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DEFENSE ALERT: Venezuela Navy Deploys Iranian Peykaap III Missile Boats in Caribbean Waters.


According to information published by OSINTWarfare via the social media platform X on September 6, 2025, the Venezuelan Navy has reportedly deployed Iranian-made Peykaap III fast attack craft in a development that could significantly alter naval dynamics in the southern Caribbean. A video posted online appears to show multiple Peykaap III vessels conducting maneuvers in Venezuelan waters. Although the footage has not yet been independently verified, its rapid spread has drawn close attention from defense analysts due to its strategic implications.
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Unverified video shared on X on September 6, 2025, allegedly depicts an Iranian-made Peykaap III fast attack craft delivered to Venezuela. The authenticity of the footage has not been confirmed. (Picture source: OSINTWarfare X account)


The Peykaap III is a fast attack craft originally developed by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy, tailored for high-speed swarm tactics in confined maritime environments. Measuring approximately 17 meters in length and capable of speeds over 50 knots, the vessel is designed for rapid engagement and mobility. It can be armed with heavy machine guns and anti-ship missiles such as the CM-90, which is estimated to have a range of up to 90 kilometers. This combination allows the Peykaap III to carry out hit-and-run attacks against larger surface vessels and critical maritime infrastructure, making it a threat disproportionate to its size.

If confirmed, the appearance of these vessels in Venezuelan service marks a turning point in the country’s naval strategy, shifting from traditional coastal defense to a more agile and potentially offensive maritime doctrine. This evolution aligns with the broader trend of intensified military cooperation between Caracas and Tehran, which has expanded in recent years despite enduring international sanctions. Open-source ship-tracking data and regional intelligence suggest that the delivery of these craft may have occurred covertly during the summer of 2025, under a growing umbrella of bilateral defense agreements between the two governments.

The operational deployment of missile-equipped fast attack boats introduces a new challenge for U.S. forces operating under the jurisdiction of U.S. Southern Command. SOUTHCOM routinely conducts counter-narcotics missions and freedom-of-navigation patrols in waters near Venezuela, including the approaches to key maritime chokepoints in the Caribbean. The presence of Iranian-origin fast attack craft in these contested waters could heighten tensions during future U.S. or allied naval operations, particularly in scenarios involving surveillance, interception, or search-and-boarding procedures.

From an operational standpoint, the main threat to U.S. Navy vessels in the region stems from the Peykaap III’s ability to operate in swarms and exploit the cluttered maritime environment near the Venezuelan coastline. These boats can use coastal geography to mask their movements, disperse rapidly, and engage U.S. or allied ships with short-range missile strikes before retreating to protected harbors. Their high speed, low radar signature, and expendable nature make them ideal platforms for asymmetric harassment tactics, particularly during joint interdiction or monitoring missions involving larger U.S. warships such as Arleigh Burke-class destroyers or littoral combat ships.

Should tensions escalate, these fast attack craft could be used to harass or encircle U.S. naval elements during routine patrols, forcing commanders into more defensive postures. This could degrade operational tempo and increase the likelihood of miscalculation during close encounters. The presence of such systems also raises the risk for U.S. boarding teams, helicopters, and small-boat detachments, which could be targeted by coordinated surprise attacks launched from concealed coastal positions.

In strategic terms, the deployment signals Venezuela’s intent to deny maritime access to foreign forces using cost-effective, high-speed platforms that are difficult to counter without sustained surveillance, air cover, and rules of engagement clarity. It presents a scenario in which a lower-tier naval power, empowered by foreign technology, seeks to undermine freedom of navigation through persistent disruption rather than traditional fleet confrontation.

While the authenticity of the video remains unconfirmed by official sources, its emergence underscores the value of open-source intelligence in identifying early indicators of force projection and capability transfers. Army Recognition will continue to monitor the situation closely and publish verified updates as more information becomes available.

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.


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