Intel: China Converts Civilian Fleet Into Wartime Force to Support Rapid Taiwan Invasion.

China is converting large civilian ferries and deck cargo ships into a sizable wartime lift force that can support rapid landings across the Taiwan Strait. The system increases Beijing’s ability to move troops and supplies at scale, creating a logistical challenge for Taiwan and U.S. planners.

According to an analysis published by Reuters on November 20, 2025, China has been rehearsing cross-strait landings using an armada of civilian ferries and deck cargo ships that quietly peel away from normal routes, ground themselves on a Guangdong beach, and unload military vehicles directly onto the sand. The investigation, backed by high-frequency satellite imagery and AIS ship tracking, confirms what U.S. and Taiwanese planners have long suspected: Beijing is building a “shadow navy” that will not replace the PLA Navy’s amphibious fleet but multiply its lift and sustainment capacity for a potential assault on Taiwan.
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China is transforming large civilian ferries and cargo ships into dual-use platforms capable of landing troops, armor, and supplies during a Taiwan invasion, using these vessels in recent beach-landing drills that reveal a rapidly expanding logistics force designed to support large-scale amphibious operations (Picture source: Google Earth/social media).

Since 2015, Beijing has applied national technical standards requiring that major civilian vessels, from Ro-Ro ferries to bulk carriers, be built with reinforced decks, stronger ramps, and provisions that allow rapid military conversion. In parallel, national defense mobilization and transportation laws give the state broad authority to requisition civilian ships, ports, and logistics systems for wartime use, while the PLA has created specialized transportation units embedded in major shipping companies to formalize this dual-use role.

The hulls now appearing off exercise beaches are no ordinary coasters. The large car ferries operating in the Bohai Sea displace tens of thousands of tons, with lane meters capable of carrying hundreds of vehicles and passenger space for well over a thousand embarked troops. Imagery shows several units fitted with modified bow and stern doors that allow amphibious assault vehicles to drive directly into the water during loading or to disembark onto a beach or floating pier with minimal preparation. Deck cargo ships, examined in multiple U.S. Naval War College studies, are even more utilitarian: shallow-draft hulls with broad open decks, simplified superstructures, and heavy ramps designed to ground on a shoreline. They are inexpensive, often costing under 3 million dollars to build, compared to more than 3.8 billion dollars for a modern U.S. China’s emerging Type 076.

The August 2025 Jiesheng drills show how these assets integrate into the PLA’s Joint Island Landing Campaign concept outlined in recent Pentagon reports. Twelve civilian vessels, six Ro-Ro ferries, and six deck cargo ships left routine routes, called at multiple ports, then massed off a training beach before offloading trucks and armored vehicles directly onto sand and temporary floating piers. In an invasion scenario, purpose-built Type 071 and Type 075/076 amphibious ships would spearhead the assault with armored units, while civilian hulls would be pushed into the second and third waves to widen the number of landing sites and deliver the ammunition, fuel, engineering equipment, and supplies needed to maintain tempo once Taiwan’s ports are destroyed or blocked. The emergence of Shuiqiao-class modular landing barges, tested earlier this year, points to a complete portable port system designed to bypass Taiwanese infrastructure entirely.

Behind this architecture sits the PLA’s Joint Logistics Support Force, responsible for integrating civil shipping into wartime movement control using BeiDou navigation, unified logistics information systems, and coastal railheads. In a Taiwan campaign, analysts expect a sequencing that begins with missile and air strikes, followed by airborne and special operations to seize key nodes, then an amphibious first wave. Civilian ferries and deck cargo ships would surge behind them from multiple embarkation points, escorted by maritime militia and coast guard vessels that already blur the distinction between civilian and military presence in the Taiwan Strait.

Deception is central to this concept. Taiwan’s defense establishment has repeatedly warned that China uses “gray zone” pressure, mixing militia fleets, research vessels, and coast guard patrols, to saturate air and sea approaches while masking more serious activity. AIS manipulation already appears in commercial tracking patterns as Chinese ships intermittently switch off transponders or misreport positions. In a crisis, a mass movement of requisitioned ferries and cargo ships from multiple ports, mixed with genuine commercial traffic, would severely tax Taiwan’s surveillance networks and complicate decisions about when to strike vessels that appear civilian on paper. This uncertainty is part of China’s cognitive warfare strategy, using ambiguity and visible mobilization to impose psychological pressure long before a landing force reaches Taiwan’s beaches.

Taipei is not passive: recent National Defense Reports and the latest Han Kuang exercises emphasize anti-landing and littoral denial, with mobile coastal missile batteries, HIMARS rocket artillery, naval mines, and fast attack craft such as the Tuo Chiang-class corvette positioned to shred an invasion fleet during the vulnerable transit and beaching phases. Western planners increasingly advocate a “porcupine strategy” that disperses infantry teams with anti-tank guided missiles, drones, and loitering munitions to cover likely landing zones, precisely the areas where slow civilian ferries and deck cargo ships would be at their most exposed.

The vulnerabilities of the shadow navy are stark: civilian ferries cruise at modest speeds and lack compartmentalization, defensive systems, and hardened magazines. A single modern anti-ship missile could disable a packed Ro-Ro ferry, potentially costing the PLA hundreds of vehicles and troops. Civilian crews have limited damage-control training for wartime scenarios. Temporary pier systems enabling rapid unloading at austere beaches are fragile, easily disrupted by weather, strong currents, or direct fire, as demonstrated by recent failures of similar systems in humanitarian operations elsewhere.

For all the attention focused on China’s newest aircraft carriers, U.S. and allied planners increasingly view logistics as the decisive variable in a Taiwan conflict. The PLA’s dedicated amphibious fleet remains too small to sustain a major assault without reinforcement. The shadow navy does not solve that problem outright, but it gives China a distributed, scalable foundation for the enormous sustainment effort required to keep ground forces supplied once they reach Taiwan’s shore.

Looking ahead to 2030, the trend line is hard to miss. China’s shipyards are accelerating Ro-Ro construction for booming vehicle exports, expanding a pool of hulls designed from the outset for dual roles. More Shuiqiao-type barges, improved floating pier systems, and deeper integration between commercial logistics platforms and PLA networks will likely follow. For the United States, Taiwan, and allied militaries, responding to this challenge requires not just more missiles or submarines but better tools to track and classify dual-use shipping, clearer legal frameworks for targeting requisitioned civilian vessels, and continued reinforcement of Taiwan’s ability to withstand the first wave and counterattack. The shadow navy does not guarantee China’s success if it moves on Taiwan, but it eliminates one of the historical constraints that once made such an operation implausible: sustaining a mechanized force across open water against a determined defender.