crew intervention. The vehicle must also determine whether a bay door opened correctly, whether the payload cleared the hull, and whether the release altered propulsion efficiency or acoustic signature. Oceaneering’s role is likely to center on subsea integration, vehicle support and U.S.-based execution, but the division of engineering responsibility has not been made public.

The 1,000-nautical-mile figure also requires careful interpretation. Range is not the same as combat radius: if the vehicle must return to its departure point, a nominal 1,000-nautical-mile range produces a radius of less than 500 nautical miles after accounting for reserve energy, currents, evasive routing, sensor operation, and time on station. One-way deployment, recovery at another port, or deliberate abandonment would extend operational reach, but each method changes cost and logistics. A pier-launched XLUUV could leave from a forward naval facility or commercial harbor without occupying a submarine torpedo tube or requiring a surface ship to enter the operating area. Tactically, it could survey a route, classify seabed contacts, and then place mines or sensors near a strait, naval base, or submarine transit corridor. It could also deploy acoustic receivers before a crisis, allowing other forces to monitor traffic without continuously exposing a crewed submarine. Its likely weakness would be speed: long-endurance underwater vehicles generally trade transit rate for energy efficiency, making pre-positioning and mission planning more important than rapid reaction.

CAMP is not a single-company procurement. On February 8, 2024, DIU and the Navy’s Advanced Undersea Systems office, PMS 394, selected Kongsberg, Oceaneering and Anduril for a separate large-displacement UUV prototyping effort focused on undersea sensing and payload delivery. DIU then opened the larger CAMP requirement in April 2025. Anduril announced its CAMP selection in March 2026, while a Metron-led team selected the same month and included Cellula Robotics, Integer Technologies and General Dynamics Applied Physical Sciences; Cellula is supplying its fuel-cell-powered Guardian autonomous underwater vehicle. Kongsberg and Oceaneering entered the publicly disclosed competition in July 2026 with a design-study award rather than a confirmed vehicle delivery. The available record therefore indicates parallel technical approaches involving batteries, fuel cells, and different hull architectures, not a final down-select. It also means Congress cannot yet compare unit price, payload mass, sustained speed, acoustic signature, energy reserve, production rate, or maintenance burden because those figures remain undisclosed.

The acquisition context explains why DIU is retaining several teams. The Navy’s Boeing Orca XLUUV effort was originally estimated at $379 million, but GAO reported a revised cost of $621 million for five vehicles and a test asset, an increase of $242 million or 64 percent. GAO also found that the program was more than three years late because production began without a documented production-readiness review and because design differences from Boeing’s Echo Voyager demonstrator required changes to the hull, batteries, pressure vessels, and manufacturing process. The Navy accepted the XLE0 Orca test asset in December 2023, but as of August 2025, GAO’s recommendations for a full cost estimate and production-readiness reviews remained open, with completion planned during fiscal year 2026. CAMP can reduce operational dependence on nuclear-powered submarines for mine laying, seabed surveillance and sensor placement, but only if endurance, payload release and autonomous recovery are demonstrated before production. The principal congressional issue is therefore not whether the Navy needs long-range XLUUVs; it is whether DIU can convert commercial underwater technology into repeatable military hardware without again treating a successful demonstration as evidence of production maturity.

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