Skip to main content

U.S. Navy Advances AGM-88G Missile Deployment for F-35 F/A-18 and EA-18G Fighter Jets Air Defense Strikes.


The U.S. Navy is advancing the AGM-88G AARGM-ER as a longer-range weapon for destroying advanced enemy air defenses, with internal carriage planned for the F-35 Lightning II and integration also underway on the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and EA-18G Growler. The weapon would give stealth, strike, and electronic-attack aircraft a common capability to attack hostile radars from greater distance while reducing exposure to modern surface-to-air threats.

According to information released by the U.S. Navy, the Navy-led program is supported by the U.S. Air Force and is designed to strengthen suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses across multiple combat aircraft. Deploying AARGM-ER across the F-35, Super Hornet, and Growler would expand options for penetrating integrated air-defense networks and improve aircraft survivability in high-threat operations.

Related Topic: First Combat Use of U.S. AGM-88 Missile by Ukrainian Su-27 Fighter Jet to Destroy Russian Air Defense

U.S. Marine Corps Cpl. Antonio Barrios, left, and Sgt. Ruben Medina, both aviation ordnance technicians with Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 232, Marine Aircraft Group 12, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, secure an AGM-88 HARM during an Aviation Training Relocation program at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, Feb. 5, 2026.

U.S. Marine Corps Cpl. Antonio Barrios, left, and Sgt. Ruben Medina, both aviation ordnance technicians with Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 232, Marine Aircraft Group 12, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, secure an AGM-88 HARM during an Aviation Training Relocation program at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, Feb. 5, 2026. (Picture source: U.S. Department of War/Defense)


According to the AARGM-ER Modernized Selected Acquisition Report (MSAR) for the FY2027 President’s Budget, the AGM-88G is designed to rapidly engage air-defense threats and introduces a new solid rocket motor to increase range over the earlier AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM). The report confirms that the missile is being configured for internal carriage on the F-35, while the program continues toward Initial Operational Capability (IOC).

The exact range of the AGM-88G AARGM-ER remains undisclosed in the unclassified acquisition report. This distinction is important because publicly cited range figures for earlier AGM-88 High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) variants should not be applied directly to AARGM-ER. The U.S. Navy document confirms only that the new missile uses a redesigned solid rocket motor to increase range, while more detailed performance information remains in a classified annex.

That improvement in reach is central to the value of AARGM-ER. Earlier AGM-88 HARM weapons gave U.S. combat aircraft a high-speed means of attacking hostile radar emitters, but modern Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS) are increasingly mobile, networked and capable of changing operating modes or shutting down emitters when an anti-radiation attack is detected. AARGM-ER is intended to improve the ability of U.S. aircraft to engage those threats from greater distance while reducing the exposure of the launch aircraft to Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) engagement zones.

For the F-35, the most important feature is that AARGM-ER is being configured for internal carriage. Internal carriage allows the aircraft to carry the weapon without relying exclusively on external stations, helping preserve the low-observable characteristics that make the F-35 valuable in heavily defended airspace. This is particularly important during Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) and Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses (DEAD) missions, where survivability depends not only on missile range but also on the aircraft’s ability to approach threat areas while reducing its detectability.

An internally carried AARGM-ER therefore gives the F-35 a capability that directly complements its stealth characteristics. Instead of depending entirely on other aircraft to suppress hostile radar and missile systems before entering contested airspace, the fighter can carry its own dedicated weapon to attack key components of an air-defense network. This strengthens the F-35’s role during the opening stages of an air campaign, when surveillance radars, fire-control radars, and long-range SAM systems still represent a major threat to follow-on forces.

The operational value extends beyond the individual F-35. Suppressing enemy radars can create temporary corridors through an IADS, reducing risk for other aircraft operating behind the first wave. Tankers, Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft, electronic-attack aircraft, strike fighters and other supporting forces all benefit when hostile surface-to-air missile batteries are forced to shut down, relocate or are physically destroyed.

This effect is especially relevant to the U.S. Navy because carrier air wings may have to operate against increasingly capable coastal and land-based air-defense networks. A carrier-based F-35C equipped with an internally carried extended-range anti-radiation missile can help suppress those defenses while retaining the low-observable configuration needed to operate closer to defended areas. The missile therefore supports not only individual aircraft survivability but also the wider Carrier Air Wing's (CVW) ability to generate follow-on strike missions against targets protected by layered air defenses.

AARGM-ER also strengthens the relationship between the F-35C and the EA-18G Growler. The Growler specializes in Electronic Attack (EA) and can interfere with or degrade enemy radar and communications systems, while AARGM-ER provides a kinetic means of attacking the same broader air-defense network. The F/A-18E/F Super Hornet adds another launch aircraft, giving U.S. Navy commanders several ways to distribute anti-air-defense weapons across a strike package.

The result is a more flexible approach to SEAD and DEAD operations. Growlers can apply electronic effects against enemy sensors, Super Hornets can contribute missile volume, and F-35s can use low observability and advanced sensors to operate in more heavily defended areas. Because AARGM-ER is being integrated across all three aircraft types, commanders gain greater flexibility in deciding which aircraft carries the missile and from what part of the strike package it is launched.

The AGM-88G also incorporates modernization intended to improve its usefulness in contested electromagnetic environments. The MSAR identifies integration of the NAVSTRIKE-M Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver capable of Military Code (M-Code) navigation, with fielding listed for December 2026. It also identifies a Guidance Processor (GP) redesign intended to address component obsolescence and incorporate additional security features.

M-Code integration is particularly relevant because operations against advanced air defenses are likely to occur in environments where navigation signals are jammed, spoofed, or otherwise contested. The report does not provide enough unclassified information to quantify AARGM-ER’s resistance to Electronic Warfare (EW), but adding M-Code navigation shows that the missile's modernization path includes navigation resilience.

The planned inventory size suggests AARGM-ER is intended to become a significant element of the U.S. air-launched weapons arsenal rather than a small, specialized capability. The FY2027 acquisition report maintains a procurement objective of 2,080 AGM-88G All Up Round (AUR) missiles, excluding 91 Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM), while authorized Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) has increased from 208 to 582 missiles.

That quantity matters operationally because SEAD operations can consume large numbers of weapons during sustained combat. A modern IADS may contain multiple surveillance radars, engagement radars, mobile SAM batteries and supporting command-and-control nodes spread across a large geographic area. Maintaining a deep inventory allows U.S. forces to conduct repeated suppression missions rather than relying on a limited stock of specialized missiles during the opening phase of a conflict.

The long-term procurement profile also indicates an intention to establish substantial production capacity. The FY2027 budget supplement projects purchases rising to 210 missiles in FY2032 and approximately 209 missiles annually from FY2033 through FY2039. This future production rate would support both stockpile expansion and the ability to replace weapons expended during extended high-intensity operations.

International participation could further strengthen the production base. The report identifies a U.S.-Italian project agreement covering AARGM-ER production, sustainment, and follow-on development and records Foreign Military Sales (FMS) arrangements associated with several allied countries. The program also states that international quantities can help sustain production-line continuity and preserve economies of scale.

For the U.S. Navy, the strategic value of AARGM-ER is therefore broader than its undisclosed extended range. The missile combines a counter-radar mission, increased propulsion performance, internal F-35 carriage and compatibility with the Super Hornet and Growler, giving a carrier air wing several complementary ways to attack the sensors and missile systems that threaten access to contested airspace.

For the F-35 specifically, AARGM-ER adds an important offensive dimension to survivability. Stealth helps the aircraft reduce its exposure to enemy detection, but the ability to attack the air-defense network itself can change the tactical environment for every aircraft that follows. An internally carried AGM-88G therefore gives the U.S. Navy a way to combine low observability, EW, SEAD, and kinetic strike in a single air-campaign architecture, strengthening carrier aviation's ability to penetrate, suppress, and ultimately dismantle sophisticated enemy air-defense networks.

Explore More Defense News

 Land Defense News
 Naval Defense News
 Defense Aerospace News

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.


Copyright © 2019 - 2024 Army Recognition | Webdesign by Zzam