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Russia Rehearses Baltic Sea Denial Strategy with Anti-Ship Strikes Using Bal Coastal Missile System.
On 16 February 2026, Russian Baltic Fleet coastal missile troops conducted a training exercise in Kaliningrad using the Bal coastal defense system to simulate strikes against enemy surface targets. The drill signals Moscow’s continued emphasis on layered coastal deterrence in one of Europe’s most strategically sensitive maritime corridors.
Russia’s Baltic Fleet conducted combat training on 16 February 2026 with its Bal coastal missile system along the coast of the Kaliningrad Region, rehearsing simulated strikes against hostile surface vessels in the Baltic Sea. According to the fleet’s press service and reporting by TASS, missile crews carried out electronic launches while practicing full deployment procedures, including rapid movement to firing positions and concealment. The exercise also integrated unmanned aerial vehicles for surveillance and positional security, reflecting a growing emphasis on networked targeting and force protection. Kaliningrad, geographically separated from mainland Russia and bordered by NATO members, remains a focal point of regional military planning. The drill underscores Moscow’s sustained investment in shore-based anti-ship capabilities designed to complicate NATO naval operations in the Baltic.
Russia’s Baltic Fleet staged a coordinated coastal defense drill in Kaliningrad using the Bal missile system and UAV support to rehearse simulated anti-ship strikes, underscoring Moscow’s continued focus on reinforcing its Baltic Sea deterrence posture (Picture Source: Russian MoD)
During the exercise, missile units redeployed in column formation from their permanent bases to a designated positional area along the Kaliningrad coast, where they brought the Bal launchers and support vehicles to combat readiness. Once in position, crews practised opening firing positions, conducting pre-launch checks, and carrying out simulated engagements against surface targets using electronic launches rather than live missiles. The scenario also included rapid changes of firing position after “strikes”, emphasising shoot-and-scoot tactics intended to reduce vulnerability to enemy counter-fire and reconnaissance. Camouflage, concealment and movement in difficult terrain were highlighted as key skills for the personnel operating in a region that is under constant satellite and aerial observation by NATO members.
The Bal coastal missile system (Russian designation 3K60, NATO code SSC-6 Sennight) is one of the principal anti-ship weapons of the Russian Navy’s coastal forces. Mounted on MZKT-7930 8×8 high-mobility chassis, a typical Bal battery comprises command and control vehicles equipped with surface-search radar and up to four transporter-erector-launchers, each carrying eight Kh-35 family subsonic anti-ship cruise missiles. The Kh-35, originally developed as a compact counterpart to Western systems such as Harpoon, is a sea-skimming missile with a high-explosive warhead of around 145 kg, guided by inertial navigation with active radar homing in the terminal phase. Depending on the missile variant and targeting support, reported ranges extend from roughly 120 km to more than 250 km, allowing a Bal unit in Kaliningrad to cover large sectors of the central and southern Baltic Sea approaches.
Designed to engage surface combatants, amphibious vessels and logistic shipping up to several thousand tonnes displacement, Bal is optimised for denying an adversary the ability to operate freely near the Russian coastline. The system can fire its missiles in salvos, engaging multiple targets simultaneously or saturating the defences of a high-value ship or task group. Its mobility is central to its survivability: according to open sources, a Bal unit can transition from march to combat readiness in minutes, fire, and then quickly relocate to secondary positions. In the configuration deployed around Kaliningrad, Bal is usually integrated into a broader coastal defence architecture that includes surveillance radars, other missile systems and air-defence assets, creating overlapping fields of fire across key maritime axes.
The operational history of Bal reflects Russia’s wider approach to coastal anti-access and area denial. The system entered Russian service in the 2000s and has since been deployed with several fleets, including the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets, with regular participation in command-and-staff and live-fire exercises. In Kaliningrad, Bal units have been gradually integrated into an evolving network alongside Bastion-P coastal missile batteries, which employ the faster and longer-range P-800 Oniks missile. This pairing allows Russian forces to threaten both medium-sized surface combatants and higher-value targets at greater distances, creating a layered anti-ship defence reaching well beyond territorial waters.
From a tactical perspective, the latest drill highlights several trends. The emphasis on electronic launches shows that Russian coastal troops are focusing on the full kill chain, detection, target acquisition, fire control and post-strike manoeuvre, without expending expensive munitions. The march from permanent bases to the positional area, combined with camouflage and frequent changes of position, reflects an assumption that coastal missile units will operate under continuous threat from enemy air and long-range fires. The explicit mention of training with unmanned aerial vehicles for positional security underlines the growing role of drones in protecting high-value missile assets, by enhancing situational awareness, detecting enemy reconnaissance and potentially cueing counter-measures against special forces or loitering munitions.
Exercises of this type reinforce the role of Kaliningrad as a forward bastion for Russian power projection and deterrence in the Baltic Sea. The exclave sits between Poland and Lithuania, close to the so-called Suwałki corridor, and Bal batteries deployed along its shoreline can threaten shipping lanes leading to Polish and Lithuanian ports, as well as sea lines of communication used to reinforce NATO’s eastern flank. When combined with Bastion coastal missiles, long-range air-defence systems and strike assets based in the region, Bal contributes to an anti-access environment that complicates the planning of any maritime operation near the Russian coast. Each new training iteration therefore has a signalling dimension: it demonstrates to neighbouring states that Russia maintains ready, mobile anti-ship capabilities in the Baltic, even as its armed forces are heavily engaged elsewhere.
The 16 February training of the Baltic Fleet’s Bal coastal missile troops on the Kaliningrad coast illustrates both the routine and the strategic aspects of Russia’s coastal defence posture. On the one hand, it is a standard combat-training cycle, focused on marching, deployment, simulated missile engagements and protection of the positional area, now reinforced by the systematic use of unmanned aerial vehicles. On the other hand, it confirms that Russia continues to invest in the readiness of its coastal missile forces in a region where even peacetime drills carry a clear strategic message. For observers of Baltic security, the exercise is another reminder that any future crisis at sea in this area would unfold under the shadow of mobile, radar-guided anti-ship missiles capable of shaping access to one of Europe’s most sensitive maritime frontiers.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.