INTELLIGENCE: China Reveals JL-3 Submarine-Launched Nuclear Missile Capable of U.S. Continental Strike.

According to an analysis of parade footage broadcast by China Central Television (CCTV) on September 3, 2025, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) publicly displayed the JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) for the first time, marking a historic milestone in China's strategic weapons development. The missile was showcased during the Victory Day military parade in Beijing, signaling the emergence of a more confident and capable Chinese nuclear deterrent and the maturation of its undersea leg of the nuclear triad.
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China’s JL-3 submarine-launched nuclear missile seen for the first time during the 2025 Victory Day military parade in Beijing. The display marks a major milestone in the operational readiness of China’s sea-based nuclear deterrent, confirming its ability to strike the U.S. mainland from protected waters. (Picture source: China Social Network)

The Chinese JL-3’s SLBM (Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile) appearance is far more than symbolic. It represents the culmination of nearly two decades of strategic missile development aimed at giving the PLAN a credible sea-based second-strike capability. Previously shrouded in secrecy, the JL-3 is the successor to the JL-2, featuring significant advances in range, survivability, and payload delivery. With an estimated range of 9,000 to 12,000 kilometers, the JL-3 can now strike targets across the continental United States from patrol zones deep within the South China Sea, far beyond the reach of most Western anti-submarine warfare (ASW) platforms.

The JL-3 is designed for deployment aboard Type 094A and future Type 096 nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), enabling silent patrols with strategic impact. This missile incorporates solid-fuel propulsion, improved guidance systems, and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), giving it the capability to evade missile defenses while striking multiple strategic targets simultaneously. Military analysts believe each JL-3 may carry three to five warheads, or alternatively a combination of warheads and penetration aids designed to defeat U.S. missile defense interceptors such as the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system.

This first-ever public display of the JL-3 confirms that China is no longer content with strategic ambiguity. It signals the operationalization of its SLBM force and its readiness to use sea-based assets as a credible nuclear deterrent against U.S. strategic forces. Unlike the JL-2, which was limited to regional strike roles, the JL-3 positions China among the top tier of nations with true global SLBM reach, rivaling the U.S. Trident II D5 and Russia’s RSM-56 Bulava.

The JL-3 also reflects a dramatic evolution in China's strategic posture. For decades, Beijing adhered to a doctrine of minimum deterrence with a limited number of land-based missiles. The unveiling of the JL-3, alongside the new DF-61 intercontinental ballistic missile, points to a deliberate move toward a credible second-strike posture, emphasizing survivability, mobility, and assured retaliation. By strengthening the sea-based leg of its nuclear triad, China ensures that even if its land-based silos are targeted in a first strike, it retains the ability to respond with devastating force.

From a U.S. defense perspective, the JL-3 introduces several new challenges. First, its increased range means Chinese SSBNs no longer need to sail into the Pacific to threaten the U.S. mainland. This reduces their exposure to U.S. and allied ASW operations near the first island chain and increases their survivability. Second, MIRV capability complicates missile defense planning. Each JL-3 launch could deliver multiple warheads across a broad area, overwhelming current interception systems designed around limited incoming threats.

The operational integration of the JL-3 is directly tied to China’s evolving fleet of strategic missile submarines, specifically the Type 094A and the future Type 096. These platforms represent the maritime backbone of China’s nuclear deterrence. The Type 094A, an improved variant of the earlier Type 094 (Jin-class), is believed to carry up to 12 SLBMs, now upgraded from the JL-2 to the JL-3. The 094A incorporates enhancements in acoustic quieting, sonar systems, and reactor performance, though it remains noisier than U.S. Ohio-class or Russian Borei-class SSBNs. Nonetheless, its deployment has enabled China to conduct longer and more routine deterrence patrols in the South China Sea. It is believed that at least six Type 094/094A submarines are in active service.

The Type 096, currently under construction at the Bohai Shipyard, is expected to represent a generational leap forward in Chinese SSBN capability. It will likely feature a new hull design optimized for stealth, advanced air-independent propulsion for longer submerged endurance, integrated sonar arrays, and more sophisticated noise-reduction technologies. Most critically, it is anticipated to carry 16 to 24 JL-3 SLBMs, offering both increased firepower and strike flexibility. Once fully deployed, the Type 096 will offer China a far more survivable sea-based nuclear deterrent. U.S. intelligence assessments indicate that these submarines, when combined with the range and accuracy of the JL-3, will allow China to conduct continuous at-sea deterrence patrols, a capability previously limited by technological and doctrinal constraints.

The strategic consequences are clear. A stealthier, more heavily armed Chinese SSBN force complicates U.S. detection and tracking efforts and forces a recalibration of Indo-Pacific maritime strategy. The JL-3, delivered from a new class of near-silent submarines, creates a survivable and mobile strike option that could operate undetected in vast oceanic areas, including the Indian Ocean and western Pacific. As China shifts from a reactive to a proactive nuclear posture, the JL-3 and its undersea platforms will form the spearhead of its deterrence strategy. For the United States, this raises the stakes not only for missile defense but also for undersea warfare dominance. The JL-3's emergence is not just a display of capability, it is a challenge to strategic balance.

This dramatic SLBM development is taking place alongside a broader and unprecedented expansion of China’s entire undersea warfare fleet. As of 2025, the PLAN operates the world’s largest submarine force in numerical terms, with an estimated 76 to 80 submarines in active service. This includes 6 Type 094/094A SSBNs, approximately 7 to 9 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) such as the Type 093A Shang-class, and around 60 conventionally powered diesel-electric submarines, including the modern Type 039B/C Yuan-class equipped with air-independent propulsion.

While China’s nuclear-powered submarines still trail the U.S. Navy in stealth and endurance, the PLAN’s rapid shipbuilding capacity and advances in quieting technology are narrowing the gap. Analysts note a significant improvement in acoustic performance in newer SSNs, with Type 093B and the under-development Type 095 likely to incorporate advanced reactor cooling systems and pump-jet propulsion. Meanwhile, the conventionally powered fleet, particularly the Yuan-class, poses a growing threat in regional waters due to its ability to operate silently in shallow seas with improved AIP endurance.

Together, these developments give the PLAN not just numerical strength but operational flexibility across the spectrum of undersea warfare, from nuclear deterrence and long-range strike to regional sea denial and anti-surface warfare. The JL-3’s introduction completes the strategic puzzle, giving China the ability to credibly threaten targets across continents from submerged platforms, while continuing to press its advantage in the contested waters of the Indo-Pacific.

For U.S. and allied naval planners, this transformation underscores an urgent need to reinforce undersea surveillance, accelerate SSN procurement, and deepen interoperability across Indo-Pacific anti-submarine warfare networks. The JL-3’s public appearance may have been ceremonial, but what it represents beneath the surface is a new era of global undersea competition.

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.