Taiwan Approves Sky Bow IV Missile Production Adding 70 km-Range Missile Defense Against China.

Taiwan’s National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology has completed operational evaluation of the Strong Bow, or Sky Bow IV, air and missile defense system, clearing it for mass production. The new upper endo-atmospheric interceptor adds a 70 km engagement layer to Taiwan’s defenses, strengthening protection of airbases and command nodes against potential PLA ballistic missile strikes.

Taiwan’s National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology has completed the operational evaluation of the Strong Bow air and missile defense system, clearing the island’s first indigenous upper endo-atmospheric interceptor for mass production. The milestone strengthens Taiwan’s ability to keep airbases, ports, logistics nodes, and command centers functioning under the opening missile salvos of a People’s Liberation Army invasion scenario by expanding the defended battlespace and increasing engagement opportunities against high-altitude threats. It also signals momentum behind Taipei’s push for a more integrated, multi-tier air defense network as cross-strait military pressure continues to intensify.
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Taiwan's indigenous Strong Bow (Sky Bow IV) air and missile defense system adds a 70 km upper-layer intercept capability to the island's T-Dome architecture, strengthening protection of critical airbases and command nodes against PLA ballistic missile strikes and reinforcing deterrence against a potential Chinese invasion (Picture source: NCSIST).

Known domestically as Tien Kung IV, or Sky Bow IV, and developed under the Strong Bow program, the system is designed to intercept ballistic and high-altitude aerodynamic threats at up to 70 km, expanding coverage well above the 35 to 45 km class typically associated with Sky Bow III and creating a wider first-shot window before follow-on engagements by Patriot PAC-3. This ceiling matters less as a headline number than as a tactical geometry advantage. A higher intercept basket gives Taiwan more time to classify tracks, allocate interceptors, and execute shoot-look-shoot sequencing against leakers, while also reducing the probability that a single saturated axis collapses the defense of a critical node.

Strong Bow is a system of systems rather than a single missile. The architecture includes a new trailer-mounted active electronically scanned array radar with a detection range exceeding 500 km, paired with a command element intended to link dozens of launch units and automate engagement recommendations under high-pressure conditions. The radar’s AESA configuration enables rapid beam steering, multiple simultaneous track files, and improved resistance to jamming compared to mechanically scanned arrays, all essential characteristics when facing large-scale ballistic and cruise missile raids supported by electronic warfare.

The missile itself has been described in open reporting as a two-stage interceptor. A solid-fuel booster accelerates the weapon into the thin upper atmosphere, after which a separating second stage takes over for the terminal endgame using thrust vectoring and an onboard millimeter-wave seeker for high-resolution homing. An assessment brief shared with Army Recognition further characterizes the design logic as upper endo-atmospheric maneuvering enabled by a combined control approach, blending aerodynamic control early in flight with thrust-based attitude and divert control in the terminal phase. This configuration is consistent with the physics of intercepting fast reentry targets, where conventional fins rapidly lose authority as air density drops and precise attitude control becomes critical to maintaining intercept geometry.

Warhead and kill mechanism details remain partially opaque in official disclosures, but defense reporting indicates Strong Bow likely uses a directed-fragmentation lethality package rather than a pure hit-to-kill concept. That engineering choice trades the exquisite terminal accuracy demanded by kinetic intercept for a larger effective lethal volume at the cost of heavier endgame hardware. For Taiwan, this approach aligns with the operational problem it faces: defeating large numbers of short-range ballistic missiles and quasi-ballistic threats in terminal flight, potentially amid electronic attack, decoys, and debris. In such a scenario, the probability of kill and inventory efficiency can outweigh the theoretical advantages of kinetic impact alone.

The most consequential capability is not simply altitude, but networked engagement tempo. Strong Bow’s AESA radar and command center are designed to integrate with Sky Bow III and to incorporate AI-assisted decision support that recommends which tier should take the shot first based on track quality and battlespace conditions. This networked approach forms the backbone of Taiwan’s T-Dome initiative, which seeks to integrate disparate sensors and effectors to raise interception rates through faster correlation, improved resource allocation, and greater survivability via mobility and dispersion. The system is also intended to link with long-range early warning radars such as the Leshan site, enabling earlier cueing of fire-control sensors and compressing the sensor-to-shooter timeline.

Strong Bow is tailored to the opening phases of a People’s Liberation Army coercion or invasion campaign, where the PLA Rocket Force and airpower would likely attempt to paralyze Taiwan’s command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance network, crater runways, and shut ports to prevent reinforcement and enable air and maritime blockade operations. By extending the defended footprint upward and outward, Taipei is attempting to force Beijing into a larger expenditure of missiles to achieve the same level of functional damage. The objective is not an impenetrable shield, but operational continuity. Preserving enough radars, command posts, and airfields to sustain air operations and anti-ship targeting is central to complicating a cross-strait amphibious assault.

Procurement signals indicate Taipei aims to scale this architecture through a proposed multi-year special defense budget that includes at least two Strong Bow system sets and more than 100 interceptors, alongside expanded Patriot capacity, short-range air defense assets, and integration infrastructure designed to fuse indigenous and U.S.-supplied systems into a unified battle management network. Without that integration layer, additional interceptors alone would not guarantee survivability in a saturation fight.

The next indicator to watch is how rapidly Strong Bow transitions from evaluation to field deployment at scale, and whether follow-on developments aiming for higher intercept altitudes mature into a credible additional tier. In the operational logic of Taiwan Strait deterrence, each resilient and networked layer that preserves air operations and national command authority increases the uncertainty Beijing must accept before betting on a short, decisive invasion.