US Navy's Trump-class battleship fleet construction could cost $275 billion by 2056, CBO report shows.

On August 5, 2026, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) published an official report estimating that the U.S. Navy's planned procurement of 15 Trump-class nuclear-powered guided missile battleships will total $275 billion between FY2028 and FY2056. The analysis projects a lead-ship authorization cost of $23.4 billion in FY2028, followed by 14 production vessels averaging $18 billion each to replace the previously planned DDG(X) destroyer program. Adopting the 35,000-ton nuclear-powered hull design increases planned annual surface combatant procurement funding by 69 percent to provide enhanced fleet air defense, ballistic missile defense, and hypersonic strike capacity.

The Congressional Budget Office estimates that procuring fifteen 35,000-ton Trump-class battleships equipped with 128 Mk 41 VLS cells, 12 Conventional Prompt Strike hypersonic missiles, and nuclear propulsion will require $275 billion through FY2056. This acquisition timeline raises average annual surface combatant funding from $11.3 billion to $19.2 billion while increasing total required shipbuilding tonnage output by 60 percent over thirty years.

Related topic: US Navy's new nuclear-powered Trump-class battleship program may cost up to $700 Billion by 2090

The Trump-class battleship would combine the U.S. Navy's largest weapons inventory, including hypersonic, nuclear, anti-ship, land-attack and air defense missiles, with an electromagnetic railgun, high-energy lasers, conventional naval guns and close-range defensive weapons. (Picture source: CBO)

On August 5, 2026, the U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that procuring 15 Trump-class nuclear-powered guided missile battleships would cost $275 billion between FY2028 and FY2056, with the lead ship valued at $23.4 billion, instead of the $17 billion previously requested, and the fourteen follow-on vessels averaging $18 billion each. The first battleship would be authorized in FY2028, followed by two ships in FY2030 and FY2031, then one every two years through FY2056, creating a 28-year acquisition sequence for a class whose design is still in its early stages. The Trump-class will therefore increase the average annual procurement funding for large surface combatants from $6.9 billion under the FY2025 plan to $15.2 billion under the FY2027 plan, a rise of 120%.

Across the full surface combatant account, including frigates, annual procurement rises from $11.3 billion to $19.2 billion. The Trump-class is intended to combine 128 Mk 41 launch cells, twelve Conventional Prompt Strike hypersonic missiles, SLCM-N nuclear cruise missiles, an enlarged AN/SPY-6 radar, two high-energy lasers, an electromagnetic railgun, conventional naval guns, electronic warfare systems and reserve capacity for weapons not yet in service. At a full-load displacement of 35,000 long tons, the Trump-class battleship would be 3.61 times heavier than a Flight III Arleigh Burke-class destroyer and 2.22 times heavier than a Zumwalt-class destroyer.

The projected length of 256 to 268 m would place the ship near the length of an Iowa-class battleship and slightly longer than the two largest battleships ever built, the Japanese Yamato and her sister ship Musashi, although the American ship would displace less than half as much because it would not carry a comparable armor belt, armored citadel, or nine 460 mm guns. Beam would reach 105 to 115 ft, compared with 59 ft for a Flight III DDG-51, 81 ft for a Zumwalt, and 108 ft for an Iowa, while draft would remain between 24 and 30 ft. Sustained speed would exceed 30 knots, allowing the ship to operate with carrier strike groups without accepting the endurance penalties imposed on conventionally powered escorts running at high speed.

Crew size is estimated at 650 to 850 personnel, compared with 359 on a Flight III DDG-51, 197 on a Zumwalt, and 1,562 on a modernized Iowa. Nuclear propulsion alone raises procurement cost by 13% compared with a conventionally powered design, but it removes ship fuel consumption from the operating profile, reduces dependence on replenishment oilers, and allows the ship to sustain high-speed transit for periods limited mainly by crew endurance. The planned missile armament centers on 128 Mk 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) cells and four large Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) launchers, each holding three hypersonic missiles, for a total of twelve CPS rounds. The Mk 41 battery exceeds the 122 cells carried by a Ticonderoga-class cruiser, the 96 cells on a Flight III Arleigh Burke, and the 80 cells on a Zumwalt, while the CPS launchers add a second capacity dedicated to long-range hypersonic strike.

The 128 standard cells could carry a mix of SM-2, SM-3 and SM-6 interceptors, Tomahawk land-attack missiles, anti-ship weapons, anti-submarine rockets and SLCM-N nuclear cruise missiles, although the final load would depend on mission priorities and magazine planning. If the CPS launchers were omitted, their volume could accommodate 32 additional Mk 41 cells and increase the battery to 160. A denser Mk 41 packaging method capable of increasing launcher capacity by 25% within the same physical space could further raise the standard battery from 128 to 160 cells while retaining CPS, or to 200 cells without the hypersonic tubes. Only the four Ohio-class SSGNs, each able to carry as many as 154 Tomahawks, approach the same conventional missile concentration, but those submarines are expected to retire within the next four years.

The battleship's combat system would be built around a scaled-up AN/SPY-6 integrated air and missile defense radar intended to conduct fleet air defense, ballistic missile defense, long-range surveillance and missile targeting at the same time. Planned weapons include one electromagnetic railgun, two high-energy laser systems, two 5-inch naval guns, two RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile launchers, four remotely operated 30 mm weapons, electronic warfare equipment, decoys and optical dazzlers. Electrical generation capacity is sized to support laser weapons in the 300 to 600 kW class, with growth potential toward approximately 1 MW, meaning the Trump-class reserves space, weight, power and cooling for systems that may not be ready when the lead ship begins construction. 

The $275 billion procurement total includes slightly more than $5 billion in one-time design and non-recurring engineering expenditure, contributing to a lead-ship price 30% above the follow-on average. A conventionally powered version of the same 35,000-ton hull would cost $243 billion, including $21.3 billion for the first ship and $15.9 billion for each subsequent vessel, reducing acquisition expenditure by $32 billion across the class. The nuclear premium is therefore $2.1 billion on the lead ship and $2.1 billion on each average follow-on vessel before operating-cost differences are considered. One $18 billion battleship costs the same as five Flight III Arleigh Burke destroyers priced above $3 billion each, which would provide the ability to operate in several areas at once.

Future Ford-class carriers are the only U.S. Navy ships with comparable procurement prices, at $22 billion each, placing the lead battleship $1.4 billion above a future carrier and the average follow-on Trump-class $4 billion below it. The CBO cost estimate includes a 16% adjustment for shipbuilding costs rising faster than economy-wide inflation and another 12% for current labor-hour growth, workforce instability, and supplier constraints. As estimated by Army Recognition in May 2026, the Trump-class full lifecycle expenditure could reach between $500 billion and $700 billion through the 2090 to 2110 period once procurement, crew costs, maintenance, reactor support, modernization, infrastructure, and sustainment are included.

At current prices, that range is equivalent to 33 to 53 new Ford-class carriers, 180 to 315 Flight III Arleigh Burkes, 357 to 583 FF(X) frigates, 104 to 162 Virginia-class Block V submarines, or 50 to 77 Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines, comparisons that show the scale of the budget commitment potentially centered on one warship class. Moreover, the construction plan depends on a distributed model with final assembly at Newport News Shipbuilding and major modules produced by Bath Iron Works, Ingalls Shipbuilding and other facilities. Newport News is the only U.S. yard certified to construct new nuclear-powered surface ships, while Bath and Ingalls have the facilities and surface combatant experience needed to fabricate large hull sections but lack nuclear construction certification.

Final assembly is expected in Dock 12, the same facility used to assemble Ford-class aircraft carriers, creating direct competition for dry-dock time, nuclear-qualified welders, electricians, pipefitters, naval architects, heavy-lift capacity and quality-assurance personnel. Newport News is already building Ford-class carriers, Virginia-class attack submarines and Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines, and all three production lines face schedule pressure. For instance, the US Navy assumes an eight-year construction period for the first battleship, yet Arleigh Burke destroyers already require an average of eleven years from authorization to delivery, compared with five years between 2000 and 2009. Attack submarines, destroyers and large amphibious ships now require nine to eleven years to build, compared with five to six years during the first decade of the 2000s.

The 2027 plan nevertheless calls for Trump-class authorization in FY2028, FY2030 and FY2031, then every other year through FY2056, while continuing to procure two Flight III Arleigh Burkes in most years. By 2035, annual large surface combatant production would rise from 16,000 light tons to 35,000 light tons, and total output over thirty years would increase by 60%. The fifteen battleships alone represent 420,000 light tons of work, compared with 345,000 tons for the 28 DDG(X)s they replace, meaning the industrial burden grows even though the number of future hulls falls from 28 to fifteen. The most immediate program risk is the attempt to authorize the lead ship in FY2028 before the design reaches the level of maturity normally required for stable construction.

A displacement increase from 35,000 to 41,000 tons, already considered in Navy planning assumptions, would raise the lead ship estimate by 16%, adding $3.74 billion and increasing the price from $23.4 billion to more than $27.1 billion before other changes. Raising the lightship-to-full-load ratio from 80% to 85% would add another 6%, while the five historical U.S. nuclear-powered surface combatant classes averaged 87%, including 89% for Long Beach, 91% for Bainbridge, 91% for Truxtun, 83% for California and 86% for Virginia. More extensive shock protection, compartmentation, redundancy, armor, damage control features and nuclear safety margins would push structural weight and cost upward.

Operationally, the Trump battleship would combine fleet command, air defense, ballistic missile defense, anti-ship warfare, land attack, hypersonic strike, tactical nuclear strike and arsenal-ship functions in one hull. That concentration reduces duplication in crews and machinery, but it also creates a high-value target and links several mission areas to the availability of the same ship. The central force planning issue is therefore not whether a Trump-class battleship carries more weapons than any U.S. vessel in service, which it clearly does, but whether fifteen heavily concentrated nuclear combatants provide greater wartime value, survivability, and geographic coverage than a much, much larger number of aircraft carriers, destroyers, submarines, and frigates funded from the same long-term budget, which could reasonably and logically be doubted.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.

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