U.S. Demonstrates Microwave Weapon Defeating Fiber-Optic FPV Drones.

Epirus released footage on 13 January 2026 showing its Leonidas VehicleKit high-power microwave system disabling a fiber-optic guided FPV drone during a December 2025 live-fire test at a US government site. The demonstration highlights a potential solution to a growing counter-drone gap, as fiber-guided UAS increasingly defeat traditional electronic warfare defenses used by NATO and US forces.

US counter-drone specialist Epirus has publicly demonstrated that high-power microwave effects can be used against fiber-optic guided first person view unmanned aerial systems, a category of threat specifically engineered to bypass radio-frequency jamming. Video footage released by the company shows its Leonidas VehicleKit system disabling an FPV UAS during a live-fire event conducted in December 2025 at a US government test range, according to Epirus statements accompanying the release. The trial reflects mounting concern within US and allied militaries that low-cost, resilient drones, now common on Ukraine’s battlefield, are eroding existing base defense and force protection architectures.
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The Leonidas Autonomous Robotic counter-UAS system, combining Epirus’ Leonidas high-power microwave with General Dynamics Land Systems’ TRX unmanned tracked vehicle, was displayed at AUSA 2025 (Picture source: Army Recognition)

Fiber-optic FPV drones are changing the tactical balance because they circumvent the usual counter-drone toolkit. Conventional small drones rely on a radio frequency (RF) command-and-control link that can be jammed, spoofed, or disrupted. Fiber-optic versions, by contrast, trail a thin cable from a spool, maintaining a continuous physical connection between the drone and its operator. This architecture removes the RF control channel, depriving electronic warfare solutions of their primary point of leverage. On today’s front lines, this is not a minor technical detail: it enables FPV attack drones to remain controllable in heavily jammed environments and to conduct one-way strikes or intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions despite dense electromagnetic activity.

Epirus presents Leonidas as a response to this shift by targeting the drone’s electronics rather than its communications. The company describes Leonidas as an electronic warfare platform capable of delivering “software-defined weaponized electromagnetic interference” to induce a full shutdown of critical onboard electronics. Unlike kinetic defeat, the effect is not based on impact or fragmentation but on forcing failures in the subsystems that keep the drone flying and navigating: flight controllers, power management, computers, and processors. This logic directly matches the fiber-optic challenge: even if the operator retains perfect control through the cable, the aircraft still depends on electronics that can be vulnerable to high-power effects.

Leonidas falls within the category of directed energy weapons based on high-power microwave (HPM) technology. Launched by Epirus in 2020, the system has evolved rapidly: a third-generation version was unveiled in April 2022 with software and hardware improvements claimed to deliver more than twice the power of the previous iteration. This variant adopts a ruggedized design, installable on a military-grade trailer, and can be fitted with a 360-degree mechanical gimbal to widen the protected azimuth, a key parameter when covering a base perimeter against threats approaching from multiple directions. The approach remains consistent with the non-kinetic concept emphasized by Epirus: producing fast and repeatable effects without relying on munition stocks or imposing a heavy resupply burden.

The system’s architecture also reflects an industrial intent: to make Leonidas scalable and interoperable rather than standalone. Epirus indicates a modular design based on an open system architecture, with an open application programming interface (API) that supports integration with command-and-control (C2) systems to detect, track, and engage drones. The technological core relies on gallium nitride (GaN) semiconductors, which can operate at high power density while limiting thermal constraints, reducing the need for vacuum tubes or complex cooling solutions. The system uses a digitally beamformed antenna to optimize the energy applied to the target while limiting exposure to friendly forces. From a readiness standpoint, Epirus highlights field-replaceable amplifier modules, with maintenance actions stated as achievable in under eight minutes, addressing a common constraint for systems intended for sustained high-tempo use.

The Leonidas VehicleKit (VK) configuration shown in the video fits this flexible deployment concept. A vehicle-integrated format suggests an intended role in mobile protection for maneuver units, convoy security, or forward site defense, not only the protection of fixed infrastructure. Mobility changes the operational equation: in drone-dominated warfare, the most exposed targets are often logistics points, road movements, and temporary staging areas. A vehicle-mounted HPM system can reposition, cover different approaches, and follow the pace of operations, whereas static solutions can be bypassed. In this context, integration on the Stryker platform is particularly relevant: Epirus and General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS) unveiled a “Stryker Leonidas” configuration in October 2022 designed to support short-range air defense, and the ability to fit into a widely fielded vehicle fleet can accelerate deployment options.

Epirus also emphasizes near-instant effects, with direct tactical consequences. In practice, countering an FPV drone is often decided within seconds, as these aircraft fly low, fast, and with limited signatures. If an HPM system can trigger immediate electronic failure, it reduces the engagement window and limits the need for repeated actions. The company also states that rapid defeat could help influence the drone’s drop zone to reduce collateral damage. This factor matters for base defense and urban or semi-urban environments: neutralizing a drone is only part of the problem, since where it crashes can be equally consequential.

The urgency of such capabilities is reinforced by Ukrainian battlefield experience. Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov has publicly stated that Russian forces are fielding fiber-optic FPV drones with a range of 31 miles (approximately 50 km). At that distance, the threat extends beyond the immediate frontline: it becomes a deep-strike tool against supply routes, artillery resupply points, medical evacuation corridors, and rear-area command posts. A US Army analysis dated August 2025, cited by Epirus, likewise concludes that these drones are extremely difficult to detect and target, and that they represent a major counter-drone challenge. The implication is that this threat category is unlikely to remain limited to Ukraine.

The Leonidas demonstration reflects a broader geopolitical trend: the accelerated militarization of electromagnetic effects as states adapt to drone-driven attrition warfare. Fiber-optic FPV drones represent a low-cost innovation capable of eroding established advantages in air defense and rear-area security, and their spread is likely to extend to other theaters where dispersed operations and contested logistics are expected. For NATO members and partners, this increases pressure to modernize counter-drone architectures, integrate more non-kinetic effects into layered defense, and invest in detection networks able to cue directional effectors rapidly. As adversaries refine drones designed to bypass jamming, competition shifts toward electronics-kill solutions and interceptors, as well as toward industrial-scale production and doctrinal adaptation, with direct implications for force protection, deterrence credibility, and the stability of future high-intensity conflicts.

Written By Erwan Halna du Fretay - Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Erwan Halna du Fretay is a graduate of a Master’s degree in International Relations and has experience in the study of conflicts and global arms transfers. His research interests lie in security and strategic studies, particularly the dynamics of the defense industry, the evolution of military technologies, and the strategic transformation of armed forces.