India Thinks About Leasing Second Russian Akula SSN or Producing its Own Attack Submarines.

According to information published by IDRW on August 6, 2025, Russia is prepared to offer India a second Akula-class nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) during President Vladimir Putin’s forthcoming visit to India. This proposal is intended to compensate for the multi-year delay in the delivery of INS Chakra III, originally leased under a 2019 agreement but now postponed until 2028 due to complications arising from Western sanctions and disrupted logistics chains. As India's undersea capabilities remain stretched thin, the leasing of a second Akula-class platform would temporarily restore the Indian Navy's nuclear attack submarine fleet at a critical moment in the region’s evolving security landscape.
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Akula-class SSNs offer nuclear propulsion, 30+ knot speed, 100-day endurance, and Kalibr missiles (Picture source : U.S. DoD)

The Akula-class submarine family, known in Russia as Project 971 Shchuka-B, comprises several variants with increasing levels of sophistication. Among the likely candidates for India is the Project 971I Gepard (Akula III), the most modern version featuring upgraded quieting technologies, digital combat systems, and enhanced hull coatings. Other potential options include the Vepr (Akula II) and Samara (Improved Akula I), both of which offer formidable submerged performance and long-range strike capability. These submarines typically feature a double-hull construction for improved survivability and pressure tolerance, with submerged displacements ranging from 8,000 to nearly 12,800 tons depending on the variant. They are powered by an OK-650B pressurized water reactor producing approximately 190 megawatts of thermal power, enabling maximum submerged speeds exceeding 30 knots and unlimited range except for food and maintenance limitations. Operational depth is estimated at over 500 meters, while endurance exceeds 100 days without surfacing.

The Akula class is equipped with eight torpedo tubes, four 533mm and four 650mm, which are capable of launching a mix of 3M-54 Kalibr land-attack cruise missiles, 91R anti-submarine missiles, and heavyweight torpedoes such as the Type 65. Reports suggest that both Chakra III and the proposed second SSN would be equipped with the Kalibr missile system, giving them the ability to conduct land-strike missions up to 1,500 kilometers away. These weapons can be deployed from standard torpedo tubes using buoyant capsule launch systems. The sonar suite on earlier Akula variants includes the MGK-540 Skat-3, but for Indian service, the boats would undergo extensive modifications to accommodate the USHUS sonar suite and the Panchendriya tactical control and communication system, both developed by India’s DRDO. These upgrades would not only improve acoustic performance and situational awareness but also ensure seamless integration into the Indian Navy’s network-centric warfare architecture.

The urgency behind this potential acquisition is driven by growing Chinese naval assertiveness in the Indian Ocean Region. The Indian Navy’s current inventory includes only a single operational SSBN (INS Arihant) and no active SSNs, with its last nuclear-powered attack submarine, the leased INS Chakra II, returned to Russia in 2021. China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy has deployed advanced Shang-class SSNs and Jin-class SSBNs into the IOR for extended patrols, including logistics support through Pakistan’s Gwadar Port and Djibouti. These developments are narrowing India’s strategic advantage in the region. Diesel-electric submarines, including India’s Kalvari-class, are limited by battery endurance and require frequent snorkeling, which exposes them to detection. SSNs, in contrast, provide high-speed transit, long-duration submerged operations, and the ability to operate independently in contested areas, making them essential for sea denial, deep-sea surveillance, and escorting strategic assets such as India’s SSBNs.

India's long-term submarine strategy revolves around Project 77, its indigenous SSN program managed jointly by the Indian Navy, DRDO, and the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC). These future submarines will feature an Indian-designed nuclear propulsion system, likely derived from the 83 MW reactor developed for the Arihant-class, but optimized for fast attack roles. The submarines will emphasize low acoustic signatures through pump-jet propulsion, advanced anechoic tiles, and modular construction techniques. Unlike the Akula class, which uses older analog systems and heavier hull construction, the Project 77 submarines are expected to employ digital control architecture, composite structures, and a high degree of automation. They will also be fully integrated with Indian weapons systems, including indigenous torpedoes and future hypersonic missiles under development. In terms of displacement, the Project 77 SSNs are expected to be smaller than Akulas, likely around 6,000 to 7,000 tons, but will prioritize stealth, maneuverability, and extended underwater endurance.

Despite the clear operational benefits of acquiring another Akula-class SSN, the path forward is filled with potential roadblocks. Russia's submarine construction industry is currently overburdened, as it prioritizes completing the Yasen-M class SSNs and the Borei-A class SSBNs for its own navy. Shipyards such as Sevmash and Zvezdochka are operating at full capacity, and refurbishing an existing Akula-class hull for Indian service would require drydock availability, specialized labor, and access to sensitive components, all of which are constrained under ongoing Western export restrictions. At the same time, India is actively deepening its defense cooperation with France, particularly in areas of undersea propulsion, where preliminary talks have been held regarding nuclear propulsion assistance and submarine design collaboration under the framework of a future India-France strategic submarine program.

Geopolitical balancing will also influence the decision. Leasing a second Russian SSN at a time when India is seeking strategic neutrality between the West and Moscow could attract diplomatic friction, particularly from the United States, which has been expanding security and technology partnerships with India under the QUAD and iCET frameworks. Washington has previously expressed concern over India’s continued defense dependence on Russia, and future sanctions or policy shifts could create obstacles for financing, logistics support, or spare parts. There are also technical challenges in operating mixed-origin submarine fleets. Integrating Russian hulls with Indian or Western weaponry, sensors, and command systems has historically proven difficult and could limit the full operational utility of the platform.

In summary, while the offer of a second Akula-class SSN represents a significant opportunity for the Indian Navy to temporarily bolster its undersea warfare capabilities, the move must be carefully weighed against the strategic imperative of advancing indigenous capabilities under Project 77 and navigating a complex web of geopolitical relationships. If finalized, the lease would provide Indian crews with continued SSN operational experience, maintain a deterrent presence in contested waters, and allow critical breathing space for India’s own nuclear submarine fleet to emerge.