Could US Iowa-class battleships really return to service after Trump’s surprise remarks?.

Trump’s surprise remarks at Quantico reignited speculation over whether Iowa-class battleships could be restored to service, citing $31B tariffs, armor strength, and shells cheaper than missiles.

On September 30, 2025, President Donald Trump told more than 800 generals, admirals, and senior officials at Marine Corps Base Quantico that his administration is actively considering bringing back battleships. He cited $31 billion in tariff revenue as a possible funding source and highlighted the Iowa-class for their six-inch (15 cm) armor, arguing they were tougher than modern aluminum-built warships. Trump also repeated his view that battleship shells are cheaper than missiles and recalled World War II-era fleets of armored giants, declaring that “nothing could stop them.”
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The Iowa-class represented the peak of American battleship design, as their main armament consisted of nine 406 mm/50 calibre Mark 7 guns, each able to fire a 1,225 kg projectile up to 38 km. (Picture source: US Navy)

In his remarks, he invoked the Iowa-class battleships, noted their six-inch (15 cm) thick steel sides, and contrasted them with today’s use of aluminum, which he claimed could not withstand modern missile threats. He also repeated a long-standing argument that shells are cheaper than missiles and said he still draws inspiration from the World War II documentary series Victory at Sea. Trump admitted that he dislikes the appearance of some of the US Navy’s stealth ships, describing them as “ugly,” and suggested that older designs were tougher and better looking. He recalled the image of battleships sailing in formation with destroyers, saying that in those days “nothing could stop them.”

A battleship is traditionally understood as a large, heavily armed, and armored surface combatant designed to engage enemy warships with heavy artillery at relatively close ranges compared to missile warfare. These ships were defined by their ability to mount very large-caliber guns, often 12 inches (305 mm) or greater, protected by thick armor belts and decks that shielded vital areas such as ammunition magazines and machinery spaces. Unlike cruisers or destroyers, their role was to absorb damage while delivering sustained firepower, making them the centerpiece of fleet actions throughout the first half of the 20th century. Their design philosophy revolved around a balance between three factors: protection, firepower, and mobility, with compromises in one area often required to achieve superiority in another. The dreadnought revolution in the early 1900s cemented this definition, as all-big-gun layouts and concentrated armor became the hallmarks of what naval planners meant by a battleship.

Battleships were once at the center of American naval power. Their heyday ran from the early 20th century through World War II, with the Iowa-class representing the peak of U.S. design. These ships carried nine 16-inch (406 mm/50 calibre) Mark 7 guns, each firing shells weighing 1,225 kg to ranges of almost 40 kilometers. They displaced around 58,500 tonnes at full load, measured 270 metres in length with a beam of 33 metres, could reach 33 knots, and were heavily armored, with belts up to half a meter thick in critical areas. They also carried 127 mm dual-purpose secondary guns. In the 1980s, the class was modernized with 32 Tomahawk cruise missiles, 16 Harpoon anti-ship missiles, and Phalanx close-in defense systems, which made them hybrid platforms mixing heavy naval guns with long-range precision strike capability. Even with these upgrades, however, the Iowa-class required crews exceeding 1,500 sailors, costly upkeep, and specialized ammunition, making them far more expensive to operate than cruisers or destroyers.

These battleships had long service lives spanning several wars involving the US Navy. USS Missouri became famous as the site of Japan’s surrender in 1945, while Iowa, New Jersey, and Wisconsin all saw combat in the Pacific. Missouri’s 1946 voyage to Turkey signaled U.S. support for allies against Soviet pressure during the early Cold War. Iowa-class ships returned for the Korean and Vietnam wars, conducting bombardments of coastal targets. In the 1980s, they were reactivated as part of President Reagan’s 600-ship Navy initiative and fitted with missiles.

In the Gulf War of 1991, Missouri and Wisconsin fired both heavy shells and Tomahawk missiles against Iraqi positions, showing that the class could still deliver fire support. But tragedy also struck: an explosion in USS Iowa’s second turret in 1989 killed 47 sailors, a stark reminder of the risks of operating large, aging naval gun systems decades after their introduction. All four ships were then decommissioned between 1989 and 1992, and by 2006, they were officially retired from the Naval Vessel Register. Today, eight U.S. battleships, including Missouri and New Jersey, are museum ships.

The reasons battleships became obsolete are closely tied to changes in naval warfare. Torpedoes and mines proved to be the leading causes of battleship losses, as no armor scheme could completely protect the underwater hull without unacceptable penalties in weight and stability. Even the most heavily armored ships like the Yamato and Bismarck classes suffered from shallow defense systems that allowed catastrophic flooding. Lattice masts, once adopted to reduce weight, often collapsed in heavy seas or when damaged, disrupting fire control and observation.

Complex quad turrets like those on the British King George V class often jammed, slowing the rate of fire. Above all, air power redefined the balance of naval power: Prince of Wales and Repulse were sunk by Japanese aircraft in 1941, the Italian battleship Roma was destroyed by a guided bomb in 1943, and Yamato was overwhelmed by carrier-based aircraft during Operation Ten-Go in 1945. Communications and coordination problems, such as those seen at Jutland, also limited how effectively battleships could bring their firepower to bear.

Modern warfare makes the gap even clearer. China has fielded anti-ship ballistic missiles such as the DF-26, which can reach more than 4,000 km, keeping U.S. surface forces at a distance in a potential conflict. The U.S. Navy itself has shifted away from large guns: the Zumwalt-class destroyers’ 155 mm Advanced Gun System never entered service due to the high cost of ammunition, and the ships are being repurposed for hypersonic missiles. Survivability now depends on detection avoidance, electronic warfare, layered missile defense, and dispersing firepower across carriers, submarines, and missile ships. Today, both naval experts and in-depth analysis note that while battleships were once built to absorb hits, in modern combat, a ship’s best chance of survival is not being hit at all.

Suggestions to reactivate old hulls persist but remain impractical. The museum contract for USS New Jersey technically allows the Navy to call the ship back in a national emergency, but the ship is not maintained for that role. USS Iowa was recently described as being in poor condition, with billions of dollars required to restore seaworthiness. A 2024 report claimed New Jersey could return “to service” in 60 days, but even that estimate admitted to major deficiencies, including a non-functioning fuel system, lack of ammunition, and no stock of spare parts. Crews with the necessary skills no longer exist in the fleet, and the supply chains for large naval shells have disappeared. Experts note that even if one ship could be restored, defending it against missiles, drones, submarines, and torpedoes in today’s anti-access environments would be prohibitively expensive and operationally questionable compared to distributing capabilities across existing modern platforms.

If a vessel called a battleship were ever built again, it would not look like Iowa or Missouri. Analysts believe it would more likely be a heavily armed arsenal ship or coastal fire support platform designed to carry large numbers of missiles rather than heavy guns. Such a ship would rely on sensors, stealth, and defensive systems to avoid being targeted, not on armor to survive hits. Some hypothetical uses include major amphibious landings against heavily defended coasts, such as in a Taiwan conflict scenario, but most of these roles are already covered by existing carrier air wings, submarines, and long-range missile platforms. The current consensus is that nostalgia and symbolism may explain why the idea resonates politically, but in practice, the US Navy’s resources are better directed toward modern platforms that align with today’s demands for survivability, precision, and efficiency.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.