China deploys warships to track US Navy ship as maritime confrontations intensify in the South China Sea.

China’s People’s Liberation Army Southern Theater Command Navy dispatched naval forces to track and monitor the U.S. Navy littoral combat ship USS Charleston (LCS-18) near Sabina Shoal in the South China Sea. The tracking operation occurred approximately 145 kilometers (78 nautical miles) northwest of Palawan, inside the Philippines' exclusive economic zone, where Beijing and Manila have repeatedly clashed over maritime access. The U.S. Seventh Fleet maintained that the Independence-class warship was conducting routine operations in international waters, while Beijing cited unauthorized entry into Chinese-claimed territory.

China said its navy tracked the USS Charleston near Sabina Shoal after the American warship allegedly entered Chinese-claimed waters without authorization, while the U.S. Seventh Fleet maintained that its operations complied with international law. (Picture source: US Navy)

On October 20, 2026, China announced that its People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) dispatched forces to track the U.S. Navy littoral combat ship USS Charleston (LCS-18) near Sabina Shoal in the South China Sea, 145 km northwest of Palawan, where Beijing and the Philippines have repeatedly confronted each other over maritime access since 2024. PLA Southern Theater Command Navy spokesperson Yin Gang accused the American warship of entering Chinese-claimed waters without authorization and confirmed that naval forces had been dispatched to follow the American ship, while the U.S. Seventh Fleet maintained that the Independence-class ship was conducting routine operations in international waters. Philippine Rear Admiral Roy Vincent Trinidad also rejected Beijing's claim that the ship had entered Chinese territory.

China did not identify the vessels involved, their distance from Charleston, or the duration of surveillance, and no collision, weapons employment, or forced withdrawal was reported. The confrontation occurred as the Philippines recorded 31 Chinese naval and Coast Guard vessels near four contested maritime areas during October 13-19, an increase from 27 during October 6-12, while at least eight close encounters involving Chinese and Philippine forces had occurred across the South China Sea and Luzon Strait since October 1. The USS Charleston, commissioned on March 2, 2019, is an Independence-class littoral combat ship (LCS) assigned to Singapore-based Destroyer Squadron 7 under the U.S. Seventh Fleet. Its aluminum trimaran hull measures 127.4 m long and 31.6 m wide, with a 4.3 m draft and a full-load displacement of 3,100 tons.

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Four waterjets powered by combined diesel and gas turbines provide speeds exceeding 40 knots and a nominal range of 4,300 nautical miles at 18 knots. Its weapons include a Mk 110 57 mm gun, two Mk 44 30 mm cannons, an 11-cell SeaRAM defensive missile launcher, and mission-dependent anti-ship weapons, including Naval Strike Missiles (NSMs) on appropriately equipped ships. Unlike Arleigh Burke-class destroyers carrying 90 or 96 vertical-launch cells, the USS Charleston lacks the Aegis combat system and long-range area air defense missiles. Nevertheless, its shallow draft, speed, surface-search sensors, and aviation facilities supporting MH-60R/S helicopters or MQ-8 drones are more relevant to maintain a naval presence near contested reefs, although its embarked aircraft and weapons configuration on October 20 remain unconfirmed. Sabina Shoal's location explains why an American warship operating there attracts Chinese attention.

This atoll, known as Escoda Shoal in the Philippines and Xianbin Jiao in China, lies 76-78 nautical miles from Palawan, substantially inside the Philippines' 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone. Its position near maritime approaches to the eastern Spratlys makes it relevant to Philippine Coast Guard patrols and resupply movements toward contested areas, including Second Thomas Shoal, where Philippine troops occupy the grounded BRP Sierra Madre. In April 2024, Manila stationed the patrol vessel BRP Teresa Magbanua (MRRV-9701) at Sabina to monitor Chinese activity and suspected land reclamation. The ship remained for five months before withdrawing in September 2024 after repeated confrontations, including collisions and restrictions affecting its resupply. Another collision occurred during a Philippine refuelling mission in September 2026, with both sides blaming each other.

Philippine monitoring subsequently counted two PLA Navy warships near Sabina during October 13-19, although their involvement in the USS Charleston's tracking operation remains unconfirmed. The scale and distribution of Chinese deployments during the preceding week provide a more concrete measure of Beijing's maritime presence than the October 20 encounter alone. Chinese naval and Coast Guard deployments near contested areas with the Philippines increased from 27 vessels during October 6-12 to 31 during October 13-19, a 14.8% weekly rise. The latest count comprised 23 China Coast Guard vessels and eight PLAN warships, with Scarborough Shoal accounting for 16 ships, including 13 Coast Guard vessels and three warships, or 51.6% of the total. Second Thomas Shoal had six Coast Guard ships, Thitu Island had four Coast Guard ships and three warships, and Sabina had two PLAN vessels. Coast Guard ships represented 74.2% of the monitored force, producing a 2.875-to-one numerical advantage over naval warships.

Scarborough's concentration was eight times Sabina's, reflecting different observed force allocations: substantial Coast Guard coverage near a contested fishing area, six cutters near the BRP Sierra Madre resupply route, and a smaller military presence near Sabina. These figures measure vessels observed during one week, and exclude maritime militia vessels and Chinese ships operating outside the four monitored areas. The larger numerical component of China's maritime presence is its militia fleet, whose deployment patterns changed significantly between 2024 and 2025. Across 12 monitored reefs in the South China Sea, average daily militia presence increased from 232 vessels in 2024 to 241 in 2025, a 3.9% rise. More significant was the redistribution of ships: Mischief and Whitsun reefs together accounted for nearly half of observed militia activity, while Mischief experienced four separate peaks exceeding 200 vessels.

Conversely, Fiery Cross Reef's daily average declined from 32 vessels in 2024 to zero in 2025. The force combines professional maritime militia units with the state-subsidized Spratly Backbone Fishing Fleet, whose vessels can remain near contested features for extended periods. Concentrations were lowest between January and mid-February, then increased after Lunar New Year, with additional peaks in June and late November. These figures indicate a shift toward selected eastern Spratly locations, although vessels anchored near reefs cannot automatically be counted as ships actively conducting patrols or interceptions. Chinese facilities at Fiery Cross, Subi, and Mischief reefs support these deployments through harbors, surveillance installations, airfields, and defensive missile positions. Fiery Cross has a 3,048 m runway, while the three principal Chinese airfields in the Spratlys can accommodate military transport, patrol, and combat aircraft.

Their forward locations reduce transit requirements from mainland bases, but no confirmed information establishes which sensors or ships detected Charleston on October 20. The U.S. Navy instead maintains regional presence through forward-deployed warships, aircraft, and multinational operations. For instance, the USS Santa Barbara (LCS-32) conducted successive maritime activities with Philippine, Japanese, and Australian forces during July-August 2026, supported by the broader availability of P-8A Poseidon patrol aircraft and Marine Corps MQ-9A Reaper drones. In 2025, the USS Higgins (DDG-76) also conducted a freedom-of-navigation operation near Scarborough after a collision between a Chinese destroyer and a Chinese Coast Guard vessel killed two sailors. The USS Charleston encounter also followed Chinese maritime challenges extending beyond the Spratlys. On April 17, 2026, a Chinese Coast Guard vessel 5303 operated 31 nautical miles west of Tambobong, Pangasinan, while another Chinese cutter was detected 41 nautical miles west of Salvador Island, prompting challenges from Philippine aircraft.

At least eight close encounters involving Chinese and Philippine forces occurred during October 1-20 across the South China Sea and Luzon Strait, although not all involved physical interference. On October 20, a separate confrontation developed near the Taiwan-controlled Pratas Islands when a Chinese Coast Guard vessel entered Taiwan-restricted waters and exchanged radio challenges with the Taiwanese patrol ship Taichung. The previous week, Taiwan's Coast Guard had used a water cannon against a Chinese fishing vessel near Pratas, prompting a warning from Beijing. The operational distinction remains measurable: Beijing demonstrated the ability to follow an American Independence-class warship near a disputed reef, whereas actual denial of access would require evidence of successful obstruction, forced diversion, or interruption of its mission.

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Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, South Korea, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.