U.S. Congress approves deployment of SLCM-N nuclear cruise missiles on Trump-class battleships.

The U.S. Congress confirmed on January 8, 2026, that the Nuclear-Armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N) will equip the future Trump-class guided-missile battleship.

On January 8, 2026, the U.S. Congress confirmed that the Nuclear-Armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N) will be integrated into the future Trump-class guided-missile battleship, also known as BBG(X). The decision formally links the revived non-strategic nuclear cruise missile to a new large surface combatant program, marking the first planned deployment of a nuclear cruise missile on a U.S. surface warship since the early 1990s.
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The SLCM-N cruise missile will equip the future Trump-class battleship, marking the return of sea-based nuclear strike options beyond submarines for the U.S. Navy. (Picture source: U.S. Navy)

This decision connects a revived non-strategic nuclear cruise missile with a new large surface combatant concept for the first time, expanding the scope of sea-based nuclear options beyond attack submarines alone. The confirmation follows several announcements that unfolded between 2024 and late 2025, including an acceleration of the missile program, mandatory funding mechanisms, workforce reallocation inside the nuclear enterprise, and the political decision to revive battleship-scale surface warships as part of a broader fleet expansion concept. Together, these steps define a clearer trajectory for both the missile and the ship class, with overlapping timelines that extend from near-term limited deployment requirements into the late 2030s.

The historical background of SLCM-N reflects a reversal of post-Cold War naval nuclear policy that had removed such weapons from U.S. surface ships and most submarines. The U.S. Navy first deployed a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile in the mid-1980s with the TLAM-N, a nuclear variant of the Tomahawk, which had a stated range of 2,500 kilometers and was carried on surface ships and attack submarines. In 1991, the United States withdrew sea-based tactical nuclear weapons, leading to the removal of TLAM-N by mid-1992 and the elimination of the nuclear mission for surface ships, while retaining a latent submarine option. The Obama Administration recommended retiring TLAM-N in 2010, and the Navy completed that retirement in 2013. The first Trump Administration reversed course in 2018 by proposing the SLCM-N as a regional, non-strategic nuclear option, alongside the low-yield W76-2 warhead for submarine-launched ballistic missiles, reintroducing the concept of a sea-launched nuclear cruise missile as part of U.S. deterrence planning.

The SLCM-N capabilities and specifications have been shaped by this historical context and by the desire to minimize development risk. The missile is intended to be a nuclear-capable cruise missile deployable from naval platforms rather than ballistic missile submarines, with initial integration work focused on Virginia-class attack submarines and later expanded to surface combatants. The warhead planning centers on the W80 warhead family, derived from designs already associated with air-launched cruise missiles, reducing the need for an entirely new nuclear package. Development activity during 2025 included prototype missile design work as well as contracts for the launcher and canister, indicating preparation for platform integration rather than purely conceptual studies. The missile is intended to provide a low-yield, non-ballistic nuclear option that can be forward deployed or deployable without visible force generation, offering different signaling characteristics compared with aircraft-delivered systems or submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

The cost profile of SLCM-N reflects sustained congressional support despite repeated executive-branch efforts to terminate the program. Authorizations for the missile reached $25 million in FY2023, $190 million in FY2024, and $252 million in FY2025, with corresponding appropriations of $25 million and $130 million for the first two years, while the warhead line received $20 million in FY2023 and $70 million in FY2024, with $70 million authorized again in FY2025. Beyond annual appropriations, reconciliation legislation assumed $1.92 billion in mandatory funding for the missile and $272 million for the warhead, with additional sums of $2 billion and $400 million, respectively, allocated to accelerate work. The FY2026 NDAA authorized $210 million for the missile and $50 million for the warhead and imposed a requirement to deliver a limited number of deployable assets by September 2032, alongside an earlier statutory requirement for initial operational capability by September 30, 2034. A Congressional Budget Office estimate placed combined missile and warhead costs at $10 billion between 2023 and 2032 if the program began in 2024, excluding later production and several integration and operations costs.

The Trump-class battleship has its own historical background rooted in the absence of U.S. Navy battleships since the retirement of the Iowa class in 1992. After World War II and the Cold War, no new battleships were constructed, and attempts to replace their fire support role shifted toward destroyers, most notably the Zumwalt class, which was curtailed after three ships. Subsequent planning focused on the DDG(X) large surface combatant, but by late 2025 the administration announced a new guided-missile battleship concept as part of a wider effort to expand the surface fleet and respond to concerns about global shipbuilding competition. The Trump-class was presented as both a symbolic and functional revival of very large surface warships, intended to integrate missile firepower, command roles, and advanced defensive systems within a single platform.

Planned capabilities and specifications of the Trump-class reflect its role as a large missile-centric combatant rather than a traditional gun battleship. Current planning parameters describe a ship exceeding 35,000 tonnes in full-load displacement, with a length between roughly 256 and 268 meters, a beam of 32 to 35 meters, and a projected crew of 650 to 850 personnel. The propulsion concept targets speeds above 30 knots using an integrated power system combining gas turbines and diesel generators to meet both propulsion and electrical demands. The primary missile battery is planned to include 128 Mk 41 vertical launch cells and a separate 12-cell launcher for Conventional Prompt Strike hypersonic missiles, with the ability to embark SLCM-N adding a nuclear strike option to the surface fleet. Additional elements under consideration include two 127 mm guns, a potential 32-megajoule railgun, Rolling Airframe Missile launchers, close-in weapons, directed-energy systems rated between 300 and 600 kilowatts, modern radar and electronic warfare suites, and aviation facilities for helicopters and tiltrotor aircraft supporting fleet-level command and coordination.

The cost and timeline of the Trump-class are significant factors shaping its interaction with the SLCM-N program. The Navy has indicated that an initial design schedule would be clarified within 30 to 60 days as of January 2026, with a design phase expected to run roughly from 2026 into 2031 or 2032, followed by construction in the early 2030s and commissioning in the late 2030s or near 2040. Cost estimates range from about $10 billion per ship for later units to as much as $15 billion for the lead ship, provisionally named USS Defiant, potentially making the Trump-class battleship more expensive than a Ford-class aircraft carrier. Industrial planning anticipates a roughly 72-month design effort led by the Navy with support from major U.S. shipbuilders, and the program is intended to absorb and supersede elements of earlier DDG(X) work. These timelines overlap with SLCM-N’s mandated limited deployment by 2032, linking the missile’s early operational availability with longer-term ambitions to embed it within a new generation of large surface warships.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.