Croatia to purchase two new multipurpose corvettes in largest naval procurement to date.

Croatia plans to acquire two new multipurpose corvettes, marking the largest naval procurement in the history of the Croatian Navy by both value and ship size.

According to Jutarnji on January 6, 2026, Croatia is preparing to acquire two new multipurpose corvettes, marking the largest naval procurement in the history of the Croatian Navy by both value and ship size. The program, estimated at €660 million to €1.6 billion, aims to provide regional sea control in the Adriatic and support NATO and EU maritime operations. The possible agreement has drawn interest from eight countries and twelve shipyards and is expected to define the Croatian Navy’s core surface capability for decades.
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The future Croatian corvette will likely be a modern multipurpose corvette optimized for regional sea control, not blue-water power projection, placing it firmly above offshore patrol vessels but below light frigates, with limited but credible self-defense. (Picture source: Army Recognition)

Croatia plans to acquire two new multipurpose corvettes, representing both the largest naval procurement in the country’s history and the introduction of the biggest warships ever operated by the Croatian Navy. After years of uncertainty, the political leadership announced in 2025 that the Navy would pursue a new warship, before being refined into a program focused specifically on corvettes rather than larger frigates or smaller patrol ships. Now covering two ships rather than a single hull, the project has attracted a strong international interest, with eight countries and twelve shipyards competing to supply the ships.

Depending on the final configuration and industrial arrangements, the total value of the program is estimated between €660 million and €1.6 billion, placing it among the most expensive defense procurements since Croatia’s independence. The ships under consideration fall within the corvette category, positioned above offshore patrol vessels and missile boats but below frigates, and are intended primarily for regional sea control rather than deep-ocean power projection. Modern corvettes typically displace between 1,000 and 3,500 tonnes and measure roughly 80 to 120 meters in length, making them large enough for sustained operations but still suited to confined seas like the Adriatic and limited deployments across the Mediterranean.

These ships cover three core tasks at once: fighting enemy ships, defending against aircraft and missiles, and hunting submarines, although most designs are constrained in at least one of these domains. Air defense is usually the limiting factor compared to larger warships, as corvettes most often carry short-range systems with engagement ranges of 20 to 25 kilometers, only occasionally medium-range missiles in the 60 to 70 kilometer class, and never long-range air-defense weapons. These constraints frame the Croatian choice as a balance between survivability, cost, and mission scope rather than a pursuit of full frigate-level capability. Operational requirements described for the Croatian Navy emphasize control of Croatia’s half of the Adriatic Sea rather than distant force projection.

The geographic reality that the Adriatic Sea is narrow and largely enclosed by allied coastlines reduces the likelihood of hostile surface units entering freely, but it does not eliminate the risk posed by submarines operating below the surface, as they are harder to detect and track. For that reason, a strong anti-submarine warfare, combined with enough air defense to protect the ship itself or allow it to operate safely with allied vessels, is presented as a central requirement. Beyond national defense, the new corvettes are also expected to take part in NATO and EU missions, mainly in the Mediterranean and potentially as far as the Suez Canal and Red Sea. The decision to procure two ships instead of one is justified by availability needs, ensuring that at least one vessel remains operational at all times.

In Croatia, the current debate highlights a preference for either a lower-cost configuration or a higher-capability configuration, while portraying mid-range compromises as offering the least operational return for the investment. The warship program is also linked to systems Croatia already operates on land and at sea. The coastline is monitored by U.S.-built AESA radars acquired in the 2000s, and the Navy operates three mobile coastal missile batteries that are approaching the end of their service life. Any new ship is therefore expected to remain compatible with Croatia's existing missile inventory to avoid costly changes. Another growing concern is the spread of unmanned threats, including remote-controlled kamikaze boats, longer-range torpedoes, and underwater or semi-submerged drones, due to their low cost and potential for mass employment.

While such systems are not entirely new, they showed their effectiveness in the Ukrainian war. This has strengthened the argument that Croatia will need both well-protected ships and its own unmanned systems, some of which could be developed locally, alongside the new corvettes. Therefore, the industrial participation remains a sensitive issue, as Croatia weighs the desire to involve domestic shipyards, but difficulties with previous patrol boat programs have raised concerns about risk and delays. While the Croatian shipyards are technically capable of building hulls, the hull itself typically represents only about 25 percent of a corvette’s total cost, meaning most high-value systems, such as sensors, weapons, and electronics, would still be imported.

For this reason, the most realistic approach leans toward a foreign construction combined with offset work or partial assembly in Croatia, depending on the selected partner. Beyond the ships themselves, the acquisition of two corvettes is presented as a chance to reshape how the Croatian Navy operates, where corvettes would serve as command platforms to coordinate unmanned surface and underwater systems and operate in environments saturated with drones. If carried through as planned, the acquisition would redefine the Croatian Navy’s capabilities for decades, while failure to equip the ships with sufficient combat systems risks limiting the strategic return of a historic investment.

When it comes to weapons, the discussion focuses on proven systems rather than experimental technology. Anti-ship missile options include the Norwegian NSM, with a stated range of 180 to 200 kilometers and the ability to hit land targets, the Swedish RBS-15 Mark IV, heavier but able to reach targets close to 300 kilometers, and the French Exocet Block 3c, which also offers limited land-attack capability. The main question is usually how many launchers the future ship carries, often four or eight, rather than which missile is chosen.

For air defense, short-range protection can be provided by systems like the RAM system (using the RIM-116 missile with a reach of up to 8.9 kilometers), while medium-range options focus on missiles such as the CAMM-ER or the RIM-162 Evolved SeaSparrow, both with ranges of about 60 kilometers. Corvettes do not carry the deep vertical launch cells found on larger warships, which explains why their air-defense capability remains limited by design. A recurring theme amid Croatian media is the modularity, with modern hulls designed to accept different radar, sonar, and missile suites in a “building-block” approach rather than tightly integrated, fixed configurations.

With all of these demands, the competitive field spans across Europe, Türkiye, South Korea, and the United States, with Europe described as particularly strong in this segment. According to Jutarnji, France could offer the Gowind, which combines Exocet missiles, vertical launch cells for MICA and possibly Aster 15, and a balanced mix of sensors with possible industrial offsets, making it one of the more capable options. Germany is linked to the Braunschweig class, optimized for coastal defense, as it carries RBS-15 Mark III missiles, but only short-range air defense. Italy could offer either the European Patrol Corvette, whose future remains uncertain due to diverging national requirements, or the Al Zubarah class built for Qatar, which approaches the capability of a light frigate at a higher cost.

The Netherlands is associated with the SIGMA design, noted for its modularity but rarely produced in a high-end configuration, while Spain is linked to the Avante 2200, broadly similar in concept to the Gowind. Türkiye's Ada-class, which is seen as more affordable and optimized for anti-submarine warfare, remains limited in air defense, while carrying the Atmaca missile with a 200-kilometer range and land-attack capability. South Korea is highlighted for offering larger ships closer to light frigates, such as the Incheon-class (FFX-I) and Daegu-class (FFX-II), with hull lengths of 120 to 125 meters, medium-range air defense, competitive pricing, and a willingness to share technology. Finally, U.S. options based on the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) design, such as the Saudi HMS Saud, are generally viewed with caution due to their rapid withdrawal from service.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.