U.S. plans major Patriot PAC-3 MSE sale to Taiwan to counter China’s ballistic missile threat.

The United States is preparing a potential arms sale to Taiwan centered on additional PAC-3 MSE interceptors for the Patriot air defense system, which could support the formation of at least one new Patriot battalion amid ongoing Chinese ballistic missile deployments opposite Taiwan.

According to the Taipei Times on February 14, 2026, the United States is preparing a potential arms sale to Taiwan, which will include additional PAC-3 MSE interceptors for the Patriot air defense system. The package could support the formation of at least one new Patriot battalion and also integrates IBCS command systems, NASAMS air defense systems, LTAMDS sensors, and vehicle-mounted counter-drone systems. This delivery would expand Taiwan’s Patriot missile defense coverage and engagement altitude amid ongoing Chinese ballistic missile deployments opposite Taiwan.
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The reinforcement of Patriot units through new PAC-3 MSE battalions and mixed deployment with existing PAC-3 CRI interceptors is intended to increase defensive density around key bases and infrastructure. (Picture source: US DoD)

According to the Taipei Times's sources, the next US arms sale package to Taiwan is likely to include Patriot PAC-3 MSE interceptors, IBCS command systems, NASAMS air defense systems, LTAMDS sensors, and vehicle-mounted counter-drone systems. The prospective package is part of a broader plan valued at up to $20 billion and is aligned with Taiwan’s NT$1.25 trillion, or $40 billion, special defense budget. The PAC-3 MSE quantity under consideration is assessed as sufficient to equip at least one new air defense battalion. In parallel, Taiwan has already procured 102 PAC-3 MSE interceptors using surplus funds from a previous Patriot acquisition, at a cost of about NT$20 billion, or $637 million, with initial deliveries beginning in early January 2026.

These measures could be linked to a plan to support Taiwanese President William Lai’s proposal to establish a layered T-Dome air and missile defense network capable of countering China's ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, aircraft, and unmanned systems, as the planned package combines interceptors, sensors, and command systems into a layered architecture intended to operate as a single network. The IBCS would enable sensor and shooter integration across different missile types, allowing data from radars and other sensors to be shared among multiple engagement units. The LTAMDS, designed with three active electronically scanned array panels, would provide a 360-degree coverage and replace older Patriot radars.

The NASAMS, for its part, would strengthen low-to-medium altitude air defense coverage using networked launchers and radar cueing. The mobile counter-drone element under discussion includes M-ACE systems integrating radar, electro-optical and infrared sensors, radio frequency detection, electronic warfare modules, jammers, and a 30 mm autocannon mounted on trucks or light tactical vehicles, with at least three units considered for capital-area protection. The integration of these systems is structured to increase detection range, engagement depth, and response coordination against ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, aircraft, and unmanned systems. Taiwan's T-Dome, also known as the Taiwan Shield, is structured as a multi-layer air and missile defense network combining U.S.-supplied and indigenous systems.

It links PAC-3 interceptors with the Tien Kung III surface-to-air missile and the Strong Bow, or Tien Kung IV, which is entering serial production to intercept ballistic threats at ranges up to 70 kilometers. The structure includes an integrated battle management system that incorporates AI-assisted decision support and tactical network information-sharing components to create a common operational picture. Additional programs connected to the broader force posture include M109A7 self-propelled howitzers, HIMARS multiple launch rocket systems, low-cost attack drones, and suicide unmanned surface craft to enhance coastal and depth strike capabilities. The layered structure is intended to coordinate high, medium, and low altitude interception zones while linking them to strike and sensor networks.

The objective is to distribute engagement authority and improve the survivability of critical assets under missile and drone attack scenarios, as these developments occur amid sustained Chinese military pressure, including deployments of short and medium-range ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan and repeated large-scale air operations near the island. The DF-series ballistic missiles deployed along the mainland coast increase the relevance of higher-altitude interception and longer engagement ranges. The PAC-3 MSE’s increased ceiling of up to 60 kilometers expands the intercept envelope compared with earlier PAC-3 CRI interceptors, which operate at lower altitudes.

The PAC-3 MSE interceptor itself is a surface-to-air missile employing hit-to-kill technology that destroys targets through direct kinetic impact rather than blast-fragmentation. It is equipped with a dual-pulse solid rocket motor that provides increased range and altitude performance over the PAC-3 Cost Reduction Initiative variant. The missile measures 5 meters in length, 25 centimeters in diameter, and weighs about 370 kilograms. It can engage targets at altitudes up to 60 kilometers, with a range of 120 kilometers, and reaches speeds exceeding 4,900 kilometers per hour. The higher intercept altitude increases available reaction time and engagement space against tactical ballistic missiles. The missile integrates an active Ka-band radar seeker that provides target range, range-rate, and angle data during terminal guidance.

An inertial measurement unit supports mid-course navigation, and a guidance processor unit functions as the primary onboard computer. A multi-band radio frequency data link enables uplink and downlink communication with ground-based fire control systems. The dual-control autopilot combines aerodynamic control fins with an attitude control section using side thrusters to provide rapid divert capability during endgame maneuvers. Updated seeker software, modified lethality enhancer components, enlarged control surfaces, improved actuators and batteries, and enhanced thermal hardening contribute to expanded maneuverability and engagement performance. Insensitive munitions improvements are incorporated to enhance safety during storage and handling.

The PAC-3 MSE is compatible with the M903 launcher configuration, which can carry up to 12 PAC-3 MSE interceptors per launcher or mixed loads combining PAC-3 MSE and PAC-3 CRI missiles. The launcher incorporates an Enhanced Launcher Electronics System and updated fire solution computer redesign software to calculate engagement solutions for different missile types. One-pack canister arrangements facilitate field replacement and reconstitution, and minor launching station modifications accommodate cabling changes and improved canister design. Load-out flexibility allows tailoring of missile mixes based on threat profiles, increasing firepower density compared with earlier Patriot configurations.

In Ukraine, Patriot systems equipped with PAC-3 interceptors have been used to engage Russian ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and air-launched threats since their deployment in 2023, providing combat data under operational conditions. Ukrainian authorities have publicly stated that Patriot batteries intercepted multiple ballistic missiles, including Kh-47 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles, during large-scale strike waves targeting urban infrastructure. Engagements have involved both PAC-3 CRI and PAC-3 MSE interceptors, depending on configuration, and have required multiple interceptors per target in certain scenarios to increase kill probability.

Information generated by those intercepts, such as radar tracking data, interceptor telemetry, seeker performance information, and engagement geometry, has now been shared with Lockheed Martin to support software updates, guidance refinements, and threat modeling against evolving Russian missile tactics. The feedback loop between battlefield use and manufacturer analysis contributes to adjustments in seeker algorithms, data link performance, and integration with command-and-control networks, while also informing production planning as demand for interceptors increases in response to sustained missile attacks, meaning that the U.S. must maintain the Patriot's effectiveness against these changing aerial threats.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.